Greasing the Skids:
How Corporate Elite Campaign Donations Shape State-Level Collective Bargaining Legislation

By

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For the workers of the world—
past, present, and future—
who continue to resist, struggle,
and inspire in the face of overwhelming odds
under an oppressive state.

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Introduction

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-AWJ, 2017

PREFACE

I was dreaming when I wrote this, forgive me if it goes astray.[1]

[1] Nelson (1981)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	The Agricultural Adjustment Act
ACS	American Community Surveys
AEI	American Enterprise Institute
AFL	American Federation of Labor
ALL	American Liberty League
BCS	Bonacich Centrality Score
BRT	Business Roundtable
CDE	Controlled Direct Effect
CED	Committee for Economic Development
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organizations
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FIRE	Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IPUMS	Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
IRC	Industrial Relations Council
LMRA	Labor Management Relations Act
LMRDA	Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
MC	Member of Congress
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NCF	National Civic Federation
NCSL	National Conference of State Legislatures
NIE	Natural Indirect Effect
NIMSP	The National Institute on Money in State Politics
NLA	The Norris-LaGuardia Act
NLRA	National Labor Relations Act
NLRB	National Labor Relations Board
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PAC	Political Action Committee
PRWORA	Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
RLA	The Railway Labor Act
RTAA	Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
RTW	Right to Work
SSRC	Social Science Research Council
TE	Total Effects

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Does money influence politics? Based on popular rhetoric, it would certainly appear so. In the 2016 US presidential elections, one of the most common topics brought up by candidates across the political spectrum was the role of corporate money in politics. Perhaps most famously, Democratic Primary runner-up Bernie Sanders' campaign platform promoted reforming campaign finance laws:

> "If we do not get a handle on money in politics and the degree to which ***big money controls the political process in this country***, nobody is going to bring about the changes that is needed for the middle class and working families"
>
> - Bernie Sanders, February 4, 2016 (emphasis added)

Sanders was not alone in criticizing the role of big money in politics. Other big-name Democrats, including Senator Elizabeth Warren (MA), have been outspoken about these issues. Even the Democratic Party Nominee and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was often criticized for taking large donations from corporate America, has gone on the record about the negative impact of big money in politics:

> "There's no question that we need to make Washington work much better than it does today. And that means, in particular, getting unaccountable money out of our politics. That's why I'm so passionate about this issue, and I will fight hard to end the ***stranglehold that the wealthy and special interests have on so much of our government***."
>
> - Hillary Clinton, June 22, 2016 (emphasis added)

However, it was not just Democrats who brought his up. Even Donald Trump, Republican Party Nominee and now 45th President of the United States, has suggested corporate money is a problem in US politics. Reflecting on his time as a businessman before entering politics, he said:

> "I will tell you that our system is broken. I gave to many people before this. Before two months ago I was a businessman. I give to everybody. ***When they call, I give. And you know what? When I need something from them two years later, three years later, I call them. They are there for me***. That's a broken system."
>
> - Donald Trump, August 4, 2016 (emphasis added)

The fact that three very different candidates have all gone on the record to critique the relationship between big money and political behavior suggests that this is a problem. But is it? Are corporate campaign donations a problem? Does money influence politicians' behavior? If so, how? I argue that, despite the intuitive theoretical relationship, we actually do not know. We do not know if corporate money influences politicians for two reasons. First, different theoretical paradigms about the political process and the state can lead us to different understandings of the relationship between money and politics. Second, the evidence linking campaign donations to political behavior is actually very mixed, and there is no clear consensus on this relationship.

In this project, I address both the theoretical and empirical gaps in the political sociology and political science literature by examining how corporate elite campaign donations influence legislative effort and political outcomes. Specifically, I ask the following questions: Do corporate elite donations encourage anti-labor legislative effort? Is the relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort strategic? Do corporate elite donations shape anti-labor legislative outcomes? Finally, do corporate elite donations shape anti-labor legislative outcomes by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort?

To answer these questions, I compiled a unique and comprehensive dataset combining information on all collective bargaining bills proposed in 2012, information on all state-level legislators in 2012, and information on those legislators' most recent campaign donations to examine how corporate elite donations are associated with bill proposal and passage. Although

previous work has examined if and how campaign donations contribute to voting patterns among legislators, this is the first study to my knowledge that examines legislative effort measured by bill proposals.

This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 covers the relevant theoretical and empirical research to date. Because this work is grounded in elite class dominance theory, I pay special attention to research in this area. Chapter 3 describes my data and methods in detail. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the bills analyzed in this dissertation. Chapter 5 address the question of whether elite capital investment encourages anti-labor legislative effort. Specifically, I examine how different measures of campaign donations are associated with legislators' proposals of pro-labor and anti-labor bills. Chapter 6 address the question of whether the relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort is strategic. Specifically, I test whether a state's political climate towards labor moderates the effect of corporate elite campaign donations on legislative effort. Finally, Chapter 7 address the questions of whether elite capital investment shapes anti-labor legislative outcomes, and, if so, does elite capital investment shape anti-labor legislative outcomes by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort. To answer these questions I first test if corporate elite campaign donations are associated with bill passage. I then test if the effect of corporate elite campaign donations on bill passage is mediated by increased legislative effort. Chapter 8 provides a discussion of my findings and a conclusion of the dissertation.

CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND BACKGROUND

Theories of the State

Because the relationship between money and political action is embedded within a set of institutional relations set by the state, the nature of the state is central to any analysis concerning money and politics. Thus, it is important that we begin with an overview of the main theoretical traditions concerning state and its relation to society. There are three theories of the state that dominate political sociology that might help explain this relationship: pluralism, institutionalism (sometimes separated into state-centered and historical institutionalism), and elite class dominance (sometimes called power structure research). Each theory has its own theoretical paradigm, unit of analysis, and understanding of the nature of the state, power relations, and policy outcomes. Drawing from Alford and Friedland (1985) and Campbell and Skocpol (1994), Table 2.1 summarizes the key aspects of each theory. In the following sections, I review the key elements and formative sociological research that supports each of these theories. It should be noted that these theoretical traditions are not entirely mutually exclusive; some works may fit into multiple categories.

Pluralism

Plurlaism stresses the importance of a variety of collective social actors in shaping policy (Hicks and Lechner 2005). It is based on the idea that society is pluralist in respect to values, interests, and function (Campbell and Skocpol 1994). Based on a functionalist understanding of politics and society, it argues that society is divided into groups based on ideology, interests, and identities, and distributes power according to these divisions. The level of analysis of pluralist

Table 2.1: Key Aspects of Theoretical Traditions

	Pluralism	*Institutionalism*	*Elite Class Dominance*
Theoretical paradigms / assumptions	Functionalist: Individuals take action and join groups, which work together to form societal consensus	Weberian: State actors work within a bureaucracy; the organization has institutional constraints	Elite Theory: The power elite (capitalist class) has gained control of the state, maintains hegemonic societal dominance
Key aspect of the state	Democratic	Bureaucratic	Dominated by capitalist class
Level of Analysis	Individual	Organizational	Societal
Who or what determines state action	Citizens/groups organized through political parties, interest groups, and lobbyists	Political elites (elected officials) who operate within the political institutional constraints	The "power elite" that represent the ruling class interests Responses to class struggle
What is the content of state policy	Reflects the relative balance of groups that compete for power in / attention from state	Reflects the balance of power of political parties Shaped by previous legislation (path dependency) and institutional constraints	Policy favors interests of the ruling class Reproduces capitalist class relations
Sources of conflict	Conflict between organized interest groups Strain	Conflicts between political parties / factions Conflicts between state actors and citizens	Conflicts between social classes Conflicts between factions within social classes
State autonomy	No: State is an arena that exists in which groups compete for power	Potentially: Depending on institutional structure and state capacity, state can be autonomous with its own agenda	No: State is an instrument of the elite class
State bias	State is neutral, policy favors strongest interest groups	State is biased toward its own interests; state policies favor previous policies	State is biased to favor the interests of the capitalist class
Role of money in politics	Donations serve as political participation, helps with campaigns. Money grants access for interest groups equally	State actors are interested in maintaining the state. Money aids in re-election of state actors. If money matters in politics, it should matter most where it has historically been influential	Money creates and maintains social relationships between capitalist class and state actors. Large donations leave state actors beholden unto their benefactors

theory is the individual level (Alford and Friedland 1985). That is, the main focus is on individuals who join together into interest groups, and political organizations respond to aggregates of organized individuals. Alford and Friedland (1985:4) note that pluralism is based on "the realm of 'normal politics' in which individual actions in concrete situations can be observed. When widespread political participation and group competition are possible… pluralist concepts are appropriate." Thus, the key aspect of the state for pluralism is that it is democratic above all else. The state is not autonomous, and is considered unbiased under pluralist theory: it simply serves as a neutral arena where opposing interests groups compete for power and influence.

One of the most famous pluralists is Robert Dahl (1961), whose book (*Who Governs?*) solidified pluralist theory among political scholars. Dahl's pluralist theory had four major concepts (see also McFarland 2007): (1) power as causation (A's ability to change the behavior of B to A's interests), (2) the political process model (that actors representing groups will pursue their own interests), (3) separate domains of political processes (that power as causation and the political process model can vary in different domains), and (4) reliance on actors' definition of their own interests (that a group's interests should be defined by the group not the researcher). As citizens organize in local functional organizations, they compete with other interest groups and organizations for power and influence over the state and its policies. State policy, then, is a result of the relative balance of interest groups and political parties (Nash 2009). Conflict arises from competition between interest groups, but the overlapping interests of the competing groups ameliorate inter-group conflict and create stability in society (Campbell and Skocpol 1994).

Pluralism explains the development of laws by examining the needs of constituents, assuming legislators represent and vote based on those needs (or perceived needs). Mayhew's

(1974) seminal book (*Congress: The Electoral Connection*) argues that all actions by lawmakers can be traced back to their desire to be re-elected. That is, re-election is the primary motivator for politicians. Further, on any given policy, any interest group can gain the attention of their lawmaker, given they form a powerful coalition. For this reason, lawmakers want to act in ways that favor the strongest coalitions and represent the interests of their constituents. Thus, we would expect the characteristics of constituents to affect legislators' interests and opinions, which, according to pluralism, will ultimately affect most elections and policy. For example, in states with higher union density (where unions presumably have a stronger voice in state politics), policy should be more favorable to labor than states with little union presence.

In sum, pluralist views of policy formation put most emphasis on the influence of constituents' interests. Because politicians want to be re-elected, they should create policy that is in the best interest of those who vote (Mayhew 1974). Pluralism also stresses the importance of coalitions between groups to get legislation passed, so it is possible that organized business might try to make temporary coalitions with another group that has a shared interest in weakening labor legislation.

Institutionalist Theories

Another theory, or really group of theories, dominant in political sociology is institutionalism. Institutionalist theories generally argue that state institutions have their own agendas to shape how the political process works (Amenta 2005). Institutionalism can be further divided into state-centered institutionalism and historical institutionalism, but both focus primarily on the state as an agent. According to institutionalist theories of politics, elites and politicians determine state action, but they do so within the constraints imposed by the political institutions of the state (Campbell and Skocpol 1994). Institutionalist approaches are loosely

derived from Weberian social theory in the following ways: (1) states are viewed as autonomous (or potentially autonomous) bureaucracies with their own goals, (2) policy needs to be considered in its institutional context in relation to bureaucratization, where the timing of democratization and bureaucratization matters, and (3) past policy shapes which how future policy is framed and debated, known as path dependency (Orloff 1993). Focused on the organizational unit of analysis (Alford and Friedman 1985), state policy reflects the balance of power among parties, politicians, and elites existing within the state, as well as previous legislative history. Unlike the other two theories discussed here, the state is not simply a passive apparatus that interest groups use to achieve their goals; rather, the state is autonomous, with its own agenda, and "a major force in shaping the directions of social legislation" (Quadagno 1987).

Theda Skocpol's (Skocpol 1992; Skocpol and Ikenberry 1983; Skocpol and Amenta 1985) work on the development of New Deal policies is perhaps the most famous example of the state-centered approach. Skocpol and Amenta (1985:573) argue that other scholars exaggerate the power of business interests to shape legislation, and that viewing the state as simply an arena for interests to compete for power fails to explain the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, "for which Congressional liberals took the initiative in the face of the Roosevelt administration's reluctance to support pro-union legislation."

An important part of institutionalist approaches is the focus on the historical trajectories of states. Current policy debates are informed by the way that existing policies influence "the political understanding of problems, the framing of political interests, and the institutional capacities for further action" (Orloff 1993:89). Instead of seeing policy as something that comes from tension among groups or from elites in civil society, most institutionalists argue that policy-making is a naturally historical process in which all actors build on, or counter against, previous

government institutions (Orloff 1993). For example, old-age pensions were also modeled after previous pension policies, suggesting a path-dependent process (Skocpol 1992:526): "Earlier experiences with Civil War benefits and maternalist policies… influenced the Social Security Act and subsequent U.S. social policymaking." Thus, state-centered theorists consider the ways in which past and current policies direct future policy.

Another important part of this theory is how the institutional structures of the state, such as legislative rules, can affect legislative decisions. Agenda setting abilities (Anzia and Jackman 2014; Cox and McCubbins 2005) have consistently been found to be associated with the fate of bills. A majority party has agenda setting abilities when it is able to control the legislative calendar (and decide the order in which bills are heard), or when it has other rights, such as not being required to report on all proposed bills. Cox and McCubbins' (2005) research finds that when a majority party has the ability to set the legislative agenda, they can better control policy outcomes by blocking unfavorable bills from being voted on. Similarly, Anzia and Jackman (2013) find that in state legislatures where a majority agenda setting abilities (such as the power to control the legislative calendar), majority roll rates are significantly lower than in legislatures where the agenda setting ability is weaker. Thus, controlling for the outside influence of constituents, elites, and corporate campaign finance, institutions themselves can sometimes affect the ease with which bills may be passed or blocked.

In sum, state-centered institutionalism is more concerned with how historical trajectories and institutional structures and rules shape policy than how elites or coalitions influence politics. The effect of campaign donations on legislative behavior should be negligible at best, and any significant relationships should disappear once controlling for institutional factors.

Elite Class Dominance

This dissertation is based in elite class dominance theory. Elite class dominance, or power structure theories, are a group of related theories based on the idea that political and economic elites, often working together, determine state action and policy. This theory is derived from an instrumentalist Marxist viewpoint—the elite capitalist class controls the behavior of political actors. The instrumentalist Marxist view regards the state as a state in a capitalist society, a phrase drawn from Miliband's (1969) book (see also Hay 1999; Jessop 2004). Miliband (1969:23) argued that "the 'ruling class' of capitalist society is that class which owns and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society." The state functions for the elite by serving elite interests (Campbell and Skocpol 1994; Mills 1956). Whereas the key aspect of the state is democratic for pluralist theory, and bureaucratic for state-centered institutionalist theory, the key aspect of the state here is that it is controlled by the capitalist class. As long as it is dominated by this class, the state will continue to function reproduce capitalist relations.

An important part of elite class dominance theory is that the power elite are more than just extremely rich: they have both *structural* and *social* power. Structurally, the elite control companies with billions of dollars in assets, they employ millions of workers, and they own the land which is rented to people and small businesses, all of which makes the elite important in terms of contributing to the tax base of the government and the overall health of the economy. However, they also have social power—for example, the elite are members of the same exclusive clubs (Domhoff 1974, 1975; Hunter 1953; Kahn 2012; Mills 1956), they go to the same exclusive boarding schools and universities (Domhoff 2014; Kahn 2011; Karabel 2005; Mills

1956), they marry into each other's families (Baltzell 1987, 1989; Domhoff 2014), and perhaps most importantly, they sit on each other's corporate boards of directors where they transmit and receive information (Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2014; Useem 1984). This social power makes the elite theoretically distinct from other business interests. Domhoff (2014: xiii) writes:

> This combination of economic power, policy expertise, and continuing political access makes the corporate rich a dominant class, not in the sense of complete and absolute power, but in the sense that they have the power to shape the economic and political frameworks within which other groups and classes must operate, right down to changing the rules that govern elections and who can vote in them. They therefore win far more often than they lose on the issues of concern to them.

Similarly, other research finds that big business and the capitalist class are connected in a tight social network, advising state actors on policy planning (e.g., Baran and Sweezy 1966; Useem 1984).

In sum, elite class dominance focuses on the ways in which the capitalist class gain and maintain control over state actors. The dimension of power is economic-relational: through elite network ties, members of the capitalist class have historically been able to shape policy in a way they find favorable (e.g., Baran and Sweezy 1966; Carroll 2010; Carroll and Sapinski 2010; Domhoff 1990, 1996; Domhoff and Webber 2014; Kahn 2012; Mills 1956; Murray 2014, *forthcoming*; Mizruchi and Bunting 1981; Useem 1984; Van Appeldoorn 2015).

Historical Context of the Power Elite in the US

Domhoff and Webber (2011:10) note that "class domination is not inevitable but highly dependent on many historical factors." Indeed, the relationship between the power elite and politicians has evolved over time. In this section, I place elite class dominance theory in historical perspective. I begin with the period spanning the Gilded Age, then I focus on the Great

Depression and the New Deal, followed by the postwar era. I then move to the rise of neoliberalism and globalization in the 1970's and end with the current era of politics.

The Gilded Age: The Rise of an Interlocked Elite

There are several historical factors that gave rise to the development of a strong and cohesive elite in the United States that is in many ways unique, explained in detail by Domhoff and Webber (2011:11). First, the United States never had feudal elites based in an agrarian economic system. A lack of feudal elites that lorded over peasants meant that the capitalist class in the US had no economic rivals. Second, the federalist system of government in the US, with an emphasis on local and state power, allowed local and regional elites to easily dominate the federal government. Third, the lack of political threats at the US borders, and the ongoing protection of the British military, led the US to have a relatively underdeveloped military until the Second World War. This meant that economic elites historically have not had to compete with the military for power. Finally, the US has never had an official religion, meaning that the capitalist class has not had a theological and ideological rival for power.

The corporate community in the US dates back to at least the turn of the nineteenth century when 80 wealthy textile owners in New England would join together to invest in other companies (Domhoff 2014). Known as "the Boston Associates," these men controlled 31 companies that accounted for 20 percent of the US textile industry. Over a dozen of these men served as directors of Boston banks that controlled 40 percent of the city's banking capital, 20 were on the boards of six prominent insurance companies, and 11 sat on the boards of five railroad companies (Dalzell 1987; Domhoff 2014). Similar city-wide networks of corporate elites

continued through most of the nineteenth century.[2] The late nineteenth century, however, was marked by a period of rapid economic expansion alongside a shift into an industrial economy in the US. Mass production quickly increased, and along with it, big business and corporate finance (Laughlin 2012; Roy 1983). This changing economy required a restructuring of business in the US: what is now known as the merger movement saw vast horizontal integration, as one more successful businesses acquired, or merged with, their less successful competitors, turning themselves into large conglomerate companies (Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013; Seavoy 2006). By acquiring their competitors, these conglomerates were better able to control prices and output over the entire market, as a monopoly would (Cashman 1984; Chandler 1977; Laughlin 2012; Roy 1983; Seavoy 2006).

Investment banker J.P. Morgan was one of the essential brokers of the merger movement. In an effort to stop what he called "destructive competition" (race-to-the-bottom price wars between competing businesses), he first bought up Carnegie Steel in 1901 (Seavoy 2006). He then used Carnegie Steel "as the nucleus" to organize multiple mergers with a large number of other steel mills, manufacturers, and mines (Seavoy 2006:250). In addition to making investments in all major industrial firms, Morgan then placed himself and his banker associates on the boards of directors of these corporation (Mizruchi 1981; Mizruchi and Bunting 1981; Roy 1983), thus creating an interlocking network of corporate elites (Bunting 1983; Roy 1983, 1997).

During this time, corporate interlocks of directors grew rapidly, and "the wealthy became the corporate rich, with their fortunes in all business sectors, from agriculture to real estate, protected by their incorporated fortresses" (Domhoff 2014:19). Roy's (1983) research traces this

[2] See, for example, Bunting's (1983) research on nineteenth century interlocks in New York City, and Isaac's (2002) research on corporate elites in Gilded Age Cleveland.

development of the corporate network in the US during the Gilded Age. Of the 374 non-financial and non-banking companies across 20 years that he sampled, Roy found that between 1886 and 1892, 126 directors formed 149 interlocks during the pre-depression years (1886-1892). During the depression of 1893-1897, 145 people formed 206 interlocks. This number increased drastically during the post-depression years, where he found that 380 people held 649 interlocks between 1898 and 1905. Further, he found that finance capitalists played an increasingly integrative role during this time: "In the first period, 23% (20 of 88) of finance capitalists held more than one directorship in the nonfinancial industries. This figure rose to 35% in 1898-1905. … On the other hand, during this same period only 8.2% of those without banking affiliations were interlockers" (Roy 1983: 156-157).

The power and wealth of the corporate elite in America continued to grow into the early twentieth century. The corporate elite also became more diverse during this "era of good feelings" (Domhoff and Webber 2011:33). In the context of the merger movement, the increasing violence directed at the labor movement (see Lipold and Isaac 2009), as well as a return to prosperity after a three-year depression, a moderate faction among the corporate elite emerged (Domhoff and Webber 2011). These "corporate moderates" differed from their "ultraconservative" elite counterparts in that they expressed a willingness to work with the labor movement in an effort to reduce industrial tensions. The corporate moderates began to enter into collective bargaining agreements with the burgeoning labor movement, but they limited the terms to small concessions (such as wages and working hours) in an effort to avoid a larger critique of capitalist relations (Domhoff 2014; Domhoff and Webber 2011; Ramirez 1978).

One particularly important development during this time was the National Civic Federation (NCF), an organization funded in 1900 and comprised of both executives from large

corporations as well as leaders from trade unions (Cyphers 2002; Domhoff and Webber 2011; Green 1956). The NCF was the first national policy planning group formed by the corporate elite, and its aim was to improve industrial relations through the means of collective bargaining. Although this sounds rather progressive, the NCF was made up of the above-mentioned corporate moderates, and as Domhoff and Webber (2011:37) note, "the unionism the NCF leaders were willing to support was a narrow one such as was represented by the American Federation of Labor (AFL), focused almost exclusively on skilled or craft workers, to the exclusion of the unskilled industrial unions in mass production industries." That being said, the NCF was relatively moderate in its attitude toward labor, especially in comparison with the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the "core organization for the ultraconservatives in the corporate community" (Domhoff and Webber 2011:38), focused on the destruction of the closed shop.

Although the NCF was successful for a short time in proposing agreements between capital and labor, it eventually declined in importance after World War I. This decline was due to several factors: it fulfilled some of its milder reformist goals, it deemphasized collective bargaining (which made organized labor less interested in membership), and as the labor movement grew stronger, corporate business members were no longer willing to be in an organization with union leaders (Domhoff and Webber 2011). The NCF was replaced by several new organizations, including the US Chamber of Commerce (COC, founded in 1912) and other policy-planning groups. The US COC was mostly funded by philanthropic foundations started by wealthy elites such as the Carnegies and the Rockefellers (Domhoff and Webber 2011).

Other policy-planning groups and think tanks began to emerge at the same time, most of which has multiple ties to the corporate elite. For example, the National Bureau of Economic

Research was founded in 1919, and had direct ties to Ivy League economists and business school professor as well as top business leaders (Domhoff and Webber 2011). In addition, the Institute of Government Research (founded in 1916 with ties to wealthy businessman Robert Brookings and the Carnegie Corporation), the Institute of Economic research (founded in 1922 with ties to Carnegie Corporation), and the Brookings Graduate School of Economics (founded in 1923 with ties to Brookings and Carnegie Corporation) merged together in 1927 to form the Brookings Institution (Domhoff 2014; Domhoff and Webber 2011). Although the Brookings Institution is considered liberal in its leanings by some, Domhoff (2010:89-90) asserts that "this is a misperception … the Brookings Institution always has been in the mainstream or on the right wing. Although some of its economists were important advisors to the Democrats in the 1960s, they were also among the most important advisors to the corporate moderates in the Committee for Economic Development as well."

Finally, the influence of John D. Rockefeller Jr. and his family during this time should not be understated. Through his foundations, the Rockefeller family supported a large number of think tanks and policy discussion groups, including the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), founded in 1923, which was "an important source of policy expertise" during this time (Domhoff and Webber 2011:49). Over 90 percent of the SSRC's funding came from foundations directly connected to Rockefeller in its first 10 years, and top advisors from the SSRC went on to play large roles in the development of many New Deal policies (Domhoff and Webber 2011). Rockefeller also hired researchers and advisors to study best practices for improved industrial relations, forming the Industrial Relations Council (IRC), which included three leaders of powerful corporations, two Rockefeller Foundation employees, and the president of Dartmouth.

In sum, the period leading up to the Great Depression was marked by rapidly increasing class conflict, power, and profits among a growing network of corporate elites. As the merger movement continued, a small number of wealthy individuals concentrated their power, and most of them shared interlocking connections by sitting on each other's board of directors. The corporate moderate faction of the elites also began to emerge during the "era of good feelings," creating a division among the ownership class. Finally, this era marked the beginning of the policy-planning network, as the wealthy elite created foundations that funded think tanks and policy discussion groups.

The Great Depression and the New Deal

The power and wealth of the corporate elites continued to accumulate in the US through the 1920's. For example, in 1928, the top one percent of earners made nearly 20 percent of all wage and salary income, and the top 0.5 percent made over 55 percent of all capital income in the US (Picketty and Saez 2003). When the Great Depression struck in 1929, panic spread, and a great deal of animosity was directed at reckless Wall Street stock brokers and bankers. Facing an increasingly agitated working class, President Roosevelt was able to propose and pass several policies as part of his New Deal package. These policies are generally considered to be liberal or left-leaning in nature, which has led some researchers to question the relevance of power structure theory (e.g., Skocpol and Amenta 1985). However, Domhoff's (1990,1996, 2014; Domhoff and Webber 2011) work has demonstrated that the corporate elite were heavily involved in many of these progressive policies[3]. These members of the corporate elite often

[3] For a thorough account of how corporate moderates, ultraconservatives, and the agricultural capitalists played a hand in the development of New Deal policies, see especially Domhoff and Webber (2011), *Class and Power in the New Deal*.

worked through the increasingly important policy-planning network to influence politicians and legislation.

For example, after World War I, the farming industry in the US began to slow down: Europeans started farming their own food again, and American farmers found themselves with a difficult to absorb surplus. The farming industry began to collapse at a time when nearly a third of all US workers were employed in farming. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933 aimed to fix this problem by encouraging farmers to plant fewer crops and kill excess livestock in exchange for subsidies, which reduced surplus and increased the value of the crops and livestock (Gilbert and Howe 1991). The developers of this plan came straight from the corporate policy-planning network, including Beardsley Ruml, president of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund (Domhoff and Webber 2011). Ruml was in turn connected to other members of the corporate elite through the SSRC and the US COC. In the final version of the bill that was signed into law, it is clear that this bill was a win for the elite: those involved were mostly concerned with big agriculture rather than small farmers, and the subsidies generally favored only large farms (Gilbert and Howe 1991). In fact, even President Wilson "shared the mainstream agricultural economists' general view that small farmers would have to leave farming for some other work" (Domhoff and Webber 2011:97). Therefore, while the idea of subsidies seems progressive on the surface, it was actually a bill favoring the agrarian capitalist class.

Similarly, Domhoff's (1996; Domhoff and Webber 2011) analysis of the passage of the 1935 Social Security Act demonstrates how the Rockefeller Network was the biggest player in pushing for the legislation. He illustrates how the financial interests of the Rockefellers were directly tied to both the SSRC and the Industrial Relations Counselors Inc. (IRC) — two

organizations widely considered to be the most prominent in the development of Social Security. After the disastrous Ludlow Massacre, whereby 13 people—mostly family members of striking miners—died at the hands of strike breakers and private militia, Rockefeller was the target of increasingly negative press coverage and had to face a presidential commission on industrial relations and an investigation into his involvement. Rockefeller's next step was to hire a public relations expert and a labor relations expert, whom urged Rockefeller to develop company unions, giving workers representation within the company, rather than outside organizing (Domhoff 1996). Rockefeller then helped create and fund two research centers on industrial labor relations—one at the University of Pennsylvania and one at Princeton. Faculty and students from these programs ended up being some of the most influential drafters of the Social Security Act (Domhoff 1996:130-132; see also Domhoff and Webber 2011).

Finally, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), or the Wagner Act, was arguably the most progressive piece of permanent New Deal legislation. Described in more detail below (see the section on "History of Collective Bargaining Legislation in the US"), the NLRA was passed in 1935, and was vehemently opposed by both ultraconservatives and corporate moderates (Domhoff and Webber 2011; McCammon 1990). It guaranteed private employees the right to join unions, engage in collective bargaining, and strike if necessary (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). The NLRA also permanently established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce its provisions and to mediate labor disputes.

Domhoff and Webber (2011: Chapter 3) disagree with institutionalist accounts of the passage of NLRA that emphasize the importance of liberal Democrats gaining a majority because other liberal policies, such as changes to the Federal Reserve System and tax increases for the extremely wealthy did not pass, and the corporate elite were successful in removing the

most progressive aspects of public utility regulation. Furthermore, they disagree with protest-disruption theorists who argue that it was the strength of organized labor that allowed for the NLRA to pass (e.g., Goldfield 1989), since an earlier version of the NLRA was not able to pass at the height of the labor movement two years earlier. Instead, they argue that the NLRA passed because liberals intentionally excluded agricultural workers from the Act's provisions. In doing so, corporate moderates and ultraconservatives lost one of their main allies, agribusiness. Thus, "corporate leaders did not lose power in general despite the calamity of the Depression. Instead, they lost on this issue because their key allies, the plantation capitalists, did not stick with them" (Domhoff and Webber 2011:139).

Further support for elite class dominance theory is evidenced by the near immediate reversal in some of the most liberal aspects of the Wagner Act. Almost immediately after its passage, corporate elites began pushing for new legislation that would favor business again (Davis 1986; Domhoff and Webber 2011; McCammon 1990). For example, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the American Liberty League (ALL) declared the NLRA to be unconstitutional, and advocated that employers entirely disregard the law (McCammon 1990). Furthermore, once the CIO began trying to organize a racially integrated workforce in the South, agribusiness turned back against the NLRA, meaning that the entire capitalist class was again united against the NLRA, resulting in its conservative reforms (Domhoff and Webber 2011). Thus, despite its overall liberal leanings, the NLRA did face constant challenges, and the corporate community was able to limit the impact of the Wagner Act by narrowing legitimate conflict to "collective bargaining over wages, hours, and working conditions," and was able to weaken the power of collective bargaining through "welfare

capitalism, human relations initiatives, judicial rulings, outright repression, and the post-1938 limitations on the National Labor Relations Board" (Domhoff and Webber 2011:216).

An important event that happened soon after was the Flint sit-down strike at General Motors that spanned from 1936 to 1937. During this industry-wide strike, a few hundred automobile workers were able to defeat the then-largest company in America by occupying the plant while on strike, thus preventing the employment of replacement workers (Murray and Schwartz 2015). After the strike ended, a wave of sit-down strikes emerged across the US for the next two years. These strikes resulted in the unionization of the entire automobile industry and an increase in union membership among auto workers from 13.5 percent in 1936 to 23 percent by 1941 (Murray and Schwartz 2015). In response to this pressure from organized labor, the corporate elite started to pressure the government to render the sit-down strike illegal (Domhoff 2014; McCammon 1990). In 1939 the Supreme Court Ruling of *NLRB vs. Fansteel Metallurgical* ruled that sit-down strikes were illegitimate (McCammon 1990; Mizruchi 2013). Due to these kinds of concessions, a majority of the corporate elite held favorable opinions of NLRB, although they wanted to continue to reform it (Mizruchi 2013). Thus, although it was instituted as a means to protect workers and mediate disputes, the corporate elite was eventually able to use the NLRB to systematically strip labor of structural power (e.g., barring sit-down strikes and sympathy strikes), even though it occasionally gave favorable decisions in terms of non-structural gains (McCammon 1990; Mizruchi 2013).

Other New Deal policies, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Public Works Administration, and the Works Progress Administration, were indeed very liberal and perhaps less influenced by the corporate elite, but as Domhoff and Webber (2011:28) note, these policies fit with the "regulating the poor" theories (see Piven and Cloward 1971), that these policies were

allowed as a temporary means to satiate, or regulate, the increasingly agitated poor. Once the disruptive power of poor Americans subsided, these policies were ended.

In sum, New Deal policies were passed during a time when everyone (business, labor, and politicians) was concerned with getting the US out of the Depression. Although on the surface these policies appear to both favor the working class and limit the power of the corporate elite, power structure researchers such as Domhoff (1996, 2014; Domhoff and Webber 2011) show that these policies were often shaped by the corporate elite. Corporate moderates were especially influential in shaping both the Social Security Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act through elite policy-planning networks. In the one instance where corporate moderates lost some power (the NLRA), many of these losses were recovered when corporate moderates and ultraconservatives reestablished a coalition with the Southern capitalists and big agribusiness.

The Postwar Period

Many historians and social scientists contend that after World War II and the Depression a "labor-management accord" existed for several decades, and tensions between the working class and capitalist class were low (e.g., Clawson and Clawson 1999; Mizruchi 2013; Reich 2015; Weisskopf 1979). While this is generally accepted as true among many, and while tensions may have been less acute than before World War II, other scholars argue that the amicable nature of the accord is vastly overstated. For example, Lichenstein (2002:98) argues that "the very idea of such a harmonious accord is a suspect reinterpretation of the postwar industrial era." He points out that phrases such as "social contract" and "labor-capital accord" were not used until the 1980s during the Reagan Administration. While the capitalist class may have been quieter during the postwar era, power structure researchers have shown that they were still quite active in

shaping US policy, both foreign and domestic (e.g., Domhoff 2014; Mills 1956). I discuss some of these trends below.

After World War II there was a fear among most that the US might fall into another depression, and there was an additional fear among the corporate elite that the liberal-labor alliance that helped some progressive New Deal policy pass might continue to be successful (Domhoff 2014). In response to these concerns, the business elite re-mobilized with think tanks and legal strategies that had both domestic and foreign focuses. On the domestic side, the corporate elite helped to create the Committee for Economic Development (CED) in the early 1940s, "to help plan for a postwar world" (Domhoff 2014:99), and the National Right-to-Work Committee in the early 1950's (Lichenstein 2002; Shermer 2009). While the CED could be considered corporate moderates during this time, the ultraconservative US COC and NAM were also extremely active during this period, and became increasingly formalized (Lichenstein 2002). In response to the progressive aspects of the NLRA, there was a concerted effort among the corporate elite to pass legislation limiting the power of organized labor. This effort culminated in the Taft-Hartley Act, which officially allowed states to implement Right-to-Work laws, and was passed in 1947. As Lichenstein (2002: xiii-xiv) writes:

> Right-to-Work laws became a cause célèbre in the 1940s even before Taft-Hartley and Section 14b opened the door for state-level Right-to-Work statutes that proscribed the union shop and weakened trade union power…. When the Right-to-Work Committee was founded in the 1950s, it was funded by the most reactionary textile, oil, and food-processing interests. Its propaganda against the union shop was virtually indistinguishable from a larger anti-union, anti-Communist, states' rights discourse that often evoked McCarthyite and segregationist themes.

Thus, despite the commonplace assumption that labor and capital were in a postwar accord, historical accounts of the business class during this time suggest the opposite.

The corporate elite were also active during this time in foreign affairs. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) was a think tank started by "internationally oriented bankers and leaders in large corporations" (Domhoff 2014:94). The CFR's main goal was to expand American elites' financial interests in Europe. One example of successful policy created by CFR was the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), which authorized the executive branch negotiate trade agreements to later be voted on by Congress (Domhoff 2014; Dreiling and Darves 2011). As Dreiling and Darves (2011) note, the RTAA's emphasis on executive power was specifically designed to protect corporate interests in trade policy, as made evident by the creation a system of trade committees devoted to hearing business concerns. The authors continue:

> Consequently, the RTAA established the politico-institutional conditions for greater executive autonomy (from Congress) in trade policy and created specific channels for corporate political engagement in both the legislature and the executive in the decades that followed…. These institutional changes tended to conceal corporate involvement in the executive branch, thus reinforcing notions of autonomous and rational state actors crafting trade policy, while making more visible corporate conflicts over trade policy in the legislature, thus reinforcing perceptions of business division over trade policy. (Dreiling and Darves 2011:1518)

The CFR continued to influence trade policy by issuing policy statements created by "study groups" comprised of corporate executives, government and military officials, and academics who met to study specific policy "problems" and then issue a statement with "a set of policy recommendations" (Domhoff 2014:95). Beginning in 1939, and with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, the CFR's War-Peace study groups "brought together approximately 100 top bankers, lawyers, executives, economists, and military experts in 362 meetings over a five-year period" (Domhoff 2014:95). These groups were extremely influential in shaping international economic policy in the Post-War era.

Banks also continued to play an important role in the postwar period. However, as large nonfinancial corporations continued to grow and accumulate capital, the role of banks began to shift during this time (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Mizruchi 2013). In addition, the Banking Act of 1933 (described above) required a separation of commercial and investment banks, contributing to the decline in their power. The role that banks played in the postwar era was a function of "their centrality in the social networks created by ties among the leaders of the largest American corporations" (Mizruchi 2013:111). The boards of directors of banks function as meeting places for the corporate elite, who both exchanged and transmitted information about the economy. Further, some argue that during this time banks served to enforce a financial "hegemony" over corporations (e.g., Mintz and Schwartz 1985). Thus, during the postwar period, "banks contributed to the moderate, pragmatic approach adopted by the American corporate elite" (Mizruchi 2013:112).

Another important event in the postwar period was the second Red Scare of the 1950's. During a time when worries of a communist takeover created a public hysteria, the corporate elite effectively mobilized to purge socialists and communists from unions (Stephan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). Generally speaking, the capitalist class strategically decided that working with craft-based unions in the AFL, which tended to not question the capital-labor relationship, was preferable to having communists in the CIO lead the labor movement, as these unions tended to be much stronger, more radical, and more effective (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). The communist-led CIO also advocated industry-wide organizing, social benefits for workers, and egalitarian racial and gender relations in the workplace, as opposed to simply bargaining for steady contract and better pay. Thus, the corporate elite worked with conservative business unionists in exchange for the purging of radicals from the unions. This is made evident in the fact

that one of the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) was that all union leaders were required to sign affidavits declaring that they did not support the Communist Party (Cochran 1979; Feldacker and Hayes 2014; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003).

In sum, while many historians, social scientists, and even politicians contend that the postwar period was marked by an "accord" between organized labor and the capitalist class, there is ample evidence to suggest that the corporate elite were still extremely active during this time. In addition, although they no longer were the only source of capital for large corporations during this time, banks continued to play an important role of connecting members of the corporate elite together in the postwar era. During this time, there was also a temporary alliance between conservative trade unions and the corporate elite, joining together against the radical communist unionists during the Red Scare. However, once the communist threat was gone by the end of 1960's, the corporate elite turned on the business unionists and the labor movement as a whole.

The Counter-Offensive of the 1970's and Beyond

Perhaps one of the reasons why it is easy to argue that there was a labor-capital accord in the postwar era is because the corporate elite's strategy in regards to policy became much more overt during the following decades. Specifically, as the economy began to slump in the early seventies and international competition increased, "the American corporate elite began to turn against the forces that had constrained it during the postwar period, in particular the federal government and organized labor," and an overt assault on progressive policy began (Mizruchi 2013:140). During this time, the corporate moderates began to shift to align with ultraconservative ideology, resulting in a more unified elite (Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013).

One example of the corporate moderates' shift rightward can be seen by examining the CED at the beginning and the end of the 1970s. Domhoff (2014:100) compares examples of policy statements issued in 1971 and 1979:

> In the first report [1971], the emphasis was on the social responsibility of corporations and the need for corporations to work in partnership with government on social problems. The report at the end of the decade [1979] stressed the need to limit the role of government in a market system. … This change occurred even though almost half of the 40 members of the Research and Policy Committee in 1979 were on the committee in 1971 and had endorsed the earlier policy statement…. This is strong evidence that the moderate conservatives had come to agree with ultraconservatives on many issues in the changing circumstances of the 1970s.

Another example of the conservative shift during this time was the increased corporate opposition to regulatory agencies. When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) were first created, they did not face much opposition from the corporate moderates (Mizruchi 2013; Noble 1986; Vogel 2003). OSHA received some resistance from ultraconservatives like NAM and US COC, but it also "received support from some of the leading corporations" (Mizruchi 2013:143). By the end of the 1970's, members of the corporate elite began to push back against what they felt to be excessive regulations. In response to these threatening regulations, the corporate elite "launched a counteroffensive that defined the politics of the 1970s and, some argue, redefined American politics in the decades that followed" (Mizruchi 2013:144).

Two of the biggest players in the conservative backlash of the 1970s were the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and the Heritage Foundation (Domhoff 2014; Mizuchi 2013). The AEI was founded in 1943 as a part of the US COC, but remained relatively underfunded until the 1970's (Domhoff 2014). As the corporate elite began mobilizing against regulations, the need for conservative think tanks grew, and consequently, more funds were directed towards the AEI. The

Heritage Foundation was founded in 1974 as another response to the need for more conservative think tanks. Both AEI and Heritage had several ties to ultraconservatives in the corporate elite, such as the Coors family, the Mellon family, General Electric, and GM (see Bellant 1991; Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013).

In addition, ultraconservative foundations—especially the Olin Foundation, the Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation—began to grow during this time that competed with more moderate foundations such as the Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie foundations (Mizruchi 2013). With funding from ultraconservative right-wing foundations, the corporate elite launched an effective counter-mobilization consisting of books, articles, op-eds, TV programming, and conservative talk radio through the seventies (Mizruchi 2013). As the corporate moderates began to become more conservative, the corporate elite became increasingly unified.

Another important part of the policy-planning network starting in the 1970's was the Business Roundtable (Burris 1992; Domhoff 2014; Gross 2010; Mizruchi 2013). The Business Roundtable (BRT) was made up of CEOs from the largest US corporations, and quickly "became an exclusive fraternity of the nation's most powerful and prestigious business leaders" (Gross 2010:235). The categorization of the BRT remains somewhat unclear. "Unlike the CED," argues Mizruchi (2013:157) "which viewed itself as a policy-planning organization whose suggestions were made in the national interest, the Roundtable was a lobbying group, explicitly devoted to advancing the interests of business." Alternatively, Domhoff (2014) views the BRT as more of a policy discussion group. The BRT can be considered a mix between the two: it is indeed a discussion group, but its goal is less to generate policy for politicians than to generate policy positions among the corporate elite. It is also a lobbying group since it does in fact formally

lobby on behalf of these policy positions. Therefore, although its exact role may be slightly contested, the fact remains that the BRT has played an extremely important role in corporate dominance in the US. For example, in the seventies, the BRT formed a committee to launch a public information campaign in an attempt to improve the public's opinion about business in the US (Gross 2010).

During this time, the corporate policy-planning network, led by AEI, Heritage, and the BRT, and played important roles in defeating both organized labor and government regulation (Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013). The BRT, NAM, and the US COC successfully lobbied to defeat a labor reform bill recommended by President Carter in 1977. Together, these groups and the largest corporations "hired a public relations firm, placed canned editorials in newspapers, financed a study that suggested the likely inflationary consequences of the bill," which was soundly defeated in the Senate through filibuster (Mizruchi 2013:159). The corporate elite also began a campaign against government regulation at this time. For example, the BRT helped to block both the implementation of the Consumer Protection Agency and tax reforms proposed by Carter (Mizruchi 2013).

In sum, while organized capital fought directly against labor during the so-called "accord" years, the fight became much more aggressive since then. As the corporate elite continued to limit the power of both organized labor and the government's ability to regulate the economy, their own power increased. Contrary to the generally accepted notion that the Reagan administration was responsible for the demise of labor and massive deregulation, the massive "undoing of the constraints on the American corporate elite had already been largely accomplished by the time that Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in January 1981" (Mizruchi 2013:180). However, the Reagan administration did continue the vast cutbacks of

social services and the deregulation of corporations, a trend that continued through the Clinton, George W. Bush, and even Obama administrations (Domhoff 2014).

The Corporate Elite Today: Fractured or Globalized?

Today the corporate elite in America appear to look and operate differently than in the past. For example, banks are less central in terms of elite networks and interlocks (Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013). There are two main arguments drawn from the changing landscape of the corporate elite. The first is that the elite are now fractured and no longer unified (e.g., Chu and Davis 2016; Mizruchi 2013). The second is that instead of fractured, the elite are actually just unified at a global, or transnational level (e.g., Carroll 2010; Murray *forthcoming*).

The leading advocate for the fracturing hypothesis is Mark Mizruchi (2013), who argues the unity characterized the 20th century American elite is gone. Instead, because the corporate elite achieved their main goals of diminishing the power of both labor and the state, corporations no longer need to be unified, and now pursue their own short-term interests, sometimes at the expense of the capitalist class as a whole. Mizruchi's evidence lies in the fact that commercial banks' centrality in the corporate elite network has declined, and so has the density of the corporate elite network as a whole.

Despite the provocative and popular idea that the corporate elite have fractured and are no longer dominant, there is a large body of research that suggests otherwise. These scholars argue that the corporate elite has not fractured, but rather the unity has moved from the national to the international level (Carroll 2010; Carroll and Sapinski 2010; Murray 2014, *forthcoming*; Robinson and Harris 2000; Sapinski 2015). For example, Carroll (2010) found that although

domestic corporate interlocks declined in the US since the nineties, transnational interlocks actually increased during this time period.

The increasingly globalized nature of the corporate elite does not necessarily mean that the domestic elite is declining, however. Murray (*forthcoming*) studied PAC donations from the largest 500 companies in the world to open races for US Congress in 2006. He found that US-only and the transnational capitalist class (measured by the G500) have a dense donation network, with no signs of fragmented political behavior. He also finds that when Congressional races are close, the corporate elite tend to converge on one candidate. Importantly, he argues that "the corporate elite are relatively unified transnationally, but that the unity is blended with, rather than in opposition to domestic business unity. Thus… transnational mechanisms function to facilitate political unity among the U.S. corporate elite" (Murray *forthcoming*: 56).

Domhoff's (2014) research also contradicts Muzruchi's fracturing hypothesis. Although the interlocks among the 2010 Fortune 500 companies were not as dense as previous years, the American corporate elite still has a core, or center. It is made up of the corporations with the most interlocks and the ever-important policy-planning network. For example, he provides evidence of the continued centrality of the BRT and the Business Council in the corporate community. He also provides evidence of elite continuity across administrations that are considered in the public eye to be extremely different: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama. All three presidents had top appointees with ties to large banks, the Wall Street community, and the same elite educational institutions (see also Van Apeldoorn 2015).

In sum, there is a large body of research that finds the corporate elite are still dominant in the US and internationally, although Mizruchi (2013) argues otherwise. While banks may no

longer be as central as they used to be, that does not mean that the elite are fragmented. In an increasingly globalized world, it may just be that the elite no longer need banks to provide connections to other members of the elite. Rather than commercial banks being the glue to avoid "destructive competition" as they were from when JP Morgan first put himself on other boards until the 1980s, now policy-planning groups and a collection of large transnationally oriented corporations at the center of the global interlock network serve that purpose. In other words, rather than a decline in elite unity, there may just be declining domestic sources of unity (Murray *forthcoming*). The elite continue to show strong unity in their campaign contributions (Burris 2005; Domhoff 2014; Murray 2014, *forthcoming*).

Theorizing Money and Politics

Drawing from the larger theories of the state, I have developed two models that can help us understand the relationship between money and politics: the Donations-As-Votes model, and the Donations-As-Relationships model[4]. Table 2.2 summarizes the similarities and differences of these two models.

Donations-As-Votes

The first model that helps illustrate how donations and legislative behavior are connected is what I call the Donations-As-Votes model. In this model, the primary function of campaign donations is to aid in the campaign of the legislator running of office. In this way, donations act much like a vote from a constituent.

[4] Similarly, political scientists Grossman and Helpman (1996) argued that all rational actors donate for either "electoral motives" or "influence motives" (see also Magee 2002). These models are similar in that donations seek to either affect the electoral outcomes or influence behavior, but they differ some in their assumptions and theoretical traditions.

Table 2.2: Donations-As-Votes and Donations-As-Relationships Models

	Donations-As-Votes	**Donations-As-Relationships**
Theoretical Traditions	State Autonomy, Pluralism, Network Homophily	Elite Dominance, Network Diffusion
Legislator Concerns	Maintaining power	Maintaining power
Powerful Positions	Elected positions	Elected positions, High-paying private-sector jobs, positions of influence
Source of Power in Society	The state	Corporate elite
Means of Maintaining Power	Win support of voters	Maintain relationships with corporate elite
Source of Policy Preferences	Coalitions of voters	Wealthy donors
Function of Donations	Supporting candidates you already agree with	Buying access, creating relationship between politicians and elite
Do Donations Influence Behavior?	No	Yes
Are Donations Strategic?	No	Yes

According to this model, legislators are primarily concerned with staying in power, which is achieved by being elected and re-elected (e.g., Mayhew 1974). Because legislators are primarily concerned with (re)election, the policy desires of their constituents ultimately drive their own policy actions. This fits both pluralist and state autonomy perspectives. Under a pluralist model, legislators will try to make the mix of interest groups in their own districts and states happy in order to build a winning coalition. Under a state autonomy perspective, donors will try to support candidates that already agree with them so that state power will reflect their interests.

In this model, donations do not change politician's behavior. Rather, donations act as resources that allow a candidate to get their message out to their coalition of constituents. Given this, *donors are more likely to treat their donation as a vote*- giving to candidates that already

agree with them, and that they intend to vote for in the coming election (if possible). Magee (2002) and Grossman and Helpman (1996) call this the "electoral" motivation. The intention behind donating is in hopes that the candidates they agree with will be able to continue their campaigns and reach more voters. From a network perspective, this is *network homophily*: the donor-candidate connection is created on the basis of their shared ideology, rather than the connection causing the shared ideology. Consider the following relationship in Figure 2.1:

Figure 2.1: The Donations-As-Votes Model



Donor 1 (D_1) and Legislator 1 (L_1) both have a shared ideology, Policy Preference X (P_x), while Donor 2 (D_2) and Legislator 2 (L_2) both favor Policy Preference Y (P_y). According to the Donations-As-Votes model, Donors 1 and 2 will notice that Politicians 1 and 2 share their respective policy preferences (Step 1), and because of this, they will donate to the respective politician (Step 2).

In this model, donations *are not strategic*: given unlimited resources, an individual would donate the same amount to all politicians they agree with. That is, if donors give to people that

agree with them in order to influence the outcome of elections, they will do so consistently across all political environments. To summarize, in the Donations-As-Votes model, potential donors use their financial donations as votes for the politicians that they agree with.

Donations-As-Relationships

The other way of understanding the connection between donations and legislative behavior is the Donations-As-Relationships model. In this model, the primary function of donations is to maintain a relationship between the legislator and the elite.

As in the Donations-As-Votes model, the Donations-As-Relationships model still assumes that a legislators' primary concern is still staying in a position of power and privilege. However, elected position is not the only position of power and privilege. Rich donors may provide resources to get legislators elected, but they can also provide powerful, well-paying jobs after legislators leave office. This structural power of wealthy donors, which is the foundation of elite domination theory (e.g., Domhoff 2014), creates an environment where candidates that receive money are likely to align their policies with the interests of their donors. Thus, a legislator's power is preserved by maintaining a relationship with the elite.

Under this conception, donations from the elite represent gifts that are part of long-term social relationships. They also create a sense of indebtedness, which leads to reciprocation in the form of legislative effort. That legislative effort is then reciprocated by more donations, and eventually a job through the revolving door. This is also known as "influential" donation motives because donations are about influencing the behavior of politicians (Grossman and Helpman 1996; Magee 2002)

Under this model, *donations are strategic*. Donors should focus their money where their influence matters the most. Since donations are about influencing politicians' behavior, donors may seek to target their money where they will have the most influence. In an environment that is already friendly to the interests of the elite, elite donations will have minimal impact (as their interests will likely be served in any event). However, in an environment that is hostile to elite interests, elite donations can have the maximum impact. From a network perspective, this is *network diffusion*: policy preferences diffuse from donor to candidate due to the relationship established by donations. Campaign donations buy access, and this access leads to diffusion of perspective on policy. Consider the relationship in Figure 2.2:

Figure 2.2: The Donations-As-Relationships Model



Here, Donor 1 (D_1) and Donor 2 (D_2) still have their policy preferences (P_x and P_y, respectively). However, Legislator 1 (L_1) and Legislator 2 (L_2) no longer have any policy preferences. According to the Donations-As-Relationships model, Donors 1 and 2 will first donate to Legislators 1 and 2 to initiate a relationship (Step 1), and because of this, shared ideology

diffuses from donor to candidate as part of the social relationship (Step 2). In other words, in this model, campaign donations presuppose the shared ideology.

To summarize, in the Donations-As-Relationships model, elite donors use their financial donations to create and maintain relationships with political actors. These relationships are strategic, and are focused on securing the interests of the elite and influencing political behavior.

Theoretical Model

Figure 2.3 presents a conceptual model that displays the mechanisms through which the corporate elite exert influence on politicians. The model begins with elite capital investment, where the corporate elite invest money into legislators' political campaigns. Following the Donations-As-Relationships model, this model creates and maintains a relationship between legislators and the elite, and leads to increased legislative effort, in this case, more anti-labor bill proposals. Legislative effort in turn leads to political outcomes, in this case, increases in anti-labor bill proposals will lead to increases in anti-labor bills being passed and signed into law.

Figure 2.3: Theoretical Model



There is also a moderation aspect to this conceptual model. I argue that political climate moderates the relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort. Specifically, the corporate elite's influence on legislative effort should be stronger in labor-friendly

environments, where their power is less secure. In support of the Donations-As-Relationships model, this suggests strategy on the part of the corporate elite.

Previous Research: Does Money Matter?

Although the link seems intuitive and clean-cut, the research examining the influence of campaign donations on legislators is actually quite mixed. In this section I review the literature that specifically examines whether donations influence the attitudes or actions of legislators. I separate this section according to the main findings: (1) donations have no effect, (2) donations lead to access, and (3) donations shape legislative behavior.

Donations Have No Effect

Some research finds little, if any, relationship between donations and legislative action (Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Austen-Smith 1995; Bronars and Lott 1997; Chappell 1981, 1982; Evans 1986; Grenzke 1989; Kau & Rubin 1982; Levitt 1991; Wright 1985, 1989). Three early and influential studies that first examined the (lack of) influence of campaign donations are Chappell (1981), Wright (1989), and Grenzke (1989). For example, Chappell's (1981) research found that the relationship between donations from maritime union PACs and Congressional roll call votes was "unavoidably ambiguous." Wright (1989:411) collected data from five large PACs that were most active during the 97th Congress. Combining quantitative data on election contributions and roll call votes, as well as 14 in depth interviews, he found no evidence supporting a relationship between campaign donations and votes. Finally, Grenzke (1989) studied the effect of campaign contributions from 120 PACs on the behavior of the 154 members of Congress who severed continuously between 1973 and 1982. Using both statistical

analyses and qualitative interviews, she found that PAC donations have little effect on the behavior of members of Congress.

Bronars and Lott (1997) extended this earlier work by focusing on the effect of changes in campaign donations during a politician's last term in office. They distinguish between a "sorting" theory (similar to the Donations-As-Votes model) and the "vote-buying" theory (similar to the Donations-As-Relationships model). They argued that the sorting theory predicts that politicians will not alter their behavior during their last term (because ideology remains relatively stable over time), whereas the vote-buying hypothesis predicts that changes in campaign donations should predict changes in how politicians vote. Focusing on members of Congress (MCs) who were in office from 1977-1990, the authors examine how changes in donations from labor and corporate PACs influenced changes in MCs roll call votes with respect to conservative and liberal issues. In general, their results support the sorting theory; that contributions are made to politicians who value the same policy positions as their donors (and the Donations-As-Votes model). Specifically, Congressional voting patterns are consistent "even when the threat of reelection is removed and when campaign contributions from interest groups decline dramatically" (Bronars and Lott 1997:319).

More recently, Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003:117) argued that "campaign contributing should not be viewed as an investment, but rather as a form of consumption—or, in the language of politics, participation." Individuals and corporations contribute to political campaigns not to try to sway the actions of legislators, but for three reasons: because they are interested in politics, because they are asked to, and because they have the resources necessary to participate civically. "Political giving," they argue, "should be regarded as a form of consumption not unlike giving to charities, such as the United Way or public radio"

(Ansolabehere et al. 2003:118). The authors' meta-analysis of studies that examine the influence of political donations on roll call votes in Congress found that PAC donations had little or no significant effect on roll call voting most of the time. Their own empirical analyses supported this, and found that "voters' preferences using district fixed effects almost completely eliminates the effects of contributions on legislative voting" (Ansolabehere et al. 2003:116).

One of the possible shortcomings of this work is the aggregating of different types of donations. Specifically, the research does not consider why some kinds of PACs (i.e., corporate elites) might have a stronger influence than other kinds (i.e., labor unions). This is because this research, grounded in pluralist traditions, generally assumes no intrinsic difference in the ability for some coalitions to exert more power than others, and certainly is not attuned to forms of class power.

Donations Lead to Access

Other research finds that campaign donations lead to increased access to legislators, but does not address whether this leads to changes in behavior (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993; Fellowes & Wolf 2004; Kalla and Broockman 2015; Langhein 1986; Powell 2012; Powell and Grimmer 2016). For example, Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993's (1993) study of corporate PAC directors finds that campaign contributions are viewed as gifts (rather than bribes), leaving politicians to feel indebted to their benefactors. This grants corporate PACs easy access to the political elite. Indeed Langbein's (1986) study of PAC contributions and access estimated it would cost PACs on average over $72,000 to access a member of the 95th Congress for an hour, where the mean PAC contribution of $28,360 only granted about one-half hour of access time. A recent experiment by Kalla and Broockman (2015) found that members of Congress are three times as likely to meet with people who identified themselves as a major campaign donor rather

than just a constituent. Powell (2012) also confirmed that this relationship between money and access also exists in state legislatures. Although these studies do not prove anything in terms of policy formation, it is certainly suggestive that money helps create access to legislators.

Donations Shape Legislative Behavior

Finally, some research argues that donations do exert influence on legislators in the form of vote-buying (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Beaulieu and Magee 2004; Magee 2002; Monardi and Glantz 1998; Peoples 2010; Stratmann 1991, 1995, 2002, 2005). These generally focus on industry-specific relationships, such as trade, tobacco, or environmental industries.

In particular, Clayton Peoples' (Peoples 2008, 2010; Peoples and Gortari 2008) work has used a power structure approach to examine if and how campaign contributions influence policymaking. For example, using a sample of state legislators in Ohio, Peoples (2008) showed that legislators with similar donors exhibit similar patterns in voting behaviors, especially legislators within the same party. A later study of the federal level (Peoples 2010) examined the dyadic relationships of members in the 102nd through 109th US House of Representatives and how PAC contributions influenced roll call voting. Legislators who had similar PAC contributors were significantly more likely to have similar voting patterns. These patterns were particularly strong among incumbent Representatives, even when controlling for prior voting patterns.

Outside of sociology, economist Christopher Magee's (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Beaulieu and Magee 2004; Magee 2002, 2007) research has also worked toward documenting these relationships among support for various trade and economic policies in the United States. For example, Magee (2007) examined defense industry business PAC donations and ideological anti-war PAC donations to 1996 elections for Congress. He then examined how MCs voted on

defense spending bills. His results found that defense industry PAC donations were "decisive in defeating the proposal to eliminate funding for B-2 bombers" (Magee 2007:309).

Beaulieu and Magee (2004) examined how campaign donations from PACs (capital and labor) to MCs influenced how they voted on trade policy, specifically looking at the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Business PACs gave a 20 percentage point greater fraction of their campaign donations to NAFTA and GATT supporters, compared to labor PACs. When predicting how MCs voted, they found that in particular, business PACs from industries that stood to gain from export trades were the specific drivers for influencing legislative decisions on NAFTA, although there were no industry-specific effects for GATT.

Economist Thomas Stratmann's work also finds some evidence for a relationship between donations and legislative behavior (Stratmann 1991, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2005). He found that PACs donate more money not only during election cycles, but also right before important votes in Congress (Stratmann 1998). Analyzing PAC contributions and Congressional roll call votes for farm commodities in 1981 and 1985, another study (Stratmann 1995) found that campaign donations from agricultural PACs significantly influenced the passage of five (out of seven) farm bills that passed. These findings suggest that campaign donations are at least correlated with MCs' voting decisions. In an attempt to capture the causal effect of donations on behavior, Stratmann (2002) later examined financial services legislation: the 1991 bill to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, which was defeated, and the 1998 bill to do the same, which passed. Banking interests favored repeal of Glass-Steagall and insurance and securities industries opposed it. Stratmann (2002) estimated the change in an MC's votes from 1991 to 1998 on the changes in the MC's contributions from those three groups. He found that changes in donations

were associated with changes in voting behavior. Specifically, an extra $10,000 in banking contributions increased the likelihood of a House member voting to repeal by eight percentage points.

Shortcomings of Previous Work

The previous research testing whether campaign donations influence legislative behavior is mixed, but it is also limited in four major ways. First, previous research tends to *theorize business as homogenous*. Second, previous work does not *differentiate between homophily and diffusion*. Third, there is an overwhelming focus on *federal-level legislation*. Finally, by only examining bills signed into law, previous work suffers from *selection bias*. I detail these issues below.

Theorizing business as homogenous. The majority of work that examines whether business donations influence legislators tends to both theorize and measure business interests as homogenous. This work ignores the contributions of power structure researchers like Domhoff (1990, 1996, 2014), Useem (1984), and Mills (1956). Specifically, all business is not equal in power or motivations. When defining those in the "inner circle," Useem (1984:1) writes:

> "Most business leaders are not part of… the *inner circle*. Their concerns extend little beyond the immediate welfare of their own firms. But those few whose positions make them sensitive to the welfare of a wide range of firms have come to exercise a voice on behalf of the entire business community."

Further, while pluralists would argue that small business is an important counterweight to the corporate elite, most evidence suggests this is not true. As of 2016, there were over 28 million small businesses in the United States, making up over 99 percent of all businesses, and employing about 48 percent of all US employees (US SBA 2016). Yet Domhoff (2014:34) notes:

> Small businesses also have an important place in the American belief system because they are thought to embody the independence and initiative of all Americans. Their advocates claim that they create the majority of new jobs, but they leave out that small businesses, which have a high rate of failure, also are responsible for the most job losses and fare no better than big businesses in terms of net jobs gained. Further, they tend to pay lower wages and are less likely to offer health care and pension benefits.

Although small businesses certainly outweigh the corporate community in numerical power, recall again that elite class dominance theory argues that the corporate elite have structural and social power, which makes them theoretically distinct form other business interests.

At best, some research employs industry-specific analyses (e.g., Stratmann 1991, 2002, 2005). This supports the idea that we might see opposing interests according to segments of capital. However, while business may be fragmented, power structure theory argues that the corporate elite are unified across industry. I address weakness in the previous research of theorizing business as homogenous by not only measuring all of business together and splitting them into industrial sectors, but also distinguishing non-elite business donations from the corporate elite.

Homophily versus diffusion. The second shortcoming of the literature on campaign donations is that research generally only focuses on associations and access. This is problematic because by only examining access, we cannot differentiate between homophily and diffusion, or between motivations for donations (for an exception, discussed above, see Magee 2002). In other words, it might be that the corporate elite are influencing legislators to behave in a certain way (diffusion), but it could also be that they simply donate to legislators who would already act on their behalf because they are ideologically similar (homophily). Focusing on access rather than behavior does not allow us to differentiate between these motivations.

According to the Donations-As-Votes and Donations-As-Relationships models laid out in the section above, homophily is not strategic. If corporate donations are simply an act of homophily, then given unlimited resources, corporate donors would donate to all legislators they agree with equally, and these donations should have an equal association with behavior across all political environments. Alternatively, if donations are about influence, they should be strategic: donors should target donations where they can have more influence, and donations should be more strongly associated when these interests are more at stake. I address this shortcoming by moving beyond access and looking at behavior. This allows me to differentiate between homophily and diffusion. Specifically, I look at how the effect of corporate donations varies across political environment. Specifically, because I am focusing on labor legislation, I look at pro-labor and anti-labor political climates.

Federal-level legislation. The third major limitation of the previous work is that it overwhelmingly focuses on federal-level legislation. (e.g., Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993; Magee 2002, 2007; Stratmann 1998, 2002). Brady and colleagues (2013) recently called for a shift to examine politics at the state level. I argue that research on state-level legislation is important for three reasons. First, the federalist system in the United States, whereby sovereign states have more political power than the federal government, means that often the laws affecting the day-to-day lives of the public are passed on the sub-national level (Brady et al. 2013; Moller 2008; Quadagno and Street 2005). This is particularly true in the last several decades, as Moller (2008:324) notes that "the 'devolution revolution' since the 1980s has augmented the power of sub-national state governments in relation to the federal government." For example, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, commonly referred to as welfare reform) shifted the responsibility of providing cash assistance to the

impoverished from the federal to the state level (Cancian and Danziger 2009; Zylan and Soule 2000). Hate crime (Soule and Earl 2001) and RTW (Dixon 2010; Jacobs and Dixon 2006) laws also vary at the sub-national level.

The second reason for focusing on sub-national level is methodological. Because individual states in the US can be considered their own separate polities, analyzing state-level legislation allows for comparative research, rather than examining anecdotal federal laws (Moller et al. 2009). As Brady and colleagues point out, "U.S. states exhibit meaningful variation in institutions. … Therefore, the comparative literature could be applicable to the United States" (2013:873). State-level policies may have effects independent of federal policy (Moller 2008; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). This is especially true of labor legislation, as most conflicts between business and labor play out at the state level (Brady et al. 2013; Jacobs and Dixon 2010; Tope and Jacobs 2009). However, it should be noted that state-level policy still exists within a broader national context. For example, Right to Work laws were only made possible by the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, and although the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) was a federal law, states varied on whether they expanded the Act to the public sector (Fine and Baktari 2001).

Third, most federal candidates begin their careers on the state and local level. Therefore, the relationship between donors and candidates typically begins before they enter the federal government. This might explain why some research on Congress seems to support the Donations-As-Votes, because the social relationship was already established and is already reciprocal. This study addresses these problems by moving away from federal-level legislation and examining bills proposed in the 99 legislative chambers at the state level.

Selection bias. Finally, the overwhelming majority of the research that examines the effect of donations on legislative behavior, or the influence of the elite on politicians, suffers from selection bias because most research focuses on bills that are signed into law. This problem goes beyond just studies on campaign donations and is pervasive in most of the sociological literature on labor law. Case studies are problematic because they only focus on laws that have been passed, rather than proposed bills that have failed, which results in a selection bias. In other words, the research reviewed above fails to take into account bills that were proposed and not passed. By doing so, explanations of how and why policy is passed may be incomplete. This may explain the continued disagreement about the correct theoretical framework that explains the enactment of laws (e.g., disagreements between Domhoff and Webber 2011 and Skocpol and Finegold 1982 on why the NLRA passed). Dixon's work (Dixon 2006; Jacobs and Dixon 2010) predicting the passage of RTW laws is useful, but fails to account for states where such bills may have been proposed but failed to pass.

A small improvement to the selection bias of case studies is using roll call votes (e.g., Chappell 1981; Grenzke 1989; Jacobs et al. 2014; Monroe and Garland 1991; Wright 1989). Roll call votes enable the analyst to examine all bills that are voted upon the legislative floor. This allows for a greater number of bills, as well as variation between what is passed and failed, but analysis of roll call votes has yet to be used in studies of labor legislation. Though roll call votes may improve the problem of selection bias, they do not fix it because the vast majority of proposed bills never make it to the floor for voting. Further, once a bill makes it to the floor it is possible that legislators will vote along party lines rather than based on their policy preferences. Political science research tends to support this idea, as Hall and Wayman (1990:797) note that "the behavior most likely to be affected [by campaign contributions] is members' legislative

involvement, not their votes." This project goes beyond past research by compiling data that includes all proposed bills in a legislative session. In doing so, I provide the complete universe of policy, and help obtain more unbiased estimates of explaining the passage of labor law.

A History of Collective Bargaining Legislation in the US and Relevant Research

This dissertation focuses on labor law (specifically, collective bargaining) for several important reasons. First, labor legislation is the site of a long-lasting, contentious struggle for political power between organized capital and organized labor. The stakes are high, and there are very few actors who are undecided in the struggle. If we are interested in ideological struggles, especially those between the capitalist and working classes, labor legislation promises to be a useful field. Second, labor laws vary widely across states in the US, which will aid in examining state-level variation. Third, labor law is interesting because it is highly relevant. There has been a recent resurgence in regressive anti-labor legislation over the last decade. For example, Indiana (2012), Michigan (2012), and Wisconsin (2014) have all recently passed RTW laws. This is particularly interesting because these three states have a long history of strong labor movements. Finally, this topic is important because it matters; anti-labor law is likely connected to the precipitous decline in union strength in the US and the massive growth in economic inequality (Western and Rosenfeld 2011). Other research finds that the minimum wage is consistently related to the strength of labor unions (Bartels 2008).

The majority of research on labor legislation has focused on five historical federal policies: (1) The Railway Labor Act of 1926, (2) The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, (3) The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, (4) The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, and (5) The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. The NLRA and the LMRA have received by far the most attention. More recently, advances in labor legislation have moved

back to the state level, which is especially evident in the passage of Right to Work legislation. In this section, I provide some historical context on these laws. I pay particular attention to the effects of these laws on the labor movement and class relations.

Pre-Statutory Collective Bargaining

Before the passage of the first federal labor laws, individual states were responsible for regulation and enforcement of labor and management relations (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). Regulatory laws were usually developed by individual cases in state court, rather than being developed and passed by state legislatures (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). For example, the first recorded labor strike in the United States occurred in 1805 by shoemakers in Philadelphia. This question of the legality of the strike was taken to court in 1806 (*Commonwealth v. Pullis*, also known as the Philadelphia Cordwainer's case), whereby the court ruled that it was illegal for workers to join together in an organization in which the members decided to stop work for higher wages (Bowman 2002; Feldacker and Hayes 2014; Lloyd 1910; Tomlins 1993). This set a legal precedent that it was an unlawful conspiracy to form a union for the next forty years (Feldacker and Hayes 2014; Tomlins 1993).

In 1842, the Massachusetts Supreme Court Case *Commonwealth v. Hunt* found that forming a union was not a conspiracy and that workers had the right to organize (Commons 1910; Feldacker and Hayes 2014; Tomlins 1993). Although this favorable ruling began to spread during the latter half of the 19th century, no statutory laws existed protecting workers, and courts often issued injunction to prevent workers from striking, while maintaining they had the right to strike in theory (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). As the US labor movement increased in size and strength and strikes became more frequent, Congress saw an increasing need to intervene and passed the first statutory federal labor legislation (The Railway Labor Act in 1926).

The Railway Labor Act

The Railway Labor Act (RLA) of 1926 was the first federal statutory labor law in the US that recognized the right of employees to form unions and engage in the collective bargaining process (Feldacker and Hayes 2014:3). By the 1920's, labor unions had become increasingly popular among the two million railroad workers, and the frequency and strength of strikes increased as well. After decades of contentious battles between railroad labor and management that restricted public transportation and shipping, a special committee of railroad management and labor representatives convened to draft a proposal for federal legislation regulating the labor-management relationship (Paul et al. 2004; Thomas and Dooley 1990). This proposal was submitted to Congress, and was passed and enacted in 1926 with no substantial changes.

Although the RLA protects the right to collectively bargain, it also "includes a strong policy statement, and a variety of provisions, designed to avoid or delay any interruption to commerce such as would be occasioned by a strike" (Paul et al. 2004: v). The RLA works to discourage strikes by prolonging the process of collective bargaining, and by requiring arbitration of disputes (Paul et al. 2004; Thomas and Dooley 1990). Striking is only permitted over "major" disputes where all arbitration has been exhausted. However, unlike other labor laws that were later enacted, the RLA places very few restrictions on tactics of strikers, such as secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes (Paul et al. 2004; Thomas and Dooley 1990).

Despite its significance as the first piece of legislation to protect the right to collectively bargain, the RLA remains limited because it only covers railroad and airline employees and it requires bargaining to be done on a craft (rather than employer-wide) basis. Perhaps most importantly, the RLA did not establish ways to enforce sanctions against unfair labor practices (Thomas and Dooley 1990).

The Norris-LaGuardia Act

Prior to 1932, court injunctions continued to be a common way to circumvent previous rulings that labor unions and strikes were legal (such as the 1842 *Commonwealth v. Hunt* decision). Instead of filing criminal charges against strikers, employers would file for a civil injunction providing a temporary restraining order against striking workers. These injunctions were based on "stylized affidavits [by the employers], the truth of which often could not be challenged" (Gorman and Finkin 2004:2). The resulting restraining orders would effectively end the strike because if workers showed up to picket, they would be thrown in jail for contempt of court with no jury trial.

The Norris LaGuardia Act (NLA) was written and sponsored by Senator George William Norris (Nebraska) and Congressman Fiorello H. LaGuardia (New York), two progressive Republicans who saw these injunctions as unfair. The Act prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions on strikes and outlawed yellow dog contracts, a process in which employers required employees to sign oaths promising not to join a union as a condition of employment (Feldacker and Hayes 2014; Gorman and Finkin 2004).

Despite its progressive advances, the NLA still had its shortcomings. Perhaps most importantly, it did not expressly guarantee the rights of employees to collectively bargain. At this point, the right to unionize (except for railway workers) could still be decided on a case-by-case basis in different states (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). The NLA also had no express means to enforce its provisions. However, the ban on federal injunctions did successfully weaken a common tactic of employers and laid the foundation for the 1935 National Labor Relations Act.

The National Labor Relations Act

The 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), commonly known as the Wagner Act, is by far the policy most studied by sociologists (e.g., Cornfield 1989; Domhoff and Webber 2011; McCammon 1993, 1994). Part of Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, the NLRA is widely recognized to be the most progressive piece of labor legislation ever passed in the United States. It guarantees private employees the right to join unions, engage in collective bargaining, and strike if necessary (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). Perhaps more importantly, it established procedures by which employees may choose to unionize and established the NLRB to enforce the provisions for the NLRA, thus "unionization and collective bargaining were transformed from legally-acknowledged rights into federally-protected rights" (Sefcovic and Condit 2001:284, emphasis in original).

Sections 7, 8, 9, and 13 of the NLRA are generally considered to be the most important parts. Section 7 defines protected activity of employees: "Employees shall have the right to self-organize, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec.151). Section 8 of the NLRA defines unfair labor practices. Five types of unfair labor practices are outlined: (1) "the domination or interference with the formation or administration" of unions (2) company unions, (3) discrimination against employees who join or work to form unions, (4) retaliation against employees who file unfair labor practice charges, and (5) employer refusal to collectively bargain with union representatives (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec.158a). Section 9 declares that certified unions are "the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions

of employment" and establishes procedures to vote on union representation (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec.159). Finally, Section 13 of the Act protects the right to strike, stating "Nothing in this Act … shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike" (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec.163).

The main goal of the Wagner Act was to achieve industrial peace in an era of increasingly common labor strikes and violent repression from employers (Herrick 1946; Lambert 1998). The NLRB was now in existence to help mediate disputes between capital and labor, deciding when unions were legitimate and providing employees with means to complain about unfair treatment. But, as described in the above section on the New Deal, employers were extremely resistant to government regulation of labor relations, which only increased industrial tensions, and instead of decreasing the number of strikes, strike activity increased dramatically following the passage of the Wagner Act (Herrick 1946; McCammon 1990).

In the years following the passage of Wagner, the US labor force did see some transformative changes. For example, the number of unionized workers increased fourfold between 1934 and 1944, from about 3.5 million to approximately 14 million workers (Peterson 1945). Additionally, the number of unfair labor practice cases decreased dramatically between 1936 and 1945, suggesting that employers may have become more accepting of the NLRA over time (Herrick 1946; NLRB 1946), although other research shows that the capitalist class was pushing hard for new legislation that would turn to favor business again (Davis 1986; Domhoff and Webber 2011; McCammon 1990). In fact, as soon as the Wagner Act passed, employer groups began an attack campaign against it. Specifically, NAM and ALL declared the NLRA to be unconstitutional, and advocated that employers entirely disregard the law (McCammon 1990).

The ALL took the case to the Supreme Court, and it was not until 1937 that the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the NLRA in *National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin*.

Although the NLRA formally guaranteed the right to strike, it also was able to restrict striking. The Wagner Act defined the right to strike as a "commercial right—that is, as the liberty to engage in certain collective activities for commercial purposes" (Lambert 1998:197). In other words, acceptance of the Wagner Act meant an acceptance of the institutionalized collective bargaining procedures, the wage system, and a rejection of the idea that the worker was a "self-governing citizen with duties and responsibilities beyond the labor contract" (Lambert 1998:197). In this way, the NLRA was able to de-radicalize the labor movement in the 1930's (Klare 1978; Lambert 1998; McCammon 1990; Tomlins 1985). This fits power structure research that finds the capitalist class may make small concessions as it keeps its focus on the long-term goal of class domination. Because the NLRA protects the right to strike, Tomlins (1985) argues it weakened unions by incorporating them into the legal institutional system. The Supreme Court's *Jones and Laughlin* decision "embraced those aims of the Act most consistent with the assumptions of liberal capitalism and foreclosed those potential paths of development most threatening to the established order" (Klare 1978:265). After losing the Supreme Court battle, employers' resistance to worker organization in the workplace began shift away from legal proceedings, and towards "lobbying efforts aimed at persuading or pressuring Congress to amend the Wagner Act" (McCammon 1990: 210).

The Labor Management Relations Act

The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act, was passed in 1947 as a follow-up amendment to the NLRA and led by organized business. After World War II, the strength of the labor movement began to increase again, with

25 percent of the US workforce being unionized. Due to the wave of large scale strikes (primarily in the automobile and steel industries) causing disruptions in commerce and the post war economy and alarming the nation (McCammon 1994; Millis and Brown 1950), Congress began to attempt to restrict the power of the strong industrial unions. As the public's fears about the spread of Communism and a militant labor movement increased, McCammon (1990:212) notes that employers "played on these public fears with an intensified media campaign calling for legislation to amend Wagner, to 'equalize' the law… The general shift in public sentiment was manifested in the Congressional elections of 1946 in which the Republicans were able to reclaim majorities in both the House and Senate, and in 1947 the Republican-dominated Congress enacted Taft-Hartley."

The LMRA is generally considered to be the most important regressive labor legislation passed in the US. Whereas the NLRA protected the rights of employees, the LMRA protected the rights of employers (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). Taft-Hartley further hindered the labor movement by producing a list of unfair labor practices of workers, and banned political strikes, solidarity strikes, jurisdictional (the right to a particular job assignment) strikes, wildcat (nonunion sanctioned) strikes, secondary boycotts and mass picketing, and union donations to federal political campaigns (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). These specific types of strikes and boycotts were well known as being the most effective tactics of the labor movement (Feldacker and Hayes 2014; McCammon 1990, 1994).

The Act also outlawed closed shops, wherein employers only hire union members as employees. Banning closed shops naturally introduces the free-rider problem into unions, effectively weakening them. Finally, Taft-Hartley provided that individual states could pass

RTW laws (Section 14B). By 1955, 17 states[5] passed RTW laws. The labor movement lobbied especially hard to get this provision removed from the LMRA, but to no avail (Domhoff and Webber 2011; Zieger 1986).

Research generally agrees that the LMRA successfully reduced the power of organized labor. Wallace (2007) examined how the post-LMRA legal-institutional context affected strike activity in the US. Using a labor law index comprised of the number of pro-labor laws, NLRB unfair labor cases filed, use of anti-labor injunctions, labor mediation, and labor arbitration to measure the legal-institutional context, he finds that high values on the labor law index reduced strike activity between 1948 to 1980. Specifically, he argues that the legal-institutional context set up by Taft-Hartley delegitimized the most effective forms of labor unrest (e.g., sit-down strikes) by providing more conservative alternatives (e.g., mediation and arbitration, the ability to file complaints to the NLRB) that reduced the overall militancy of the movement.

Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin's (2003) study of 38 CIO unions from the 1930s to the 1940s also demonstrates how Taft-Hartley was devastating to the labor movement. They contend that one of the most damaging provisions was that which prohibited known members of the Communist party from holding office in unions. Their book shows how Communist-led CIO unions were generally the most racially progressive, the most democratic, and the most effective in labor demonstrations. By purging Communists from leadership roles, the Taft-Hartley Act effectively deradicalized the strongest unions in the 1940's and 1950's. It would appear that the labor movement never fully recovered.

[5] Those states were: Arkansas (1944), Florida (1944), Arizona (1946), Nebraska (1946), Virginia (1947), Tennessee (1947), North Carolina (1947), Georgia (1947), Iowa (1947), South Dakota (1947), Texas (1947), North Dakota (1948), Nevada (1952), Alabama (1953), Mississippi (1954), South Carolina (1954), and Utah (1955).

In sum, the Taft-Hartley Act is perhaps the most conservative and regressive labor law to date. While the NLRA focused on the rights of employees, the LMRA focused on the rights of employers. In support of elite class dominance theory, the US corporate elite worked together to counter the liberal Wagner Act. This concerted effort began through a judicial route by challenging the constitutionality of the NLRA, but soon moved to a legislative route by enacting the LMRA. Taft-Hartley paved the way for future regressive laws, especially RTW legislation.

The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 was created to regulate internal union matters; it established a Bill of Rights for union members, procedures for union elections, and a requirement for unions to submit annual financial reports to the Department of Labor (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). Similar to the LMRA, it was passed at the height of the second Red Scare, and the Act was in part a reaction to the increased mistrust of the labor movement, as well as recent exposures of racketeering and corruption within some unions. The stated purpose of the law was to return democracy to unions that had become increasingly autocratic, and to prevent union corruption (Fine and Baktari 2001; Summers 1984). Part of the LMDRA was a provision allowing states to expand the Act to state employees, which some states chose to do (Fine and Baktari 2001).

Several scholars have explored in detail whether the LMRDA actually increased union democracy. Drawing from Michels' (1911) theory of the iron law of oligarchy, Summers (1984) argues that the LMRDA serves to loosen the iron grip in a one-party system by dispersing power to local chapters, increasing transparency, and enabling the "politically helpless to use the courts to hold the ruling oligarch to a measure of accountability" (118). Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) argue that this increased transparency and democracy in turn leads to stronger labor militancy as

the law encourages the growth of dissident (and often more radical) factions within the union. Conversely, Snowbarger and Pintz (1970) found that the passage of the LMRDA was associated with decreases in presidential turnovers in AFL-CIO unions.

In an attempt to systematically test whether the LMRDA in fact established more democratic unions, Fine and Baktari (2001) compared levels of union democracy among state-level public sector unions that expanded the LMRDA to those that did not. They found that LMRDA provisions did lead to less autocratic unions, more transparency, and more union democracy. In addition, these provisions increased union expenses, especially legal fees. They conclude that "the LMRDA can enhance union democracy and encourage more open disclosure of those union activities that may affect its rank and file" (Fine and Baktari 2001:402).

Right to Work Laws and the Shift to State Policy

Right to Work laws are controversial statutes that prohibit union shop agreements in private sector workplaces and render mandatory union membership of all employees in a workplace illegal. RTW laws also often prohibit the automatic withdrawal of union dues from paychecks. The arguments for RTW are that (a) prohibiting mandatory union membership will encourage growth of business in RTW states and increase employment, and (b) requiring employees to join a union is a violation of an employee's First Amendment rights. The arguments against RTW laws are that (a) they cripple the already weakened labor movement, (b) depress wages, and (c) create more job insecurity by making it easier to fire and lay off workers.

As mentioned above, 17 states passed RTW laws after the passage of Taft-Hartley. Between 1958 and 2001, only five states passed RTW laws: Kansas (1958), Wyoming (1963), Louisiana (1976), Idaho (1985), and Oklahoma (2001). More recently, the battle for RTW has

again picked up momentum. Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin, three heavily unionized states, passed RTW laws between 2012 and 2015. These are the first states to pass a RTW law in the industrialized, upper Midwest. Although only three bills have passed so far, most legislatures in non-RTW states remain busy: between January 1st 2011 and December 31st 2015 there were 211 RTW bills proposed in 25 states (National Conference of State Legislatures 2015). Figure 2. provides a visual of these proposals across the US. Legislators proposed RTW laws in all but three non-RTW states during these five years.

The empirical research concerning the effects of RTW laws is limited and mixed. For example, the enactment of RTW laws has been associated with lower union organizing rates (Ellwood and Fine 1987), lower union density (Davis and Huston 1995; Hogler et al. 2004; Warren and Strauss 1979), higher rates of free-riding (Davis and Huston 1993; Sobel 1995), depressed wages (Mishel 2001), and the proposal and opening of corporate chains in RTW states (Rao et al. 2011). Other research has found that RTW laws are unrelated to union density (Farber 1984; Moore et al. 1986) and wages (Eren and Ozbeklik 2011), or are associated with higher wages (Reed 2003) and employment rates (Eren and Ozbeklik 2011).

Figure 2.4: Right to Work Bills Proposed, 2011-2015



Davis and Huston (1995) attribute mixed findings to the fact that research on the effects of RTW legislation include government, agricultural, supervisory, and transportation workers in the analysis, although these workers are not subject to RTW. The authors' analysis removes these workers and finds that union density is in fact 11.8 percentage points higher in states without RTW laws. Theoretically, this makes sense:

> RTW laws can affect demand by removing the constraints on choice imposed by union shops which permit some employees to free ride and others to demonstrate their opposition to unions on principle. RTW laws can affect supply by prompting unions to devote organizing effort to non-RTW states where free riders cannot withhold union dues as readily. Thus, from demand and supply perspectives, RTW laws should reduce the probability of membership of employees in RTW state (Davis and Huston 1995:224).

Although recent work has begun to shift its attention to state-level RTW laws, there is little consensus on how these laws impact workers or the broader society. Further, research has yet to differentiate between the short term and long term effects of these laws.

In sum, sociologists have long been interested in how the politics of labor affect workers, the labor movement, and society as a whole. Battles between capital and labor have resulted in several important federal laws that affect the current political climate today, paving the way for new policies, such as Right to Work, to pass at the state level. In a time when the battle between capital and labor is increasingly contested, the case of labor law proves to be an important case study to examine the way politics work in the US.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Drawing from previous research, elite class dominance theory, and the Donations-As-Relationships model, I have developed specific research questions and hypotheses that correspond to each chapter of this dissertation.

In Chapter 5, I ask the following research question: *Does elite capital investment encourage anti-labor legislative effort?* Elite class dominance theory suggests that the capitalist class, primarily concerned with maintaining their power, work to influence politicians to act in their favor. In order to exert influence over state actors, the corporate elite leverage their financial power and connections. Part of the way this is done is through financially investing in legislators, which I measure in campaign donations. By donating to legislators' campaigns, the corporate elite maintain a reciprocal relationship with legislators. These donations are seen as gifts rather than bribes, but gifts that legislators are expected to repay through legislative action that supports the capitalist class and limits the power of the working class. This leads to my hypothesis for Chapter 5:

H 5.1: Corporate elite donations will be positively associated with anti-labor bill proposals.

In Chapter 6 I ask the following research question: *Is the relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort strategic?* Under the Donations-As-Votes model, donations are viewed as strategic. The corporate elite should focus their donations where their influence matters the most. Because donations are about influencing politicians' behavior in favor of the capitalist class, we would expect donors to target their interests are less secure. In an environment that is hostile to elite interests and friendly toward the working class, corporate donations can have the maximum impact. Thus, I expect corporate elite donations to have more influence in labor-friendly states. I also expect the corporate elite to target more of their donations towards legislators in labor-friendly states. This leads to my hypotheses for Chapter 6:

H 6.1: The positive association between corporate elite donations and anti-labor bill proposals will be stronger in pro-labor states.

H 6.2: Legislators in pro-labor states will be more likely to have received money from corporate elite donors.

H 6.3: Legislators in pro-labor states will have a larger number of corporate elite donors.

H 6.4: Legislators in pro-labor states will receive more money from corporate elite donors.

In Chapter 7 I ask the following research questions: *Does elite capital investment shape anti-labor legislative outcomes? If so, does elite capital investment shape anti-labor legislative*

outcomes by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort? I previously hypothesized that increased monetary investment from the corporate elite would be associated with increased anti-labor legislative effort (bill proposals). I expect this relationship to extend to bill outcomes as well. In other words, legislators who receive corporate donations should not only be more likely to propose anti-labor bills on behalf of the elite, but also vote in favor of elite interests (i.e., vote against bills that enhance working class strength and vote for bills that restrict working class power). Further, the relationship between corporate elite campaign funding and the number of anti-labor bills passed in a state should be at least partially explained by increased anti-labor legislative effort, or an increase in anti-labor bills proposed in that state. This leads me to my hypotheses for Chapter 7:

> *H 7.1: Corporate elite donations to bill sponsors will be positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage.*
>
> *H 7.2: The state average of corporate elite donations to legislators will be positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage.*
>
> *H 7.3: The positive association between corporate elite donations and the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage will be mediated or explained by the frequency of anti-labor bill proposals.*

CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS

The empirical foundation of this study consists of several unique datasets that I created. This chapter outlines data collection, dataset construction, variable operationalization, missing data, and analytic strategy.

Data Sources

The data for this investigation come from five distinct sources, all of which were collected from publicly available secondary sources, described in this section.

Proposed Collective Bargaining Bills

To capture legislative effort (bill proposals) and political outcomes (bill passage), I collected data for every bill related to collective bargaining that was proposed in the 2012 state legislative sessions from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL; www.ncsl.org). The NCSL has collected comprehensive information on all bills proposed by state legislatures since 2011. Their data on labor unions and collective bargaining are available in a searchable database that is updated bi-weekly. Sub-topics within this database include bills relating to public employee unions, dues, elections, political activity, RTW, arbitration, strikes, teacher contracts, public safety, and public contracts. I chose to focus on collective bargaining legislation for four important reasons: (1) labor legislation is the center of the class-based struggle for power between capital and labor, (2) labor laws vary widely at the sub-national level, (3) labor law is currently relevant, as evident in the passage of RTW in Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and (4) because anti-labor law is connected to the decline in union strength and the massive growth of economic inequality in the US.

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I decided to analyze all proposed bills in the 2012 session for three key reasons. First, this year had the largest number of proposed bills related to collective bargaining (N=1,143). Second, 2012 was the session before an election year, and if legislators are motivated by reelection, we would expect them to be especially concerned with passing legislation during this year. Finally, collecting information on bills from 2011-2012 allows for enough time to pass to have complete data on the outcome of the bill, thus minimizing "pending" outcomes.

With funding from the Vanderbilt College of Arts and Science Summer Research Award, I employed a team of four undergraduate students and one graduate student to code the bills. Each bill was coded for its stance toward organized labor. The possible codes were (1) anti-labor/pro-business, (2) neutral, and (3) pro-labor/anti-business. Examples of coded bills are provided in Chapter 4 ("Valence by Topic"). To ensure coding reliability, two separate coders were randomly assigned to code each bill. Any coding discrepancies between coders (about 20% of the bills) were reconciled on a case-by-case basis.

Financial Contributions to Political Candidates

To measure elite capital investment, I collected information on state-level campaign donations. I gathered data on campaign donations from The National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP, www.followthemoney.org). The NIMSP is a nonpartisan guide to financial influence on all state-level elections. The Institute collects data on (1) election contributions from disclosure agencies with which candidates must file their campaign finance reports and (2) all state-level candidates in the primary and general elections. I have collected data on all financial donations to state legislative election between 2008 and 2011, capturing the donations to every legislator in office during the 2012 session. For each legislator, I capture (a) the total amount of campaign contributions in their most recent election, (b) the amount of money donated from

organized labor interests, and (c) the amount of money donated from organized business interests. I further refined the business donations by specifying donations from sources among the top 25 most interlocked corporations (discussed in detail in the "Measures" section) in the US. I also collected data on the donations from national and state Chambers of Commerce as another measure of elite business influence.

Constituent Characteristics

To capture the characteristics of constituents and to address pluralist theoretical expectations, I used the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, USA (IPUMS, Ruggles et al. 2015) to collect 2010 census data on state and constituent characteristics. The IPUMS is a collection of more than fifty high-precision samples of the American population drawn from fifteen federal censuses and from the American Community Surveys of 2000-2012. For each state, I collected data on the following constituent characteristics: (a) poverty rates, (b) unemployment rates, (c) immigrant population, (d) wages for working population, (e) the racial composition of the state, (f) trends in employment sectors, and (g) homeownership.

State Legislature Data

In order to address institutionalist accounts of the political process, I collected information on legislative institutions. Data on state-level institutions and legislative rules were collected and made publicly available for replication[6] by Anzia and Jackman (2013). In this case, NCSL data on state legislatures and data from their own 2010 email survey were combined. The legislative clerks or secretaries of all 99 state legislative chambers were emailed to ask about specific institutional rules: (a) who appoints the members and chairs of standing committees, (b)

[6] As of June 22, 2016, these data are available at https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research/selected-publications/legislative-organization-and-the-second-face-of-power-evidence-from-us-st

whether the chamber votes on committee assignments, (c) how bills are placed on chamber floor calendars, and (d) whether the calendar procedures have changed in the last 10 years.

Political Context Data

Finally, I collected data on state political context from a variety of sources, including state legislative websites. Political context matters because I am interested in how the effect of elite capital investment varies according to political environment. I collected information on laws regarding collective bargaining in each state as of 2010, the partisanship of each chamber in 2011 and 2012, the party of the governor during the 2011-2012 sessions, and whether the house or senate swung to Republican majority in the 2010 midterm elections. I also collected data on unionization rates for each state in 2010.[7]

Concept Operationalization

From the above data sources, I constructed three separate datasets. In the first dataset, the legislator is the unit of analysis (N=7,143). The Legislator Dataset provides the empirical foundation for examining influences on the behavior of the state legislators. In the second dataset, the proposed bill is the unit of analysis (N=1,143). The Proposed Bills Dataset allows me to track the outcomes of the actual bills. In the third dataset, the state is the unit of analysis (N=50). The Aggregated Dataset allows me to conduct a test of my entire theoretical model at once. In this section, I describe my variables. The use of variables differs somewhat across the three analytic chapters. Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 summarize the variables used in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, respectively.

[7] Data come from Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson's website, http://unionstats.com

Table 3.1: Descriptions of Variables Used in Chapter 5

Variable Name	Description	Coding	Source
Dependent Variable			
Anti-Labor Score	A measure of the legislator's actions against organized labor (legislative effort)	(# of bills proposed favoring business) –(# of bills proposed favoring labor)	NCSL 2015
Campaign Contributions			
Labor	Donations from Labor PACs and Unions	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Business (all)	Donations from businesses, business PACs, F.I.R.E., & COC	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Corporate Elite	Donations from top 25 interlocked corporations	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Non-Elite Business	Donations from business that were not corp. elite	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
C.O.C.	Donations from COCs	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Tech	Donations from technology sector	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Agriculture	Donations from agriculture sector	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Energy	Donations from energy sector	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Finance	Donations from financial and banking sector	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Manufacturing	Donations from manufacturing sector	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Service	Donations from service sector	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Defense	Donations from defense sector	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Political Climate			
Pro-Labor Environment	A dummy variable that measures whether the political climate of the state is favorable toward labor	1= if (a) state is not RTW, (b) state's min. wage is > fed. min., *and* (c) the unionization rate is ≥10% ; 0 for all else	Political Context Data
Majority Sets Agenda	A measure of whether majority party has agenda setting ability	1= majority controls calendar 0=no	Anzia and Jackman
Chamber Majority	A measure of the chamber's partisan majority	1= Rep. Maj.; 0= Dem., Ind./Non-Part/Split	Political Context Data
Governor Party	A measure of the Governor's political party	1= Rep.; 0= Dem. or Ind. /Non-Part.	Political Context Data
2010 Rep. Swing	Indicates if the majority party of the legislator's chamber swung from Democrat (or split) to Republican in the 2010 election	1=yes; 0=no	Political Context Data
Legislator's Party	A measure of the Legislator's political party	3 dummy variables: (1) Democrat (ref), (2) Republican, (3) Ind./Nonpartisan	NIMSP 2015
Constituent Characteristics			
% Residents Black	A measure of the state's non-Hispanic black pop.	% of all residents	IPUMS, 2010
% Residents FB	A measure of the state's foreign-born pop.	% of all residents	IPUMS, 2010
% in Manuf., 1960	A measure of the size of the manuf. sector in 1960	% of all employed residents	IPUMS, 1960
Δ % in Manuf.	A measure of the change in the manuf. sector, 1960 to 2010	(% of employed residents in 2010) – (% of employed residents in 1960)	IPUMS, 1960, 2010
% in Agriculture	A measure of the size of the agri. sector	% of all employed residents	IPUMS, 2010
% Unemployed	A measure of state's unemployment	% of all residents (25-55) who are in the labor force but not employed	IPUMS, 2010
% < Poverty Line	A measure of state's poverty	% of all employed residents below FPL	IPUMS, 2010
Average Age	A measure of the age of state residents	Average age	IPUMS, 2010
% Own Homes	A measure of state homeownership rates	% of households owned	IPUMS, 2010
Average Income	A measure of state's average income	Average family income, in thousands	IPUMS, 2010

Table 3.2: Descriptions of Variables Used in Chapter 6

Variable Name	Description	Coding	Source
Dependent Variables			
Anti-Labor Score	A measure of the legislator's actions against organized labor (legislative effort)	(# of bills proposed favoring business) –(# of bills proposed favoring labor)	NCSL 2015
Any Corporate Elite Campaign Donation	Whether the legislator received any donations from top 25 interlocked corporations	1= legislator had corporate elite donors; 0= no corporate donors	NIMSP 2015
Total Corporate Elite Campaign Donations	Total amount of money from top 25 interlocked corporations	Logged total dollars	NIMSP 2015
Number of Corporate Elite Donors	Number of corporate elite donors	Summed total of corporate donors	NIMSP 2015
Campaign Contributions			
Labor	Donations from Labor PACs and Unions	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Corporate Elite	Donations from top 25 interlocked corporations	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Non-Elite Business	Donations from business that were not corp. elite	Logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Political Climate			
Pro-Labor Environment	A dummy variable that measures whether the political climate of the state is favorable toward labor	1= if (a) state is not RTW, (b) state's min. wage is > fed. min., *and* (c) the unionization rate is ≥10% ; 0 for all else	Political Context Data
Majority Sets Agenda	A measure of whether majority party has agenda setting ability	1= majority controls calendar 0=no	Anzia and Jackman
Chamber Majority	A measure of the chamber's partisan majority	1= Rep. Maj.; 0= Dem., Ind./Non-Part/Split	Political Context Data
Governor's Party	A measure of the Governor's political party	1= Rep.; 0= Dem. or Ind. /Non-Part.	Political Context Data
Legislator's Party	A measure of the Legislator's political party	3 dummy variables: (1) Democrat (ref), (2) Republican, (3) Independent/Nonpartisan	NIMSP 2015
Rep. Swing in 2010	Indicates if the majority party of the legislator's chamber swung from Democrat (or split) to Republican in the 2010 election	1=yes; 0=no	NIMSP 2015
Constituent Characteristics			
% Residents Black	A measure of the state's non-Hispanic black pop.	% of all residents	IPUMS, 2010
% Residents FB	A measure of the state's foreign-born pop.	% of all residents	IPUMS, 2010
% in Manuf., 1960	A measure of the size of the manuf. sector in 1960	% of all employed residents	IPUMS, 1960
Δ % in Manuf.	A measure of the change in the manuf. sector, 1960 to 2010	(% of employed residents in 2010) – (% of employed residents in 1960)	IPUMS, 1960, 2010
% in Agriculture	A measure of the size of the agri. sector	% of all employed residents	IPUMS, 2010
% Unemployed	A measure of state's unemployment	% of all residents (25-55) who are in the labor force but not employed	IPUMS, 2010
% < Poverty Line	A measure of state's poverty	% of all employed residents below FPL	IPUMS, 2010
Average Age	A measure of the age of state residents	Average age	IPUMS, 2010
% Own Homes	A measure of state homeownership rates	% of households owned	IPUMS, 2010
Average Income	A measure of state's average income	Average family income, in thousands	IPUMS, 2010

Table 3.3: Descriptions of Variables Used in Chapter 7

Variable Name	Description	Coding	Source
Dependent Variables			
Ordinal Outcome	An ordered measure of all possible outcomes of a bill	(1) failed in first chamber committee, (2) failed on first chamber floor, (3) failed in second chamber committee, (4) failed on second chamber floor, (5) vetoed, (6) passed into legislation.	NCSL (2015)
Trichotomous Outcome	A trichotomized measure of the bill's outcome	(0) failed in committee, (1) failed on the floor/vetoed, (2) passed	NCSL (2015)
Dichotomous Outcome	A dichotomized measure of the bill's outcome	(0) failed at any stage, (1) passed	NCSL (2015)
State Summed Total	A measure of the number of anti-labor bills passed per state	Sum of all anti-labor bills that passed	NCSL (2015)
Bill Characteristics			
Bill Subject	Set of dichotomous variables capturing the subject of the bill	(1) Arbitration/Negotiation, (2) Elections/Politics, (3) Public Employees, (4) Dues and RTW, (5)Benefits /Wages, (6) Strikes, (7) Teachers, and (8) Misc (ref.)	NCSL (2015)
Campaign Donations			
Corporate Elite	A measure of the donations from Corp. Elite to the bill's sponsor	logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2015
Any Corporate Elite Donor	A measure of whether the sponsor of the bill received any Corporate Elite donations	1= received any corporate elite donations 0=no	NIMSP 2016
Labor	A measure of the donations from Labor to the bill's sponsor	logged % of total donations	NIMSP 2016
Total State Corporate Elite Donations	A measure of all Corp. Elite donations to legislators in the state	summed USD (thousands)	NIMSP 2017
Total State Labor	A measure of all Labor donations to legislators in the state	summed USD (thousands)	NIMSP 2018
Avg. State Corporate Elite Donations	A measure of the average Corp. Elite donations to legislators in the state	mean USD (thousands)	NIMSP 2019
Avg. State Labor	A measure of the average Labor donations to legislators in the state	mean USD (thousands)	NIMSP 2020
Political Climate			
Pro-Labor Environment	A dummy variable that measures whether the political climate of the state is favorable toward labor	1= if (a) state is not RTW, (b) state's min. wage is > fed. min., ***and*** (c) the unionization rate is ≥10% ; 0 for all else	Political Context Data
Governor's Party	A measure of the Governor's party	1= Rep.; 0= Dem. or Ind. /Non-Part.	Political Context Data
Chamber Majority	A measure of the chamber's partisan majority	1= Rep. Maj.; 0= Dem., Ind./Non-Part/Split	Political Context Data
Majority Sets Agenda	A measure of whether majority party has agenda setting ability	1= majority controls calendar 0=no	Anzia and Jackman
Constituent Characteristics			
% Residents Black	A measure of the non-Hispanic black population in the state	% of all residents	IPUMS, 2010
% Residents FB	A measure of the foreign-born population of the state	% of all residents	IPUMS, 2010
% in Manufacturing	A measure of the size of the manuf. sector	% of all employed residents	IPUMS, 2010
% in Agriculture	A measure of the size of the agri. sector	% of all employed residents	IPUMS, 2010
% Unemployed	A measure of state's unemployment	% of all residents (25-55) who are in the labor force but not employed	IPUMS, 2010
% < Poverty Line	A measure of state's poverty	% of all employed residents below FPL	IPUMS, 2010
Average Age	A measure of the age of state residents	Average age	IPUMS, 2010
% Own Homes	A measure of state homeownership rates	% of households owned	IPUMS, 2010
Average Income	A measure of state's average income	Average family income, in thousands	IPUMS, 2010

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable for Chapters 5 and is the legislator's *Anti-Labor Score* (NCSL 2015). This variable is operationalized as the number of bills proposed that favor business minus the number of bills proposed that favor collective bargaining. A scale of the difference between pro-labor bills and anti-labor bills is preferable to other measures for three reasons. First, it is not very skewed, and therefore does not have to be transformed. Second, it is preferable to a dichotomous measure (legislator proposed an anti-labor bill=1 or did not=0) because its allows for variation among legislators who proposed anti-labor bills. For example, Representative Shane Schoeller (R, Missouri) proposed one anti-labor bill in 2012, whereas Representative Neal Kurk (R, New Hampshire) proposed six anti-labor bills in 2012. A dichotomized variable would treat these two Representatives the same, which would be problematic. Third, this continuous measure is also preferable to a count of only the anti-labor bills proposed, because it accounts for any pro-labor bills that were proposed. For example, Senator Joseph Robach (R, New York) proposed two anti-labor bills and three pro-labor bills in 2012, whereas Senator Paul McKinley (R, Iowa) proposed two anti-labor bills and no pro-labor bills in 2012. A count measure of all anti-labor bill proposals would treat these two Senators as the same, which would also be problematic.

There are four dependent variables in Chapter 6. The first dependent variable is the legislator's *Anti-Labor Score*, as measured in Chapter 5. The second dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the legislator received *Any Corporate Elite Campaign Donation*. This dummy variable was coded 1 if the legislator received a donation from any of the top 25 interlocked corporations in their most recent election campaign. The third dependent variable is *Total Corporate Elite Campaign Donations*. This is a measure of the total amount (in logged USD) that the legislator received from the top 25 interlocked corporations in their most

recent campaign. Finally, *Number of Corporate Elite Donors* is a count measure of the number of separate elite corporations that donated to the legislator in their most recent campaign.

The dependent variable for Chapter 7 is *Labor Bill Outcome* (NCSL 2015). This variable has four specifications: ordinal, trichotomous, dichotomous, and a summed state total. First, there is an ordered measure of the bill outcome. Every bill proposed in state legislatures follows the same path through the legislative process. The sequence is as follows: after a bill is proposed, it moves to a committee in the first chamber. Once this committee modifies and approves the bill, it moves to a floor vote in the first chamber. If the bill passes, it is sent to a committee in the second chamber. Once the second committee modifies and approves the bill, it is moved to a floor vote in the second chamber. If the bill passes, it is sent to the governor to sign into law or veto. If the bill is vetoed, the chambers have the ability to override the veto (sometimes this requires a simple majority vote, but it usually requires a two-thirds supermajority). The ordinal specification is coded as having one of the following outcomes: (1) failed in first chamber committee, (2) failed on first chamber floor, (3) failed in second chamber committee, (4) failed on second chamber floor, (5) vetoed, or (6) passed into legislation. This process is depicted in Figure 3.1 below. The trichotomous specification is coded as (0) if the bill failed in a committee, (1) if the bill failed on the floor of either chamber (or by veto), and (2) if the bill passed. The dichotomous specification is coded as (1) if the bill is passed by both chambers of the legislature and then signed into law, and (0) if it failed at any prior stage. Finally, the summed specification coded as the total number of anti-labor bills that were passed into law for each state. This summed measure allows for analyses at the state level.

Figure 3.1: Legislative Pathways of Proposed Bills



Campaign Contributions

The focal predictor variables are campaign contributions (NIMSP 2015). *Business Contributions* is a continuous measure of the logged percent of financial contributions to the legislator from (a) business PACs, (b) individual businesses, or (c) finance, insurance, and real estate sectors.

Corporate Elite Contributions is a continuous measure of the logged percent of financial contributions (in USD) to the legislator from the 25 most interlocked corporations in 2011. Information about these top 25 corporations comes from Domhoff and Staples (2013) data on corporate interlocks. These corporations are ranked by their Bonacich Centrality Score (BCS), a measure of embeddedness within corporate networks (discussed in further detail in Chapter 5). These corporations are: 3M, Allstate, Abbott Laboratories, IBM, Continental Airlines, Northern Trust Corp., Caterpillar, Deere, United Airlines, Boeing, Corning, Smurfit-Stone Container, FedEx, Marathon Oil, Aon, Exelon, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, United Technologies, McDonald's, Aetna, Illinois Tool Works, McGraw-Hill, Eli-Lilly Pharmaceuticals, and United Parcel Service (UPS). Detailed information on these corporations can be found in Chapter 5, Table 5.3.

Non-Elite Business Contributions is a continuous measure of the logged percent of non-elite business contributions (USD), calculated by taking the total business contributions and subtracting the corporate elite contributions.

Because previous research has established that the COC was previously important in the formation of policy (e.g., Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013), *Chamber of Commerce Contributions*

is a continuous measure of the logged percent of financial contributions (in USD) to the legislator from local, state, or national COC associations.

Other work has examined the effect of industry-specific donations on legislative effort (e.g., Monardi and Glantz 1998; Stratmann 1991, 2002, 2005). To address this, I use seven measures to capture *Competing Segments of Capital*: (1) Campaign Contributions from Energy, (2) Campaign Contributions from Services, (3) Campaign Contributions from Finance and Banks, (4) Campaign Contributions from Agriculture, (5) Campaign Contributions from Manufacturing, (6) Campaign Contributions from Technology, and (7) Campaign Contributions from Defense. Each of these variables is a continuous measure of the logged percent of financial contributions (in USD) to the legislator from businesses in their respective industry or sector.

Previous work has also found it important to account for contributions from labor interests (e.g., Beaulieu and Magee 2004). *Labor Contributions* is a continuous measure of the logged percent of financial contributions (in USD) to the legislator from (a) labor PACs and/or (b) labor unions.

Political Context

Pro-Labor Environment is a dichotomous measure of political leaning toward labor. For each state, I assessed whether: (a) the state had a RTW law, (b) the state used the exact federal minimum wage, and (c) whether the unionization rate was under 10 percent. For each item, there were two possible options: a (1) indicates that the condition is present, and a (0) indicates that the

condition is absent. A state was coded as having a pro-labor environment if all three conditions were absent.[8]

Legislator's Party is separated into three dummy variables: (1) Democrat (ref), (2) Republican, and (3) Independent/Nonpartisan.

Chamber Majority is a measure of whether the majority party in the legislator's chamber is (1) Republican (reference) or (0) Democrat or Independent/Nonpartisan.

Republican Governor is a dummy variable measuring whether the governor was a (1) Republican or (0) not in the legislator's state.

Republican Swing is a dummy variable indicating that the majority party of the legislator's chamber swung from Democrat (or split) to Republican in the 2010 midterm election.

Constituent Characteristics

I employ several measures that capture constituent characteristics of the legislator's state. *Percent Black* is a measure of the proportion of state residents who identify as non-Hispanic black. *Percent Foreign Born* is a measure of the proportion of state residents who are foreign born (IPUMS 2010).

To capture the decline of industrialization in many states, I control for both the *Percent Employed in Manufacturing in 1960,* as well as the *Change in Percent Employed in Manufacturing from 1960 to 2010.* Both are measures of the proportion of employed residents who worked in the manufacturing sector. I also control for the *Percent of Residents Employed in*

[8] My analyses consistently showed that the most meaningful difference was between states where none of these conditions were present, but see Appendix G for analyses using a continuous measure

Agriculture and *Percent of Residents Employed in the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate* (FIRE) sector.

The Unemployment Rate is a measure of the proportion of the working-age population (21-55) that is unemployed and looking for work in the state. *Average Income* measures the average total family income among adult residents in the state. *Percent below Poverty Line* is a measure of the proportion of households at or below the poverty line for the state. *Average Age* is a measure of the mean age of the population in the state. Finally, *Percent Home Ownership* is a measure of the proportion of residents who own homes in the state.

Missing Data

Due to discrepancies in data from NIMSP, data on campaign donations from 406 legislators were coded as missing, and these legislators (about 5% of the total population) were dropped from the analysis. An example of a discrepancy would be Texas Representative Aaron Peña, who was reported to have received a total of $28,646.76 in donations during his 2010 campaign, but was reported to have over $29,000 in business donations alone. Legislators who had no campaign contributions were also dropped, as it is unlikely that they actually had no financial support. Appendix A provides the name, state, and reported campaign donations for all legislators dropped from the analysis.

Analytic Strategy

Subsequent analyses employ the three datasets described above. In the first dataset, the legislator is the unit of analysis (N=7,143). The Legislator Dataset allows me to examine the behavior of state legislators. In the second dataset, the proposed bill is the unit of analysis (N=1,143). The Proposed Bills Dataset allows me to track the outcomes of actual bills. The third

dataset is an aggregated version of the Proposed Bills Dataset at the state level (N=50). I detail the methodological strategies used in each chapter below.

Chapter 4

The purpose of Chapter 4 is to provide a detailed introduction to coded collective bargaining bills. All analyses are descriptive. Table 4.1 provides the breakdown of bills by political party and stance toward labor. Figure 4.1 provides a visual representation of the numbers of bills proposed by party. Figure 4.2 shows the coded valence of bills by party. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of proposals by topic and party, and Figure 4.4 presents descriptive statistics of bill valence by topic. For each category, I provide an example of a pro-labor bill and an anti-labor bill. Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of anti-labor legislation proposed across states.

Chapter 5

The research question being answered in Chapter 5 is, "*Does elite capital investment encourage anti-labor legislative effort?*" To answer this question, I estimate the effects of different measures of class interests on legislative behavior. This chapter begins by showing descriptive statistics for all relevant study variables. Means and proportions of all study variables are provided in Table 5.1. In Table 5.2, I present the average amount in US dollars and the average percent (not log-transformed) of donations by donor groups. Table 5.3 provides a detailed analysis of the top 25 interlocked corporations.

I then turn to my multivariate analyses. I use standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with standard errors adjusted for clustering within chambers. When data are clustered

(in this case by legislative chamber), observations and standard errors will be correlated together, violating the OLS assumption of independent observations and error terms. Clustered standard errors adjust for both general heteroskedasticity and intra-cluster correlation (Primo et al. 2007). Table 5.4 presents these results. In the first model, I test whether legislators' Anti-Labor Scores vary according to campaign donations from business interests. In the second model, I examine the effects of competing segments of capital or industry-specific effects. In the third model, I examine the effects of donations from the Chamber of Commerce. Finally, in the fourth model, I divide donations from business into the corporate elite and non-elite businesses.

Chapter 6

The research question being answered in Chapter 6 is, "*Is the relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort strategic?*" To answer this question, I examine how the association between campaign donations from the corporate elite and legislators' proposal of collective bargaining bills is moderated by a labor-friendly climate. The chapter begins by showing descriptive statistics for all relevant study variables. Table 6.1 provides means and proportions of all study variables that are used in Chapter 6. Table 6.2 provides a detailed description the labor climate for each state.

Table 6.3 compares the means and proportions of the study variables across legislators in pro-labor environments and anti-labor environments. I conducted t-tests and chi-squared tests of significance to test whether the mean or proportion is significantly different by climate.

I then turn to my multivariate analyses in Table 6.4. As in Chapter 5, I use standard OLS regression while adjusting my standard errors for clustering within chambers. In the first model, I establish the effect of donations from the corporate elite on legislators' Anti-Labor Scores. In the

second model, I include an interaction term (corporate elite donations × pro-labor environment) to test whether the effect of corporate elite donations is moderated by the dichotomous measure of labor-friendly environment.

I then test whether the corporate elite targets labor-friendly environments by predicting (1) whether legislators received any corporate elite donations (Table 6.5, using logistic regression), (2) the amount of corporate elite donations in logged dollars (Table 6.6, using standard OLS regression), and (3) the number of corporate donors each legislator has (Table 6.7, using negative binomial regression). All three tables have two models. The first model examines the main effect of labor-friendly environment on the outcome, to test whether the corporate elite target legislators in labor-friendly states. The second model examines if the effect of labor-friendly environments is moderated by party, to see if the corporate elite are more likely to donate to Democrats or Republicans in pro-labor states.

Chapter 7

The research questions being answered in Chapter 7 are, "*Do corporate elite donations shape anti-labor legislative outcomes?"* "*Do corporate elite donations shape anti-labor legislative outcomes by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort?*" To answer these questions, I use the Bills Dataset to examine how campaign donations from the corporate elite influence bill passage. In this chapter, I only focus on anti-labor bills (N=459). The chapter begins by showing descriptive statistics for all relevant study variables. Table 7.1 provides means and proportions of all study variables that are used in Chapter 7.

I then turn to my multivariate analyses. In this part of the chapter, I use ordered logistic regression for the ordinal outcome measure and the trichotomized outcome measure, and

standard logistic regression for the dichotomous outcomes measure. Again, I cluster standard errors by legislative chamber.[9] Using each of the dependent variables explained above, Table 7.2 examines how individual donations to bills' sponsors from the corporate elite predict anti-labor bill passage. Table 7.3 examines how whether any donations to bills' sponsors from the corporate elite predict anti-labor bill passage. Table 7.4 examines how the average corporate elite donations to legislators in the state predict anti-labor bill passage. Table 7.5 examines the relative importance of individual donations to bill sponsors and the average donations within the state.

Finally, I aggregated the Bills Dataset up to the state level to create the Aggregated Dataset (N=50), to examine the relationship between corporate elite capital investment, legislative effort, and political outcomes. Table 7.5 provides the descriptive statistics for the third dataset. To test the causal relationship between corporate elite donations, bill proposals, and bill passage, I conducted a mediation analysis, displayed in Table 7.6. Because the dependent variable in this analysis (the summed state total of anti-labor bills passed) is a count variable, the traditional tests of mediation (i.e., Sobel and Clogg tests) cannot be used (Robins and Greenland 1992; Pearl 2001). Instead I use a counterfactual mediation analysis developed by Robins and Greenland (1992) and Pearl (2001), and described in detail by Vanderwheele (2015). To conduct the mediation analysis, I use the Stata command "`paramed`" established by Emsley and Liu (2014). Using a negative binomial model for outcome Y (number of anti-labor bills signed into law), conditional on exposure A (average donations from the corporate elite), mediator M

[9] The standard ways of testing whether the parallel odds assumptions are violated in ordinal logistic regression do not allow for clustered standard errors. Thus, my final models do not test for violations for this assumption. However, I conducted supplemental analyses (not shown) predicting ordinal and trichotomized outcomes by campaign donations (individual sponsor donations, state average, and state total). Results suggest these measures do not violate parallel odds assumptions, with the caveat that these models did not cluster standard errors by chamber. Further supplemental analyses used multinomial logistic regression (which does not have a parallel odds assumption) and the results were substantively similar.

(proposed anti-labor bills), and control variables C given by exp ($\theta_0 + \theta_1 a + \theta_2 m + \theta_3 am + \theta'_4 c$), the controlled direct effect (CDE), the natural indirect effect (NIE), and the total effects (TE) on the rate ratio scale can be summarized by the following equations (Vanderhweele 2015):

Equation 3.1: Controlled Direct Effect

$$RR^{CDE}(m) = \exp\{(\theta_1 + \theta_{3m})(a - a^*)\}$$

Equation 3.2: Natural Indirect Effect

$$RR^{NIE} = \exp\{(\theta_2\beta_1 + \theta_3\beta_1 a)(a - a^*)\}$$

Equation 3.3: Total Effect

$$RR^{TE} = RR^{CDE} \times RR^{NIE} = \exp\{[\{(\theta_1 + \theta_{3m})(a - a^*)\}] \times [(\theta_2\beta_1 + \theta_3\beta_1 a)(a - a^*)]\}$$

The controlled direct effect is the effect of exposure A when the mediator M is held at its mean. The natural indirect effect can be understood as how much outcome Y would change, on average, if exposure A were fixed but M changed. In other words, the NIE expresses how much the outcome (number of anti-labor bills passed) would change if the exposure (corporate elite donations) were fixed at a = 1 (one standard deviation above its mean), but the mediator were changed from the level it would take if a* = 0 (one standard deviation below its mean) to the level it would take if a = 1 (one standard deviation above its mean).

Aside from allowing a mediation test for a non-normally distributed outcome, one of the main advantages of this method is that the counterfactual approach to mediation allows for the decomposition of results into a direct effect and an indirect effect, even when there are nonlinearities (Vanderwheele 2015). This method also tests for the possibility of a confounding exposure-mediator interaction, and controls for the confounding interaction if necessary. My

analyses indicated that there was no significant interaction between the exposure variable (average donation from the corporate elite) and the mediator (number of anti-labor bills proposed), therefore the confounding interaction was dropped.

Supplemental Analysis

Several types of sensitivity analyses were run to assess the robustness of my findings. Supplemental analyses focus on two issues: measurement and analysis. Specifically, I used several different measures of my focal predictor variables, campaign donations. The results presented in this dissertation use measures of the logged percent of total donations for each group (e.g., labor, corporate elite). I estimated three separate sets of analyses using (a) non-log transformed percent of total donations, (b) logged US dollars, and (c) non-log transformed US dollars. The results from these analyses were substantively similar across all measures. I have chosen to present the logged percent of total donations for two reasons. First, because a log-linear relationship between financial contributions and legislative behavior makes theoretical sense: we would expect that the difference between a $500 contribution and a $1,500 contribution to mean more than the difference between a $40,000 contribution and a $41,000 contribution. Second, I use percent of donations because this captures the competing interests from other donors (that is, who is donating the most) and also helps to address the issues of legislators in some states (e.g., California) getting more total donations than legislators in other states (e.g., Idaho).

Analytically, I also replicated my results using multi-level modeling instead of clustered standard errors. Multi-level modeling is another common technique used to adjust for clustering within level-2 variables. In the multilevel modeling technique, the observations are nested within the cluster variable, in this case, chamber (Cheah 2009). Multilevel modeling measures variance

at each level, allowing for errors to vary randomly within clusters and accounting for unexplained variation between clusters (Gelman 2006). Multilevel modeling works best with a large number of clusters (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Primo et al. 2007). However, because multilevel modeling heavy theory and data demands, Steenbergen and Jones (2002:234) "caution researchers against 'blindly' using these models in data analysis." There are two main reasons why I use clustered standard errors rather than multilevel modeling in this dissertation. First, I have a relatively small number of level-2 clusters (99 chambers) compared to the large number of level 1 observations (7,143 legislators). Second, the clustered standard errors approach is simpler, and because I am less interested in measuring the direct effects of chambers as I am in controlling for the effects of chambers, multilevel modeling is unnecessary. All analyses using multi-level modeling were substantively similar to the results presented here.

CHAPTER 4: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED BILLS

Introduction

This dissertation is based largely on innovative data that coded all state-level bills proposed about collective bargaining in 2012. Because these are original data that have never been used before, this chapter gives a detailed account of these bills.

Of the 1,143 bills proposed in state legislatures, 608 (53%) were sponsored by Democrats, 519 (45%) were sponsored by Republicans, and 16 (1.4%) were sponsored by Independents (see Figure 4.1). Because of the small number of Independent bills, this section mainly focuses on Democrat- and Republican-sponsored bills. Table 4.1 provides the breakdown of bills by party and stance toward labor, and Figure 4.2 graphically displays these trends. Not surprisingly, nearly 75 percent of Democrat-sponsored bills were pro-labor, and 76.7% of Republican-sponsored bills were anti-labor.

Table 4.1: Bill Stances toward Labor, by Party

	Anti-Labor	Neutral	Pro-Labor	Total
Party				
% Democrat	13.3	12.2	74.5	100.0
	(81)	(74)	(453)	(608)
% Republican	76.7***	7.9***	15.4***	100.0
	(398)	(41)	(80)	(519)
% Independent / Non-Partisan	62.5***	6.3***	31.3***	100.0
	(10)	(1)	(5)	(16)
Total	42.8	10.2	47.1	100.0
	(489)	(116)	(538)	(1143)

Notes: N=1,143; asterisks indicate significant difference between party, compared to Democrats
***p<0.001

Figure 4.1: Number of Proposed Bills by Party



Figure 4.2: Labor Valence of Proposed Bills by Party



There are also partisan differences in the topics of bills proposed (Figure 4.3). Although the majority of bills proposed by both parties were related to public employees (including public contracts, public safety officers, and public unions), Democrats focused on bills concerned with arbitration, strikes, and wages significantly more often than Republicans. Republicans proposed significantly more election legislation, RTW bills, and bills regulating dues than Democrats.

Figure 4.3: Proposed Bills by Party and Topic



Labor Valence by Topic

Figure 4.4 below shows the coded labor valence of bills by topic. For each category, I provide an example of one bill coded as pro-labor and one coded as anti-labor. Bills about *arbitration/negotiation* tended to be overwhelmingly pro-labor. Bills providing for mandatory binding arbitration were coded as pro-labor because the process tends to even the playing field between labor and management and also prevents management from stalling the bargaining

process indefinitely.[10] An example of an anti-labor arbitration/negotiation bill is OR House Bill 2655, "Labor Agreements Entered into by the State," sponsored by Gilliam (R). This bill was coded as anti-labor because it required the approval of collective bargaining and arbitration agreements by the state Legislative Assembly. An example of a pro-labor bill in this area is PA House Bill 1660, "Public School Employees' Collective Bargaining Rights," proposed by Santarsiero (D) and seven other House Democrats, and two Republicans. This was coded as pro-labor because it expanded collective bargaining, provided for mediation and fact-finding panels, set time frames for employers, and provided for strikes and lockouts in certain circumstances.

Figure 4.4: Labor Valence of Proposed Bills by Topic



Bills about *elections* were mostly anti-labor. An example of an anti-labor election bill would be Pennsylvania House Bill 602, "Secret Ballot for Employee Representation," sponsored

[10] Separate preliminary analyses dropping all binding arbitration bills when calculating the legislators' Anti-Labor Scores found no significant or substantive difference to my results.

by Scott Perry and 23 other House Republicans. This bill proposed a constitutional amendment requiring that all union elections be held by secret ballot rather than card check. Secret ballot elections are generally regarded as being unfavorable to labor, as they make it easier to weaken the solidarity of workers, and employers may sometimes intimidate workers before elections by threatening to fire pro-union workers (Lafer 2007). An example of a pro-labor election bill is California Senate Bill 104, "Labor Representatives: Elections," sponsored by Senator Darrell Steinberg (D). The bill proposed that agricultural employees could select labor representatives by petitioning the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, and required the use of representation cards rather than secret ballots. The bill also extended "existing prohibitions and penalties to employers who engage in specified unfair labor practices" to agricultural employees.

Bills that focused on *public employees* varied greatly by topic and valence. An example of a common anti-labor law in this category was Georgia House Bill 416, "Labor Organizations," which was sponsored by Representative Bobby Franklin (R). The bill intended to ban all public employees from collective bargaining. An example of a pro-labor bill in this category is New Jersey Assembly Bill 19, "Public Employees Right to Collective Bargaining," sponsored by Wayne DeAngelo (D). The bill was a proposed Constitutional amendment that would guarantee all public employees in New Jersey the right to collectively bargain. However, not all bills in this category were specifically about collective bargaining; some focused on public employee's rights. For example, California Assembly Bill 2676, titled "Agricultural Employee Safety" and sponsored by Ian Calderon (D), would have made it illegal "for any person who directs an agricultural employee to perform, or supervises such employee in the performance of, outdoor work without providing the employee with shade and potable water." This bill was coded as being pro-labor.

Not surprisingly, bills that were about *dues or RTW* were overwhelmingly anti-collective bargaining. The most common anti-labor bills in this category were those proposing RTW laws, prohibiting closed shops and mandatory dues. An example of a common pro-labor bill in this category would be Vermont House Bill 239, "Fair Share Representation Fees," proposed by Francis "Topper" McFaun (R), proposed that non-union employees still pay a fair share fee as they still receive the benefits of collective bargaining.

Bills about *political activities* were also usually coded as anti-labor, as they most often focused on restricting the rights of unions' political activity. An example of an anti-labor bill about political activities is Iowa Senate Bill 2084: "A Bill for an Act Limiting Certain Campaign Contributions by Labor Unions and Providing for a Penalty," sponsored by Senate Republicans First Dearden, First Chelgren, and First Horn. IA SB 2084 stated "that a labor union shall not make a monetary or in kind contribution to a candidate or committee." Thus, in a state with such a law, labor organizations would be unable to donate to political campaigns, but the wealthy elite and corporate PACs would still be able to. Pro-labor bills in this category generally prohibited employers from using public funds to try to dissuade employees from joining unions, such as New Jersey Assembly Bill 2054, "Prohibited Public Fund Use by Employers" (sponsored by DeAngelo).

Wage and benefit bills typically focused on establishing benefits for workers. For example, California Assembly Bill 400, "Employment: Paid Sick Days" sponsored by Representative Fiona Ma (D), stated that "an employee who works in California for 7 or more days in a calendar year is entitled to paid sick days," and "prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee who requests paid sick days." An example of an anti-labor

bill in this category is New Jersey Senate Bill 748, "Sick Leave Injury Program," sponsored by Nicholas Scutari (D), which terminated the sick leave injury program for state employees.

Bills that were about *strikes* were evenly distributed across labor valence. An example of an anti-labor bill regarding strikes is Michigan House Bill 4465, "Prohibited Strike," sponsored by Bill Rogers (R), which required that teachers who participate in unlawful strikes have a mandatory suspension of their teaching certificate. An example of a pro-labor bill in this category is New York Senate Bill 2655, "Right to Strike by Public Employees," proposed by Kruger (D). The bill established the right to strike for all public employees.

Finally, proposed bills about *teachers* were also mixed between pro-labor and anti-labor, and their subjects varied widely. Anti-labor bills about teachers sometimes prohibited teachers' unions or teachers' strikes. Others were less direct in curbing collective bargaining power. For example, Michigan House Bill 4214 (sponsored by Pscholka (R) and eventually signed into law by Governor Rick Snyder) created emergency financial managers in districts declared to be "failing." These emergency managers have the authority to unilaterally cancel or amend existing government or school employee union collective bargaining agreements. Pro-labor bills often promoted stronger teachers' unions or protected teachers in their evaluations, such as California Assembly Bill 1166, "Pupil Records Privacy: Test Scores and Grades," sponsored by Solorio (D) and Hancock (D). This bill kept students' test scores confidential when it came to teachers' annual evaluations.

Labor Valence by State

Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of anti-labor legislation proposed across states. Darker red corresponds with higher counts of anti-labor legislation proposed in 2012. States in the upper

Midwest and the Northeast, in general, saw more bill proposals that opposed collective bargaining in 2012. Many of these states (e.g., Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, and New York) are traditionally liberal states with strong unions. These patterns appear inconsistent with theories of path-dependency, which would predict that conservative states (with historically acrimonious labor relationships) would propose more regressive labor legislation. Instead, the presence of anti-labor proposals in liberal states suggests a strategic move of organized capital to pass anti-labor laws in pro-labor states.

Figure 4.5: Distribution of Anti-Labor Proposals by State



Bill Outcomes

Figure 4.6 shows the breakdown of bill outcomes. Recall that all proposed bills generally follow the same path in the legislative process:[11] (1) sent to a committee in Chamber 1, and when ready, are (2) voted on the floor of Chamber 1, and if the vote passes, they are (3) sent to a committee in Chamber 2, and when ready, are (4) voted on the floor of Chamber 2. If the bill passes, it can still be (5) vetoed by the governor, but if not (or if a veto is overridden), the bill is (6) signed into law (see figure 3.1).

Figure 4.6: Bill Outcomes



As shown in Figure 4.6, the vast majority of bills (over two-thirds) fail in Chamber 1 committees. Another ten percent die on the floor of Chamber 1. In other words, less than one-quarter of all bills even make it to Chamber 2 for committee assignment or voting. Nearly two-

[11] Except for in unicameral Nebraska, where all bills are coded as only going through Chamber 1. Therefore the codes are as follows: (1) sent to a committee, then (2) voted on the floor. If the bill passes the vote, it can still be (5) vetoed by the governor, but if not (or if a veto is overridden), the bill is (6) signed into law

thirds (66 percent) of the bills that do make it to Chamber 2 (14 percent of all proposed bills) are signed into law.

Table 4.2 provides the outcome of the bills by party. The patterns in bill outcomes are similar across parties, except that bills proposed by Democrats were more likely to be vetoed, and bills proposed by Republicans passed at a slightly higher frequency (both differences significant at $p<0.10$).

Table 4.2: Bills Outcome by Party

Outcome	Republican	Democrat
Failed Committee 1	67.3%	68.9%
Failed Chamber 1	11.0%	10.2%
Failed Committee 2	2.8%	4.4%
Failed Chamber 2	2.0%	1.8%
Vetoed	1.0%	2.3%*
Passed	16.0%	12.4%*

N=1,143 Asterisks indicate a significant Chi-Square tests of difference: *p<0.10

Discussion

This chapter introduced the bills that were collected and coded for this dissertation. Among the 1,143 bills proposed in 2012, there was great variation in topic and in stance toward labor. Many anti-labor bills seem to be focused in the upper Midwest, an area that has historically been favorable to labor. The following chapters explore the proposal and passage of these bills in depth.

CHAPTER 5: ELITE VERSUS NON-ELITE BUSINESS INTERESTS

Introduction

The question being addressed in this chapter is: Does elite capital investment encourage anti-labor legislative effort? The theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2 is presented again below in Figure 5.1, with an emphasis on the theoretical focus of this chapter: how elite capital investment influences legislative effort.

Figure 5.1: Theoretical Focus of Chapter 5



I conceptualize campaign donations as investments the corporate elite dedicate to legislators. Rather than bribes, corporate donations can be understood as gifts (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993) that work to create and maintain a relationship between political actors and the elite. Legislative effort is measured as anti-labor legislation proposals, as opposed to votes, as bill proposals can better capture influence and ideology than voting patterns. I hypothesized that corporate elite campaign donations would be positively associated with anti-labor bill proposals.

Descriptive Results

Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics for the data used in this chapter, where the legislator is the unit of the analysis (N=7,143). The dependent variable, a legislator's Anti-Labor Score, ranges from -23 to 8, with a mean of 0.

Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for All Study Variables, Chapter 5

	Mean (SD) or %	Range
Dependent Variable		
Anti-Labor Score	-0.008 (0.63)	-23.00 – 8.00
Campaign Donations (logged %)		
Labor	1.227 (1.24)	0.00 – 4.62
Business (all)	2.420 (1.08)	0.00 – 4.58
Corporate Elite	0.318 (0.54)	0.00 – 3.97
Non-Elite Business	2.430 (1.04)	0.00 – 4.62
Chamber of Commerce	0.148 (0.37)	0.00 – 2.76
Segmented Capital Sectors		
Energy	1.372 (1.02)	0.00 – 4.62
Service	1.007 (0.80)	0.00 – 4.62
Financial	0.864 (0.74)	0.00 – 4.62
Agriculture	0.792 (0.83)	0.00 – 4.14
Manufacturing	0.340 (0.51)	0.00 – 4.43
Technology	0.081 (0.25)	0.00 – 3.03
Defense	0.040 (0.18)	0.00 – 3.11
Political Climate		
Pro-Labor Environment	23.8%	0.00–1.00
Chamber Majority=Republican	61.6%	0.00–1.00
Governor=Republican	56.2%	0.00–1.00
Republican Swing in 2010	17.0%	0.00–1.00
Legislator=Republican	52.8%	0.00–1.00
Legislator=Democrat	46.2%	0.00–1.00
Legislator= Ind./ Non-Partisan	1.0%	0.00–1.00
Agenda Setting Ability	67.0%	0.00–1.00
Constituent Characteristics		
% Residents Black	11.322 (9.83)	0.37 – 37.21
% Residents Foreign Born	9.627 (6.23)	1.46 – 28.17
% in Manufacturing, 1960	23.501 (9.68)	3.64 – 39.88
∆ % in Manufacturing (2010-1960)	-12.853 (8.44)	-28.53 – 4.34
% in Agriculture	2.144 (1.21)	0.93 – 6.36
% in FIRE	4.581 (0.97)	2.30 – 6.98
% Unemployed	6.270 (1.29)	2.33 – 9.43
% < Poverty Line	33.753 (4.89)	25.34 – 45.14
Average Age	17.004 (3.14)	11.05 – 25.01
% Own Homes	37.721 (1.47)	31.83 – 40.67
Average Income (thousands $)	68.522 (4.05)	55.84 – 75.59

Notes: N=7,143

The vast majority (92%) of legislators had a score of 0, indicating that they either proposed 0 collective bargaining bills, or that the number of pro-labor bills proposed was the same as the number of anti-labor bills proposed (resulting in a score of 0)[12].

Campaign donations are presented as the logged percent of total donations from the legislator's most recent election. Business donations average more than double labor donations to legislator campaigns. Corporate elite donations (those from the top 25 interlocked corporations) on average make up a very small percentage of campaign donations.

Table 5.2: Average Donations (in Dollars and Percentage) by Donor Group

Donations from…	# of Legislators Receiving Any Donation	Average Donation (in $)	Average Donation (% of total)
Business (all)	6,642	$27,735.98	17.51%
Non-Elite Business	6,601	$26,827.48	15.87%
Corporate Elite	2,767	$2,583.83	1.83%
Chamber of Commerce	1,546	$1,571.29	1.31%
Labor	4,698	$16,500.52	10.33%
Energy Sector	5,801	$8,311.94	5.73%
Service Sector	5,597	$5,346.18	2.85%
Financial Sector	5,336	$3,975.03	2.20%
Agriculture Sector	4,897	$4,342.36	2.38%
Manufacturing Sector	3,330	$2,511.69	0.70%
Technology Sector	1,056	$1,971.84	0.14%
Defense Sector	658	$1,084.43	0.07%

[12] Nearly all of these were legislators proposing no bills (N=6,608). There were 17 legislators who proposed one pro-labor bill and one anti-labor bill: Sen. Brady (IL-R), Rep. Castelli (NY-R), Rep. Comstock (VA-R), Rep. Davis (IL-D), Rep. Dickinson (CA-D), Rep. Durhal (MI-D), Sen. Earll (PA-R), Rep. Geiss (MI-D), Rep. Gimas (NH-D), Sen. Golden (NY-R), Rep. Kay (IL-R), Sen. Lavalle (NY-R), Sen. Nishihara (HI-D), Rep. Perry (PA-R), Rep. Pretlow (NY-D), Sen. Tokuda (HI-D), and Rep. Verschoore (IL-D). There was one legislator who proposed two pro-labor bills and two anti-labor bills: Sen. Tarr (MA-R). No legislators proposed three or more of each.

Table 5.2 provides details on donations by displaying the average amount in US dollars and the average percent (not log-transformed) of donations by donor groups, dropping legislators who did not receive donations from each group.

Most legislators (93%; N=6,642) received donations from All Business interests (elite and non-elite). Of those who did, the average sum of donations from All Business per legislator was $27,736 (17.5 percent of donations). When differentiating between the Corporate Elite and Non-Elite Businesses, it is clear that most legislators also received donations from non-elite businesses (92%; N=6,601). The average total of Non-Elite Business donations was $26,827 (15.9 percent of donations). Over one-third of legislators (38.7%; N=2,767) received donations from the Corporate Elite. Of those legislators who received Corporate Elite donations, the average sum of donations from the corporate elite was $2,584 (1.8 percent of donations). About one-in-five legislators (21.6%; N=1,546) received donations from a Chambers of Commerce (COC). Of those legislators who received COC donations, the average sum of donations was $1,571 (1.3 percent of donations).

Nearly two-thirds (63%; N=4,698) of legislators received donations from Labor interests. Of those legislators who received labor donations, the average sum of donations from Labor was $16,500 (10.3 percent of donations).

When examining various segments of capital, Table 5.2 shows a great deal of variation in donations by sector. The majority of legislators (81.2%; N=5,801) received donations from the Energy Sector. Of those who did, the average sum of donations from the Energy Sector was $8,3112 (5.7 percent of donations). Over three-quarters of legislators (78.4%; N=5,597) received donations from the Service Sector. Of those who did, the average sum of donations from the

Service Sector was $5,346 (2.9 percent of donations). Nearly three-quarters of legislators (74.7%; N=5,336) received donations from the Financial Sector. Of those who did, the average sum of donations from the Financial Sector was $3,975 (2.2 percent of donations). Over two-thirds of legislators (68.6%; N=4,897) received donations from the Agriculture Sector. Of those who did, the average sum of donations from the Agriculture Sector was $4,342 (2.4 percent of donations). Almost half of legislators (46.6%; N=3,330) received donations from the Manufacturing Sector. Of those who did, the average sum of donations from the Manufacturing Sector was $2,512 (0.70 percent of donations). Less than fifteen percent of legislators (14.8%; N=1,056) received donations from the Technology Sector. Of those who did, the average sum of donations from the Technology Sector was $1,972 (0.14 percent of donations). Finally, only 658 legislators (0.9%) received donations from corporations marked as defense. Of those who did, the average sum of donations from the Defense Sector was $1,084 (0.07 percent of donations).

Table 5.3 provides a detailed analysis of the top 25 interlocked corporations, which are used to represent the corporate elite. These data come from Domhoff, Staples, and Schneider (2013). These corporations are ranked by their Bonacich Centrality Score (BCS), a measure of embeddedness within corporate networks. The BCS is a useful measure because it emphasizes how many connections a director has *and* how central those connections are (Bonacich 1972, 1987). This measure is standard among researchers examining interlocking directorates (e.g., Banerjee and Murray 2015; Davis and Mizruchi 1999; Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Mizruchi and Bunting 1981; Schwartz 1985).

Table 5.3: Top 25 Interlocked Corporations and Donations to Legislators

Corporation	Industry	BCS	Donations Range ($)	Avg. Donation (SD)	Total Donations	# of Donations
1. 3M	Conglomerate	6444.479	200 - 3500	$901.29 (633.58)	$87,425.00	97
2. Allstate	Insurance	5984.575	100 - 12750	$1,105.57 (1417.40)	$469,865.00	425
3. Abbott Laboratories	Health Care; Technology	5658.831	100 - 12250	$1,039.62 (1186.44)	$738,128.90	710
4. IBM	Technology	5078.791	-	-	$0.00	
5. Continental Airlines	Transportation	5015.414	250 - 4500	$1,105.68 (1050.87)	$48,650.00	44
6. Northern Trust Corp.	Finance	4998.747	250 - 3000	$1,625.00 (1944.54)	$3,250.00	2
7. Caterpillar	Heavy equipment; Finance	4578.335	500 - 45000	$2,766.81 (5869.67)	$417,787.90	151
8. Deere	Heavy equipment	4402.883	250 - 8000	$1,500.95 (1508.68)	$550,850.00	367
9. United Airlines	Transportation	4394.972	200 - 4270	$1,098.80 (995.90)	$27,469.96	25
10. Boeing	Aerospace; Defense	4243.344	200 - 7800	$1,045.91 (965.14)	$356,656.00	341
11. Corning	Manufacturing; Technology	3695.432	200 - 7000	$2,293.75 (2059.28)	$36,700.00	16
12. Smurfit-Stone	Packaging and Recycling	3678.537	250 - 5000	$692.98 (701.19)	$58,210.00	84
13. FedEx	Courier	3674.743	35.82 - 22500	$1,385.68 (2236.11)	$432,331.50	312
14. Marathon Oil	Energy	3658.962	250 - 5200	$688.58 (622.68)	$286,450.00	416
15. Aon	Finance; Insurance	3429.015	500 - 3000	$1,166.67 (829.16)	$10,500.00	9
16. Exelon	Energy	3260.573	200 - 20259	$1,697.22 (2381.92)	$422,608.60	249
17. Northrop Grumman	Aerospace; Defense	3214.213	100 - 9000	$1,151.67 (1186.64)	$202,693.00	176
18. General Dynamics	Aerospace; Defense	3160.564	300 - 300	$300.00	$300.00	1
19. United Technologies	Conglomerate	3098.334	700 - 900	$800.00 (141.42)	$1,600.00	2
20. McDonald's	Service	3027.044	150 - 7800	$994.85 (870.19)	$517,320.00	520
21. Aetna	Health Care	3010.225	150 - 12500	$1,299.13 (1613.73)	$336,475.00	259
22. Illinois Tool Works	Manufacturing	3009.683	500 - 2500	$916.67 (557.32)	$11,000.00	12
23. McGraw-Hill	Financial	3007.098	100 - 900	$323.81 (221.14)	$6,800.00	21
24. Eli Lilly	Pharmaceuticals	3006.585	100 - 12500	$1,098.05 (1503.07)	$1,302,285.00	1186
25. United Parcel Service	Courier	2929.440	12.87 - 22500	$1,739.69 (2041.43)	$1,089,048.00	626
TOTAL			12-45000	$1,225.46 (1772.94)	$7,414,403.86	6,051

The table displays the name of the corporation, the industry (or industries) of the corporation, the BCS, the range of donations to legislators in the dataset (all non-zero values), the average

donation (and standard deviation) to state legislators, the total sum (in dollars) of donations to legislators in the dataset, and the number of legislators to whom each corporation donated.

It is clear when looking at Table 5.3 that the most interlocked corporations are no longer all banks, as the industries of the top 25 interlocked corporations vary widely. This initial finding might seem to support Mizruchi's (2013) hypothesis of a fractured elite, but we assume that firms from different industries have different interests. Table 5.3 also shows that corporations vary widely in donating to state-level legislators. While some corporations donated to no candidates (IBM) or very few candidates (e.g., General Dynamics, United Technologies, and Norther Trust Corp), other corporations donated to several hundred legislators (e.g., Boeing, Deere, Marathon Oil, FedEx), with Abbott Laboratories donating over one million dollars to over 1,000 legislators. Overall, 3,562 state legislators in the 2012 session received over 7.4 million dollars in donations (6,051 individual donations) from the corporate elite.

The average donation by an elite corporation to a legislator was $1,225, with donations ranging from just over $12 (UPS's donation to Pennsylvania Senator Stewart Greenleaf) to $45,000 (Caterpillar donation to Illinois Representative Tom Cross). Although $45,000 is a lot of money to donate to the average citizen, these 25 corporations held over 1.2 trillion dollars in assets in 2012, about seven percent of the US GDP that year (see Appendix B for a description of reported assets by company in 2012). Figure 5.2 breaks down the corporate elite donations in increments. The modal contribution category (representing 841 legislators) was between $1,000 and $2,500. Another 406 legislators received between $2,500 and $5,000 in donations from the corporate elite.

Figure 5.2: Donations from Corporate Elite



Multivariate Results

Table 5.4 provides the results from the multivariate analyses for this chapter. Each model regresses Anti-Labor Scores on various measures of campaign donations. All analyses in this table adjust for clustering within chambers and control for various measures of political climate and constituent characteristics.

Model 1 examines the effect of All Business donations received on Anti-Labor Scores. I find that when examining all business donations together, there is no association between donations from business and Anti-Labor Scores. This initially supports previous research in political science that finds no relationship between campaign donations and legislative behavior (e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2003; Chappell 1981; Grenzke 1989; Wright 1989), as well as Mizruchi's (2013) argument that the capitalist class has fractured.

Table 5.4: OLS Regressions of Anti-Labor Scores on Campaign Donations

	(1) All Business Donations		(2) Segmented Capital		(3) Chamber of Commerce		(4) Corp. Elite vs. Non-Elite	
	b	(SE)	*b*	(SE)	*b*	(SE)	*b*	(SE)
Campaign Donations (logged %)								
All Business	0.003	(0.006)						
Segmented Capital								
Energy			0.015	(0.010)				
Services			0.002	(0.010)				
Finance/Banks			- 0.008	(0.015)				
Agriculture			- 0.008	(0.009)				
Manufacturing			0.010	(0.013)				
Technology			- 0.020	(0.026)				
Defense			0.012	(0.030)				
COC					0.043	(0.033)		
Corporate Elite							0.035**	(0.012)
Non-Elite Business							- 0.004	(0.007)
Labor	-0.049***	(0.011)	- 0.051***	(0.011)	- 0.049***	(0.011)	- 0.050***	(0.011)
Political Climate								
Pro-Labor Environment	- 0.076**	(0.028)	- 0.077**	(0.026)	- 0.078**	(0.027)	- 0.084**	(0.027)
Dem. Party	- 0.104***	(0.020)	- 0.101***	(0.019)	- 0.101***	(0.019)	- 0.100***	(0.019)
Ind. Party	0.050	(0.064)	0.059	(0.069)	0.020	(0.058)	0.060	(0.065)
Rep. Maj. Chamber	- 0.003	(0.025)	- 0.001	(0.025)	- 0.005	(0.024)	- 0.005	(0.025)
Rep. Governor	0.039*	(0.019)	0.034	(0.019)	0.042*	(0.019)	0.037*	(0.018)
2010 Rep. Swing	- 0.017	(0.024)	- 0.021	(0.025)	- 0.010	(0.023)	- 0.014	(0.023)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.025	(0.017)	0.027	(0.018)	0.024	(0.017)	0.022	(0.016)
Constituent Characteristics								
% Black	- 0.002	(0.002)	- 0.002	(0.002)	- 0.002	(0.002)	- 0.002	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	- 0.003	(0.003)	- 0.002	(0.003)	- 0.003	(0.003)	- 0.004	(0.003)
% in Manuf., 1960	0.005	(0.003)	0.005	(0.003)	0.004	(0.003)	0.003	(0.003)
∆ in Manuf. 1960-2010	0.005	(0.004)	0.006	(0.004)	0.004	(0.004)	0.004	(0.003)
% in Agriculture	0.000	(0.014)	0.001	(0.012)	0.005	(0.015)	- 0.004	(0.014)
% in FIRE	- 0.015	(0.012)	- 0.012	(0.011)	- 0.016	(0.012)	- 0.010	(0.011)
% Unemployed	0.033**	(0.011)	0.034**	(0.011)	0.032**	(0.011)	0.037**	(0.011)
Average Income	0.009	(0.012)	0.008	(0.012)	0.010	(0.012)	0.010	(0.012)
% < Poverty Line	0.004	(0.016)	0.003	(0.016)	0.006	(0.016)	0.005	(0.016)
Average Age	0.005	(0.007)	0.006	(0.006)	0.003	(0.007)	0.005	(0.006)
% Own Homes	0.012*	(0.005)	0.012**	(0.005)	0.012*	(0.005)	0.012*	(0.005)

N=7,143 Clustered standard errors (by chamber) in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Model 2 examines the influence of competing segments of capital on Anti-Labor Scores. In other words, is it specific sectors and industries that influence legislative action when it comes to collective bargaining bills? I find that no sector dominates others to influence Anti-Labor Scores. In other words, the idea that businesses unify according to their industry-wide interests is

not supported here. Supplemental analyses (see Appendix C) examined each segmented capital variable independently and found no significant relationships between any sector and the dependent variable.

Model 3 examines the effect of donations from COC on anti-labor legislation. I find no association between donations from COC and Anti-Labor Scores. Although the US COC has been important in the past, it does not appear to influence state legislators through campaign donations.

Finally, Model 4 separates Corporate Elite donations from Non-Elite Business donations. I find that while Non-Elite Business continue to have no impact on Anti-Labor Scores, there is a significant and positive association with Corporate Elite donations ($b=0.035$, $p<0.01$). In other words, legislators who receive more donations from the corporate elite (as a function of the percent of all donations) tend to propose more anti-labor legislation.

Sensitivity Analyses

I conducted sensitivity analyses of my measure for corporate elite donations, presented in Appendix D. Each model replicates Model 4 from Table 5.4, but removes one of the 24 (IBM did not donate so was not included) corporations. For example, the measure of the corporate elite in Model 1 of Appendix D includes all corporations except for 3M, which is instead included in the measure of non-elite business donations. The measure of corporate elite donations remains significant across all models. To discern if the effect of corporate elite donations changed across models, I conducted tests for the equality of coefficients using the following equation:

Equation 5.1: Equality of Coefficients

$$z = \frac{\beta_1 - \beta_2}{\sqrt{se\beta_1{}^2 - se\beta_2{}^2}}$$

None of the models differed significantly from the main analyses. This suggests that the effect of the corporate elite is structural and not driven by donations from any particular outlier corporation.

I also conducted analyses using other measures of corporate donations, presented in Appendix E. Model 1 of Appendix E uses the logged number of corporate donors to predict Anti-Labor Scores, Model 2 uses a non-logged measure of the number of corporate donors (top coded at 4 or more), and Model 3 uses a dummy-coded variable of any corporate elite donors (1=yes, 0=no). All three continue to control for donations from non-elite business and labor. I find that the number of corporate donors is associated with higher Anti-Labor Scores, as is receiving any corporate elite campaign donations.

Finally, I conducted matched sample estimation to adjust for confounding factors and selection bias, a commonly used technique when assessing the effect of a treatment that may be biased due to selection (Aral et al. 2009; Kim, Kogut, and Yang 2015; Murray *forthcoming*; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). In this case, it could be that certain legislators have a greater propensity to receive donations from the corporate elite. I estimated the propensity that each legislator had a corporate elite donor based on all of the other independent and control variables. I then matched each legislator that actually received a corporate elite donation (treated group) with a legislator that did not have a corporate elite donation (untreated group) but have the most similar propensity scores. Then I conducted a logistic regression on the matched sample to estimate the treatment effects of donations on Anti-Labor Scores. These results are presented in

Appendix F, and indicate that when comparing legislators that are by all other measures similar, those who received corporate elite campaign donations have higher Anti-Labor Scores.

Taken together, these sensitivity analyses provide strong evidence that my measure of corporate elite involvement is a useful one, and that the association between donations and Anti-Labor Scores is likely not due to selection bias. Campaign donations from the top 25 interlocked corporations has a significant and robust effect on the behavior of legislators.

Discussion

This chapter asked whether corporate elite donations encourage anti-labor legislative effort. I found that total business donations were not associated with legislative effort, nor were donations from the Chamber of Commerce, nor were donations from industry-specific segments of capital. Instead, and in support of my hypothesis, I found that when corporate elite donations were separated from non-elite business, campaign donations from the corporate elite were positively associated with anti-labor bill proposals. This supports the idea that the corporate elite are theoretically distinct from the rest of the business community. This also supports research that continues to find unity among the US elite.

It is useful to look at some concrete examples of legislators who fit this trend, [13] summarized in Table 5.5 below. Representative Mike Huval (R-Louisiana) received no donations (0%) from the corporate elite in his most recent election prior to 2012, and proposed no anti-labor bills (or any pro-labor bills) during the 2012 legislative session.

[13] For comparison purposes, I chose discuss only Republicans, but this trend was significant for Democrats as well.

Table 5.5: Examples of Legislators and Corporate Donors

Legislator	Corporate Donors	Donations from Corporate Elite	Anti-Labor Bill Proposals
Mike Huval (R-Louisiana)	None	$0	none
David Taylor (R-Washington)	Boeing Eli-Lilly McDonalds	$1,550 (1.4%)	Two WA HB 2525 WA HB 2526
David Winters (R- Illinois)	Caterpillar Deere Exelon McDonald's UPS	$5,800 (4.5%)	Three IL HB 1673 IL HB 1849 IL HB 5582

Three of the top 25 corporations, Boeing, McDonalds, and Eli-Lilly, donated a total of $1,550 to Representative David Taylor (R-Washington) prior to the 2012 session, representing about 1.4 percent of his total donations. Taylor had an Anti-Labor score of 2, representing two bills he proposed that both aimed to increase the regulation of unions: House Bill 2525 increased regulation on union finances and required public disclosure of all public-sector unions' spending. House Bill 2526 increased union regulations by requiring that all collective bargaining sessions of public unions to be conducted as open public meetings, which would effectively slow down the collective bargaining process.

Finally, five of the top 25 corporations, Exelon, Deere, Caterpillar, McDonald's, and UPS, donated a total of $5,800 to Representative David Winters (R-Illinois) prior to the 2012 session, representing about 4.5 percent of his total donations. Winters had an Anti-Labor Score of 3, representing three anti-collective bargaining bills he sponsored that all proposed to amend Illinois' Public Labor Relations Act: House Bills 1673, 1849, and 5582. The first bill proposed

an effective ban on raising taxes to pay the cost of public employees' wages and benefits. The second bill proposed to limit the amount of funds available for arbitration and collective bargaining. Finally, the third bill proposed to redefine and limit which workers would be legally defined as public employees (and therefore protected under state collective bargaining laws).

These three cases are meant to be used as illustrations of the larger pattern that finds an association between corporate elite campaign donations and anti-labor bill proposals. In accordance with my theoretical model, elite capital investment in campaigns appears to exert influence on legislative effort. This chapter established the association between donations and bill proposals, but does not address whether this association is due to homophily (the corporate elite donates to legislators who are already anti-labor) or diffusion (donations from the corporate elite influence legislators' anti-labor behavior). The next chapter addresses this question.

CHAPTER 6: THE MODERATING EFFECT OF POLITICAL CLIMATE

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I established that there is an association between elite capital investment (campaign donations) and legislative effort (bill proposals). In this chapter, I ask the following question: Is the relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort strategic? The theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2 is presented again below in Figure 6.1, highlighting the theoretical focus of this chapter: how political climate moderates the relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort.

Figure 6.1:Theoretical Focus of Chapter 6



The question of strategy can be understood by the two models previously proposed in Chapter 2, the Donations-As-Votes Model and the Donations-As-Relationships model, which I review briefly. In the Donations-As-Votes model, the primary function of campaign donations is to aid in the campaign of the legislator running for office. In this way, donations act much like a vote from a constituent (Grossman and Helpman 1996; Magee 2002). From a network perspective, this is homophily: the donor-candidate connection is created on the basis of a shared ideology, rather than the connection leading to the shared ideology. According this model,

donations are not strategic: given unlimited resources, an individual would donate the same amount to all politicians with whom they agree.

In the Donations-As-Relationships model, donations from the elite represent gifts that are part of long-term social relationships (e.g., Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993). From a network perspective, this is diffusion: policy preferences diffuse from donor to candidate due to the relationship established by donations. Campaign donations buy access, and this access leads to diffusion of perspective on policy. Under this model, donations are strategic. Since donations are about influencing the behavior of politicians, donors may seek to target their money where they will have the most influence. Thus, in an environment that is already friendly to the interests of the elite, such as states that already restrict the power of organized labor, elite donations will have minimal impact. In an environment that is hostile to elite interests, or where the working class has greater strength, elite donations can have the maximum impact.

In this chapter, I examine how the political climate of a state moderates the influence of corporate elite campaign donations. I hypothesized that (a) the positive association between corporate elite donations and anti-labor bill proposals would be stronger in pro-labor states, (b) legislators in pro-labor states will be more likely to have received money from corporate elite donors, (c) legislators in pro-labor states will receive more money from corporate elite donors, and (d) legislators in pro-labor states will have a larger number of corporate elite donors.

Descriptive Results

As in Chapter 5, the legislator is the unit of the analysis (N=7,143). Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics for the data used in this chapter.

Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of All Study Variables, Chapter 6

	Mean (SD) or %	Range
Dependent Variables		
Anti-Labor Score	-0.008 (0.63)	-23.00 – 8.00
Any Corporate Elite Donors	38.7%	0.00 – 1.00
Donations from Corporate Elite (ln$)	2.734 (3.51)	0.00 – 11.58
Number of Corporate Elite Donors	0.813 (1.44)	0.00 – 14.00
Campaign Donations (logged %)		
Labor	1.227 (1.24)	0.00 – 4.62
Corporate Elite	0.318 (0.54)	0.00 – 3.97
Non-Elite Business	2.430 (1.04)	0.00 – 4.62
Political Climate		
Pro-Labor Environment	23.8%	0.00–1.00
Chamber Majority=Republican	61.6%	0.00–1.00
Governor=Republican	56.2%	0.00–1.00
Republican Swing in 2010	17.0%	0.00–1.00
Legislator=Republican	52.8%	0.00–1.00
Legislator=Democrat	46.2%	0.00–1.00
Legislator= Ind./ Non-Partisan	1.0%	0.00–1.00
Agenda Setting Ability	67.0%	0.00–1.00
Constituent Characteristics		
% Residents Black	11.322 (9.83)	0.37 – 37.21
% Residents Foreign Born	9.627 (6.23)	1.46 – 28.17
% in Manufacturing, 1960	23.501 (9.68)	3.64 – 39.88
∆ % in Manufacturing (2010-1960)	-12.853 (8.44)	-28.53 – 4.34
% in Agriculture	2.144 (1.21)	0.93 – 6.36
% in FIRE	4.581 (0.97)	2.30 – 6.98
% Unemployed	6.270 (1.29)	2.33 – 9.43
% < Poverty Line	33.753 (4.89)	25.34 – 45.14
Average Age	17.004 (3.14)	11.05 – 25.01
% Own Homes	37.721 (1.47)	31.83 – 40.67
Average Income (thousands $)	68.522 (4.05)	55.84 – 75.59

Note: N=7,143

The means and proportions of the study variables used in Chapter 5 are identical to those in this Chapter. The primary difference in this chapter is the inclusion of three more dependent variables: (1) whether the legislator received any corporate elite donations, (2) the total donations from the corporate elite, and (3) the number of corporate elite donors. Over one-third of legislators received any corporate elite donations in their most recent election.

Table 6.2 provides a detailed description of the labor climate in each state, as well as whether the state was coded as having a pro-labor environment. About one-quarter (23.8%) of legislators live in one of the twelve states coded as pro-labor. Among all legislators, the average total donations (in logged USD) from the corporate elite was 2.73, which translates to about $1,000 (as noted in Chapter 5, among the legislators who received corporate elite campaign donations the average total was $2,583). Finally, the total number of corporate donors ranged from 0 to 14, with an average number of corporate donors being just under 1 (0.81). Of those who received corporate elite donations, the average number of corporate donors was 2.

Table 6.2: Labor Climate Scores by State

State	**Has RTW Law?**	**Uses Federal Minimum Wage?**	**Unionization <10%?**	**Labor-Friendly Environment?**
Alabama	Yes	Yes	-	
Alaska	-	-	-	✓
Arizona	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Arkansas	Yes	Yes	Yes	
California	-	-	-	✓
Colorado	-	Yes	Yes	
Connecticut	-	-	-	✓
Delaware	-	Yes	-	
Florida	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Georgia	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Hawaii	-	Yes	-	
Idaho	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Illinois	-	-	-	✓
Indiana	-	Yes	-	
Iowa	Yes	Yes	-	
Kansas	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Kentucky	-	Yes	Yes	
Louisiana	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Maine	-	-	-	✓
Maryland	-	Yes	-	
Massachusetts	-	-	-	✓
Michigan	-	-	-	✓
Minnesota	-	Yes	-	
Mississippi	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Missouri	-	Yes	-	
Montana	-	Yes	-	
Nebraska	Yes	Yes	-	
Nevada	Yes	-	-	
New Hampshire	-	Yes	-	
New Jersey	-	Yes	-	
New Mexico	-	-	Yes	
New York	-	Yes	-	
North Carolina	Yes	Yes	Yes	
North Dakota	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Ohio	-	-	-	✓
Oklahoma	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Oregon	-	-	-	✓
Pennsylvania	-	Yes	-	
Rhode Island	-	-	-	✓
South Carolina	Yes	Yes	Yes	
South Dakota	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Tennessee	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Utah	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Vermont	-	-	-	✓
Virginia	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Washington	-	-	-	✓
West Virginia	-	Yes	-	
Wisconsin	-	Yes	-	
Wyoming	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Figure 6.2 provides a visual map of the labor environment by state. The dark blue states are the coded as pro-labor environment. Not surprisingly, Washington, Oregon, and California are all coded as pro-labor on the west coast, as are Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois in the Midwest. Although New York and Wisconsin have higher than average unionization rates (in 2010 they were 24.3% and 14.3%, respectively), they were not coded as pro-labor because both states used the federal minimum wage as of 2012. Alaska, a traditionally Republican-leaning state in most elections, was coded as pro-labor as it has a high unionization rate (23.2%).

Figure 6.2: Pro-Labor Climate by State



Table 6.3 displays bivariate tests for differences in descriptive statistics across labor climate. The left column shows the means and proportions for the legislators in anti-labor states (Pro-Labor Environment=0), and the right column shows the means and proportions for the legislators in the most pro-labor states (Pro-Labor Environment=0[14]). Results from t-tests show that legislators in anti-labor states have higher Anti-Labor Scores on average than legislators in pro-labor states (a difference of 0.073, $p<0.001$). At the bivariate level, legislators received more donations from labor (as a percentage of their total donations) in pro-labor states (a difference of 0.212, $p<0.001$). Although there was no significant difference in the amount legislators received

[14] See Appendix G for supplemental analyses using continuous measure.

from the corporate elite by environment, a larger proportion of legislators in pro-labor states (33.8%) received a donation from the corporate elite than those in anti-labor or neutral states (30.9%).

Table 6.3: Means and Percentages of Study Variables by Dichotomous Climate

	Labor Unfriendly Climate (N=6,169)			Labor Friendly Climate (N=974)	
Dependent Variables					
Anti-Labor Score	0.010	(0.55)	***	-0.063	(0.84)
Any Corporate Elite Donors	38.4%			39.7%	
Donations from Corporate Elite (ln$)	2.644	(0.05)	***	3.024	(0.09)
Number of Corporate Elite Donors	0.709	(0.02)	***	1.144	(0.05)
Campaign Donations (logged %)					
Labor	1.176	(0.02)	***	1.388	(0.03)
Corporate Elite	0.318	(0.01)		0.319	(0.01)
Non-Elite Business	2.540	(0.01)	***	2.078	(0.03)
Political Climate					
Majority Sets Agenda=1	68.8%		***	61.5%	
Chamber Maj=Republican	71.8%		***	28.8%	
Governor=Republican	64.2%		***	30.8%	
Republican Swing in 2010	20.5%		***	5.8%	
Legislator=Republican	56.7%		***	40.5%	
Legislator=Democrat	42.2%		***	58.9%	
Legislator= Ind. / Non-Part.	1.2%		***	0.5%	
Legislator= Incumbent	71.2%			71.2%	
Constituent Characteristics					
% Residents Black	12.721	(0.14)	***	6.849	(0.11)
% Residents Foreign Born	8.995	(0.08)	***	11.649	(0.15)
% in Manufacturing, 1960	21.213	(0.12)	***	30.817	(0.19)
Δ % in Manufacturing (2010-1960)	-10.840	(0.11)	***	-19.287	(0.16)
% in FIRE	4.514	(0.01)	***	4.797	(0.02)
% in Agriculture	2.204	(0.02)	***	1.953	(0.02)
% Unemployed	6.039	(0.02)	***	7.008	(0.03)
Average Income (thousands $)	33.028	(4.71)	***	36.072	(4.76)
% < Poverty Line	17.333	(0.05)	***	15.951	(0.04)
Average Age	37.532	(1.43)	***	38.325	(1.44)
% Own Homes	68.767	(0.05)	***	67.737	(0.12)

N=7,143. Asterisks indicate significant bivariate difference across labor environment: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Not surprisingly, the political climate measures are all significantly different by labor climate, with the exception of incumbent legislator. Agenda-setting abilities are more common in anti-labor climates, as are Republican legislators, governors, and chamber majorities. Chambers were also more likely to have swung to Republican from Democrat or split majority in 2010 in anti-labor states.

All of the constituent characteristics also varied by labor climate. While there are significantly more Black residents in anti-labor states, there are more immigrants in pro-labor states. Labor-friendly states had, on average, larger manufacturing sectors in 1960, but also saw a larger decline in manufacturing between 1960 and 2010. Labor-friendly states have higher rates of residents employed in the FIRE sectors, and lower rates of employment in agriculture. Labor-friendly states have higher unemployment rates, but also higher average incomes and lower poverty rates. The average age of constituents is slightly higher in pro-labor states, and the homeownership rate is slightly lower.

Multivariate Results

Table 6.4 examines the moderating effect of labor climate on the relationship between corporate elite donations and Anti-Labor Scores. Model 1 established that corporate elite donations are positively associated with Anti-Labor Scores. Model 2 includes an interaction between corporate elite donations and pro-labor environment. The results show a significant and positive interaction. These findings indicate that the association between corporate elite donations and Anti-Labor Scores is stronger in labor-friendly states.

Table 6.4: OLS Regression of Anti-Labor Score on Corporate Elite Donations

	(1)		(2)	
	b	(SE)	*b*	(SE)
Focal Interaction				
Corp. Elite Donations × Pro-Labor Enviro.			0.129**	(0.041)
Campaign Donations (logged %)				
Corporate Elite	0.035**	(0.012)	0.015	(0.010)
Non-Elite Business	-0.004	(0.007)	-0.007	(0.007)
Labor	-0.050***	(0.011)	-0.054***	(0.011)
Political Climate				
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.084**	(0.027)	-0.127***	(0.031)
Party=Dem	-0.101***	(0.019)	-0.091***	(0.019)
Party=Ind./Non-Partisan	0.061	(0.066)	0.065	(0.065)
Chamber = Rep. Maj.	-0.005	(0.024)	-0.003	(0.024)
Governor=Rep.	0.037*	(0.018)	0.050**	(0.018)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.014	(0.025)	-0.018	(0.022)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.022	(0.016)	0.019	(0.016)
Constituent Characteristics				
% Black	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.003	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	-0.004	(0.003)	-0.006*	(0.003)
% in Manuf., 1960	0.003	(0.003)	0.002	(0.003)
∆ in Manuf. 1960-2010	0.004	(0.003)	0.003	(0.003)
% in FIRE	-0.004	(0.013)	-0.008	(0.013)
% in Agriculture	-0.010	(0.012)	-0.005	(0.011)
% Unemployed	0.038**	(0.011)	0.036**	(0.011)
Average Income	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
% < Poverty Line	0.005	(0.016)	0.009	(0.016)
Average Age	0.005	(0.007)	0.008	(0.006)
% Own Homes	0.012*	(0.005)	0.011*	(0.005)

Notes: N=7,143. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Clustered standard errors (by chamber) in parentheses

Figure 6.3 shows the association between corporate elite donations and Anti-Labor Scores by dichotomized labor climate (based on Model 2 of Table 6.4). The light grey line represents the focal association in anti-labor states and shows only a small slope. The black line represents the slope in the most labor friendly states, and shows a more dramatic positive slope. This indicates that the effect of corporate elite donations is much stronger in pro-labor states.

Figure 6.3: Anti-Labor Score by Corporate Elite Donations and Labor Climate



These findings lead to the question of where donations go. Specifically, if the effect of corporate donations matter more in labor friendly states, do we see corporations focusing their money in these areas? Below I predict corporate elite campaign donations in three ways.[15] First, I use logistic regression to predict whether legislators received *any* donations from the corporate elite in their most recent election (Table 6.5). Second, I use OLS regression to predict the *amount of money* (in logged USD) from the corporate elite donors to legislators (Table 6.6). Third, I use negative binomial regression to predict the *number of corporate donors* to legislators (Table 6.7). In each table, the first model predicts the outcome focusing on the main effect of pro-labor environment. The second model in each table includes an interaction between pro-labor environment and the legislator's party.

[15] These analyses drop a small number (N=72) of independent and non-partisan legislators to examine differences between Democrats and Republicans.

Table 6.5: Logistic Regression of Having any Corporate Elite Donors

	(1)		(2)	
	b	(SE)	*b*	(SE)
Pro-Labor Environment	0.950*	(0.406)	1.338**	(0.462)
Party=Democrat	-0.856***	(0.192)	-0.726***	(0.206)
Pro-Labor Environment × Democrat			-0.731**	(0.283)
Incumbent	1.083***	(0.143)	1.094***	(0.143)
Donations from Labor (ln$)	0.094**	(0.029)	0.095***	(0.029)
Donations from Non-Elite Bus (ln$)	0.500***	(0.149)	0.503***	(0.150)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.289	(0.266)	0.302	(0.268)
Chamber = Rep. Maj.	0.273	(0.247)	0.283	(0.247)
Governor=Rep.	0.304	(0.257)	0.278	(0.259)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.616	(0.344)	-0.629	(0.342)
% Black	0.062**	(0.020)	0.062**	(0.020)
% Foreign Born	0.181***	(0.041)	0.181***	(0.041)
% in Manuf., 1960	0.215***	(0.044)	0.218***	(0.043)
∆ in Manuf. 1960-2010	0.190**	(0.059)	0.193**	(0.059)
% in Agriculture	0.565**	(0.188)	0.579**	(0.186)
% in FIRE	-0.727***	(0.175)	-0.725***	(0.177)
% Unemployed	-0.523***	(0.149)	-0.523***	(0.152)
Average Income	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
% < Poverty Line	-0.167	(0.113)	-0.159	(0.113)
Average Age	0.080	(0.094)	0.075	(0.093)
% Own Homes	0.040	(0.046)	0.039	(0.046)

Notes: N= 7,071. Logistic regressions predict the whether the legislator had any corporate elite donors give money to their most recent election campaign. Clustered standard errors (by chamber) in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Model 1 of Table 6.5 shows that the corporate elite are more likely to donate to legislators in pro-labor environments (b=0.950, p<0.05). Exponentiating the logged odds coefficient produces an odds ratio of 2.58, meaning that the odds of having any corporate elite donors are 158% higher in pro-labor states than anti-labor states.

Model 2 interacts pro-labor environment with party and finds a significant, negative interaction term (b=-0.731, p<0.001). This means that while the corporate elite targets legislators of both parties more often in pro-labor states, this relationship is weaker for Democratic legislators. In other words, the corporate elite are the most likely to donate to Republicans in pro-

labor states. Figure 6.4 uses this interaction to show the predicted probabilities[16] of a legislator having received corporate elite campaign donations.

Figure 6.4: Predicted Probability of Having Corporate Donors



It is perhaps unsurprising that the corporate elite are more likely to donate to Republicans than Democrats, as the Republican Party has traditionally been considered the pro-business party, while the Democratic Party has historically been more aligned with labor. What is interesting, however, is that the probability of having a corporate donor is much higher in pro-labor states for both parties. In fact, the probability of a Democrat in a pro-labor state receiving corporate elite donations (p=0.29) is almost the same as the probability of a Republican receiving corporate donations in an anti-labor or neutral state (p=0.31).

[16] This was done using the `margins` command in Stata 14 SE.

In Table 6.6, I regress the total amount (in logged USD) of money legislators receive from the corporate elite on political climate. Model 1 shows that legislators in pro-labor states received significantly more money from the corporate elite than legislators in other states (b= 1.502, p<0.01). While Democrats report significantly less money from the corporate elite than Republicans, the interaction between pro-labor environment and party in Model 2 is not significant. In other words, in terms of the amount of money donated, the corporate elite targets Democrats and Republicans in pro-labor states equally.

Table 6.6: OLS Regression of Corporate Elite Donations (logged USD)

	(1)		(2)	
	b	(SE)	*b*	(SE)
Pro-Labor Environment	1.502**	(0.537)	1.803**	(0.614)
Party=Democrat	-1.321***	(0.189)	-1.174***	(0.204)
Pro-Labor Environment × Democrat			-0.571	(0.362)
Incumbent	1.233***	(0.175)	1.242***	(0.175)
Donations from Labor (ln$)	0.152***	(0.027)	0.148***	(0.027)
Donations from Non-Elite Bus (ln$)	0.375***	(0.061)	0.375***	(0.061)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.268	(0.338)	0.272	(0.339)
Chamber = Rep. Maj.	0.798*	(0.368)	0.815*	(0.370)
Governor=Rep.	0.048	(0.313)	0.038	(0.315)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.707	(0.426)	-0.722	(0.425)
% Black	0.074**	(0.024)	0.072**	(0.024)
% Foreign Born	0.296***	(0.050)	0.296***	(0.049)
% in Manuf., 1960	0.306***	(0.060)	0.308***	(0.060)
∆ in Manuf. 1960-2010	0.280***	(0.081)	0.282***	(0.081)
% in Agriculture	0.553*	(0.226)	0.555*	(0.225)
% in FIRE	-0.857***	(0.194)	-0.855***	(0.194)
% Unemployed	-0.646***	(0.168)	-0.648***	(0.169)
Average Income	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
% < Poverty Line	-0.181	(0.134)	-0.174	(0.134)
Average Age	0.048	(0.148)	0.048	(0.146)
% Own Homes	0.082	(0.061)	0.080	(0.061)

Notes: N= 7,071. OLS regressions predict the donations (in logged USD) to legislators from the corporate elite. Clustered standard errors (by chamber) in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Model 1 of Table 6.7 shows that legislators in pro-labor states have a greater number of corporate elite donors compared to legislators in anti-labor states (b=0.801, p<0.001). Exponentiating the unstandardized coefficient provides an incident rate ratio of 2.228, meaning that the expected count of corporate donors is nearly 123% greater in pro-labor states than in other states. Model 2 shows that the interaction with Democrat is negative, meaning that while legislators in pro-labor states are expected to have more corporate elite donors, this effect is not as strong for Democrats. This is similar to the finding that the corporate elite are more likely to target legislators in pro labor states, especially Republicans.

Table 6.7: Negative Binomial Regression of Number of Corporate Elite Donors

	(1)		(2)	
	b	(SE)	*b*	(SE)
Pro-Labor Environment	0.801***	(0.194)	0.899***	(0.195)
Party=Democrat	-0.372***	(0.071)	-0.289***	(0.083)
Pro-Labor Environment × Democrat			-0.223*	(0.098)
Incumbent	0.758***	(0.096)	0.763***	(0.097)
Donations from Labor (ln$)	0.045**	(0.015)	0.044**	(0.015)
Donations from Non-Elite Bus (ln$)	0.464***	(0.057)	0.465***	(0.057)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.316*	(0.124)	0.314*	(0.125)
Chamber = Rep. Maj.	0.417***	(0.123)	0.429***	(0.123)
Governor=Rep.	-0.119	(0.156)	-0.122	(0.156)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.408*	(0.187)	-0.409*	(0.187)
% Black	0.053***	(0.012)	0.053***	(0.012)
% Foreign Born	0.111***	(0.019)	0.111***	(0.019)
% in Manuf., 1960	0.093***	(0.027)	0.093***	(0.027)
∆ in Manuf. 1960-2010	0.070	(0.037)	0.071	(0.037)
% in Agriculture	0.329**	(0.111)	0.331**	(0.111)
% in FIRE	-0.351***	(0.093)	-0.348***	(0.093)
% Unemployed	-0.333***	(0.089)	-0.332***	(0.090)
Average Income	-0.000*	(0.000)	-0.000*	(0.000)
% < Poverty Line	-0.175*	(0.075)	-0.171*	(0.075)
Average Age	0.000	(0.046)	0.001	(0.046)
% Own Homes	0.037	(0.025)	0.037	(0.025)

Notes: N= 7,071. Negative binomial regressions predict the number of corporate elite donors that gave money to legislators. Clustered standard errors (by chamber) in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Taken together, the findings presented in Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 indicate that the corporate elite target their campaign contributions to legislators in labor-friendly states. While this focused donation pattern occurs for both Democrats and Republicans, the pattern is strongest among Republican legislators.

Discussion

This chapter asked if the corporate elite are strategic in influencing legislative behavior. I found evidence to suggest they are: the effect of corporate elite campaign donations is stronger in pro-labor states, where the corporate elite's power is not as secure. These findings support the Donations-As-Relationships Model, wherein donations serve to create and maintain long-term social relationships between the corporate elite and politicians (e.g., Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993). According to this model, because campaign donations are about influencing politicians' behavior, corporate elite donors should seek to target their money where it will have the most influence. This is precisely what I find. In the most pro-labor environments, where the working class has the greatest strength and therefore elite interests are most at risk, elite donations have greater influence on the behavior of legislators.

Further, this chapter finds that the corporate elite actually target legislators in labor-friendly states. They donate more money, more often, to more legislators in pro-labor environments. These results suggest that the corporate elite focus on strategic targeting for access: money goes to candidates in states where they are in a position to help the corporate elite (i.e., the corporate elite do not need as much help to ensure anti-labor laws in states that are already hostile to labor).

For illustrative purposes, it is helpful to examine legislators who received a similar amount from the corporate elite but varied by labor climate, summarized in Table 6.8 below.[17] Consider Senator James Jackson (R) from Texas, a state that was coded as anti-labor (indeed, Texas actually has low union density, uses the minimum wage, and is a RTW state, so it ranked the lowest on the continuous measure of labor climate as well). He received $21,000 in donations from seven of the top 25 interlocked corporations (Allstate, Boeing, Continental Airlines, Eli-Lilly Pharmaceuticals, Exelon, and Marathon Oil), making up 1.6 percent of his most recent campaign donations. Jackson had an Anti-Labor Score of 0, as he did not propose any bill related to collective bargaining in 2012.

Table 6.8: Examples of Legislators with Similar Donations

Legislator	Labor-Friendly Environment?	Corporate Donors	Donations from Corporate Elite	Anti-Labor Bill Proposals
James Jackson (R-Texas)	No	Allstate Boeing Continental Eli-Lilly Exelon Marathon Oil	$21,000 (1.6%)	none
Bob Huff (R-California)	Yes	Allstate Boeing Eli-Lilly FedEx UPS	$14,800 (1.6%)	Two CA SCA 18 CA SB 1059

Conversely, consider Senator Bob Huff (R) from California, a state that is coded as pro-labor. Huff received $14,800 in donations from five corporations (Allstate, Boeing, Eli-Lilly, FedEx, and UPS). Although this is less in total dollars than what Jackson received, this total amounted to

[17] I again focus on Republicans for comparison purposes, but these effects do hold for Democrats.

1.6 percent of Huff's most recent campaign donations. Unlike Jackson, Huff proposed two bills that aimed to restrict collective bargaining in 2012: SCA 18, which placed severe restrictions on retirement benefits for public employees (including requiring employees to forfeit entire pension if ever convicted of a felony), and SB 1059, which restricted aspects of what public school teachers could collectively bargain over, and also removed the time frame for giving notice to an employee regarding action on charges.

Table 6.9: Examples of Legislators with Similar Anti-Labor Scores

Legislator	Labor-Friendly Environment?	Corporate Donors	Donations from Corporate Elite	Anti-Labor Bill Proposals
Glen Casada (R- Tennessee)	No	FedEx Marathon Oil	$3,250 (2.2%)	Five TN HB 179 TN HB 599 TN HB 3229 TN HB 3387
Mark Jansen (R-Michigan)	Yes	Eli-Lilly McDonald's	$2,250 (1.8%)	Five MI S 7 MI S 8 MI S 9 MI S 11 MI SJR 3

Alternatively, it is useful to consider two legislators who have the same Anti-Labor Score from different labor climates: Glen Casada (R-Tennessee) and Mark Jansen (R-Michigan). Both legislators received donations from two corporations (FedEx and Marathon Oil donated to Casada; Eli-Lilly and McDonald's donated to Janesn), and both showed a large amount of anti-labor legislative effort in the same year by proposing five separate anti-labor bills, listed in Table 6.9 above. However, Casada is in Tennessee, an anti-labor state, and Jansen is in Michigan, a pro-labor state. In his most recent election, Casada received $3,250 from the corporate elite, making up 2.2 percent of his total campaign contributions. Jansen received $2,250 in donations

from the corporate elite, making up 1.8 percent of his total campaign donations. Casada was given more money by the corporate elite (both in terms of total amount as well as the percent of all donations) than Jansen but both proposed the same number of bills. This suggests that, dollar-for-dollar, corporate elite money goes farther, and their influence is stronger, in pro-labor states.

These cases are meant as illustrations of the moderating effect of labor-friendly environments on the association between corporate elite campaign donations and anti-labor bill proposals. In accordance with my theoretical model, I find that pro-labor environments increase the effect of corporate elite campaign donations of anti-labor legislative effort. This variation across climate appears to be strategic, and suggests that the association is due to diffusion rather than homophily. This chapter establishes that the elite exert strategic influence on legislative effort, but does not address whether the corporate elite's influence extends to policy enactment. The next chapter addresses this question.

CHAPTER 7: PREDICTING LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES

Introduction

The previous two chapters demonstrated that donations from the corporate elite influence legislative behaviors by increasing anti-labor bill proposals. In this chapter, I shift the focus to examine bill outcomes, that is, whether bills are signed into law. Specifically, I ask the following questions: Does elite capital investment shape anti-labor legislative outcomes? Does elite capital investment shape anti-labor legislative outcomes by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort? The theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2 is presented again below in Figure 7.1, with an emphasis on the theoretical focus of this chapter: how elite capital investment (corporate elite campaign donations) shapes political outcomes (in this case, passed anti-labor legislation).

Figure 7.1: Theoretical Focus of Chapter 7



This chapter begins by examining if and how campaign donations from the corporate elite influence the odds of an anti-labor bill being signed into law. Previous chapters established that corporate elite campaign donations lead to increased anti-labor legislative effort. I argue that this is because donations from the corporate elite act as gifts that create and maintain social relationships between elites and politicians. Campaign donations leave legislators feeling indebted to the elite, and one way they act in reciprocation is through increased anti-labor

legislative effort (measured as bill proposals). However, symbolically proposing bills is only one way legislators may serve the interests of the elite. Labor legislation works to either strengthen or weaken the ability of the working class to organize (e.g., Davis and Huston 1993, 1995; Ellwood and Fine 1987; Hogler et al. 2004; McCammon 1990; Mishel 2001; Wallace 2007; Wallace et al. 1998; Warren and Strauss 1979), so it is in the interest of the elite to ensure that these anti-labor bills are signed into law. Thus, recipients of elite donations may also act on behalf of the elite by voting these bills through the legislative process. I hypothesized that (a) corporate elite donations to bill sponsors would be positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage, and that (b) the state average of corporate elite donations to legislators would be positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage. In this part of the chapter, the proposed bill is the unit of analysis, and I examine all anti-labor bills (N=459).

This chapter also addresses the mechanisms through which elite capital investment (donations) and legislative outcomes (bill passage) are related. Specifically, I hypothesized that (c) the positive association between corporate elite donations and the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage will be partially mediated or explained by the frequency of anti-labor bill proposals. The argument here is that when the corporate elite donate more money to legislators, these legislators will propose more anti-labor bills. When more bills are proposed, there is a greater likelihood of bill passage. In this part of the chapter, I move to an analysis at the state-level (N=50).

Descriptive Results: Bills Dataset

Table 7.1 provides descriptive statistics for the Bills Dataset (N=459). As described in Chapter 4, the majority of bills were not signed into law. The average bill had an Ordinal Scale score of 1.88, a trichotomized score of 0.38, and only 11.7 percent of all anti-labor bills were signed into law. Figure 7.2 provides the breakdown of outcomes among the anti-labor bills.

Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics of All Study Variables, Chapter 7

Variable	Range	Mean (SD) or %
Bill Outcomes		
Ordinal Outcome Scale	1.00 – 6.00	1.88 (1.69)
Trichotomized Outcome	0.00 – 2.00	0.38 (6.92)
Dichotomized Outcome	0.00 – 1.00	11.7%
Campaign Donations		
Any Donation from Corp Elite (=1)	0.00 – 1.00	44.8%
% From Corp Elite (ln)	0.00 – 4.62	0.50 (0.84)
% From Labor (ln)	0.00 – 4.62	0.94 (01.20)
Average State Corp. Elite Donations (ln)	0.00 – 10.05	4.93 (3.32)
Average State Labor Donations (ln)	0.00 – 12.53	8.53 (2.64)
Political Climate		
Pro-Labor Environment	0.00 – 1.00	35.0%
Governor=Republican	0.00 – 1.00	45.1%
Chamber = Republican Majority	0.00 – 1.00	51.5%
Agenda Setting Ability	0.00 – 1.00	76.7%
Constituent Characteristics		
% Black	0.37 – 31.89	8.85 (6.52)
% Foreign Born	1.46 – 28.17	11.15 (7.15)
% Employed in Manuf, 1960	4.40 – 39.88	27.98 (9.04)
Δ Employed in Manuf. 1960-2010	-28.53 – 4.34	-16.46 (7.75)
% Employed in F.I.R.E.	2.30 – 6.85	4.85 (0.78)
% Employed in Agriculture	0.93 – 6.36	1.86 (0.90)
% Unemployed	3.90 – 9.24	6.52 (1.30)
% < Poverty Line	11.05 – 20.94	16.01 (2.81)
Average Age	31.83 – 40.67	38.07 (1.08)
% Own Homes	55.84 – 75.59	68.26 (5.44)
Bill Subject		
Arbitration/Negotiation	0.00 – 1.00	6.8%
Elections	0.00 – 1.00	3.1%
Public Employees	0.00 – 1.00	27.0%
Dues / RTW	0.00 – 1.00	25.4%
Politics	0.00 – 1.00	2.0%
Benefits/Wages	0.00 – 1.00	1.0%
Strikes	0.00 – 1.00	3.7%
Teachers	0.00 – 1.00	13.9%
Misc. / Multiple	0.00 – 1.00	17.2%

Figure 7.2: Anti-Labor Bill Outcomes



Just under one-half (44.8%) of anti-labor bills proposed were sponsored by legislators who received donations from the corporate elite. The average corporate elite donation to bill sponsors was about 5.5 percent of total donations (logged percent=0.49), and the average labor donation bill sponsors was about 5.9 percent of total donations (logged percent=0.95). For these bills, the average donation from the corporate elite to legislators in the state is $1,660 (logged average is 4.93), and the average donation from labor interests to legislators in the state is $19,119 (logged average is 8.53). Nearly one-in-five bills (19.8%) were proposed in a pro-labor state. Forty-five percent of anti-labor bills were proposed in states with Republican governors, just over half were proposed in chambers with a Republican majority, and over three-quarters (76.7%) were proposed in chambers where the majority party has agenda setting abilities.

Figure 7.3 provides a summary of these anti-labor bills analyzed by subject. The most common anti-labor bill was about public employees (27. %), followed by dues and RTW bills (25.4%). Miscellaneous bills and bills about multiple subjects made up about 17 percent of the

dataset. Bills about teachers made up another 13.9 percent of the bills. Less common were bills about arbitration and negotiation (6.8%), strikes (3.7%), elections (3.1%), politics (2%), and benefits and wages (1%).

Figure 7.3: Anti-Labor Laws by Subject



Multivariate Results: Bills Dataset

Table 7.2 provides three models that examine how corporate elite campaign donations to the sponsor of a bill (measured in logged percent of total donations) predicts the bill's outcome. Model 1 uses ordered logistic regression to predict the six-category outcome variable. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict the trichotomized outcome variable (failed in committee, failed on chamber floor, or passed). Model 3 uses logistic regression to predict whether the bill passed (versus all failures). Across all three models, corporate elite campaign donations to bill sponsors are unrelated to the chances of anti-labor bills passing. This means that

the amount of money from the corporate elite donated to anti-labor bill sponsors is unrelated to bill passage.

Table 7.2: Regressions of Bill Outcomes on Sponsors' Corporate Elite Donations

	(1) Ordinal Outcome		(2) Trichotomized Outcome		(3) Dichotomized Outcome	
	b	SE	*b*	SE	*b*	SE
Campaign Donations to Bill Sponsor (ln %)						
Corporate Elite	0.157	(0.180)	0.146	(0.171)	0.180	(0.226)
Labor	0.151	(0.121)	0.008	(0.103)	0.059	(0.146)
Political Climate						
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.321	(0.764)	-0.066	(0.781)	1.362	(1.060)
Governor=Rep.	-0.140	(0.404)	-0.085	(0.443)	-0.355	(1.284)
Chamber Maj. = Rep	1.143*	(0.551)	1.831**	(0.605)	2.945	(2.184)
Agenda Setting Abilities	-0.695	(0.428)	-0.175	(0.431)	0.216	(0.417)
Constituent Characteristics						
% Black	-0.052	(0.032)	-0.026	(0.034)	0.076	(0.049)
% Foreign born	-0.020	(0.064)	0.010	(0.075)	0.118	(0.158)
% in Manufacturing, 1960	0.070	(0.099)	0.100	(0.112)	0.102	(0.114)
∆ in % Manufacturing	0.101	(0.160)	0.089	(0.180)	0.072	(0.172)
% in FIRE	-0.699*	(0.272)	-0.803*	(0.333)	-1.073	(0.806)
% in Agriculture	0.292	(0.502)	0.718	(0.613)	0.031	(0.688)
% Unemployed	0.274	(0.411)	0.108	(0.422)	-0.541	(0.594)
% < Poverty Line	-0.021	(0.109)	-0.018	(0.118)	0.091	(0.210)
Average Age	0.081	(0.234)	-0.077	(0.257)	0.005	(0.462)
% Own Home	-0.089	(0.072)	-0.117	(0.079)	0.037	(0.116)
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)						
Arbitration/Negotiation	1.085	(0.881)	0.912	(0.964)	1.524	(1.061)
Elections	0.085	(0.744)	-0.073	(0.753)	-1.103	(1.215)
Public Employees	0.527*	(0.268)	0.383	(0.281)	0.486	(0.359)
Dues / RTW	0.195	(0.400)	0.233	(0.402)	-0.891	(0.693)
Politics	-1.542	(0.800)	-1.471	(0.812)		
Benefits/Wages	2.338*	(0.924)	1.466**	(0.513)	1.063	(0.791)
Strikes	0.579	(1.338)	0.500	(1.423)	1.774	(2.059)
Teachers	-0.151	(0.401)	-0.475	(0.443)	-0.499	(0.645)

Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Model 1 uses ordered logistic regression to predict ordinal scale (1-6) of bill outcomes. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict trichotomized scale (0, 1, or 2) of bill outcomes. Model 3 uses logistic regression to predict dichotomized outcome (pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05

Table 7.3 reproduces the models in Table 7.2, but uses the dichotomous measure of corporate elite campaign donations. In Model 1, I find that an anti-labor bill whose sponsor received any donations from the corporate elite is significantly more likely to move through the legislative process ($b=0.797$, $p<0.01$). Exponentiating this coefficient produces cumulative odds ratio of 2.2, meaning that the odds of a bill moving to the next step in the legislative process are increased by 120% when a bill has a sponsor who received donations form the corporate elite.

Model 2 uses the trichotomized outcome measure. Again, I find that an anti-labor bill whose sponsor received any donations from the corporate elite is significantly more likely to move through the legislative process ($b=0.850$, $p<0.01$). Exponentiating this coefficient produces a cumulative odds ratio of 2.3, indicating that when an anti-labor bill has a sponsor who is connected to the corporate elite, the bill is 2.3 times as likely to make it to the floor to be voted on than bills sponsored by legislators without corporate elite donations, and it is 2.3 times as likely to move from the floor to being passed than bills whose sponsors do not have corporate elite campaign donations.

There is no association in Model 3, which uses a dichotomous outcome. This suggests that bills sponsored by legislators who received corporate elite donations are not more likely to pass than fail, compared to bills whose sponsors did not receive elite money. However, this could be due to the loss of variation that comes with dichotomizing the outcome into pass or fail.

Table 7.3: Regressions of Bill Outcomes on Any Corporate Elite Donations

	(1) Ordinal Outcome		(2) Trichotomized Outcome		(3) Dichotomized Outcome	
	b	SE	*b*	SE	*b*	SE
Campaign Donations to Bill Sponsor						
Any Corp Elite Donation (=1)	0.797**	(0.292)	0.850**	(0.295)	0.529	(0.379)
Labor (ln %)	0.168	(0.100)	0.018	(0.089)	0.111	(0.133)
Political Climate						
Pro-Labor Environment (=1)	-0.348	(0.765)	-0.068	(0.788)	1.211	(1.007)
Governor=Rep.	-0.092	(0.412)	-0.037	(0.426)	-0.344	(1.194)
Chamber Maj. = Rep	1.181*	(0.531)	1.923***	(0.582)	2.904	(2.017)
Agenda Setting Abilities	-0.745	(0.410)	-0.235	(0.381)	0.120	(0.405)
Constituent Characteristics						
% Black	-0.072*	(0.034)	-0.043	(0.036)	0.065	(0.048)
% Foreign born	-0.038	(0.064)	-0.009	(0.069)	0.109	(0.164)
% in Manufacturing, 1960	0.065	(0.089)	0.093	(0.099)	0.103	(0.106)
∆ in % Manufacturing	0.106	(0.148)	0.094	(0.166)	0.062	(0.165)
% in FIRE	-0.585*	(0.252)	-0.668*	(0.297)	-1.001	(0.794)
% in Agriculture	0.143	(0.483)	0.564	(0.576)	0.068	(0.665)
% Unemployed	0.257	(0.413)	0.083	(0.425)	-0.590	(0.583)
% < Poverty Line	-0.039	(0.106)	-0.044	(0.118)	0.108	(0.201)
Average Age	0.084	(0.218)	-0.077	(0.228)	-0.071	(0.437)
% Own Home	-0.103	(0.067)	-0.133	(0.075)	0.047	(0.114)
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)						
Arbitration/Negotiation	0.854	(1.014)	0.662	(1.079)	1.386	(1.171)
Elections	0.039	(0.726)	-0.155	(0.726)	-1.099	(1.172)
Public Employees	0.538	(0.280)	0.391	(0.291)	0.531	(0.354)
Dues / RTW	0.138	(0.396)	0.176	(0.401)	-0.814	(0.699)
Politics	-1.637*	(0.825)	-1.575	(0.828)		
Benefits/Wages	2.198*	(0.960)	1.289*	(0.548)	1.034	(0.806)
Strikes	0.435	(1.421)	0.336	(1.539)	1.663	(2.092)
Teachers	-0.188	(0.370)	-0.532	(0.405)	-0.515	(0.615)

Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Model 1 uses ordered logistic regression to predict ordinal scale (1-6) of bill outcomes. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict trichotomized scale (0, 1, or 2) of bill outcomes. Model 3 uses logistic regression to predict dichotomized outcome (pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05

Although any legislator can propose a bill, all legislators must vote on it if the bill advances to the floor. Therefore, I am also interested in how campaign donations to *all* legislators in the state may affect the chances of a bill passing. Table 7.4 displays three models

examining how corporate elite campaign donations to all legislators in a state (measured as the log of the mean donation) predicts the bill's outcome. Model 1 uses ordered logistic regression to predict the six-category outcome variable. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict the trichotomized outcome variable (failed in committee, failed on chamber floor, or passed). Model 3 uses logistic regression to predict whether the bill passed (versus all failures).

Model 1 reveals a significant and positive relationship between the average donation from the corporate elite to all legislators in a state and the bill's outcome ($b=0.439$, $p<0.001$). This means that when the corporate elite donate more money, on average, to legislators in the state, there is a significant increase in the cumulative odds of the bill moving through the legislative process.

Model 2, which uses the trichotomous outcome measure, has a similar finding that increased donations to the legislators in a state are significantly associated with the bill moving forward ($b=0.620$, $p<0.001$).

Model 3 finds no significant relationship between state-average corporate elite campaign donations, but again this may be due to the loss in variation when using a dichotomous variable. However, in general I find that when the corporate elite donate more money to legislators in a state, anti-labor bills have increased odds of moving through the legislative process. This includes moving from committees and onto the floor and also being voted for on the floor.

Table 7.4: Regressions of Bill Outcomes on State Average Corporate Elite Donations

	(1) Ordinal Outcome		(2) Trichotomized Outcome		(3) Dichotomized Outcome	
	b	SE	*b*	SE	*b*	SE
Average Campaign Donation in State (ln $)						
Corporate Elite	0.439***	(0.130)	0.620***	(0.143)	0.360	(0.194)
Labor	-0.420**	(0.146)	-0.583***	(0.142)	-0.488**	(0.185)
Political Climate						
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.158	(0.707)	0.645	(0.688)	1.237	(1.084)
Governor=Rep.	0.026	(0.343)	0.191	(0.389)	-0.042	(1.055)
Chamber Maj. = Rep	0.848	(0.590)	2.064***	(0.610)	2.128	(1.665)
Agenda Setting Abilities	-0.827	(0.460)	-0.344	(0.422)	0.329	(0.380)
Constituent Characteristics						
% Black	-0.112**	(0.043)	-0.075	(0.043)	0.051	(0.056)
% Foreign born	-0.047	(0.065)	-0.054	(0.078)	0.188	(0.181)
% in Manufacturing, 1960	0.149*	(0.076)	0.178*	(0.077)	0.240	(0.161)
∆ in % Manufacturing	0.308*	(0.131)	0.351**	(0.133)	0.263	(0.239)
% in FIRE	-0.402	(0.259)	-0.165	(0.367)	-1.001	(0.733)
% in Agriculture	-0.744	(0.544)	-0.476	(0.528)	-0.350	(0.972)
% Unemployed	0.530	(0.377)	0.462	(0.401)	-0.568	(0.601)
% < Poverty Line	-0.190	(0.122)	-0.328*	(0.155)	0.106	(0.185)
Average Age	0.371	(0.207)	0.300	(0.179)	0.055	(0.408)
% Own Home	-0.181*	(0.078)	-0.275**	(0.101)	0.067	(0.125)
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)						
Arbitration/Negotiation	0.881	(0.876)	0.551	(0.973)	1.399	(1.175)
Elections	0.130	(0.744)	-0.038	(0.736)	-1.078	(1.092)
Public Employees	0.531*	(0.251)	0.358	(0.277)	0.502	(0.308)
Dues / RTW	0.209	(0.413)	0.181	(0.416)	-0.788	(0.709)
Politics	-1.604	(0.860)	-1.663	(0.873)		
Benefits/Wages	2.045*	(1.019)	1.101	(0.589)	0.874	(0.801)
Strikes	0.601	(1.714)	0.360	(1.726)	1.746	(2.575)
Teachers	-0.217	(0.397)	-0.564	(0.441)	-0.516	(0.620)

Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Model 1 uses ordered logistic regression to predict ordinal scale (1-6) of bill outcomes. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict trichotomized scale (0, 1, or 2) of bill outcomes. Model 3 uses logistic regression to predict dichotomized outcome (pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05

Table 7.5 extends the analyses in the previous tables by combining whether the sponsor received any campaign donations from the corporate elite and the state's average donations from the corporate elite.

Table 7.5: Regressions of Bill Outcomes on State Average and Individual Elite Donations

	(1) Ordinal Outcome		(2) Trichotomized Outcome		(3) Dichotomized Outcome	
	b	SE	*b*	SE	*b*	SE
Average Campaign Donation in State (Thousands $)						
Corporate Elite	0.339*	(0.138)	0.515***	(0.153)	0.276	(0.181)
Labor	-0.494**	(0.152)	-0.608***	(0.159)	-0.524**	(0.188)
Campaign Donations to Bill Sponsor						
Any Corp Elite Donations (=1)	0.664*	(0.313)	0.652*	(0.310)	0.559	(0.394)
Labor (ln%)	0.223*	(0.109)	0.092	(0.099)	0.167	(0.142)
Political Climate						
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.243	(0.728)	0.547	(0.721)	1.237	(1.197)
Governor=Rep.	-0.017	(0.359)	0.207	(0.410)	-0.165	(1.187)
Chamber Maj. = Rep	0.550	(0.583)	1.860**	(0.664)	2.176	(1.882)
Agenda Setting Abilities	-0.826	(0.430)	-0.348	(0.404)	0.323	(0.374)
Constituent Characteristics						
% Black	-0.101*	(0.042)	-0.067	(0.045)	0.058	(0.060)
% Foreign born	-0.050	(0.064)	-0.056	(0.081)	0.145	(0.197)
% in Manufacturing, 1960	0.138	(0.081)	0.173*	(0.081)	0.199	(0.164)
∆ in % Manufacturing	0.291*	(0.134)	0.339*	(0.138)	0.229	(0.242)
% in FIRE	-0.401	(0.255)	-0.159	(0.414)	-0.959	(0.912)
% in Agriculture	-0.597	(0.521)	-0.399	(0.532)	-0.381	(1.034)
% Unemployed	0.517	(0.389)	0.435	(0.418)	-0.464	(0.681)
% < Poverty Line	-0.156	(0.113)	-0.307	(0.174)	0.044	(0.207)
Average Age	0.335	(0.196)	0.269	(0.183)	0.090	(0.411)
% Own Home	-0.167*	(0.072)	-0.273*	(0.110)	0.022	(0.134)
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)						
Arbitration/Negotiation	0.597	(1.050)	0.336	(1.104)	1.022	(1.347)
Elections	-0.086	(0.715)	-0.258	(0.697)	-1.274	(1.050)
Public Employees	0.491	(0.287)	0.325	(0.308)	0.529	(0.343)
Dues / RTW	0.078	(0.400)	0.087	(0.404)	-0.886	(0.695)
Politics	-1.702*	(0.842)	-1.727*	(0.857)		
Benefits/Wages	2.005*	(0.989)	1.005	(0.584)	0.851	(0.783)
Strikes	0.397	(1.585)	0.215	(1.708)	1.654	(2.459)
Teachers	-0.213	(0.381)	-0.577	(0.411)	-0.455	(0.632)

Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Model 1 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the ordinal scale (1-6) of bill outcome. Model 2 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the trichotomized scale (0, 1, or 2) of the bill outcome. Model 3 presents a logistic regression, predicting the dichotomized outcome (pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Like Tables 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4, Model 1 of Table 7.5 uses ordered logistic regression to predict the six-category outcome variable. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict the

trichotomized outcome variable. Model 3 uses logistic regression to predict whether the bill passed (versus all failures).

In Model 1, I find that the average amount of money donated from the corporate elite to state legislators has a significant, positive effect on the odds of the bill moving through the legislative process, independent of whether the sponsor of the bill received corporate elite campaign donations (b=0339, p<0.05). Figure 7.4 displays the predicted probabilities of each of the outcome categories across three values of average campaign donation: $500, $1,000, and $2,000.

Figure 7.4: Predicted Probabilities of Bill Outcomes, Ordered Measure



Although the greatest probability across all donation values is failure in the first committee, a bill proposed in a state where the corporate elite gave an average of $250 to legislators has a greater probability (p=0.80) than a bill proposed in a state where the legislators gave an average of $2,000 per legislator (p=0.67). Further, the probability of an anti-labor bill passing is almost twice as high for bills proposed in states where the corporate elite donated an average of $2,000 (p=0.12) as bills proposed in states where the corporate elite only noted an average of $250 per legislator (p=0.07).

In Model 2, which uses the trichotomous outcome measure, I find that increased donations to the legislators in a state are significantly associated with the bill moving forward, independent of whether the sponsor received corporate elite campaign donations (b=0.515, p<0.001). Figure 7.5 displays the predicted probabilities of each of the three outcome categories across three values of average campaign donation: $500, $1,000, and $2,000.

Figure 7.5: Predicted Probabilities of Bill Outcomes, Trichotomized



As in Figure 7.4, it is clear that bills are still most likely to fail in committees rather than on the floor. However, anti-labor bills proposed in states where the corporate elite donated little money to legislators on average had a higher probability of failing in a committee (p=0.85) than bills proposed in states where the corporate elite donated an average of $2,000 per legislator (p=0.66). Bills proposed in states where the corporate elite donated an average of $2,000 per legislator had a probability of passing nearly three times as high (p=0.14) as bills proposed in states where the corporate elite donated very little money (p=0.05).

In sum, these results show that corporate elite campaign donations can help influence legislators beyond simply proposing anti-labor bills. Corporate elite money appears to also influence legislative voting, as evidenced by the fact that bills proposed in states where the corporate elite donate more money to more legislators have a greater chance of passing. In the next section, I examine the three-step process of campaign donations leading to increased legislative effort leading to increased anti-labor political outcomes.

Descriptive Results: Mediation Analysis

Finally, I conduct a mediation analysis to directly model the indirect effect of corporate elite campaign donations on anti-labor bill passage through increased bill proposals. Previously, Figure 7.1 outlined a conceptual model arguing a three-way causal path: (1) elite capital investment in the form of campaign donations leads to (2) increased legislative effort in the form of increased anti-labor proposals, which in turn leads to (3) legislative outcomes, in this case, new anti-labor laws. I now use the Aggregated Dataset to test this conceptual model. Table 7.5 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the mediation analysis. Note that with an N of 50, the model is simplified, removing variables that have consistently been unrelated to outcomes in previous analyses.

Table 7.6: Descriptive Statistics, Aggregated by State

Variable	Range	Mean (sd) or %
Anti-Labor Bills		
Anti-Labor Bills Passed	0.00 – 6.00	0.86 (1.58)
Anti-Labor Bills Proposed	0.00 – 50.00	14.30 (16.44)
Campaign Donations (logged thousand $)		
Average Donations from Corp. Elite	0.00 – 2.48	0.48 (0.55)
Average Donations from Labor	0.01 – 4.93	1.66 (1.17)
Average Donations from Non-Elite Business	0.03 – 4.07	1.86 (1.04)
Political Climate		
Pro-Labor Environment	0.00 – 1.00	24%
Governor=Republican	0.00 – 1.00	58%
Chamber = Republican Majority	0.00 – 1.00	54%
Constituent Characteristics		
% Black	0.40 – 37.21	10.13 (9.56)
% Employed in Manufacturing	2.41 – 14.55	8.15 (2.73)
% Employed in Agriculture	0.93 – 6.36	2.26 (1.28)
% < Poverty Line	11.04 – 25.01	17.01 (3.07)
Average Age	31.83 – 40.67	37.59 (1.53)
% Own Homes	55.84 – 75.59	68.36 (4.15)

Note: N=50

Although anti-labor bills were proposed in most states (with an average of 14 proposals per state), 32 states did not pass any anti-labor bills into legislation. The mean of the count is 0.86. The average campaign donation per legislator from the corporate elite was $929 (with a logged average of 2.5), and the average campaign donation per legislator from labor was over $10,912 (with a logged average of 1.66). Although organized labor donated a lot more than the corporate elite on average, recall that the corporate elite is a small subset of business. The average campaign donation per legislator from non-elite businesses was $ 9,672 (with a logged average of 1.86).

Multivariate Results: Mediation Analysis

Table 7.7 provides the results of the counterfactual mediation analysis (see Chapter 3, especially Equations 3.1-3.3, for a detailed discussion of these methods). Model 1 predicts the mediator, which is the number of anti-labor bills proposed. The results show that the average corporate elite donation in the state is associated with an increase in anti-labor bill proposals in that state (b=15.849, p<0.01). Model 2 predicts the count of anti-labor bills passed, while including the mediator. Not surprisingly, the number of anti-labor bills proposed in a state is positively associated with the number of anti-labor bills that are passed (b=0.062, p<0.001). This means that for every anti-labor bill that is proposed, we can expect an increased count of anti-labor bills passed by 0.062; put another way, we can expect an increase of one anti-labor bill passed for every 16 anti-labor bills proposed in a state (recall again that the average state proposed 14 anti-labor bills). The average corporate elite donation is not significant in Model 2, suggesting complete mediation.

Table 7.7: Counterfactual Mediation Analysis

	(1) Anti-Labor Bills Proposed		(2) Anti-Labor Bills Passed	
	b	(S.E.)	*b*	(S.E.)
Avg. Corp Elite Donation	15.849	(5.854)***	0.179	(0.55)
Anti-Labor Bills Proposed			0.062	(0.01)***
Pro-Labor Environment	-5.105	(5.29)	-0.043	(0.50)
Avg. Labor Donation	5.506	(3.46)	-0.77	(0.39)**
Avg. Non-Elite Business	-9.231	(4.14)**	1.031	(4.97)
Rep. Gov.	-0.360	(4.94)	0.275	(0.58)
Republican Majority in State	8.727	(5.47)	1.021	(0.85)**
% Black	-0.325	(0.27)	-0.034	(0.04)
% Manufacturing	1.706	(0.86)	0.102	(0.09)
% Agriculture	-4.582	(1.90)**	-0.219	(0.34)
% < Poverty Line	-0.548	(0.75)	0.018	(0.11)
Avg. Age	2.457	(1.40)	0.350	(0.21)
% Own Homes	-0.876	(0.62)	-0.069	(0.07)

Notes: N=50; asterisks indicate significance: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 7.6 provides a causal diagram of the counterfactual mediation presented above and includes the Natural Indirect Effect (NIE) of corporate elite donations on the number of anti-labor bills passing (2.087, $p<0.05$) and the Total Effect (TE, 2.388, $p<0.10$). The NIE gives an estimate of the indirect effect of corporate elite donations on anti-labor bill passage through the pathway of increased bill proposals. Specifically, for every standard deviation increase in average donations to the legislators in a state (here it is about $1,700), there is an expected increase of about two more anti-labor bills passed. This is due to the increase in anti-labor bill proposals.

Figure 7.6: Counterfactual Mediation Results



Notes: NIE= Natural Indirect Effect; CDE= Controlled Direct Effect; TE= Total Effect
Coefficients based on models in Table 7.7, asterisks indicate significance: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The Controlled Direct Effect (CDE) is not significant, which indicates that there is complete mediation. By dividing the NIE by the TE, I am able to calculate the proportion mediated:

Equation 7.1: Proportion Mediated

$$\frac{NIE}{TE} = \frac{2.182}{2.388} = 0.914$$

The proportion mediated can be understood as the amount of the independent variable's (corporate elite donations) effect on the dependent variable (number of anti-labor bills passed) that is due to the mediator variable (anti-labor proposals). The result is 0.914, which means that if we were able to eliminate the effect of elite campaign donations on anti-labor bill proposals, we could reduce the impact of elite donations on anti-labor bill implementation by about 91 percent.

Discussion

The previous two chapters demonstrated that donations from the corporate elite influence legislative behaviors by increasing anti-labor bill proposals. In this chapter, I focused on outcomes, or where these bills ended in the legislative process. Specifically, I asked the following questions: Do corporate elite donations shape anti-labor legislative outcomes? Do corporate elite donations shape anti-labor legislative outcomes by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort?

In the first half of this chapter, I used the bill as the unit of analysis to examine the odds of an anti-labor bill moving forward through the legislative process. While I found that the amount of money that the corporate elite donated to anti-labor bill sponsor was unrelated to bill outcomes, the dichotomous measure of any donation did significantly increase the odds of anti-

labor bills moving through the legislative process. Further, I found that the state average of corporate elite donations to legislators was also positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage, even when controlling for donations to a bill's sponsor. This means that when the corporate elite donate more money to the legislators in a state, anti-labor legislation is more likely to be signed into law. These findings support the theory of elite class dominance, and the Donations-As-Relationships Model. Recipients of elite donations do not just propose more anti-labor bills; they also appear to act on behalf of the elite by ensuring these bills move through the legislative process.

In the second half of the chapter, I employed a counterfactual mediation model to examine the three-step relationship between corporate elite campaign donations, bill proposals, and anti-labor bill outcomes. Here, the state (N=50) was the unit of analysis. I found that the positive association between corporate elite campaign donations and the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage is explained by the frequency of anti-labor bill proposals in a given state. Thus, I found support for my theoretical model first introduced in Chapter 2: elite capital investment (campaign donations) leads to increased legislative effort on behalf of the elite (increased anti-labor bill proposals), which in turn leads to political outcomes that favor the corporate elite (increased anti-labor bills passing). This means that when the corporate elite donate more money to legislators, these legislators are likely to propose more anti-labor bills. My results estimate that when the corporate elite increase their average donations to legislators in a state by about $1,700, we can expect approximately two more anti-labor bills to be passed in this state, due the increase in anti-labor bill proposals.

The proportion mediated calculated from the counterfactual mediation analyses suggested that if we were able to eliminate the effect of corporate elite campaign donations on anti-labor

bill proposals, we could reduce the impact of elite donations on anti-labor bill implementation by about 91 percent. Therefore, if any serious reforms are going to be made to tackle the elite's influence on regressive labor law, they should begin by focusing on campaign donations from the corporate elite.

CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Review of Main Findings

This dissertation began with a simple question: Does money influence legislative actors? Specifically, I have examined if and how campaign contributions from the corporate elite influence both legislative behavior and political outcomes. Table 8.1 summarizes my hypotheses and the support I found for them.

Table 8.1: Support for Hypotheses

Hypothesis	*Supported?*
H 5.1: Corporate elite donations will be positively associated with anti-labor bill proposals.	Yes
H 6.1: The positive association between corporate elite donations and anti-labor bill proposals will be stronger in pro-labor states.	Yes
H 6.2: Legislators in pro-labor states will be more likely to have received money from corporate elite donors.	Yes
H 6.3: Legislators in pro-labor states will have a larger number of corporate elite donors.	Yes
H 6.4: Legislators in pro-labor states will receive more money from corporate elite donors.	Yes
H 7.1: Corporate elite donations to bill sponsors will be positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage.	Partial
H 7.2: The state average of corporate elite donations to legislators will be positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage.	Partial
H 7.3: The positive association between corporate elite donations and the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage will be mediated or explained by the frequency of anti-labor bill proposals.	Yes

In Chapter 5 I tested different theoretical relationships between business and anti-labor bill proposals. First, I measured business as a homogenous group, as most of the research tends

to do (e.g., Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Balwdin and Magee 2000; Magee 2002; Startmann 1991). I found no relationship between overall business donations and anti-labor bill proposals. Then, following research that suggests segmented capital might have industry-specific effects (e.g., Luke and Krauss 2004) or that the corporate elite is fractured (e.g., Mizruchi 2013), I examined how different industries may affect anti-labor bill proposals. Again, I found no significant relationships. Following research that demonstrates how powerful the Chamber of Commerce was in 1930's-era policy planning (e.g., Aaron 1958; Domhoff 1996; Hacker and Pierson 2010), I also tested if donations from national, state, and local Chambers of Commerce predicted anti-labor bill proposals. Again, I found no influence. Finally, following elite class dominance theory (e.g., Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993; Domhoff 2014, 1990, 1996; Mills 1959; Useem 1986), I split business donations into two groups: corporate elite and non-elite business. In support of Hypothesis 5.1, I demonstrated that campaign contributions from the corporate elite are positively associated with legislative effort; specifically, greater corporate elite donations were associated with higher Anti-Labor Scores. In other words, among state legislators in office during 2012, those who received campaign donations from the elite corporations proposed more anti-labor bills and fewer pro-labor bills.

In Chapter 6, I addressed the question of homophily and diffusion by examining how political climate moderates the relationships established in Chapter 5. According to the Donations-As-Votes model, I hypothesized that if financial relationships between the corporate elite and legislators were due to homphily, we would see no variation in the effect of corporate donors across political climate. According to the Donation-as-Relationships model, I hypothesized if the financial relationship was due to ideological diffusion we would find evidence of strategy. In support of the Donations-As-Relationships model (network diffusion)

and Hypothesis 6.1, I found that these relationships are much stronger in labor-friendly environments. In other words, corporate donors exert more influence on legislators proposing anti-labor bills in states that are pro-labor. In support of the idea that the corporate elite are strategic in donating money, Hypothesis 6.2 argued that legislators in pro-labor states would be more likely to have received money from corporate elite donors, Hypothesis 6.3 stated that legislators in pro-labor states would have a larger number of corporate elite donors, and Hypothesis 6.4 predicted that legislators in pro-labor states would receive more money from corporate elite donors. In support of these three hypotheses, I found that the corporate elite donate more money, more often, to more legislators in labor-friendly states. This again suggests that the corporate elite are being strategic: they are focusing their money and influence in states where they currently have less secure power. These results support power structure research by finding that the power elite are strategic, focusing their energy where their influence is required most.

In Chapter 7, I demonstrated that the relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort extends to political outcomes.

I hypothesized that corporate elite donations to bill sponsors would be positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage (H 7.1), and that the state average of corporate elite donations to legislators would be positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage (H 7.2). I found partial support for these hypotheses. Specifically, anti-labor bills that were (a) proposed by legislators who received any money (vs. no money) from the corporate elite and (b) proposed in chambers where the average legislator received more money from the corporate elite are more likely to be passed (however, I did not find a relationship between the continuous amount of corporate money donated to a bill sponsor and the bill's

outcome). These findings are important because they show that corporate elite donations do not only influence bill proposals, but bill passage. Further, I hypothesized that the positive association between corporate elite donations and the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage would be mediated or explained by the frequency of anti-labor bill proposals (H7.3). Using the aggregated state-level dataset, a counterfactual mediation test supported this hypothesis by showing that the relationship between elite capital investment and political outcomes is entirely mediated by legislative effort. Although these findings seem intuitive, this is the first study to my knowledge that explicitly tests these links. I find that when the average donations form the corporate elite to legislators in a given state increases by around $1,500, we can expect about two anti-labor bills to be signed into law, and this is entirely due to the fact that elite capital investment leads to increased anti-labor legislative effort.

Historical Context: What is Generalizable?

Overall, these findings suggest that campaign donations are an important mechanism through which the corporate elite exert influence over legislative behavior and policy. Because all of the bills analyzed in this project were proposed in 2012, it is important to think about this unique historical context. Specifically, while some of these findings are likely generalizable across time, others are likely to be time-specific.

I find that business as a whole has no effect on the behavior of legislators, while corporate elite businesses do have an effect. I argue that the role of elite businesses is generalizable. This can help to explain why many studies of campaign donations find no effect on political behavior: they do not differentiate between elite and non-elite business (e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2003; Austen-Smith 1995; Bronars and Lott 1997; Chappell 1981, 1982; Evans 1986; Grenzke 1989; Kau & Rubin 1982; Levitt 1991; Wright 1985, 1989). This can also

help to explain the seemingly inconsistent findings by pluralist and institutionalist political scientists and elite theorists. Elite class dominance theory contends that the capitalist class has and will continue to work towards securing their own power and weakening the power of the working classes that oppose them. This theory, supported by my results, is consistent over time. For example, Domhoff and Webber (2011) demonstrated how the power elite worked to shape New Deal policies after World War II to favor the capitalist class, and other research has demonstrated that the corporate elite helped shape the spread of neoliberal policy in the 1970's (Burris 1992; Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013).

Clawson and colleagues' (1993) study of corporate PAC directors sheds more light on this trend. When asked how they would reach politicians if the PAC mechanism was abolished, for example, one director said that they revert to the "old system," where companies "put a whole bag of money together and brought it to the member and said 'Here.' By the way, not a bad idea—I am not sure it was any better or any worse than anything else" (Clawson et al 1993:195). In response to the same question, another director said:

> "I'd still have a job. It would take a little different avenue, a different track. Somebody still has to represent the company. … I would suggest that my salary would go up and I would make a lot more personal contributions. … There are wats around it. The system is dynamic. By the time they change, it's too late" (Clawson et al. 1993:195-196).

Clawson and colleagues' findings support elite class dominance theory. If one avenue of exerting influence over politicians is shut down, members of the corporate elite admit they would simply find new avenues (or revert to old ones).

In sum, while the specific mechanism of influence (campaign donations) is not necessarily generalizable over time, the pattern of influence is. It is not just that business always seeks to influence, but that the corporate elite *specifically* act as a leading edge of business political action, and they continue to wield influence over time. Thus, while the elite may have

used different mechanisms in the New Deal compared to today, they were influencing policy nonetheless.

Historical Context: Why Now and Not Before?

If the capitalist class always attempts to weaken labor power and exert influence over politics in the US, the question becomes why does the specific mechanism of campaign donations leading to state-level anti-labor legislation hold today? That is, why now, and not before? I discuss a few possibilities in this section, but it should be noted that these are simply speculations—they are not definitive, nor are they mutually exclusive.

Although my dissertation examines all anti-collective bargaining bills, it his helpful to focus on the patterns in RTW legislation over time. Figure 8.1 depicts the number of RTW laws enacted by decade. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a significant number of states enacted RTW legislation shortly after the passage of Taft-Hartley, with 17 states having done so by the end of the 1950s. We then see a significant lull in RTW legislation from the 1950s until 2010, with only one new RTW law being enacted each decade.

Figure 8.1: Right to Work Laws Enacted, 1940-2016



Why was there a lull in RTW legislation for over 50 years? Why has there been a recent resurgence in the last six years? One possibility is that the labor movement was much stronger from 1945 until the mid-70's and into the 80's, meaning that while the capitalist class was able to enact RTW laws immediately after Taft-Hartley (and mostly in the non-industrialized South), they may have been blocked by the countervailing labor forces for the next several decades. Once unions began to decline precipitously in the 80's and 90's (Clawson and Clawson 1999; Tope and Jacobs 2009), the corporate elite may have had no real motivation to target the labor movement. During this time, we see a greater focus on legislation pushing economic deregulation and free trade. After the 2007 economic crash and the subsequent Great Recession, we have seen a resurgence of mobilization among the general populace, as evidenced by popular movements such as Occupy Wall Street. Unions do not have the financial resources to contribute as much to campaigns as large corporations, and now they also do not have the structural

leverage of numbers to influence politicians. In this context, the capitalist class may now be targeting labor-friendly states and passing RTW laws before there is a revitalized labor movement powerful enough to challenge them.

Another reason that corporate elite campaign donations might be a more useful mechanism for the elite to exert influence today could be the fact that it is much more expensive to run for political office than it used to be. Although it has always cost money to win an election in the US—for example, many attribute George Washington's 1755 electoral loss for Virginia's House of Burgesses to his lack of gifting voters hard alcohol (Gaughan 2012; Randall 1998)—the cost of running a successful campaign has increased drastically over the last several decades (Bartels 2008; Ornstein et al. 2014). For example, after adjusting for inflation, the average cost of a winning an election for the US House of Representatives rose from $753,274 in 1986 to $1,596,953 in 2012 (Ornstein et al. 2014). Similarly, the average cost of a winning a US Senate election rose from about 6.4 million dollars in 1986 to 10.4 million dollars in 2012, after adjusting for inflation (Ornstein et al. 2014). As political campaigns become increasingly expensive, candidates become increasingly dependent on campaign donors. This creates an opportunity for wealthy individuals and corporations to contribute much needed resources to candidates, which may mean politicians are particularly beholden to their donors in the current era of politics.

Another important and related change over time is the increasingly relaxed regulations surrounding campaign donations. A series of US Supreme Court rulings have allowed for more money from corporations to finance campaigns. For example, the 1990 ruling in *Austin* v. *Michigan Chamber of Commerce* (494 US 652) ruled that while corporations may not use their own treasury to contribute to political campaigns, they may establish separate accounts in PACs

that can donate. The 2006 decision on *Randall* v. *Sorrell* (548 US 230) ruled that states must ensure that contribution limits are high enough to enable the candidate to run an effective campaign. Finally, the highly-politicized 2010 ruling in *Citizens United* v. *Federal Elections Commission* (558 US 310) ruled that states may not place limits on the amount of money corporations, PACs, and other organizations use for election communications so long as the group does not directly align itself with a candidate. While *Citizens United* focused on independent expenditures, (i.e., it did not rule that direct contributions should be limitless) research suggests that some states have increased their limits on direct donations in response (Torchinsky and Reese 2016).

Further, state-level elections do not always have the same rules concerning donations that federal elections do[18]. States are allowed to set their own limits, if any, to the amount individuals and groups can donate to politicians. Twelve states (Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia) currently impose no contribution limits on individual donors. Among those that do, individual donation caps run anywhere from $170 (Montana's limits for State House and State Senate) to $50,000 (New York's limit for Governor), and some states allow for even larger amounts from PACs (e.g., Connecticut has a $100,000 limit for PACs). Because there is much less regulation of campaign contributions at the state level, it is possible that the use of campaign donations to exert influence over politicians is particularly strong for state politics.

In sum, I argue that the capitalist class attempts to weaken labor power and exert influence over politics in the US, and this is consistent across time. What does appear to change, however, is the *mechanism* through which the corporate elite exert their influence. Currently, one

[18] For a review, see NCSL (2016), "State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, 2015-2016 Election Cycle"

of the mechanisms is that of corporate elite campaign donations leading to state-level anti-labor legislation. When considering the unique point in history—with a weakened labor movement, a populace more skeptical of income inequality than previous decades, and increasingly deregulated campaign finance laws—it makes sense that the corporate elite use campaign donations to exert influence over legislators in states where their power is less secure.

Implications

Theoretical Implications

This dissertation has important theoretical, methodological, and policy implications. In Chapter 2, I introduced a theoretical model that traces how the capitalist class dominate American politics. It begins, I argue, with elite capital investment, measured in terms of campaign donations. Donations from the elite represent gifts that are part of long-term social relationships, and these gifts leave legislators beholden unto their donors. I find that increased corporate elite campaign donations lead to more anti-labor legislative effort, by proposing more anti-labor bills and fewer pro-labor bills. This effort can be understood as reciprocity on the part of politicians to their donors. This legislative effort in turn produces more anti-labor political outcomes, or more regressive labor legislation that is signed into law. My theoretical model also shows that elite investment in legislators is strategic, as they focus their money and influence on legislators in labor-friendly states. This strategy supports the idea that donations are indeed about exerting influence over legislators.

Methodological Implications

There are several methodological implications as well. First, I build on previous work by measuring business as heterogeneous rather than homogenous. Specifically, I measure the effect of corporate elite campaign donations as separate from non-elite business donations. The fact

that I consistently find no effect for business as a whole, but find robust effects for corporate elite donations, speaks to the seemingly inconsistent findings among research testing the effect of business donations on legislative behavior. Part of this inconsistency, it seems, is how researchers both theorize and measure business interests.

Second, I move the research forward by focusing on the state level rather than the federal level. Currently, the vast majority of research focuses on federal policy. The move to state-level analyses is important because this allows for comparisons across political climates and legislative institutions.

Third, this comprehensive dataset of all bills proposed allows for formal statistical tests of significance, rather than only looking at individual cases. While previous work using case studies of individual laws and interviews with politicians have been informative, this dataset allows for me to specify the extent to which donations influence legislative behavior.

Lastly, by examining the complete universe of proposed bills, I am able to correct for selection bias in previous work. Further, bill proposals are likely a better estimate of ideology and influence than roll-call votes, as voting is almost entirely along party lines rather than ideology.

Implications for Policy

This dissertation also has policy implications. Recent research suggests that it is the opinions and preferences of the corporate elite that drive policy in the US, rather than public opinion (Gilens and Page 2014). This is despite the fact that the public is generally distrusting of large corporations and frustrated with corporate influence on politics. The public's frustration is especially evident in the overwhelming popular support for politicians like Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, as well as movements such as Occupy Wall Street. The fact that the public is

concerned with corporate power, yet nothing seems to be done, can be unsettling. If campaign finance reforms are going to be made, they require a better understanding of the exact mechanisms of corporate influence on legislative behavior. This work explicates these mechanisms. It all begins, at least in part, with corporate elite investment in legislative campaigns.

Implications for Economic Inequality

A final important implication is about economic inequality more broadly. We live in a time where economic inequality is the highest it has ever been since the Great Depression, and much of this can be attributed to a weakened labor movement (Bartels 2008; Cornfield 1991; Western and Rosenfeld 2011). The purpose of any labor movement is to protect the workers from exploitation as much as possible, for labor is, by definition, always at odds with capital (Perlman 1928). Labor unions act as a buffer to inequality by bringing workers together, ensuring fair treatment, raising wages through collective bargaining, pooling resources, and threatening capital with collective action (Brady et al. 2013; Cornfield and Fletcher 2001). One of the main consequences of a weakened labor movement is increased economic inequality (Bartels 2008; Wallerstein and Western 2001; Western 1994).

Western and Rosenfeld's (2011) research found that union decline explains roughly one-third of the increase in economic inequality among fulltime workers, regardless of union affiliation. Unions, they argue, do not only work to increase union members' wages, but unions also function to equalize wages for nonunion workers in two ways. First, unions create the threat of unionization; when there is a large union presence, employers tend to raise the wages of their workers to preempt any organizing. Second, unions work to increase nonunion wages by setting norms for equality and justice. Specifically, unions promote "a moral economy that

institutionalize[s] norms for fair pay, even for nonunion workers" (Western and Rosenfeld 2011:514). Therefore, union decline contributes to rising inequality by (1) taking away the power of once-organized workers to gain higher wages, (2) removing the threat of unionization, which allowed employers to have the upper-hand in wage-setting, and (3) undermining the cultural norms of fairness and equality and contributing to the norms of antipathy toward unions.

Further, Brady and colleagues (2013) found that unionization was a stronger predictor of working poverty status than a state's welfare policies, GDP per capita, or unemployment rate. Unions not only help the unionized working poor, they also improve the conditions for women, the under-educated, and racial and ethnic minorities. Similar to Western and Rosenfeld (2011), they argue that "unionization is a key institution in shaping working poverty," because unions raise wages and benefits and reorganize the distribution of resources, increase opportunity by protecting quality jobs, and normalize expectations of equity (Brady et al. 2013:888). The continued decline in unions, therefore, has huge implications for the working poor in the US.

Taken together, this means that the corporate elite's influence on labor legislation will not only diminish the strength of unions and the US labor movement, but will also serve to produce inequality as a whole. By limiting the power of organized labor, these enacted anti-labor laws will perpetuate—and perhaps exacerbate—the trend of increased economic inequality in the US, an era that Bartels (2008) calls the "New Gilded Age."

Limitations

Cross-Sectional Data

This dissertation has several limitations. First, my data are cross-sectional, which makes arguments about causality difficult. Although cross-sectional data may be a limitation, the

alternative is also problematic. In order to examine changes in corporate donations and changes in legislative effort, it would require only examining incumbents, and thus limiting my sample size, and introducing selection bias. Further, I would likely have to limit my sample to legislators who served during the same years, and states vary widely by their election years and term lengths.

Consider the example of examining changes in donations and changes in bill proposals between 2010 and 2014. In 2010, 88 of the 99 state legislative chambers held elections. The eleven chambers without elections were the upper and lower houses in Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey and Virginia, and the upper house (senate) in Kansas, New Mexico and South Carolina. Thus, longitudinal study during this time would already lose analyses of four states, and one chamber in three other states.

Further, the legislators elected in 2010 would be up for re-election at different times. In both state senates and assemblies/houses, the term lengths vary widely across states (Ballotpedia 2016a). For example, there are 12 states (AZ, CT, GA, ID, MA, ME, NC, NH, NY, RI, SD, and VT) where senators have two-year terms and therefore have elections every two years. In eight other states (AR, DE, FL, HI, IL, MN, NJ, and TX), senators have what is known as 2-4-4 terms (two four-year terms followed by one two-year term), which allows senate elections to reflect decennial census estimates. In the other 30 states, state senators have four year terms. Further, of the 38 states wherein state senators have 4-year or 2-4-4-year terms, 27 of those states stagger elections so only half of the senate seats would be up for re-election every two years. Returning to the example of examining changes between 2010 to 2014, only half of the state senators in 27 states would be up for re-election in 2010. Similar problems of varying term lengths exist among state representatives.

Finally, in 15 states, state legislators are subject to term limits. In 2012, for example, 79 state senators (representing 15% of the 523 senate seats up for election) and 169 state representatives (representing 13% of the 1,263 seats up for election in lower-houses) were unable to run for re-election due to term limits (Ballotpedia 2016b). Thus, term limits would increase the number of legislators dropped if employing a longitudinal analysis.

Politics or Policy Development?

A second limitation is that I focus on politics more than policy development. Specifically, this dissertation does not address policy planning networks, think tanks, or the ways in which the legislators who propose and sponsor bills *get* their policy ideas (Domhoff and Webber 2011:23). Although this is true, the role of donations is undertheorized and even at times taken for granted among power structure researchers. These findings should be considered as complementary to previous work that emphasizes the importance of policy-planning network, and not contradictory to it, nor a substitute for it.

Results Underestimate Impact of Corporate Elite

Third, the results reported here are most likely underestimates. The measures I use for corporate influence are only legal, documented, financial donations to legislators' most recent campaigns. I do not include "dark money" contributions or gifts (e.g., fancy dinners, exclusive club memberships, cars, designer watches). Therefore, the results shown only capture what is likely a small portion of total corporate elite donations. However, the fact that I do consistently find significant relationships between corporate donors and legislative behavior suggests that the relationships are there, they might just be even stronger.

The Question of Influence

A final limitation is the question of influence. What exactly do I mean by influence? In the historic 1976 case of *Buckley* v. *Valeo* (424 US:26), the US Supreme Court ruled that contribution limits to campaigns were constitutional because the government has a compelling interest in preventing "the actuality and the appearance of corruption," and defined corruption as the use of campaign donations to bribe politicians in *quid pro quo* deals (see also Gaughan 2012). So, is this bribery? Are votes being bought in this sense? The US Supreme Court unanimously overturned the corruption conviction of former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell because the Court's "concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns. It is instead with the broader legal implications of the Government's boundless interpretation of the federal bribery statute" (*McDonnell* v. *United States* 579 US). Because there was no evidence of *quid pro quo* bribery, McDonnell (in the eyes of the Supreme Court) should not have been convicted. Similarly, there is no smoking gun proof that money has been traded for bill proposals or votes.

I believe that influence does not have to be *quid pro quo* bribery, nor does it necessarily mean changing the behavior of an individual such that a once pro-labor legislator begins supporting anti-labor bills. Influence can be making sure anti-labor legislators get re-elected, it can be helping to unseat pro-labor legislators, or it can be simply pushing an anti-labor legislator to introduce more anti-labor bills than he/she would have. Corporate funding can be a way of maintaining a relationship, rather than the purchase of services. Regardless, these findings show that the elite are being strategic and expect to get a return on their investment.

Future Directions

Future research should continue to build on this work in several ways. First, researchers should analyze the direct network ties of state legislators to the corporate elite. Are state

legislators simply funded by the corporate elite, or are they actual members of this class? Specifically, it would be interesting to examine how being a member of the corporate elite (e.g., Fortune 500 board membership, Chamber of Commerce membership, elite ties through marriage, attending an Ivy League school) differs from ties to the corporate elite (through campaign funding).

Second, future research should consider examining changes in corporate funding and changes in anti-labor bill proposals over time, with the caveat that these analyses would require selecting only certain incumbents across specific election years. Despite the setback of selection biases, longitudinal analyses would allow for more rigorous tests of temporality (i.e., do donations influence one's legislative behavior or does legislative behavior influence the donations one receives?).

Third, it would be useful to extend this work qualitatively by examining the in-depth content of these bills. How do legislators talk about collective bargaining? How are unions framed? How are corporations characterized (or is the subject absent from these bills)? For example, RTW bills often emphasize the liberty and freedom, rather than class conflict, unions, or inequality. A 2012 RTW bill proposed by Hawaiin Senator Sam Slom (R), opens by stating:

> Regardless of an individual's determination on [union] membership, the individual's *right to work must be protected*. Currently, the citizens of twenty-two U.S. states enjoy a *freedom of choice* in this regard…. It is time that this *freedom of choice* be made available to the citizens of this State. The purpose of this Act is to *protect* the employability of persons who are not members of labor organizations.
>
> -Hawaii Senate Bill 278 (2012, emphasis added)

Right-to-Work laws are also sometimes framed as a First Amendment issue, arguing that compulsory union dues are a violation of an individuals' right to free speech and freedom to associate (or not to associate). Matt Patterson's (2016) op-ed in *Forbes* argues that

> Forced dues is forced association, *a clear violation of both the letter and the spirit of freedom of assembly* [which is protected by the First Amendment]. And since American labor unions are nakedly political enterprises, and support almost exclusively liberal causes and candidates, how is forcing non-liberal teachers to support that organization not a gross violation of their free speech protections?
>
> -Patterson (2016, emphasis added)

Considering the controversial nature of such legislation, future research would benefit from in-depth analyses of the ways that these bills are framed to both legislatures and to the public.

Finally, from a theoretical perspective, future research should consider theorizing the corporate elite and organized business from a social movement perspective. Often the corporate elite are theorized as highly influential, powerful individuals, or at best, a group of individuals. Recent research (e.g., Mizruchi 2013) argues that the capitalist class is fractured, and the corporate elite are more self-interested. My research suggests the exact opposite, that there is a corporate elite that is indeed unified. As a class for themselves (Murray 2014), the corporate elite are being strategic in exerting influence over legislators, and understanding organized business as a social movement, or a counter-movement (in direct opposition to the labor movement) could be a useful avenue of future research.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Accornero, Harry	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Ahlgren, Christopher J	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Albano, Nelson	NJ	0	0	0	0	0
Allen, Mary M	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Almy, Susan W	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Alting, Ron J	IN	4000	64858.48	6100	450	4000
Altobello, Emil A (Buddy)	CT	-2068.65	295	0	0	0
Antosz, Jason P	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Atkins, Kenneth W	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Avard, Kevin A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Awana, Karen Leinani	HI	0	0	0	0	0
Babson Jr, David L	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Banks, James E	IN	450	9564.75	500	125	450
Bardon, Jeb	IN	250	9300	500	0	250
Baroody, Benjamin C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Barry, J Gail	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Barry, Richard W (Dick)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Bates, David	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Bauer, B Patrick	IN	151500	159300	2000	4250	151500
Beattie, Thomas L	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Becker, Vaneta G	IN	7750	20272	500	0	7750
Behning, Robert W (Bob)	IN	400	4300	500	600	400
Belanger, Ronald J	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Bergevin, Jerry E	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Berube, Roger R	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Bishop, Wesley T	LA	0	0	0	0	0
Bissonnette, Clement	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Boehm, Ralph G	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Bolster, Peter S	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Boots, Phillip L (Phil)	IN	1750	14800	800	750	1750
Borders, Bruce Alan	IN	1300	4550	0	0	1300
Bosma, Brian C	IN	5400	520800	6000	3600	5400
Botzow Ii, William (Bill)	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Bouchard, Bob	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Bowers, Spec	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Bradley, Lester W	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Bray, Richard D	IN	2450	10650	0	550	2450
Breaux, Jean	IN	2500	7800	300	500	2500
Brennan, Patrick M	VT	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Broden, John Edward	IN	7600	10500	800	300	7600
Bromell Tinubu, Gloria	GA	0	0	0	0	0
Brown, Adam M	IL	0	0	0	0	0
Brown, Charlie	IN	1250	5950	600	0	1250
Brown, Julie M	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Brown, Paul	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Brown, Timothy N (Tim)	IN	500	6600	800	250	500
Browne, Brendon S	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Brownrigg, Randy	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Brunelle, Michael	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Buck, James R (Jim)	IN	500	6806.33	600	0	500
Bulis, Lyle (Rusty)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Burke, Mollie S	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Burton, Charles (Woody)	IN	450	29125	0	525	450
Butynski, William (Bill)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Buxton, Michael	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Byrnes, John J	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Cali-Pitts, Jacqueline	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Caruso, Christopher L	CT	0	0	0	0	0
Casey, Ron	MO	0	0	0	0	0
Cataldo, Sam A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Champagne, Norma Greet	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Charbonneau, Ed	IN	3450	34421.89	500	3750	3450
Charron, Gene P	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Cheatham, David	IN	4200	6500	0	0	4200
Cherry, Robert W (Bob)	IN	500	10564.48	0	600	500
Chirichiello, Brian K	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Christensen, Chris	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Christiansen, Lars T	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Clark, Gregory S	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Clere, Edward D (Ed)	IN	250	55449.5	100	35250	250
Coffey, James	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Connors, Christopher J	NJ	0	0	0	0	0
Cooney, Mary R	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Cote, David E	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Coulombe, Gary M	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Cox, Sean C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Crawford, William A	IN	1250	11700	200	750	1250
Crouch, Suzanne M	IN	10300	20175	0	400	10300

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Culver, Wesley	IN	500	3750	500	250	500
Current Sr, William A	NC	1100	2000	0	0	0
Cusson-Cail, Kathleen	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Daniels, Gary L	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Daugherty, Duffy	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Davenport, Joshua	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Davis, Bill J	IN	500	9640	500	200	500
Day, Russell C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Deberry Jr, John J	TN	21200	2900	4000	0	450
Deen, David L	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Delph, Mike	IN	1125	58578.15	1100	500	1125
Dermody, Tom	IN	5750	12780	500	0	5750
Desimone, Debra L	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Devine, James E (Jim)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Dicicco, Domenick	NJ	0	0	0	0	0
Dipentima, Rich	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Dodge, Richard A (Dick)	IN	250	32188.5	0	20000	250
Domingo, Baldwin (Dom)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Dowling, Patricia A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Drenner, Karla Lea	GA	0	0	0	0	0
Drisko, Richard B (Dick)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Dwinell, Richard J	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Eaton, Stephanie	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Eberhart, Sean R	IN	800	5950	500	0	800
Edwards, Sarah R	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Emerson, Susan	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Emerton, Larry	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Erickson, Duane	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Espich, Jeffrey Keller	IN	900	39400	900	500	900
Evans, Debbie	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Ferrante, Beverly Ann	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Fesh, Robert (Bob)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Fields, Dennis H	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Flanagan, Jack B	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Flanders, Donald H (Don)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Fleck, Joseph W	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Floren, Olivia R (Livvy)	CT	0	0	0	0	0
Fredette, Robert A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Friend, William C	IN	500	9431.07	500	250	500

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Frizzell, David N	IN	400	12128.59	1200	600	400
Fry, Craig Raymond	IN	12100	13645.87	1400	0	12100
Frye, Randy	IN	1000	1076	200	0	1000
Gagne, Larry	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Gagnon, Raymond	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Garcia, Marilinda	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Gard, Beverly J	IN	1400	19658.34	1600	1450	1400
Gargasz, Carolyn M	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Garrity, Patrick	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Giaquinta, Phil	IN	3250	24900	900	250	3250
Gidge, Kenneth N (Ken)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Gile, Mary Stuart	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Ginsburg, Phil	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Gionet, Edmond	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Gonzalez, Carlos E	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Gorman, Mary J	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Gould, Franklin	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Gould, Kenneth H	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Gove, Dianne	NJ	0	0	0	0	0
Gove, Dianne	NJ	0	0	0	0	0
Grassie, Anne C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Greazzo, Phil	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Greemore, Bob	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Greshin, Adam	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Grubb, Floyd Dale	IN	11050	15150	500	350	11050
Gutwein, Douglas L	IN	250	4350	200	0	250
Hagan, Joseph M	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hamm, Christine C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hansen, Peter T	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Harris, Earl L	IN	250	1000	0	0	250
Harshman, Steve	WY	0	0	0	0	0
Harty, Martin	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hatch, William A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hawkins, Ken	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Head, Randall	IN	550	7665	500	0	550
Headd, James (Jim)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Helm, Robert (Bob)	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Hensgens, Bob	LA	0	0	0	0	0
Hershman, Brandt	IN	1850	28250	3900	250	1850

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Hikel, John A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hill, Gregory	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hinch, Richard (Dick)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hines, John J	WY	0	0	0	0	0
Hinkle, Phillip D (Phil)	IN	750	4550	500	600	750
Hoelzel, Kathleen M	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hofemann, Roland P	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hogan, Timothy	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Holdman, Travis	IN	550	30475	1600	525	550
Hooper, Dorothea	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hopper, Gary S	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Howard, Thomas J	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Hume, Lindel O	IN	2750	8708	900	0	2750
Hutchinson, Winfred (Win)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Huval, Mike (Pete)	LA	0	0	0	0	0
Huxley, Robert	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Ingbretson, Paul C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Introne, Robert (Bob)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Itse, Daniel C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Jabour, Paul V	RI	0	0	0	0	0
Jeudy, Jean Leniol	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Johnsen, Gladys	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Johnson, Jane B	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Johnson, Mitzi	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Johnson, William (Bill)	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Kaen, Naida	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Kappler, Lawrence (Mike)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Katsakiores, Phyllis M	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Katsiantonis, Thomas	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Keans, Sandra Balomenos	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Keegan-Hutchinson, Karen	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Kenley, Howard (Luke)	IN	2500	112050	1800	6950	2500
Kidder, David H	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Kilmartin, Duncan F	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Kingsbury, Robert	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Kitzmiller, Warren F	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Knollman, Tom	IN	200	3500	0	250	200
Knox, J David	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Koch, Eric Allan	IN	1700	6750	200	0	1700

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Koch, Thomas F (Tom)	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Kolodziej, Walter	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Kruse, Dennis K	IN	1750	15000	600	250	1750
Lacasse Sr, Paul	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Ladd Jr, Roderick M (Rick)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Lambert, George	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Lanane, Tim	IN	10350	17370	1200	500	10350
Landske, Dorothy Suzanne (Sue)	IN	1050	8992.83	1900	0	1050
Larson, Timothy D	CT	0	0	0	0	0
Lasater, Brent T	MO	0	0	0	0	0
Laware, Thomas W	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Lawson, Connie	IN	4750	38771.2	1800	7600	4750
Lefebvre, Benjamin	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Lehe, Donald J	IN	350	6350	600	0	350
Lehman, Matthew S	IN	250	18690	800	500	250
Leising, Jean	IN	250	49276.46	0	38401.46	250
Leonard, Daniel J (Dan)	IN	750	10875	0	750	750
Leonard, Fred	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Lerandeau, Alfred (Gus)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Linares, Guillermo	NY	0	0	0	0	0
Lindsey, Steven W	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Lockwood, Priscilla Parmenter	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Long, David C	IN	8250	164750	4100	3800	8250
Long, Patrick T	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Lovett, Charlene Marcotte	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Lundgren, David C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Luther, Robert	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Malone, Robert J	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Manwaring, Ann P	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Marcus, Bruce	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Marek, Richard J	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Marriott, Jim	ID	-3745.48	750	0	0	0
Masland, James	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Mcallister, Norman H	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Mccarthy, Frank H	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Mcclain, Richard W (Rich)	IN	200	5550	0	0	200
Mcconkey, Mark E	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Mcguinness, Sean	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Mckinney, Betsy	NH	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Mcneil, James L	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Meader, David R	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Mecheski, Holly L	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Megna, Robert W	CT	0	0	0	0	0
Merrick, Evalyn S	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Merritt Jr, James W	IN	2600	121188.6	2800	26800	2600
Merrow, Harry C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Messier, Irene M	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Messmer, Mark B	IN	16150	17107.5	400	0	16150
Milam, Matthew	NJ	0	0	0	0	0
Milam, Matthew	NJ	0	0	0	0	0
Miller, Patricia	IN	1875	20911	700	1375	1875
Millham, Alida I	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Mills Jr, Fred H (T-Fred)	LA	0	0	0	0	0
Mirski, Paul M	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Mishler, Ryan D	IN	1175	23710.8	300	300	1175
Monsour, Alex	MS	-6125	2000	0	0	0
Mook, Anne Lamy	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Moore Jr, Robert W	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Moore, Charlie	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Moran Jr, Edward P	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Moukawsher, Edward	CT	0	0	0	0	0
Mrowicki, Mike	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Mrvan Jr, Frank	IN	4850	8700	600	0	4850
Munck, Philip	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Neese, Timothy	IN	250	3700	0	250	250
Newton, Clifford (Cliff)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Nodland, George	ND	9501	0	1000	0	0
Noe, Cynthia Jean	IN	250	3950	500	250	250
Nugent, Johnny	IN	6636.5	23479.6	250	0	6636.5
Obrien, Anne Theresa	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Oconnor, John T	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Ohara, Jesse	MT	0	0	0	0	0
Okerman, Richard	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Osgood, Philip (Joe)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Owen, Derek	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Packard, Sherman A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Palfrey, David J	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Palmer, Barry J	NH	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Palmer, Stephen J	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Panek, William	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Pantelakos, Laura C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Parkhurst, Henry A L	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Parsons, Robbie	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Pastor-Bodmer, Beatriz	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Patten, Betsey	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Patten, Dick	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Paul, Allen E	IN	750	67154.93	1150	300	750
Pearce, Albert (Chuck)	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Peasley, Frank	WY	0	0	0	0	0
Pelath, Scott Douglas	IN	6100	22050	700	0	6100
Pellegrino, Anthony (Tony)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Pelletier, Marsha L	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Peltz, Peter	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Pena, Aaron	TX	28646.76	29850	0	0	3350
Perry, Jonathan	LA	0	0	0	0	0
Pierce, David Maxey	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Pierce, Matt	IN	900	1800	500	0	900
Pilliod, James (Doc)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Pilotte, Maurice L	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Pitre, Joseph A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Pond, Phyllis J	IN	250	2000	0	0	250
Porter, Gregory W	IN	6300	12000	0	750	6300
Potter, Frances D	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Pratt, Calvin Dean	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Pryor, Cherrish S	IN	625	4950	700	750	625
Quigley, Thomas J	PA	158696.3	6725	9000	0	550
Ramsey, Peter	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Randolph, Lonnie Marcus	IN	250	700	0	0	250
Rappaport, Laurence M	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Reardon, Mara Candelaria	IN	3300	5000	0	0	3300
Rebimbas, Rosa C	CT	0	0	0	0	0
Reed, Michael T	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Reichard, Kevin E	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Rhodes, Brian D	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Rice, Harold L (Chip)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Richardson, Herbert D (Herb)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Richardson, Kathy Kreag	IN	1050	7500	900	550	1050

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Ritter, Glenn F	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Roberts, Kris Edward	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Rogers, Earline S	IN	1750	4350	0	0	1750
Rowe, Robert	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Rumpf, Brian E	NJ	0	0	0	0	0
Rumpf, Brian E	NJ	0	0	0	0	0
Sad, Tara	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Sanders, Elisabeth N	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Sapienza, Marie N	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Saunders, Thomas E (Tom)	IN	1709	7368	0	250	1709
Scala, Dino A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Schmidt, Peter B	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Schmidt, Stephen (Steve)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Schroadter, Adam Robert	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Schuring, J Kirk	Ohio	0	0	0	0	0
Scontsas, Lisa	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Seaworth, Brian	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Seidel, Carl W	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Semlek, Mark A	WY	0	0	0	0	0
Serlin, Christopher	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Shackett, Jeff	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Shaw, Barbara E	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Shurtleff, Steve	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Siddoway, Jeff C	ID	0	0	0	0	0
Simard, Paul H	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Simmons, Tammy	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Simpson, Tyler	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Simpson, Vi	IN	27010	49300	1900	500	27010
Smith, Edwin (Smokey)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Smith, Steven	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Smith, Vernon G	IN	650	1200	0	0	650
Soltani, Tony F	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Soucy, Connie	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Souza, Kathleen	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Sova, Charles E	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Spainhower, Dale	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Spang, Judith	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Spengler, Kristy Kurt	VT	0	0	0	0	0
St Cyr, Jeffrey L	NH	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Starr, Robert A	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Steele, Brent	IN	1100	49400	800	300	1100
Steuerwald, Gregory E	IN	600	9610	500	900	600
Stevens, Richard	NC	52463.07	53450	5350	1000	500
Sullivan, Daniel J	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Sullivan, Mary Ann	IN	7025	11364.7	750	1400	7025
Summers, Vanessa J	IN	550	7100	0	0	550
Swank, Matthew	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Swinford, Elaine B	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Sytek, John	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Tamburello, Daniel	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Tatro, Bruce L	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Taylor, Greg	IN	3550	4250	300	500	3550
Terrio, Ross W	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Theberge, Robert L	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas, Joseph	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas, Yvonne	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Tilton, Franklin T (Frank)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Torr, Gerald R (Jerry)	IN	300	26500	1600	1300	300
Townsend, Chuck	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Tregenza, Norman A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Tremblay, Marc D	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Triplett, Constance (Connie)	ND	7925	0	1000	0	1325
Truitt, Randy	IN	3000	15647	400	0	3000
Turner Jr, Donald H (Don)	VT	1975	2900	0	0	0
Turner, Paul Eric	IN	1000	29900	800	500	1000
Umberger, Karen C	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Vaillancourt, Steve	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Villeneuve, Moe	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Walker, Greggory F	IN	1000	10206.33	0	250	1000
Wall, Janet G	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Waltz, Brent	IN	12400	89959.52	0	5654.4	12400
Waterhouse, Kevin K	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Waterman, John	IN	7500	14500	0	0	7500
Watrous, Rick	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Watters, David H	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Webb, James C (Jim)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Weber, Lucy Mcvitty	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Weeden, Michael W	NH	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix A: Dropped Legislators

Name	State	Donations				
		Total	Business	Corp. Elite	COC	Labor
Welch, David A	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Welch, Peggy M	IN	10230.2	12950	400	0	10230.2
Wesco, Timothy	IN	250	2230	200	0	250
Weston, Rachel	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Weyler, Kenneth	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Wheaton, Gary	NH	0	0	0	0	0
White, Andrew	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Willette, Robert (Bob)	NH	0	0	0	0	0
Wilson, Jeff	VT	-2130.96	0	0	0	0
Wolkins, David Alan	IN	450	5970	450	400	450
Wright, Kurt	VT	0	0	0	0	0
Wyss, Thomas J (Tom)	IN	6100	44439.84	2400	13100	6100
Yarde Ii, David	IN	250	3000	0	250	250
Yoder, Carlin J	IN	250	3900	200	0	250
Young, R Michael	IN	3505	32190	2900	650	3505
Zakas, Joseph C (Joe)	IN	650	31300	600	15250	650

Appendix B:Reported Annual Assets of Corporate Elite

Company	2012 Revenue (Millions USD)	Source
3M	33,876.00	http://investors.3m.com/financials/annual-reports-and-proxy-statements/default.aspx
Allstate	126,947.00	https://www.allstate.com/about/annual-report-archive.aspx
Abbott Laboratories	31,322.00	http://www.abbottinvestor.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=94004&p=irol-proxy
IBM	119,213.00	http://www.ibm.com/annualreport/
Continental / United Airlines	38,083.00	http://ir.united.com/financial-performance/sec-filings
Northern Trust Corp.	92,975.50	https://www.northerntrust.com/documents/annual-reports/northern-trust-annual-report-2012.pdf
Caterpillar	89,356.00	http://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/Caterpillar/C10005383
Deere	56,265.80	https://investor.deere.com/our-company/investors-relations/financial-information/annual-reports-and-proxy/default.aspx
Boeing	88,896.00	http://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/annual/2012/2012_annual_report.pdf
Corning	29,375.00	http://investor.shareholder.com/corning/annuals-proxies.cfm
Smurfit-Stone / RockTenn	10,687.10	http://ir.westrock.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=254016&p=irol-rkt
FedEx	29,903.00	http://fedexannualreport2012.hwaxis.com
Marathon Oil	35,306.00	http://www.marathonoil.com/Investor_Center/Annual_Review/Annual_Reports/
Aon	30,486.00	http://ir.aon.com/about-aon/investor-relations/financial-reports/sec-filings/sec-filings-details/default.aspx?FilingId=9109157
Exelon	78,554.00	https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/9466/000119312513069749/d474199d10k.htm
Northrop Grumman	26,543.00	http://www.northropgrumman.com/AboutUs/AnnualReports/Pages/default.aspx
General Dynamics	28,373.00	http://investorrelations.gd.com/financial-reports/annual-reports
United Technologies	89,409.00	http://2012ar.utc.com/
McDonald's	30,521.00	http://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/dam/AboutMcDonalds/Investors/Investor%202013/2012%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf
Aetna	41,494.50	http://www.aetna.com/investor/annualrept.htm
Illinois Tool Works	19,309.00	http://investor.itw.com/investor-information/financial-reports/annual-reports
McGraw-Hill/S&P Global	7,052.00	http://investor.spglobal.com/Annual-Reports/Index?KeyGenPage=1073751495
Eli Lilly	34,398.90	https://investor.lilly.com/annuals.cfm
United Parcel Service	38,863.00	http://www.investors.ups.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=62900&p=irol-reportsannual
Total	**1,207,208.80**	

Appendix C: Individual Industry Regressions

	Energy	Services	Finance	Agri.	Manuf.	Tech.	Defense
Donations							
Energy	0.012						
	(0.008)						
Services		0.004					
		(0.009)					
Finance/Banks			-0.002				
			(0.010)				
Agriculture				-0.003			
				(0.010)			
Manufacturing					0.012		
					(0.013)		
Technology						-0.014	
						(0.026)	
Defense							0.013
							(0.029)
Labor	-0.051***	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.049***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Political Climate							
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.076**	-0.077**	-0.078**	-0.078**	-0.079**	-0.078**	-0.078**
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Dem. Party	-0.099***	-0.104***	-0.106***	-0.106***	-0.103***	-0.105***	-0.105***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Ind. Party	0.058	0.053	0.052	0.050	0.052	0.051	0.051
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Rep. Maj. Chamber	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Rep. Governor	0.036	0.039*	0.039*	0.039*	0.039*	0.038*	0.039*
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.020	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019	-0.020	-0.019
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.026	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.026	0.024	0.025
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Constituent Characteristics							
% Black	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Manuf., 1960	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
% In Agriculture	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
% In FIRE	-0.012	-0.014	-0.015	-0.015	-0.014	-0.016	-0.015
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
% Unemployed	0.034**	0.033**	0.034**	0.034**	0.034**	0.033**	0.034**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Average Income	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
% < Poverty Line	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Average Age	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
% Own Homes	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R^2	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043

N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations

VARIABLES	(1) Without 3M	(2) Without Abbott	(3) Without Aetna	(4) Without Allstate
Donations				
Corporate Elite	0.036**	0.042**	0.035**	0.036**
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Non-Elite	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Labor	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Political Climate				
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.084**	-0.083**	-0.084**	-0.084**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Dem. Party	-0.101***	-0.099***	-0.101***	-0.101***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Ind. Party	0.061	0.063	0.061	0.062
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Rep. Maj. Chamber	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Rep. Governor	0.037*	0.037*	0.037*	0.037*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.014	-0.013	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constituent Characteristics				
% Black	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Manuf., 1960	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Agriculture	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
% In FIRE	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
% Unemployed	0.038**	0.038**	0.038**	0.037**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Average Income	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
% < Poverty Line	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Average Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
% Own Homes	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R^2	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044

N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Continued

VARIABLES	(5) Without Aon	(6) Without Boeing	(7) Without Caterpillar	(8) Without Continental
Donations				
Corporate Elite	0.035**	0.037**	0.035**	0.035**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Non-Elite	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Labor	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Political Climate				
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.084**	-0.083**	-0.083**	-0.084**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Dem. Party	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.101***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Ind. Party	0.061	0.061	0.060	0.061
	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Rep. Maj. Chamber	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Rep. Governor	0.037*	0.037*	0.037*	0.037*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.014	-0.015	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.022	0.023	0.022	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constituent Characteristics				
% Black	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Manuf., 1960	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Agriculture	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
% In FIRE	-0.010	-0.011	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
% Unemployed	0.037**	0.037**	0.037**	0.037**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Average Income	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
% < Poverty Line	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Average Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
% Own Homes	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R^2	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044

N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Continued

VARIABLES	(9) Without Corning	(10) Without Deere	(11) Without Eli-Lilly	(12) Without Exelon
Donations				
Corporate Elite	0.035**	0.037**	0.035**	0.034**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Non-Elite	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Labor	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Political Climate				
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.084**	-0.084**	-0.084**	-0.083**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Dem. Party	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.102***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Ind. Party	0.061	0.058	0.061	0.060
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Rep. Maj. Chamber	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Rep. Governor	0.037*	0.038*	0.037*	0.037*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constituent Characteristics				
% Black	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Manuf., 1960	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Agriculture	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
% In FIRE	-0.010	-0.009	-0.010	-0.011
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
% Unemployed	0.037**	0.037**	0.038**	0.037**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Average Income	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
% < Poverty Line	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Average Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
% Own Homes	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R^2	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044

N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Continued

VARIABLES	(13) Without FedEx	(14) Without Gen Dyn	(15) Without ITW	(16) Without Marathon
Donations				
Corporate Elite	0.030*	0.035**	0.035**	0.043**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Non-Elite	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Labor	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Political Climate				
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.084**	-0.084**	-0.084**	-0.083**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Dem. Party	-0.102***	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.102***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Ind. Party	0.059	0.061	0.061	0.053
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Rep. Maj. Chamber	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005	-0.008
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Rep. Governor	0.038*	0.037*	0.037*	0.040*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.016	-0.014	-0.014	-0.011
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.023	0.022	0.022	0.020
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constituent Characteristics				
% Black	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Manuf., 1960	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Agriculture	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
% In FIRE	-0.011	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
% Unemployed	0.037**	0.038**	0.038**	0.036**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Average Income	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
% < Poverty Line	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Average Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
% Own Homes	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R^2	0.043	0.044	0.044	0.044

N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Continued

VARIABLES	(17) Without McDonald's	(18) Without McGraw-Hill	(19) Without NTC	(20) Without Northrop
Donations				
Corporate Elite	0.032*	0.035**	0.035**	0.035**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Non-Elite	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Labor	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Political Climate				
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.084**	-0.084**	-0.084**	-0.084**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Dem. Party	-0.102***	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.101***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Ind. Party	0.060	0.061	0.061	0.062
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Rep. Maj. Chamber	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Rep. Governor	0.037*	0.037*	0.037*	0.037*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.016	-0.014	-0.014	-0.015
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.021	0.022	0.022	0.021
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constituent Characteristics				
% Black	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Manuf., 1960	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Agriculture	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
% In FIRE	-0.012	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
% Unemployed	0.038**	0.038**	0.038**	0.037**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Average Income	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.010
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
% < Poverty Line	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Average Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
% Own Homes	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R^2	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044

N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Continued

VARIABLES	(21) Without Smurfit	(22) Without United	(23) Without United Tech	(24) Without UPS
Donations				
Corporate Elite	0.036**	0.036**	0.035**	0.035**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Non-Elite	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Labor	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Political Climate				
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.084**	-0.084**	-0.084**	-0.084**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Dem. Party	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.101***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Ind. Party	0.061	0.061	0.061	0.061
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Rep. Maj. Chamber	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Rep. Governor	0.037*	0.037*	0.037*	0.037*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constituent Characteristics				
% Black	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Manuf., 1960	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
% In Agriculture	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
% In FIRE	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
% Unemployed	0.037**	0.037**	0.038**	0.038**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Average Income	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
% < Poverty Line	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Average Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
% Own Homes	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*	0.012*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R^2	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044

N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix E: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Alternate Measures

	(1) # of Corp. Donors (logged)		(2) # of Corp. Donors (top-coded)		(3) Any Corp. Donors (=1)	
	b	(SE)	*b*	(SE)	*b*	(SE)
Corporate Elite Donations						
# of Donors (ln)	0.029*	(0.014)				
# of Donors (top-coded)			0.014*	(0.007)		
Any Donations (=1)					0.034*	(0.014)
Campaign Donations (logged %)						
Non-Elite Business	-0.005	(0.008)	-0.005	(0.008)	-0.005	(0.007)
Labor	-0.050***	(0.011)	-0.050***	(0.011)	-0.050***	(0.011)
Political Climate						
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.089**	(0.029)	-0.089**	(0.029)	-0.084**	(0.027)
Party=Dem	-0.101***	(0.020)	-0.101***	(0.020)	-0.101***	(0.020)
Party=Ind./Non-Part.	0.054	(0.065)	0.054	(0.065)	0.056	(0.066)
Chamber = Rep. Maj.	-0.008	(0.024)	-0.008	(0.024)	-0.005	(0.024)
Governor=Rep.	0.040*	(0.018)	0.040*	(0.018)	0.036*	(0.018)
2010 Rep. Swing	-0.017	(0.023)	-0.017	(0.023)	-0.016	(0.023)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.022	(0.016)	0.022	(0.016)	0.023	(0.016)
Constituent Characteristics						
% Black	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	-0.005	(0.003)	-0.005	(0.003)	-0.004	(0.003)
% in Manuf., 1960	0.003	(0.003)	0.003	(0.003)	0.003	(0.003)
Δ in Manuf. 1960-2010	0.004	(0.003)	0.004	(0.003)	0.004	(0.003)
% in FIRE	-0.001	(0.014)	-0.001	(0.014)	-0.001	(0.014)
% in Agriculture	-0.011	(0.011)	-0.012	(0.011)	-0.011	(0.011)
% Unemployed	0.038**	(0.012)	0.038**	(0.012)	0.037**	(0.011)
Average Income	0.009	(0.011)	0.009	(0.011)	0.009	(0.011)
% < Poverty Line	0.004	(0.016)	0.004	(0.016)	0.004	(0.016)
Average Age	0.005	(0.006)	0.005	(0.006)	0.004	(0.007)
% Own Homes	0.011*	(0.005)	0.011*	(0.005)	0.012*	(0.005)

N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix F: Treatment Effects Estimates Using Propensity Score Matching

	Anti-Labor Score
Corporate Elite Donations Dummy	0.037 *
	(0.015)

Notes: N=7,143. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance: * p < .05, ***p < .01, *** p < .001

Appendix G: Supplemental Analyses Using Continuous Labor Climate Measure

	(1)		(2)	
	b	(SE)	*b*	(SE)
Focal Interaction				
Corp. Elite Donations × Pro-Labor Enviro.			0.043**	(0.013)
Campaign Donations (logged %)				
Corporate Elite	0.032**	(0.011)	-0.042	(0.022)
Non-Elite Business	-0.001	(0.007)	-0.005	(0.007)
Labor	-0.050***	(0.011)	-0.054***	(0.012)
Political Climate				
Pro-Labor Environment	0.002	(0.012)	-0.012	(0.011)
Party=Dem	-0.102***	(0.019)	-0.096***	(0.019)
Party=Ind./Non-Partisan	0.044	(0.065)	0.044	(0.064)
Chamber = Rep. Maj.	-0.003	(0.027)	-0.005	(0.027)
Governor=Rep.	0.036	(0.021)	0.043*	(0.021)
2010 Rep. Swing	0.015	(0.025)	0.014	(0.024)
Agenda Setting Ability	0.028	(0.017)	0.028	(0.016)
Constituent Characteristics				
% Black	-0.000	(0.002)	-0.000	(0.002)
% Foreign Born	-0.003	(0.003)	-0.004	(0.003)
% in Manuf., 1960	0.001	(0.003)	-0.001	(0.003)
∆ in Manuf. 1960-2010	0.004	(0.004)	0.002	(0.003)
% in FIRE	-0.013	(0.013)	-0.016	(0.013)
% in Agriculture	0.001	(0.011)	0.005	(0.011)
% Unemployed	0.024*	(0.011)	0.021	(0.011)
Average Income	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
% < Poverty Line	0.000	(0.016)	0.001	(0.016)
Average Age	0.004	(0.007)	0.005	(0.007)
% Own Homes	0.013*	(0.005)	0.011*	(0.005)

N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix H: Bill Outcomes Using Total Donations in State

	(1) Ordinal Outcome		(2) Trichotomized Outcome		(3) Dichotomized Outcome	
	b	SE	*b*	SE	*b*	SE
Total Campaign Donation in State (ln$)						
Corporate Elite	0.415***	(0.126)	0.603***	(0.136)	0.377*	(0.192)
Labor	-0.425**	(0.147)	-0.576***	(0.145)	-0.490**	(0.185)
Political Climate						
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.120	(0.713)	0.715	(0.694)	1.266	(1.075)
Governor=Rep.	0.021	(0.350)	0.186	(0.391)	-0.101	(1.055)
Chamber Maj. = Rep	0.829	(0.591)	2.114***	(0.612)	2.240	(1.724)
Agenda Setting Abilities	-0.810	(0.456)	-0.339	(0.418)	0.313	(0.376)
Constituent Characteristics						
% Black	-0.107*	(0.042)	-0.071	(0.043)	0.052	(0.056)
% Foreign born	-0.040	(0.064)	-0.051	(0.076)	0.188	(0.179)
% in Manufacturing, 1960	0.159*	(0.072)	0.183*	(0.075)	0.234	(0.151)
∆ in % Manufacturing	0.318*	(0.128)	0.361**	(0.131)	0.257	(0.224)
% in FIRE	-0.409	(0.250)	-0.160	(0.353)	-0.967	(0.711)
% in Agriculture	-0.750	(0.538)	-0.486	(0.527)	-0.352	(0.935)
% Unemployed	0.510	(0.374)	0.446	(0.394)	-0.579	(0.604)
% < Poverty Line	-0.186	(0.120)	-0.332*	(0.151)	0.093	(0.182)
Average Age	0.368	(0.205)	0.306	(0.178)	0.064	(0.392)
% Own Home	-0.179*	(0.079)	-0.276**	(0.100)	0.070	(0.129)
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)						
Arbitration/Negotiation	0.880	(0.876)	0.547	(0.973)	1.394	(1.174)
Elections	0.122	(0.745)	-0.033	(0.736)	-1.061	(1.102)
Public Employees	0.529*	(0.251)	0.355	(0.278)	0.505	(0.310)
Dues / RTW	0.222	(0.416)	0.186	(0.416)	-0.784	(0.709)
Politics	-1.598	(0.859)	-1.662	(0.871)		
Benefits/Wages	2.031*	(1.012)	1.089	(0.588)	0.868	(0.795)
Strikes	0.652	(1.770)	0.383	(1.737)	1.767	(2.646)
Teachers	-0.216	(0.397)	-0.560	(0.441)	-0.517	(0.620)

Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Models 1 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the ordinal scale (1-6) of bill outcome. Model 2 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the trichotomized scale (0, 1, or 2) of the bill outcome. Model 3 presents a logistic regression, predicting the dichotomized outcome (pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

APPENDIX H, Continued

	(1) Ordinal Outcome		(2) Trichotomized Outcome		(3) Dichotomized Outcome	
	b	SE	*b*	SE	*b*	SE
Total Campaign Donation in State (ln$)						
Corporate Elite	0.422***	(0.125)	0.597***	(0.135)	0.378*	(0.177)
Labor	-0.495**	(0.153)	-0.596***	(0.157)	-0.524**	(0.191)
Contributions to Bill Sponsor (ln%)						
Corporate Elite	0.042	(0.195)	0.066	(0.216)	0.059	(0.254)
Labor	0.229	(0.130)	0.096	(0.105)	0.157	(0.158)
Political Climate						
Pro-Labor Environment	-0.044	(0.720)	0.811	(0.790)	1.377	(1.067)
Governor=Rep.	-0.115	(0.356)	0.144	(0.421)	-0.224	(1.165)
Chamber Maj. = Rep	0.710	(0.588)	2.118**	(0.815)	2.332	(1.807)
Agenda Setting Abilities	-0.830	(0.431)	-0.367	(0.428)	0.326	(0.392)
Constituent Characteristics						
% Black	-0.096*	(0.040)	-0.062	(0.047)	0.058	(0.061)
% Foreign born	-0.054	(0.063)	-0.066	(0.092)	0.132	(0.197)
% in Manufacturing, 1960	0.136	(0.085)	0.163	(0.091)	0.184	(0.165)
∆ in % Manufacturing	0.301*	(0.138)	0.349*	(0.140)	0.228	(0.226)
% in FIRE	-0.384	(0.275)	-0.111	(0.522)	-0.907	(0.874)
% in Agriculture	-0.632	(0.519)	-0.441	(0.543)	-0.390	(0.911)
% Unemployed	0.548	(0.371)	0.483	(0.410)	-0.400	(0.679)
% < Poverty Line	-0.182	(0.112)	-0.352	(0.203)	-0.007	(0.225)
Average Age	0.386*	(0.187)	0.338	(0.182)	0.167	(0.390)
% Own Home	-0.167*	(0.075)	-0.284*	(0.132)	0.017	(0.148)
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)						
Arbitration/Negotiation	0.752	(0.918)	0.494	(0.993)	1.172	(1.192)
Elections	0.116	(0.725)	-0.052	(0.712)	-1.078	(1.105)
Public Employees	0.515	(0.283)	0.342	(0.310)	0.525	(0.352)
Dues / RTW	0.179	(0.411)	0.151	(0.415)	-0.867	(0.697)
Politics	-1.617*	(0.816)	-1.666*	(0.847)		
Benefits/Wages	2.040*	(0.936)	1.081	(0.554)	0.864	(0.758)
Strikes	0.573	(1.553)	0.366	(1.624)	1.789	(2.495)
Teachers	-0.185	(0.418)	-0.531	(0.458)	-0.474	(0.659)

Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Models 1 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the ordinal scale (1-6) of bill outcome. Model 2 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the trichotomized scale (0, 1, or 2) of the bill outcome. Model 3 presents a logistic regression, predicting the dichotomized outcome (pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05