Partisanship and Politics in the U.S. Civil Service

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DEDICATION

To Corinna and Mo

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 1
Theoretical Frame

Political scientists far too often appeal to their own intellectual vanity by suggesting they have provided a new theory about how the world works. This dissertation does not make any such bold claim. Rather, through endeavoring to directly observe the action in question rather than rely on proxies, I test several well housed beliefs regarding the executive branch of the United States. Through three related but substantively different chapters, I show how civil servants engage in the political process and how politics shapes their careers.

1.1 The Oversimplification of Administration

Modern governance is complicated. Every day civil servants make decisions about the safety of medicine, ensure airplanes safely arrive at their destination, regulate nuclear energy, and distribute billions of dollars to citizens that need that assistance to survive. In all of these daily activities, policy experts tasked with carrying out rules and laws in a fair in just manner apply their expertise to maximize welfare for citizens of the United States. As such, governments have sought to attract the best and brightest in order to ensure the best possible outcomes for its citizens.

This rosy presentation of the role of civil servants juxtaposes itself against the need for democratic accountability. While these policy experts provide reasoned judgements, it is also true that their decisions are only held responsible to the public to the degree that elected officials desire. The civil servants only have authority to act if delegated by elected politicians. The retention of that authority is contingent upon elected officials approving of their actions by not revoking the civil servants decisions. Politics must be present to ensure democratic outcomes from administration, but politics in administration has the potential to compromise decisions

reached by experts. When faced with this conundrum, what should scholars of the executive branch do in analyzing the modern administrative state?

Unfortunately, the common solution is to assume away politics. Since Woodrow Wilson, one of the operating paradigms of administration is the political-administration dichotomy. He wrote "Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices" (Wilson 1887). That arrangement supposes that the individual civil servant sets aside her beliefs about politics and carries out the orders of the political overseer. And while this is probably true during the time Wilson was writing, because the administrative decisions largely focused on setting fair rates for rail travel, it likely falls short today, when administrators face decisions like how to best resolve issues of poverty or construct an education system that maximizes outcomes for students. The latter set of policy questions requires at a minimum a flavor of politics, if not a wholly political answer.

Yet the initial frame posited by Wilson has not been updated to account for the political realities in modern governance. Formal models of bureaucratic policy making typically assume the agency to have an ideal point that is exogenously determined, meaning that the agency does not determine the initial policy position it takes. When they do have some control deciding policy, it is given to the agency by the appointee, who represents the present's ideal policy. Or, agencies can shift agency policy set by the political actors slightly. Neither seems particularly satisfying when the people that are experts in the area and tasked to carry out implementation and enforcement have almost no say in how policy is set or determined.

Even behavioral analyses look to assume away the political realities modern agencies face. To be sure, agencies certainly gain creditability by maintaining professional norms and

ensuring professional outcomes. But creditability and professionalism are hardly well defined and empirically observable concepts. By and large, each relies on face validity and the Potter Stewart standard of "knowing it when you see it" to frame arguments. Little credit is given to the ability of civil servants to navigate the political woods in Washington, D.C. Even less credit is given to them participating and playing politics. Yet, we have every reason to think it is an option for agencies to take. Presidents worry about appointees becoming a part of the agency rather than a vehicle for their policy. The winning over of appointees from their boss to the side of the agency seems like it has some sort of political flavor. Bureau chiefs take steps to ensure unwanted tasks do not fall on their desks. Anticipating that action seems from someone who has set aside their political beliefs about policy seems to stretch credulity.

The bureaucratic ideal of neutral competence suggests federal employees set aside personal political beliefs in carrying out their job functions. Yet, but virtue of working in the public sector, federal employees potentially interact and receive instructions of how to carry out their job from political actors. In cases of disagreement between the wishes of political principals and the preferences of the agency, federal employees simply following instructions, presuming the request has legal authority, from political actors anecdotally does not hold. Richard Nixon informed appointees that they would face "disloyalty and obstruction" from those with civil service status (Aberbach and Rockmand 1976). Additionally, Ronald Reagan sought to end retrenchment and the scope of involvement for federal agencies in the lives of citizens (Nathan 1983). In his 1996 State of the Union address Bill Clinton declared the era of "big government" to be over. For civil servants tasked with carrying out a task, the president saying the agency should stop doing something takes a conflictual tone. Immigration and Customs Enforcement publically fought president Obama regarding executive action on immigration (Bono 2014).

Agencies have the potential to house a resistant culture towards political actors that might spill over into the political arena. Acutely, a recent news article published by The Hill noted substantial differences between who was receiving campaign contributions from federal employees, with the lion's share of money going to Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump (Swan 2016). At an extreme, the Consumer Financial Protection Board only contributed money to Hillary Clinton (Fox News 2016). Employees in these agencies that participate politically stand to face an interesting crossroad when orders from President Trump come across their desk and it is plausible that these employees resist this orders.

Federal employees, despite normative desires for neutral behavior, can have political preferences of their own and have the opportunity to engage political action in carrying out their job tasks. Aberbach and Rockamn (1976) noted Richard Nixon faced and administrative state populated by members of his opposing party. In the later work, they also demonstrate that three different Republican administrations sought to rebalance the partisan distribution of federal employees in favor of more loyal civil servants (Aberbach and Rockman 2000). This sort of influence, as framed by Moe (1985), is the natural byproduct of presidents seeking to place loyal individuals in the federal government in order to see the president's agenda enacted.

The previous characterization of federal employees as political actors focuses on the desires of the president. But, there is another side to this narrative. The reason why presidents must trade competence and loyalty is that federal employees have preferences of their own that they act upon in ways that could run counter to what the president desires. Golden (2001) notes that federal employees that disagree with policy have the option either exit government, voice their discontent, demonstrate loyalty through responsiveness, or neglect their own personal feelings and comply with the new administration. Given limited options, federal employees

could also turn to the ballot box to voice their desire for political change. If they are, those federal employees engaging in political activities do so in ways that could systematically correlate with their job function.

Past work also indicates the possibility professional norms and agency reputations motivate federal employees to act in an apolitical fashion. Kaufman (1981) and Wilson (1989) frequently note administrative behavior motivated by the desire to maintain an agency's reputation. Carpenter (2010) posits agency reputations being staked to how well an agency does its job, the honesty of the agency, the capacity of the agency to carry out its mission, and the procedural compliance with rulings regarding the agency. While these concepts might not be related to one another, explicitly absent but implicitly present in this construction is the role of the agency being subservient to political actors. Carpenter and Krause (2012) suggest agencies rely heavily on reputation to avoid political alienation and maintain support. In their assessment, administrators rely heavily on the reputation of the agency to navigate these potentially choppy political waters. One benefit of an enhanced reputation for agencies is increased authority and autonomy (Carpenter 2001; Wilson 1989). In sum, these accounts suggest that professional norms carry the day and federal employees rise out the political morass to execute law in an objective and apolitical fashion because that is what provides the greatest long run benefit for the agency.

The two previous characterizations of the behaviors of federal employees perhaps suggest a theoretical conflict regarding agency behavior. This is not necessarily the case as each characterization is not mutually exclusive. Civil servants do not operate with total political naiveté; they also maintain high levels of professional decorum. What this dissertation aims to argue is that the scholarly literature pays far too little attention to how political federal

employees are and how that political behaviors translate in to their jobs. To provide evidence for this line of argument, I will show how political servants participate in elections and how they do so strategically. Next, I will show politics shaping how long top civil servants remain in government. Finally, I will demonstrate that the tenure of political appointees is shaped by institutional arrangements. These changes in tenure are indicative of political control of the agency and the autonomy with which the agency has to operate. The following section more concretely describes the studies used to substantiate these claims.

1.2 Path Forward

The next chapters progress with two overarching goals. The first is substantive: demonstrating that federal employees engage in politics as private citizens and that politics enters their work lives. Before demonstrating how politics enters the workplace for federal employees, it is necessary to demonstrate a heterogeneity of participation in elections. To do so, this project will examine how federal employees spend their money in elections by contributing money to candidates seeking the presidency.

The contributions of federal employees sit in a unique context compared to other citizens. Governed by the Hatch Act, civil servants can contribute to elections, just not in any governmental capacity. The bulk of the restrictions in elections deal with solicitation of contributions, not the individual actions of any civil servant. In addition to the context in which they contribute, the destination of the contribution, when it is to a presidential candidate, goes to someone who either will be the future boss of the civil servant or ran against their boss. This means the signal sent to the president from the civil servant can either be one of cooperation with the new administration, or if things do not work out for the candidate receiving the contribution,

a signal that could out the civil servant as being of the opposition party. Moreover, aside from the civil servant being an individual signal to the administration, civil servants could act together to signal the disposition of the agency or attempt to influence their future boss. The extent to which any of these behaviors is occurring is an open empirical question that this project tackles in the next chapter. To do so, original surveys of top federal employees will be matched with the contributions each respondent made to presidential candidates. This will allow for the understanding of political beliefs of individuals as it relates to the decision to give or not to give to presidential candidates.

After showing a variety of strategic behaviors with the patterns of campaign contributions of federal employees, the next chapter examines if politics shapes the careers of federal employees. Namely, do the career decisions of when civil servants opt to leave government correlate with political factors surrounding the agency. Recent work (Bolton et al. 2016) found that out-partisans are more likely to exit following a change in presidential administration. This useful demonstration is not surprising, given the beliefs of executive conflict with agencies who have a mission misaligned with the president. Yet even this demonstration only shows that *agencies* that have beliefs different than the president have an increase in turnover. It only implies out-partisans are leaving. Chapter 3 connects the work histories of career civil servants during the Bush administration and then tracks those individuals during the Obama administration to see which federal employees leave both during the transition, but also during the course of the majority of the Obama administration. Conducting such a study will allow for a richer understanding of who is leaving government.

The final empirical chapter, Chapter 4, examines the departure of political appointees to understand better the nature of bureaucratic control. As mentioned previously, elected officials

conducting oversight is what prevents democratic norms from being violated when rules generated by civil servants govern behaviors of citizens. Yet who has control over the bureaucracy is a far from settled question. And even if it were settled, who holds political power changes, and the nature of oversight changes in turn. As the political actors lose control over agencies during certain political arrangements, the agency stands to gain in autonomy.

One consistent finding across many disciplines is that individuals leave their place of work when they lose control over the decisions being made at that job. As such, agency autonomy will ebb and flow with tenures of civil servants. Extended tenures imply greater autonomy while increased turnover suggests less autonomy for the federal employee. Chapter 4 specifically tracks the tenure of all appointees on the Executive Schedule, all Schedule C employees and all noncareer members of the Senior Executive Service from 1976 to 2014 to consider how divided government and congressional oversight committees shape the tenure of federal employees. The results of this analysis find that when the political party opposite the president controls the Senate, appointees stay longer, suggesting the agency has greater control over decision-making. This contribution helps better understand who has control over the bureaucracy when conducting oversight.

The second overarching goal is methodological: provide better insights to important substantive questions by better measuring the concepts in the question. Technological and data limitations of the past has left scholars to turn to proxies and samples to better understand the substantive question. Yet in doing so certain assumptions must hold for the results to be generalizable beyond the sample. I take advantage of better technology and data to test the assumptions in prior work with each empirical chapter.

Chapter 2 helps the scholarly understanding of the motivations of campaign

contributions. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) provides very granular and detailed information about every contribution and dollar spent in federal elections. One can know the name, zip code and employment of the person who made the contribution. This allows for the answering of seemingly any question related to campaign contributions. However, this is not the case for one question: why? FEC records are only those that gave. A peer group of those that did not is not included, leaving scholars to assume plenty about the distribution of those who gave. To get a sample with those that did not give, scholars will included a question on a nationally representative sample of if someone gave money to an election. But this, too, has pitfalls. Where the money went is unclear. Moreover, covariates explaining why the person might have contributed money are at best coarse.

Chapter 2 resolves many of these difficulties. By merging a survey of federal employees with FEC data, I uncover exactly who gave money to federal elections with a peer group that did not. As such, I know why someone in a similar strata opted *not* to give money, where those that did contribute directly gave their money to, and have a sample of people who sit in work environment with clear gains to be made for making the contribution. This allows for a better understanding of why someone contributed money simply by virtue of a better data construction.

Scholars of turnover face a different data problem that stands to compromise results. Public records will allow for the observance of when someone leaves government. Those records will in no way account for the political beliefs of those individuals and the work environment. To get those important beliefs, scholars turn to surveys. Yet, by virtue of being in the survey, the individual currently works in government. Rather than wait several years to see who leaves, scholars include a question about how likely to survey respondent is to leave their place of work in the future. Saying one is going to quit is quite different, in terms of costs to the employee, than

actually leaving the job. I merge a survey of federal employees with their employment histories to resolve this problem. To preview a methodological find in Chapter 3, these differences vary systematically, with partisans over reporting their exit intention.

Finally, Chapter 4 considers control of the bureaucracy over several decades across all agencies. Past work has either looked in a cross section for control, used a theoretical model, or taken one agency and done a case study on that agency. While each contributes to the scholarly understanding of bureaucratic control, each approach has questions about generalizability. Cross sectional studies might be the reflection of what was occurring in that particular year. Theoretical models might abstract away important factors. Case studies might select an agency that is not representative of others in government. By turning to the employment history of all appointees, Chapter 4 is able to consider an extended period of time and all employees with real employment outcomes to see who controls the bureaucracy.

With the theoretical stage set, and the substantive and methodological payoffs highlighted, it is now time to turn to describing each of the studies referenced above.

Chapter 2
Why Do Bureaucrats Make Campaign Contributions to Presidential Candidates?: Evidence from 2004-2012

Like other citizens, federal employees commit time and money to presidential candidates seeking federal office.[1] However, unlike other citizens, federal employees work in an executive establishment governed by a person to whom they may donate. As Moe (2006) notes, "even the most ordinary bureaucrats, by taking collective action in elections and other realms of politics, may be able to exercise political power in determining who their bosses are and what choices the latter will make in office" (p. 2). The exercising of political control could operate directly through the selection mechanism for the office or more indirectly by signaling to political principals the collective preferences of the agency or individual preferences of the contributor. The extent to which bureaucrats engage in presidential elections is open for empirical investigation.

One form of political participation bureaucrats could coordinate with one another to influence the president is through campaign contributions. A recent news article published by The Hill noted substantial differences between which presidential candidates received money from federal employees in the 2016 election, with the vast majority of money going to Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump. The State Department, where Clinton recently had served as Secretary, gave over $400,000 to Secretary Clinton compared to just over $4,000 to Mr. Trump. Department of Justice employees contributed nearly $300,000 to presidential candidates, of which all but $8,756 went to Clinton (Swan 2016). At an extreme, the Consumer Financial Protection Board only contributed money to Hillary Clinton (Krayden 2016). These articles all suggest this to be evidence that the agency is Democratic. Recent scholarly work by Chen and

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[1]An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, known better as the Hatch Act of 1939, restricts the political behavior of federal employees in the executive branch under federal law. Importantly for this article, campaign contributions are not restricted behavior under this Act or any of the subsequent amendments.

Johnson (2015) characterized agency ideology using campaign contributions by agency employees to estimate agency preferences. The general assumption that undergirds these facts and estimates is that the aggregation of these individual actions translates to some general sentiment about the preferences of the agency.

However, such claims above about campaign contributions expressing the will of agencies skip an important step. Campaign contributions to candidates seeking federal office must disclose the occupation and employer of the contributor. This makes for easy identification of the contributions of federal employees, but it also potentially conflates the aggregation of those donations with the collective preference of the agency. Each contribution could be the result of personal factors independent of the agency where that individual works that makes aggregating the contributions inappropriate. Past scholarly work suggests federal employees remain politically neutral to enhance agency reputation (Carpenter 2010, Carpenter 2001, Carpenter and Krause 2012, Kaufman 1981, Miller and Whitford 2016, Wilson 1989). What motivated the campaign contribution of federal employees: the collective will of the agency, the strategic context of the bureaucrat's job, or the bureaucrat's individual political preferences? Appreciating why bureaucrats become campaign contributors allows for a richer understanding of the politicization of staffing decisions in the executive branch and the involvement of federal employees in presidential elections.

The article finds little evidence of collective action from employees but rather individual actions that express the individual's values. Those values can be either a political preference or a function of the strategic context where that individual works. In addition to gaining understanding about what motivates campaign contributions, the article speaks to the relationship that federal employees have with their political principal, specifically the president. Individual

characteristics are more associated with changes in the probability of making a campaign contribution. Appointees, partisans, ideologues and those with insulated personnel provisions contribute more frequently. Moreover, the patterns of partisan careerists giving differ depending upon who occupies the Oval Office.

The results suggest administrations deal with heterogeneous agencies *and* individuals in managing the bureaucracy. Some agencies are ideologically mismatched with the president. However, even in agencies that are aligned with the president, some individuals tasked with enacting the president's agenda might not support the current administration. This might seem to limit even more the ability of the president to control the administrative state. However, the same is also true of co-partisans working in mismatched agencies. Campaign contributions might serve as the signal by which civil servants signal their support of the current administration, thus making it easier for the administration to position more sympathetic civil servants in seats of power.

2.1 Federal Employees as Political Actors

One interesting feature of presidential campaigns is that presidents preside over individuals who may or may not have supported their candidacy. As Aberbach and Rockman note, "personnel working for the state could also reflect the partisan or attitudinal profile of the population" (2000, p.47). This suggests that even with goals of neutrality, people working for government enter their jobs with diverse political preferences amongst other traits. Such a distribution is consistent with one of Krislov and Rosenbloom's characterization of representative bureaucracy (1981). Civil servants have clients, and in order to provide best for those citizens needing the agencies assistance, individuals in the agency ought to share some of

the traits of those citizens they assist. Yet, Putnam finds "correlations between social background and policy preferences are remarkably weak and unpredictable" (1976, p. 96-97). Moreover, Aberbach and Rockman (1981) found closer ties between individual ideology and the department the individual works in, rather than the sociopolitical origins of that individual. While this suggests agency life is not a constant political battle, it does leave open the possibility for civil servants to possess beliefs counter to their political principals. Such a discrepancy could lead to conflict.

Federal employs have a long history in the United States of participating in elections, specifically concerning campaign contributions (Corrado, et al. 1997). The first restrictions placed on campaign contributions came in 1867 outlawing naval officers from soliciting dockworkers for contributions (Naval Appropriations Bill 1867). Such regulation sought to curtail a particular practice by a very specific set of federal employees. The regulation of the political activities of federal employees more generally first entered law with the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act (1883). Most notably the Pendleton Act brought about merit based hiring and firing practices for federal employees. In addition to introducing a merit based system, the Pendleton Act forbid campaign solicitations on government property (Maranto 1993). Simply having meritorious hiring practices does not remove unwarranted political influence in the administrative state. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, commonly known as the Hatch Act (1939), was enacted following allegations of Democrats using Works Progress Administration jobs in key states to employ contributors (Clement 1971; Leupold 1975). The Hatch Act and nearly 80 years of subsequent amendments spell out the permissible and impermissible activities of federal employees. Concerning campaign contributions, currently (as of the amendments passed in 2012) federal employees are allowed to contribute to federal offices

and candidates just like any other citizen, subject to the current limitations allowed by the Federal Election Commission under the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002. However, unlike other citizens, federal employees have a long history of norms and regulations regarding campaign contributions. Understanding the evolution of this dynamic is critical for evaluations of how federal employees participate in elections.

Federal employees, despite normative desires for neutral behavior, can have political preferences of their own and have the opportunity to engage political action. Aberbach and Rockman (1976) noted Richard Nixon faced and administrative state populated by members of his opposing party. In later work, they also demonstrate that three different Republican administrations sought to rebalance the partisan distribution of federal employees in favor of more loyal civil servants (Aberbach and Rockman 2000). This sort of influence, as framed by Moe (1985), is the natural byproduct of presidents seeking to place loyal individuals in the federal government in order to see the president's agenda enacted.

The previous characterization of federal employees as political actors focuses on the desires of the president. But, there is another side to this narrative. The reason why presidents must trade competence for loyalty is that federal employees have preferences of their own that they act upon in ways that could run counter to what the president desires. Golden (2001) notes that federal employees that disagree with policy have the option to either exit government, voice their discontent, demonstrate loyalty through responsiveness, or neglect their own personal feelings and comply with the new administration. Given limited options, federal employees could also turn to elections to voice their desire for political change. If they are, those federal employees engaging in political activities do so in ways that could systematically correlate with their job.

Coordinated agency action would also be associated with agency characteristics. Those features would likely be design features seeking to remove the agency from politics. If agencies are resolving a collective action problem, agency size surely correlates with the probability of making a campaign contribution. Additionally, agency structure such as insulation produces different agency outcomes depending upon the degree of insulation from political actors (Selin 2015). Also, the relative influence from political actors (Lee and Whitford 2012, Marvel and McGrath 2016) likely correlates with the political participation of individual employees in the federal government as individuals that report more policy influence from political actors have a greater interest in seeing a particular party control the executive or legislative branch. These agency characteristics situate employees in different agency contexts that could influence the decisions of the individual to participate in elections or the ability of the agency to act collectively in the electoral arena.

2.2 Federal Employees as Non-Political Actors

The possibility that federal employees participate politically competes with considerable evidence that professional norms and agency reputations motivate federal employees to act in an apolitical fashion. Kaufman (1981) and Wilson (1989) frequently note administrative behavior motivated by the desire to maintain an agency's reputation. Carpenter (2010) posits agency reputations being staked to how well an agency does its job, the honesty of the agency, the capacity of the agency to carry out its mission, and the procedural compliance with rulings regarding the agency. While these concepts might not be related to one another, explicitly absent but implicitly present in this construction is the role of the agency avoiding fights with political actors. Carpenter and Krause (2012) suggest agencies rely heavily on reputation to avoid

16

political alienation and maintain support. Borrowing their sailing metaphor, administrators rely heavily on the reputation of the agency to navigate these potentially choppy political waters. One benefit of an enhanced reputation for agencies is increased authority and autonomy (Carpenter 2001; Wilson 1989). Most recently, Miller and Whitford (2016) demonstrate that bureaucrats still view being above politics as a way to gain credibility with political actors. In sum, these accounts suggest that professional norms carry the day and federal employees rise out of the political morass to execute law in an objective and apolitical fashion because that is what provides the greatest benefit for the agency.

While the two previous characterizations of the behaviors of federal employees perhaps suggest a theoretical conflict regarding agency behavior, this is not necessarily the case and this paper does not seek to horserace the competing explanations. Rather, both accounts suggest a heterogeneity in the composition of the types of employees working within an agency. Individuals in some agencies perhaps refrain from entering the electoral arena. Others in a different context within the federal government might be more likely to participate. Understanding this variation, if it exists, allows for a nuanced understanding of behaviors within the bureaucracy and presidential control.

2.3 Motivations of Giving

Traditionally, motivations of giving are individual actions that fall into two categories. First, a campaign contribution could indicate the political preferences, either partisan or ideological, of the donor (Brown, Powell and Wilcox 1995, Francia, et al. 2003, Bonica 2013).[2] This will be referred to as expressive giving. The logic behind this type of donation would be donors want in

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[2]Recent scholarship has used campaign contributions to estimate the ideal points of candidates as well as donors (Bonica 2013).

office representatives similar to their own beliefs. As such, donors open their wallets to help likeminded individuals into office. This is more or less akin to the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court regarding the nature of contributions since the *Buckley v. Valeo* (1976) decision equating contributions with speech.

The second category of giving is strategic. While there are many forms of strategic contributions, at its heart this form of contribution is to better the donor's self-interest with little concern for general policy preferences. Advocates of restrictive campaign finance law fear this form of giving where moneyed individuals buy access for favorable policy through campaign contributions to political actors. Recently, several Supreme Court rulings[3] have heightened these concerns as but a few wealthy individuals fund candidates through new legal avenues (Kang 2010, Kang 2012, Briffault 2012). The strategic motivations for giving can take on many different forms. For this article, specifically a strategic contribution relates to the preferences housed by individuals regarding the individual's career and agency.

While these auspicious donors grab attention and headlines, the motivations of these contributions and other donations remain largely anecdotal (Hill and Huber (2015) is a recent notable exception). Modern presidential candidates need hundreds of millions of dollars to win the Oval Office in a modern campaign (Adkins and Dowdle 2002, Busch and Mayer 2003, Wayne 2012). One of the prominent ways this money flows into a candidate's campaign coffers is through contributions from individual donors. While *McCutcheon v FEC* (2014) recently removed aggregate caps on individual donors making direct contributions to federal candidates, The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) still limits donors to any one

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[3] Recent SCOTUS rulings such as *FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.* (2007), *Davis v. FEC* (2008), *Citizens United v. FEC* (2010), *McCutheon v. FEC* (*2014*) all have lessened restrictions on campaign contributions or money in campaigns.

candidate at $2,000 per election per candidate indexed for inflation.[4] The hope is by placing a cap on the size of contributions any one individual can make to a candidate, many citizens can give the maximum legal amount. If donors were hoping for access to the candidate, the intent of the law is the volume of competing voices would crowd out those attempting to purchase influence.[5] Whether or not this actually occurs is an empirical question that remains largely unanswered, but at least one recent incident forced presidential candidate Rick Perry to quip "I raised about $30 million, and if you're saying I can be bought for $5,000, I'm offended" (NPR 2011). The mere asking of the question suggests some still believe the caps insufficient in preventing strategic contributions. Pinning down these strategic factors motivating a campaign contribution is necessary to understand the genesis of campaign contributions.

Federal employees provide a unique avenue to consider strategic giving in detail. Despite the Weberian (1946) desire of neutral competence, bureaucrats are political actors within government (Lowi 1969, Wilson 1989). Some individuals opt into civil service with the desire to influence policy (Gailmard and Patty 2007, Gailmard 2010). Others enter into the federal government via political appointment (Lewis 2008). In the past, campaign contributions by federal employees were kickbacks for patronage positions (Theriault 2003, Lewis 2007). Past reforms, the Pendleton Act specifically, sought to remove this form of *quid pro quo* exchange from appointees to elected officials. All of these factors have important implications for how the federal government operates but the pervasiveness of each remains largely unknown in a modern setting. This article aims to begin to shed light on this issue. To do so unique data of federal

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[4] The caps were $2,000, $2,300 and $2,500 in 2004, 2008 and 2012 respectively in one election cycle for an individual donor. This means any one citizen could give $5,000 in 2012, the maximum contributions in both the general and primary elections.
[5] In other words, the rational actor wanting to purchase access sees thousands of other donors making similar contributions and realizes that her contribution is not unique enough to garner special attention from the candidate.

employees must be collected. The next section describes such data.

2.4 Data

To begin to consider the campaign contribution behavior of federal employees requires novel data. First, both contributors and those that did not contribute must be present. Donor files only provide information about the givers. In better understanding why someone gives money to a presidential candidate, one must consider the contributor's peers who opted not to give. Second, personal beliefs that are not readily observable must be included in the analysis. To observe these qualities, scholars typically turn to survey instruments. In this case, the Survey for the Future of Government Service (SFGS) surveyed top careerists and appointees in the United States federal government.[6] The SFGS in 2007 and 2014 used the Federal Yellow Pages (FYP) to generate a sample of highly ranked federal employees. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) publicly discloses all contributions made to federal candidates over $200.[7] These FEC records were merged with two SFGS surveys. Unique identifiers between each dataset matched the survey responses to the campaign contribution records published by the FEC.[8]

The merging of the first survey with 2004 and 2008 contribution records revealed 845 and 1,321 contributions, respectively, made by the population sampled in the survey to any

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[6] For full details of each survey please see Clinton et al. (2012) for the 2008 SFGS survey and http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/research/sfgs.php for the 2014 SFGS survey

[7] The $200 threshold is an aggregate total of contributions made to a given candidate. As such, campaigns are required to disclose smaller donations if those donations in sum add up to $200 or more.

[8] Specifically, first name, last name and state of the survey respondent had to match a contribution in the FEC's records. In addition, Washington D.C., Maryland and Virginia were considered the same state as not to miss bureaucrats who commute from the suburbs to the D.C. metro. To ensure that false positives were not included in this matching process, individual's employer as disclosed in the FEC's data must match the agency listed in the FYP or indicate employment by the federal government generally. General employment contributions constituted ~10% in a given cycle and findings are consistent even with their exclusion.

federal office. Removing repeat contributions,[9] contributions to other offices and those that did not respond to the survey, 75 survey respondents (3.37%) contributed to a presidential candidate in 2004 and 150 survey respondents (6.74%) contributed to a presidential candidate in 2008. In 2012 with the second SFGS survey, 2,272 contributions were made from the sample to a federally registered entity. Again removing duplicate contributions, donations to candidates for other office and those that did not respond, 150 survey respondents (4.22%) donated money to a presidential candidate.[10] These contributions largely went to the nominees for the two major parties.[11] This compares with roughly 3-4% of the population contributing money to office (Bonica, McCarty, et al. 2013) and 4-9% of medical doctors (Bonica, Rosenthal and Rothman 2014).

The unique data generated has several desirable properties. First, by selecting a sample based off a criterion other than making a campaign contribution, the evaluation of similar givers and non-givers is possible. Second, because the contributions went directly to candidates, no ambiguity exists about the intended destination of the contribution and the propensity to give to a presidential candidate. Third, having survey responses to political questions as well as job function questions for federal employees allows for the measurement of concepts that have clear ties to behavior that might motivate a campaign contribution but are not readily observable. Taking these unique facets collectively, a better understanding of campaign contributions as well as the relationship federal employees have with the president and presidential candidates is possible.

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[9] For example, someone giving $50 to a presidential candidate for five months need only be counted once in terms of their decision to contribute or not.

[10] Nonqualified PACs associated with campaigns were treated as a contribution to the candidate for the purpose of this analysis. Therefore, money directed to the Obama Victory Fund would be a contribution to a presidential candidate whereas a contribution to ActBlue would not. For descriptive statistics of the sample, not just survey respondents, see table A1 in the Appendix A.

[11] For full details of which candidates received contributions from respondents, see table A1 in Appendix A

2.5 Expressive Giving

Expressive giving can be measured by traditional survey measures of partisanship and ideology. Partisanship was measured on a five-point scale, with independents in the middle of the scale, partisans on the ends and "leaners" in-between. Ideology was measured on a seven point scale with moderates in the middle and very conservative or liberal responses on the ends of the scale. Both variables were rescaled to have the moderate or independent category be zero, with increases away from zero to be increases in partisanship or ideology.[12] This will be referred to as the absolute deviation of these measures and appear as *|PID|* and *|Ideology|* in the upcoming models. The expectation for each would be partisans and ideologues contribute more frequently than moderates and independents.

2.6 Strategic Giving

Both surveys as well as other governmental resources measure the agency context of the bureaucrat. Beginning with the FYP, all individuals sampled note the type of appointment for each bureaucrat. In this article presidential appointees requiring confirmation, presidential appointees, non-career members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and Schedule C employees are considered appointees. The FYP notes careerists as a career member of the SES, members of Senior Foreign Service, or simply a careerist. Whether someone is an appointee or careerist could alter the individual's probability of giving. Given historical precedents, appointees should give more frequently than careerists (Lewis 2008). An indicator variable (*Careerist*) accounts for this in the upcoming estimates.

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[12] Cross party giving would complicate interpretations of such a coding scheme. However, across three election cycles only 11, 0.92% of all presidential contributions, where given by members of one party to a candidate of the other party. For more detail, see Appendix B.

The FYP also provides the geographical location of where the bureaucrat works. Past work as indicated that different areas of the country give at varying rates (Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee 2011, Mitchell, et al. 2015, Sebold, et al. 2012). In the case of these federal employees, the proximity to Washington, D.C. constitutes a clear geographical bound that would differentiate bureaucrats. Those located in and around the Washington, D.C. area are more likely to engage with political actors and have more politicians in their proximity. This would leave those bureaucrats to behave as political intimates describe by Francia et al. (2003). Additionally, past surveys of donors have indicated that the most common reason for donating to a campaign was the candidates asked the donors to give money (Francia, et al. 2003, Brown, Powell and Wilcox 1995). As such, those living in the Washington, D.C. area should give more frequently than those bureaucrats living elsewhere in the country should. An indicator variable (*DC*) of if the individual works in Washington, D.C. accounts for this in consideration.

The 2014 SFGS asked what parts of the bureaucrat's job the individual respondent valued. For example, respondents indicated how important having decisions over policy outcomes (*Values Policy*) as well as career aspirations to moving to higher ranks in the federal government (*Values Move Up*) were asked to the respondents. In both instances, as bureaucrats place greater value on either making policy or moving up in government they should also be more likely to contribute. Those that value policy could view the contribution as gaining access while those that want to move up in the government are attempting to curry favor with potential political allies. This type of contribution varies from expressive giving, as the donations made are not in service of a broad political belief but rather the bureaucrat's career motivated preferences.

Past work has indicated that wealthier citizens are more likely to contribute than those

23

that make less money (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Unlike most citizens, wages of federal employees are disclosed to the public. Using FedSmith, the wages of all bureaucrats in the 2014 sample were collected.[13] The expectation again would be that bureaucrats making more money are also more likely to make a campaign contribution. To account for skewing in salaries, the natural log of salaries (*ln(Salary)*) will be used in the upcoming models.

The SFGS surveys also hold valuable insight into who the bureaucrats are in contact with during their daily job functions. By a similar logic as to why someone in D.C. would be more likely to contribute money to presidential candidates, bureaucrats that have increased contact with the White House (*White House Contact*) or Congressional committees (*Committee Contact*) should also be more likely to contribute.

2.7 Agency Characteristics

If agencies are acting collectively in elections then agency characteristics ought to vary systematically with the probability of making a campaign contribution. The SFGS also contains response items that measure the ideologies' of the different federal agencies. Clinton and Lewis (2008) estimate the agency ideal points from the 2008 survey while Richardson, Clinton and Lewis (2018) estimate the agency ideal points for the 2014 survey. The expectation would be that the more ideologically extreme agencies house bureaucrats that are more politically engaged and therefore more likely to contribute to political contests. These ideal points, like individual ideology and party identification variables, were adjusted to be the absolute deviations away from the moderate value (*|Agency Ideology|*).

How insulated the agency is from other political actors might also be associated with the

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[13] Because the pay scheduling of the federal government creates a skewed distribution, the natural log of these salaries were taken and included in the model that follows.

probability of its employees contributing. As Selin (2015) notes, agency insulation is a multifaceted concept that exist both on the policy insulation dimension as well as a dimension of how insulated personnel within the agency are from political actors. Selin recovers each type of insulation for each office in the SFGS survey. The expectation would be that increased insulation is associated with the freedom to contribute because there would not be fear of retribution from the political actors as power changes hand between the two parties. *Policy Insulation* and *Personnel Insulation* in the coming models account for both dimensions estimated.

Agencies also differ in terms of the composition of people they employ. FedCube, provided by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), reports anonymized quarterly information on nearly 2 million federal employees. In the subsequent models, the September file for each relevant year is used to construct percent of professional, technical or clerical employees within each office. The OPM data were matched to each of the 255 offices in the SFGS sample. From this, the percent of each office that constituted one of the categories mentioned above could be calculated. In the upcoming models, *% Professional* is the percent of the office that is reported to be a professional employee and the *ln(Agency Size)* is the natural log of the total number of employees reported to be working in the agency. Appendix D considers alternative categories of employment from this data.

Finally, the policymaking environment might influence the desire of the agency to act in the electoral arena. To account for this survey items were averaged asking how influential the White House (*White House Policy Influence*) and Congressional committees (*Congressional Committee Influence*) were in the policy making process within the agency. Agencies reporting more involvement from these actors ought to be more likely to participate in elections through campaign contributions. Additionally, respondents were asked how important rulemaking was

for their office. Taking the average value of that response by office (*Rulemaking Importance*) captures the regulatory environment of the office with those agencies that participate more in rulemaking being more likely to contribute.

2.8 Results for 2012

The binary nature of the outcome, either giving or not giving to a presidential candidate, makes a probit estimation appropriate. Additionally, the decision to give has no partisan direction as bureaucrats could give to either Republican or Democratic candidates, leaving one binary outcome to consider in this paper.[14] Also, Heinrich and Hill note, it is "challenging to think of a governmental context in which a multilevel conceptualization would *not* be appropriate" (2010, 836). See Resh (2014, 2015) for multiple applications accounting for these features. However, given the nature of the data, the intraclass correlation is insufficient to warrant a multilevel model. The probit coefficients are reported in the body of the text to allow for an easy discussion of the magnitude of the change provided by the coefficients. What follows in this paper are probit estimations, unless otherwise noted, with the multilevel models reported in Appendix C. Importantly, the substantive conclusions drawn from the estimates do not vary between the different modelling decisions.

The results that follow consistently demonstrate three critical findings. First, there is consistent evidence of expressive giving, as partisans are more likely to give than independents. Second, the context the individuals works in is systematically associated with changes in the probability of making a campaign contribution. Careerists are less likely to give than appointee

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[14] Additionally a total of 11 individuals across the three election cycles identified as one party and contributed to a candidate from the other party. The observed lack of cross party giving is consistent with past studies of shared donors during presidential campaigns (Dowdle, et al. 2013). This lack of cross party giving should assuage concerns of removing partisan direction from the dependent and some independent variables.

and personnel insulation increases the probability of contributing. Additionally, policy insulation decreases the probability of contributing while those that place a greater value on policy are more likely to contribute. Third, no evidence of coordinated action by similarly situated agencies was found, which suggests the decision to contribute is largely individualistic and not the coordinated effort of agencies seeking to exert influence.

To begin to explore the motivations of campaign contributions, the first model in Table 1 uses information available for the whole sample, not just survey respondents. As expected, careerists are 8.4 percentage points less likely to give than appointed officials are. While this change may not appear particularly large in terms of the size of the increase, it is important to remember for this and the subsequent predicted probabilities slightly less than five percent of respondents contributed to a presidential candidate.[15] As such, even small changes would nontrivially change the proportion of the sample that opted to contribute to a presidential contest.

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[15] Kanthak and Krause (2010) capitalize on their dyadic design interpreting their estimates into the number of contributions particular candidates could expect to receive. However, that relationship between House members and Leadership PACs is different in that the plausibility of each donor having a dyadic relationship with every candidate is different enough such interpretations are not appropriate for this article.

Table 2.1: Probit Estimations of Bureaucrats Giving to Presidential Candidates, 2012

	(1) Give 2012	(2) Give 2012	(3) Give 2012	(4) Give 2012
Careerist	-1.049***(0.051)	-1.003***(0.180)	-1.279***(0.244)	
ln(Salary)	0.823***(0.106)	0.261 (0.380)	0.354 (0.507)	
|PID|		0.336*(0.147)	0.694*(0.282)	
|Ideology|		0.076 (0.086)	0.109 (0.119)	
Values Policy		0.137 (0.085)	0.226*(0.102)	
Values Move Up		-0.102 (0.058)	-0.096 (0.068)	
DC		0.240 (0.197)	0.059 (0.200)	
Presidential Contact		-0.0334 (0.070)	-0.098 (0.095)	
Committee Contract		0.121 (0.082)	-0.004 (0.100)	
|Agency Ideology|			0.208 (0.122)	0.010 (.006)
% Professional			-0.318 (0.370)	-0.004 (.0178)
ln(Agency Size)			0.033 (0.063)	-0.006 (.003)
Policy Insulation			-0.275*(0.114)	.0003 (.003)
Personnel Insulation			0.264**(0.096)	.004 (.007)
Context Controls	No	No	Yes	No
Constant	-10.77*** (1.256)	-5.13 (4.525)	-6.025 (5.981)	0.077*** (0.010)
Estimation	Probit	Probit	Probit	OLS

*$p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, two-tailed Standard errors in parentheses
Note: Models 1 and 2 estimate robust standard errors as the measures are individualistic. Model 3 clusters errors by office with the inclusion of group measures. Estimating models with clustered standard errors for Models 1 and 2 does not alter the substantive conclusions drawn from the estimates. Model 4 uses OLS to estimate an agency level model. *Context Controls* includes controls for *White House* and *Policy Influence, and Rulemaking Importance*.

The next model considers individual predictors of why a federal employee would make a campaign contribution. First, the inclusion of these variables into the specification does not substantively change the results from the first model. Second, partisanship has a 3.5 percentage point increase in giving while the marginal change for ideology is indistinguishable from zero, suggesting for bureaucrats, increases in partisanship makes a contribution more likely while no statistically discernable change is associated with increases in ideology.[16] Individual characteristics about the respondents work are not associated with changes in the probability of contributing. As the results from the second model indicate, valuing policy is positively associated with the probability of donating to a presidential candidate whereas moving up in government is negatively associated with giving. That said while both approach conventional levels of statistical significance, neither clear the traditional $p < .05$ threshold. Model 2 also reveals little change in the substantive significance estimates in the previous specification. Careerists are still less likely to give than appointees are, but now salary does not have a statistically significant association with the probability of giving.

While the data might not warrant a multilevel model, agency characteristics might still be associated with an individual's decision to make a campaign contribution. Model 3 in Table 1 incorporates agency specific characteristics. While most agency traits are not associated with a change in predicted probability, the insulation measures now explains associated changes in the probability of giving. Individuals in agencies with more personnel protections are associated with higher rates of contributions while those in agencies with greater policy insulation see a decrease in the associated change in the probability of making a campaign contribution. Additionally, with the agency factors controlled for, an increase in the value of policy for the

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[16] One explanation for this finding could stem from party identification being too strongly correlated with ideology. These variables are correlated a 0.30 in the 2014 SFGS and 0.32 in the 2008 SFGS which should alleviate some concerns with multicollinearity. Appendix B discusses this relationship in detail.

respondent is associated with an increased probability of contributing. These nuanced factors

behind the motivation for making a contribution do not change the substantive significance of

partisans being more likely to make a campaign contribution while careerists are less likely to

make a campaign contribution. Conditional relationships between partisanship and values are

explored in Appendix E.

Finally, if agencies are systematically acting in elections through campaign contributions

it is necessary to demonstrate agency characteristics as the sole predictor of aggregate agency

behavior, Model 4 estimates agency characteristics predicting the percent of the agency that

contributed to a presidential candidate in 2012. From this estimation, there is little evidence of

systematic change in the percent of the agency that votes relative to only agency level

characteristics. This result is not surprising given the small intraclass correlation in the multilevel

models. Appendix F shows agency average models for all years used in this paper. Finding no

evidence of agency traits predicting giving demonstrates that agencies that share traits do not act

systematically with regards to campaign contributions. This does not rule out that any one

agency is not contributing in a coordinated fashion. Such a line of inquiry requires different data,

namely qualitative evidence of agency coordination, that is not available for this study.

2.9 Results for 2008 and 2004

The results presented in Table 1 are for only one election cycle and one administration.

Considering other election years surrounding the earlier SFGS survey allows for the analysis of

different election years and a different administration in power. Table 2 reports the probit

estimations of contributing to a presidential candidate in 2008 and 2004. Sample wide

characteristics do not exist to estimate a model from the full sample. Additionally, some

questions asked in 2014 were either not asked in the earlier survey or are sufficiently different to be incomparable to one another so the individual and combined model for 2008 and 2004 are presented.

Table 2.2: Probit Estimation Contribution to a Presidential Candidate. 2004-2012

	(1) Give Pres 2008	(2) Give Pres 2008	(1) Give Pres 2004	(2) Give Pres 2004
Careerist	-0.655***	-0.583***	-0.654***	-0.510*
	(0.105)	(0.141)	(0.154)	(0.234)
|PID|	0.306**	0.263*	0.612***	0.747**
	(0.099)	(0.131)	(0.182)	(0.257)
|Ideology|	0.067	0.071	0.138*	0.0448
	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.087)
White House Contact	0.164***	0.125	0.124**	0.224*
	(0.050)	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.087)
Committee Staff Contact	-0.059	-0.006	-0.0557	-0.0244
	(0.066)	(0.083)	(0.068)	(0.010)
% Professional		0.819*		0.259
		(0.325)		(0.393)
ln(Agency Size)		-0.107*		0.00606
		(0.042)		(0.039)
|Agency Ideology|		-0.006		-0.104
		(0.118)		(0.129)
Constant	-1.75***	-1.17*	-2.71***	-3.24***
	(0.228)	(0.479)	(0.396)	(0.689)
Observations	1883	1210	1883	1210

$^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$, two-tailed
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by office.

Importantly, the key findings in 2012 hold across other election years in a different presidential administration.[17] Careerists are less likely to give than appointees are. Partisans are more likely to give than independents. The inclusions of agency ideology and contact with political actors leave the key explanations substantively unaltered and are not predictive of contributions with a minor exception. In 2008, contact with the White House increases the probability of contributing. Additionally, larger agencies are associated with a decreased probability of making a campaign contribution in 2008. The results in Table 2 demonstrate the patterns observed in Table 1 persist in different election years.

One consistent finding warrants additional analysis. Across election years, careerists were less likely to contribute to presidential candidates than appointees were. While this finding is consistent with past explanations of appointee behavior, the current analysis provides a unique opportunity to look at the behavior of careerists in a political context. Figure 1 displays the rates at which different partisans give in different election years. Several observations emerge from Figure 1. Frist, careerists do participate in elections by making campaign contributions. The exception is in 2004 when no Independents of the 220 that answered the survey contributed. Second, Democrats are giving at different rates depending upon the election year. Third, depending upon the election year, partisans give at rates that are different from one another. If partisanship were purely expressive, the rate of giving should be innate to the individual and not vary across elections. However, Figure 1 displays simply the rate at which partisan careerists give. Before making conclusive statements, it is necessary to examine if other factors explain the changing rates of partisan giving amongst careerists.

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[17] Another concern could be the temporal nature of some of these responses. Having the earlier SFGS take place between two presidential administrations could complicate findings if the response items changed over time. If such changes were to occur, the findings should not look similar. However, the models estimated find similar increases in predicted probability but in terms of the direction of the effect but also the substantive size of the change in predicted probability. Such findings should alleviate concerns of changing opinions across time.

Figure 2.1: Careerist Giving by Party Identification

Note: Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the proportion of the category that contributed.

Table 3 uses similar models as Table 1 and 2, however this time only considering careerists. Partisanship undergoes a transformation as well, dropping the absolute deviation of partisanship and replacing it with indicator variables for Democrats and Republicans.[18] What is clear from

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[18]Because careerists were not selected by a partisan administration, differences between Republicans and Democrats within year are now comparable. In other words, any Democrat appointed by the Bush Administration likely has qualities that differentiate the appointee from other Democrats, making any discussion of partisanship misleading.

those estimates is Republicans and Democrats give at different rates from one another, and those rates vary by year. Beginning in 2004, partisanship provides no insight in the probability of contributing as Republicans and Democrats are equally likely to contribute, as tests regarding the difference between coefficients cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are the same.[19] These estimates, however, change in the 2008 model, with Democrats being more likely to contribute than Republicans. Using the same sample of careerists, the probability of contributing changes in different election years. Moving to a different sample in 2012, the same pattern of Democrats being more likely to contribute than Republicans persists from 2008. The findings above suggest the rate at which partisan careerists give to presidential candidates varies by year. Republican careerists were equally likely to give in 2004 as Democrats, while Democrats are more likely to give in 2008 and 2012 than Republicans.

Such a problem does not exists for careerist that transition from one administration to the next, so comparisons between Democrats and Republicans now are possible. One issue that arises is that in 2004 no independent careerists contributed to a presidential candidate. As such point estimates with independents as reference categories in that year are very large so the overall magnitude of the coefficient is not discussed. That said, the results are robust (not displayed) to excluding independents, differencing 2008 and 2004 and the inclusion of giving in 2004 as an explanatory variable in estimating 2008 giving.

[19] These results are consistent with models estimating both Republican and Democrat indicators with Independents as the reference category. Those results appear in Appendix H.

Table 2.3: Probit Estimation of Careerists Giving to Presidential Candidates, 2004-2012

	(1) Give 2012	(1) Give2008	(1) Give 2004
|Agency Ideology|	0.016 (0.116)	0.074 (0.13)	-0.007 (0.147)
DC	0.265 (0.184)	0.615* (0.268)	0.397* (0.201)
|Ideology|	0.124 (0.080)	0.197* (0.083)	0.0787 (0.090)
Presidential Contact	0.135* (0.063)	-0.072 (0.111)	0.135 (0.122)
Committee Contact	-0.010 (0.021)	0.100 (0.064)	-0.082 (0.072)
Democrat	0.584* (0.276)	0.686 (0.392)	3.607*** (0.185)
Republican	0.123 (0.345)	0.111 (0.462)	3.748*** (0.181)
% Professional	0.667* (0.281)	0.823* (0.349)	0.592 (0.489)
ln(Agency Size)	-0.0115 (0.035)	-0.0954* (0.044)	0.0197 (0.05)
Constant	-3.03*** -0.398	-2.77*** (0.572)	-6.34*** (0.54)
Observation	1747	1042	1042

$^+$p < 0.1 * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, two-tailed
Standard errors in parentheses

To speculate some about why these patterns emerge, the clearest explanation stems from the changing electoral context. In 2004, a Republican incumbent controlled the White House. By 2008, it seemed likely a Democrat would occupy the Oval Office and the same Democrat would be in office for a second term in 2012 (Bartels 2013). Perhaps these underlying circumstances

altered different partisan groups' probability of giving. The strongest evidence of this interpretation lies in differences between 2004 and 2008. Recall, those samples are the same bureaucrats. Yet when the election year, and the context associated with that year changes, Democrats change their probability of contributing. This result is not a function of Republicans censoring their behavior. There was actually a slight increase in the number of contributions for John McCain over George W. Bush. Instead, the sizable increase lies with Democratic candidates receiving three times the number of contributions in 2008 when compared to 2004.[20] This finding is evidence of strategic giving, as context seems to be altering the probability of making a campaign contribution. The following interpretation receives support when considering the findings in 2012. With a new sample but still in the Obama administration, Democrats are more likely to give than Republicans are. If expressive characteristics of donors motivated the underlying propensity to give, clear election specific differences should not emerge along partisan lines. Yet the findings above demonstrate this exact behavior is occurring amongst careerists. The same sample demonstrates different behaviors in different election years and different samples demonstrate similar behaviors under the same administration. Such donation patterns are suggestive of strategic behavior being associated with giving, not just an innate probability of contributing.[21]

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[20] Table A in Appendix A shows the number of campaign contributions received by presidential candidates in all three elections considered by survey respondents.

[21] One potentially puzzling result for careerists is the discrepancy between 2004 and 2012. Both deal with incumbent presidents seeking reelection, yet the partisans do not give in similar ways. Two key distinctions help in understanding this result. First, the Bush reelection was far more in doubt than Obama's reelection bid. John Kerry led in the polls as late as July and August in 2004 (http://www1.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2004/president/us/general_election_bush_vs_kerry-939.html#polls).
Second, Democrats outnumber Republicans. If a Democratic careerist were to back a losing candidate, they would still work in an executive branch comprised a majority of copartisans. Republicans backing a loser return to a different environment where they are the political minority and are out of power.

2.10 Discussion

Looking for trends across the years between the different models reveals consistent findings. First, bureaucrats display evidence of expressive giving. Partisans are more likely to make campaign contributions than independents. This result is consistent with past studies that characterized donor composition (Brown, Powell and Wilcox 1995, Francia, et al. 2003, Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee 2011). In some cases, this is also true for ideologues, though the magnitude of the change in predicted probabilities is always smaller than partisanship. All the expressive findings were robust and only trivially decreased by the inclusion of strategic motivations for donating money to a presidential candidate.

Bureaucrats also contribute to presidential candidates for career-motivated reasons. Careerists are less likely to contribute to presidential campaigns than appointees are. This decrease in giving for careerists is quite large considering the propensity of the sample to give. Careerists appear to be participating less when it comes to making campaign contributions. There are several reasons for this observation. First, careerists could be staying away from political conflicts and maintaining the agency's reputation by not contributing. Second, it could be that longer time horizons for federal employees compared to political actors make the appearance of picking a side unwise. That said the need to stay away from the political competitions for careerists is interesting. Future work should investigate the extent to which political retribution against out-party careerists alters the behavior of bureaucrats.

There is greater suggestive evidence for career motivated strategic giving in 2012 when bureaucrats revealed their values about their career. Federal employees looking to alter policy are more likely to contribute to a presidential candidate. This behavior mirrors a story of access buying told about donors representing business interests. Like the private sector contributors

looking to influence the policy outcomes via campaign contributions to presidential candidates, those bureaucrats that place higher values on making policy also are more likely to contribute to presidential candidates.

Another past explanation of giving was resource based (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). People with more money are better equipped to contribute money to elections. In 2012, when salaries of federal employees are known, the simple models predicting giving found evidence of this expectation. However, as more explanations of giving were included into a model predicting giving behavior, the marginal change in predicted probability disappeared. This result suggests that salary varies with other strategic explanations of giving, not just simply making more money. In other words, simply having money does not make federal employees more likely to contribute. While it is likely a necessary condition to be able to give, ultimately the decision to part ways with one's wealth needs something strategic or expressive to facilitate the contribution. This finding is important for scholars studying campaign contributions as simply having more money only coarsely correlates with an increased probability of giving to a presidential candidate for bureaucrats once other explanatory considerations are included in the specification.

The outstanding question of if the collective action of donors should be inferred to be the preferences of the agency remains. The results above suggest campaign contributions are far more individualistic than they are the aggregation of individuals to resolve a collective action problem. Most agency characteristics were not associated with giving. Two exceptions were size of the agency and the insulation of individuals in the agency in some years. Regarding agency size, one could speculate that larger agencies present a more difficult collective action problem and therefore federal employees choose not to participate in this fashion. Interestingly, insulation

38

of top employees as constructed by Selin (2015), is associated with changes in the probability of making a campaign contribution. Individuals with greater job security through insulation are more likely to contribute money to a presidential candidate. This is particularly interesting because the individuals within the survey come from the upper echelons of the agency where the protections are in place most readily. This result is suggestive evidence that individuals that work within agencies with more insulation might be more likely to participate in the political process because they have additional protections and have less fear of retribution from political actors. Moreover, increased policy insulation is associated with a decreased probability of contributing. Considering a contribution like access buying, this is suggestive evidence that employees that are insulated in the policy making process do not make campaign contributions, even when controlling for how much those individuals value making policy.

Three broader implications of this work merit further exploration. First, the inclusion of partisanship and ideology as predictors of giving result consistently in partisanship having a larger increase in the probability of giving. In some cases, the effect of ideology is statistically indistinguishable from zero. While donors are more ideological than non-donors (Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee 2011), for presidential politics with bureaucrats, it is partisanship that has a greater motivating force. Perhaps this finding is a result of presidential politics being the best-case scenario to observe partisan contributions from federal employees. Money clearly goes to candidates of one of the two major parties. The money required to win office also is massive and requires contributions from citizens all across the country with diverse preferences. Under these circumstances, one could envision partisans participating in presidential elections more so than other elections. This could also be a quirk of federal employees, but repeating this procedure with different survey samples would reveal if this pattern persists.

The second question these results spur relates to the downstream consequences of a contribution made by a federal employee. Are there payouts to employees that contributed to a presidential candidate? The 2012 results at least plausibly suggest contributors that have a greater stake in policymaking contribute. Tracking the career trajectories of those that contributed would reveal job consequences regarding both the trajectory of the employee as well as the work output and placement of that official. Documenting the career paths of those employees would answer if campaign contributions were detrimental or helpful to promotions as well as if those that contribute get better access to policymaking positions.

Third, estimating models with just ideology have little substantive differences in terms of how ideology relates to the propensity to contribute. This leaves the interpretation of the results to be that contributions are a function of partisanship, not ideology. This is an interesting finding because federal employees and agencies generally bear the moniker of an ideology, not a party. The potential conflation of these two notions is an interesting line of inquiry, suggesting that while contributions do not appear to be an agency specific phenomenon given the results in the paper, other areas of agency action might be partisan and not ideological.

2.11 Conclusion

The decision to make a campaign contribution is a complicated calculation of strategic and expressive factors. When examining federal employees to limit the complicated strategic environment of the population at large, clear evidence of increases in the probability of giving exists for partisans and in some instances ideologues. Evidence of career motivated strategic giving complements the expressive giving results as careerists are less likely to give relative to appointees. That said, the strategic giving seems to stop at the individual and is not

systematically used by agencies to resolve a collective action problem. Scholars using campaign finance records should be mindful of the motivations that generated the contribution when using such data in their analyses.

In addition to providing a better understanding of campaign contributions, this article provides valuable insight into the heterogeneity of political preferences in the bureaucracy the president faces when attempting to oversee the executive branch. Not all bureaucrats behave in the same way or have the same political opinions. While breaking employees into categories based off appointment type helps in explaining this variation, there are differences within those categories that stem from the personal beliefs and values of individual employees. These differences likely have other consequences related to the execution of governmental action in the modern administrative state. To understand better the modern administrative state and how presidents interact with federal agencies, future work should attempt to map the values of individual employees, as those values likely are consequential for outcomes produced by the federal administrative state and the ability of the president to control policy decisions.

Federal civil servants contributing to presidential races provide several important implications students of the presidency and the executive branch. First, presidents face an executive branch with diverse missions and personnel. Not only may the purpose of the agency not align with the president, the civil servants within agencies may not support that president relative to the other party's candidate in the previous election. This opens up the possibility of resistance to the new administrations agenda by these mismatched civil servants. But the ideological misalignment cuts both ways. In agencies that the administration might anticipate this resistance, some civil servants, via campaign contributions, could signal their willingness to cooperate with the new administration. This could lead to those individuals being placed in seats

of power that would enable greater control of the agency beyond what the political appointees provide the administration. Future work should consider if individuals making campaign contributions see more or less favorable job outcomes depending upon who occupies the Oval Office.

Second, federal agencies do not act as a monolith in elections via campaign contributions. Agencies are not attempting to control their principal in elections nor are they giving at rates that would suggest a strong signal from the agency to the administration. Rather, individuals give to their preferred candidate, with those that value policy being more likely to give. Such a result suggests that politics enters the executive branch, but only through individuals exercising their right to make a campaign contribution. In modern times, this information is publicly available, so it could signal support that would in turn benefit the civil servant in their career.

Finally, career civil servants behave strategically when making a campaign contribution. In addition to career aspirations correlating with giving noted above, the rates of giving by partisans shift in conjunction with the changing winds of American politics, even for career civil servants. This suggests that not all civil servants abstain from the political process. Future work should consider how the political engagements of civil servants in elections manifest in the career decisions and outcomes of federal employees.

Chapter 3
Partisan Turnover in the Permanent Civil Service

The surprise victory of Donald Trump, which sent shockwaves through the American electorate, also reverberated through the civil service. One poll of federal employees taken directly before the inauguration suggested that slightly over a quarter considered leaving government and, indeed, many have followed through by publicly resigning (Cox 2017; Federal Executive 2017). Some departing civil servants penned pleas to those remaining in government to resist the Trump administration: they did not want the President to be able to use civil servants' expertise to legitimize the administration's actions (Cohen 2016; Hennessey 2016). What the president might dismiss as the action of disgruntled Democrats might actually be indicative of a growing partisan battleground in the civil service.

The anecdotal evidence of turnover among high-level civil servants during the Trump administration raises the more general question of the role politics plays in turnover in the permanent government. While the Trump administration's relationship with the civil service seems particularly strained, some tension is common after elections. The Nixon administration, for example, fought what it believed to be a Democratic civil service (Aberbach and Rockman 1976); the Reagan administration used targeted reassignment in the Environmental Protection Agency (Golden 2000); and, the Obama administration used czars to help control policy (Steinzor 2012). When confronting these political pressures, civil servants might prefer to exit government rather than carry out programs they disagree with.

The original motivation for the creation of a professional civil service was to ensure an expert administration of the laws (Van Riper 1958). High levels of turnover undercut the quality and competence of the civil service, because lost human capital acquired on the job is costly to replace (Lewis 1991; Light 2008). The *Washington Post* Editorial Board felt so strongly about

this the Sunday after Donald Trump won the presidency they wrote:

> [O]ne shift guaranteed to damage the nation would be an exodus of smart, experienced and civic-spirited people from federal service. If good lawyers leave the Justice Department, less-experienced and less-principled ones may take their place. If seasoned diplomats leave their posts, those who will fill their shoes will have to conduct the nation's foreign policy with less knowledge and fewer relationships abroad. Federal civil servants are not responsible for making policy, but they are responsible for lending their brains and expertise to the process of applying it, so that the wisdom of experience filters up even as policy comes down. More than ever, the country needs that process to continue.

When civil servants opt to exit the public service, performance of federal programs is put at risk (see, e.g., Boylan 2004, Lewis 2008). Moreover, exit becomes a normatively troubling problem if political factors precipitate the decision to leave government as those losses change the composition of the federal workforce.

Scholars have conducted important research illuminating different individual and contextual factors that predict exit for civil servants (see, e.g., Bertelli 2007; Lee and Whitford 2008; Pitts et al. 2011; for good overviews on turnover see Abbasi and Hollman 2000; Grissom et al. 2015; Park and Shaw 2013). Absent from many studies is what makes agencies a unique and interesting organization: the role of politics. It is important to know if politics enters in the decision for individuals to exit the public service. Civil servants face similar decisions as other employees (e.g., the role of salary, benefits, retirement packages, diversity concerns, etc.). However, unlike private firms, agencies face a work environment where elected officials, with interests that could run counter to the mission of the agency, interfere in the work of the public employee.

Recent work that does engage the role of politics provides competing predictions about how it should influence exit. Furthermore, the data restrictions of these studies limit our ability to arbitrate between these predictions. The extant empirical work that does consider politics relies

on either employment records *or* stated intent to exit in a survey (see, e.g., Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Bolton et al. 2016; Pitts et al. 2011). However, government employment records have no data on an individual's political beliefs and surveys do not observe someone actually quitting the public service.[1] Each provide an incomplete snapshot. This paper bridges this gap by combining survey-based measures of partisanship with government employment records. This allows me to assess *directly* the role of politics in actual departure, rather than stated departure decisions.

The paper proceeds with the following sections. First, it begins by reviewing past explanations for exit, focusing on the role of politics. The paper then describes the survey of civil servants and Office of Personnel Management records used to observe individual political beliefs and exit from government. It demonstrates that actual exit diverges from survey respondents' stated exit intention. Next, a longitudinal analysis demonstrates that independents and those in moderate agencies are more likely to exit government than partisans and those working in more ideological agencies. While displaying these results, the paper highlights discrepancies between the conclusions one would reach using survey based measures of turnover intention compared to actual exit. To put these results into context, the paper discusses how the partisan distribution of the civil service can change over an administration given estimated exit rates. Finally, the paper addresses the generalizability of the results using early data from the Trump administration and concludes with a discussion of the implications for our conception of a neutral public administration.

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[1] There can be a consequential difference between what people report they will do on a survey and what they actually do. Recent work looking a turnover for another public servant, teachers, found an 80 percent gap between exit intention on a survey and observed exit (DeAngelis et al. 2013).

3.1 Why Do Senior Civil Servants Exit Government?

The National Commission on the Public Service warned of increased turnover due to an aging workforce in 1989. Dubbed the "quiet crisis" in the civil service, the commission warned of dire losses of human capital from an aging workforce and a lack of interest by college graduates in the most senior positions in government. At the time, only 3 percent of honors students sought jobs in the public service (Leadership for America 1989, p. 29), while retirements of Baby Boomers loomed. The capacity lost from this increased turnover and the dearth of talented replacements threatened the productivity of agencies spanning the entire government. Lewis (1991) concurred with the looming troubles due to an aging workforce and difficulties recruiting new talent, but suggested a decade remained to intervene and fix the problem. While the measurement of performance in public sector bureaucracies is difficult (Heckman, Heinrich and Smith 1997; Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002), a recent meta-analysis of organizational departures finds a negative correlation between turnover and performance (Park and Shaw 2013).

Concerned with the negative effects of turnover, scholars have sought to identify its causes. Both individual and contextual factors may enter into a civil servant's decision to leave government. These factors interact with individual civil servants personal beliefs and alter their propensity to exit. In addition to age, important work demonstrates that other demographic characteristics, like gender and race, are correlated with employee exit (see, e.g., Cho and Lewis 2012; Pitts, Marvel and Fernandez 2011). As with most labor market contexts, the relative compensation of federal employees and the availability of outside options influences career choices (Bertelli 2007; Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Chen and Johnson 2015; Gamassou 2015; Lee and Whitford 2008). Exit also is associated with the ability of employees to voice opinions and

the loyalty they feel towards the organization (Lee and Whitford 2008). More generally, scholars hypothesize that some employees view their service in government as a noble cause and an important component of career decisions (Bright 2008; Perry and Wise 1990). Collectively, there is robust empirical evidence that these factors influence job satisfaction and overall satisfaction determines the likelihood of exit (see, e.g., Hahm, Jung and Youl Lee 2014; Kim and Fernandez 2015; Lee and Jimenez 2011).

In addition to individual factors related to exit, the context of public sector work influences employee exit. First, organizational factors, such as agency prestige, culture, and management practices enter into the individual's decision to exit (Bertelli 2007; Gamassou 2015; Pitts, Marvel and Fernandez 2011; Wilson 1994). Additionally, the networks in which the employee operates help in understanding conditions within the agency that alter exit intention (Moynihan and Pandey 2008; Pitts, Marvel and Fernandez 2011).

3.2 Politics, Partisanship, and Turnover

Only recently have scholars begun to focus on the role of politics in civil service turnover (Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Bolton et al. 2016; Cameron et al. 2015).[2] An example from the Trump administration provides a useful illustration of why politics might enter in the decision to exit. In July of 2017, a member of the Senior Executive Service working in the Department of the Interior wrote an Op-ed in the *Washington Post* discussing his reassignment from evaluating policy regarding climate change and indigenous peoples in Alaska to collecting royalties for oil companies. Despite possessing no accounting experience, the Trump administration moved the employee because, as he viewed it, his policy positions on climate change were in conflict with

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[2] A recent meta-analysis of public sector turnover intention found 29 covariates associated with turnover; none were political (Hur 2017).

those of the Trump administration (Clement 2017). This employee (and the 50 others referenced in the Op-ed) can opt to either exit and not work in government during the Trump years or to "wait it out" and fight the administration.[3]

Importantly, the existing work on the role of partisanship and turnover provides competing accounts of who exits and what different types of employees will do in response to political interference.[4] First, numerous works suggest that policy disagreements between partisan agency personnel and the administration will increase turnover (Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Gailmard and Patty 2007; Richardson 2016). In this view, partisan civil servants have strong views about policy and a mismatch with the new presidential administration can decrease worker satisfaction, and thus lead to exit.

Other work suggests a second set of civil servants who exit under certain political conditions. Cameron et al. (2015) use a formal model to highlight conditions under which civil servants with strong policy views on the left or the right are more likely to *stay* in government, while moderates leave. This is because policy-motivated bureaucrats who disagree with the president decide to stay in the agency to "wait out" the current administration in addition to ideologically congruent civil servants enthusiastic about enacting the president's new policy agenda. Those in the middle of the ideological distribution will stay hoping they can make a

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[3] The Trump administration is not alone in making politicized staffing decisions. The Nixon administration used such a tactic when Fred Malek distributed the Federal Political Personnel Manual to pressure civil servants with protections to leave so the Nixon administration could gain control over a Democratic bureaucracy (Aberbach and Rockman 1976; Cole and Caputo 1979; U.S. Congress 1973). Other examples of this behavior include the targeted reassignment by Reagan's first EPA administrator, Anne Gorsuch (Golden 2000), and other discrete actions of presidents influencing the civil service ranks through replacement in later presidencies (Aberbach and Rockman 2000; Maranto 1993). The EPA struggled with recruitment and retaining top personnel following the Obama administrations use of czars (Steinzor 2012).

[4] Past works studying politics and the executive branch tend to focus on the ideology of an agency rather than partisanship (Clinton and Lewis 2008, Chen and Johnson 2015, Richardson, Clinton and Lewis 2015). Yet, assuming ideology is stable, the relationship between individual and agency ideology does not change over time. A conservative working in a liberal agency is always mismatched. Change occurs when political offices change between the parties, making partisanship the salient measure as it relates to exit. Moreover, scholars of public opinion note attitudes are oriented around partisanship and not ideology (Bartels 2000, Hetherington 2001, Hetherington 2009). For these reasons, partisanship serves as a useful measure to consider with the decision to exit.

difference and mitigate what they perceive to be the harmful choices of the new administration. However, when presidents enact extreme policy relative to the bureaucrat's ideal policy and the expected value in the next period, moderates are most likely to depart because they have less to gain from waiting out the new administration and cannot temper extreme policy.[5] Under these circumstances, partisans are the most likely to stay.

The conflicting predictions of past work underscore the methodological difficulties in studying exit from the permanent civil service. Surveys of federal employees often reveal a stated desire to depart but it is unclear how well responses to a survey correlate with actual behavior. Relying on survey questions about intent to exit could be problematic since responses to such questions can be expressive rather than truly reflective of likely career choices. For example, past work indicates teachers overstate their likelihood of exit (DeAngelis et al. 2013; Grissom et al. 2015) and a gap exists between stated intention to vote and actual turnout exists (Silver et al. 1986). Even with these potential pitfalls, Bertelli and Lewis (2013) estimate the relationship between policy disagreement between civil servants and appointees and intent to exit using data from the 2007 Survey on the Future of Government Service. They report a positive but imprecisely estimated relationship. Similarly, Richardson (2016) finds a correlation between the politicization of an agency and career employees' survey indicated intent to exit.

Office of Personnel Management (OPM) records allow scholars to observe actual exit, but reveal nothing regarding the individual political beliefs of civil servants. Bolton et al. (2016)

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[5] To provide more details regarding the Cameron et al. (2015) arguement, they argue presidents centralizing power disheartens many policy-motivated zealots who quit in protest. Two other types of employees stay. First, policy-motivated bureaucrats with significant disagreements with the current administration opt to "wait out" the current administration. The zealots adopting this strategy slack while the current administration is in office and wait for future gains when the administration changes. Second, moderate policy motivated bureaucrats are the most likely to exit when policy is centralized with the president and they feel they cannot "make a difference" by bringing extreme policy back towards the middle. If moderates do not feel like they can curb extreme policy by staying, they will exit. The middle exits when presidential administrations change and the new administration successfully moves policy to an opposing extreme.

examine exit rates of career civil servants following elections and use the ideological leanings of agencies as a proxy for individual ideology. Using complete records of employment provided by OPM spanning nearly three decades, they show that ideologically mismatched agencies (for example, EPA during Republican administrations) have higher rates of turnover when the presidency changes party. The relationship between exit and elections is strongest for those at the top of the agency, such as the Senior Executive Service. Careerists with lower rank in the agency exit less, presumably because they will be promoted to fill the positions vacated by those in the upper echelons of the agency. Yet this work attributes ideology to the agency, not the individuals who ultimately exit. The evidence from these works is an important step in demonstrating the relationship between exit rates and politics for the permanent civil service; however, data limitations make it difficult to parse accurately the effect of partisanship and politics on turnover.

3.3 Data

This paper resolves past data shortcomings by combining data from a survey of federal career executives in 2007 with OPM personnel records from 2007 to 2015. This allows for an examination of the relationship between individual partisan attachments and actual departures over the course of an administration, resolving methodological difficulties in past work. To begin, the 2007 Survey on the Future of Government Service (SFGS) asked top federal employees a wide array of questions regarding their views and backgrounds. From a sample of 6,321 career civil servants, 1,770 responded. Notably, the survey asked respondents, "How likely is it that you will leave your agency in the next 12 months?" and provided the choices of "Very likely" (10.8%), "Somewhat likely" (15.8%), "Somewhat unlikely"(17.0%), "Very unlikely" (53.4%), and "Not sure" (3.0%) for their responses.

To observe actual exit, I tracked each respondent's career through OPM personnel data provided by federalpay.org. This website includes annual personnel data from the Enterprise Human Resource Integration (EHRI) system managed by OPM.[6] I matched this data with the names of survey respondents from the SFGS. I consider an employee to have departed when she is no longer included in the EHRI system (i.e., she is no longer in the database and ceases to draw a salary from the federal government).[7] For the 1,040 careerist survey respondents matched to OPM data, 543 exit between 2007 to 2015.

Table 1 displays the results of a cross-tabulation between stated exit intention and actual exit. The values appearing in the table are the percentage of the people providing the particular response (e.g., "Very likely") that had left government one, two or three years after taking the survey (i.e., FY 2008, FY 2009, FY 2010). The striking feature of this table is how few of those expressing a desire to leave actually quit. Of those reporting that they are "Very likely" to leave government in the next 12 months, only half do so within that year. One in five who are "Somewhat likely" to exit in 12 months actually exit. Three years after the survey, nearly a third of those that say they are very likely to exit in 12 months remain in government. This is initial evidence that stated exit may be unreliable. Yet the difference is only substantively important if the estimates produced provide competing predictions (which will be attended to in the results section).

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[6] To see the actual salary of the employee, that individual must make over $100,000 or be in the top 10% in pay for the agency. Given the construction of the SFGS, nearly all member of the sample fall in this category. Individuals working in sensitive positions, such as the military, federal police or nuclear science are not publicly disclosed and are not available. From federalpay.org: "Under open government laws specified in 5 U.S.C. § 552, the names, titles, and salaries of all civilian government employees are considered public information. However, employee demographics such as race and sex, and information on employee performance or disciplinary actions, are not publicly available. Data withheld under exceptions to these laws includes the identity and location of employees in sensitive occupations and security agencies (FBI, Secret Service, DEA, ATFE, the Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Mint), which are restricted for national security reasons." In this paper redacted salaries were dropped. For more details see: https://www.federalpay.org/article/employee-lookup.

[7] The survey entered the field in fiscal year 2007. Some individuals drew no salary in 2008. Others drew their last salary in fiscal year 2008. Those that departed in either fashion were counted as exiting by 2008.

Table 3.1: Careerist Turnover Intention Compared to Actual Turnover

	% Exit FY2008	% Exit FY2009	% Exit FY2010
Very likely (10.8%)	50.0	60.0	68.5
Somewhat likely (15.8%)	21.5	39.8	51.8
Not sure (3.0%)	2.7	10.8	21.6
Somewhat unlikely (17.0%)	2.4	10.7	21.4
Very unlikely (53.4%)	2.9	7.9	15.7

3.4 Who Exits? Adjudicating between Competing Predictions

Partisan misalignment between civil servants and the administration might influence the decision to exit. To measure partisanship, the SFGS asked survey respondents if their political party was, "Republican", "Democrat", "Independent", "Other" or "Don't Know." [8] A follow-up question asked those who failed to pick one of the two major parties if they leaned towards one of those parties. I created two indicator variables to designate if the respondent is a Republican (0, 1; 23.6%) or Democrat (0, 1; 62.6%). Leaners were classified as being part of the party they leaned towards, consistent with past work (Keith et al. 1992).[9] The remaining respondents have no partisan attachment and will be referred to as independents.[10]

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[8] Partisanship presents the best measure for the type of political factors that enter the decision to exit as it provides a clear signal of policy agreement or disagreement between political actors and civil servants. Models including ideology are not displayed, but those models reveal no relationship between individual ideology and the decision to exit. The upcoming results for partisanship are robust to the inclusion of individual ideology from survey responses and individual ideal point estimates.

[9] The results presented are robust to using a five-point partisan scale and displayed in Appendix I. Results show no meaningful statistical difference between leaners and independents, but the sign for estimates of leaners is negative.

[10] The prediction by Cameron et al. (2015) centers around a discussion of policy implementation. While policy and politics are undoubtedly correlated, it is important to still account for a policy dimension that perhaps is unrelated to partisanship. Clinton et al. 2012 estimate ideal points for each bureaucrat by scaling hypothetical roll call votes for

The data show independents exit more than partisans. From 2008 to 2014, 126 of 247 (51.0%) Republicans and 342 of 664 (51.5%) Democrats exit. This contrasts with the 75 of 129 (58.1%) of independents who exited. This is important initial evidence that partisanship appears to matter for turnover with partisans being most likely to stay. Democrats may be looking forward to working with a new Democratic administration and Republicans may be staying to fight or possibly wait out the new administration. Independents, perhaps, find the policy changes to be less to their liking and leave government.

Most importantly, a closer look at the differences between intent to exit and actual exit reveals that partisans are more likely to say they will exit but not follow through. For them, a survey question potentially provides an opportunity to express dissatisfaction. Of those reporting in late 2007 that they are "Very likely" to leave in the next 12 months but do not exit two years later, close to 39% are Republican while only 3% are independents. Thus, a reliance on survey measures as a proxy for exit is potentially problematic when considering politics and may lead scholars to make incorrect inferences regarding the relationship between politics and exit.[11]

3.5 Testing Traditional Explanations for Exit

A number of individual and contextual factors help explain departure decisions. To account for these factors, the upcoming models include a number of controls. First, older employees might exit more frequently. An indicator, *Retirement Age*, controls for if the person is 65 years old or older.[12] In 2007, 8.5 percent of the sample was 65 or older. The mean changes as

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each respondent. Models including this measure do not alter substantive conclusions and the policy dimension is not statistically significant.

[11] Appendix H examines why some career executives say they will exit government but stay (i.e., difference between turnover intention and actual turnover). The two primary causes of the discrepancy are partisan attachments and persons that get raises after the survey period.

[12] The upcoming results are robust the inclusion of the respondents actual age as well as models estimated with the respondents age and squared age. Including a measure for years spent in government is positively

the sample ages and exits occur. The measure of age comes from a numerical value provided by respondents taking the SFGS in 2007 and is updated in each year when considered in the longitudinal models. Previous work has indicated a difference between the sexes and the rate of exit from the public sector. The inclusion of an indicator, *Female* (mean .279; s.d. .449), controls for differences in exit for men and women. Next, to account for compensation, I include the logged salary, *ln(Salary)* (mean 11.88; s.d. .165), of each individual in the model.[13] Scholars believe that an individual's public service motivation can also influence their decision to stay or depart (Bright 2008, Perry 2010, Perry and Wise 1990, Perry, Hondeghem and Recascino Wise 2010). The SFGS includes a battery of questions regarding why the individual entered government including pay and benefits as well as the desire to make a difference.[14] Respondents entering for *Pay and Benefits* (mean 3.52; s.d. .988) ought to be more likely to leave while those wanting to *Make a Difference* (mean 4.23; s.d. .919) should be less likely to leave.

Bolton et al. (2016) found turnover to increase in ideologically mismatched agencies with the president following elections. Given these careerists served during the Obama administration, conservative agencies ought to have increased turnover. I code each agency as a *Liberal Agency* (0, 1; 31.8%) or a *Conservative Agency* (0, 1; 30.6%) using estimates created by Clinton and Lewis (2008). Agencies are conservative or liberal if the 95% confidence interval surrounding

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associated with exit and does not alter the substantive conclusions reached regarding partisanship and exit. The indicator is displayed in the text for ease of interpretation for the reader.

[13] Another measure to consider is the bump in pay from one year to the next. To measure this I subtract the log of the employee's salary in the current period from the log of the employee's salary in the previous period. This measure is not included due to endogeneity concerns since factors related to exit might also be related to getting a raise. The same is true for annual bonuses. Moreover, during the Obama administration several years saw a bonus freeze on all bonuses not required by statute. The results are consistent regardless of specification.

[14] Survey respondents were asked, "Now thinking about your original decision to enter government service, how important were each of the following in your decision?" On a five point scale with the options "Very Important", "Important", "Moderately Important" "Not too Important", and "Not Important at all" respondents received ten options to evaluate. The manuscript uses "Salary and benefits" and "Desire to make a difference" in the estimates. For entering for "Salary and benefits" 16.3% say "Very Important", 36.5% say "Important", 31.6% say "Moderately Important", 13.3% say "Not too Important", and 2.3% say "Not Important at all". For those entering with the "Desire to make a difference", 49.3% say "Very Important", 32.2% say "Important", 13.2% say "Moderately Important", 4.3% say "Not too Important", and 1.0% say "Not Important at all".

the point estimate did not contain zero. The remaining agencies are considered moderate and are the reference category in models that follow. Finally, an increase in state unemployment suggests a lack of outside labor options that should decrease the likelihood of exit. As one might expect, most (77.4%) of the sample presides in the DC metro. I include the annual unemployment rate (*State Unemployment;* mean 7.33, s.d. 1.97) to account for changes in the outside labor market.[15]

3.6 Methods

To evaluate the impact of political factors on exit choices over an individual's career, I estimate Cox proportional hazard models. Cox models predict failure, in this case departure from government, conditional on remaining in the sample and not leaving in an earlier period. Regression estimates produce hazard ratios of the estimated hazard relative to the baseline hazard. To ease interpretations, the paper reports the coefficients of the hazards. Positive values indicate an increased likelihood of exit (i.e., greater probability of departure in a given period, conditional on not having departed already) and negative coefficients indicate a decrease in the likelihood of departure. The models estimates hazards for 1,040 career civil servants with continuous observed service in government. The period begins in 2007, when the survey sample

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[15] Before turning to the models, it is worth noting what is omitted in the primary models. First, covariates that vary only by year, such as economic indicators and first year(s) of a new administration, lack variation due to the limited period considered. When included, the estimates are in the expected direction and do not change substantive interpretations of anything that follows, but the point estimate is simply an indicator for that year. Other aspects of that year beside the election would be captured in that estimate. As such, the coefficient cannot be stated as the "effect" of an election because all other factors that vary by year but are not measured are also captured in that estimate. Therefore, models with year indicators are not included in this analysis. Second, measures of agency independence are not included in the results that follow. Selin (2015) provides useful estimates for personnel insulation that particularly appear relevant. However, she estimates for a different office structure than the SFGS reports, making for roughly a third of the periods at risk to be excluded because they could not match to the correct office. Models estimated with the inclusion of the Selin measures that could match reveal it to be unrelated to exit and none of the substantive conclusions regarding other covariates changed. Yet, due to the substantial data loss and unknown nature of the missing estimates, the results of these models are not included. Models estimated with an indicator for being outside the cabinet departments reveal no relationship with agency independence and exit and do not alter the substantive conclusions for other variables of interests. Models estimated with indicators for the race of the respondent reveal it is not associated with exit for top career civil servants.

was constructed, and runs to 2015. During this time, 543 of the individuals exited government. The virtue of the Cox model is that it allows for a variety of different baseline hazard rates and it accounts for right censoring in the data for those still in government in 2015.[16]

3.7 Results

Models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2 estimate hazard models using actual exit data. One quarter of the respondents exit by 2011; half exit by 2014.[17] Across these model specifications, the Cox models reveal consistent directional patterns. The results consistently indicate that partisans are *less* likely to exit government during this period. The coefficient estimates are negative and precisely estimated across all models, or put another way, both Republicans and Democrats have lower hazard rates than independents. The hazard ratios allow for the comparison of the rate of exit for partisans to the baseline rate of exit. For partisans, hazard ratios of .76 for Republicans and .80 for Democrats suggest a 24 and 20 percent reduction in the rate of exit for Republicans and Democrats in a given year relative to independents.[18]

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[16] Exit in 2015 cannot be considered even though data for that year exists because data in 2016 is needed to evaluate their exit in 2015.

[17] The models fit the data well. Diagnostic tests suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the hazards are proportional. The Schoenfeld residuals tests suggests all variables pass the proportionality assumption in the Cox model, failing to reject the null.

[18] Hazard ratios estimated by Model 3 in Table 2. The reduction is in reference to the baseline hazard rate.

Table 3.2: Estimates of Exit for Careerists, 2008 – 2015

	(1) Actual	(2) Actual	(3) Actual	(4) Intent to Exit
Partisan				
Republican	-0.266*	-0.256*	-0.273**	0.049
	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.120)
Democrat	-0.257**	-0.223*	-0.221*	0.001
	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.106)
Individual				
Retirement Age		0.398***	0.399***	0.682***
		(0.0938)	(0.0938)	(0.120)
Female		-0.0926	-0.0966	-0.043
		(0.0942)	(0.0944)	(0.0816)
Ln(Salary)		0.484*	0.544**	0.490**
		(0.270)	(0.273)	(0.221)
Make a Difference		-0.0911**	-0.0895**	-0.051
		(0.0427)	(0.0426)	(0.0391)
Salary and Benefits		0.0882**	0.0857**	-0.047
		(0.0433)	(0.0435)	(0.0370)
Contextual				
State Unemployment			0.0194	0.055
			(0.0340)	(0.0387)
Liberal Agency			-0.166*	-0.009
			(0.0998)	(0.0893)
Conservative Agency			-0.200**	0.047
			(0.100)	(0.0882)
Model	Cox	Cox	Cox	Ordered Probit
Cases	6717	6717	6717	
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1059
Failures	543	543	543	

* $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered to individual in hazard models, robust standard errors in ordered probit the model. The ordered probit model used constant term and four cut points in the estimation but not displayed. The ordered probit has more cases because it includes cases that were later

discontinuous. Order probit cut points at $\tau_1=7.29$, $\tau_2=7.74$, $\tau_3=7.82$, $\tau_4=8.44$

Additionally, and with respect to the magnitude of the coefficient above, Republicans and Democrats appear equally likely to depart government during the 2007 to 2015 period. A Wald test reveals the difference between the coefficients estimated for Republicans and Democrats to be statistically indistinguishable from one another (p<0.58 in Model 3). Moreover, holding partisanship constant, working in liberal agencies (e.g., Education, Labor) and conservative agencies (e.g., Commerce, Treasury) are *both* less likely to exit than individuals working in moderate agencies (e.g., Agriculture, Transportation). Other past explanations of exit largely comport with expectations and receive attention in Appendix D.[19]

Just as important, and perhaps the most striking feature of Table 2, is the difference between models using actual exit and Model 4, shaded in gray, which estimates an ordered probit model predicting whether respondents indicated one of the five response categories regarding the intent to exit government in the next 12 months. The conclusions drawn using this approach are markedly different. Unlike Models 1-3, the coefficients estimated for Model 4 suggest no relationship between partisanship and exit; if anything, partisans are *more* likely to exit. Moreover, several other explanations of exit fail to achieve statistical significance in Model 4. Thus, scholars relying on survey responses would draw very different and incorrect conclusions

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[19] The models assume there are no conditional relationships between partisanship and other factor such as the ideology of the agency, age, or time. I estimated models with interaction terms for the partisanship of the individual and the ideological leaning of the agency. The substantive findings are unaltered. Table C1 in Appendix J displays the results of this estimation. Cameron et al. (2015) suggest a conditional relationship between partisanship and age. If individuals truly wait out administrations, then Democrats past retirement age during this period should be more likely to stay than Republicans to receive their payoffs from staying in government. To test this consideration, I estimated models with an indicator for being of the retirement age interacted with partisanship. Table C2 displays the results suggesting no conditional relationship between age, partisanship and exit. Republicans and Democrats of retirement age exit at rates similar to one another. This suggests that the longer time horizons that might incentivize those in the out-party to stay do not outweigh the decision to leave government (and presumably retire). Finally, the exclusion of the first year of exits (when the Bush administration still occupied the Oval Office) does not change the substantive conclusions. Estimates in Table C3 replicate specifications from Table 2, showing consistent results. The relationships are less precisely estimated due to fewer cases, but partisanship is still negatively signed for both Republicans and Democrats and of similar magnitudes. Moreover, many of the individual and contextual explanations that were statistically significant in Table 2 are statistically significant and signed in the same direction for Table C3.

regarding who left government from the sample. Taken collectively, the results suggest that moderate careerists exited government more frequently than partisans, consistent with one of the results predicted by Cameron et al. (2015), and suggests a potential for the middle to hollow out.

3.8 Changing Partisan Distributions in the Management Corps

The Cameron et al. (2015) model provides insights regarding the changing distribution of ideology within the management corps. Specifically, they found the continuing exit of moderates from government would result in only partisan zealots on either extreme remaining in government. Yet the overall distribution of ideology within federal agencies shifts not only in accordance with exit, but also based upon who replaces those that left. The next section considers various replacement strategies in conjunction with estimated partisan exit to display what the partisanship of the management corps might look like over the course of a two-term presidential administration.

One way of evaluating the effects of partisanship on departures is to project what this would mean for the composition of a corps of managers over the course of a presidential term. For examples, consider the Senior Executive Service. Placed just under appointees, OPM states the SES, "are the major link between these appointees and the rest of the Federal workforce."[20] As such, even subtle changes in the partisan distribution of exit have potentially important consequences to the federal government.

To calculate the likely effect of exit on the partisan composition of the management corps, one must consider those that exit as well as the replacements. The first set of columns in Figure 1 includes estimates of the percentage change in the management corps by partisanship,

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[20] See https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/ for a full characterization of the SES.

assuming that replacements will be drawn in a random (i.e., merit-based) way from the existing distribution of careerists.[21] Positive values represent gains in the share of the management team; negative values are the lost share of the management team. The first set of columns assumes replacement is a random draw from the partisan distribution of executives (i.e., a draw from the partisan distribution in the previous year, adjusted for accessions and separations). Under this assumption, we see 2.1 percent more partisans in the management corps after 8 years.[22] The slightly more than 2 percent loss of independents might seem small, but they only comprise 13.8 percent of the sample to begin the administration. Under these conditions, partisans would now occupy 15 percent of positions previously occupied by independents.

Interestingly, even though Republicans were in the minority, the number of Republicans increased because they were the least likely to leave. Perhaps this is to be viewed as a silver lining in the effort to prevent presidential overreach in the executive branch. When out-partisans are the least likely to exit, the turnover for other types of partisans prevents a skewing of the composition of agencies towards the party in power.

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[21] The average rate of departure for the sample in any given year is 11.5 percent. Democrats are 2.1% less likely to exit while Republicans are 2.8% less likely to exit in a given period. Estimates for the marginal change in exit for partisans come from probit estimates of exit with a time control for duration dependence.

[22] The percentage change subtracts the percentage of the management corps identifying as one type of partisan from the beginning of the administration from the distribution identifying at the end. When values are positive, this indicates that more of the type is present at the end of the administration than there was initially.

**Figure 3.1: Change in Partisan Share of the Civil Service, Due
to Exit over a Two-Term Admin**

Note: Percent change calculated through iterative process described in text above. The values of the bars represent the difference between the percentages of a particular category of partisan at the end of the two terms less the percentage of the category of partisan at the beginning of the two terms. *Leadership Directories* list just over 6,000 positions in the SES.

What if promotions favor partisans? Replacement favoring one party over the other shifts the distribution of partisanship quite differently. The second set of columns in Figure 1 assume that an administration can pick co-partisans to replace those who exit. Specifically, the assumption here is that a Democrat administration promotes 5 percent more Democrats and 5 percent fewer Republicans. Such an assumption amounts to every twentieth pick being a Democrat promoted over a Republican. Under these assumptions, the changes in partisanship results in significant gains for the Democrats while Republicans and Independents suffer losses.

By construction, the losses for independents are nearly the same as the random draw from the sample. However, Republicans now suffer losses due to politicized replacement because the favoritism is greater than the gap in exit rates between Republicans and Democrats.

These results have two key implications. First, so long as independents have the highest rate of exit from government, their share of the partisan distribution will decrease (unless for some reason they are overrepresented in the replacements). Second, subtle partisan promotion patterns in conjunction with partisan exit rates can move the composition of the civil service even within one administration. Future work should examine partisan promotion patterns and how that changes the partisan composition of the federal workforce.

3.9 Early Discussion of the Trump Administration

The Trump administration needs to play out to conduct a similar analysis for Obama administration employees. Yet some work on this subject matter suggests a different pattern of exit. Doherty et al. (2018) examines exits from the Senior Executive Service from 2014 through the first six months of the Trump administration. They find little difference in partisan exits prior to the election of Donald Trump, but then see a significant difference between Republicans and Democrats following his election. Both Democrats and liberal members of the SES were more likely to exit following the election.

While this result is different than Bush era employees during the Obama administration, it is not inconsistent with theoretical predictions by Cameron et al. (2015) and other empirical results. When the politics of the new administration are very different from the views of the civil servant, some civil servants will opt to leave government rather than carry out the policy directives of the new administration. Perhaps the contrasting results speak to the relationships

that each administration has with the permanent civil service. Future work should evaluate this turnover of career civil servants during different presidential administrations to see what patterns emerge under different presidencies.

3.10 Conclusion

Since the advent of the civil service system, voters and their elected officials have given greater deference to the administrative state to ensure welfare-enhancing outcomes from government. Retaining qualified and experienced personnel to make reasoned, rather than partisan, judgments is a necessary component of a professional bureaucracy in the United States. The systematic loss of particular employees due to changes in political power has the potential to remove a moderating opinion from agency deliberations as well as set up hostile dynamics between agencies and new administrations.

This paper provided evidence that turnover of top careerists in the United States varies in accordance with the political beliefs of the individual civil servant. First, what civil servants report on surveys in "intent to exit" questions is different from actual exit. Partisans may overstate their exit intention and this can lead to materially different conclusions regarding partisanship and its relationship with exit. Estimates of exit across the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations suggests partisanship plays a role in the exit decision of top career civil servants. In addition, Bush administration federal executives working in moderate agencies are more likely to leave than their colleagues who work in more political agencies on the left or the right holding all else constant.

The results highlight the possibility of a moving partisan distribution amongst federal civil servants. If independents are exiting government at the highest rate, then agencies are being

increasingly populated with partisans. If presidents are using strategic promotion decisions, this will only serve to accelerate the partisan polarization of federal agencies. Demonstrating this behavior for multiple presidencies will help in the understanding of agency dynamics across administrations and overall trends of the federal work force.

Political turnover could have profound consequences for government. These civil servants occupy positions at the top of the federal hierarchy. Losing these individuals is costly to the federal government and normatively troubling. The agencies where those losses occur acutely feel the consequences of the departure because they lose someone with a title like "Director" or "Deputy Assistant Secretary" who was tasked with important functions within the agency. When these positions lose experienced careerists, agencies and their constituents suffer. Furthermore, in a time of crisis, a new Trump administration lacking a subject matter expert to help resolve the problem might result in a decline in general welfare. Understanding these varying partisan exit rates could have profound consequences for agency outputs in the United States.

Chapter 4
Politics and the Tenure of U.S. Political Appointees, 1977-2014

Agencies carry out the vast majority of modern governmental functions. Unelected officials tasked with these important functions generate policy based off expertise to ensure competent governance. As such, elected officials supervise the outcomes and processes generating policy to hold the unelected officials accountable to the public. This oversight by elected officials is a central pillar of democratic accountability for agencies, ensuring political actors have some control over agency decision-making. Yet the nature of that oversight changes as elections shift political control of the different branches of government or the number of principals overseeing an agency increases or decreases. When these changes occur, who now controls the administrative state is not clear. On one hand, multiple voices could soak up discretion and restrict agency action. On the other, competing voices might lead to opportunities to pick policy from a wider menu of options and provide cover to disagree with one of the political principals.

The changing exit rates from government of federal employees constitutes an observable implication to the nature of bureaucratic control. Individuals exit their place of employment more frequently when they lose control over decisions in their work environment. As such, the relationship between turnover and bureaucratic control should reveal changes in effectiveness for political oversight. By looking at turnover of appointees, it is possible to consider how different political controls alter the autonomy of the agency and in turn shed light on who controls agency actions.

The paper proceeds with the following sections. First, it briefly reviews the literature on bureaucratic controls and agency turnover, linking the two through agency autonomy. Next, it describes different political appointees and how each my respond differently to different forms

of bureaucratic controls. The paper then describes the data and presents results on the nature of bureaucratic control and appointee tenure, finding divided government extends appointee tenure while additional congressional oversight committees provides conflicting results. The paper concludes by discussing the findings and the implications they have for bureaucratic control.

4.1 Bureaucratic Control and Turnover

As Hammond and Knott (1996) note, there exists conflicting accounts of who controls the bureaucracy. Citing past work, they characterize this congressional control as a reduction of autonomy and perhaps "agency subservience" in the way Congress controls agencies. Yet Hammond and Knott (1996) also note through other past works ways in which presidents exert control on agency action, one of which is the selection of appointees to direct the agency. Critical to either framing, the exercise of control by the president or Congress results in the reduced autonomy of agencies.

It is hard to conceive of an action from an agency with executive appointees and congressional appropriations that lack the potential for political control. Yet this multifaceted control rarely pits political branches in direct conflict with one another. Rather, these conflicts take of form of sequential interactions political overseers have with agencies. For example, Congress passes legislation authorizing agencies to act. Yet presidents can alter the intent of the legislation through signing statements and other executive directions either directly from the president or through the president's appointees. Congress can then revise the legislation to curb any unwanted action through executive direction. Given this arrangement, it is not clear power lies with the branch granting broad authority or the branch implementing the policy. In another example, Congress possesses the power of the purse. Yet, unless specific language by Congress

binds the agency's discretion with the funds, administrators within the agency, potentially overseen by appointees put in place by the president, have discretion over how the money is spent. In this instance, the agency and the executive branch acts second to any congressional authorization or appropriation, but ultimately decides how the money is spent. It is debatable which branch has the upper hand in this situation. These sequential and endogenous decisions make identifying who controls agency actions a difficult question for scholars to address.

Scholars have wrestled with these power dynamics. For example, two competing explanations exist for how multiple principals alter the influence of Congress over agencies. Some argue overlapping jurisdictions increases the influence of Congress (Aberbach 1990; Bendor 1985; King 1997; O'Connell 2006) while others argue it decreases influence (Clinton et al. 2015; Gailmard 2009; Hammond and Knott 1996, 1999; Weingast and Moran 1983). How each reach their conclusion strays away from the topic of this paper. However, turnover provides an interesting test of these competing predictions. Multiple principals either make agency life stressful and chaotic or liberating and empowering. The realization of which type of agency life should clearly manifest in the length of the tenure of civil servants.

Even when scholars hone in on one type of oversight, the results are mixed. The congressional oversight structure in the United States does not uniformly transcend agencies. Rather, layers of oversight, typically in the form of committees, observe similar agency actions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Dodd and Schott 1979; Evans 1999; King 1997; Seidman 1998), so much so that at least four committees oversee every agency (Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod 2000). And scholars have shown the proliferation of committees has benefited members electorally, but at the expense of Congress being able to respond to executive action (Clinton et al. 2014). Such an institutional arrangement creates an environment where civil

servants may have multiple signals to interpret, with the consequences of having the multiple signals being unclear.

The structure of bureaucratic oversight creates multiple principals to oversee agency action. These differences have consequences for bureaucratic outcomes (McCarty 2005). While committees overseeing agency action might be nuanced, perhaps the starkest differences between ideal policy for the executive and legislature emerge during times of divided government. In times of divided government, presidential policy input likely differs from that of oversight committees because the party controlling the committee is different than the party controlling the presidency. Past work has indicated that political actors struggle to influence agency action when there is disagreement with what the actors want the agency to do (Bawn 1995; Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; King 1997; Whitford 2005; Wood and Waterman 1993). As unified and divided government change, so too does the ability of each branch to control agency action. Agencies may listen to a singular voice in the executive (Moe 1985, 1987) or seek shelter from those in Congress who share the preferences of the agency (Hammond and Knott 1996; Wilson 1989). Observing appointee tenure varying systematically with these changes in institutional arrangements would provide insight in the nature of agency autonomy and bureaucratic control.

Past work suggests the loss of autonomy leads to greater exit from government. Employees leave government with they lose the ability to voice opinions (Lee and Whitford 2008). Organizational factors, such as agency prestige, culture, and management practices enter into the individual's decision to exit (Bertelli 2007; Gamassou 2015; Pitts, Marvel and Fernandez 2011; Wilson 1994). Collectively, there is robust empirical evidence that these factors influence job satisfaction. That satisfaction determines the likelihood of exit (Hahm, Jung and Youl Lee

2014; Kim and Fernandez 2015; Lee and Jimenez 2011). So, when oversight binds the hands of an agency and makes an unpleasant work environment, employees should be more likely to leave. Or, when granted additional autonomy in decision-making, employees should be more likely to stay.

4.2 Variety of Appointees

Many scholars contribute to our understanding of the consequences of appointee turnover (Boyne, et al. 2010; Dull and Roberts 2009; Dull, Roberts and Keeney 2012; Hahm, Jung and Youl Lee 2014; Lewis and Waterman 2013; Wood and Marchbanks 2008). These works provide critical insight into why political appointees matter to government. However, gradations exists within the appointee ranks. With different career paths and protections from political actors, these different appointees assist in the execution of policy. To understand more generally the role of politics and oversight as it relates to exit decisions of civil servants, it is necessary to consider the nuance in types of political appointees.

This paper considers three different types of appointees: employees on the Executive Schedule (EX pay band), Schedule C employees, and appointed members of the Senior Executive Service (SES). To begin, political appointees serve the president and leave not only when the civil servant desires to exit, but also if the president deems it time to move on from a particular appointee. Yet even amongst appointees, clear distinctions exist. The most prominent political appointees (e.g., cabinet secretaries and others in senior management positions) go through a confirmation process in the Senate. Once nominated, the Senate goes through a vetting process to affirm the individual in question possesses the requisite skills to fill the office. As such, by statute, they are compensated more than careerists working within the agency and in

some cases their pay is codified by statute specifically stating the positions on the Executive

Schedule.

While some appointees go through rigorous confirmation hearings, others do not face

such scrutiny. One example are Schedule C employees. These employees serve the president as

confidential assistants, policy experts, special councils and schedulers (Moore 2017; NYT

2016).[1] In addition to political appointees and Schedule C employees, the president has

appointment authority with up to ten percent of the Senior Executive Service (SES). Created

during the Carter administration, the SES reorganized the top of the hierarchy for careerists,

creating a class of civil servant above the General Schedule. These civil servants represent a

professional class of elite administrators that provide a conduit between appointees and others in

the agency. The different appointment authorities and procedures by which each type enters

office enables tests for if varying degrees of appointee autonomy through the institutional

arrangements each face.[2] The next sections operationalize those differences and evaluate the exit

decisions for each of the different actors.

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[1] Typically these positions are for a specific policy domain that requires particular attention. Also, Lee Atwater possessed strong convictions about rewarding young campaign staffers with Schedule C positions (Wheaton, 2016). Within the federal hierarchy, Schedule C employees are the lowest level of political appointment. The immediate supervisor to these employees needs to be a presidential appointee, a member of the Senior Executive Service, or another Schedule C employee (OPM, 2018). That said most of the time Schedule C employees still occupy the top pay bands in the General Schedule. Sometimes these appointees convert to career civil servants. This conversion, sometimes referred to as "burrowing", is not without controversy. For example, in 2008 Congress found "burrowing" the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security improperly allowed political appointees to convert to career positions (Schwemle, 2012). Additionally, in 1992 the GAO criticized the practice of placing newly hired Schedule C employees immediately in positions within the Executive Office of the President, which ultimately led to the end of this practice (Ungar, 1992).

[2] Civil servants work with a variety of protections against political removal. At one extreme, political appointees serve the president and can be terminated at the discretion of the president. Legal safeguards provide some protection for appointees from the president. For example, fixed terms help insulate agency heads from the president. Notably, Selin (2015) provides the greatest degree of nuance to this debate, providing a Bayesian latent variable model across 50 different structural features. Selin (2015) adds to the literature on political insulation by considering the range of protections afforded to agencies. Yet this insulation results in agency level protections that shields individuals. Considering different types of employees contributes to the understanding of insulation and resultant turnover of federal employees.

4.3 Data

Employment records are necessary to evaluate the tenure of federal employees. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) keeps such records. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, Buzzfeed News obtained employment histories of all federal employees from 1973 to the first quarter of 2017. OPM categorizes employees with unique markers to indicate the different types of federal employees mentioned previously.[3] Table 1 displays descriptive information about the tenure of the different federal employees.

Several interesting facts emerge in Table 1. First, the panel contains the career history of anyone who worked on the Executive Schedule, received a Schedule C appointment or served as a member of the SES in a Noncareer capacity. All told, this encompasses 25,975 employees who provided 72,468 years of service in some appointed capacity. For all three appointee types, most serve less than three years in their position. Yet some serve much longer. The granular nature of these data allow for the identification of each of the longest serving appointees. The longest tenured individual on the Executive Schedule served on the Railroad Retirement Board, Schedule C in the Security and Exchange Commission, and Noncareer SES on the Barry Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education Foundation.

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[3] All employees on the EX pay band are considered political appointees. While this is not the universe of political appointees, EX employees represent the highest pay for political appointees. A unique numerical value for the appointment type for Schedule C (44) and Noncaeer SES (55). For Appendix N, appointment type identifies Career SES (50). OPM began reporting ALJs with their own pay play (AL) in 1991.

**Table 1: Length of Tenure Description for
Political Appointees, 1977-2014**

	EX Pay	Schedule C	Noncareer SES
Number of employees	4,278	14,673	7,024
Number of quarter-persons	61,129	151,620	77,123
Number of exits	3,893	13,453	6,430
Median length of tenure	11 Quarters	8 Quarters	9 Quarters
Mean length of tenure	13.1 Quarters	9.7 Quarters	10.3 Quarters
Year First Observed	1977	1982	1979
Longest Tenure	88 Quarters	97 Quarters	88 Quarters

OPM records contain a unique numerical identifier for each individual in the data. By selecting upon the unique identifier for the type of employee in each quarter, then appending those records, a panel can be created with the unique identifier distinguishing each civil servant through time.[4] When civil servants cease to draw a salary in that pay band they no longer appear in the panel. Figure 1 shows when these exits occur for each type of federal employee.

Figure 1 displays several useful trends. First, clear spikes in turnover occur following the election of a new president. It is not surprising that appointees who served the previous administration leave. Second, trends in appointee exits roughly mirror one another, which perhaps suggests differentiating appointees by type is a distinction without a difference. Figure 1 only shows the number of exits from the employee type, not the rate at which that type of

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[4] While data exist through 2017, a data breach ended the unique numerical identifier after the second quarter of 2014 and is why it is the last date considered in this analysis.

employee exits. Figure 2 considers the relative rate of exit for each employee. From Figure 2, it is clear that the rate of exit by a particular type of appointee seems to vary closely with one another. Yet these observations do not control for any factors leading up to the decision for these employees to exit government. The rest of the paper addresses this concern.

Figure 4.1 Number of Appointee Exits by Year

Figure 4.2 Percent of Appointees Departing by Year

Percent Departing by Year

4.4 Hypotheses

This paper considers if turnover is associated with two institutional arrangements. First, the institutional arrangement of requiring some political appointees to be confirmed by the Senate creates a distinct prediction. When the Senate is controlled by the opposition party, agencies receive signals from multiple principals with potentially competing messages. As such it could lead to increased agency autonomy and a decline in turnover. Moreover, those appointees that require confirmation from the Senate ought to stay in government longer. The reason for this is that replacing these individuals becomes more difficult and in turn enhances the stature within the executive branch of the current appointee. If this is an accurate characterization, individuals on the Executive Schedule should see the greatest decrease in departure rate. An indicator for if the opposition party controls the Senate accounts for this in the upcoming model.[5]

Second, past works evaluating the number of oversight committees from Congress and its relationship with the bureaucracy produce conflicting accounts, suggesting more oversight committees can enhance agency autonomy (Gailmard 2009; Hammond and Knott 1996, 1999) or limit agency discretion (Aberbach 1990; Bendor 1985; King 1997; O'Connell 2006). Accounting for the oversight structure should adjudicate between these differences and how it alters the work environment of federal employees.

Past works considering exit suggest poor agency jobs satisfaction, culture and prestige can exacerbate turnover (Bright 2008; Lee and Whitford 2008; Gamassou 2015; Hahm, Jung and Youl Lee 2014; Kim and Fernandez 2015; Lee and Jimenez 2011; Perry and Wise 1990; Pitts, Marvel and Fernandez 2011; Wilson 1994). A natural implication of how oversight alters agency

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[5] Across all three types of appointees, just over 49 percent of the observations have the opposite party controlling the Senate.

life is how long employees work for the agency under differing levels of oversight. Shorter tenures for agencies with more committees overseeing the agency suggests many oversight committees detract from agency life while longer tenures suggest an enhanced workplace experience through greater autonomy. The Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies (Lewis and Selin 2012) provides information about the characteristics of the agency, namely the number statutorily required oversight committees.[6]

4.5 Controls

Civil servants leave government for many other reasons beyond politics. Like other employees across the private sector, as civil servants age they are more likely to leave. Federal records report the age of the civil servant in each quarter. This control is included in the upcoming model as well as a squared term.[7] Table B1 in Appendix B reports the descriptive statistics for age and each subsequent upcoming control by appointee type.

Pay is also associated with exit. Typically those that are paid more are more likely to stay in their job (Bertelli 2007). Federal employment records report the base pay of each civil servant in each quarter. Upcoming models include the pay of federal employees adjusted to 2016 dollars. Additionally, outside opportunities may shape the employees desire to stay in the federal government. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data of quarterly unemployment. The unemployment rate in the quarter proxies for outside employment opportunity. When the unemployment rate is high, civil servants' lack of outside opportunity might lead to them being

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[6] Committees formed outside statutory authorization, which matters for behavior of legislators (see Bamugartner et al. (2003), are not considered in this count. For the cases in the data, the mean number of committees for an individual is 3.36, s.d. 3.33.

[7] OPM reports age in 5 year intervals. Each interval reported was coded to be the highest value in that category. A squared term is used to shape the relationship with age if it is the case that people are most likely to leave early in their life (the job is not right for them) or well in to their careers (they are approaching retirement age).

more likely to stay in their current job. The national unemployment rate in the given quarter appears in the upcoming models to account for this explanation.

The president's standing vis-à-vis the public has the potential to shape the workforce in the executive branch. Popular presidents have political capital and seek to enact their agendas. That suggests positive agency action and a more enjoyable workplace for civil servants. This contrasts with an unpopular president, who more likely has to act through agency action (rather than congressional action) and in turn can create a contentious relationship between the president and the people working for agencies. The presidential approval at the end of each quarter is included in the upcoming estimates to account for this consideration.

Several other institutional arrangements about the agency might alter the tenure of civil servants. Independent agencies might also be different than departments within the cabinet. An indicator differentiates these agencies from cabinet positions.[8] Finally, employees working in ideological agencies might also have different tenures. Using the Clinton and Lewis 2008 ideology estimates for agencies, indicators of if the agency is considered conservative or liberal are included.[9]

4.6 Results

A probit model with indicators for duration dependence estimates the departure of each appointee from government. For the upcoming estimates, each type of appointee has its own panel in the estimates are for only that type of appointee. For example, the Schedule C panel only considers the tenure of individuals while they were drawing salaries as Schedule C

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[8] The upcoming results are robust to the estimations considering only commissions to be independent.
[9] Because the size of the confidence intervals vary around the agency ideology estimates, I opt not to use the rank order of the ideal point estimates but rather the ideal point suggests the agency is conservative or liberal. The agency is considered liberal or conservative if the agency ideology confidence interval does not contain zero.

employees. As such, their exit is when they no longer are a Schedule C employee. Leaving the panel does not necessarily mean the individual left government. Despite being at the top of the federal hierarchy, some employees leave a particular employment category to enter another within government. While they are exiting the panel and no longer part of that employment category, their reasons for leaving are quite different than exiting government and all the theoretical predictions previously discussed. The concern of the paper is those leaving government, so it excludes cases of moving within the federal government across pay categorization. Appendix A discusses this consideration in greater detail.

The upcoming probit models include indicators for each quarter to control for duration dependence. So, if a given observation were to be the second time the individual appears in the panel, the indicator for period two would take a value of one while all other indicators take a value of zero. Fixed effects control for which year in the presidential administration (i.e., year one, year two, etc.) as well as which administration (Carter, Reagan, etc.) to account for difference in where in an administration the exit occurred as well as differences in presidents. Table 2 displays the results for the departure estimates for the three different appointee types. Variables included in the estimation but not the table appear in the note.

Several interesting results emerge from the estimates in Table 2. One institutional arrangement, if the Senate is of the opposition party, does consistently alter the tenure of several types of federal employees. All Appointees are more likely to stay in government when the opposition party controls the Senate. Next, the number of committees overseeing an agency only alters the associated change in departure rate for members of the Senior Executive Service, making them more likely to exit. The result suggests that the oversight structure of increased committees adversely alters the tenure of these employees.

Two other agency specific characteristics results merit attention. First, independent agencies see less turnover. While coarse, an indicator of agency independence denotes a clear step away from presidential control and influence designed specifically to insulate the agency.[10] It seems like that has extended tenures for appointees as even the results that do not achieve statistical significance have the correct sign. That said only those appointees requiring confirmation by the senate see a decreased departure rate that is statistically different from zero.

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[10] The results are robust to considering independent commissions, not just if the agency is independent from the cabinet.

Table 4.2: Probit Estimates for Government Exit for Federal Appointees, 1977-2014

	(1) EX Pay	(2) Schedule C	(3) Noncareer SES
Opposition Senate	-0.078*	-0.081***	-0.107**
	(0.0394)	(0.022)	(0.036)
Number of Committees	0.0051	-0.0024	0.0079**
	(0.0039)	(0.0019)	(0.0027)
Independent Agency	-0.259***	-0.014	-0.019
	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Liberal Agency	0.071*	0.084***	0.066**
	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.023)
Conservative Agency	0.080**	0.0627***	0.075***
	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Unemployment	0.157***	0.185***	0.204***
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Administration FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Duration Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individuals Traits	Yes	Yes	Yes
Person Quarters	41,257	108,034	55,689
Persons	3,362	12,407	5,941

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Models estimated with a constant, excluding individuals who left the pay band but did not leave government as well. Models estimate the departure from the federal government. Quarterly presidential approval is included in the model.

Second, ideological agencies see greater turnover during this period. This relationship is not conditional upon who occupies the Oval Office. Models estimating interaction terms between the president and the ideologically different agency do not show any magnified rates of departure for appointees in mismatched agencies.[11] How this relates to careerists is another consideration for future work.

Thus far the discussion of the results simply notes the sign of the estimate and if it is statistically distinguishable from zero. Most importantly, it is necessary to consider just how much the estimates expedite departure from the federal government. Figure 3 considers the marginal rate of exit for different types of federal employees for political and institutional arrangements for one session of Congress. Figure 3 provides some context as to just how many more federal employees leave when circumstances change. For example, if the opposition party controls the Senate for two years, the marginal decline in exit is just over 9 percent for Noncareer members of the SES. Recall from Figure 2, the naïve exit rate for these employees is roughly 10 percent. So, a 9 percent increase in departure over two years constitutes a 45 percent increase in departures during a congressional session.

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[11] Given that the appointees were either placed in the mismatched agency by the president, or the president allowed the previous appointee to stay on through the new administration, it seems plausible that the turnover rates of appointees should remain insensitive to the ideological congruency of the agency (not the appointee) and the president. Also, if appointees exit preemptively in anticipation of an administration change, these result would emerge.

Figure 4.3: Change in Probability of Exit for One Congressional Session

Note: Point estimates generated by calculating marginal change in the probability of exit then multiplying the marginal change by 8 to note differences across a two-year period. For continuous measures, the estimate was also multiplied by a one standard deviation change to provide a more plausible change in the probability of exit.

4.7 Discussion

The results present have several relevant implications towards broader American politics.

First, more Congressional oversight committees are associated with greater turnover in the SES. Perhaps oversight committees are efficiently allocated to cover the complex policy domains some agencies work in and the resulting turnover is just a consequence of the policy a particular agency handles. However, if too many committees oversee a particular agency, a consequence of that arrangement is increased departure from the SES. Losing employees from the SES, even if they are appointed, costs agencies in terms of the ability to communicate with the president that may in turn lead to conflict with the agency.

The nuanced result for the relationship between the number of oversight committees and exit is indicative of the conflicting accounts in the literature. It makes sense that oversight actions from Congress alter the work of different civil servants in different ways. The result in this paper demonstrates the consequence of such oversight through increased turnover in the SES. In interpreting this result, one should not conclude that a reorganization is necessary to trim the number of committees overseeing agencies because these results cannot judge what the optimal number of committees overseeing a particular agency ought to be. To assess the optimal amount of oversight by Congress requires additional studies.

Perhaps past conflicting accounts of congressional oversight stem from the heterogeneity of employees the oversight affects. The composition of the federal workforce is not constant across all agencies. As such, there very well could be a variety of responses from agencies to the same oversight structure depending upon the composition of the employees working in the agency. Accounting for the people the oversight affects, in addition to the structural features that characterize the agency, better assesses the role oversight plays in controlling the actions of federal agencies.

The opposition party controlling the Senate decreases the rate of exit for top federal

employees. This is true of all three types of appointees. The differences between the appointees are statistically indistinguishable from one another. To speculate, if only those in the EX pay band saw decreased departure rates, it would stand to reason that the institutional arrangement of a Senate confirmation be at the heart of the result because it would be harder to confirm the replacement. However, several other types of employees that are not subject to confirmation hearings display the same decrease in departure, suggesting that senatorial confirmations do not shape appointee tenure in different ways. It seems divided government promotes autonomy for agencies when presidents and the senate are not of the same party. [12]

One other somewhat paradoxical result requires additional discussion. The expectation for employee tenure as it relates to unemployment rates was that increases in unemployment would decrease the probability for exit because there would be fewer alternatives for the next job. Yet this result is consistently in the opposite direction. Recent theoretical work by Li (2018) provides insight as to why this may occur. In his model, presidents are more likely to retain the "bad" type employee in good times. When the times turn bad, presidents are now more likely to fire the bad types (and some of the good types) in order to signal to the public responsiveness. With unemployment being clearly linked to good and bad times, the empirical result in this paper is consistent with the result in the Li (2018) model.

Anecdotally, there is also reason to speculate that appointees have different career prospects than careerists. For example, when Tom Price resigns from his position as the Secretary of Health and Human Services, his prospect of future employment is quite different from a civil servant. As a former member of Congress, should he desire, he could find

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[12] One might worry that divided government advantages not the appointee, but the president. To evaluate this consideration, Appendix N estimates the same models with the career members of the SES and Administrative Law Judges. The results suggest that even careerists are more likely to stay in divided government. Therefore, it appears that the agency, not the president, is advantaged during times of divided government.

employment at a number of different firms that would find his past experience and connections valuable. As such, the national unemployment rate for appointees might be tapping in to the overall standing of the administration. In other words, bad times economically might lead to the removal of appointed officials as scapegoats for a bad economy. Such a decision-making process would lead to the observed result and be consistent with good times verse bad times argument in Li (2018).

4.8 Conclusion

Political appointees operate in a complex environment. When carrying out their job functions, they must weigh technical information specific to the policy domain of the agency in addition to the political realities that constrain action. Different types of federal employees carry out these tasks with varying degrees of statutory authority and protection from political actors. This paper provides important evidence that the heterogeneity of officials at the top of the federal hierarchy sometimes results in different turnover rates of employees for different forms of oversight.

The different turnover rates indicate who controls the bureaucracy. When government is divided, exits wane. This suggests greater discretion for the agency. Congressional committees seem to only reduce autonomy for the SES, which suggests a muted consequence from congressional oversight committees on the bureaucracy. Future work should consider if these factors trickle down through the hierarchy and alter the length of tenure for career civil servants.

Demonstrating that politics alters the turnover rates of appointed officials is not surprising. They reach public office via the blessing of a political actor; they will always be linked to politics. Since the passage of the Pendleton Act, civil service reforms have attempted to create a clear demarcation between career officials and appointees. Understanding if, and the

extent to which, this occurs shapes the execution of laws in the United States. Future work should consider how expedited turnover affects policy outcomes for agencies.

Chapter 5
Conclusion

As the previous chapters hopefully highlight, federal employees work in a complicated work environment. The important work they conduct each day also must deal with political factors and realities permeating into their jobs. Chapter 2 demonstrated that federal employees contribute individually, not as a collective trying to represent the group. Yet individuals contribute more frequently when they are more politically expressive but also in strategic ways when those individuals express a greater desire to access policy.

Chapter 3 demonstrated that partisan federal employees from the Bush administration were more likely to stay on during the first six years of the Obama administration than independents. This finding is interesting because it suggests that employees exiting are not out-partisans, but rather those caught in the middle of agencies that are becoming more politicized. This result is for one cohort and needs additional points in time to assess if this result is true across many different administrations. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the context surrounding the transition from the Bush administration to the Obama administration yielded this pattern of turnover. Future work should consider if this hollowing out of the middle has persisted or if a different paradigm governs other political contexts as it relates to employee exit.

Chapter 4 provides evidence that agencies gain greater control over their action with divided government. Multiple principals provide cover for agencies to enact policies in accordance with the preferences of the agencies and not the preferences of the political overseers. It is not to say that agencies are being subversive, but rather they are not being micromanaged in such a way that would encourage civil servants to exit government. In this sense, divided government has the silver lining of encouraging the retention of human capital in agencies.

Taken collectively, these chapters breathe life in to the notion that federal employees possess a heterogeneous set of political beliefs, they act upon those beliefs outside of work, and then also have those beliefs interact with their daily work environment. Future work should be cognizant of these results and strive to include the differences (some political) between individual civil servants rather than assume them to interchangeable or lack preferences of their own.

Several future works naturally extend from this dissertation. From Chapter 2, the design created applies to all employees, both federal civil servants and those in the private sector. Taking representative samples and merging campaign contribution histories of those employees helps better the understanding of who opts to participate in elections through campaign contributions. The best way to understand why someone gave is to evaluate that person's decision juxtaposed against a similar person that did not. This is true of both civil servants and the population at large.

Next, the results in Chapter 3 provide evidence that it is not always the out-partisans leaving during administration changes or more generally when the president and agency do not see eye to eye on a particular policy. Rather, in one case, civil servants across government that were partisan were more likely to exit as well as those working in moderate agencies. This suggests a politicization of federal employees in a way that may not be congruent with democratic norms. Future work should evaluate if this pattern persists both in future administrations but also historically to understand how we arrived at this point in time.

In addition to the substantive work going forward from Chapter 3, a methodological point remains to be tested. By examining survey response items with actual departure decisions, scholars can examine past conclusions that undergird our understanding of departure to see if the

survey "intent to exit" question correctly mapped in to the exit decision of those that took the survey. At least with the sample in Chapter 3, it did not. That begs the question of if this occurred in other samples or just this set under these conditions. Future work should examine if past surveys of public sector employees that generated the expectations about turnover accurately reflect who exited government or if there were systemic over or under representations of who left from a particular sample. In the case of Chapter 3, it was partisans over representing their exit intention. In areas where politics enters less, it may not be the case. Moreover, in places further down the hierarchy, civil servants might be more responsive to economic changes or changes in the oversight structure that would then change their decision to exit. Future work should consider these factors to allow for a better understanding of the exit decision of public sector employees more generally.

Finally, Chapter 4 evaluates agency autonomy by considering when appointees exit government. In doing so it excluded people who left their appointed position to enter in to the government in some careerist capacity. Becoming a careerist from an appointed position, dubbed "burrowing" by the federal government, could compromise merit hiring practices. By excluding anyone who burrowed in Chapter 4, I have also identified all instances of burrowing. Who burrows? Once in a careerist position, are they staying in government and influencing agency decision making or do they become ostracized and leave government more quickly? These are important questions to answer if scholars are to understand the consequences of burrowing and if presidents use burrowing to continue their influence in agencies well beyond their time in office. This line of inquiry, and the others listed, are all research items I plan to take on in the future.

Federal employees sit in the unenviable position of being tasked with carrying out complex policy positions required of the modern administrative state, yet are subject to the

intervention of political actors seeking to achieve their own version of what is optimal policy. To the extent that the political actors seek to deviate policy from a social optimum set by neutrally competent bureaucrats, the ability of those employees to resist political influence in carrying out the job function of the agency is paramount to achieving good governance in the modern society. Future work should seek to explore this nuanced relationship between the composition of agency personnel and how that interacts with the political actors seeking to oversee and influence agency behavior.

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A. Counts of Candidates Receiving Contributions by Bureaucrats

Table A1 displays the count of the number of donors for each candidate in the three election

cycles. Table A2 displays the count of donors that responded to the SFGS in a given year.

Table A.1: Count of Donors in the SFGS Sample
by Candidate, 2004-2012

	Candidate Name	Donors	Percent
2012	Newt Gingrich	1	0.17
	Barack Obama	476	91.36
	Tim Pawlenty	1	0.17
	Mitt Romney	48	8.13
	Ron Paul	1	0.17
	Total	590	
2008	Bob Barr	1	0.24
	Joe Biden	1	0.24
	Sam Brownback	1	0.24
	Fred Thompson	5	1.22
	Hillary Clinton	18	4.39
	Mike Huckabee	1	0.24
	John Edwards	1	0.24
	John McCain	196	47.8
	Barack Obama	157	38.3
	Bill Richardson	2	0.49
	Mitt Romney	11	2.68
	Ron Paul	1	0.24
	Rudy Giuliani	12	2.93
	Tommy Thompson	3	0.73
	Total	410	
2004	George W. Bush	164	72.56
	Howard Dean	3	1.33
	John Edwards	2	0.88
	Dick Gephardt	1	0.44
	Joe Lieberman	1	0.44
	John Kerry	55	24.34
	Total	226	

When considering which candidates received money from federal employees, the clear pattern that emerges is the eventual nominees receive the lion share of these contributions. By considering both the primaries and the general elections together, this outcome should occur. The general election has far more contributions (Mitchell, et al. 2015) and those campaigns are salient over a much wider timeframe than those eliminated in the primary season. While one should not compare absolute numbers received between election years (as sample sizes were not the same), in elections with incumbents those candidate receive the vast majority of the contributions. This could be a function of placing employees in positions and getting contributions in return. Another competing explanation could be donors fearing retribution for giving to the losing candidate feel safe to give to an incumbent that likely will win office. One stark difference is the sizable proportion of donations given to Barack Obama in 2012. That said the sample in the 2014 SFGS that identified as Democratic is much higher than 2008 and the appointees are also Democratic rather than Republican. So the proportion of giving from Democrats is not particularly outsized given the composition of the sample is heavily Democratic.

**Table A.2: Contributions Made by Survey
Respondents by Candidate, 2012-2004**

	Candidate	Donor	Percent
2012	Barack Obama	138	92
	Mitt Romney	12	8.01
	Total	150	
2008	Bob Barr	1	0.67
	Joe Biden	1	0.67
	Fred Thompson	2	1.33
	Hillary Clinton	8	5.33
	Mike Huckabee	1	0.67
	John McCain	56	37.33
	Barack Obama	71	47.33
	Bill Richardson	1	0.67
	Mitt Romney	3	2
	Rudy Giuliani	6	4
	Total	150	
2004	George W. Bush	50	66.67
	Howard Dean	2	2.67
	Dick Gephardt	1	1.33
	John Kerry	22	29.34
	Total	75	

B. Cross Party Giving

One potential concern with looking at the decision to give absent partisan direction is that federal employees give across party lines with great frequency. If many strong Republicans gave to John Kerry in 2004, the results would still find partisanship to be a predictor of giving, yet it would not be operating in a way that intuitively makes sense. As such, a check is required to see how many times partisans crossed over to the other party when making a campaign contribution.

Table B.1: Cross Party Giving by Federal Employees to Presidential Candidates

Year	Repub to Dem	Dem to Repub	Total	Percent Cross Party
2012	3	1	590	0.68%
2008	5	2	320	2.50%
2004	0	0	266	0.00%
Total	8	3	1176	0.94%

As the results in table B clearly show, bureaucrats rarely give across party lines. The behavior is true of the population at large, as Dowdle et al. (2013) found little evidence of contributors to primary losers giving to the other party in the general election. Importantly for this study, the lack of cross party giving justifies the decision to model simply the act of giving.

C. Multilevel Modeling Robustness Check

Multilevel modeling is appropriate when groups within the data likely vary along the outcome of interest. Canonically, evaluations of students across multiple classrooms need to consider that classrooms produce different outcomes for a host of reasons that vary only by classroom. When discussing both individuals and agencies in the federal government, this too should be modeled with more than one level. Tables C1-C3 display hierarchical models for the models in the body of the text.

Table C1: Multilevel Probit Models of Table 1

	(1) Give 2012	(2) Give 2012	(3) Give 2012
Careerist	-1.026*** (-16.77)	-0.986*** (-6.30)	-1.231*** (-5.51)
ln(Salary)	0.947*** (8.86)	0.208 (0.75)	0.287 (0.57)
|PID|		0.365** (2.66)	0.709** (2.66)
Values Policy		0.130 (1.58)	0.219* (2.12)
Values Move Up		-0.104 (-1.94)	-0.100 (-1.48)
DC		0.233 (1.41)	0.0378 (0.19)
Presidential Contact		-0.0372 (-0.52)	-0.103 (-1.10)
Committee Contact		0.126	0.00525

110

		(1.72)	(0.05)
|Agency Ideology|			0.201
			(1.66)
% Professional			-0.308
			(-0.83)
ln(Agency Size)			0.0219
			(0.36)
Committee Policy Influence			-0.147
			(-1.50)
White House Policy Influence			-0.000345
			(-0.08)
Policy Insulation			-0.275[*]
			(-2.43)
Personnel Insulation			0.259[**]
			(2.63)
Rulemaking Importance			-0.116
			(-1.37)
Constant	-12.31[***]	-4.476	-5.070
	(-9.76)	(-1.33)	(-0.85)
ICC	0.123	4.22e-33	3.69e-34
	(1.44)	(0.37)	(0.34)
N	10138	1080	757

$p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$, two-tailed
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: Models 1 and 2 estimate robust standard errors as the measures are individualistic. Model 3 clusters errors by office with the inclusion of group measures. Estimating models with clustered standard errors for Models 1 and 2 does not alter the substantive conclusions drawn from the estimates. Model 4 estimates agency level models. Model 4 excluded as it was an agency average model.

Table C2: Multilevel Models of Table 2

	(1) Give Pres 2008	(2) Give Pres 2008	(1) Give Pres 2004	(2) Give Pres 2004
Careerist	-0.689***	-0.582***	-0.655***	-0.507*
	(0.114)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.240)
|PID|	0.292**	0.249	0.612***	0.748**
	(0.104)	(0.138)	(0.182)	(0.260)
|Ideology|	0.0640	0.0675	0.139*	0.0455
	(0.0487)	(0.0652)	(0.0700)	(0.0880)
White House Contact	0.183***	0.152	0.125**	0.223*
	(0.0510)	(0.0872)	(0.0457)	(0.0876)
Committee Staff Contact	-0.0501	0.00337	-0.0545	-0.0181
	(0.0672)	(0.0850)	(0.0697)	(0.104)
% Professional		0.840*		0.229
		(0.351)		(0.384)
ln(Agency Size)		-0.105*		0.00453
		(0.0432)		(0.0406)
|Agency Ideology|		0.00951		-0.106
		(0.123)		(0.128)
Constant	-1.840***	-1.343**	-2.720***	-3.258***
	(0.252)	(0.489)	(0.418)	(0.706)
ICC	0.133	0.104	0.00507	0.0180
	(0.0680)	(0.0682)	(0.0269)	(0.0350)
Observations	1883	1210	1883	1210

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The intraclass correlation is not sufficiently large to justify the need for hierarchical modelling in this case. This is due to campaign contributions being rare events so the second level of the model lacks variation. Importantly, none of the substantive conclusions reached in the paper change when considering these models with multiple levels.

D. OPM Computational Alternative Specifications

Including multiple measures that are percentages with the same denominator makes for interpreting changes in one percentage holding all others constant impossible because increasing one category must decrease one of the others. As such including measures of different types of OPM employment categorization would be doing just this. Therefore, each category was estimated independently from one another. Tables D1-D3 estimates each model in the paper with different various categories of employees controlled for in the model. The type of employment across the categories is not associated with a change in the predicted probability of making a campaign contribution.

Only in 2008 for professional employees are the results statistically significant. Those results appear in the body of the text. Because the results are not consistent across specifications this result reflects something unique about 2008 or is a false positive.

Table D1: Probit Estimates Varying OPM Occupational Classification Control, 2012

	(1) Give Pres 2012	(2) Give Pres 2012	(3) Give Pres 2012
% Technical	0.528 (0.94)		
% Clerical		-1.545 (-1.14)	
% Professional			-0.0901 (-0.25)
|PID|	0.718** (2.97)	0.692** (2.73)	0.698** (2.76)
ln(Salary)	0.358 (0.79)	0.248 (0.57)	0.303 (0.66)
Values Policy	0.211 (1.88)	0.208 (1.85)	0.208 (1.84)
Values Move Up	-0.117 (-1.63)	-0.120 (-1.67)	-0.120 (-1.68)
|Agency Ideology|	0.108 (0.93)	0.0631 (0.57)	0.0901 (0.79)
ln(Agency Size)	-0.0151 (-0.28)	-0.00725 (-0.15)	-0.00388 (-0.08)
Policy Insulation	-0.265** (-2.76)	-0.268** (-2.83)	-0.261** (-2.69)
Personnel Insulation	0.241** (2.82)	0.211* (2.50)	0.224** (2.72)
Constant	-6.822 (-1.27)	-5.389 (-1.04)	-6.113 (-1.11)
N	780	780	780

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D2: Probit Estimates Varying OPM Occupational Classification Control, 2008

	(1) Give Pres 2008	(2) Give Pres 2008	(3) Give Pres 2008
% Technical	-0.467 (-0.90)		
% Clerical		0.0958 (0.27)	
% Professional			0.664* (2.25)
Careerist	-0.622*** (-4.93)	-0.628*** (-4.86)	-0.630*** (-4.87)
|PID|	0.358** (2.74)	0.356** (2.75)	0.353** (2.67)
White House Contact	0.187* (2.44)	0.187* (2.45)	0.196* (2.51)
Committee Staff Contact	-0.0855 (-1.10)	-0.0841 (-1.08)	-0.0689 (-0.89)
ln(Agency Size)	-0.120** (-3.23)	-0.127*** (-3.44)	-0.130*** (-3.39)
Policy Insulation	0.0849 (1.05)	0.0895 (1.12)	0.0572 (0.72)
Personnel Insulation	-0.101 (-1.12)	-0.0959 (-1.06)	-0.0940 (-1.03)
Constant	-0.692 (-1.57)	-0.699 (-1.61)	-0.933* (-2.01)
N	1257	1257	1257

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D3: Probit Estimates Varying OPM Occupational Classification Control, 2004

	(1) Give Pres 2004	(2) Give Pres 2004	(3) Give Pres 2004
% Technical	0.0305 (0.05)		
% Clerical		-0.294 (-0.39)	
% Professional			0.142 (0.35)
Careerist	-0.460[*] (-2.24)	-0.451[*] (-2.19)	-0.461[*] (-2.31)
|PID|	0.792[**] (3.12)	0.793[**] (3.12)	0.793[**] (3.11)
White House Contact	0.145 (1.63)	0.145 (1.64)	0.148 (1.73)
Committee Staff Contact	0.0210 (0.23)	0.0209 (0.23)	0.0225 (0.24)
ln(Agency Size)	0.0163 (0.41)	0.0163 (0.42)	0.0171 (0.43)
Policy Insulation	0.0535 (0.70)	0.0530 (0.70)	0.0482 (0.60)
Personnel Insulation	0.166 (1.65)	0.162 (1.64)	0.165 (1.62)
Constant	-3.408[***] (-5.71)	-3.391[***] (-5.76)	-3.466[***] (-5.26)
N	1257	1257	1257

t statistics in parentheses
[*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$

E. Conditional Values Models

The relationship between values and the individual could be conditional on partisanship and if the individual is an employee or careerist. The idea would be that only those that are ostracized by the current administration would feel compelled to contribute to see a seat change in the Oval Office. Table E estimate this conditional relationship. Due to the questions only appearing on the 2012 survey this can only be done for the 2012 estimates.

From the results in Table E, some evidence of this relationship appears as the sign for the interaction is positive for the conditional relationship with partisanship and valuing policy influence. The magnitude of the result is quite large and likely stems from a lack of variation due to the likelihood of a contribution being a rare event. This leaves over a quarter of the observations perfectly determined. As such the results are consistent with theory but sufficiently unstable to not warrant inclusion in the body of the text.

Table E.1: Conditional Relationship of Values

	(1) Give Obama 2012
Careerist	-0.854***
	(-4.13)
PID	-13.58***
	(-15.51)
Values Policy	0.101
	(0.71)
PID X Values Policy	3.325***
	(12.92)
ln(Salary)	0.416
	(0.83)
Values Move Up	-0.149
	(-1.92)
Agency Ideology	-0.159
	(-1.40)
% Professional	-0.0593
	(-0.13)
ln(Agency Size)	0.00958
	(0.16)
Policy Insulation	-0.186
	(-1.69)
Personnel Insulation	0.238*
	(2.05)
Constant	-6.113
	(-1.01)
N	780

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

F. Agency Average Models

Evidence of federal employees using campaign contributions to signal administrations would require agency characteristics be predictive of contributions from employees. This should manifest in models of agency averages predicting the percentage of employees making a campaign contribution. Table F show these agency average models where surveys shared questions and measures. The results of these estimates show only in 2008 any agency characteristic predicting an increase in the share of contributors within that agency. This again comports with the diagnostic on multilevel modelling which suggested a lack of second level variation.

Table F.1: Agency Average Models

	(1) Give Pres 2012	(1) Give Pres 2008	(1) Give Pres 2004
|Agency Ideology|	0.001	-0.007	0.010
	(1.68)	(-0.81)	(1.06)
% Professional	-0.004	0.036	-0.052
	(-0.23)	(1.19)	(-1.68)
ln(Agency Size)	-0.006	-0.014^{***}	-0.009
	(-1.96)	(-3.91)	(-1.24)
Policy Insulation	0.0003	0.010	-0.005
	(0.09)	(1.11)	(-0.87)
Personnel Insulation	0.004	-0.003	0.014
	(0.57)	(-0.32)	(1.08)
Constant	0.081^{**}	0.167^{***}	0.109
	(2.72)	(5.25)	(1.64)
N	126	134	134

t statistics in parentheses
$^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$
Note: The reduced number of agencies stem from the ideology estimates needed five respondents to answer. Agencies with fewer than five respondents were not included in these estimates.

G. Ideology vs PID check

Another concern with the model specification could be the inclusion of both partisanship and ideology in the same model. While the correlation is low enough ($\rho < 0.33$ or less in each sample) that multicollinearity should not be a problem, it could be that partisanship simply washes out the effect of ideology. If this were to be true, estimating models with just one of the partisanship or ideology variables should shed light on to the interplay of these two forms of expressive giving. Tables G1-G3 report models from the text, this time excluding one of the partisan or ideological variables as well as the models produced in the text.

What the results consistently show is that partisanship is diminishing the effect of ideology. If partisanship is not included, the effect of ideology now increases and is statistically distinguishable from zero in all models. That said the marginal change in predicted probability is smaller than partisanship in the model with both variables included and partisanship sees a similar increase in the magnitude of the change in predicted probability when models exclude ideology. Two suggestions naturally follow from this observation. First, ideology and partisanship do vary with one another in a positive manner. However, that variation is not that large. Even when totally excluding partisanship the marginal change in predicted probability for ideology is smaller than partisanship for the model including both variables. Second, excluding partisanship, a clearly important variable, creates a model that likely has omitted variable bias. Given multicollinearity is likely not an issue here, introducing bias to draw conclusions about ideology would be doing so from a model with theoretical issues. As such, the models reported in the article contain estimates with both ideology and partisanship in the same model.

Table G1: Ideology and Partisan Multicollinearity Check, 2012

	(1) Give Pres 2012	(2) Give Pres 2012	(3) Give Pres 2012	(4) Give Pres 2012	(5) Give Pres 2012	(6) Give Pres 2012
Careerist	-.925***	-1.000***	-.926***	-.742***	-.834***	-.762***
	(.0943)	(.0928)	(.0943)	(.225)	(.212)	(.224)
DC	.364**	.375**	.366**	.436*	.463**	.452*
	(.120)	(.118)	(.120)	(.175)	(.174)	(.176)
|PID|	.385***		.363***	.355***		.313**
	(.0921)		(.0939)	(.102)		(.105)
|Ideology|		.110*	.0381		.169**	.0960
		(.0515)	(.0542)		(.0631)	(.0669)
|Agency Ideology|				.0313	.0130	.0283
				0.0870)	(.0840)	(.0871)
Presidential Contact				.0928	.112*	.0907
				(.0514)	(.0487)	(.0512)
Appointee Contact				.0267	.0269	.0284
				(.0493)	(.0486)	(.0493)
Constant	-1.930***	-1.335***	-1.925***	-2.312***	-1.834***	-2.325***
	(.216)	(.145)	(.219)	(.344)	(.289)	(.344)
Observations	2915	2997	2863	2289	2352	2248

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, two-tailed
Standard errors in parentheses

Table G2: Ideology and Partisan Multicollinearity Check, 2008

	(1) Give Pres 08	(2) Give Pres 08	(3) Give Pres 08	(4) Give Pres 08	(5) Give Pres 08	(6) Give Pres 08
Careerist	-.691***	-.734***	-.685***	-.674***	-.734***	-.674***
	(.0985)	(.0969)	(.0992)	(.109)	(.108)	(0.111)
Headquarter	.611***	.646***	.616***	.510**	.550**	.519**
	(.165)	(.163)	(.165)	(.177)	(.174)	(.176)
|PID|	.367***		.319***	.311***		.250**
	(.0934)		(.0946)	(.0944)		(.0956)
|Ideology|		.143**	.0780		.154**	.100*
		(.0450)	(.0462)		(.0477)	(.0491)
|Clinton-Lewis|				-.0910	-.103	-.0950
				(.0684)	(.0677)	(.0689)
White House Contact				.0679	.0533	.0564
				(.0481)	(.0482)	(.0486)
Own Appointee Contact				.0575	.0640	.0660
				(.0478)	(.0479)	(.0483)
Constant	-2.128***	-1.692***	-2.143***	-2.233***	-1.882***	-2.261***
	(.254)	(.180)	(.254)	(.301)	(.255)	(.305)
Observations	1973	2031	1951	1807	1856	1789

p < 0.05, ** *p* < 0.01, *** *p* < 0.001, two-tailed
Standard errors in parentheses

Table G3: Ideology and Partisan Multicollinearity Check, 2004

	(1) Give Pres 04	(2) Give Pres 04	(3) Give Pres 04	(4) Give Pres 04	(5) Give Pres 04	(6) Give Pres 04
Careerist	-.706***	-.744***	-.690***	-.727***	-.769***	-.698***
	(0.120)	(.118)	(.122)	(.131)	(.129)	(.132)
Headquarter	.186	.236	.179	.152	.195	.139
	(0.177)	(.173)	(.178)	(.192)	(.189)	(.192)
|PID|	.790***		.700***	.738***		.651***
	(0.191)		(.191)	(.191)		(.191)
|Ideology|		.226***	.152**		.213***	.141*
		(.0558)	(.0590)		(.0594)	(.0629)
|Clinton-Lewis|				-.0905	-.0887	-.0745
				(.0839)	(.0835)	(.0846)
White House Contact				.0923	.104	.102
				(.0585)	(.0563)	(.0581)
Own Appointee Contact				-.0112	-.0127	-.00930
				(.0590)	(.0597)	(.0595)
Constant	-2.893***	-1.791***	-2.930***	-2.795***	-1.776***	-2.865***
	(.419)	(.203)	(.417)	(.439)	(.287)	(.438)
Observations	1973	2031	1951	1807	1856	1789

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, two-tailed

Standard errors in parentheses

H. What Predicts Changing Opinions?

Table A1 contains estimates of probit models that predict staying in government for career executives stating an intention to exit (0, 1; 50%). The model controls for partisanship, salary, gender, being of retirement age, and public service motivation. Two interesting findings emerge from this analysis. First, of those "Very likely" to exit, partisans are far more likely to say they are going to exit government but not actually leave. This is particularly true of Republicans. They are 23% more likely to report an inaccurate exit intention than independents. Additionally, it seems those with a higher annual salaries are less likely to stay in government despite suggesting they are "Very likely" to exit. These results suggest a potential for systematic differences between intent to exit and actual exit even with the limited number of cases.

Table H1: Probit Estimations of Staying in Government by Response Category to the Likelihood of Leaving Question

	(1) "Very Likely"	(2) "Somewhat Likely"
Partisan		
Republican	0.766*	-0.0997
	(0.410)	(0.413)
Democrat	0.431	-0.251
	(0.387)	(0.329)
Individual		
Retirement Age	-0.169	0.152
	(0.320)	(0.302)
Female	0.258	-0.271
	(0.265)	(0.237)
ln(Salary)	-1.808**	-3.053***
	(0.764)	(0.924)
Make a Difference	0.178	0.0211
	(0.139)	(0.132)
Salary and Benefits	0.0529	-0.0629
	(0.125)	(0.116)
Contextual		
State Unemployment	0.602***	0.328***
	(0.125)	(0.0986)
Liberal Agency	0.713**	0.182
	(0.297)	(0.257)
Conservative Agency	0.453	0.751**
	(0.285)	(0.324)
Constant	16.13*	35.49***
	(8.978)	(11.08)
N	150	178

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

I. Chapter 2 Alternative Specification

Table I.1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model for
Turnover of Careerists in the Obama Administration

	(1) Cox	(2) Cox	(3) Cox
Partisan			
Republican	-0.288**	-0.251*	-0.251*
	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.132)
Lean Republican	-0.215	-0.213	-0.219
	(0.151)	(0.149)	(0.149)
Lean Democrat	-0.176	-0.191	-0.223
	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.184)
Democrat	-0.324**	-0.312**	-0.328**
	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.156)
Individual			
Retirement Age		0.405***	0.408***
		(0.0946)	(0.0945)
Female		-0.0904	-0.0958
		(0.0958)	(0.0960)
ln(Salary)		0.473*	0.530*
		(0.272)	(0.275)
Make a Difference		-0.0868**	-0.0846*
		(0.0438)	(0.0438)
Salary and Benefits		0.0882**	0.0862*
		(0.0443)	(0.0446)
Contextual			
State Unemployment			0.0182
			(0.0344)
Liberal Agency			-0.171*
			(0.102)
Conservative Agency			-0.193*
			(0.101)
Cases	6612	6612	6612
Observations	1024	1024	1024
Failures	533	533	533

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered to individuals.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

J. Models Estimating Conditional Relationships

One assumption within the estimation in Table 2 is that there are no conditional relationships between individual partisanship and the ideology of the agency. Yet Bolton et al. (2016) found that agencies with ideological disagreements with the president have higher turnover. To test this conditional consideration, models similar to the one in Table 2, this time with interaction terms for the partisanship of the individual and the ideological leaning of the agency, are included. The previous substantive findings are consistent with the inclusion of interaction terms and no robust conditional relationship appears. There is suggestive evidence that Republicans in conservative agencies might leave more than other Republicans, but the Wald test between the two coefficients is inconclusive (p = .1). When the data are subset by agency type, partisans that stay the most are in moderate agencies. In liberal agencies both Republicans and Democrats are negatively signed but not precisely estimated. In conservative agencies, the magnitude of the effect is even smaller than liberal agencies. Perhaps this suggests partisanship does not matter for conservative agencies, but additional years and other administrations need consideration before making such a claim.

Cameron et al. (2015) suggest another conditional relationship between partisanship and age. If individuals truly wait out administrations they are in ideological disagreement with, then Democrats past retirement age should be more likely to stay than Republicans to receive their payoffs from staying in government. To test this consideration, the indicator for being of the retirement age is interacted with partisanship using the same controls as the model that produced Table 2. Table J2 displays the results suggesting no conditional relationship between age, partisanship and exit. Republicans and Democrats of retirement age exit at rates similar to one another. This suggests that the longer time horizons that might incentivize those in the out-party

128

to stay do not outweigh the decision to leave government (and presumably retire).

A final concern might be that the first two years in the period considered take place during the Bush administration. Estimates in Table J3 replicate specifications from Table 2 excluding those years. The relationships are less precisely estimated due to losing two periods, but results in Table 2 persist. Partisanship is still negatively signed for both Republicans and Democrats and of similar magnitudes. Moreover, the individual and contextual explanations that were statistically significant in Table 2 are statistically significant and signed in the same direction for Table J3.

Table J1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Turnover of Careerists in the Obama Administration with <u>Interaction Terms for Agency Ideology and Individual Partisanship</u>

	(1) Cox
Partisan	
Republican	-0.528***
	(0.201)
Democrat	-0.385**
	(0.184)
Conservative Agency	-0.538**
	(0.250)
Liberal Agency	-0.371
	(0.269)
Republican X Conservative Agency	0.516*
	(0.313)
Republican X Liberal Agency	0.370
	(0.355)
Democrat X Conservative Agency	0.347
	(0.281)
Democrat X Liberal Agency	0.195
	(0.296)
Individual	
Retirement Age	0.401***
	(0.0945)
Female	-0.1000
	(0.0953)
ln(Salary)	0.530*
	(0.276)
Make a Difference	-0.0860**
	(0.0430)
Salary and Benefits	0.0801*
	(0.0439)
Contextual	
State Unemployment	0.0199
	(0.0346)
Cases	6717
Observations	1040
Failures	543

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

130

Table J.2: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates of Exit Exploring Retirement Age as a Conditional Relationship with Partisanship

	(1) Cox
Partisan	
Republican	-0.247
	(0.155)
Democrat	-0.180
	(0.139)
Retirement Age	0.513**
	(0.233)
Republican X Retirement Age	-0.0791
	(0.312)
Democrat X Retirement Age	-0.154
	(0.257)
Individual	
Female	-0.0988
	(0.0946)
ln(Salary)	0.550**
	(0.273)
Make a Difference	-0.0893**
	(0.0426)
Salary and Benefits	0.0875**
	(0.0436)
Contextual	
State Unemployment	0.0194
	(0.0340)
Liberal Agency	-0.167*
	(0.0999)
Conservative Agency	-0.201**
	(0.100)
Cases	6717
Observations	1040
Failures	543

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered to individual.
* $p<.1$, ** $p<.05$, *** $p<.01$

Table J.3: Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Exit Using only Obama Administration Years, 2009 - 2015

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan			
Republican	-0.244*	-0.237*	-0.249*
	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.142)
Democrat	-0.258**	-0.224*	-0.220*
	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Individual			
Retirement Age		0.382***	0.384***
		(0.0979)	(0.0983)
Female		-0.0770	-0.0823
		(0.0988)	(0.0991)
Ln(salary)		0.410	0.446
		(0.286)	(0.289)
Make a Difference		-0.0890**	-0.0891**
		(0.0454)	(0.0454)
Salary and Benefits		0.0898*	0.0886*
		(0.0459)	(0.0461)
Contextual			
State Unemployment			0.0329
			(0.0358)
Liberal Agency			-0.120
			(0.105)
Conservative Agency			-0.160
			(0.104)
Cases	4692	4692	4692
Observations	987	987	987
Failures	491	491	491

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered to individuals
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

K. Discussion of Controls

Several other estimates from Table 2 help in understanding exit. Federal executives with higher salaries are more likely to exit. An increase in pay of one standard deviation of salary results in an increased exit rate of 12.1% in any period. Under the pay plans used by the federal government, those with higher pay have greater skills and responsibilities, thus making them the most likely targets for the private sector. A competing explanation for the correlation between pay and departure is that those at the top of the pay scale face pay ceilings that could increase the gap between public and private sector pay, leading to increased departure rates. The question then becomes if the people with stagnant pay at the top of the pay scale exit because of the pay ceiling or because they have the greatest private sector marketability. Future work with a larger sample should consider this dynamic over time so the proper prescription to retaining top civil servants can be applied.

Beyond compensation, measuring why someone entered government helps in understanding that individual's propensity to exit. Individuals that entered government to make a difference are more likely to stay in government while those that entered for pay and benefits are more likely to exit. The result suggests those that report a more altruistic motivation for service stay and continue their work while those motivated by pay and benefits are less likely to stay in government. Moving one response category up the scale, which is close to a one standard deviation increase, increases hazards of exit by 10 percent for those valuing salary and decreases hazards of exit by 10 percent for those wanting to make a difference.[56] Importantly, the differentiation of employees by their public service motivation helps in understanding which employees are more likely to stay in government. This also highlights a key difference between

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[56] Recall, *Pay and Benefits* s.d. .988; *Make a Difference* s.d. .919.

public sector employees and those in the private sector. Civil servants that feel a commitment to the mission of the agency and want to serve the country are more likely to stay in government.[57]

Finally, three demographic controls require brief discussion. First, when career civil servants reach retirement age, they are much more likely to exit. A civil servant who is 65 years old or older is 7.0 percent more likely to exit in each given period. Retirement motivates exit just like any other citizen, even for top career civil servants. Additionally, we cannot reject the null that gender has no influence on departure propensities for this group. Women that ascend to the tops of the civil servant ranks are no more or less likely to exit government than their male counterparts. Lastly, unemployment rates for the state in which the career civil servant works is not associated with that individual's decision to exit government. In the period considered, which included the Great Recession, top civil servants' exit decisions were not associated with outside unemployment levels in the state they worked in.

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[57] One might believe conditional relationships between the public service motivation questions and what the individuals are actually being paid. Interactions between these questions and salary reveal no such relationship. The hazards are indistinguishable from the baseline hazard for the interaction term.

L. Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics

While all employees considered are at the top of the federal hierarchy, not all departing their current position exit government. For appointees moving to career positions this is referred to as "burrowing". This practice has garnered attention from Congress and the GAO at different periods in time. To give an idea of just how often this is occurring, Table A1 reports the number of people who left a top pay band and moved to some other pay band in the federal government. In addition, Table A1 reports how many person-quarters are lost due to these individuals that did not exit government for the estimates in Table 2. All quarters for individuals who ultimately "burrowed" are excluded.

Table L1: Descriptive Statistics of Individuals Leaving of Pay Plan but Remaining in the Federal Government

	EX Pay	Schedule C	Noncareer SES
Number of People Burrowing	968	4,074	2,084
Quarters of Employees who Burrow	21,540	35,732	29,511
Quarters of Employees who Exit Government	29,003	89,910	34,986

M. Summary of Chapter 3 Control Variables

Table M.1: Summary Statistics of Control Variables

	EX	Schedule C	Noncareer SES
Age	49.4	35.3	42.97
	(9.81)	(11.6)	(9.68)
Pay (2016 Dollars)	$176,026	$101,300	$167,249
	($17,140)	($37,615)	($17,318)
Quarterly Unemployment	6.37	6.15	6.34
	(1.58)	(1.59)	(1.63)
Independent Agency	0.40	0.20	0.22
	(0.49)	(0.40)	(0.41)
Conservative Agency	0.42	0.39	0.44
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.50)
Liberal Agency	0.25	0.31	0.26
	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.44)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.

N. Comparison to Career Civil Servants

Career members of the Senior Executive Service are the top career civil servant in the federal government, possessing excellent skills in management. The professionalism for these employees makes them interchangeable, allowing agencies (and by extension the president) to reassign career members of the SES with very little advance warning or legal restrictions.[58] While they are technically protected from political firings, the ease with which reassignments can occur still could subject these employees to presidential influence should the administration wish to target particular employees.[59]

Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) are the final type of civil servant considered. These federal employees represent a highly professional class of civil servant that are particularly insulated from political actors. As stipulated by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ALJs go through a rigorous screening mechanism and are the only federal judges to reach their position through solely merit. ALJs, under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §557, are not allowed to be policy or rule makers. While part of the executive branch, ALJs receive no direction or supervision from any employee in the federal agency and are exempt from performance ratings, valuations, and bonuses. Removal requires a petition be filed with the Merit Systems Protection Board and good-faith errors are not grounds for dismissal (Butz v.

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[58] An agency may reassign a career SES member to any SES position in the agency for which he/she is qualified. Reassignments in the Same Commuting Area require a 15-day advance written notice, which may be waived only when the appointee consents in writing. Reassignments to a Different Commuting Area require consultation with the executive and a 60-day advance written notice, which may be waived only when the appointee consents in writing. An agency may remove a career appointee who fails to accept a directed reassignment under adverse action procedures. The appointee is entitled to appeal the removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. A career appointee may be transferred to another agency to an SES position for which he/she is qualified, with the consent of the appointee and the gaining agency.

[59] Anne Gorsuch notably used target reassignments in the EPA (Golden 2001). At least one member of the Career SES felt the Trump administration used this on him and 50 other in the Department of the Interior (Clement 2017).

Economou, 1978). As such, ALJs occupy important positions within agencies, yet enjoy great protection from dismissal. Because ALJs leave government on their own terms with next to no involvement from political actors, they provide a useful placebo to compare to other employees.

The following Tables and Figures take the same approach as the body of the paper. Models estimated on career civil servants are identical to the ones appearing in the main text. From these results, it is clear that career civil servants exit less frequently than appointees and the factors associated with those changes do not have the same magnitudes. Career members of the SES exit like Noncareer SES as it relates to the number of oversight committees and an opposition Senate. Yet, unlike appointees, career members of the SES are less likely to exit when the economy worsens.

Table N1: Length of Tenure Description, 1977-2014

	EX Pay	Schedule C	Noncareer SES	Career SES	Administrative Law Judges
Number of employees	4,278	14,673	7,024	34,022	3,265
Number of quarter-persons	61,129	151,620	77,123	865,860	13,5761
Number of exits	3,893	13,453	6,430	27,446	1,542
Median length of tenure	11 Quarters	8 Quarters	9 Quarters	17 Quarters	34 Quarters
Mean length of tenure	13.1 Quarters	9.7 Quarters	10.3 Quarters	24.7 Quarters	40.6 Quarters
Year First Observed	1977	1982	1979	1979	1991
Longest Tenure	88 Quarters	97 Quarters	88 Quarters	140 Quarters	94 Quarters

Table N.2: Estimates for Government Exit for Federal Employees, 1977-2014

	(1) EX Pay	(2) Schedule C	(3) Noncareer SES	(4) Career SES	(5) ALJs
Number of Committees	0.0051 (0.0039)	-0.0024 (0.0019)	0.0079** (0.0027)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.0213 (0.014)
Opposition Senate	-0.078* (0.0394)	-0.081*** (0.022)	-0.107** (0.036)	-0.058*** (0.011)	0.0530 (0.054)
Presidential Approval	0.0045*** (0.0012)	0.0042*** (0.0007)	0.0056*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.0003)	-0.009*** (0.002)
Independent Agency	-0.259*** (0.024)	-0.014 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.022)	-0.055*** (0.008)	-0.077 (0.044)
Liberal Agency	0.071* (0.028)	0.084*** (0.016)	0.066** (0.023)	-0.061*** (0.009)	-0.031 (0.044)
Conservative Agency	0.080** (0.025)	0.0627*** (0.016)	0.075*** (0.021)	0.037*** (0.0082)	0.0396 (0.087)
Unemployment	0.157*** (0.013)	0.185*** (0.008)	0.204*** (0.012)	-0.019*** (0.0049)	-0.022 (0.026)
Administration FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Duration Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individuals Traits	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	41,257	108,034	55,689	717,160	116,308

Figure C3: Change in Probability of Exit for One Congressional Session

Marginal Change in the Probability of Exit

Note: Point estimates generated by calculating marginal change in the probability of exit then multiplying the marginal change by 8 to note differences across a two-year period. For continuous measures, the estimate was also multiplied by a one standard deviation change to provide a more plausible change in the probability of exit.

Administrative Law Judges thus far have received very little attention. That stems from very little in the model explaining their exit from the federal government. At face value, ALJs appear similar to top federal employees. They are well compensated and educated. Yet they reach their positions through a rigorous screening based on merit and have nearly no oversight from elected officials and careerists within the agency. The null results provide a useful placebo test to suggest the results for appointed officials and Career SES are not simply the function of trends within federal employment that spuriously correlate with political explanations for exit. ALJs turnover at a much slower rate descriptively than even career members of the SES and political factors seem orthogonal to their decision to exit. These results suggest two conclusions. First, the insulation and selection mechanism seem to be sheltering ALJs from politics as it relates to their decision to remain in government. Second, observed political exit for other types of federal employees is not simply a function of general personnel trends within the executive branch.