CIRCULATING ANTI-COLONIAL CAIRO:

DECOLONIZING INFORMATION AND CONSTRUCTING THE THIRD WORLD IN EGYPT, 1952-1966

By

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For my family, and especially Mémère Bernadette and Mémère Sophie
The two women I admire most and whose friendship defined my life

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In the iconic aughts teen dramedy film *Mean Girls*, the climactic scene sees the main character Cady (pronounced Katie) winning the coveted Spring Fling Queen tiara. But like all coming of ages movies, upon receiving the thing she once desired – a plastic crown in this case, Cady finally realizes that the award no longer matters. Instead, gazing into a sea of high schoolers, Cady proceeds to break the tiara apart and share the pieces with all the other girls. Narrating the parable of the film, Cady explains that the tiara belongs to all of them and that rather than competing against one another, young women should support each other. Submitting a dissertation has the echoes of winning a Spring Fling Queen title. For one, my name is the only one that appears as author. Doing this research also required copious grant applications (some of which I was lucky enough to receive), which means I essentially spent years asking people to vote for me. Finally, as I come to the end of this process, I now finally realize that while that this dissertation is far more meaningful than a plastic tiara, this project does not solely belong to me. So, just like Cady, I too would like to break apart this dissertation and share the pieces with those who have helped me get here.

The first piece undoubtedly goes to my advisor, Thomas Schwartz, whose kindness and patience verges on superhuman. Even as I strayed about as far as a graduate student in history can without outright leaving the discipline, Tom never gave up on me, and when I sent him chapters with incomprehensible graphs, he never hesitated to send encouraging feedback. The next piece would go to the other three members of my committee - Paul Kramer, Leor Halevi, and Madeleine Casad. Thinking back on my first years in graduate school, I was incredibly fortunate to have been a student in both Paul and Leor's classes, and their influence on my intellectual growth would be difficult to overstate, as would the impact of their thoughtful comments on my dissertation. Even

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Beyond Vanderbilt, I have been fortunate to join a wider scholarly community first through the annual conferences at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and then at the National History Centers' International Decolonization Seminar, where I learned that brilliant scholars could also become supportive friends. This realization has been further reinforced through

Twitter of all places, where I have been fortunate to join the digital humanities community and share not only gifs and emojis, but also a shared commitment to making the future of humanities research. Micki Kaufman in particular deserves a piece of this dissertation as both inspiration for my research and the person who first encouraged me to experiment with digital methods. I was able to pay this favor forward as a digital humanities developer at the Scholars' Lab at UVA, and I will always be grateful to the entire staff, but especially Shane Lin, Brandon Walsh, and Amanda Visconti for supporting my less than perfect attempt to balance working a full-time job with writing a dissertation. A further piece goes to Steve Brownlee and John Wark at the Nashville Software School, who not only taught me how to code, but also that my work also had value beyond academia. None of my research (or friendships) would have happened without funding from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, which gave me the requisite time to undertake such an ambitious project. My undergraduate mentors, Robert Bothwell, Arne Kislenko, and Jens Hanssen, at the University of Toronto were all also instrumental in preparing and encouraging me to apply for graduate school, while my friends from Trinity College, especially Jennah Khaled and Evan Koetsenruijter, also deserve a piece for putting up with me for the last decade (soon to be two!). My oldest friends, Kate MacNeill, Emily Cordeaux, Jeyda Elsasser, Emily Pong, and Marisa Tanaka, not only get a piece but are partially responsible for my decision to incorporate Mean Girls into my dissertation, since their friendship was what got me through the traumas of high school (also I'm pretty sure we watched the movie together).

The last community is the one I didn't choose, but regardless, has supported me through think and thin – my family. With five grandmothers and three grandfathers, I have been to lucky to grow up with an abundance of love and encouragement, if not the most conventional family. No matter where I have traveled, knowing that I had a community that believed in helped me finish what at times felt like an impossible challenge. I'm especially indebted to my parents, Jennifer, Gilles,

and Laura, who sacrifices were the foundation for me to follow my dreams, and have more than earned the largest piece of this dissertation, as well as my love and gratitude. My younger sister Camille also deserves a piece for always being there for me, even though I was usually half way around the world. Finally, my partner Dr. Daniel James Miller gets the last piece, for loving and supporting me throughout this journey. As Cady would say, he is truly the grool-est (a portmanteau of great and cool) person I know.

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INTRODUCTION

CIRCULATING AND CONSTRUCTING THE REVOLUTION: ANTI-COLONIALISM AND INFORMATION IN EGYPT AND THE THIRD WORLD

In his weekly "From the Editor" letter in September 1964, Dr. Abdul Hamid El-Batrik, Editor in Chief of *The Arab Observer: The Non-Aligned Weekly*, depicted Cairo as a city ascendant. With monthly international conferences bringing revolutionaries from across the globe, a large print media establishment buttressed by one of the largest radio infrastructures in the world, Cairo had become a leader among revolutionary states and a hub for international news agencies who had, "been racing to keep up with Egyptian events." According to Dr. El-Batrik, Cairo's new and prominent global position was proof of the Free Officers' revolutionary promise to transform Egypt[1] into an independent nation. While independence in 1952 was largely defined as opposing British rule, by 1964, Egypt had changed its name to the United Arab Republic and its definition for independence; now premised on opposing imperialism beyond its borders and furthering the spread of decolonization across the globe. To El-Batrik, the United Arab Republic had finally arrived at its rightful place on the international stage when even foreign newspapers acknowledged "Cairo's vitality as a meeting place for new ideas."[2]

Yet Cairo's ascendancy to the crossroads of anti-colonialism and international events was not accidental. A decade earlier, in the first issue of Egypt's first state-funded magazine for an international audience, the editorial painted a much less rosy picture, writing that foreign reporting of events in the Middle East "appears somewhat tinted" and that there needed to be a new "organ to give voice to the Middle East public opinion."[3] The Egyptian ambassador to the United States,

[1] I use the term United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) and Egypt somewhat interchangeably, though the former is more closely tied with this anti-colonial moment than the later name.
[2] Abdul Hamid el-Batrik, "From the Editor," *Arab Observer*, 220 (September 7, 1964), 6.
[3] "Editorial," *The Scribe.* (August 1955), 7.

Mustafa Kamel, repeated this theme when he explained the Egyptian view of foreign media, stating "that except in periods of crisis, when the United Nations provides us a platform, our affairs are slighted by the communications media of some parts of the world." For Kamel, the problem was not only international news agencies, but of public relations, since "we [Egypt] have no Madison Avenue in Cairo."[4] While scholars have thoroughly studied Nasser's Egypt, the story of how Cairo went from the peripheries to the center of international events and news media flows remains to be uncovered. Excavating this history requires a reconsideration of how Egyptian anxieties over international news media were tied up in larger debates over the future of the postcolonial state and the processes of decolonization. Fear over foreign news coverage was not unique to Cairo, with many decolonizing states expressing frustration over the domination of news agencies like Reuters and Agence Presse, which were largely seen as perpetuating the legacies of empire. By the end of the 1960s the majority of the previously colonized world was now liberated, yet news still traveled largely through former imperial networks, creating barriers to decolonized states sharing information with one another, and skewing international coverage towards events in the West. Eventually, this bloc of decolonized states would turn to international institutions such as the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and especially the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to confront these international news flow imbalances through initiatives like the New World Information and Communications Order. Yet even prior to these international coalitions, Nasser and his coterie of military-officers-turned bureaucrats were challenging this international order and attempting to shape international public opinion – propagating Egypt-centric media content that promoted pan-Arabism and that eventually came to support a multitude of Third World-isms.

[4] Mostafa Kamel, "An address delivered at the University of Virginia November 6, 1958–Charlottesville, Va.," *Arab nationalism; a movement of awakening.* (Washington, Embassy of UAR, 1958), 1.

This dissertation tells the story of how Egypt became the one of the foremost promoters of news media and information among decolonized states in the 1950s and 60s, creating their version of a 'Madison Avenue' to propagate revolutionary discourses of anti-colonialism, liberation, and neutralism. This effort blurred distinctions between the local, national, regional, and global scales, as the revolution in Egypt confronted both the emerging decolonizing world and the growing divisions of the Cold War. With the prospect of a Third World bloc, Nasser quickly became attuned to the potential for this coalition to both further Egypt's international standing, while also undermining both the forces of imperialism (largely Britain) and neo-colonialism (largely Israel). To this end, the Egyptian government promoted Cairo as a hub for anti-colonialism, offering support to revolutionaries, leftist intellectuals, and new Third World institutions. Yet Nasser also wanted to transform public opinion both within Egypt and abroad, and thus, initiated a new era – where the state became the primary clearinghouse for all information, from military intelligence to political news to cultural production. While the creation of new intelligence agencies and the building of new radio broadcast infrastructure is well-known in the scholarship on Egypt, these were only the beginning of a political project that would seek to make information a category for state intervention; a project that had its antecedents in the colonial era, but also represented a radical transformation of the scale and very nature of the Egyptian state.

But this expansion of the Egyptian state, and especially its mass information regime, was not without its detractors and competitors, both at home or abroad. Within Egypt, the rise of a state-run, mass-scale information regime, capable of collecting, producing, disseminating, and suppressing information, provoked vigorous debates over mass media and the purpose of cultural production, as well as the continued repression of freedom of the press and political dissent. Among the Free Officers, these debates largely divided along Cold War lines, with supporters of more leftist and Soviet models of statism fighting against proponents of a right-wing, Western-centric approach to

communications and the media. While Sadat's presidency signaled a victory for the pro-Western officers, the divisions between these groups were largely over methods rather than substance; both agreed on the necessity of promoting anti-colonial solidarities and countering foreign propaganda. Yet this consensus within Egypt would be contested internationally, as the very definition of propaganda became implicated in these debates over news flows. To the European powers, and especially Britain and France, as well as to Israel, Egypt's 'propaganda' was intended to establish Nasser as the Hitler of the Middle East and North Africa. Similarly, Arab monarchies were increasingly wary of both Nasser's pan-Arab message and the expanding reach of the Egyptian information regime. American perceptions were initially favorable towards Nasser, but over the 1950s and 60s would increasingly see Egypt's international information campaign as an object of both suspicion and skepticism. Conversely, the Soviets had the opposite trajectory in regards to Nasser, especially as Nikita Khrushchev set his sights on the Third World as the next bastion of the revolution. Britain and the United States eventually invested heavily to counter Egypt's radio and print media outlets, although they struggled to undercut the appeal of Third World ideologies. Lastly, many decolonizing states in the region and across the globe were ambivalent about Egypt since it was both an early supporter and a model of how to build a postcolonial state capable of influencing global public opinion, but also simultaneously targeted these new states for its messaging.

Scholars have explored aspects of this history through the prism of the shifting relationships between the Egyptian state and the press, as well as the impact of Egyptian propaganda in the broader the Arab world. This dissertation expands on this work by bridging histories of Egyptian intelligence service with works on the Egyptian press, and by connecting studies of Egyptian propaganda with the more Western-centric field of public diplomacy. This project also draws from periodical and media studies to explore these new publications not only as historical sources, but

also as objects of inquiry in their own right. This perspective provides a window into how the universalizing idea of the Third World was constructed in the pages of these publications along with discussions of modernity, post-coloniality, and the idea of Arab socialism. Treating mediums and messages as constitutive also offers the opportunity to compare discourses between Egyptian publications, as well as across those produced by other Third World capitals and revolutionary movements. While scholars have explored the longer intellectual origins of anti-colonialism, examining the shifting discourses in these magazines produces new insights into how international events were inflected through local lenses. Indeed, focusing on the production of new platforms for this international anti-colonial audience highlights how this moment was implicated in the rise of mass media and communications studies. Exploring the influence of new theories of media and public opinion, much of which was emerging from the postwar American military and university industrial complex, helps trace the contours and contingencies of the Egyptian information policies and projects.

Ultimately, this project is concerned with how Egyptian nation making became intertwined with the Third World project. Since Matthew Connelly's germinal *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* in 2002[5], historians have increasingly explored the international dynamics of postcolonial nation making, especially the rise of revolutionary anti-colonial solidarities through the emergence of what would eventually become termed the Third World. The international history turn, as well as the emergence of the US in the World field, has produced a rich scholarship on the myriad of intersections between the Cold War and decolonization, and how these forces both constrained and empowered postcolonial leaders

[5] Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 2002). See also Matthew Connelly, "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (33. 2 May, 2001), 221-245; Matthew Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *The American Historical Review* (105. 3. June 2000), 739-769.

seeking to modernize their countries and legitimize their rule. While most of these works have not focused on the Middle East and North Africa per se, recent works by David Stenner, Yoav Di-Capua, and Jeffrey Byrne have further explored this dynamic, with Reem Abou-El-Fadl's 2019 book quite literally titled *Foreign Policy as Nation Making: Turkey and Egypt in the Cold War*.

This existing research provides the requisite foundation to begin exploring the historical forces that produced the larger state information regime in Cairo, and how these were tied to the shifting tides of Third World. In this project, I argue that Cairo's investment in circulating information was deeply tied to their commitment to the Third World project. In many ways this connection was not exceptional to Nasser, who like many nationalist leaders of this era, believed that world opinion was beholden to the existing international order that privileged the authority of European empires, Cold War superpowers, and neo-colonial settler states. Seeking to challenge this status quo, decolonizing states constructed infrastructure capable of circulating their political message, one that was often promoting the shared, though nebulous, anti-colonial cause. Indeed, across Third World capitals, the advent of relatively cheap mimeographs led to an explosion of periodicals from revolutionaries and intellectuals seeking to counter prevailing discourses and creating intellectual networks from Bandung to Havana.

While this moment was global, this dissertation zooms in on Cairo as the Egyptian revolution was one of the earliest, enabling Cairo to assert their leadership in these movements, and offer resources to other liberation movements seeking to produce anti-colonial media. While Cairo had long been a capital for print media in the Arab world, Nasser quickly became invested in promoting Cairo as a Third World capital, providing refuge to nationalist revolutionaries and serving as a platform for leftist intellectuals to influence anti-colonial discourses. Furthermore, the city hosted numerous international conferences and institutions, from the Arab League to the Afro Asian People's Solidarity Organization. While contemporary observers were skeptical of Nasser's

intentions, these activities produced an ideological pull for a whole host of Arab intellectuals, African American activists, and nationalist revolutionaries from across the world. Though other capitals would eventually supersede Cairo's prominence, Nasser and his government were among the first to build a mass information regime oriented towards this larger Third World audience.

This dissertation argues that focusing on Cairo is crucial for making visible the contradictions between this international anti-colonial moment and national information regime. While Egypt was building an information regime capable of countering foreign news coverage and denouncing the imperialism of Israel and the West, it was also jailing those who questioned Nasser's orthodoxy. Indeed, propagating Nasser's vision for the Third World and attempting to influence international public opinion became a self-fulfilling justification for the massive expansion of state power that laid the groundwork for what would become the authoritarian legacies of the Nasser period. This dissertation explores these dynamics while also considering how and why so many revolutionaries, leftists, intellectuals, and activists from Egypt and abroad became involved with this information regime. By the end of the 1970s the Egyptian government and these revolutionaries had largely diverged in their aims and methods. Thus, I consider how, even if only for a brief moment, the making of the Third World also meant the making of a new Egyptian nation, and how this intersection was profoundly embedded in the rise of mass information platforms and technologies in the mid-twentieth century.

At the heart of this story of the rise of the expansive Third World idea, and specifically, how that idea became so influential in Cairo. While anti-imperialist movements have a long history in Egypt, the rising winds of decolonization in the 1950s and 60s inspired new intellectual and political imaginings in Cairo – from pan-Arab unity to Arab socialism to neutralism. These ideas were deeply contested and indefinite, but they also inspired the creation of new solidarities between decolonizing states, and eventually the formation of institutions to promote this new Third World project.

However, I argue that with this shift from idea to institution, the Third World represented less of a revolutionary ethos challenging the international order and instead became embedded in the very system that earlier revolutionaries had sought to overthrow. Thus, this project traces how the initial information regime in Egypt was constructed to influence the flow of international information and spread the Third World idea, and then how those efforts became too costly through a combination of internal and external forces. Such a perspective helps contextualize the rise of regional and multilateral institutional approaches of the 1970s, and the ways in which information was a site for both the making and unmaking of the Third World. Ultimately, this project seeks to shed new light on how the Third World emerged as an animating idea for Egyptian and international political communities, and how this era, when information became the purview of the state, continues to have wide-ranging legacies across the formerly colonized world.

Chapter Outlines

The first chapter traces the publication history of the urtext of the Egyptian revolution – *The Philosophy of the Revolution*. *The Philosophy* has become a mainstay in histories of the Nasser era, yet few details exist about its initial publication or how it became so popular among scholars. Using this investigation as a window into scholarly practices for studying Egypt, this chapter then situates this project within wider historiographical trends. Weaving together these various historical fields and analytical lenses is intended to both explicate the larger scholarly foundations that informed my research, while also considering how previous work has made this current avenue of research possible. This chapter closes with a meditation on the possibilities and potential pitfalls of archival research in both Egypt and in the digital age.

The second chapter explores the initial establishment of the Egyptian information regime, first through a consideration of how this history has remained marginalized, and then exploring its

initial forays in both the Arab world and beyond. While historians have explored aspects of Nasser's relationship with the press and the growth of Egyptian propaganda in the Arab world, this chapter expands this story beyond Nasser and the region, considering the efforts of an influential, though hitherto under-studied Egyptian, Mohamed Abdel Kader Hatem, in shaping this new regime. Shifting the focus to Hatem, as well as other key figures, makes visible the initial attempts of this new revolutionary government to influence international public opinion, which built on earlier antecedents but also represented the beginning of a new era of state expansion into all areas of information.

The third chapter opens with the Bandung Conference of 1955 as a window into Cairo's initial participation in the emerging global politics of anti-colonialism. While the conference provided Nasser with new international prestige, the Suez Crisis of 1956 was the transformative moment for both the Egyptian leader and the state. Facing down the combined might of Britain, France, and Israel, Nasser became an anti-colonial and revolutionary hero around the globe, and the crisis had cemented the necessity of the mass information regime. This anti-colonial activity culminated with the Cairo Conference in December 1957, and then the abrupt creation of a political union with Syria a month later. Yet rather than ushering in a new era of leftist anti-colonialism within Egypt, the prospect of international competition and internal criticism of Nasser's leadership led to a tightening of the state's control over information.

The fourth chapter begins with the most formal articulation of this new statist approach, the 1960 Press Reorganization Law, which initiated an expansion in the mass information regime and Hatem's ascension to the top of what the British Embassy termed "Cairo's Propaganda Machine." This chapter also explores the Year of Africa and the outbreak of the Congo Crisis in Cairo. 1960 is usually glossed over in histories of Egypt since it appears relatively quiescent compared to 1958 or 1961. Yet the Congo crisis engendered a transformation in Egypt's anti-colonial policies, which for

the first time involved direct action beyond the Arab world. This chapter charts how this shift impacted the content of the mass information regime, especially with the rise of non-alignment, which seemed to herald a new international political bloc capable of challenging the existing international order. Yet with the close of 1961, the reality was much more mixed. The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in September and the expansion of the information regime seemed to validate Nasser's policies. Yet the secession of Syria from the UAR and the death of Dag Hammarskjold threatened this progress both at home and abroad.

The fifth chapter takes up the response to these events, beginning with the 1962 Charter, which heralded a new commitment to Arab socialism, as well as a response to what Lutfi al-Khuli termed the "crisis of intellectuals" - when the government fearing that the regime lacked legitimacy, released socialists and intellectuals seeking to co-opt them to the regime's cause. Given this new investment in culture and information, this chapter explores how the Egyptian government expanded both their publications for the Third World and their investment in Third World institutions. Focusing on both the mediums and meeting places of the Third World helps elucidate the distinctiveness of Cairo's Third Worldism, and this chapter compares the discourses in Cairo's periodicals with those emerging in other Third World capitals. This chapter ends with 1964, a climactic year in which Cairo hosted multiple Third World conferences and seemed to many observers to be at the crossroads of the movement.

Yet the apogee of Cairo's anti-colonial leadership, hosting the Non-Aligned Movement Conference in the fall of 1964, was in many ways the beginning of the end for this version of the Third World. The combination of coups that would overthrow Nkrumah in Ghana, Ben Bella in Algeria, and Sukarno in Indonesia, as well as a rising radical socialism within Egypt, transformed both the mass information regime and Egypt's relationship to the Third World. The conclusion charts these shifts in the domestic and international political landscapes, exploring how, although

Third World conferences and institutions continued, the rhetoric of anti-colonialism increasingly became radical in response to the continued struggles in Rhodesia, South Africa, and Vietnam (though Egypt was simultaneously trying to tamper down this language in relation to the Palestinian armed struggle). In response to the international fracturing of this initial Non-Aligned Movement, Nasser increasingly turned towards communists both within Egypt and abroad, eventually leading to the marginalization of the more technocratic bureaucrats like Hatem, and with them, their efforts to influence world public opinion. This dissertation ends before the catastrophe of 1967, exploring what would prove to a brief though influential pivot in Cairo towards supporting the more radical anti-colonialism of liberation movements.

However, this story continues long after 1967 or even Nasser's untimely death in 1970. With Sadat's unexpected rise to power, many Egyptian communists and intellectuals were once again either jailed or marginalized from power, and bureaucrats like Hatem were again ascendant. With the 1973 war, Hatem recreated his information victory from Suez, and over the course of the 1970s distilled his theories on mass media and information theory into monographs in both Arabic and English. However, Egypt's mass information regime remained buried in the past, as new multilateral and institutional initiatives such as the New World Information and Communications Order, were now the preferred vehicle for challenging international information flows. In many ways though, this moment still carried the spirit of Cairo's earlier anti-colonial politics, as Egypt played a crucial role in the bridging the Afro-Arab movements, resulting in the Arab OPEC countries agreeing to finance African development in 1977. Future research will explore how Sadat's recognition of Israel in early 1978 shattered this solidarity, and undermined the last three decades of Egyptian public diplomacy that had been consistent in depicting Israel as an imperialist power. Prior to excavating that history though, this dissertation details how in the 1950s and 60s an expansive vision of anti-colonialism became inseparable from Egypt's revolutionary political ideology. The result of this combination

was the creation of a new anti-colonial Cairo that symbolized independent Egypt's place in the world and simultaneously rationalized a massive expansion in the Egyptian state, as it attempted to control and circulate information not only within Egypt but across the globe.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICIZING *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*: METHODS AND SCHOLARLY TRENDS IN HISTORIES OF EGYPT AND THE THIRD WORLD

The Philosophy of the Revolution is one of the most cited Egyptian books from the 1950s, and is certainly the most cited work of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Indeed, in writings about post-revolution Egypt, the shadow of *The Philosophy* looms large, with many historians citing the book as the urtext of Egyptian political thought for the Free Officers' Revolution of 1952, an event that would itself become instructional for later nationalist revolutions across the colonized world. Scholars have considered many aspects of the publication, from how the ideas outlined in *The Philosophy* had earlier antecedents, to how the new nationalist government utilized it to both legitimize and fashion its political identity. Indeed, the text is eminently citable with most editions totaling under a hundred pages and Nasser providing enumerated lists of both the six principles of the revolution and the three circles of Egyptian influence. Yet even with these factors in its favor, how *The Philosophy* became so popular remains elided in most historical accounts, even though it was not Nasser's only publication in the early revolutionary period. Figure 1 traces the arc of both Nasser's publications and the frequency that these works are cited from both WorldCat and Google Scholar data (including multiple languages and editions).[6] Through his numerous speeches and the powerhouse

[6] Tracing the citations of *The Philosophy* or Nasser's other publications is a large enough endeavor for an entire separate article, and thus these figures should be taken as illustrative. Figure 1 consists of two trends - the citation and publication frequencies. The publication frequency represents data scraped from WorldCat search for the author Gamal Abdel Nasser, and includes any media with a publication date. The WorldCat data contains some duplicates of titles, but unlike Goodreads, which only lists only 14 distinct works for Nasser (https://www.goodreads.com/author/list/2817228._), this data contains a wide range of materials that were produced under Nasser's name. The citation frequency is scraped from a Google Scholar search for the author Gamal Abdel Nasser, including both English and Arabic variants of his name. The exact mechanism for how these citations were created remains a bit fuzzy, but Google Scholar documentation does list some details of how their data collection parsers bibliographic information (for more information see, "Inclusion Guidelines for Webmasters" https://scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/inclusion.html [accessed May 2019]). Ultimately, determining the accuracy of both the Google Scholar and WorldCat collections is

publishing capacity of the Egypt state, Nasser was prolific until his death in 1970, and yet *The Philosophy* remains overwhelmingly his most cited work.

Figure 1. Publication Frequency Compared to Citations Rates of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Published Works



This chapter traces how *The Philosophy* became so prevalent in the historiography, and then uses this investigation as a window into the broader trends in scholarship on Egyptian media and press regulation, decolonization and the Cold War, and the emerging field of information histories – all of which have influenced this project. For example, I draw from both the history of the book and studies of Egyptian media and press to contextualize the efforts of the postcolonial Egyptian state to nationalize and co-opt intellectual and cultural production through the creation new platforms, institutions, and regulations to help circulate Cairo's message. To understand this mass information regime, I also incorporate insights from the emerging field of information history. While largely a Western-centric field, this analytical lens helps elucidate how information became defined in ways that legitimized and catalyzed the expansion of the Egyptian state. The new Bandung and Cold War histories have also been influential, helping situate Egypt within larger international processes –

difficult, especially in regards to works published in non-romantic languages, but even with this caveat, this data helps underscore the larger argument about the contingency of *The Philosophy* as the representative text of Nasserism.

most especially the creation of the Third World and Cold War modernization debates. Combined, the scholarship in these fields informs both the historical and analytical framing for this project. To help situate both this literature and the dissertation, this chapter explores some of the broader historiographical trends in the last three decades of research in these areas. From this perspective, I also consider how the obstacles to research in Egypt has influenced current scholarship. While the current political situation in Egypt has prevented certain avenues for research, this chapter also discusses the prospects of what Lara Putnam has termed the "transnational and text-searchable turn". Putnam argues that this new digital history turn provides new possibilities, but also potential pitfalls, in how historical research practices. From this perspective, I briefly discuss my use of digital methods to study discourses and mediums from both Cairo and the decolonizing world, and how this furthers my aim of understanding these historical sources as objects of inquiry in their own right. As a case study for why Egyptian state publications should be understood as historically produced, this chapter begins with an investigation into the publication history of *The Philosophy of the Revolution,* meditating on both the proliferation of multiple editions, and how this has influenced historians' relationship to and citation of the book. While the history of *The Philosophy* does not radically rewrite existing research, I argue that the book's duality (popular but also under historicized) is both emblematic of the difficulties and necessities for studying the Egyptian mass information regime – a story that is at the heart of this project.

A Brief Publication History of *The Philosophy of the Revolution*

This chapter opened with the question of how *The Philosophy* became so popular in histories of Egypt, and this section traces its privileged position as contingent rather than inevitable,

examining both its initial reception, as well as the context of its publication.[7] Initial reviews of *The Philosophy* often paired it with another Egyptian publication - Mohamed Naguib's *Egypt's Destiny* since they were both published in English on the same day, April 14 1955.[8] While Naguib was the initial leader of the Free Officers, historians have detailed how he was eventually sidelined from power and then placed under house arrest until his death in 1971. *The New York Times*' Middle East Correspondent, Dana Adams Schmidt reviewed both books in April 1955, but devoted far more coverage to *Egypt's Destiny*.[9] That same month Percy Wood in the *Chicago Tribune* also compared the two books, writing "Naguib's book is much more interesting than Nasser's" and describing how Naguib detailed his interactions with the late King Farouk, whereas Nasser's brevity around his revolutionary goals was "disappointing."[10] These two reviews were more generous, with many reviewers panning both Nasser and *The Philosophy*, including one author who described it as "a strange and some ways disturbing little book."[11] This initial middling coverage of the book and resulting low sales meant that in the summer of 1956, Public Affairs Press Director, Morris Schnapper, was looking to unload "his Egyptian turkey." Luckily for Schnapper, he kept the rights as the outbreak of the Suez Crisis later that summer would make the book a bestseller with multiple sold out printing runs.[12] Indeed, by September, Schnapper felt empowered to pen a Letter to the Editor in *The Washington Post* chiding their recent coverage of Egypt, writing that when *The Philosophy*

[7] While the earlier figure included all data from Google Scholar and WorldCat, including non-English publications, this section focuses on the English language historiography of Egypt.
[8] "Books and Authors," *New York Times* (April 4 1955), 27 and "Books Published Today," *New York Times* (April 14 1955), 26. *Egypt's Destiny* is listed for $4, while *The Philosophy* is $2. John Badeau, "Book Reviews: Arab World," *Middle East Journal.* (9. 3. Summer 1955), 328-329 Badeau's review was notably more positive about *The Philosophy*, ending his review with the assessment that the initial Egyptian revolution had gone "far better than the cynical West expected".
[9] Dana Adams Schmidt, "Each Played His Part," *The New York Times* (May 8 1955), BR10.
[10] Percy Wood, "Kicking Out A King," *Chicago Tribune* April 24 1955. *The Manchester Guardian* also listed The Philosophy in its books received from April 28 1955.
[11] Emil Lengyel, "Review of *Egypt's Liberation*," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* 300. (July 1955), 176-177. Lengyel was even harsher of Nasser in his review of Naguib's book in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* from September 1955, described Naguib as "a mature, even though not a strong, person", whereas Nasser is described as "a philosophizing secondary student than a 'statesman'" on page 256.
[12] Harvey Breit, "In and Out of Books," *The New York Times* (January 27 1957), BR5. For an example of renewed Suez Coverage, see Roderic H. Davidson's Review, "Nasser Sees It This Way" *Washington Post* (September 9 1956), E6.

was first published by his press, "it was all but ignored by most newspapers (including *The Washington Post*) and most Western diplomats (including our own State Department)."[13]

The Suez Crisis propelled *The Philosophy* to new heights, although subsequent coverage of the book in the 1950s largely remained negative. Indeed, many reviews compared the book to *Mein Kampf* and Nasser to Hitler[14]. In "Israeli Perceptions of Nasser and Nasserism", Elie Podeh discusses how the Israeli Military Intelligence translated *The Philosophy*, and publicly released it in December 1954. The Israeli translation included a postscript that was emblematic of the Israeli perception of *The Philosophy*, denouncing the publication as legitimizing Nasser as a proto-Hitler in the region with aspirations of lebensraum through an aggressive "special, Nasser-style imperialism."[15] The Israelis were not alone in their perception of Nasser, with the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden often drawing similar comparisons. Given the West and Israeli's fears around Nasser's intentions and the perception that *The Philosophy* was Nasser's blueprint for the nebulous specter of Arab unity, the eventual prominence of this book in the historiography seems inevitable, yet exploring the initial reception underscores how the Suez Crisis was instrumental in this later popularity. Indeed, the first graph in Figure 2 traces the citation frequency of *The Philosophy*, while the second graph compares its citation frequency to those of Naguib's *Egypt's Destiny* and Kwame Nkrumah's *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. Nkrumah was the first Prime Minister of decolonized Ghana, and in many ways Nasser's counterpart, and sometimes competitor, for leadership in pan-African politics. While initial reviewers compared Naguib and Nasser's works, historians have decidedly focused on *The*

[13] Schnapper goes on to say that they published the book "not because its editors agreed with him, but because they recognized it was a documentary of extraordinary importance. That seems to be generally acknowledged these days." *The Washington Post* (September 10 1956), 16.
[14] Moses J. Steiner, "Book Reviews," *Jewish Social Studies* (January 1 1958), 251-50, and Robert G Spivak, "Watch on the POTOMAC," *Daily Defender* (March 5 1957), 4.
[15] Elie Podeh, "Israeli Perceptions of Nasser and Nasserism," *Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt*. Edited by Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2004), 76, 83-85, 92.

Philosophy as the representative text for discussing modern Egypt, similar to *Neo-Colonialism* for understanding Nkrumah's Ghana.[16]

Figure 2. Citation Frequency Per Year for Nasser, Naguib, and Nkrumah's Most Cited Publications (Aggregate Data from Google Scholar)



Thus, although unlikely at the time of publication, *The Philosophy* has become a mainstay in the scholarship on Egypt, in part due to contemporary observers seeking to understand Nasser, and also through the Egyptian state's promotion of the book and its message. Yet even though *The Philosophy* has become so established, scholars offer conflicting accounts of the book's origins, with few concrete details regarding its initial publication or eventual translation into English. For example, in Podeh's brief discussion of *The Philosophy*, he also mentions that the book was written not by Gamal Abdel Nasser, but his close confidant, the journalist Mohammed Hassanein Heikal. This claim has no citation, and even more confusing is that in the same volume, but in the introduction, Podeh with co-editor Onn Winckler describe the book as being published in "1953-54".[17] To make matters even murkier, in *The Decline of Arab Unity* published in 1999, Podeh writes

[16] Similar to Figure 1, this figure contains data collected from Google Scholar and is not exhaustive though citations for multiple editions were combined.
[17] Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler, "Introduction," *Rethinking Nasserism*, 1.

that *The Philosophy* was written in the summer of 1953. Published in 2002, James Jankowski's *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and The United Arab Republic* supports Podeh's claims of Heikal's ghostwriting, and a publication date of fall 1954. Joel Gordon also cites this date in *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, though he describes *The Philosophy* as being "published in late 1954, along with a series of articles penned by Sadat in early 1955, later published as books and reissued in several editions, becoming the definitive accounts of the Free Officers' roots."[18] Conversely, in both her earlier article and recently published book, Reem Abou-El-Fadl dates the publication of *The Philosophy* to 1953 and takes aim at the rumor that the book was ghostwritten by Heikal, instead arguing that the impetus for *The Philosophy* came from Nasser's earlier experiences among the Free Officers in the late 1940s.[19] Laurie Brand's *Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria* from 2014[20] also cites 1953 as the publication date, whereas a number of authors reference 1954, including earlier works from the 1960s and 70s, such as Anouar Abdel-Malek's *Egypt: Military Society* and Tarek Y. Ismael's *The UAR in Africa*, and more recent scholarship both on Egypt, such as Said K. Aburish's *Nasser: The Last Arab* and Mohammed El-Shahed's dissertation *Revolutionary Modernism*, as well as international histories of the Third World, like Vijay Prashad's *Darker Nations* and Jeffrey Byrne's *Mecca of Revolution*. One of the citations for the 1953 date comes from Baha Abu-Laban's article in 1967, where in a footnote he writes that *The Philosophy* was initially published in 1953 as a "modest pamphlet", though this claim has no corroborating evidence.[21] The most in-depth study of *The*

[18] Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992). In the 2012 *Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation,* Gordon again lists 1954 as the publication date though the bibliography cites the 1955 *Egyptian Liberation* edition on page 34.
[19] Reem Abou-El-Fadl, "Early pan-Arabism in Egypt's July revolution: The Free Officers' political formation and policy-making, 1946–54," *Nations and Nationalism* (21. 2. 2015), 294 and *Foreign Policy as Nation Making: Turkey and Egypt in the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2019), 107, 111-112. The claim of that *The Philosophy* was ghostwritten by Heikal is also questioned in Ghada Hashem Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali* (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 2007), 341.
[20] Laurie Brand, *Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2014), 34-5.
[21] Baha Abu-Laban, "The National Character in the Egyptian Revolution", *The Journal of Developing Areas* (1. 2. January 1967), 184. This claim is also repeated in Richard Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics* (NYC: SUNY Press, 1971), 100.

Philosophy is M. Karen Walker's article, "Analyzing Nasser's *Philosophy of the Revolution* as a Constitutive Text" published in May 2011. Walker writes that "Nasser began writing the Philosophy in 1953, publishing it in September 1954. The Public Affairs Press of Washington, D.C. released an English translation in March, 1955." She mentions briefly some of the initial coverage, and writes that "more compilation than narrative thread, the *Philosophy* is culled from newspaper articles, drafts of Nasser's speeches and extracts from Nasser's notebooks; Nasser's confidant and diarist Hassanein Heikal aided in the production process."[22] While Walker's analysis offers more depth, a number of details are still hazy, including which publication house initially released the book, how it was first formatted, and how did it eventually come to the attention of Public Affairs Press. This level of detail may seem fastidious, but without considerations of how the book was published, scholars have used multiple editions regardless of their historical or editorial differences as demonstrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Frequency of Citations for Four Most Commonly Cited Editions of The Philosophy of the Revolution (Data from Google Scholar)



While the myriad editions underscore *The Philosophy*'s popularity, and the slippage in edition citation does not undermine existing scholarship, this brief investigation helps elucidate how the

[22] Karen M. Walker, "Analyzing Nasser's Philosophy of the Revolution as a Constitutive Text," (May 2011), 3-4 http:www.rhetoric.info.nasser-philosophy.pdf

publication came to be both so prominent, while remaining under-historicized. However, I also believe that this lack of attention to the publication history of work like *The Philosophy* has influenced our understanding of Nasser's regime, and its use of mass news and information media. From the early days of the revolution, Nasser and his fellow Free Officers deployed information as a tool, utilizing both secrets and censorship, as well as close relationships with key journalists and state publications, to shape the narrative of the revolution. While the details surrounding *The Philosophy* are murky in part because the passage of time, I also believe that this haziness is one of the legacies of state information institutions that often-erased individual effort in favor of presenting the revolution as a unified front that was both inevitable and idealized. Yoav Di-Capua illustrates this point in *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past* when after Naguib's ouster in February 1954, Nasser and Saleh Salem erased all of his recorded speeches, including any tapes mentioning him. For Di-Capua, "this event was not an anomaly. In the months and years following the revolution, an enormous project of orchestrated amnesia took place. Everything from films and books to statues was treated in accordance to this harsh code of erasure and elimination."[23] Though closer attention to the various editions of *The Philosophy* would help resolve some of this citational confusion, ultimately uncovering the details around this book, and the larger state institutions that produced it, is crucial for making visible the legacies of the Nasserist era.

So how was The Philosophy published?

The previous Dean of the American University in Cairo and future American ambassador to Egypt, John Badeau stated in his January 1955 review that *The Philosophy* "was originally published in Arabic about eighteen months ago"*,* suggesting a publication date sometime during the summer of

[23] Yoav Di-Capua, *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009), 261.

1953. In 1955, A. J. M. Craig wrote an *International Affairs* review offering additional clues, describing *The Philosophy* as initially "a collection of three articles written for an Egyptian illustrated magazine". Craig goes on to disparage the lackluster translation, but describes how the transformation from articles to books shaped its final form.[24] In a much more favorable review, Halford L. Hoskins describes *The Philosophy* "as a collection of personal jottings originally not intended for publication", though he sees the book as valuable window into Nasser's thoughts.[25] Finding reviews of the book published in Egypt is difficult since by 1955 it had already become canonical in the regime's rhetoric.[26] One of the first advertisements for the book was in the state owned newspaper *Al-Gumhuriyya* on July 22, 1954 in the section "World of Books, Philosophy of Books." While sharing excerpts from the book, the one-page advertisement contains no information about its initial creation.[27] The most detailed description of the book's publication that I have discover so far is in Robert St. John's *The boss: the story of Gamal Abdel Nasser.* St. John describes Nasser and Heikal collaborating on *The Philosophy* in 1953, which began "as a series of three articles in the magazine." Which magazine is never clarified, but regardless St. John claims that after writing the first article, Heikal rewrote both that version, and then the second and third were produced from a series of discussions were Nasser talked and Heikal took notes. Apparently, their talks took "many hours, night after night", once Nasser approved the final results they were reprinted in 1954 by the Liberation Rally, the primary political party at the time.[28]

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[24] A. J. M. Craig, "Review *Egypt's Liberation*," *International Affairs* (31. 4. October 1955), 530.
[25] Halford L. Hoskins, "Review *Egypt's Liberation*," *The Western Political Quarterly* (9. 1. March 1956), 196-197.
[26] For example, see President Gamal Abdel Nasser's speech at the reception of the winners of the book "Philosophy of Revolution" and "Constitution of Tomorrow" (27 March 1955) *Bibliotheca Alexandrina Gamal Abdel Nasser Archive* (Hereafter *Nasser Archive*) http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=326&lang=ar .
[27] "Dunya al Kutub, Filasafat al Kutub" *Al Gumhuriyya* (July 22 1954) *Nasser Archive.* http://nasser.bibalex.org/common/mapviewer.aspx?ID=6855&type=PressArchive&PDFStart=-9&lang=en&PDFEnd=0&dir=next
[28] Robert St. John, *The boss: the story of Gamal Abdel Nasser* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), 193.

St. John's account offers the most concrete details, but verifying them remains difficult. The only reference that I have discovered so far is in the diplomatic cables from the American Embassy in Cairo. In a memo from January 20 1954, Jefferson Caffery writes about the "Philosophy of The Revolution (Part III)", which he describes as a series of articles published in the weekly magazine *Akhir Sa'a*. Caffrey writes that "although the article is signed by Gamal Abd Al Nasir, its authorship would be more accurately reflected by attributing it to Gamal Abd Al Nasir "as told to" Muhammad Hassanein Heikal", who was Editor of the magazine until 1956. Caffery ends the memo with the promise to send the other two parts translated back to Washington.[29] Unfortunately, neither of those initial translations could be located in the embassy archives at the National Archives. Furthermore, attempts to track down the initial copies of *Akhir Sa'a* have been so far unsuccessful, as the only library with copies of the magazine for those dates in North America is the Library of Congress, but as of spring 2019 the archivists have been unable to locate the relevant microfilm.[30]

Nonetheless, weaving these fragments together starts to provide an initial narrative. *The Philosophy* was likely written in the summer of 1953, and then published as a serial in *Akhir Sa'a*. Heikal clearly helped with the publication, though evaluating the degree of his involvement remains difficult. St. John recounts Heikal discussing the book with an American correspondent, who querying if Heikal had read *The Philosophy* and received the reply, "Read it? Yes, I've read it, my friend. In fact, I wrote it."[31] Yet in Fawaz Gerges' recently published *Making the Arab World: Nasser,*

[29] Jefferson Caffery, "PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION," January 20 1954. RG 84 Cairo Gen Recs 1953-1961 Box 2 1953-1955 350 Egypt. National Archives and Records Administration (Hereafter NARA)

[30] The only library that I have been able to locate that has the magazine for these dates is the French National Library, which has 1950-1956. To locate the magazine, I primarily searched WorldCat using variants of the title, including Akhir Sa'ah, Akhir Sa'a, Akher Saa, and آخر ساعة. As a brief overview, the current collections for *Akhir Sa'a* in North America includes Stanford 1959-61 and 1963-1997; University of Washington 1974-1985 and 1985-1991; Harvard 1963-1984; SOAS 19661-983; Yale 1991-2018; Cornell 1989-1994; UVA 1991-1992; Brown 1984; UCLA 1978-2019; University of Michigan 1947-1952 and 2002-2019; Washington University in St. Louis 1991-1994; Duke 1981-1985; Indiana has 1962-1979. However, given the varieties of Arabic transliteration and the improvements to library metadata, this search should not be seen as conclusive, but rather indicative of current holdings.

[31] St. John *The boss,* 94.

Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East, he writes that while interviewing Heikal he asked if he had authored *The Philosophy*. Heikal "recounted how they [Nasser and Heikal] had brainstormed about the philosophy of the revolution and the road ahead", but that "he only helped Nasser organize his thoughts and craft the narrative."[32] While determining exact authorship is impossible, the first version of *The Philosophy* was likely released in September 1954 by the government-operated Dar al Ma'arif publication house under the auspices of the Liberation Rally.[33]

The exact trajectory from this first edition to the eventual English translation remains murky, although the most likely conduits were the Arabists in the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency. In *America's Greatest Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East*, Hugh Wilford provides extensive details on the rise of American Arabists like Kermit Roosevelt and Miles Copeland, who wielded enormous influence in American foreign policy in the Middle East from the late interwar period into the 1960s. In particular, Wilford discusses the links between these Arabists and the Free Officers, as well as the American Friends of the Middle East (AFME), an organization founded in 1951 dedicated to countering Zionist propaganda within the United States. While the CIA's funding and support for AFME would eventually undermine its mission, the initial organization benefited from the reputation of one its leaders, Dorothy Thompson, a renowned American journalist.[34] Thompson was also important in the history of *The Philosophy* since her introduction was appended to the first English translation of the book published by Public Affairs Press, and it was her idea to change the title to *Egypt's Liberation.*[35] Wilford argues that this publication was one of the most successful endeavors of the AFME and Project Alpha, one of what

[32] Fawaz Gerges, *Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2018), 79.
[33] The majority of the archival material consulted for this project concerns post-1958, and thus, future research in diplomatic archives will likely provide some further insights on this point.
[34] Hugh Wilford, *America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (NYC: Basic Books, 2013), 118-120, 130-31.
[35] St. John *The boss*, 194.

would eventually become many ill-fated American and British initiatives to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Arab world. A large part of AFME's involvement in Project Alpha were its efforts to counter negative coverage in the American press of Arab countries and especially of Nasser and Egypt, resulting in not only the publishing of *The Philosophy* in April 1955, but also Nasser's cover story in *Time Magazine* on September 26 1955.[36]

American support for the Free Officers also included assistance for the expansion of Egyptian State Broadcasting (ESB). In *The Failure of American and British Propaganda*, James Vaughan recounts how initially the British were able to control Egyptian broadcasts through the management of the ESB by the British Marconi Company. However, this access was revoked in 1947 in response to British attempts to prevent the Arab League in Cairo from broadcasting. After the revolution, given the close relations between the Free Officers and the Arabists, the State Department established the "Cairo Packaging Center", and between 1953 and 1955, "this center furnished as much as half of all the foreign language material broadcast by ESB". Indeed, Vaughan describes how Miles Copeland boasted about providing the majority of equipment for Radio Cairo, which would eventually become one of the most powerful broadcasting infrastructures in the world after the United States and the Soviet Union.[37] Vaughan notes the irony of this statement since by the end of 1955, Radio Cairo would increasingly attack the United States as one of the loci of international imperialism. Indeed, the publishing of *The Philosophy* likely represented one of the last collaborations between the Free Officers and the Arabists, who in the wake of American ire over the Egyptian-Czech arms deal in the summer of 1955 were increasingly sidelined in American foreign policy making. Yet *The Philosophy* would increasingly come to occupy a position of privilege in the Egyptian

[36] Wilford, *America's Greatest Game*, 181-184; and "Cover Page," *Time Magazine* (September 26 1955) *Nasser Archive*. http://nasser.bibalex.org/common/mapviewer.aspx?ID=8&type=Magazines&PDFStart=-9&lang=en&PDFEnd=0&dir=next

[37] James Vaughan, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945–1957: Unconquerable Minds*. (NYC: Springer, 2005), 38-39.

regime, eventually becoming "the bible of the Nasser revolution" with over a million copies distributed both within Egypt and internationally the end of 1959.[38]

This chapter began with an exploration of *The Philosophy* to elucidate how historians have engaged with this publication, but also to underscore the difficulties in recovering details from or about the larger postcolonial state institutions that produced the book. This investigation provides a brief foray into the larger question of this dissertation - namely how did Nasser and his coterie conceive of their efforts as *controlling communications* both domestically and internationally. In the following chapters, I contextualize *The Philosophy* as part of an expansive undertaking to counter foreign media narratives about Nasser and Egypt, and to eventually spread Cairo's message across the globe. This enterprise included the Egyptian Broadcasting Services' infamous Radio Cairo, as well as lesser known book series, periodicals, and pamphlets.[39] Focusing on these materials and thus the perspective from Cairo, I argue that the rise of this new mass information regime was intertwined with the emergence of international anti-colonialism. However, excavating this history requires engaging with recent historiographical shifts. This project is only possible with the recent turns in historical praxis that have brought to the fore new analytical lens (book history, development and modernization, global history) and reinvigorated existing ones (diplomatic and foreign relations, intellectual, and media history). This next section traces the development of these subfields, and how they have helped shape my research.

Situating Egypt in the New Information and International Historiographies

Relative to other Middle East and North African countries, Egypt, and the Nasser period in particular, has received significant scholarly attention. Much of this earlier work from the 1950s and

[38] St. John *The boss*, 194.
[39] While the broadcasts from Radio Cairo were not archived, many of them were summarized and repackaged for print media.

1960s examined the biography of Nasser and his peers, as well as their ideas of Arab socialism, revolution, and regional unity.[40] Malcolm Kerr's work on the Arab Cold War in 1971 marked a new focus on Arab regional affairs, and the Sadat era with its emphasis on de-Nasserization and economic privatization shifted the scholarship towards studies of political economy.[41] The Mubarak era resulted in a new openness to examine Nasser, and many of the works from this era rely on oral history interviews with key figures from the Free Officers.[42] Since the late 1990s, historians have increasingly examined the narratives, meanings, and memories surrounding Nasser and Nasserism - the term for the mix of ideology and personality cult that emerged during his regime. This shift has spawned a number of biographies of Nasser, and reinvigorated studies of pan-Arabism.[43] The advent of the cultural and social turns in the 1970s and 80s produced a growing emphasis on non-elite Egyptians, and a new focus on Egyptian mass media.[44] While some of this work is focused on explicating the influence of new media on Egyptian society, especially after the 2011 revolution[45],

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[40] Jean Lacoutre, *Egypt in Transition*. (New York, Criterion Books. 1958); Wilton Wynn, *Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity*. (Cambridge, MA: Arlington Books, 1959); Keith Wheelock, *Nasser's New Egypt; a Critical Analysis*. (New York: Praeger, 1960); Malcolm H. Kerr, *Egypt under Nasser*. (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1963); Peter Mansfield, *Nasser's Egypt*. (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1965); P J. Vatikotis, *Egypt Since the Revolution*. (New York, Praeger, 1968); Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography*. (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1971); Anthony Nutting, *Nasser*. (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972).

[41] Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and his rivals, 1958-1970*. (London: Oxford UP. 1971); Raymond William Baker, *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1978); John Waterbury, *Egypt: Burdens of the Past, Options for the Future*. (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1978); John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes*. (New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1983); Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of the Authoritarian-Modernizing State*. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985).

[42] Anthony McDermott, *Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution* (London: Croom Helm, 1988); Ismael Hoseein-zadeh, *Soviet Non-Capitalist Development: The Case of Nasser's Egypt* (New York: Praeger, 1989); Israel Gershoni, *The Emergence of Pan-Arabism in Egypt* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv UP, 1984).

[43] Peter Woodward, *Nasser* (London: Longman, 1992); Anne Alexander, *Nasser: His Life and Times* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2005); Laura M. James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003); James P. Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Ripener Publishers, 2001); Elie Podeh, *The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of United Arab Republic* (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 1999).

[44] See Joel Beinin, *Was the Red flag flying there? Marxist politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict in Egypt and Israel, 1948-1965*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Samah Selim, *The Novel and the Rural Imaginary in Egypt, 1880-1985* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004); Michael Gasper, *The Power of Representation: Publics, Peasants and Islam in Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Zachary Lockman, "Imagining the Working Class: Culture, Nationalism, and Class Formation in Egypt, 1899–1914," *Poetics Today* 15 (1994), 157-190.

[45] Abdalla F. Hassan, *Media, Revolution and Politics in Egypt: The Story of an Uprising* (Bloomsbury, 2015)

there is also a rich scholarship on the rise of mass media during the Nasser and Sadat eras. Drawing from television, film, and sound studies, these scholars explore how these mediums were sites for building new political subjectivities and Egyptian statehood.[46] However, these histories tend to be concerned more with questions of socio-political impact, and thus only briefly examine the infrastructures that produced these new platforms, often referencing the foundational studies of the Arab and Egyptian press and broadcasting from the 1970s and 80s.

Two of the most cited works are William Rugh's *Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics* from 1979 and Douglas Boyd's *Broadcasting in the Arab World* from 1982. Respectively, these books represent the two most common approaches in Communication Studies of the region, that is either a focus on the history of freedom of the press and journalism, or on the rise of communications and broadcasting. The former is largely comprised of journalists exploring the evolution of press freedoms and regulations within postcolonial Arab states, as well as the creation of 'professional' journalism[47]. The latter is dominated by communication scholars interested in the rise of Al Jazeera and Arab satellite broadcasting, as well as exploring issues of international communications regulation and analyses of content flows.[48] While most of these works discuss the longer histories of these phenomena, they do so briefly as a means of explicating the present problems in the region. Exceptions to this trend include Ghada Hashem Talhami's work on the Egyptian press and Palestine, Sonia Dabbous' chapter on the history of Egyptian press under

[46]Joel Gordon, *Revolutionary Melodrama: Popular Film and Civic Identity in Nasser's Egypt* (Chicago UP: 2002) and Lila Abu-Lughod, *Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt* (Chicago: UP Chicago, 2005). More recently see Andrew Simon, "Censuring Sounds: Tapes, Taste, and the Creation of Egyptian Culture," *The International Journal of Middle East Studies* (51. 2. May 2019), 233-256.

[47] For example, see Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), famous Egyptian journalist Awatif Abd al-Rahman's multiple books, including *Humum al-Sahafah wa al-Sahafiyeen fi Misr* [The Concerns of the Press and Journalists in Egypt] (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1995) and *Dirasaat fi al-Sahafah al-Misriyyah al-Muasirah* [Studies in Modern Egyptian Journalism] (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al Arabi, 1985), and Mohamed El-Bendary, *The Egyptian Press and Coverage of Local and International Events* (Lexington Books, 2010).

[48] For example, see Omair Anas, "The Changing Profile of Media in the Arab State," *Global Media Journal* Arabian Edition Vol. 2, Nos. 1-2, (Fall/Spring 2012-2013), 28-46, Marwan M. Kraidy, "Arab Satellite Television Between Regionalization and Globalization," *Global Media Journal, 1* (1) (2002), and Tourya Guaaybess, *a New Order of Information in the Arab Broadcasting System* (European University Institute, 2002).

Nasser, and Mohammad I. Ayish's research on Arab communication studies.[49] These authors posit their work against Rugh and Boyd, arguing that this earlier research imposed a Western-centric normative assessment of the Arab press, drawing from Media and Postcolonial Studies. While most famously theorized by Edward Said, more recently in *Arab Cultural Studies* Tarek Sabry and Walter Armbrust call for media histories of the Arab world that move beyond narratives of Western impositions towards more nuanced accounts of the entanglements between differing conceptions of modern, modernity, modernization, and modernism.[50] Such a perspective has been influential in my project, helping trace Egyptian officials that, while reading Western media theorists, were also deeply influenced by the lessons of Egyptian decolonization and the struggles to build an information regime in Cairo.

While historians have largely internalized these cultural and postcolonial turns for studying the press and media in the region, recent obstacles to archival research in Egypt have made studying the Nasser period increasingly difficult.[51] Conversely, the subfields of Ottoman and colonial history have seen an outpouring of scholarship on the press broadly defined, with new work exploring the intersections of law making and urban spaces, press networks and publishing technologies, and the emergence of new political communities and global economies.[52] For example, Elizabeth M. Holt's

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[49] Ghada Hashem Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From al-Ahram to al-Ahali*, (Lexington Books, 2007), Noha Mellor, *The Making of Arab News* (Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), and Mohammad I. Ayish, "Communication Studies in The Arab World," *The International History of Communication Study* Edited by Peter Simonson, David W. Park (New York: Routledge, 2015) and "Arab State Broadcasting Systems in Transition: The Promise of the Public Service Broadcasting Model," *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication* 3 (2010), 9–25.

[50] Tarik Sabry, "Introduction: Arab Cultural Studies: Between 'Reterritorialisation' and 'Deterritorialisation'," in *Arab Cultural Studies: Mapping the Field* edited by Tarik Sabry (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 1-32, and Walter Armbrust "History in Arab Media Studies" in the same volume pages 32-55 and "A History of New Media in the Arab Middle East," *Journal for Cultural Research* Volume 16 Number 2–3 (April–July 2012).

[51] Yoav Di-Capua makes this argument, writing "somewhat curiously, most studies conclude at the beginning of World War II while others resume the history after the 1967 war" in *No Exit*: *Arab Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre & Decolonization*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018), 16. See also *Arabic Thought against the Authoritarian Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Present* by Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss (eds.) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018), 6.

[52] For example, see Will Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality: Europeans, Ottomans, and Egyptians in Alexandria* (Columbia UP, 2017); Matthew H. Ellis, *Desert Borderland: The Making of Modern Egypt and Libya* (Stanford UP, 2018); Joseph Ben Prestel, *Emotional Cities: Debates on Urban Change in Berlin and Cairo, 1860-1910* (Oxford UP, 2017).

Fictitious Capital: Silk, Cotton, and the Rise of the Arabic Novel weaves together the rise of serialized novels in the region with shifts in international economic order and new practices of financial capital in the late Ottoman era. Her work is part of a larger rise of studies of the *Nahda*, or renaissance era, of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss' recent edited volume on the intellectual history of the *Nahda,* Alon Tam's recent dissertation on Cairo Coffeehouses, Arthur Asseraf's recent book on Algeria and the rise of news media, and Ziad Fahmy's book and articles on Egyptian mass media and what he terms 'media-capitalism' in the early twentieth century.[53] Indeed, this turn towards the press and publication histories in studies of this era is exemplified in a recent anthology edited by Anthony Gorman and Didier Monciaud, with chapters covering news publishing from the Ottoman financial crises of the 1870s to the Palestinian press in the interwar period, as well as the rise of journalist and dissident networks from the Young Turks to Tunisian anti-fascists in the 1930s.[54] This recent scholarly attention is part of a larger turn of renewed interest in book and periodical history.[55] While largely situated within English and Media Studies, Kathryn Schwartz details the rise of this new analytic of 'book history' in Middle Eastern studies, with its initial origin in histories of Medieval Europe, and how this new lens has inspired recent scholarship, including a growing number of digital humanities projects.[56]

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[53] *Arabic Thought beyond the Liberal Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Nahda,* eds. Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Alon Tam, "Cairo's Coffeehouses in The Late Nineteenth- And Early Twentieth-Centuries: An Urban and Socio-Political History" (2018). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2908; Arthur Asseraf, *Electric News in Colonial Algeria* (Oxford UP, 2019); and Ziad Fahmy, "Media Capitalism: Colloquial Mass Culture and Nationalism in Egypt, 1908-1918," *The International Journal of Middle East Studies* (42. 1. 2010), 83-103 and *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture* (Stanford UP, 2011).

[54] *The Press in the Middle East and North Africa, 1850-1950*. Edited by Anthony Gorman and Didier Monciaud (Edinburgh UP, 2018). The editors describe their volume as investigating the press as "not only a medium of representation that society produces *of* itself but also of what a society produces *for* itself" and particularly interested in the rise of nationalist movements and the end of the Ottoman empire and the press as a site for debates over political community.

[55] For example, see Aaron Rock-Singer, *Practicing Islam in Egypt: Print Media and Islamic Revival* (Cambridge University Press, 2019)

[56] Kathryn A. Schwartz, "Book History, print, and the Middle East," *History Compass* (15. 12. December 2017). For examples of this turn see Maya Kesrouany, *Prophetic Translation: The Making of Modern Egyptian Literature* (Edinburgh UP, 2018); J.R. Osborn, *Letters of Light: Arabic Script in Calligraphy, Print, and Digital Design* (Harvard, 2017); *The Digital Humanities and Islamic & Middle East Studies* Edited by Elias Muhanna (Walter de Gruyter, 2016).

While few scholars have adopted this approach to study the Nasser era, one exception is Elizabeth M. Holt's other recent work on *Hiwar,* a periodical published by the CIA-funded Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) as an attempt to counter the rising "Bandung spirit" in Cairo.[57] In many ways, Holt adopts a similar methodology to this project, but details the flip side of this story - how the American CCF tried to use periodicals to infiltrate Cairo, and through the city, the larger Afro-Asian movement. Holt's work builds on a larger scholarship on Western propaganda and public diplomacy initiatives in the region.[58] Hugh Wilford and James Vaughan's research was mentioned in the introduction, but recent work also includes Sonke Kunkel's research on visual media in US public diplomacy, Jason C. Parker's study of US public diplomacy to the Third World, Robert Rakove's book on the American response to the Non-Aligned Movement, and Philip Muehlenbeck's work on JFK and LBJ's policies towards the decolonizing African continent.[59] All these works engage to various degrees with media as a tool for state policy, but with the exception of Holt's research, almost all of these are written exclusively from the Western perspective. Nonetheless, this research is critical for contextualizing this broader global contest over information flows and the meaning of the Third World.

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[57] Elizabeth M. Holt, "Cold War in the Arabic Press: *Hiwar* (Beirut, 1962-67) and the Congress for Cultural Freedom," *Campaigning Culture and the Global Cold War: The Journals and Networks of Congress for Cultural Freedom.* Edited by Charlotte Lerg and Giles Scott-Smith (New York: Palgrave, 2017) and "Cairo and the Cultural Cold War for Afro-Asia," *Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties*. Edited by Chian Jen, Martin Klimke, Masha Kirasirova, Mary Nolan, Marilyn Young, and Joanna Waley-Cohen (New York: Routledge, 2018).

[58] One of the germinal works for this new public diplomacy history is Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), which itself builds off of previous histories into American Soft Power and ideologies, such as Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) and Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

[59] Jason C. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: US Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Sönke Kunkel, *Empire of Pictures: Global Media and the 1960s Remaking of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016); Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012); and Philip E. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders* (New York: Oxford UP, 2012). See also William A. Rugh, *Front Line Public Diplomacy: How US Embassies Communicate with Foreign Publics* (New York: Palgrave, 2014); Gregory M. Tomlin, *Murrow's Cold War: Public Diplomacy for the Kennedy Administration* (U of Nebraska Press, 2016); *Campaigning Culture and the Global Cold War: The Journals and Networks of Congress for Cultural Freedom*, Edited by Charlotte Lerg and Giles Scott-Smith (New York: Palgrave, 2017)

This research is part of the burgeoning US in the World field, which has been part of a larger historiographical shift - the rise of international history. Mentioned briefly in the introduction, international history has been in vogue since the 1990s, and within this framing there has been a number of related lenses from transnational to global, and subfields from Atlantic World to histories of Empire - each with its own particular constellation of heuristics. Perhaps unsurprising given the influence of this turn, scholars have critiqued its tendency to reproduce a 'world is flat' narrative. Richard Drayton and David Motadel's recent "Discussion: the futures of global history" provides a helpful summary of this current debate, which they locate with two prominent critiques.[60] First, from David Bell who in 2013 took aim at the rise of "network" and its attendant verbiage within the global history turn. Bell argues that while global historians have detailed how "'currents' flowed in multiple directions, and that 'networks' had multiple nodes", they have failed to provide any interpretation about the logics that produced these forces.[61] This theme was further articulated in Jeremy Adelman's "What is global history now?", where he questioned the value of histories of "connectedness" given the recent rise of nationalist movements.[62] While both these critiques are coming from within the house, as both Bell and Adelman have published in this field, Drayton and Motadel argue that the global lens is not antithetical to studying national histories. Perhaps tellingly these authors advocate not for 'pure' global history but rather a rediscovery of how "history at the scales of the local, 'national', regional, and global has been entangled with the very origins of human study of the past".[63] While this rejoinder might be more of an appropriation of Bell and Adelman's critique of global history than a riposte, Drayton and Motadel caution against treating these scales as

[60] Richard Drayton and David Motadel, "Discussion: the futures of global history," *Journal of Global History* 13, (2018), 1–21.
[61] David Bell, 'This is what happens when historians overuse the idea of the network', New Republic, 26 October 2013. https://newrepublic.com/article/114709/world-connecting-reviewed-historians-overuse-network-metaphor.
[62] Jeremy Adelman, 'What is global history now?', Aeon, 2 March 2017. https://aeon.co/essays/is-global-history-still-possible-or-has-it-had-its-moment.
[63] Drayton and Motadel "Discussion: the futures of global history," 3. See also Sebastian Conrad, *What is Global History?* (Princeton UP, 2016).

equal. Indeed, this debate might be distilled to both sides calling for more attention to the analytic and historical realities of power.[64]

Whether this debate produces a new era of 'global history' remains to be seen, but at the very least such an appeal for more attention to hierarchies of power points to the revitalization of the once marginal field of diplomatic history, which has long been focused on this question. As an alternative to the earlier nation state paradigm, the intertwining of diplomatic and international history has been especially prodigious for historians of the Cold War and decolonization. While the introduction mentioned the work of Matthew Connelly, another watershed publication for this field was Odd Arne Westad's *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* published in 2007. In many ways these two monographs have become the pillars of this new scholarship, with Connelly as the flag bearer for "taking off" the Cold War lens, whereas Westad advocates for its relevance as an analytical and historical category. Regardless, both authors make the case for exploring this history not solely in Washington or Moscow, but in the decolonizing world.[65] Historians have headed this call, producing a number of anthologies and books that explore these intersections, drawing new regional and geographic clusters and complicating periodizations of these processes.[66] This project certainly adopts such an approach, exploring how the locality of Cairo

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[64] For more on the analytic of power, see Paul A. Kramer, "Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World," *The American Historical Review* Vol. 116, No. 5 (December 2011), 1348-1391.

[65] From Matthew Connelly, see *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), and "Taking Off the Cold War Lens," *American Historical Review* 105 (June 2000), 739–69. From Odd Arne Westad, see *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); "The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, vol. 1, Origins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and *The Cold War: A World History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017).

[66] *The Cold War in the Third World,* Edited by Robert J. McMahon. (New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2013) and *The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East: Crucial Periods and Turning Points*, Ed. Lorenz M. Luthi. (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015); *The Middle East and the Cold War: Between Security and Development*, Ed. by Massimiliano Trentin. (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012); Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (UNC Press, 2015); Renata Keller, *Mexico's Cold War: Cuba, the United States, and the Legacy of the Mexican Revolution* (Cambridge UP, 2015); Gregg A. Brazinsky, *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2017); and Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* (New York, 2012).

intersected with national, regional, and international forces of the Cold War, while also emphasizing the limitations of this global Third World moment due to these power dynamics.

As part of this new Cold War history, scholars have increasingly examined how the conflict was also one between competing ideologies of modernity and modernization theories. Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela's recently published edited collection *The Development Century: A Global History* provides a useful overview of the field, beginning in the 1990s with germinal works such as Timothy Mitchell's *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* and James C. Scott's *Seeing Like A State*.[67] Their volume describes how scholars have complicated the categories of development and modernization through a myriad of angles, including historicizing its roots in earlier imperial imaginings[68], tracing the links between postwar nation state expansion and the rise of social science[69], and detailing the tensions between the ideology of modernization and the limitations of development projects[70]. Increasingly, historians have detailed how Cold War competition over modernization was mediated through the emerging Third World, with nationalist leaders and local officials often leveraging these discourses to legitimize their agendas.[71] Building from Mitchell's

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[67] See Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, eds. *The Development Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) On page 5 of their introduction they describe the "pioneering critiques of development discourse by social scientists such as James C. Scott, Arturo Escobar, Timothy Mitchell, and Frédérique Apffel-Marglin" as the foundation for later work by Frederick Cooper, Nick Cullather, and many others. Their introduction has extensive footnotes and outlines the larger historiographical trends in the field. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) and Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

[68] For examples, see Helen Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). Also, Amanda Kay McVety, "Wealth and Nations The Origins of International Development Assistance" in Macekura and Manela, eds. *The Development Century*.

[69] For example, see Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000) and *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War,* ed. Gabrielle Hecht (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2011).

[70] Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); David Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); and Timothy Nunan, *Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[71] David C. Engerman, *The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2018); Gregory Mann *From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel* (Cambridge UP, 2015); and Luise White, *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

pioneering work, historians of development and modernization in the Middle East have increasingly explored both the longer Ottoman and colonial legacies of modernization, as well as the modernizing ideologies of Arab economists and politicians, moving beyond one way transmission histories.[72] For example, in *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt*, Omnia El Shakry details the history of social sciences in Egypt, tracing the creation of social knowledge from the late 19th century to the early Nasser period around ideas of population control and social welfare. She argues that these Egyptian modernization theorists and social scientists, while aware of European social science, were also "self-consciously" focused on local circumstances and the inability of the European enlightenment model to work in the colonial and postcolonial state. Studies of modernization in the Middle East continues to inspire new research in environmental history, as well as reinvigorating studies of political economy and intellectual history.[73] Furthermore, this modernization lens has produced a new focus on international institutions, such as the UN, as a site for these competing discourses around modernization, human rights, and state sovereignty.[74]

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[72] Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018); Nicholas Danforth, "Malleable Modernity: Rethinking the Role of Ideology in American Policy, Aid Programs, and Propaganda in Fifties' Turkey," *Diplomatic History* 39, no. 3 (2015), 477–503; Perin E. Gürel, *The Limits of Westernization: A Cultural History of America In Turkey* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); and Nathan J. Citino, "The Ottoman Legacy in Cold War Modernization," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40, no. 4 (2008), 579–97; *Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and the Arab World*, ed. Karim Makdisi and Vijay Prashad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016); Nathan J. Citino, "Nasser, Hammarskjöld, and Middle East Development in Different Scales of Space and Time," in *The Development Century* ed. Erez Manela and Stephen Macekura; and Cyrus Schayegh, "1958 Reconsidered: State Formation and the Cold War in the Early Postcolonial Arab Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45, no. 3 (2013), 421–3.

[73] For examples of environmental histories, see Nancy Reynolds, "City of the High Dam: Aswan and the Promise of Postcolonialism in Egypt: City of the High Dam," *City & Society* 29. 1 (April 2017), 213-235; Alan Mikhail, ed., *Water on Sand*: *Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Toby Jones, *Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010). For examples of new intellectual history, see Max Weiss "Left Out: Notes from the Struggle over Middle East Intellectual History" *International Journal Middle East Studies* 51. 2 (March 2019), 1-4 and Omnia El Shakry, *The Arabic Freud*: *Psychoanalysis and Islam in Modern Egypt* (Princeton University Press, 2017).

[74] *Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World: The Pasts of the Present*, Edited by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton UP, 2019); Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Amy Sayward, *The United Nations in International History*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).

This project builds on this abundance of research, but also expands the current scholarly boundaries of modernization studies to include media and information history. Indeed, none of the chapters in Macekura and Manela's volume consider media or communications theory, even though many of the most famous "modernization mandarins" were also influential in these fields, crafting policies for the new postwar international communications order. While the latest international histories have started to re-examine the New International Economic Order in the 1970s, comparatively few studies exist on the coterminous proposals for a New World Information and Communication Order.[75] Consequently, there remains a gap in histories of decolonization around the intersection of modernization and media – a history that was also critical to the Third World project. One exception is James Brennan's work, which explores the impact of Cairo's radio transmissions on East Africa, as well as competition between American news agencies and UNESCO over controlling news flows.[76] Heidi Tworek's recent work on Germany and early twentieth century news competition also provides an additional model of how international and media history can be combined.[77] Historians are also turning to periodicals from this period to understand these larger revolutionary and anti-colonial movements, such as Anne Garland Mahler's book on the Tricontinental movement that analyzes the magazine of the same name, and Christopher M. Tinson's book on *Liberator* magazine and African American activists in the 1960s.[78]

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[75] For example, see Christy Thornton, "A Mexican International Economic Order? Tracing the Hidden Roots of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* (9. 3. 2018), 389-421, and Umut Özsu, "'In the Interests of Mankind as a Whole': Mohammed Bedjaoui's New International Economic Order," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* (6. 1. 2015), 129-143.

[76] James Brennan, "The Cold War battle over global news in East Africa: decolonization, the free flow of information and the media business, 1960-1980," *Journal of Global History* 10. 2 (2015), 333-356 and "Radio Cairo and the Decolonization of East Africa, 1953-1964" *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives* edited by Christopher Lee. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 173-195.

[77] Heidi Tworek, *News from Germany: The Competition to Control World Communications, 1900-1945* (Harvard University Press, spring 2019)

[78] Anne Garland Mahler, *From the Tricontinental to the Global South: Race, Radicalism, and Transnational Solidarity* (Duke UP, 2018) and Charles M. Tinson, *Radical Intellect: Liberator Magazine and Black Activism in the 1960s* (University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

Tinson's work builds on a rich subfield of US in the World that intertwines African Americans' activism, civil rights legislation, decolonization, and the Cold War.[79] Whereas Mahler's is part of the new histories of the Third World, including the studies of the Bandung Conference and its legacies, as well as research on neutralism and the Non-Aligned Movement.[80]

For historians of the Middle East, this new Cold War and international history perspective has helped move beyond a regional lens; utilizing multiple perspectives to help internationalize events like the Suez Crisis or the Yemeni civil war.[81] In addition to this internationalizing of the 'Arab Cold War', historians adopting this approach have also started to excavate the influence of the Middle East and North Africa on the Third World. For example, David Stenner's forthcoming book recounts the international dimensions of Moroccan anti-colonial activists, Paul Chamberlin's research details the global activism of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Jeffrey Byrne's recently published book zooms in on Algiers as a 'Mecca of Revolution' for the Third World.[82] Fundamentally, these works are part of a growing trend in the scholarship to examine larger international networks of activists, revolutionaries, and nationalists that were part of the Third World project. While relative to Algeria, there are fewer analyses of Egypt's role in the Third World, though recent work is starting to uncover this history.

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[79] For examples, see Penny von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY, 1997); Sean L. Malloy, *Out of Oakland: Black Panther Internationalism during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 2017); and Carol Anderson, *Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation, 1941-1960* (Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[80] For examples, see *Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties*. Edited by Chian Jen, Martin Klimke, Masha Kirasirova, Mary Nolan, Marilyn Young, and Joanna Waley-Cohen (New York: Routledge, 2018); *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?* edited by Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Janick Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss (Routledge, 2015); *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives* edited by Christopher Lee. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010); Guy Laron "Semi-peripheral countries and the invention of the 'Third World', 1955–65", *Third World Quarterly,* 35. 9 (2014), 1547-1565.

[81] Guy Laron, *Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization, 1945–1956* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press/Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013); Jesse Ferris *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); and Asher Orkaby *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68* (Oxford UP, 2017).

[82] Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization and the Third World Order* (New York, 2016); Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* (New York, 2012)

Part of this story has been woven into new urban and spatial histories of Cairo and Egypt. In particular, Nancy Reynolds' research on Aswan High Dam and Mohamed Elshahed's study of Egyptian modernist architecture explore some of the international elements of Arab socialism in Egypt.[83] Yoav Di-Capua's *No Exit: Arab Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Decolonization* adopts an international intellectual history framing to explore the same phenomenon, detailing the rise of Arab existentialism and their connections to the European left; in particular Sartre's 1967 visit to Egypt and then the impact of the Six Days War in cleaving the Arab and European left.[84] Historians of Egypt have studied the intellectual origins of Arab socialism and modernism, including earlier work by Roel Meijer on the Egyptian left and Rami Ginat on Lutfi al-Khuli, one of the most prominent Egyptian communists.[85] Increasingly, scholars have also utilized the Egyptian press as a source for exploring these ideas. Rami Ginat and Meir Noema analyze the 1940s periodical *Al-Fajr al-Jadid* and its role in spreading ideas of neutralism; a theme that Reem Abou-el-Fadl also explores in recent book and articles on Egyptian foreign policy.[86] Laura Nasser, Ewan Stein, and Ghada Hashem Talhami also use the Egyptian press to explore images and discourses around war, Israel, and Palestine respectively.[87] Lastly, Laura Bier traces the rise of anti-colonial feminism in *Bint al Nil* and

[83] Nancy Reynolds, "City of the High Dam: Aswan and the Promise of Postcolonialism in Egypt," *City & Society*, vol. 29, no. 1 (April 2017), 213-235 and Mohamed Elshahed, "Revolutionary Modernism? Architecture and the Politics of Transition in Egypt 1936-1967," Dissertation New York University January 2015. See also Gehan Selim, "Instituting order: the limitations of Nasser's post-colonial planning visions for Cairo in the case of the indigenous quarter of Bulaq (1952–1970)," *Planning Perspectives*, 29. 1 (2014), 67-89.

[84] Yoav Di- Capua, *No Exit: Arab Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Decolonization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018). Recent intellectual histories also include Meir Hatina and Christoph Schumann, *Arab Liberal Thought after 1967: Old Dilemmas, New Perceptions* (Springer, 2016) and Cemil Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2017).

[85] Roel Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity: Secular Liberal and Left-Wing Political Thought in Egypt, 1945–1958* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002) and Rami Ginat, *Egypt's incomplete revolution: Lutfi al-Khuli and Nasser's socialism in the 1960s.* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

[86] Rami Ginat and Meir Noema, "Al-Fajr al-Jadid: A Breeding Ground for the Emergence of Revolutionary Ideas in the Immediate Post-Second World War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44. 6. (2008), 867-893.

[87] Ewan Stein, *Representing Israel in Modern Egypt: Ideas, Intellectuals and Foreign Policy from Nasser to Mubarak* (I.B. Tauris, 2012); Laura James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); and Ghada Hashem Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From al-Ahram to al-Ahali* (Lexington Books, 2007).

Hawwa, while Mohammed Elshahed utilizes *Imara'* and *Bena' al-Watan* as a source of revolutionary modernism.[88]

Yet even with this focus on these sources, few of these scholars have explored the institutions that produced these publications, instead using them primarily as sources to uncover other aspects of Egyptian history. One exception is Menachem Klein's research into what he termed Egypt's revolutionary print culture, detailing the revolutionary state's influence on the publishing industry, though he largely focuses on the Arab world rather than the larger international efforts of Nasser's government.[89] Literary scholars have built on Klein's research to explore the legacies of this revolutionary publishing culture, including Richard Jaquemond's study on the decline of Egyptian literary dominance in the Arab World and Elizabeth Kendall's research into literary modernism in Egyptian magazines in the late 1960s and 70s.[90] Taking a more international perspective, Christopher Dwight Mickelwaith's 2010 dissertation explores similar questions to Kendall's work through a comparison of Third World modernisms in literary magazines from Mexico, Haiti, and Egypt, though he focuses on the first half of the twentieth century.[91] Laura Bier's work on revolutionary feminism in Egypt focuses on both the Nasser era and the impact of the Third World on state-sponsored feminism. Bier traces how 'the Egyptian woman' became a political project, intersecting with debates over nationhood, modernity, and state power. Often referred to as 'the

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[88] Elshahed "Revolutionary Modernism?" and Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood. Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2011).
[89] Menachem Klein, "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture, 1952-62", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 39:2, (2003), 149-178 and "Ikhtarna Laka (We Have Selected for You): A Critique of Egypt's Revolutionary Culture," *Orient* 38, no. 4 (1997), 677-691.
[90] Richard Jacquemond, *Conscience of the Nation: Writers, State, and Society in Modern Egypt*, trans. David Tresilian (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2007) and Elisabeth Kendall, *Literature, Journalism and the Avant-Garde: Intersection in Egypt*, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Literatures (New York: Routledge, 2006). See also Alan Lensink Master's Thesis "The Writers in The Alley: State Legitimacy and Literature in Nasser's Egypt, 1952-1967" (Dalhousie University, 2011) and Benjamin Geer "Prophets and Priests of the Nation: Naguib Mahfouz's Karnak Café and the 1967 Crisis in Egypt" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 41 (2009), 653–669 who built from this research to explore in particular Naguib Mahfouz's relationship with the Egyptian state.
[91] Christopher Dwight Micklethwait, "Faits Divers: National Culture and Modernism in Third World Literary Magazines" (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2011).

women question' Bier details how "feminists, policy makers, intellectuals, and others grappled with as they struggled to define a new notion of nationalist womanhood, as well as to the particular historical conditions that shaped those engagements."[92] To this end, Bier leverages a number of sources, but most relevant to my work is her research into the Egyptian women's press, which by the late 1950s had largely been confined to either sections in general magazines and newspapers, or to the magazine *Hawaa'* founded in 1957 under the auspices of Amina Sa'id. Using this magazine in particular Bier considers images and articles about the Third World and Egyptian women's transnational networks depicted a prescriptive and often contradictory vision of this "global sisterhood", often deploying stereotypes to emphasize the relative modern-ness of Egyptian women.[93]

Building from Bier's research, Reem Abou-El-Fadl's article from June 2019, explores the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference from 1957 in Cairo, and argues that "if Bandung was the moment of emergence for Egypt's Afro-Asian solidarity framework, then the Cairo Conference provided the opportunity for its enunciation".[94] Abou-El-Fadl raises similar questions to my project, from how "the line separating the state apparatus from the intellectuals under study here was blurred" to "the limits placed upon popular solidarity by a centralised state in the context of decolonisation", and positions her work as part of the new Bandung and Third World histories.[95] Furthermore, in the article, she discusses the creation of the African Affairs Bureau and its state-sponsored publication, *Renaissance of Africa* – a magazine intended to promote Cairo's leadership and views on African decolonization. However, Abou-El-Fadl does not adopt an intellectual or media history lens, and thus her focus is solely on Egyptian activities in Afro-Asian organizations. Similarly,

[92] Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood*, 15.
[93] Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood*, "Chapter 5 Our Sisters in Struggle: State Feminism and Third World Imaginaries"
[94] Reem Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub: Infrastructures of Solidarity and the 1957 Cairo Conference," *Journal of World History*, 30. 1-2 (June 2019), 188
[95] Reem Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub," 190.

while Laura Bier details the history of the women's press, she is primarily focused on the influence of *Hawwa'* and other Egyptian publications on Egyptian debates around 'the women question'. Consequently, the relationship of *Hawwa'* to other government-funded publications remains to be explored, or how the promotion of this 'global sisterhood' was also furthered in these magazines marketed to international anti-colonial audiences.

This project builds from these works, weaving together their intellectual frameworks and scholarly literatures as a foundation for studying the questions raised in the introduction. Yet perhaps the most influential scholarly shift on this research has been the rise of information history. Emerging in the last two decades from the fields of science and technology studies, information systems, and social knowledge histories, information history is in many ways a product of our current moment – the so-called *information age*. In "An Information History Decade: A Review of the Literature and Concepts, 2000–2009," Toni Weller outlines the central impetus for the field, writing that "information history is the study of information in the past, [… it] attempts to contextualize the themes of information dissemination, censorship, preservation, access, privacy, and so on within a broader historical discourse."[96] Weller posits this approach against history of the book, information technologies, library studies, and information sciences, arguing that information history is more expansive than these existing frameworks. Ultimately, Weller advocates for treating information as historically constructed, an approach that animates this dissertation.

Information history overlaps significantly with the recent 'public diplomacy' turn in the history of Cold War, which emerged as part of the 1990s international and cultural turns. Jason Parker describes studies of public diplomacy as studies of "covert operations, journalism, media productions, and Madison Avenue-style marketing. Some of these efforts appeared in the colors of

[96] Toni Weller, "An Information History Decade: A Review of the Literature and Concepts, 2000–2009", *Library & Information History*, 26:1 (2010), 83-84.

propaganda: black (disinformation, often disseminated by secret agents and bearing false or no attribution); white (official, attributed output in a journalistic vein); and gray (blurring lines and combining elements of the first two)."[97] While such a perspective informs my project, I believe that information as an analytical framework is better suited to my research since this lens enables a more broad view of this history beyond foreign relations. Building from public diplomacy's focus on state-led initiatives to influence public opinion, I trace how information in Cairo became implicated in Arab intellectual debates over post-colonialism, Egyptian institutional struggles over the role of the state, and international efforts to remake global news media flows. However, information history as a field has so far largely remained focused on the West, whereas recent work in public diplomacy has expanded geographically. Thus, this project contributes to furthering the geographic lens of information history, and bridging existing works on public diplomacy in the non-Western world.[98]

Yet adopting this new framework of information history also requires thinking through how the Western-centric focus of this field has influenced existing scholarly accounts of what constitutes 'information'. In the introduction to their recent edited volume, *Arabic Thought Against the Authoritarian Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Present*, Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss raise a similar critique of 'global' or 'international' history, arguing that this analytic has largely been developed through the prism of Western historiography and historians. Such perspectives often present Europe as the starting point of, sometimes unwittingly triumphalist, accounts of the 'global.' Hanssen and Weiss posit the question of how historians should of the Middle East adopt such a methodology when the region in question was at times opposed to these international processes and

[97] Jason C. Parker, "All the World's a Stage/From Confrontation to Conversation: The Historiography of Cold War Public Diplomacy" *Passport* (April 2016), 22.
[98] For examples, see George Roberts "Press, propaganda, and the German Democratic Republic's search for recognition in Tanzania, 1964-1972", in Philip E. Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva (eds), *Warsaw Pact Intervention: Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (London: IB Tauris, 2018), 148-72 and Frank Gerits, "'When the Bull Elephants Fight': Nkrumah, the Non-Aligned Movement and Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology (1957-1966)," *International History Review*, 37, no. 5 (October 2015), 951-969.

the existing historiography tends to treat the region as a recipient of global events. Indeed, they question whether, given the legacies of colonialism, "modern Arab intellectual history [will be] consigned to only ever amount to a derivative discourse [of those in the West]?"[99] This question is also applicable to information histories of the Middle East, and whether this field perpetuates these same teleologies, but with new branding for the twenty-first century. While these dangers exist, I argue that just as Arab intellectual history is once-again becoming popular, so too could information histories of the region. This new Arab intellectual history does not hermetically seal the region off from the rest of the world, but fundamentally embraces Dipesh Chakrabarty's call to "provincialize Europe", centering these histories in debates and individuals in the region.[100] To this end, the following chapters privilege Egyptian print media published from, and accounts of, the mass information regime as an entry point into how Nasser's regime conceived of 'information'. Treating these materials as both source and historical objects, I endeavor to place Cairo at the forefront of this international moment, triangulating Egyptian perceptions of information within broader global debates and intellectual currents.[101] Building from these historiographical debates, this final section considers some of the barriers to research in Egypt, which has shaped the existing scholarship. This section also ruminates on the possibilities of the international history turn, specifically given the rise of digital archives and computational methods.

[99] Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss "Introduction" *Arabic Thought against the Authoritarian Age*, 1
[100] Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, (Princeton University Press, 2000).
[101] Weller makes a similar point in her article, "An Information History Decade", writing that "Historians have been guilty of not seeing the wood for the trees. We use different types of 'information' all the time in our research in the form of documents, letters, diaries, archives, or newspapers, so we do not easily distance ourselves from these materials as information sources in order to think about information more conceptually. This helped contribute to the problem that, until the last decade, information has been perceived as not having its own history to explore.", 91.

Archives of Decolonization and Digital Archives

Though this chapter has uncovered some of the history surrounding *The Philosophy*'s publication, this story is far from complete. Omnia El Shakry zeroes in on the barriers to offering a more definitive account in her article "'History without Documents': The Vexed Archives of Decolonization in the Middle East". El Shakry describes how historians of the Middle East are facing a crisis of archives, as the combination of political instability and autocratic regimes in the region have made archival research increasingly hazardous. She goes further, to consider the specific problems around archives of decolonization, which remain sites of ongoing political contestations. She describes the counterintuitive ways in which the postcolonial state has made the colonial state more visible, while occluding "the precise nature of the political and social debates that went into the consolidation of regimes in the aftermath of decolonization." Indeed, her title "history without documents" was originally coined by the Egyptian Historian Ibrahim Abduh's in his description of writing histories of the Nasser period and Egyptian decolonization.[102] Since the publication of El Shakry's article in 2015, the situation in Egypt has become even more dire. In February 2016, the Egyptian security forces arrested and tortured to death Giulio Regeni, an Italian PhD student researching labor unions in Cairo. In the aftermath of his murder, research in Egypt has come to a standstill as the state continues to arrest foreign researchers and Egyptians, with the Middle East Studies Association warning against travel to the country as recently as spring 2019.

Facing limited access, historians have turned to archives outside of the region to help triangulate the Egyptian perspective. This dissertation utilizes this approach leveraging the observations of American and British embassy officials, as well as African Americans in Cairo to assist in uncovering this moment. Although these sources provide crucial insights, they are also

[102] Omnia El Shakry, "'History without Documents': The Vexed Archives of Decolonization in the Middle East" *American Historical Review* 120. 3 (June 2015), 922-24.

limited to the biases of these historical actors, which in the case of foreign embassies were acutely Orientalist. A potential alternative source into the Egyptian state perspective is examining materials similar to The Philosophy; that is the output of the Egyptian state information regime. Indeed, in "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture, 1952–62", Menachem Klein adopts this approach, exploring the impact of the Free Officers' revolution on book publishing within Egypt. While Klein is primarily focused on book publishing for the new Egyptian middle class, he does explore how the majority of these state published books were translations of Western materials, even though politically Egypt was increasingly oriented towards the socialist and anti-colonial world.[103] While Klein's insights are important for this project, his analysis also demonstrates the difficulty of exploring not just publication histories, but also publication content. His analysis of these Egyptian books, though astute, rarely delves into changing discourses or translations, instead discussing shifting cultural norms around reading and publishing. This dissertation adopts a similar method to examine the scale of periodical publishing, but also traces how the content within these publications was contingent and constructed.

This perspective is crucial for uncovering Egyptian discourses about the Third World. But the scale of this output, with multiple publications published over the decade, makes detailed comparisons difficult. To that end, this dissertation integrates an alternative and slightly experimental approach for confronting this problem - digital history methods. While the rise of digital humanities has been relatively meteoric, the adoption of this digital turn among historians in their scholarship remains mixed, especially relative to other humanities disciplines. In his essay "Digital History's Perpetual Future Tense" in *Debates in Digital Humanities*, Cameron Blevins explores the origins of this problem, but his diagnosis is sharp - "in terms of using technology specifically to advance academic claims about the past, digital history has largely overpromised and

[103] Menachem Klein, "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture, 1952–62."

underdelivered."[104] Given the decline of quantitative history in the 1970s, this state of affairs is not entirely unsurprising but when compared to historians' embrace of digital methods in their research practices the difference is stark. Today in most archives, historians are using a wide range of digital technology, from digital cameras to smartphones to flatbed scanners, to capture their archival finds.[105] Furthermore, historians are increasingly creating and utilizing databases of digitized archival sources in their research.

However, this embrace of digital methods for research is not without its drawbacks or dangers.[106] Indeed, in "The Transnational and the Text-Searchable: Digitized Sources and the Shadows They Cast", Lara Putnam argues that historians have under theorized the advent of "web-enabled digital search" since it "accelerates the kinds of information-gathering that historians were already doing, its integration into our practice has felt smooth rather than revolutionary."[107] For Putnam, these new platforms are transformative in their scale and speed, but also pose challenges to historical research, specifically around the topography of physical information which used to be clustered in state capitals but is increasingly in the cloud. With this unprecedented ease of access, Putnam questions how historians' knowledge production has changed as the rise of "side glances" into the archive becomes more common, rather than the sustained and contextual experience of extended periods in the archive.[108] While Putnam rightly calls out the dangers of this "drive-by transnationalism", where scholars 'parachute' into digital archives, this type of research practice is

[104] Cameron Blevins, "Digital History's Perpetual Future Tense", *Debates in Digital Humanities.* (University of Minnesota Press, 2016) http://dhdebates.gc.cuny.edu/debates/text/77
[105] For further analysis see, Abby Mullen, "Untangling the Mess: Researchers' Photo Practices" *Tropy Blog* (November 01, 2016) https://tropy.org/blog/untangling-the-mess-researchers-photo-practices/
[106] For an example of these dangers, see the recent news coverage of the errors in Naomi Wolf's latest book from her use of the Old Bailey Archive. Concepcion de Leon "After an On-Air Correction, Naomi Wolf Addresses Errors in Her New Book" *New York Times* (May 24, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/books/naomi-wolf-outrages.html.
[107] Lara Putnam, "The Transnational and the Text-Searchable: Digitized Sources and the Shadows They Cast" *The American Historical Review* 121. (2 April 2016), 379.
[108] Putnam, "The Transnational and the Text-Searchable," 384, 396.

neither inherent nor inevitable with digital archives. However, considering these potential pitfalls is imperative for assessing the use of digital history methods in this project.

I employ digital methods to confront the scale of the material generated by the Egyptian mass information regime and to place its publications at the center of this study. However, given the quasi-nationalization of the press in 1960, this publishing infrastructure comprises dozens of newspapers and magazines with a wide range of periodicities. Future iterations of this project will hopefully integrate this larger source base, but for the dissertation I have focused primarily on state-funded periodicals from key institutions. The majority of these magazines were multilingual and intended for audiences not solely in Egypt. Focusing on this more limited sample also provides the opportunity to compare these magazines to additional ones published from Afro-Asian institutions in Cairo, as well as ones from other Third World capitals and revolutionary movements.[109]

However, collecting and digitizing these materials remains difficult. Currently, most digital archival collections skew heavily towards Western publications, especially in materials published prior to 1923. Indeed, besides the somewhat controversial efforts of the Gamal Abdel Nasser Archive at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina, there exists only a few repositories containing digitized Arabic newspapers for this period.[110] To get around this obstacle, this project leverages a custom-built web application that I designed and developed, which takes archival photos and transforms them into machine readable datasets. While this level of effort to explore these publications might seem excessive, my argument that the cultural shifts in these periodicals were emblematic of shifting discourses in Cairo around the Third World requires methods that can provide both granularity and magnitude. Thus, this project adopts the established historical approach of closely reading selected articles and issues, but also adopts methods to model these discourses at various scales, which makes

[109] My current corpus contains 35 digitized publications in Arabic, English, and French, with a mixture of publication dates and place of origin. More details about the corpus and its creation will be provided in the appendix.
[110] For more on this controversy, see El Shakry "History Without Documents," 923.

visible the friction between Nasser's stated policies and the larger anti-colonial zeitgeist. To this end, this project utilizes a combination of natural language processing and machine learning to explore these discourses across pages, publications, and even publishers. Considering the experimental nature of these methods, this project uses these models as an additional line of evidence. This approach is fundamentally not invested in discovering a quantitative and objective reality in these sources, an approach that I would argue is antithetical to history. Rather, these models represent productive reductions of specific historical phenomena that help triangulate this history - especially given the crisis of archives in Egypt. Thus, eschewing *The History Manifesto*'s call for a "Big Data" approach to history, this project instead focuses on a circumscribed time period and questions, and seeks to integrate these newer methods within historical scholarly practices, rather than offer an ill-begotten attempt to revolutionize the field.

Returning to El Shakry's article, she ends by outlining the need for studies of these decolonizing states that trace "the new modes of governance, expertise, and social knowledge that defined the era of decolonization", and demands that "attention be paid to our archival imaginaries—the ways in which the intellectual traditions of the era of decolonization have been appropriated, remembered, or forgotten."[111] This dissertation builds from El Shakry's clarion call, exploring the creation of a new information regime in Cairo beginning in the Nasser era, and specifically its eventual orientation towards the emerging Third World. This project reconstitutes this history through a variety of methods and sources, with the aim of moving beyond current archival silences towards a more in depth understanding of the constitutive relationship between Egypt's revolution and the making of international anti-colonialism. Uncovering this history requires questioning the established narratives of Egyptian decolonization, while also confronting the scale of these efforts to circulate an Egyptian vision for the decolonizing world within the larger context of a

[111] El Shakry, "History Without Documents," 933-34.

contested international information order. Tracing the visions and limitations of this moment is imperative for rethinking anti-colonialism in Cairo during the 1950s and 60s, understanding the legacies of these internationalist politics into the 1970s and beyond, and uncovering the influence of this earlier anti-colonial media on our current international news media structures.

CHAPTER II

REVOLUTIONARY NEWS: THE EMERGENCE OF AN ANTI-COLONIAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAIRO

In histories of modern Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, also known as al-Rayyis (the Boss), casts an enormous shadow. When the revolution was first announced on the morning of July 23, 1952 few knew his name, and historians have detailed Nasser's ascendance over the course of the early 1950s, as he both jailed political opponents among the communists and Muslim Brotherhood, and also increasingly marginalized his fellow Free Officers. As al-Rayyis' power grew, so too did the state promotion of Nasserism - indelibly tying Nasser and the modern Egyptian nation together. Consequently, understanding the history of information in Egypt requires to some degree also studying Nasser. With a daily ritual of reading multiple newspapers and an early promoter of information as a "pillar of the revolution", Nasser was both the progenitor and proponent of the state's information regime.[112] Yet to ascribe the entirety of Cairo's information policies to Nasser obscures both the extent of these efforts and the battles between key figures in the government to shape the state's relationship to information. Historians have explored parts of this story through tracing the creation of the modern intelligence services under Zakaria Mohieddin or the mobilization of Arab intellectuals through the patronage of Yusuf al Sabai and Thawrat Ukasha. This dissertation expands on this work through exploring the life and influence of another Free Officer who was instrumental in the Egyptian information infrastructure, Dr. Mohammed Abdel Kader Hatem.

Described as part of the "outer rim" of the Free Officers, Hatem was born on September 3, 1918 in Alexandria, Egypt and raised in a moderately religious family that owned a successful flour

[112] Owen L. Sirrs. *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A history of the mukhabarat, 1910-2009*. (London : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 64.

business.[113] In his memoirs, Hatem describes attending Attarin primary school with both Gamal Abdel Nasser and Abdul Aziz Kamel, who in the 1960s would become Minister of Waqfs and then Deputy Prime Minister under Anwar Sadat.[114] Historians have explored how Alexandria in the 1920s and 30s was a growing metropolis with a cosmopolitan community including a large Greek population. However, recent scholarship has started to qualify the older narrative of Alexandria as a liberal and cosmopolitan enclave, detailing both the rise of European fascism in this period and nationalist tensions.[115] Indeed, Hatem's memoirs focus primarily on the injustices of growing up under the era of 'foreign concessions', describing shops run by foreigners, the privileging of European languages, and a policing system that treated Egyptians as second-class citizens. Hatem, along with Nasser, was inspired to join the nationalist youth demonstrations against the British after Prime Minister Isma'il Sidqi's suspension of the 1923 constitution.[116] The two budding nationalists also protested the visit of British Foreign Minister Samuel Hoare to the city, and Hatem was with Nasser when he was arrested at Manshiya Square.[117] Given their close ties, Hatem's involvement in the Free Officers is unsurprising, especially since Hatem graduated a year after Nasser from the Military Academy in 1938, one of the hotbeds for Egyptian nationalism.[118] Yet Hatem initially

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[113] Elie Podeh's *The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic* is one of the few monographs to mention Hatem. Other members of this outer rim included, "Tharwat 'Ukasha, Kamal Rifa't, 'Abbas Radwan, the brothers 'Ali and Zu al-Fiqar Sabri, Mahmud Riad, 'Abd al-Muhsim Abu al-Nur, Sidqi Sulayman, Mahmud Yunis, Amin Huwaydi, Sha'arawi Guma'a, Muhammad Fawzi, and 'Abd al-Wahhab Bishri.", 59. Both Podeh and Joel Gordon's biography of Nasser, *Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation* describe the shared social and political experiences between the Free Officers. For more about the initial makeup of the Free Officers, see also P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations?* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1961), 44-48, 224.

[114] Mohammed Abdel Kader Hatem and Ibrahim Abdel Aziz, *Mudhakkirāt 'Abd al-Qādir Ḥātim, ra'īs ḥukūmat ḥarb Uktūbir [Memoirs of Abdel Kader Hatem, Leader of the October War]* (Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-'Āmmah li-Quṣūr al-Thaqāfah, 2016), 51-54.

[115] See James Moore, "Between Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism: The Strange Death of Liberal Alexandria," *Journal of Urban History*. 38. 5 (August 2012) 879-900.

[116] For more on the protests see Malak Badrawi, *Isma'il Sidqi, 1875-1950: Pragmatism and Vision in Twentieth Century Egypt*. (Routledge, 2014), 63-65.

[117]While Hatem was with Nasser, he describes escaping the roundup of protesting students due to his much shorter stature than Nasser. Hatem, *Mudhakkirāt*, 51-54. In 1954, Nasser referenced his arrest in a speech at the same square, stating that event was a personal watershed for his commitment to Egyptian freedom and anti-colonialism. The speech and details of Nasser's childhood are from Hoda Abdel Nasser "A Historical Sketch of Gamal Abdel Nasser". *Bibliotheca Alexandrina Nasser Archive*. Retrieved 9 April 2019. http://nasser.bibalex.org/Common/pictures01-%20sira_en.htm#1

[118] Reem Abou-El-Fadl, *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, 102.

refused to join the group. Instead, he continued his studies, completing a Bachelors in Political Economy at the London School of Economics in 1947, and then a Masters in Political Science and a PhD in Information from Cairo University in 1954 and 1960, respectively.[119] Though not formally part of the Free Officers, Hatem anonymously published a series of articles in *Ruz al Yusuf* in the 1940s on a wide variety of topics, including the potential of the national Egyptian bank to counter the influence of foreign banks, for tourism to improve the national economy, and lastly, the concept of urbanizing parts of the desert to expand Cairo, which would later be implemented through the Tahrir Project.[120] He credits these articles with bringing him back to Nasser and the Free Officers' fold, especially since unlike many of the Free Officers Hatem was a self-described centrist and was not initially a supporter of nationalization, leading him to clash with the more socialist officers.[121] Hatem was also different in that he lived until the age of 97 in Cairo and recently passed away in 2015, and thus experienced both the heights of the revolutionary fervor of the 1950s and 60s, and then the ongoing and ambivalent legacies of Nasserism while serving under both Sadat and Mubarak.

On the first page of his memoirs[122] published posthumously in 2016, Hatem paraphrases both Ahmed Shawqi's poetry for Mustafa Kemal that "the recollections of man have an afterlife"

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[119] These details are confirmed in a number of biographical sketches of Hatem, including "Mohammed Abdel-Kader Hatem" *Prabook*. Accessed 9 April 2019. https://prabook.com/web/mohammed_abdel-kader.hatem/1346621 and Arthur Goldschmidt "Hatim, Dr. Muhammad 'Abd Al-Qadir" *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt*. 2000. 75, which cites both *al-Ahram* and *Akhir Sa'a* as sources.

[120] For more on desert settlement and the Liberation Province project see Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (University of California Press, 2002) and Nancy Reynolds, "City of the High Dam: Aswan and the Promise of Postcolonialism in Egypt," *City & Society*, vol. 29, no. 1 (April 2017), 213-235.

[121] Hatem, *Mudhakkirāt*, 59-60.

[122] The form of these memoirs is not a straightforward recounting but rather an introduction written by Ibrahim Abd al-Aziz, followed by a few chapters of discussion between the two men, and then various thematic snapshots written by Hatem from his notes. In a recent blog post reviewing the book, the writer critiques this format for not specifying what exactly was Hatem versus Abd al-Aziz. This dissertation treats the book as a memoir and tries to when possible verify the information through additional sources. "Yousef Al Qaid reviewing Hatem's Memoirs" *Mkalatk Website(Your Articles)*. Published January 29 2017. Accessed April 5 2019 at https://mkalatk.com/article/86513-%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1_%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85

and Shakespeare's idiom from King Lear that "it is better to forgive and forget."[123] While such a framing is fairly conventional for a memoir, coming from the man largely responsible for the creation of the modern Egyptian information regime, this emphasis on messaging and memory is notable. Indeed, considering the time of the publication - five years after the 2011 revolution, Hatem likely felt the weight of this history, especially since he frames his memoir as both a testament to the victories of his generation, as well as a model for the next generation of Egyptians, who he felt needed to once again "build the nation". Yet Hatem is also careful not to apologize for his part, and largely defends or demurs on the culpability of others, which for some online reviewers of his book was akin to whitewashing the repressiveness of the Egypt state.[124] While memoirs are typically self-promoting, Hatem's use of King Lear's line on forgetting is somewhat ironic, for among his generation of Free Officers he has probably received the least scholarly attention. This absence is remarkable given Hatem's lengthy tenure in government and his involvement in some of the most influential Egyptian institutions. Indeed, during the Nasser era, Hatem was involved with the initial genesis of both Cairo's radio and television infrastructure - both of which would become enormously powerful state information tools. Hatem also proposed and established the Middle East News Agency and the Information Department, the first of their kind for the region that would eventually become models for many decolonizing states.

Hatem's marginalization in histories of the 1950s and 60s might in part be due to his much more visible role in the October War[125]. As Minister of Information, Hatem instituted a policy that

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[123] While many of the Free Officers' have published memoirs, Hatem's likely represents one of the last from this first generation who experienced and shaped that transition from colonial to national rule, though recent publications continue from the younger generation of figures who grew up during Nasser's regime, such as Amr Moussa's recently published his memoirs.

[124] See reviews of Hatem's book on Goodreads https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/33553670 or this article on his memoirs, "Ibrahim Abdel Aziz Uncovers the Secrets of Politicians and the Press. Yet the Secrets Keeper, Abdel Kader Hatem Continues to Keep Sadat's Silence". *Al Dostor.* 10 January 2017. Accessed 9 April 2019. https://www.dostor.org/1280111

[125] The subtitle of Hatem's memoirs is "Leader of the October War", and he's published multiple books on the "surprise strategy" of the October war, which he claimed to have developed and implemented.

he described as a reversal from 1967, when the press proclaimed victory as Israel decimated Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Instead, Hatem was keen on winning not only Egyptian hearts and minds but those of the world through an information strategy of both "presenting all facts objectively and truthfully", while also preventing the Egyptian press from forewarning the Israelis of their plans.[126] Hatem's contribution to victory in 1973 led to his appointment as Deputy Prime Minister and eventual replacement of Mohamed Hassanein Heikal as Chairman of *Al Ahram*, the pre-eminent Egyptian newspaper. Under Mubarak, Hatem continued to serve on various national councils until his retirement in 1996, while also publishing extensively on a wide range of topics, including Islam and media, information and the October War, and Japanese culture.

However, I believe that Hatem's relative obscurity in the current historiography is also a byproduct of the struggles of the Nasser era, specifically over how the state should manage culture and information. In particular, Hatem's struggles against leftist intellectuals among the Free Officers, such as Ahmed Hamroush and Thawrat Ukasha, over the methods for state media were crucial to the construction of this anti-colonial, mass state information regime. Thus, Hatem's ascendancy in the late 1950s and 60s was part of this political project that privileged information as an object for government intervention and as a means to influence regional and international public opinion. Tracing Hatem's efforts and writings provides a crucial through line into the ebbs and flows of this Egyptian information regime, as well as the impact of postwar modernization and media theory in Egypt.

Building from the previous chapter's extended historiographical investigation, this chapter begins with the new Revolutionary Command Council and its efforts to transform the Egyptian state, specifically exploring the ideas that were developed to legitimize this new revolutionary regime. Investigating how historians have uncovered the longer antecedents of the RCC's ideologies, as well

[126] Mohammed Abdel Kader Hatem, *Information and the Arab Cause* (London : Longman Group, 1974), 276.

as their early emphasis on neutralism and pan-Arabism, helps make visible the discursive power of these ideas in postcolonial Egypt. This chapter then considers how this rhetoric helped shape the early Egyptian information regime, especially with respect to the press. While this history has longer antecedents that go back to the initial foundation of print media and the press in Egypt, this chapter focuses on institutions that emerged in the aftermath of the revolution. Scholars have detailed the tensions of the early revolutionary period over freedom of the press, and the revolving door between government officials and the various Egyptian newspapers and publication houses. Yet without the broader framing of information, there remains a disconnect between these histories of the Egyptian press and research on Egyptian propaganda efforts to the broader the Arab world. This chapter combines the two perspectives to elucidate the extent of this information infrastructure, making visible the initial experiments of the Egyptian state in the 1950s to produce content for international audiences beyond the Arab world and how this represented a new statist understanding of information and media.

Revolutionary Ideas: The Free Officers' Revolution and Postcolonial Intellectual Histories

At 7:20 am on July 23 1952, Anwar El-Sadat announced over a radio broadcast that, acting in the spirit of the 1923 Constitution, a "blessed movement" of military officers had ended the corruption of King Farouk and the political elites, essentially taking over Egypt with an almost bloodless coup (only two soldiers were killed at the Egyptian General Command).[127] The timing of the announcement and the coup was earlier than planned, as the Free Officers feared imminent arrests after getting word that Farouk knew of their activities.[128] In her memoirs, Tahia Nasser, the

[127]See Abou-El-Fadl *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, 112, and Yoram Meital, *Revolutionary Justice: Special Courts and the Formation of Republican Egypt*, (Oxford UP, 2016), 36.
[128] Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution* (Oxford UP, 2016), 53 and Robert McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952–1967* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 24 .

wife of Gamal, described listening to Sadat's address that morning with Tharwat Ukasha, another prominent Free Officer, and how apparently the announcement had almost not happened because Sadat had forgotten the password to enter General Command, but had finally been let in and delivered the statement written by Nasser.[129] In *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, Joel Gordon describes how the news of the coup came when most of the political elites were summering in Alexandria with rumors swirling about what was happening in the capital. Yet the reaction to the broadcast was largely positive, Gordon writes that it was received with both "nervous anticipation" and "cautious but hopeful" over the potential new government.[130] Within the next three days, the Free Officers would become the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and appoint 'Ali Mahir, a veteran politician, as prime minister, while King Farouk was forced to abdicate and fled to Italy (though some of the officers wanted an even harsher fate for the erstwhile monarch).[131]

Historians have detailed and debated the origins of this revolution, and especially how circumstances conspired to enable a hundred or so military officers to take control of the Egyptian government within a matter of days.[132] Most scholars highlight a series of factors, including the legacies of the 'Urabi revolts of 1880s, the failures of the Wafd nationalist party, the interwar protests over British concessions, the 1948 Nakba defeat in Palestine, the breakdown of the parliamentary system, especially after 1950, and finally the sheer luck of the officers who at crucial moments avoided capture and detection of their plans.[133] While the amount of foreign support for

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[129] Tahia Khaled Abdel Nasser, *Nasser: My Husband*, Translated by Shereen Mosaad (American University in Cairo Press, 2013), 54-55.
[130] Joel Gordon *Nasser's Blessed Movement,* 5.
[131] Initially after the revolution, a Regency Council was established for the infant son of the Khedive Farouk but that was quickly dissolved over August 1952. For more see, Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement,* 61 and Steven A. Cook, *The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square* (Oxford UP, 2011), 55.
[132] The actual membership of the Free Officers is debated, but the inner circle was comprised of nice core members. See R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Patterns of Political Leadership: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon* (Albany, NY: 1975), 176-7 for more information.
[133] Studies and memoirs of the 23 July Revolution have become a historiography onto itself. For an overview of the field see the introduction of James Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). Particularly influential for this project has been Joel Gordon's *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, *Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt* Edited by Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler (University

the coup is debated, the close ties between the American CIA and State Department with the Free Officers after the revolution, as well as promises to respect British interests, meant that the officers did not have to contend with foreign intervention in response to their coup.[134] Perhaps most influential for the Free Officers' success was the creation of a broad alliance beginning in the late 1940s with various Egyptian political groups, including communists, liberals, and the Muslim Brotherhood. While the revolution was not inevitable, even with this growing coalition of dissenters, most historians consider the Great Cairo fire of January 25-26 1952 as a turning point when, in response to British forces killing fifty policemen at a gendarmerie in the Suez Canal, mass demonstrations broke out in the city and eventually set fire to many of the most prominent symbols of British imperialism in Cairo.[135]

The initial figurehead of the revolution was General Mohamed Naguib, whose book *Egypt's Destiny* was discussed in the last chapter. Naguib was not an original member of the organization, but was selected to give authority to the movement, which was mostly made up of junior and, at that point, unknown military officers.[136] Almost immediately after taking power, the Free Officers through the RCC started to consolidate their control, beginning within the army through forced retirements and arrests of dissenting officers. The RCC also increasingly clashed with the established political parties, ordering them to 'purge' their ranks of the old guard and eventually replacing Mahir

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Press of Florida, 2004), R. Hrair Dekmejian *Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971), and P. J. Vatikiotis *Nasser and His Generation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978).

[134] A number of studies have explored American foreign policy and covert involvement in Egypt, especially around support for the RCC. For more see Hugh Wilford, *America's Great Game*, Jon B. Alterman, *Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 1952-1956: Hopes Dashed* (New York: Palgrave. 2002), Laura M. James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), and Ghada Hashem Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From al-Ahram to al-Ahali* (Lexington Books, 2007).

[135] For the most in-depth account see Nancy Reynolds, *A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, the Cairo Fire, and the Politics of Decolonization in Egypt* (Stanford UP. 2012) and in particular her chapter "The Cairo Fire and Postcolonial Consumption". See also Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 27-28 and Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, 13-14.

[136] For detailed accounts of Naguib's selection and his early role in the Free Officers see Robert St. John, *The boss: the story of Gamal Abdel Nasser* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960) and Said K. Aburish, *Nasser: The Last Arab* (New York: St. Martin's Press and Thomas Dunne Books, 2004).

after he failed to support their land reform proposals.[137] Historians have detailed in-depth the uncertainty of this initial revolutionary period, when it seemed as if a civilian parliamentary system might be established, and then increasingly how the Free Officers institutionalized their power, responding to protests and dissent with force. This clash over who would control the new government came to a head in January 1953 when the RCC announced the abolition of all political parties, with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood. The liberal Wafd party and the communists' parties, including the Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL), protested this policy, but, given the prospect of a return to the previous political instability, many Egyptians supported the new law.[138] In place of these political parties, the RCC created the Liberation Rally, the sole political party, which would become the model for the next two decades of Egyptian politics.

Yoram Meital's recent book *Revolutionary Justice: Special Courts and the Formation of Republic Egypt* explores this initial period through the lens of the revolutionary tribunals, which were one of the primary institutions for the RCC to legitimize their efforts and eliminate the opposition. Meital argues the RCC's tactics were part of a coherent policy, unlike earlier scholars who emphasized the reactionary nature of their plans. By the summer of 1953, this plan was beginning to be fully implemented with Naguib announced as President of the new Egyptian Republic, and Nasser and other members of the RCC appointed to his cabinet.[139] Almost exactly a year after banning political parties, the government extended this ban to their largest political opponent - the Muslim Brotherhood. The Free Officers and Muslim Brotherhood had collaborated since the 1940s, though

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[137] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 64-66 and Yoram Meital, *Revolutionary Justice: Special Courts and the Formation of Republican Egypt*, (Oxford UP, 2016), 36-37

[138] For more on Egyptian communist movement, see Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1885-1954* (Cairo, Egypt: American University in Cairo Press, 1998); Joel Beinin, *Was the Red Flag Flying There? Marxist Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict in Egypt and Israel, 1948-1965* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Rami Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism: Jews and Their Compatriots in Quest of Revolution* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2011). For more on the confrontation see Roel Meijer *The Quest for Modernity*, 157-162.

[139] Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt,* 20-21 and Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 123-24.

the leaderships had never been close, with the Free Officers fearing the popular support for the Brotherhood. After the founder of the Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna, was assassinated in 1949, Hassan Isma'il al-Hudaybi became the leader of the organization, and though he initially supported the Free Officers movement, increasing the relationship between the two became fraught. Internal divisions within the Brotherhood furthered this distrust, with the Free Officers trying to promote their preferred candidates over Hudaybi.[140] Yet Hudaybi remained in power, and so on January 12 1954, when a confrontation between Brotherhood and Liberation Rally students broke out, the RCC suddenly announced the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood, arresting the Brotherhood's top members and shattering the previous alliance between the two groups.[141] Historians continue to uncover new angles on this fractious moment, complicating the initial post ad hoc accounts of the revolution that were perpetuated by the state, as well as later revisionist accounts of the early post-revolution. Yet almost all of these studies describe the defining moment for the RCC as the March 1964 crisis, when the new regime faced its most serious opposition from their one-time ally - General Naguib. In late February, Naguib resigned in protest from his position over the RCC's marginalizing of the other political factions. In reaction, the liberals, communists, and Brotherhood organized massive protests and the RCC faced potential mutiny from the military, as well. Forced to back down, the RCC agreed to lift the restrictions on political parties, but after an attempted assassination attempt on October 14, Nasser finally had enough popular support to fully marginalize both the Brotherhood and Naguib.[142]

As the RCC consolidated power over the course of 1952-54, so too was Nasser, increasingly going from what James Jankowski described as "*primus inter pares*" to al-Rayyis.[143] At the outset of the

[140] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*,.29-30, 99-103. On the longer relationship between the Free Officers and the Brotherhood, see Fawaz Gerges, *Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash that Shaped the Middle East* (Princeton University Press, 2018).
[141] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 106-107.
[142] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 125-27 and Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 126-27.
[143] Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt,* 19.

revolution, Nasser, like many of the Free Officers, was unknown to most Egyptians. Yet this anonymity was not an accident. After years of operating as a secret society, the Free Officers were reluctant to share their plans, and Nasser specifically wanted Naguib to be the only public face of the revolution to keep the officers from vying for attention. The first mention of Nasser in the Egyptian press came in August, but his importance was only revealed in September in an article by the well-known Egyptian journalist and editor Mustafa Amin in his paper, *Akhbar al-Yawm*.[144] The article named Nasser as the leader of "the nine" core officers, but Nasser quickly censored further mention of his involvement.[145] While scholars have speculated on Nasser's rationale for choosing to remain in Naguib's shadow, his use of selective access to information would become emblematic of his regime. This strategy went back to the early days of the Free Officers, when beginning in 1946, they published a series of anonymous pamphlets to circulate their ideas in the army, attacking both the British and monarchy.[146] These pamphlets have been one of the central avenues into studying the ideologies of the Free Officers, helping excavate the origins of what would become the core of Nasserism.

In her recent book, Reem Abou-El-Fadl explores these documents in-depth, arguing that they represent a window into Nasser and the Free Officers' 'visions' for their revolutionary nation. Similar to Meital, Abou-El-Fadl positions her work as revising the existing historiographical claim that the Free Officers were reactionary and lacking a clear ideology.[147] Instead, through these pamphlets, Abou-El-Fadl argues that the Free Officers were early proponents of pan-Arabism, anti-colonialism, and social justice. She traces the terminology in these pamphlets as evidence of the expansive views of the officers, tracing the slippage in usage between "*wataniyya* (one-state

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[144] St. John, *The boss,* 134.
[145] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement,* 113; *Sonia Dabbous*, "Nasser and the Egyptian Press," in *Contemporary Egypt through Egyptian Eyes,* ed. Charles Tripp (London: Routledge, 1993), 63-64.
[146] Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt,* 15 and Abou-El-Fadl, *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, 104-110.
[147] Abou-El-Fadl, *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, 101-2. For an example of an account that emphasizes lack of ideology see Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press* Chapter 4.

patriotism) and *qawmiyya* (pan-Arabism)", as well as "*al-watan al-'arab*i ('the Arab homeland'), [...] *al-umma al-'arabiyya*, [...] and Egypt as *al-watan* ('the homeland') [...and] Egypt's citizens as *al-umma* ('the nation')."[148] She goes on to argue that though pan-Arabism was not explicitly a principle of the revolution, the RCC's earliest efforts were focused on instituting pan-Arab policies and promoting an early proto-neutralism founded in their opposition to British control.[149] Though Abou-El-Fadl mentions how Nasser in *The Philosophy* frames the revolution as part of a longer history dating from 'Urabi revolts of 1881, she does not contextualize the RCC's ideas within the larger intellectual milieu in Egypt or the Arab world.[150]

Yoav Di-Capua's book *No Exit* investigates this history through the intersections of Arab and European existentialist thinkers. Building from Omnia El Shakry's research on the rise of professional psychology and the creation of adolescence as a category in 1930s Egypt, Di-Capua traces how this "youth crisis" of the 30s was a reaction to the failures of Arab liberalism and the traumas of colonialism, which among the younger generation created an "overwhelming sense of loss, humiliation, helplessness, shame, desperation, powerlessness vis-à-vis oneself and others, spiritual and material deprivation, a broken—if not castrated—father figure, and a general sense of emptiness and anxiety." While the rise of the Brotherhood and Marxists in the 1930s was in part a response to this crisis, Di-Capua instead focuses on the emergence of pan-Arabism and its relationship to existentialism, arguing that the latter was appealing to the younger generation because it "suggested itself as a way out of the generational impasse of colonialism."[151] Indeed, Di-Capua traces how a battle between Arab intellectuals over the purpose of literature and writing, intersected

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[148] Abou-El-Fadl, *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, 117. See also Marlene Nasr, "Vocabulaire National et Islam dans le Discours de Hassan el-Banna et de Gamal Abdel Nasser, » in Sylvianne Rémi-Giraud, Pierre Rétat and Paul Bacot eds., *Les Mots de la Nation*, (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1996).
[149] Abou-El-Fadl *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*., 167. See also Sirrs, *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service*.
[150] Recent work beginning in the 1990s has explored the intellectual and literary shifts in this moment. See chapter 1 for a more in-depth discussion of this historiography.
[151] Di-Capua, *No Exit*, 51 and Omnia El Shakry "The Arabic Freud: The Unconscious and the Modern Subject." *Modern Intellectual History* 11, no. 1 (April 2014), 89–118.

with the question of whether existentialism was capable of delivering on its promise of "transforming colonial subjectivity into a healthy postcolonial Arab interiority."[152]

This debate became especially prominent in the postwar era, which as the work of Rami Ginat and Joel Beinin on the Arab left has demonstrated was a moment of intellectual ferment, with the rise of new leftist periodicals (primarily the Marxist *al-Fajr al-Jadid* [The New Dawn]) and political groups (the nationalist al-Tali'a al-Wafdiyya [the Wafdist Vanguard]) that promoted a revolutionary and neutralist ideas.[153] Indeed, Rami Ginat argues that the period from 1950-52 in Cairo experienced the rise of the 'extremist' press, with a number of journals promoting anti-Western neutralism.[154] Di-Capua frames these discourses and magazines as part of a larger generational, intellectual debate over existentialism and Arab identity. On one side was what Di-Capua terms the *'udaba* (literary writers), such as the high priest of Egyptian cosmopolitanism and modernism Taha Hussein, who was one of the last champions of the *Nahda* in Egypt. Known as the blind scholar, Hussein was part of the Arab cultural renaissance, or *Nahda* that originated in the late Ottoman period and continued up into the mid-twentieth century.[155] In 1945, Hussein established, *al-Katib al-Misri* (The Egyptian Scribe), which was intended to share the work of Western intellectuals (André Gide, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Richard Wright) with the new Arab middle class. *Al-Katib* also published Jean-Paul Sartre's "La nationalisation de la littérature" ("The Nationalization of Literature"), though Hussein used the opportunity to counter Sartre's idea of *littérature engagée*, advocating instead for an approach to writing and thought that privileged 'art for art's sake'.[156] Hussein termed the Sartrian engaged or

[152] Di-Capua, *No Exit*, 55
[153] For more details see Rami Ginat an Meir Noema, "Al-Fajr al-Jadid" and Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*.
[154] Rami Ginat, "The Egyptian Left and the Roots of Neutralism in the Pre-Nasserite Era," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 30. 1 (May, 2003), 5-24.
[155] For more about the Nahda, see Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss, editors. *Arabic Thought beyond the Liberal Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Nahda.* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2016).
[156] Di-Capua, *No Exit*, 61-63. For more about Hussein and *al-Katib al-Misri* see Christopher Dwight Micklethwait, "Faits Divers: National Culture and Modernism in Third World Literary Magazines" (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2011).

committed approach as *iltizam*, which Di-Capua notes is ironic, since Hussein's article would actually popularize the term for the primary intellectual movement of the 1950s and 60s that would eventually displace the *'udaba* like Hussein.[157]

While capitals like Beirut, Tunis, and Cairo were critical to *iltizam*, given Sartre's influence on the movement, the rise of committed literature (*al-Adab al-Multazam)* in the Arab world also traces its origins to postwar Paris and the Latin Quarter specifically, where Arab intellectuals were part of the growing Third Worldism. Di-Capua in particular highlights the experiences of Suhayl Idris in the Latin Quarter and his inspiration from Sartre's journal *Les temps modernes* for the founding of his literary journal *al-Adab* in Beirut in 1953, which would become one of the most prominent venues for Arab existentialism and pan-Arab universalism. The first issue of the magazine summed up the ideology of *iltizam,* writing "the present situation of Arab countries makes it imperative for every citizen, each in his own field, to mobilize all his efforts for the express object of liberating the homeland, raising its political, social and intellectual level."[158] Opposed to the neutrality of earlier writers, such as Hussein or Tawfiq al-Hakim, this new committed intellectual was imagined as a revolutionary citizen, and engaged with the larger global processes of decolonization and the making of the Third World. Inspired by the European left in Paris and Marxists in Moscow, this *iltizam* movement would both marginalize the earlier literary generation of the *'udaba*, and become one of the main proponents of pan-Arabism, an idea that would become akin to a "political theology", according to Di-Capua.[159] That *al-Adab* and other literary journals were being founded in Beirut was in part a reaction to the growing mass state information regime in Cairo, which would increasingly

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[157] Di-Capua, *No Exit,* 64. See also Verena Klemm, "Different notions of commitment (*Iltizam*) and committed literature (*al-Adab al-Multazim*) in the literary circles of the Mashriq", *Arabic & Middle Eastern Literature*, 3:1 (2000),51-62.
[158] Di-Capua, *No Exit,* 67-69, 85-89.
[159] Di-Capua, *No Exit,* 109-111. For more about *al-Adab al-Multizam* see David DiMeo, *Committed to Disillusion: Activist Writers in Egypt from the 1950s to the 1980s* (American University in Cairo Press, 2016) and Chapter 2 in Elisabeth Kendall, *Literature, Journalism and the Avant-Garde: Intersection in Egypt*, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Literatures (New York: Routledge, 2006).

alienate Arab intellectuals. Yet understanding this intellectual and cultural context of pan-Arabism helps situate the initial ideologies of Nasser and the RCC.

Though their early promotion of pan-Arabism and neutralism was also pragmatic, fundamentally these ideas, as well as the larger Third World project, were all part of this postcolonial ideology that tied decolonization to the establishment of a new modern nations and citizens, freed from the political and psychological shackles of colonialism. The rise of these ideas and discourses, as well as the movement of *iltizam*, would become crucial to the Nasser era, helping legitimize the revolution, social reforms, and eventually leading to the co-optation of intellectuals into the mass state information regime. The next section explores the creation of this regime, considering how the earlier history of the press and politics in Egypt, as well as how this pan-Arab and Third Worldist ideology shaped the Nasser regime's first attempts to circulate and control information from Cairo.

Revolutionary Information: Making the State and the Mass Information Regime

Historians have detailed the longer histories of the press and politics in Egypt, with most studies beginning in the early nineteenth century with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, which brought printing presses to Alexandria, and then Mohammed Ali Pasha's establishment of *Waqai Misriyya* in 1828, the first newspaper in Cairo. Under Ismail Pasha, the khedive of Egypt in the 1860s and 70s, the press flourished, with Egypt's most famous newspaper, *al-Ahram*, founded in 1875. In 1881, the first law to regulate the press was passed, aiming to censor the rising nationalist 'Urabi sentiment. Some of the regulations included requiring licenses to print and allowing the Minister of the Interior to ban foreign newspapers.[160] Yet the law was not in place for long, and in *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation Through Popular Culture*, Ziad Fahmy writes that "the two decades from 1890 to

[160] Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation Through Popular Culture*, 56-59; James J Napoli and Hussein Y Amin "Press Freedom in Egypt" *Press Freedom and Communication in Africa* (Africa World Press, 1997), 187-189.

1910 were the beginning of the golden age of colloquial and satirical journalism in Egypt, which lasted for almost half a century."[161] Anthony Gorman charts this history in his recent work on the rise of the anarchist press in Egypt, building on earlier work, including Beth Baron's on the women's press, which explored this moment as "the journalistic phase of Egyptian nationalism."[162]

These shifts also impacted literary trends in the region, which Elisabeth Kendall explores in her work on the rise of modernist avant-garde literary journals, depicting this period as a surge of foreign literary fiction in journals including "*al-Muqtataf (The Selection, 1876* [1885 Cairo]-1952), *al-Hilâl (The Crescent Moon,* 1892), and *al-Dîyâ' (Light,* 1898-1906)." Kendall argues that this rise of foreign fiction in Cairo was a by-product of economics, and specifically the costs of printing, which remained high and would only get worse in 1909 when the 1881 press law was reinstated and followed by British wartime measures that produced paper shortages.[163] Nonetheless, new publications appeared in the 1920s, including *Ruz al-Yusuf*, *al-Mussawar*, and *al-Mustaqbal*.[164] In his book, Fahmy charts the decline of colloquial newspapers, arguing that by the 1950s most had disappeared entirely, replaced with new colloquial technologies (television, radio, and movies), as well as the rise of the Fusha and the standardized press.[165] Part of this shift was also the influence of the 1936 Constitution, which while maintaining many of the earlier press restrictions, provided more freedom for the private press to flourish (though it was still largely dominated by the British and those loyal to the empire).[166] Censorship in this era was imposed through the Ministry of Interior

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161 Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians,* 75-77.
162 Anthony Gorman "The Anarchist Press in Egypt Before WWI" in *The Press in the Middle East and North Africa, 1850-1950.* Edited by Anthony Gorman and Didier Monciaud (Edinburgh UP, 2018) and Beth Baron "Readers and the Women's Press in Egypt" *Poetics Today*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Cultural Processes in Muslim and Arab Societies: Modern Period II (Summer, 1994), 217-240.
163 Kendall, *Literature, Journalism and the Avant-Garde,* 30-35.
164 Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 94-95.
165 Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians,* 172-174.
166 Adnan Almaney, "Government Control of the Press in the United Arab Republic, 1952-1970," *Journalism Quarterly,* Vol. 49 (1972), 341-2, and Mohamed El-Bendary *The Egyptian Press and Coverage of Local and International Events* (Lexington Books, 2010), 2-3.

that appointed censors to each newspaper who would enforce the law depending on the relationship between the paper and the palace. Due to its close relationship to the monarchy, *Akhbar el-Youm* was not only given preferential treatment, but often allowed exclusives, while other newspapers had to wait weeks to print the same stories.[167] Literary and cultural journals would also increasingly become popular during the 1930s, as the rise of a new Egyptian middle class created demand for both translated European and Egyptian fiction. These literary journals, such as *al-Kitab al-Misriyya*, would eventually face competition from the committed literature and state-funded periodicals of the 1950s.[168]

While these earlier antecedents certainly influenced the contingencies of this later history, scholars have debated how much the initial policies for the RCC were similar to those from the interwar period. In *The Great Social Laboratory*, Omnia El Shakry argues for the continuities between the interwar colonial period from the 1930s and the early revolutionary moment, arguing that Nasser largely built upon previous regime's discourse of social welfare and modernism.[169] Yet Ghada Hashem Talhami argues that even though some of the tactics for censoring news was similar, the 1952 revolution drastically and quickly changed the relationship between the press and the state.[170] One holdover from the previous regime was the continued use of censors at newspapers through the newly established Ministry of National Guidance, headed by one of the original Free Officers, Salah Salem.[171]Yet whether this policy was part of a coherent plan remains hazy, with most scholars characterizing the initial relationship between the fourth estate and the officers as "unstable," with

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[167] Almaney, "Government Control of the Press," 341 and James Napoli and Hussein Amin, "Press Freedom in Egypt" in *Press Freedom and Communication in Africa* Edited by Festus Eribo and William Jong-Ebot (Africa World Press, 1997), 190.
[168] Kendall, *Literature, Journalism and the Avant-Garde*, 221.
[169]Omnia El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007) Chapters 4 and 5 discusses continuities between earlier social welfare and later population policies during the Nasser era.
[170] Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 132.
[171] International Press Institute Survey, *The Press in Authoritarian Countries* (Zurich, 1959), 179.

the RCC frequently oscillating between imposing and relaxing censorship.[172] Upon hearing of the revolution, most press coverage within Egypt was positive, especially since the officers had a close relationship with two important publications - Mustafa Amin's magazine *Ruz al-Yusuf* and the Wafdist *al-Misri* edited by Ahmad Abu al-Fath (who was Thawrat Ukasha's brother-in-law).[173] Furthermore, Nasser was increasingly growing close to Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, the recently promoted Editor-in-Chief of *Akhir Sa'a,* who would eventually become the doyen of Egyptian newsmen and Nasser's personal spokesman.[174] Yet Nasser was not satisfied with simply utilizing existing platforms. One of the first initiatives of the Free Officers was creating the Dar al-Tahrir publishing house. The first magazine published was *al-Tahrir* (Liberation) with Ahmed Hamroush as Editor-in-Chief. Hamroush was able to produce the first issue in early September 1952, but was quickly replaced in November after Nasser felt that his communist politics were influencing the content of the magazine.[175] In an interview, Hamroush described how he was one of the few officers with previous journalism experience, and "was surprised one day when I was told that Tharwat Ukasha had replaced me as editor of *al-Tahrir*."[176] Hamroush was then sequestered to the newly created daily newspaper *al-Gumhuriyya* (*The Republic*), which would become the main mouthpiece for the RCC.[177]

In his memoirs, Sadat described the initial impetus for *al-Gumhuriyya* from a conversation with Nasser in the summer of 1953, where he outlined the necessity for the RCC to have their own

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172 *Dabbous*, "Nasser and the Egyptian Press,", 63.
173 Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 53 and Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 130.
174 Salah Nasrawi "Heikal, Egypt's most famous journalist, dies at 92" *Al-Jazeera.* 17 Feb 2016 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/heikal-egypt-famous-journalist-dies-92-160217072359949.html and *Dabbous*, "Nasser and the Egyptian Press," 68.
175 Ahmad Hamroush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu,* 2nd vol. (Cairo; Madbouli, 1983), 94-95 and Khaled Mohieddin *Memories of a Revolution* (Cairo: AUC Press, 1995), 145.
176 Gamal Nkrumah, "*Ahmed Hamroush: For Corps and Country*." *Al-Ahram Weekly* Online, July 26–August 1, 2001, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/544/profile.htm and Gordon *Nasser's Blessed Movement* p. 95-96
177 The publishing house would also publish one of the first state weeklies *al Tahrir*, which ran from 1952-1957. Helmi Sharawy "Memories on African liberation (1956 - 1975) A personal experience from Egypt" *Pambazuka News* Issue 530 (2011-05-19) http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/73404

newspaper. Sadat was initially skeptical, considering the difficulties of procuring the equipment and personnel, but Nasser pressed on, arguing that they needed a platform to defend the revolution. Sadat visited Egyptian publishing houses, investigated their practices, and then set up shop in August 1953, turning to Western and Eastern newspapers as examples. Sadat was able to assemble a team of writers and publish the first issue of the newspaper on December 7, 1953.[178] While Sadat emphasizes his efforts, Tahia Nasser paints a slightly different picture, describing Nasser and Sadat working on the newspaper together for months before its first publication, and claiming that the paper often published the former's articles under the latter's name.[179] The first issue of the newspaper included articles from Taha Hussein, Louis Awad, and Nasser's article "The Role of Colonialism in Pummeling Arab Nationalism". The newspaper also published a series of articles from British Labour politician Aneurin Bevan.[180] The timing of *al-Gumhuriyya*'s founding was crucial since the banning of the Brotherhood happened in the next few weeks, and was followed by the March crisis of 1954. The RCC had already begun shuttering journals and newspapers, especially leftist ones after the events in January 1953 when political parties were banned.[181] In response to the 1954 crisis, the RCC loosened its censorship, leading to an outpouring of criticism of the military regime, with calls for an end to the emergency powers of the RCC, the release of political prisoners, and immediate elections. Fearing what they perceived as counterrevolutionary elements, the RCC responded swiftly. First, members of the RCC that supported Naguib, including Khalid Mohieddin and Ahmed Hamroush, were essentially sidelined and relegated to diplomatic posts abroad.[182] Former allies in the press faced even worse fates, including Ihsan 'Abd al-Quddus the Editor-in-

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[178] "El Sadat wa ta'asis jaridat al-Gomhouriya [Sadat establishes *al-Gumhuriyya*]" *Bibliotheca Alexandrina Sadat Archive* http://sadat.bibalex.org/More_Pages/23Revolution.aspx?TextID=AR_8915.
[179] Tahia Khaled Abdel Nasser *Nasser: My Husband*, 16-18
[180] Four political articles by Mr. Aneurin Bevan in newspaper "Al Gumhuriya" on Britain, Commonwealth and American foreign policy matters and internal affairs. British National Archives (BNA) Foreign Office (FO) 371/108562. 1954.
[181] Hashem, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 147 lists "*al-Fidaa*, *al-Natheer*, *al-Kateb*, *al-Malayeen*, *al-Wajeb*, *al-Muarad-hah*, and *al-Maydan*", see also Mohieddin, *Memories of a Revolution*, 136-7.
[182] St. John, *The boss*, 177, and Nkrumah, "Ahmed Hamroush: For corps and country".

Chief of *Ruz al-Yusuf*, who along with many journalists arrested and jailed. Particularly bold was the shutting down of *al-Misri*, the most widely circulated Egyptian daily, and the trials of the Fath brothers who owned the newspaper and had previously been the most powerful publishers in the country. The final move came with placing the press syndicate under RCC control through appointing Fikri Abaza of *Al-Musawwar* as the new head of the syndicate.[183] Combined these policies meant that Nasser and the RCC no longer feared any criticism from the press; essentially realizing their vision of a press committed to Nasser and the pan-Arab cause. In his memoirs, Ahmed Hamroush describes this shift as the beginning of the military controlling cultural production in Egypt, which was one of the most prominent features of the state mass information regime.

This transformation was further cemented through the RCC's expansion of the *mukhabarat,* the Egyptian State Intelligence Services. In *The Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910-2009*, Owen Sirrs details the growth of intelligence agencies in Egypt, which today have become some of the most robust and repressive institutional forces in the country. According to Sirrs, after the 23 July revolution, Nasser appointed Zakaria Mohieddin, one of the Free Officers, to the head of Military Intelligence. Though Mohieddin had no previous experience in the field, he quickly reorganized the institution, creating the General Investigations Directorate (GID) and the Military Intelligence Department (MID).[184] Sirrs argues that there were continuities between the pre and post-revolutionary intelligence institutions, but that one crucial change was the growing collaboration with American intelligence agencies, who provided equipment, training, and even public relations guidance to the RCC.[185] With this foreign assistance, Mohieddin and Nasser were able to expand the scope and scale of Egyptian intelligence institutions, creating for the first time the

[183] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 139-140; Dabbous, "Nasser and the Egyptian Press," 65; and Hashem, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 148.
[184] Sirrs, *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service,* 31.
[185] Sirrs, *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service,* 32-35.

capacity for Egyptian covert action and information collection beyond their borders. One of the primary agencies responsible for these endeavors was the Arab Affairs Bureau of the MID, created in October 1952 and overseen by Mohammed Fathi al-Dib and 'Izzat Soleiman.[186] In *Abdel Nasser et la Révolution algérienne*, Al-Dib explains that the development of the Arab Affairs Bureau was premised on Nasser's belief that the liberation of Egypt would only be complete when all occupied Arab lands were freed. To this end, the Bureau started information gathering with political dissidents and students in Cairo from other Arab states, and traveling to those states still under colonial rule.[187] Information collection had initially been the purview of the Foreign Ministry but the RCC, not trusting the existing institutions, founded the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) along with the Arab Affairs Bureau.[188] Combined the EGIS and the Bureau would eventually conduct clandestine missions and intelligence gathering in the region, while also establishing the News and Broadcasting Group to analyze and translate foreign news and broadcasts.

Building from these institutions, the RCC worked towards propagating their pan-Arab message both at home and abroad. While the press was one avenue for this message, scholars have also uncovered how the RCC's educational reforms were part and parcel of building this new state ideology. In *Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria,* Laurie Brand details how the regime transformed Egyptian education through the creation of new revolutionary and pan-Arab textbooks and curriculum. Expanding on Yoav Di-Capua's study of Egyptian historians and history writing, Brand explores how history textbooks in particular were a site for expanding the definition of nationhood through new terminology and subject matter that emphasized Egypt's *Arab-ness*.[189]

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[186] Sirrs, *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service,* 41-43, and Abou-El-Fadl *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, 169-171.
[187] Fathi Al Dib, *Abdel Nasser et la Révolution algérienne* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985), 11-12, in *Foreign Policy as Nation Making* Reem Abou-El-Fadl writes that "The Bureau also cultivated ties with Arab students in Cairo, who numbered more than 35,000 in 1954, seeking particularly those involved in political activism," 171.
[188] Partially also the aftermath of the March crisis of 1954, Sirrs, *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service,* 41-43.
[189] Laurie A. Brand *Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014) and Yoav Di-Capua *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (University of California Press, 2009).

Gerasimos Tsourapas' research also explores these shifts in Egyptian education policies following the revolution, cataloguing the extent to which the new regime used 'secondment', temporary contracted work visas, of Egyptian teachers and technicians to Arab countries to spread this radical message. Given the extractive legacies of colonialism, few Arab states had the capacity to educate their populace or build new infrastructure, and thus the affordability and availability of Egyptian experts was especially attractive to these governments, and this in turn made these Egyptian emigrants some of the most effective vehicles for spreading revolutionary propaganda.[190] Through al-Azhar and Cairo University, the regime also used scholarships to bring students from across the region, and eventually the Third World, to Egypt, which further established Cairo as a hub for revolutionary activity. Yet while these efforts were influential for spreading Cairo's message, the most potent propaganda tool was radio, especially the creation of the Voice of the Arabs (*Sawt al-Arab*) programme in Summer 1953.

Mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, the Egyptian State Broadcasting (ESB) had been responsible for radio administration since the 1940s, and thus, even before the revolution, radio was a state-run industry. Under the RCC, the ESB would continue to administer radio infrastructure, though the divisions between the ESB, EGIS, and Arab Affairs Bureau would increasingly become meaningless as Zakaria Mohieddin centralized his control over all aspects of Egyptian intelligence. Initially the ESB was a modest operation with a small staff and no shortwave capabilities, but with American assistance, Nasser and the RCC immediately expanded the scale of Egyptian radio infrastructure, producing their first shortwave international broadcasts on July 4, 1953 with the first half hour transmission of the Voice of the Arabs (VOA).[191] VOA or *Sawt* would go on to become

[190] Gerasimos Tsourapas "Nasser's Educators and Agitators across al- Watan al-'Arabi: Tracing the Foreign Policy Importance of Egyptian Regional Migration, 1952-1967", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 43. 3, (2016), 324-341.
[191] Douglas A. Boyd, "Development of Egypt's Radio: 'Voice of the Arabs' under Nasser," *Journalism Quarterly*; Vol. 52 Issue 4 (Winter 1975), 646.

synonymous with the Nasser regime, becoming one of its primary avenues for propagating Cairo's message. Reem Abou-El-Fadl recounts how from the outset of VOA, Nasser was explicit about his vision, stating that "I want this radio to be one of the revolution's weapons for the realisation of Egyptian and Arab independence. The radio will be one of the most important weapons of the future."[192] Nasser echoed this sentiment in an interview with Edward Murrow in 1959, when he stressed the importance of VOA in countering imperialism and colonialism, inculcating self-determination, and influencing international public opinion.[193] Indeed, along with the Arab Affairs Bureau and the EGIS, Voice of Arabs was explicitly intended to help promote Arab liberation and pan-Arabism, and was relatively successful - inspiring revolutionaries from Algiers to Sana'a.

Scholars studying VOA have focused especially on its host, Ahmed Saïd, who was dubbed 'Mr. Hate' by British newspapers, due to his fiery anti-colonial and anti-British rhetoric.[194] Indeed, Saïd was often described pejoratively in the Western press, such as in a *Harper's Magazine* article that depicted him as "Nasser's Other Voice", and as "the world's most influential broadcaster… a dove-voiced demagogue, who can call fifty million Arabs to riot and murder."[195] This reaction from Western observers is not surprising given the content of Saïd's shows, which included segments such as "Truth and Lies" and "Do Not Forget" in which Saïd would counter foreign newspaper coverage and explicate the history of Western imperialism in the Arab world.[196] VOA's early role in assisting Arab nationalist movements also fueled Western fears. After the exiling of the Moroccan

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[192] Abou-El-Fadl, *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, 170.
[193] Anas Alahmed, *Voice of the Arabs Radio: Its Effects and Political Power during the Nasser Era (1953-1967*) Dissertation. Indiana University (March 2011), 6-7.
[194] Laura M. James, "Whose Voice? Nasser, the Arabs and 'Sawt al-Arab' Radio," *Transnational Broadcasting Studies*, 16 (2006). Retrieved from http://www.tbsjournal.com/James.html
[195] William Ellis "Nasser's Other Voice" Ellis, *Harper's Magazine* 222, 1333 (June 1, 1961), 54.
[196] This strategy of countering foreign news coverage of Egypt and Nasser would become emblematic of the Egyptian mass information regime in the 1960s. Laura M. James recounts how even when retransmitting Nasser's more measured speeches, VOA would often omit those sections for their audiences, instead providing a more radical account, which helped legitimize Cairo as a revolutionary capital, though conversely straining Egypt's relationship with Western and Eastern superpowers. Laura M. James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 47-48.

King Muhammad V in August 1953, VOA increasingly covered North African liberation, with Ahmed Ben Bella officially launching the Algerian Front de libération nationale (National Liberation Front or FLN) on November 1, 1954 through a VOA broadcast.[197] These broadcasts also targeted conservative monarchies in Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, eventually leading to competition over the airwaves as these Arab states built competing broadcasting infrastructure, which in turn produced issues of overcrowding on the broadcast spectrum and an undermined international governance of the airwaves.[198] However, even with these new facilities, by the 1960s broadcasts from Cairo would outpace the rest of the region, rivaling American, British, Soviet, and Chinese international broadcasts in the number of programming hours, producing a number of shows in addition to VOA.[199]

[197] Abou-El-Fadl, *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, 172. For more information on North African revolutionaries in Cairo see David Stenner ,"'Bitterness towards Egypt' – the Moroccan nationalist movement, revolutionary Cairo and the limits of anti-colonial solidarity," *Cold War History* (2015), 159-175, and Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[198] "Intelligence Memorandum: The Spread of Super-Powered Broadcasting Stations in the Arab World" CIA. CIA-RDP85T00875R001500220002-6. January 1968
[199] Data from 'Table 2: Weekly Broadcast Hours, 1950 to 1973' in Douglas Boyd, "Egyptian Radio: Tool of Political and National Development," *Journalism Monographs* No. 48. (Feb 1977), 27.

Figure 4. Weekly Broadcast Hours, 1950 to 1973 for Top Six International Broadcasters



Domestically, Radio Cairo was the most well-known service, though other programmes also existed, including some from Alexandria.[200] VOA was technically intended as a regional service, along with the Middle East programme and the Holy Quran programme, though the distinction between regional and international increasingly became irrelevant as the ESB built new high-powered short-wave and medium-wave broadcasting capacities. This expansion of radio infrastructure also enabled new international programming, initially to East Africa with the Voice of Africa in the late 1950s and eventually further afield to Latin America and parts of Asia.[201]

Given the relative success of VOA and Egyptian radio programming, scholars have debated the origins of this operation, with some pointing to Zakaria Mohieddin and Nasser, while recent work advocating for the influence of Mohammed Fathi al-Dib and Ahmed Saïd.[202] Notably one of the more foundational analyses, Douglas Boyd's "Development of Egypt's Radio: 'Voice of the Arabs' under Nasser", addresses this debate. Published in 1975, Boyd writes in the article about the origins of the VOA that:

> "There is a difference of opinion among Egyptian media observers as to who started this service. Although Ahmed Saïd would become well known as its director and chief announcer, he was not in a position at the time to authorize its beginning. The real power behind the Voice of the Arabs lay with Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mohammed Abdel-Kader Hatem. Dr. Hatem, who would serve Egypt in several information-related capacities

[200] The term Radio Cairo is often used in the literature synonymously with VOA or as a catchall for radio broadcasts from Cairo. Douglas Boyd addresses this slippage in "Egyptian Radio: Tool of Political and National Development," 15-16.
[201] Miles Copeland in *The Game of Nations* describes a CIA survey report on Radio Cairo that outlined its apparent success and scale from Morocco to Iraq. Shalabieh, Mahmoud, "A Comparison of Political Persuasion on Radio Cairo in the Eras of Nasser and Sadat" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1975), 37-38.
[202] Owen Sirrs advocates for the former, whereas Reem Abou-El-Fadl and Laura M James promotes the latter.

including the post of Minister of Information, probably initiated the idea for the service, and Nasser provided enthusiastic support."[203]

Almost no recent secondary literature references Boyd's claim about Hatem, even though many cite this particular article. This absence is perhaps in part due to the difficulty in verifying Boyd's assertion of Nasser and Hatem's responsibility, though Hatem's memoirs provides additional clues. After working as an instructor at the Military Academy in Cairo, Hatem describes his initial position in the RCC as director of Nasser's office, and then being among the five selected by Nasser and Zakaria Mohieddin to help plan and establish the new Egyptian General Intelligence Service. At EGIS, Hatem described his position as part of the press section and focused on translating international news, which might explain his involvement in VOA.[204] In his 1974 *Information and the Arab Cause*, Hatem further repeats this claim of responsibility for VOA while describing a secret meeting with the French Minister Christian Pineau in 1955. According to Hatem, Pineau was threatening to provide Israel military assistance if Egypt continued to support the Algerian FLN, and Hatem responded by "acknowledging his personal responsibility for *The Voice of the Arabs*" and thus indicating to Pineau that no threats would induce Egypt to halt its assistance.[205] While VOA and the broader Radio Cairo apparatus was the work of many, the absence of Hatem in any of the current literature on radio broadcasts from Cairo underscores the difficulties in excavating this mass state information regime. Zooming in on Hatem helps make visible the wide array of initiatives to control and circulate information in the early years of the post-revolutionary moment.

In addition to his work with VOA and EGIS, Hatem also became involved in state publications. While the history of state-funded publications in Egypt is intertwined with the rise of

[203] Boyd, "Development of Egypt's Radio," 646. This claim is repeated in Jarice Hanson and Uma Narula *New Communication Technologies in Developing Countries* (Routledge, 2013), 137.
[204] Hatem, *Mudhakkirāt*, 65.
[205] Hatem, *Information and the Arab Cause*, 167-8.

Egyptian periodicals and the press, the revolution also radically transformed the quantity and content of these publications. Reem Abou-El-Fadl mentions one of these government-funded series in her recent book, though given her focus on Egyptian foreign relations, the series is used as a source, rather than as a window into the institutions and individuals that produced them. Instead, Menachem Klein's research from the early 2000s provides a much more in-depth account of what he terms "Egypt's revolutionary publishing culture", in which Hatem played an influential role. In two articles, Klein outlines the extent of book publishing in Egypt during the Nasser era, exploring how the revolution accelerated Cairo's existing publication industry. In particular, Klein takes aim at the argument that the Nasser era experienced a 'crisis of intellectuals', arguing that "most of the intellectuals and cultural producers at the formative period of Nasser's regime were neither totally oppressed nor alienated from their national origins."[206] Klein takes the scale and diversity of publishing in this period as a proxy for Egyptian and Arab intellectuals' relationship to the state. Given the government's suppression and jailing of any opposition, Klein's argument elides over those who suffered under the Nasser regime, but his articles do point to a crucial question at the heart of this project - the paradox of how the revolution initiated a period of state centralization that also resulted in an expansion of cultural and informational media. Klein's research is especially useful to this question since he dives into both the impact of government-run publication houses on private publishing in Cairo, as well as the variety of content produced from these initiatives.

Similar to their initial approach to the press and the creation of *Dar al-Tahrir*, the RCC did not radically transform the publishing industry immediately, and instead used a combination of existing private publication houses, like *Dar al-Ma'arif* founded in 1890, as well as eventually creating their own, such as the National Publications House, which will be discussed in the next chapter. These efforts were initially overseen through the Ministry of Education and Culture until 1958,

[206] Menachem Klein, "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture, 1952-62", *Middle Eastern Studies,* 39. 2 (2003), 158.

when it was subsumed into the Ministry of National Guidance. According to Klein, the rise of government-funded publications did not eliminate smaller private publishers due to the RCC's ambitious publication rate that engendered a fairly pluralistic publishing market where Egyptian authors would often publish with multiple houses.[207] The result of this ambitious policy was that, by 1964, 71 separate series were published in Cairo. Klein details the various subjects of these series, including foreign policy focused series, such as *al-Fiker al-'Alami* (World Thought) and *Dirassat Ifriqiyya* (African Studies), pan-Arab and nationalist series, like *Kutub Lil'arab* (Books For Arabs) and *Kutub Qawmiyya* (Nationalist Books), Islamic series with *al-Thaqafa al-Islamiyya* (The Islamic Culture), and finally philosophical series, such as *Maktabat al-Dirasat al-Falsafiyya* (The Library of Philosophical Studies) which paired the works of classical Arab philosophers such as Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina with Western thinkers like Dewey and Kierkegaard. Not all of these series were first published in the early revolutionary period, such as the more popular series *Kutub Siyasiyya* (Political Books) that was first issued in the Summer of 1957 and would eventually comprise over 350 books in the series.[208] The majority of these books were pocketbook sized and paperback, and the most popular were published regularly (either weekly or monthly) and priced relatively low (6-10 Qirsh). Most of the series included Nasser's photo, though *Kutub Siyasiyya* was one of only two series to include advertisements from state-operated companies, such as the Suez Canal Authority and Bank Misr. The other one was the series that would become the most successful for the state - *Ikhtarna Laka* (We Have Chosen for You).[209]

[207] For example, Muhammad Mustafa 'Ata, who was a member of the editorial board of *Ikhtarna Laka*, published with both *Dar al-Ma'arif* and *al-Maktaba al-Anglo al-Misriyya*. Klein, "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture," 151-2.
[208] Klein, "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture," 150, 154-160.
[209] Elie Podeh, *The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), 121, and Klein "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture," 161.

This series was the first published in February 1954 with Israel Cohen's *This is Zionism*, which included a foreword from Nasser.[210] Initially *Ikhtarna Laka* was intended to spread the regime's message, with books emphasizing Arab unity, the threats of Israel and imperialism, and the need for neutralism in foreign policy. Eventually the series expanded to a broader range of historical and literary content, including a number of translations from Western political theorists such as John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Klein notes that these translated editions rarely comprised the full English version, and that even though Western thinkers were fairly ideologically out of step with the anti-colonialism of the regime, *Ikhtarna Laka* was increasingly the most popular series, with many of its books becoming part of the curriculum at Egyptian universities. The series was the sole one offered as a subscription, where readers could sign up for monthly books. Though that model only lasted from 1957-1959, the series would eventually include almost 200 books over its full run and was one of the few profitable government-funded series. Indeed, by the mid-1960s, four million books would remain unsold from these various series in government warehouses, and the National Publications House would have an annual deficit of over "80 percent of production costs".[211] Given *Ikhtarna Laka*'s exceptional success, Klein speculates over what differentiated the series, and points to the political clout of its editorial board, and in particular its Editor in Chief Abdel Kader Hatem. According to Klein, "as part of the revolutionary establishment's political elite, and as one with special relations with Nasser, Abdel Kader Hatem was able to carve a special niche for *Ikhtarnâ Laka* in Egypt's cultural life."[212] While the editorial board also included other influential officials such as Dr. Abdel Hamid Batrik, Amin Shaker, Amin Mustafa, and Muhammad Mustafa 'Ata, Hatem remained the guiding force for the

[210] Abou-El-Fadl, *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, 168, and Menachem Klein, "*Ikhtarna Laka* (We Have Selected for You): A Critique of Egypt's Revolutionary Culture" *Orient 38*, no. 4 (1997), 681.
[211] Klein, "*Ikhtarna Laka"*, 684-687 and "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture", 167-8.
[212] Klein, "*Ikhtarna Laka"*, 680.

series. Hatem's influence also helps explain the form and content of the series. Unlike Arab intellectuals writing in *al-Adab* or even more leftist Free Officers like Thawrat 'Ukasha or Khaled Mohieddin, Hatem was a centrist and an advocate for media as a medium for modernization and development, similar to postwar communications theorists like Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm. Thus, *Ikhtarna Laka* privileged quantity over intellectual quality with the assumption that access to information and education would help further the revolution's reforms, even if the content of these publications were at odds with the regime's state politics.

Ultimately, Hatem's belief in the need to share and shape information would lead him to continue his efforts from *Ikhtarna Laka* and VOA with a new endeavor - the government-funded magazine, *The Scribe/al-Katib*. The name of the magazine and its logo hearken back to Taha Hussein's *al-Katib al-Misri* from 1945-48, which first used the seated scribe in its masthead. Christopher Dwight Micklethwait explores *al-Katib al-Misri* in the context of twentieth century modernism, and writes that the symbol of the seated scribe "recalls the image of the twenty- seventh-century B.C.E. genius Imhotep, Pharaoh Djoser's semi-sacred scribe, chancellor, architect and medical doctor." How this symbol and title became use for *The Scribe* remains unknown, though it would eventually become the logo of the General Egyptian Book Organization, the successor of the National Publications House, and according to Micklethwait "indisputably the most prolific institution of literary publishing in modern Egypt, if not the whole Arab world."[213] In *Memories of a Revolution*, the leftist Free Officer Khaled Mohieddin also mentions that *Al-Katib* was the title of a communist magazine that was shuttered in December 1952.[214] Given the popularity of the name and the logo, the magazine was likely intended to invoke this longer history, as well as co-opt this symbolism to the government's cause. The first issue of *The Scribe* was published in August 1955 under the auspices of the Center for

[213] Christopher Dwight Micklethwait, "Faits Divers: National Culture and Modernism in Third World Literary Magazines" (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2011), 175–76.
[214] Khaled Mohieddin, *Memories of a Revolution* (American University in Cairo, 1995), 136-7.

Middle East Research and Dar al-Hilal. Currently, no scholarly accounts exist of the magazine, but the first issue helps explain the intended rationale with an unsigned editorial stating:

> "Yet the great happenings which take place in this area [the Middle East] are reported to the world through foreign correspondents who are not expected to give more than a brief account. This, in turn, appears in the world press somewhat tinted. Under the circumstances, the need for an organ to give voice to the Middle East public opinion and make reports on current events has become imperative. I hope that THE SCRIBE will fill this gap." [215]

To this end, the first article in the issue was Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser's "Reconstruction", where he detailed the revolutionary reforms that were "destroying political and economic feudalism" now that Egypt had "broken away from the shackles of the British Empire."[216] This theme was reiterated in Major Salah Salem's article on the Tripartite Agreement between Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia that was intended to resist the "Turkey-Iraq-Pakistan" axis, which had formed through the Baghdad Pact in February 1955, a British and American endeavor to create a NATO-like alliance in the region.[217] The issue's content was wide-ranging, from articles on land reforms and reclamation efforts to the development of the Aswan High Dam and the art of Ahmed Sabri, as well as the latest news on Egyptian sports and ballet. These snapshots of Egyptian life were further buttressed with the liberal use of photos in the magazines, such as the picture of Nasser being mobbed by celebrating Egyptians next to his article, or the cover of the second issue, which depicted the Egyptian Women's National Guard and the caption "delicate and feminine, they are trained in the use of light weapons, tommy guns, hand grenades, and explosives."[218] Combined these articles and photographs painted a prescriptive picture of a modernizing nation unified by a revolutionary ethos. While *The Scribe*

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[215] "Editorial," *The Scribe* (August 1955), 7.
[216] Gamal Abdel Nasser, "Reconstruction", *The Scribe* (August 1955), 4.
[217] Salah Salem, "Tripartite Agreement", *The Scribe* (August 1955), 6.
[218] "Women's National Guard," *The Scribe* (September 1955), 2.

covered diverse topics, ultimately the magazine was intended as a platform to promote Nasser's vision and state-sponsored initiatives.

After the first issue, the Editor in Chief was listed as Dr. Nabeel Kamil, and his editorials at the beginning of each issue were emblematic of this purpose. The September 1955 one focused on democracy in Egypt, which repeated Nasser's line that democracy was "insuring the liberty of the people" not "allowing party organizations to control elections", and the editorial in the following month's issue stressed the need for the United Nations, which was seen as a "gain both to the Great Powers and to smaller nations[...], the hope of the suppressed and the colonized [...whose] collapse would be a retrogression which throws humanity back hundreds, if not thousands, of years."[219] The United Nations was also the topic of the November 1955 editorial, which celebrated "the victory of the Afro-Asian group over the combined forces of imperialism" at the UN, after the group defeated France's attempt to table any discussion of Algeria.[220] These editorials were indicative how *The Scribe* was utilized as a vehicle to counter Western coverage of Egypt. Indeed, the November issue appeared after the signing of the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian arms deal, and the majority of the magazine was a riposte to the deal's critics, writing:

> "the West accuses Egypt of upsetting the "balance of power." Therefore, almost every newspaper and monthly and weekly magazine, and even the week-end "yellow" press, has used this term in such a way as to make its readers feel that Egypt has committed a grave crime. [...] It is true that the emergence of a strong Egypt will cause a disturbance in the international field. Western plans will have to be remodelled; Western outlook will have to be changed, and Western policy renovated. It is true that a balance of power has been upset - the balance of the West."[221]

[219] Nabeel Kamil "Editorial," *The Scribe.* September 1955 and October 1955, 3.
[220] Kamil "Editorial," *The Scribe.* November 1955, 3.
[221] "Balance of Power," *The Scribe.* November 1955, 4-5

These editorials and articles repeated much of the RCC rhetoric, but *The Scribe* bolstered this perspective through articles from foreign observers, such as the British historian Arnold Toynbee or the American Rabbi Dr. Elmer Berger.[222] These articles often expounded on the threat of Israel and Zionism, and the magazine would often print follow-up responses from Egyptian and foreign readers to these articles, which helped create the impression of an international audience that supported Egypt and the Arab world.

The magazine was originally printed in English, but beginning in October 1955 the magazine would occasionally print half the issue in English and half in Arabic. Notably, this bilingual issue was not a simple translation of the articles, but instead included completely different coverage. For example, the November 1955 English section included an article on the recently signed Egyptian-Syrian military agreement, describing the pact as "an expression of solidarity between Egypt and the people of Syria" to "guard them against the different political influences that may loom on their horizon and exaggerate minor differences between neighbours."[223] The Arabic section included coverage of the same agreement, but with much more pointed language, describing the pact as a "fatal blow to Western interventions in the region, which had infiltrated through the guise of lofty military and economic alliances, but that concealed the same obligations and limitations under which Egypt had already suffered for centuries."[224] In addition to this new Arabic section, *The Scribe* increasingly printed advertisements for state-owned companies similar to those in *Ikhtarna Laka*. The magazine also introduced new sections, such as the "People Make News" and "News of the Month" that reported on world events such as Yugoslavian President Tito's visit to Cairo or the boycotting of the British operated Near East Broadcasting Station by Arab artists and writers across

[222] For more about Elmer Berger see Jack Ross *Rabbi Outcast: Elmer Berger and American Jewish Anti-Zionism* (Potomac Books, 2011) and Hugh Wilford's *America's Great Game*.
[223] "Military Agreement Between Egypt and Syria". *The Scribe*. November 1955, 11.
[224] "al-Mithaq al-Askarri bayna Misr wa Suria" *al-Katib* November 1955, 34.

the region. Given these features, the absence of any subscription data, and that the majority of these articles lacked authorship, the intended audience for the magazine remains hazy, seeming to cater to a broad audience of both Egyptians and foreigners, and Arabic and English speakers. Some additional clues appeared in the February 1956 issue, which was the first time the editorial board was listed, comprising of Col. Abdel Kader Hatem as the President, along with Dr. M. Yehia Eweis and Mtre. M. M. Omar. This issue included the first advertisement for *The Scribe* which boldly proclaimed that magazine was read by "500,000 people" and "the only Egyptian monthly magazine to reach the four corners of the Earth." The advertisement also paints an illustrious picture of its audience, from the "world's political organizations" to "world's famous clubs." On the following page was an additional advertisement, but this time from an organization mentioned in the previous chapter, the American Friends of the Middle East. With the headline "Take the Middle East out of Domestic Politics: An Open Letter to Every American Citizen," the two-page advert was for a letter writing campaign to the American government over the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. The AFME stressed the dangers of Israel and its supporters influencing American arms sales policies in the region, and the need for an objective American policy in the region. Somewhat surprisingly they warn of the prospect of the Soviet Union and its satellites arming Arab States, writing "already one state has accepted this offer," which was Egypt in the Fall of 1955.[225] That an Egyptian government-funded magazine would print an advertisement from an American organization criticizing its policy seems strange, yet the call for "every American citizen regardless of race or religion" to tear out, sign and mail back the letter to support a campaign fits with the broader efforts of *The Scribe* and the Egyptian information regime to influence international public opinion.

The final pieces of this new mass state information regime were the creation of two institutions in December 1955 and early 1956 - Wakalat Anba' al-Sharq al-Awsat (Middle East News

[225] *The Scribe*. February 1956, 11-12.

Agency or MENA) and Maslahat al-Isti'lamat (the Information Department). Though prolific in publishing materials, few historical accounts exist of these institutions. Yet once again focusing on Hatem provides a window into these endeavors. In his memoirs, Hatem describes how his work in Nasser's office and at the EGIS lead him to propose to Nasser that they build an Egyptian News Agency. However, "Nasser replied that it was difficult for Egypt to establish a global news agency like Reuters, United Press or [Agence] France Presse, and that some Egyptians had already endeavored to established agencies but failed, and Nasser was afraid of repeating their mistakes."[226] Undeterred, Hatem countered that he would establish the agency out of his salary, which at the time was sixty-five pounds a month. Hatem rented an apartment in Tahrir Square and hired a small staff of "four reporters, a sub-editor, two typists and two messengers" to translate foreign newspapers and transcribe political broadcasts, which was compiled into a news bulletin and then sold to foreign embassies and organizations in Egypt.[227] After a few months, Nasser changed his mind and declared the agency a success, officially establishing the Middle East News Agency on December 15 1955. The initial budget was twenty-thousand pounds, and funding for the agency was pooled from the four main Egyptian publishing houses, al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, Dar al-Tahrir, and Dar al-Hilal. The agency was modeled on the shared cooperative of the Associated Press, and thus, the agency was technically a non-governmental agency.[228] However, given the state's ownership of a number of the publishing houses, the separation between the two from the outset was ambiguous, and would only become increasingly intertwined over the 1960s. Indeed, the first director of the agency was Nasser's former press secretary, Col. Kamal al Din Hinnawi, who was joined by the editors of the major

[226] Hatem, Mudhakkirāt, 59-60.
[227] Hatem, Mudhakkirāt, 60-61, "Monographs III: MENA: Middle East News Agency, PRENSA LATINA, REUTERS, TANJUG: Telegrafska Agencija Nova Jugoslavija, TASS: Telegrafnoie Agenstvo Sovietskavo Soyusa, UPI: United Press International" *UNESCO International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 15* 1978, 103.
[228] Wilton Wynn. *Nasser of Egypt; the search for dignity*. (Arlington Books, 1959), 134-35, and "Monographs III," UNESCO, 103.

Egyptian newspapers on the board of the agency, and many of the initial staff for MENA were seconded from these same publishing houses.[229]

The UNESCO report from March 1956 on professional journalism in the region noted that the agency was providing some training to journalists, and had already established foreign correspondents in Khartoum, Damascus, and Beirut. However, the report also noted that the agency lacked "technical and professional 'know-how'", which was repeated in a 1978 UNESCO report which described the initial structure of the agency as essentially ad-hoc.[230] At the time of MENA's establishment, there were no 'government-controlled' or 'official' news agencies in the Middle East or in Africa (though private ones existed in South Africa, Somalia, and Sudan).[231] While Ghana would establish the Ghana News Agency in 1957 after its independence, many of the Arab states sought guidance from MENA for establishing their own agencies in part to counter the sheer abundance of Egyptian news media.[232] Eventually MENA would become one of the leading news agencies in the decolonizing world, and the only African or Middle Eastern one to have correspondents across the globe. Initially though, the rationale for the agency was the same for the wider information regime - to counter foreign coverage of Egypt and the region, and especially to challenge the hegemony of the existing international "imperialistic agencies".[233]

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[229] Reed M. Khalife "The Middle East News Agency" *International Perspectives on News* Edited by L. Erwin Atwood, Stuart J. Bullion, and Sharon M. Murphy (Southern Illinois UP, 1982), 95-96 and Wynn. *Nasser of Egypt*, 135.
[230] Ahmed Kassem Gouda, "Facilities and Methods of Professional Training for Journalism in the Middle East" *UNESCO* 13 March 1956., 7 and "Monographs III" UNESCO, 103-6.
[231] William A. Hachten, *Muffled Drums* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University. Press, 1971), 40-41.
[232] Even the Arab League which was based in Cairo was hesitant to have the Arab States Broadcasting Union be established in Cairo since it would likely fall under the purview of MENA. For more information see Douglas A. Boyd "The Arab states broadcasting union", *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 19:3, (1975), 320; Hatem. Mudhakkirāt., 61; and "Monographs III" UNESCO, 108.
[233] For more on international competition over news see Heidi Tworek's recent work *News from Germany: The Competition to Control World Communications, 1900-1945* (Harvard University Press, 2019) and *Exorbitant Expectations: International Organizations and the Media in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Routledge, 2018) Co-edited with Jonas Brendebach and Martin Herzer. Wynn. *Nasser of Egypt*, 135.

The final component of this mass state information regime was the Information Department, which was formally established in 1956, though references to it appear earlier. As a hub for intelligence services, news media, and cultural production, the Information Department is most visible in the historical record through its publications, but parsing its activities and structure remains difficult since it was not initially an established ministry.[234] Indeed, publications attributed to the department are often listed not only under the Maslahat al-Isti'lamat (the Information Department), but also Hay'ah al-'Āmmah lil-Isti'lamat (General Intelligence Service), which seems to reference the Egyptian General Intelligence Services. However, the relationship between these entities is unclear. One of the first publications from the department was *The Egyptian Revolution in Three Years, 1952-1955*, which described the creation of a new Information Institute, "the first of its kind in the Middle East," where Egyptian professors and world experts would train students in "the art of propaganda." At the head of this institute was "Colonel (S.O.) M. A. Hatem, Director-General of the Information Administration."[235]In his memoirs, Hatem describes creating this department after the success of MENA, and recruiting journalists from the agency to help staff this new service. He claims that his most important work was setting up a special section of over twenty translators devoted to books published internationally, such as the works of Mao Zedong. Some of these translated publications were utilized for *Ikhtarna Laka* series, but Hatem also details the creation of a special bulletin for Nasser and core RCC members that comprised of translated news and excerpts from newspapers in the region, and especially those from Lebanon.[236] Robert St. John outlines a similar picture, describing the "Department of Information" as creating a 'daily journal' for Nasser and his top aides. According to St. John,

[234] Most works on Egypt in this period cite the Information Department sources but there remains no scholarly discussion of the department after the 1960s.
[235] United Arab Republic Maslahat al-Isti'lamat *The Egyptian Revolution in Three Years, 1952-1955*. (Cairo, 1955), 123.
[236] Hatem. *Mudhakkirāt*, 62.

> "only a hundred copies are printed [... and] each is labeled, in large letters, highly confidential. Only Ministers and other important officials are permitted to see it because it contains reprints of all the attacks on the regime made anywhere in the world during the past twenty-four hours. In a typical issue the first three pages are devoted to quotations from articles and editorials from the world press about Egypt; page 4 is always reserved for news and comment about Israel; page 5, the Sudan; page 6, Asia; page 7, the East-West Cold War; pages 8 and 9, digests of world-wide radio broadcasts; page 10, a summary of a new book. In addition to this daily digest, the Information Department prepares a twenty-page summary of every book published in any major language that it considers important. At least one of these summaries a day is sent to Nasser."[237]

While such a capacious information output sounds exaggerated, Nasser is often described in memoirs as spending much of his day reading reports and newspapers.[238] Though questions remain about the activities of the Information Department, the department would eventually become the Ministry of Information, inspiring similar institutions across the region over the 1960s.

The combined broadcasting of VOA and Radio Cairo, the presence of government-funded publications like *Ikhtarna Laka* and *The Scribe*, and the creation of the Middle East News Agency and the Information Department, were all critical to circulating Nasser's and the Egyptian state's message of pan-Arabism and neutralism. Indeed, "Egypt Will Seek Better Publicity: Broad Reform Plan Set Up for Information Programs Cairo Conducts Abroad", a *New York Times* article from April 1955, described the rationale for these efforts as an attempt to undo "the past deficiencies of "Egypt and other Arab states in the field of public relations." Leading this transformation was a "38-year-old intelligence officer" with "wide powers to reform the Egyptian information programs" -

[237] St. John, *The boss*, 230.
[238] Sirrs, *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service*, 64-65; Hatem. *Mudhakkirāt*, 62; and St. John, *The boss*, 229-231.

Lieut. Col. Mohammed Abdel Kader Hatem. The article describes Hatem's recent appointment to the director general of the Information Department, and his education and history, noting that since the revolution Hatem had become "a contact man with the foreign press" in Egypt. The article is an unsigned "Special to the *New York Times*," and thus, its origins remains unknown. Nonetheless, the article provides a window into Hatem's operation and future aspirations. For example, the piece contrasts the monarchy's penchant for expelling critical foreign journalists with Hatem's approach; where he used the opportunity of critical foreign coverage to educate foreign journalists on the truth of the revolution, rather than revoke their access. Given the regime's recent suppression of domestic critics, the positive tone of the *New York Times* coverage is questionable. Yet regardless of the spin, some of the plans listed in the article would eventually become a reality - including Hatem's proposal for posting information officers abroad, creating information kiosks at tourist sites, and publishing English and French magazines.[239] Tracing Hatem's growing influence elucidates what Dekmejian termed the rise of the "officer-technocrats" in Egypt. Indeed, in the aftermath of the revolution, Hatem along with many of the Free Officers were placed in the bureaucracy to help solidify the revolution and de-politicize the army.[240] While scholars have long utilized the output of this mass state information regime, few have examined these institutions holistically. This next chapter considers how international events also shaped this mass state information regime, and how Hatem's vision for information as means to influence public opinion was challenged by proponents of Egypt's intellectual and cultural traditions.

[239] "Egypt Will Seek Better Publicity: Broad Reform Plan Set Up for Information Programs Cairo Conducts Abroad" Special to The New York Times. *New York Times* (April 10, 1955), 13.
[240] Dekmejian, *Patterns of Political Leadership*, 128.

CHAPTER III

CONSTRUCTING ANTI-COLONIAL CAIRO: BANDUNG, SUEZ, AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Disembarking at the Cairo airport after spending three weeks traveling to the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, Indonesia during April 1955, Gamal Abdel Nasser spoke of his experiences abroad,

> "This conference was considered the most crucial one in the modern era, since it is the first time that the Asian countries have met with African countries without the participation of the powers that had ruled them. The Asian and African nations have come together to declare to the world that they are to be free, that their peoples will be liberated and that they will no longer be ruled by colonialism or colonialists. [...] Today, the whole world was looking at Egypt as an independent free state, a state that expresses its conscience and its independence, the state that expresses truth and for the sake of truth alone. "[... This truth we speak] is for the establishment of independent states all over the world, working hand in hand so that the world is no longer run by stooges of the superpowers."[241]

This message was a familiar one, repeating the RCC's themes of anti-imperialism and liberation, yet the scope was far grander. From the outset of the revolution, Nasser and the RCC had promoted an ideology of pan-Arabism and neutralism that had international implications, from supporting liberation movements in Algeria and Morocco to attempting to influence politics in Sudan and other

[241] Nasser was met by the council at the airport. "Kalimat al-rayyis Gamal Abdel Nasser min riasat majilis al-Wazura'a ba'ed 'awadti min mutamara Bandung 2/5/1955" [The speech of President Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers after his return from the Bandung Conference] *Nasser Archive*. May 2 1955 http://nasser.org/Speeches/html.aspx?SID=344&lang=en.

Arab states.[242] Nasser's return from the conference seemed to herald the emergence of a more expansive version of these ideas - a vision that would span the globe.

By the end of the 1950s, this vision would increasingly become a reality. Nasser had ascended as one the leaders of this new international anti-colonial political bloc, and thousands of students and revolutionaries were flocking to Cairo. As the city became a hub for liberation movements, the outbreak of the Suez Crisis in 1956 further cemented both Nasser's anti-colonial credentials, as well as the necessity of the mass information regime discussed in the previous chapter. In particular, the ability to circulate information not only domestically, but also abroad, was seen as crucial to Egypt's 'information' victory during the crisis. Suez, along with Bandung, also underscored the need for popular support, leading to the release and re-integration of the regime's previous critics. Through both the umbrella of pan-Arabism and Afro-Asianism, Egypt increasingly became the vanguard of revolutionary anti-colonialism, an identity that culminated in the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958.

Yet for all this flurry of activity and inspiring speeches, the Bandung moment was replete with contradictions and competing interests, within both Egypt, as well as the Afro-Asian political bloc. Given the popular support that followed in the wake of Bandung and Suez, Nasser loosened restrictions on the press, allowing the Arab left to create new publications and increasingly dominate Egyptian political discourse. The creation of new literary and cultural government ministries and institutions furthered these efforts and enabled a "virtual state monopoly on culture."[243] Although these activities furthered the regime's aims, they also represented a challenge to Hatem's vision for the information regime that privileged publishing speed and quantity over intellectual quality and cultural capital. While this debate would become increasingly acrimonious over the next decade,

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[242] Abou-El-Fadl, *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, 226-227.
[243] Anwar Abdel-Malek, *Egypt, Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser* (New York: Random House, 1968), 199.

both sides were largely in agreement over the necessity of the state's expansion into media and intellectual production. Conversely, communists in Cairo and Damascus began questioning the regime's legitimacy, demanding more reforms and the liberalization of the government's extensive powers. These challenges were compounded internationally, as over the course of 1958, Iraq and Ghana emerged as potential alternative leaders of the Arab and African blocs, respectively. Even the formation of the UAR, heralded as a victory for pan-Arabism, was more accurately seen as a hasty initiative of which Nasser was a reluctant participant, a symptom of the growing pressures on the regime to live up to its revolutionary zeal.

This chapter traces the influence of these international events on Egypt in the second half of the 1950s, especially the emergence of a new anti-colonial bloc after Bandung, which transformed Cairo and accelerated many of the Egyptian information regime's initial efforts. Beginning with a discussion of the historiography of Bandung and the Third World, this chapter then traces the initial implementation of an official African policy in Cairo. The Suez Crisis furthered these activities, providing the first significant test of Egypt's ability to influence international public opinion, while also opening new spaces for the Left both within and outside of the government. In particular, the rise of new state-funded cultural institutions and the establishment of the Ministry of Culture heralded the state's renewed focus on intervening in art and literature to promote political ideologies. Yet as Cairo increasingly became a hub for international revolutionary thought and movements, the regime also started to foreclose the fledgling domestic spaces for political dissent. The final result was a regime committed to anti-colonial liberation abroad, while pursuing policies that expanded the state's power at the expense of political and intellectual freedoms at home. Ultimately, I argue that understanding this transformation requires situating Egypt within this international moment, exploring both the promises and pitfalls of these efforts to remake Cairo as a capital for global anti-colonialism.

The Bandung Period: African Liberation and the Arab Left in Cairo

Following a visit to Saudi Arabia for the *hajj* in 1954, the Asia-Africa, or Bandung Conference was Nasser's second international trip and considered a success, with cheering crowds welcoming him at every stop. Nasser was seen as "a young revolutionary icon of the time", with his military uniform and wide smile standing out among the older cohort of leaders at the conference.[244] Arriving at the conference, Nasser's assertion that this conference was "the most crucial" is understandable, as over six hundred delegates from twenty-nine countries representing more than half the world's population were welcomed by Indonesian President Sukarno on April 18 1955. The impetus for the conference had come from the Colombo Powers, comprised of the five Asian countries – Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, that had met in Colombo, Ceylon in 1954 and who feared a potential conflict between the United States and China after the creation of the American-led SEATO pact, and thus, intended the conference as an opportunity to promote peace and "usher in a new era of Asian relations."[245] While the list of attendees had originally been envisioned as members of the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations, it quickly grew to include a number of observer delegations. Nasser had been nervous prior to the conference, but over the course of five days, he emerged as the senior leader of the African and Arab blocs, in part because of the divisions between the Arab states, and in part by default, since the only three other African countries were Ethiopia, Liberia, and Libya, as well as two delegations from the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Sudan. The conference was particularly useful to Egypt, providing an international platform for pursuing their policies of isolating Israel and challenging the Western-led

[244] Naoko Shimazu, "Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955," Modern Asian Studies 48, no. 1 (2014), 246.
[245] Homer A. Jack *Bandung: an on-the-spot description of the Asian-African Conference* (Chicago: Toward Freedom, 1956), 1; and Christopher J. Lee, "Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung" in *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*, Ed. Christopher J. Lee (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 10-11.

Baghdad Pact.[246] By the time he returned home, Nasser had become "one of the Big Four" of the decolonizing world, establishing a new global reputation for himself and Egypt.[247]

While Bandung was Nasser's first time on the international stage, he had previously met with both Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that February in Cairo, with the latter in part responsible for Nasser's trip, since he had initially been skeptical to attend Bandung.[248] While Nehru was initially unimpressed with Nasser, mostly based from his reading of *The Philosophy,* the two quickly hit it off, with Mohammad Hassanein Heikal describing the first meeting between Nasser and Nehru as "falling in love" as the two found common cause over national development and world politics.[249] Their friendship, along with Tito, would eventually become a cornerstone of the Non-Aligned Movement. However, at this first meeting, Nehru was mostly interested in determining whether or not Nasser supported the proposed Islamic Conference.[250] Anwar Sadat had begun talks with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan the previous year to initiate some type of Islamic organization between the three, but even during discussions Nasser was hesitant, telling the press that the "aim of the conference was not to create a "religious bloc", but rather promote solidarity among Islamic peoples and nations, completing the work of the Arab League."[251] Given India's tensions with Pakistan, Nasser's response heartened Nehru, and the two would meet again on Nasser's trip to Bandung. In New Delhi, the Egyptian delegation briefly participated in The Delhi Conference of Asian Countries on Relaxing of

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[246] Jack, *Bandung,* 32-33; CIA-RDP91T01172R0003003700 "Afro-Asian Conference Developments" 18 April 1955, 1; and Mohammed Fayek *'Abd Al-Nasir wa-l-Thawra Al-Ifriqiyya* [Abdel Nasser and the African Revolution] (Cairo: Dar Al-Mustaqbal Al- 'Arabi, 1982), 39-40.
[247] St. John *The boss,* 202.
[248] David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World.* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), 63.
[249] Mohamed Heikal, *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973), 279; and Robert Vitalis, 'The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-doong)', *Humanity* 4, no. 2 (2013), 267.
[250] Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, 277-279.
[251] "Nasir Discusses Activities of Islamic Conference", RG 84 Cairo Gen Recs 1953-1955 Box 1 Folder 310 Conf & Org A-Z, American Embassy Cairo August 27 1954.

International Tensions (CRIT) organized by the World Peace Council.[252] The CRIT involved thousands of non-state participants, becoming a model for later events in Cairo that aimed to blur the popular with the official. Even more significant though was the stop in Rangoon, where Nasser would meet Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai and Burmese Prime Minister U Nu for the first time. Along with Nehru, the group would travel to Bandung, and while en route, Nasser reportedly asked Zhou En Lai about potential arms from the Soviet Union, with their discussion laying the groundwork for the eventual purchase of weapons from Czechoslovakia that Fall – a first for a country not officially affiliated with the Communist bloc.[253] Upon Nasser's return, Radio Cairo announced plans for a second Bandung in the Egyptian capital (though this proposal had yet to be confirmed with other world leaders), and over the coming years the conference would come to occupy a place of privilege in the Egyptian anti-colonial narrative.[254]

Today, Bandung has once-again become the focus of multiple scholarly works. While there was extensive initial coverage of the meeting, including from George Kahin, a professor of Southeast Asian history; Homer Jack, peace activist and Unitarian minister; and Richard Wright, the African American writer and intellectual, the conference remained a footnote until the international history turn of the 1990s and early 2000s.[255] This New Bandung History is exemplified in Vijay Prashad's 2007 *The Dark Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, which starts with the iconic line, "The Third World was not a place. It was a project."[256] Prashad contextualizes Bandung within the

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[252] Carolien Stolte, ""The People's Bandung": Local Anti-imperialists on an Afro-Asian Stage." *Journal of World History*, 2019, 125-156

[253] Heikal, *The Cairo Documents,* 48-49; Said K Aburish, *Nasser: The Last Arab* (London: Thomas Dunne, 2004), 84. For more on Egypt-China relations see, Kyle Haddad-Fonda "The Domestic Significance of China's Policy Toward Egypt, 1955–1957", *The Chinese Historical Review*, 21:1, (2014), 45-64.

[254] CIA-RDP91T01172R0003003700 "Afro-Asian Conference Developments" 18 April 1955, 3. For an example of how Bandung became emblematic in Egyptian narratives, see Gamal Abdel Nasser *On Non-Alignment* (Information Department, 1964).

[255] George Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956); Homer Jack, *Bandung*, and Richard Wright, *Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (New York: World Publishing, 1956).

[256] Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York, 2007), xv.

creation of the 'Third World', exploring the longer global history of anti-imperialism from Paris to Algiers over the twentieth century. Christopher Lee's edited volume *Making a World After Bandung* from 2010 furthers this research avenue, with chapters exploring how "Bandung contained both the residual romance of revolution, as well as the *realpolitik* of a new world order in the making."[257] However, this New Bandung History has also been sharply criticized for, at times, mythologizing the conference. In particular, Robert Vitalis' "The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-doong)" excoriates the tendency among scholars to represent the conference as "the Paul Revere's ride of our postcolonial age", portraying Bandung as the seed crystal of the entirety of 1960s and 70s revolutionary zeitgeist.[258] Vitalis details the continued repetition of factual errors about the conference in the historiography, including the misidentification of Nkrumah and Tito as participants, but his argument is more than just fact-checking. Vitalis is cautioning against ahistorical treatments of ideas like positive neutralism and neo-colonialism, as well as drawing too direct of line between Bandung and later conferences in Cairo, Belgrade, and Havana.[259]

More recent work has heeded Vitalis' call for attention to the particulars of Bandung, helping unpack how the "Bandung spirit" intersected, and at times competed, with other international solidarities (Afro-Asianism, neutralism, and non-alignment) and national interests.[260] Emblematic of

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[257] Lee, "Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung", 10.

[258] Vitalis's critique is echoed by Roland Burke, writing "Despite these provocative interventions, and a milieu seeming exquisitely well-suited to the "transnational" turn that has captured the enthusiasm of so many other areas of history, survey monographs on the Third World have not appreciably advanced in recent years" in "Real Problems to Discuss": The Congress for Cultural Freedom's Asian and African Expeditions, 1951–1959" *Journal of World History*, Volume 27, Number 1, (March 2016), 56.

[259] Vitalis, 'The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah", 263.

[260] For examples, see Lorenz M. Luthi, "Non-Alignment, 1946–1965: Its Establishment and Struggle against Afro-Asianism," Humanity 7, no. 2 (2016), 201–223: 202; Kweku Ampiah, *The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK and Japan* (2007); Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008); Roland Burke "'The Compelling Dialogue of Freedom': Human Rights at the Bandung Conference," *Human Rights Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (2006), 947-65; Burke "Afro-Asian Alignment: Charles Malik and the Cold War at Bandung," in *Bandung 1955: Little Histories*, ed. Derek McDougall and Antonia Finnane (Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2010), 27-42; Itty Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65," *Commonwealth and Comparative Studies* 46, no. 2 (2009) 195-219; Rinna Kullaa, *Non- Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge* (London: Tauris, 2012); and Vijay Prashad *Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South* (London: Verso, 2013).

this shift is the latest issue of the *World History Journal,* "Special Issue: Other Bandungs: Afro-Asian Internationalisms in the Early Cold War." Edited by Su Lin Lewis and Carolien Stolte, the issue is premised on questioning the very value of Bandung as a historical lens, asking in the first article, "what do we lose when we focus on a single conference as an epoch-making event for the Third World? What do we miss about this era and all of its possibilities when we narrow our view to diplomatic arenas?" For the authors, Bandung is meaningful in that it offers a window into the "other Bandungs" of this era – that is the multitude of conferences and meetings that established new solidarities and represented a moment of "unrealized emancipatory potential."[261] These lesser-known conferences often blurred the lines between state and non-state actors, and were hosted in cities across the Third World, from Beijing to Havana. For example, from the lens of The Delhi Conference of Asian Countries on Relaxing of International Tensions (CRIT), Carolien Stolte argues that the definition of the "Bandung Moment" should include not only "interstate diplomacy, but on more popular -- and certainly more populous -- expressions of the much-famed 'Bandung Spirit'."[262] The articles in this issue examine how Cold War tensions were often refracted through these anticolonial and international organizations, including UNESCO and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (discussed later in this chapter), in unexpected ways; at times foreclosing these Third World solidarities, while also generating new affinities and networks.[263] This research builds from recent germinal work on the antecedents and legacies of Bandung, including Michael Goebel's work on anticolonialism in interwar Paris, Adam Ewing's research on global Garveyism in

[261] Su Lin Lewis and Carolien Stolte, "Other Bandungs: Afro-Asian Internationalisms in the Early Cold War" *Journal of World History*, Volume 30, Numbers 1-2, (June 2019), 4
[262] Carolien Stolte "The People's Bandung": Local Anti-imperialists on an Afro-Asian Stage." *Journal of World History*, Volume 30, Numbers 1-2, June 2019, 125-26
[263] See articles from the issue including Gerard McCann "Where was the Afro in Afro-Asian Solidarity? Africa's 'Bandung Moment' in 1950s"; Rachel Leow "A Missing Peace: The Asia-Pacific Peace Conference in Beijing, 1952 and the Emotional Making of Third World Internationalism."; Su Lin Lewis "Asian Socialism and the Forgotten Architects of Post-Colonial Freedom, 1952–1956"; Hanna Jansen "Soviet "Afro-Asians" in UNESCO: Reorienting World History"; and Ali Raza "Dispatches from Havana: The Cold War, Afro-Asian Solidarities, and Culture Wars in Pakistan."

the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and edited volumes on the global 1960s, non-alignment, and neutralism – all of which help situate Bandung beyond a narrow geographic or temporal scope.[264] Ultimately, this most recent articulation of the New Bandung History is premised on looking beyond the 'official' narratives, and uncovering new dynamics, such as how intellectuals, writers, and artists were part of this broader "Third World project", as well as the tensions and contradictions between the 'Bandung spirit' and its ability to transform the international order - a perspective that is crucial for understanding the impact of Bandung in Cairo.

While this new Bandung history has helped uncover the larger footprint of Bandung, historians of Egypt have long been attuned to the conference's impact on Cairo. In the 1968 *Egypt: Military Society; the Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change*, Anouar Abdel-Malek termed the period after Nasser's return as "the Bandung period."[265] Abdel-Malek's nomenclature was in part due to the

[264] Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Adam Ewing, *The Age of Garvey: How a Jamaican Activist Created a Mass Movement and Changed Global Black Politics.* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014) *Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties.* Edited by Chian Jen, Martin Klimke, Masha Kirasirova, Mary Nolan, Marilyn Young, and Joanna Waley-Cohen (New York: Routledge, 2018); *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?* edited by Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Janick Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss (Routledge, 2015); and Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska, eds., T*he Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung- Belgrade* (London: Routledge, 2014)

[265] Abdel-Malek, *Egypt, Military Society* p. 116. One crude though indicative measurement of Bandung's influence is the frequency in which Nasser mentioned the conference in his speeches (data compiled from *Nasser Archive).*

Figure 5. Frequency of 'Bandung' in Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches, 1952-1970



conference's significance as a milestone for Nasser and the RCC, providing the government with new networks across the globe and legitimizing the revolution internationally. Yet Bandung's influence was also felt within Cairo, accelerating the expansion of Egypt's initiatives to support international anti-colonialism, especially with respect to African liberation movements. Building upon the success of the Arab Affairs policy, a committee was formed in January 1956 to formalize Egypt's policy towards Africa as a whole, recommending that Cairo should advocate for "Africa for the Africans" – in other words, the liberation of the continent "from foreign influence, politically, economically, socially, culturally, and militarily."[266] To this end, new institutions were created, including an African Affairs Bureau in the Foreign Ministry under Mohammed Fawzi, and one in Hatem's Information Department.[267] However, the primary driver of African policy for the next decade would be Mohammed Fayek. Similar to Hatem, Fayek had graduated from the Military College in 1948, and been drafted into the revolution by his former instructor, Lt. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. Fayek was also posted to Egyptian General Intelligence under Zakaria Mohieddin, where he quickly carved a niche as an expert in African affairs, initially working on Egyptian policy towards Sudan.[268] In late 1955, Fayek would establish another African Affairs Bureau, but given his close relationship to Nasser, this office was directly affiliated with the Presidency, and Fayek was often described as Nasser's close advisor on Africa.[269] In his memoirs, Fayek describes the rationale for this new organization as facilitating "the political officers of the liberation movements and African national movements." These movements were provided offices, access to "state agencies to

[266] Tareq Ismael, *The UAR in Africa: Egypt's Policy Under Nasser* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 34-34.
[267] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 35, 248.
[268] Helmi Sharawy, *Political and Social Thought in Africa*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2014), 35. According to Sharawy, Fayek also accompanied Nasser on international trips and learned about "about Africa in a general form by reading *Inside Africa* by John Gunther (1955), but he continued through more sophisticated material, ended with a thorough reading of Karl Marx's *Das Capital*.", 29
[269] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 247

help them print and disseminate information", and help with "press conferences for the recognition of African delegations from the liberation movements […] and interviews with officials."[270]

Fayek was also involved with the African Association, a private organization established in late 1955, which was officially run by Muhammad Abdel Aziz Ishak, nicknamed the 'professor' as he would often lead "discussions about empire and resistance in Africa".[271] The association had initially been founded to help coordinate the thousands of students predominantly from the Sudan and West Africa coming to study at al-Azhar and Cairo University, but as new national liberation movements were drawn to Cairo the mission expanded. Part of this shift was Fayek's increasing involvement in the association, which in turn blurred the line between the state-run Bureau and the private Association. Nonetheless, Fayek believed that this collaboration between the two organizations was critical for the "popularity of the association and its global reputation."[272] In his memoirs, Helmi Sharawy details meeting Fayek for the first time at the Association in March 1956, while part of "a group of young men from Egypt, Somalia, Eritrea, Uganda, Southern Sudan, Nigeria and Chad," reading an article in the Newsweek magazine of March 1956, entitled "The Black Nation" with Ishak introducing the 27-year old Fayek as the "sponsor of African renaissance in Egypt."[273] Fayek and Sharawy would eventually become friends and collaborators, forming what Sharawy described as a "lifelong partnership" working towards national liberation across both the Arab and African worlds.

In "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", Reem Abou-El-Fadl portrays the new Association building in Zamalek as "the site of tens of African liberation movement offices, and a cultural centre for Egyptian scholars, writers, students and activists who supported their cause."[274] Indeed, beginning in 1956, the association became home to African activists and their movements, including

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[270] Fayek *'Abd Al-Nasir wa-l-Thawra Al-Ifriqiyya*, 40.
[271] Reem Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub: Infrastructures of Solidarity and the 1957 Cairo Conference" *Journal of World History*, Volume 30, Numbers 1-2, (June 2019), 164.
[272] Fayek *'Abd Al-Nasir wa-l-Thawra Al-Ifriqiyya,* 40.
[273] Sharawy, *Political and Social Thought in Africa*, 28-29.
[274] Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", 162.

Felix Moumié, leader of the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon; John Kale of the Ugandan National Congress; Amani Thani of the National Zanzibar Party; Odinga Odinga and the Kenya Africa National Congress; and Oliver Tambo and Vusumzi Make of the African National Congress.[275] The appeal of Cairo to these groups was in part location (remaining on the African continent), as well as the funds (a monthly salary of 100 Egyptian pounds) and access to offices at the Association headquarters. In her memoirs, Marthe Moumié, the wife of Felix, describes arriving in Zamalek, "the epi-center of Afro-Asian solidarity", and being offered accommodations in a villa that had been abandoned by an Englishman.[276] She also vividly recounts an esprit-de-corps among these young nationalists, many of whom were meeting for the first time as colonial governments often prevented travel across the continent.[277] While this support was crucial for many of these movements, perhaps the largest draw to Cairo was access to the Egyptian information regime. These national liberation bureaus were not only able to network with each other and meet with foreign embassies in Cairo, they were also given access to print facilities for their own publications, the ability to utilize Radio Cairo's broadcasts to publicize their movements, and a platform to host press conferences and share their agendas.[278] Tables 1 and 2 provide details regarding the establishment of these liberation bureaus in Cairo as well as the multitude of publications these movements produced. The opportunity to disseminate their nationalist message both domestically and abroad was crucial to these movements given colonial government monopoly of the news media, as well as the imbalances of international news flows. Especially for groups like the Baustoland Congress Party or the Bechuanaland Peoples Party, this platform was crucial in enabling these communities to seek self-

[275] Helmi Sharawy, "Memories on African Liberation (1956–1975): A Personal Experience from Egypt, Part I," *Pamvazuka News*, May 19, 2011, issue 530.
[276] Marthe Moumié, *Victime du Colonialisme: Mon Mari Félix Moumié* [Victim of Colonialism: My Husband Félix Moumié] (Paris: Duboiris, 2006), 99.
[277] Moumié, *Victime du Colonialism* 100-103; Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 36-37; and Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", 165-166.
[278] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 36-37.

determination, though as Lydia Walker recently detailed, competing rights' claims from within postcolonial states were neglected at United Nations in the 1960s. While Walker's research is focused on the failure of Nagaland versus the success of Namibia, she advocates for "uncovering the network of individuals who connected the nationalist claims of seemingly peripheral peoples with the international politics of 1960s decolonization"[279] – a network that, for many African liberation movements, included Cairo.

Table 1. African National Liberation Bureaus in Cairo

Data from "Cairo Based African Political Parties" Ankush B. Sawant Egypt's Africa Policy pp.64-66.

Nation of Origin	Liberation Movement	Bureau Established	Bureau Closed
Cameroon	The Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC)	1958	1960
Uganda	Uganda National Congress (UNC)	1958	1963
Kenya	The Representative body of Kenya Political Organization Abroad (KANU)	1958	1963
Zanzibar	Nationalist Party of Zanzibar	1958	1963
Ruanda-Burundi South Africa	UPRONA RUNAR	1959	1961
Northern Rhodesia(Sambia)	UNIP	1960	1964
South Africa	PAC	1960	Still operating as of 1981
South Africa	NAC	1960	""
Somalia	Somali National Movement	1960	""
French Somaliland	Front of Liberation of Somalia Coast (FLSC)	1960	""
Namibia	SAAPO	1961	""
Basutoland	Basutoland Congress Party	1961	1966
South West Africa	SWANU	1961	1962
Mozambique	UDENAMO	1961	1972
Mozambique	FRELIMO	1961	Still operating as of 1981
Angola	MPLA	1961	""
Guinea Bissau	PAIGOC	1961	""
Angola	FNLA	1963	""
Swaziland	The The Swaziland Progressive Party	1963	1968
Bechuanaland	Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP)	1963	1966
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	ZANU	1964	Still operating as of 1981

[279] Lydia Walker "Decolonization in the 1960s: On Legitimate and Illegitimate Nationalist Claims-Making", *Past & Present*, Volume 242, Issue 1, (February 2019), 228.

Table 2. Publications from African National Liberation Bureaus in Cairo

Data from WorldCat and "Cairo Based African Political Parties" Ankush B. Sawant Egypt's Africa Policy pp.64-66.

Liberation Movement	Publication Title	Publication Established	Publication Closed	Frequency
The Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC)	*The Voice of Kamerun* *	April 1958	January 1960	Bi-monthly
Uganda National Congress (UNC)	*Uganda Renaissance (also Newsletter)*	May 1958	February 1961	Monthly
The Representative body of Kenya Political Organization Abroad (KANU)	*The New Kenya*	October 1958	July 1963	Monthly
UNIP	*Voice of Northern Rhodesia*	October 1960	September 1964	Every two months
PAC	*Pan Africanist News and Views*	November 1960	Still operating as of 1981	n/a
FNLA	*Liberte Angola Information*	January 1961	n/a	n/a
Nationalist Party of Zanzibar	*Dawn in Zanzibar**	February 1961	October 1962	n/a
SAAPO	*Solidarity*	July 1961	n/a	n/a
Basutoland Congress Party	*Makatolle (Basutoland Newsletter)*	November 1961	March 1968	Monthly
ZANU	*Zimbabwe Review*	November 1961	Still operating as of 1981	Monthly
Nationalist Party of Zanzibar	*Zanzibar Awakening**	February 1962	August 1962	Bi-monthly
NAC	*South Africa Freedom News*	February 1962	Still operating as of 1981	n/a
Nationalist Party of Zanzibar	*Freedom News*	July 1962	n/a	n/a
SWANU	*Freedom*	September 1962	n/a	Every two months
The The Swaziland Progressive Party	*Swaziland Newsletter*	March 1963	September 1968	Monthly
Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP)	*MASA (Dawn) (Bechawana Newsletter)*	January 1964	March 1966	Quarterly
ZANU	*Zimbabwe Today**	January 1964	Still operating as of 1981	n/a
ZANU	*Democratic Voice*	October 1965	Still operating as of 1981	Fortnightly
UPRONA RUNAR	*Activities Politiques on Ruanda Burundi*	n/a	n/a	only a few issues
UDENAMO	*Cambate*	n/a	n/a	n/a
FRELIMO	*Patriotic*	n/a	n/a	n/a
MPLA	*MPLA Information*	n/a	n/a	n/a
PAIGOC	*PAIGC Activities*	n/a	n/a	n/a

Though the majority of the Bureau and Association's activities were geared towards supporting African liberation movements, there was also a push to "spread awareness about Africa among Egyptians."[280] Accordingly, the Association hosted talks and seminars, and published two new monthly journals *Nahdhat Ifriqiya* [Renaissance of Africa] and *Al-Rabita al-Ifriqiya* [The African Association], which included translated articles from many of these African nationalists.[281] Indeed, Helmi Sharawy describes submitting articles to *Renaissance of Africa*, which was one of the first Arabic-language periodicals to study Africa, and was intended to promote consciousness in Egypt

[280] Fayek *'Abd Al-Nasir wa-l-Thawra Al-Ifriqiyya,* 40-1.
[281] Fayek *'Abd Al-Nasir wa-l-Thawra Al-Ifriqiyya*, 41 and Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 38.

about Africa and nationalist liberation movements across the continent.[282] The relationship between these new publications and the mass information regime is hazy, but at some level they represented a competing approach to Hatem's vision of the state directing all informational activities, especially those intended to influence public opinion. Yet these new periodicals were also loosely affiliated with the African Affairs Bureau of the Presidency – again blurring the line between the state and private individuals. This relationship would become even more complicated over 1956 and 1957 as the "spirit of Bandung" continued to influence Egyptian politics.

Indeed, Abdel-Malek's label for this era "the Bandung period" not only referred to the rise of "Afro-Asian solidarity", but was also about how Nasser's experience at the conference reinforced his belief in the need to mobilize the masses and "a certain form of guided democracy" to solidify the revolution. To this end, the post-Bandung period witnessed the release of "communist progressives and leftist liberals" from prison, who were then reincorporated into the regime in an effort to shore up support through limited liberalization.[283] In the aftermath of the March crisis of 1954, not only was the opportunity for democratic reform sidelined, many of the original Free Officers found themselves marginalized from power, with some sent abroad on diplomatic missions, such as Thawrat Ukasha and Khaled Mohieddin in Paris and Rome, respectively, while others were jailed for their involvement in pro-Naguib activities, as was the case for Ahmed Hamroush.[284] Regardless, these former allies remained committed to the revolution, even Hamroush who, while surprised at his change of circumstances, claimed "he bore no grudges" and believed he had more to give to the revolution.[285] Nasser was keen to harness this zeal and also counter foreign criticisms

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[282] Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", 167-169, Sharawy, *Political and Social Thought in Africa*, 35; and Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 38. Eventually parts of the issue were printed in English and French so that it could be circulated across the continent.
[283] Abdel-Malek, *Egypt, Military Society*, 115-116 Roel Meijer, 211
[284] Wynn. *Nasser of Egypt*, 61; Laura James, *Nasser at War*, 19; and St. John *The boss,* 177
[285] Though jailed, Hamroush claimed "he bore no grudges" against Nasser, likely in part because he describes his imprisonment as "relatively pampered Foreigners' Prison for 50 days. I was put in one of five especially well-kept cells reserved for foreign women prisoners." Nkrumah, "*Ahmed Hamroush: For Corps and Country*."

over the lack of democratic reforms, especially as relations with the West increasingly strained over the Czechoslovakian arms deal, even though there remained prospects for American funding of the Aswan High Dam.[286]

However, given their previous roles in challenging his power, Nasser was hesitant to give these former Free Officers free reign. The solution was to place them in newly established government-funded Arabic dailies and periodicals, as well as in official positions somewhat removed from key government ministries. Khaled Mohieddin became the new Editor in Chief of the revived leftist *al-Messa* and Salah Salem became Editor in Chief of the daily *al-Shaab*; while eventually Thawrat Ukasha was appointed as Minister of Culture and Hamroush as Minister of National Theater. These efforts were largely intended as a way to co-opt the Arab Left back into the regime, and *al-Messa* in particular, would become "the ideological workshop of the new Egypt" with "communists, progressives, and liberal intellectuals" all collaborating on the magazine.[287] Indeed, *al-Messa* quickly became regarded as the premier venue for Egyptian politics, with Nasser reportedly reading it daily.[288] This shift was part of the emergence of what Abdel-Malek termed a *"virtual state monopoly of culture"* with the creation of not only the Ministry of Culture in 1958, but also the Higher Council for Arts and Letters in 1956. In *Conscience of the Nation*, Richard Jacquemond argues that this new monopoly was "largely in continuity with the previous khedival and monarchical ones", perpetuating a similar system of patronage. However, Jacquemond acknowledges "the unprecedented expansion of the state's ideological apparatus" and "the determination of the state to control the intellectual market."[289] In *The Quest for Modernity: Secular Liberal and Left-Wing Political*

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[286] For more on the High Dam, see Nancy Reynolds "City of the High Dam: Aswan and the Promise of Postcolonialism in Egypt," *City & Society*, vol. 29, no. 1 (April 2017), 213-235.
[287] Abdel-Malek, *Egypt, Military Society*, 120, Robert St. John writes that "the Red major, Khaled Mohieddin, had been given three quarters of a million dollars to help him make a success of his new daily newspaper." *The boss*, 271.
[288] International Press Institute Survey, *The Press in Authoritarian Countries,* 181 and Abdel-Malek, *Egypt, Military Society*, 120
[289] Richard Jacquemond, *Conscience of the Nation: Writers, State, and Society in Modern Egypt*, trans. David Tresilian (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2007), 16.

Thought in Egypt, 1945–1958, Roel Meijer also details how this moment experienced a shift in discourses around modernity. During the monarchy, Egyptian modernist intellectuals had rallied around efforts to limit the powers of the executive and legislative, but increasingly, these demands for more democratic governance were eroded by what Meijer terms 'authoritarian modernism' – the language of "technocratic arguments […], terminology of efficiency and authoritarian organization", all of which justified this expanding state edifice.[290]

This expansion was largely overseen by Yusuf al-Sibai, a former Free Officer and writer, who gained the epithet "general of the army of letters" given his efforts on behalf of the state to establish new cultural institutions and networks of patronage.[291] Prior to his new position, Sibai was appointed Editor in Chief of *al-Risala al-Gadida* (*The New Dispatches*), a government-funded magazine established in 1954 to replace an earlier version of the magazine that had been shut down. In addition to *al-Risala,* the government also founded the monthly cultural periodical *al-Shahr* (*This Month*) in 1955 under the auspices of Sa'd al-Din Wahba. These two magazines were similar in content to Suhayl Idris' *al-Adab* from Beirut, discussed in the previous chapter, and these publications provided venues for the new realist literary trend, while also articulating an "agenda for social and political change."[292] To further the state's involvement in literary affairs, Sibai founded the Association of Men of Letters (*Gami'yat al-Udaba')* in 1955 as the Egyptian branch of the larger Congress of Arab Writers. Jacquemond describes how this Association of Men of Letters was set up intentionally to avoid the liberal syndicate model, which could then advocate for individual freedoms, or the totalizing control of the "Soviet-style writers union."[293] Instead, the aim of the Association was to mobilize writers for "spreading the literary and cultural aspects of Nasserism in

[290] Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 212.
[291] Jacquemond, *Conscience of the Nation*, 18.
[292] Sabry Hafez "Cultural Journals and Modern Arabic Literature: A Historical Overview"*Alif* 37 (2017), 20-21.
[293] Jacquemond, *Conscience of the Nation*, 18.

the region" and similar to the African Association, this literary institution was housed in a villa in Zamalek that would host literary debates and social clubs – a venue that would become the primary meeting place for Cairo's writers until the 1970s.

These new state-run cultural institutions would become powerful arbiters in the Egyptian and Arab literary scene. Indeed, scholars have detailed how Naguib Mahfouz's acclaimed *The Cairo Trilogy*, though written prior to the revolution, was first published with the patronage of Sibai and Ukasha, as well as Mahfouz's growing misgivings about this expanding state apparatus.[294] In addition to *al-Shaab* and *al-Messa*, the government also funded the creation of two additional magazines, Amin Shaker's *Bena' al-Watan* and Amina Sa'id's *Hawwa'*.[295] These new publications and institutions were all intended to both promote the regime, and signal a loosening of restrictions on political discourse. This liberalizing of regulations around the press and media was at the time considered to be the "new spring of 1954." This shift was in part the legacy of Bandung, which had demonstrated the potential for anti-colonialism to mobilize the masses.[296] Yet even more transformative was the outbreak of the Suez Crisis in October 1956. While the legacies of Suez were many, perhaps one of the most profound was the cementing of Nasser's primacy in Egyptian political life. Without the threat of political rivals, the government would increasingly fund this new 'state monopoly on culture', trading political control for the promise of intellectual support for the Nasserist project. The next section details the impact the Suez Crisis on the Egyptian information regime, and how this furthered Egypt's prominence in both pan-Arab and Afro-Asian intellectual and political worlds.

[294] Lensink "*The Writers in the Alley*", 52-56 and Geer, "Prophets and Priests of the Nation", 656
[295] Talhami *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 150 and Laura Bier "Feminism, Solidarity, and Identity in the Age of Bandung: Third World Women in the Egyptian Women's Press", in Christopher Lee ed., *Making a World after Empire*, 143–172.
[296] Abdel-Malek, *Egypt, Military Society*, 122.

Winning Hearts and Minds: The Suez Crisis and The Cairo Conference

Few moments in Egyptian history have been as thoroughly studied for their international dimensions as the invasion of the Suez Canal by Israel, followed by Britain and France in late October 1956. Though scholars have increasingly contextualized the crisis, it remains a powerful watershed moment in narratives tracing the decline of the British, and the emergence of an American empire in the region.[297] In histories of Nasser's Egypt, Suez also looms large, although unpacking the regime's many myths remains difficult.[298] In *Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization*, Guy Laron details that in the aftermath of Bandung and the arms deal, American President Eisenhower still hoped to entice Nasser into American regional alliances through the prospect of funding for the Aswan Dam. Yet Laron argues that this olive branch was undermined by what he characterizes as "isolationists", from British Prime Minister Anthony Eden to the American congress, as well as the growing Egyptian middle class (what Laron terms the *effendia*) that were critical of Nasser's previously more internationalist and conciliatory policies towards Britain and the United States.[299] Previous work has emphasized Nasser's hostility towards American alliances in the region, most notably the 'Omega' plan, and American anger after Egypt granted communist China diplomatic recognition.[300]

Regardless, during a flight back from Brioni, Yugoslavia on July 19, where Nasser had been meeting with Tito and Nehru, he learned that American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had

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[297] For examples, see K. Kyle, *Suez* (New York, St Martin's Press, 1991); W. Scott Lucas, *Divided We Stand* (London, John Curtis, 1991); W. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds), *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989); and David Carlton, *Britain and the Suez Crisis* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1988).

[298] Laura James writes "Unfortunately, the legend surrounding this defining moment in modern Egyptian history tends to obscure the actual sequence of events. The summer of 1956 is often described like a slow-motion table tennis match." *Nasser at War*, 22.

[299] Guy Laron, *The Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization, 1945-1956*. (Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 7-9, 136-140.

[300] James, *Nasser at War*, 16 and Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 47.

formally withdrawn the funds for the dam – a moment that would later be dramatized and memorialized in the Egyptian film *Nasser 56*.[301] The film and most of the initial historiography depict Nasser as immediately deciding to nationalize the Suez Canal in response. Yet in *Nasser at War,* Laura M. James contends that this narrative does not fit with actual events, as Nasser likely made the final decision much closer to the announcement on July 23, and that this choice was also premeditated as he plausibly expected American funding to be rescinded and was considering nationalization as early as 1955.[302] In response to Nasser's announcement, a flurry of international negotiations were organized to try and mediate the conflict, but both Britain and France were adamantly against Egypt maintaining control of the canal – fearing the loss of both material goods (especially oil) and prestige (particularly Nasser's growing popularity with nationalists in the Middle East and North Africa).[303] Dissatisfied with negotiations, the two European powers secretly joined forces with the Israelis, signing the Protocol of Sèvres on October 24, 1956 and agreeing to undertake a two-step invasion of Egypt with the aim of toppling Nasser. Israel invaded first on October 29 1956, followed by the British and French forces that were sent under the guise of ending the conflict. Almost immediately the 'tripartite aggression' was met with international opprobrium including from both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as protests in France and Britain.

For Nasser, the resulting UN peace keeping force in the Sinai and the announcement of the Eisenhower doctrine, not to mention the bombing of Port Said, were all considerable setbacks. Yet the Suez Crisis was largely seen as an international victory for Egypt, and especially Nasser, whose leadership was now cemented both at home and abroad. Indeed, America's public rebuke of the

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[301] Joel Gordon, "Film, Fame, and Public Memory: Egyptian Biopics from Mustafa Kamil to Nasser 56," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31 (1999) and "Nasser56/'Cairo 96 Reimaging Egypt's Lost Community" in *Mass Mediations: New Approaches to Popular Culture in the Middle East and Beyond* Ed. Walter Armbrust (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 200).
[302] James, *Nasser at War*, 22-24.
[303] Laron, *The Origins of the Suez Crisis*, 163-172.

European empires and Israel bolstered the efficacy of the Egyptian information regime's attempts to sway public opinion In *Information and the Arab Cause*, Hatem devotes a chapter to the crisis, though he claims that it is "not possible [in one book] to describe in detail all the activities of the Egyptian information services at the time of Suez."[304] These extensive activities largely built upon the foundation outlined in the previous chapter. In February 1956, the Middle East News Agency (MENA) had started in publishing its first bulletin, which was quickly followed by "local news services distribution […] to all newspapers, foreign news agencies, embassies, governmental ministries all over Egypt."[305] With the outbreak of the crisis, these materials became crucial for circulating Cairo's message about events in the canal. MENA dispatched stories to other Arab and international news outlets, with the aim of "condemning the aggression and exposing it to the whole world public opinion."[306] In his memoirs, Hatem details how he personally brought foreign correspondents, who had been confined to Semiramis Hotel in downtown Cairo to Ismailia after hearing from international news agencies of a speech by the French Premier, Guy Mollet, claiming that the French flag was flying in the city. Finding no flag, these correspondents were able to quickly send dispatches back, including to France – helping undermine the narrative in Paris. [307] In addition to MENA, the Information Department was also responsible for translating and countering 'inaccuracies' in foreign coverage. Hatem terms these activities 'counter-propaganda', and argues that given the crisis, the information regime had "a duty to maintain national morale against the military and propaganda onslaught of the enemy."[308] While he is careful to not condone the manipulation of news, even arguing that such an approach would undermine the Egyptian cause, Hatem does acknowledge that the information regime was not confined to "mere factual reporting."[309] Instead,

[304] Hatem, *Information and the Arab cause,* 186.
[305] "Monographs III" UNESCO, 105.
[306] "Monographs III" UNESCO, 105.
[307] Hatem. *Mudhakkirāt*., 64.
[308] Hatem, *Information and the Arab cause,* 191.
[309] Hatem, *Information and the Arab cause,* 191.

he depicts the Egyptian press and information services as 'encouraging' public opinion towards adopting a perspective, while also 'protecting' public opinion from enemy and partisan information, from both within and outside of Egypt.[310]

This perceived need to counter foreign propaganda was at least in part born from British efforts to counter Egypt's radio propaganda. In October 1956, Britain established both secret radio broadcasting facilities and requisitioned *Sharq al-Adna*, a radio broadcasting station initially founded in Palestine in 1945 and later moved to Cyprus. Until the creation of Radio Cairo, *Sharq* had been the most popular station in the region, but had since been faltering in the face of Cairo's broadcasts.[311] *Sharq* (also known as Near East Broadcasting Services) was rechristened as the Voice of Britain during the crisis, since British involvement in *Sharq* was already well-known leading to an Egyptian effort to boycott the station in the Fall of 1955. The Voice of Britain was apparently "the most heavily criticized of Britain's propaganda initiatives during the entire crisis", largely failing to undermine Nasser with heavy handed broadcasts calling for Egyptians to topple their 'mad leader' and listing eight potential replacements, two of whom were already dead.[312] These inflammatory broadcasts were paired with leaflets claiming that tripartite forces were coming to liberate Egyptians and sent to towns along the canal, including the heavily bombed Port Said.[313] However, while some of these initiatives were unsuccessful, British covert efforts were significant. Indeed, James Vaughan recounts how in September 1956, the American embassy in Cairo reported receiving a pamphlet that they believed was 'black propaganda' and called for the creation of an Egyptian-led Committee, threatening to deny oil supply to 'enemies' of the Arab world. Vaughan describes how "the

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[310] Hatem, *Information and the Arab cause*, 192-94.
[311] Vaughan, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda in The Arab Middle East, 1945-57,* 35-36 and Simon Collier, *"*Countering Communist *and* Nasserite Propaganda*; the* Foreign Office Information Research Department *in the* Middle East *and* Africa*,* 1954–1963*,"* (PhD thesis, University of Hertfordshire, 2013), 87.
[312] Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, 109; Boyd, "Development of Egypt's Radio", 649; and Vaughan, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda*, 210.
[313] Hatem, *Information and the Arab cause,* 188-189.

pamphlet was designed to look like an official Egyptian Government information leaflet", copying previous Egyptian publications and inserting this "oil grab" theme.[314] While the Americans failed to identify the source, Vaughan uncovered classified reports claiming responsibility from the British Information Co-ordination Executive, the agency responsible for propaganda during Suez. These types of covert economic propaganda proliferated in the lead up to the crisis, especially on British 'black' radio stations.[315]

In response to this challenge, Hatem states that "the Egyptian information machinery used all the media—the written word, the spoken word, the visible image—available to it at the time."[316] For example, a daily review of the Arab press was broadcast on Radio Cairo, which was further circulated by stations in other Arab states and broadcast publicly throughout Egypt with newly installed loud-speakers in public spaces. Egyptian newspapers also provided crucial venues for the regime, as well as foreign newsmen in Cairo, who were given access to both the cities under siege in the canal region, as well as telephone facilities, reports, and photographs for their coverage.[317] These photos would become the central focus of *The Scribe* during and after the crisis, which would replace the majority of articles with images of the destruction in the Suez. For example, the November 1956 issue contained a single article, which was described as "the text sent, to the Press Agencies of the world, by the Swedish Journalist-Photographer Per-Olow Anderson", while the cover featured an injured Egyptian woman with her child in Port Said.[318] Hatem also details the use of rapid book publishing, boasting of how a week after Israel published *A Hundred Hours to Suez,* the Information Department responded with their riposte, *A Hundred Hours in Sinai.*[319] However, radio remained the most influential weapon in Egypt's arsenal. British and French bombers attempted to knock out

[314] Vaughan, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda*, 215.
[315] Vaughan, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda*, 214-216.
[316] Hatem, *Information and the Arab cause*, 195.
[317] Hatem, *Information and the Arab cause*, 197-99 and Boyd, "Development of Egypt's Radio", 649.
[318] *The Scribe* November 1956, 1-3.
[319] Hatem, *Information and the Arab cause*, 198.

broadcast capabilities in Cairo, and in response the Egyptian government organized "information caravans", mobile broadcasting units that transmitted news updates, political commentary, and even music, throughout Egypt.[320] While the Suez Crisis ended relatively quickly, with international negotiations leading to a ceasefire and the stationing of United Nations Emergency Forces in the Sinai that November, the influence of the crisis on Egypt is hard to overstate.

Many of the activities detailed in the last section, from the proliferation of African liberation bureaus in Cairo to the rapprochement between the government and the Egyptian left, can only be understood from the vantage point of post-Suez Egypt – when Nasser was heralded as the champion of both Egypt and the decolonizing world.[321] Indeed, for the Arab Left and African revolutionaries, the nationalization of the Suez and the spurning of Western alliances made Nasser a hero. Although the Suez provided this position of international pre-eminence, the post-1956 government policies were mainly an intensification of existing trends, including producing media to promote Egypt to decolonizing states and advocating for Cairo as a hub for international anti-colonialism. To this end, Cairo increasingly hosted anti-colonial conferences, expanded its radio broadcasting capabilities, and established many of the publications discussed earlier.

While Radio Cairo had announced plans for a second Bandung in Cairo in the immediate post-Bandung moment, this was quickly backtracked, despite the fact that the idea of the conference was clearly appealing to the government. For example, in the Summer of 1956, the American Embassy in Cairo reported on discussions between Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi and the British ambassador about a proposed African Liberation Congress planned for that summer.[322] Both the Americans and British were unsure if the Congress was indeed organized, but the embassy officials

[320] Hatem, *Information and the Arab cause*, 199 and Boyd, "Development of Egypt's Radio", 649.
[321] Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", 172-173.
[322] Byroade American Embassy Telegram July 27 1956 Folder 310 Box 2 1956-1958 RG 84 Embassy Cairo Classified Records 1953-61, 1.

noted "increasing attention had been given in the Egyptian press and radio to African problems."[323] While interest in North Africa had been ongoing, a new focus seemed to be emerging on Africa south of the Sahara, and especially with respect to Muslim populations in Mauritania, Nigeria, and East Africa. The embassy attributed this shift to Salah Salem's editorship of *al-Shaab,* which had hired a "feature writer to tour Africa south of the Sahara."[324] The embassy believed that Cairo would continue to focus on primarily Muslim Africa, but feared the appeal of the "Egyptian expression of nationalism" in Africa, and especially the potential for an African conference that would be Egyptian-led and Soviet sponsored.[325] The outbreak of the Suez Crisis would table any plans for an African conference, but this memo was prescient given that in December 1957 such a conference would occur in Cairo.[326]

On February 16, 1957 the headline of *al-Shaab* announced that Nasser had agreed to host the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference later that year, after meeting with representatives from the Asian Solidarity Committee.[327] According to the Egyptian press, the purpose of the conference was to "continue Bandung conference policy and answer imperialist plots against certain Asian and African states such as recently took place in Syria."[328] In statements to *al-Shaab* and *al-Messa*, the Indian delegate, Anup Singh, described this proposed conference as continuing the work started in New Delhi in 1955 with the Conference of Asian Countries on Relaxing of International Tensions

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[323] "Proposed African Conference" American Embassy Cairo July 17 1956. Folder 310 Box 2 1956-1958 RG 84 Embassy Cairo Classified Records 1953-61, 1.
[324] "Proposed African Conference", 1.
[325] "Proposed African Conference", 2-3.
[326] In "Memo from Henry Byroade to American Ambassador Philip K. Crowe Colombo Ceylon", Byroade contends that Nasser would wait for an Afro-Asian conference until the threat of war with Israel subsided and that he was "unchallenged leader of the Arab states." Nehru also wanted to wait until "Arab-Jewish problem may have calmed down" RG 84 Classified 1956-1958 Box 2 Afro Asian Conference (Hereafter NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58) Memos February 2 1956 and March 9 1956.
[327] Representatives included Indian Anup Singh, Russian Anatoly Sefernov, Chinese Yang Shou, and Japanese Masharu Hatanaka "Telegram American Embassy in Cairo" NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58, February 18 1957, and Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", 172.
[328] "Telegram CIRCR 311" From Secstate Washington to American Embassy Cairo NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 October 5 1957, 1.

(CRIT). Singh was not operating as an official representative of the Indian government, but regardless, the American embassy in Cairo immediately feared that "the Communist world may have begun its preparations to dominate the second Asian-African conference."[329] In an effort to forestall the conference, both the American and British embassies attempted to dissuade invited countries from attending, emphasizing the communist leanings of the committee and that this conference was not an official follow-up to Bandung.[330] Yet in a memo from the American Embassy in Cambodia, this line of reasoning failed to persuade the Cambodian Prime Minister Sim Var, who felt that participating in the Cairo Conference was critical for furthering the Bandung spirit.[331]

Part of what made the conference palatable to invited nations was that the proposed conference was not a "government-level Asian-African Conference", which Nasser claimed would be too difficult to organize given the "outstanding issues between member states", and instead aimed to address issues "which can only be dealt with by peoples [rather than governments]."[332] However, the division between the Egyptian government and the conference was blurry. The Egyptian delegation was headed by two former Free Officers - Anwar El Sadat, in charge of planning the conference, and Yusuf al-Sabai, who was appointed by Nasser as the Secretary General of the Conference, and included many prominent Egyptian writers, journalists, and government

[329] Department of State Instruction, "Proposed 'Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo in Late 1957," NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 March 6 1957, 1-2.
[330] Herter, "Circular 353, October 13, 1957, 6:00PM," From Secretary of State Washington to American Embassy in Cairo NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 October 14 1957, 1. A memo from George V. Allen outlined official American policy to "encourage indigenous output to avoid, or challenge if necessary, any reference to "Second Bandung" or "People's Bandung" as fraudulent pro-Communist effort to exploit prestige and principles of the Bandung Conference." Allen, "Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference Circular USITO 194," NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 December 6 1957, 2. The American State Department records include hundreds of pages of coordination between embassies around the globe in an attempt to collect information and counter the appeal of the Cairo conference.
[331] Carl W. Strom American Ambassador Phnom Pehn, "Forthcoming Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo, December 26th," NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 November 16 1957,1-3.
[332] "Asian African Solidarity Conference," American Embassy Cairo NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 November 16 1957, 2.

officials.[333] Given the prominence of the Egyptian state in organizing the conference, other delegations were unclear about the amount of support being provided for the conference, as well as the degree of Nasser's involvement.[334] The American embassy concluded that "Nasser considers an Afro-Asian backdrop so essential to his foreign policy ambitions, perhaps especially in Africa, that he is willing to play with dubious Communist sponsored apparatus rather than wait out government-level conference."[335] In "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", Abou-El-Fadl offers a less cynical reading of the conference, arguing that while furthering foreign policy aims, the conference was also an opportunity for Egyptian officials "to constitute themselves as subjects at home in Arab, African, and later Afro-Asian worlds, in a specifically Egyptian internationalism."[336] She compares articles from *al-Nahdat al-Ifriqiyya* and *al-Risala al-Jadida* after the conference to trace how these Egyptian meanings of Afro-Asianism were constructed discursively, as references to Suez helped reinforce Egypt's new role as "leader of the colonized."[337] For example, the famed Egyptian Marxist and writer Lutfi al-Khuli embodied the spirit of *iltizam*, discussed in the last chapter, when he wrote in the February 1958 issue of *al-Risala al-Jadida* that the conference underscored how "the Egyptian writer is required today, from his position as Arab and then as Afro-Asian and lastly as a human, [. .

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[333] The delegation also included prominent Egyptian writers such as Taha Hussein and Naguib Mahfouz; Egyptian journalists and editors – Mohamed Hassanein Heikal (editor of *al-Ahram* and *Akhir Sa'a*), Khaled Mohieddin (editor *al-Messa*), Ihsan Abdel Quddus (owner and editor of *Ruz el-Yusuf* and *Sabah al-Khair*), Ahmed Baha' al-Din (editor *Sabah al-Khair*), Abdel Aziz Sadik (editor *al-Tahrir*), Lutfi Wakid (editor *al-Shaab*, replacing Salah Salem that October), and Zakaria Lutfi Guma'a (journalist *al-Gumhuriyya*); and lastly a few select government officials, Mohamed Fuad Galal, former head of the Ministry of National Guidance and deputy speaker of the National Assembly; Mohamed Fahmy el-Sayed, MP and one of Nasser's legal advisors; Salah Abd al-Hafiz, Former Governor of Dakhaliya Province and MP; and Hatem, who at the time was an MP and spokesman for Nasser as Director Information Dept. Hare, "Telegram DEPCIRCTELS 311 and 353," NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference October 15 1957, 1; "Asian-African Solidarity Conference," NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference October 20 1957, 7; also Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub," 173 and Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 40.

[334] The American Embassy reported that the Indian Press Attaché that the "prime mover among Egyptians is Sadat who obtained Nasser's approval to hold conference in Cairo by agreeing to assume personal responsibility for the outcome." Hare, "Telegram DEPCIRCTELS 311 and 353", 2.

[335] Hare, "Telegram DEPCIRCTELS 311 and 353", 3.

[336] Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", 174

[337] Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", 180. Abou-El-Fadl cites "Al-Siba'i, 'Kharig Al-Nitaq Al-'Arabi' [Beyond the Arab Sphere], Al-Risala Al- Gadida, February 1958," but gives no page numbers.

.] to draw his pen in the face of nuclear weapons, human exploitation, and racial discrimination."[338] Ultimately, Abou-El-Fadl argues that the conference produced "the conditions of possibility of solidarity that enabled a particular Egyptian Afro- Asianism to emerge," and that crucial to this solidarity was Egypt and Cairo's physical geography, at the intersection of multiple continents, which influenced the networks of Egyptian Afro-Asianism in ways that differed from India and Ghana.[339]

While Abou-El-Fadl also considers some of the tensions within the conference, her perspective is largely concerned with those of the Egyptians and African nationalists that comprised the African Association. This viewpoint uncovers crucial, previously overlooked elements of the conference, but emphasizes connection rather than conflict among the participants. In fact, even before the conference met there were already tensions at the preparatory committee's initial meeting on October 21, which included delegates from "USSR, Red China, Mongolia, North Vietnam, Japan, India, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Algeria, Cameroons, Egypt."[340] At the meeting, the Turkish and Cambodian representatives advocated for more restrained neutralist language as more in the 'spirit of Bandung', and refused to sign resolutions on Syria and Algeria, which reportedly caused the committee "a great many headaches."[341] There were frictions within the Egyptian delegation as well, with Heikal moderating the more leftist members, like Taha Hussein and Khaled Mohieddin, and vetoing Sadat's

[338] Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", 182. Given her focus on Afro-Asianism, Abou-El-Fadl does not include in this article any larger discussion of Egyptian intellectual or literary trends, or shifts in the print or press cultures of Cairo. Notably, her recent book *Foreign Policy as Nation Making*, as well as earlier articles, adopt a similar perspective to this latest article, emphasizing solidarity and foreign relations over intellectual or media histories. In many ways, Abou-El-Fadl's argument is similar to this project's, yet our differing focus (hers on Afro-Asian solidarities, mine on the information regime) results in divergent narratives over the state's involvement in anti-colonialism in Cairo.
[339] Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub", 189.
[340] Hare, "Telegram Oct 22 1957," American Embassy Cairo NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference, 1 The original list was "all Bandung countries plus Algeria, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Malaya, Morocco, Nigeria, Somaliland, Thailand, Tunisia, and Uganda." "Deptel 900," American Embassy Cairo NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 October 3 1957, 1.
[341] "Asian-African Solidarity Conference," American Embassy Cairo NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58, October 30 1957, 2-3.

suggestion for Egypt to cover the costs for all the delegations.[342] These disagreements echoed many of the divisions at Bandung, as well as within the Egyptian government over the direction of anti-colonialism. Nonetheless, the committee set the agenda for the conference and scheduled it for December 26 1957 to January 1 1958.[343]

Thirty-nine delegations attended the conference, but many of the divisions at the preparatory meeting became even more acute, especially given the participation of the USSR and China, who along with the Syrians were seen as responsible for setting a much more radical agenda than expected.[344] Both Heikal and Hatem withdrew from the Egyptian delegation, forcing Nasser to moderate Khaled Mohieddin and the Egyptian communists, as well as the Soviet, Chinese, and Syrian delegates. [345] The prominence of the Soviets and Chinese in the conference was of immediate consternation to the American embassy in Cairo, with Hare wondering "how to reconcile this [Soviet participation] with professed government of Egypt stand against communism [… or] with either "Bandung spirit" or "positive neutrality", and incidentally hadn't Soviets really stolen Egypt's show [… and] been handed opportunity on platter to infiltrate Africa?"[346] The Egyptian press coverage glossed over these problems and immediately heralded the success of the conference, with *al-Gumhuriyya* writing "imperialists now fear Cairo because it is center of liberation movements."[347]

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[342] Hare, "Telegram Oct 22 1957", 2.
[343] The conference agenda included: "a review of the existing international situation and its bearing on the Asian and African countries; imperialism and national independence; war in Algeria; prohibition of the use and testing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; racial discrimination; consolidation of proposals for economic and technical cooperation among Asian and African countries; consolidation of proposals for cultural exchanges among Asian and African countries; and other problems raised by delegates." "Guidance 32. Confidential The Afro/Asian Solidarity Conference," American Embassy Canberra NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58, November 21 1957, 1-2.
[344] Delegates included: "Algeria, Burma, Cameroons, Ceylon, Chad, (Red) China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, (North) Korea, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Malaya, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Palestine, Senegal, (French) Somaliland, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, USSR, (North) Viet Nam, Yemen, Zanzibar. Additional delegations arrived: French Sudan, Italian Somaliland, Kuwait." Hare Telegram to Washington Embassy Cairo NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 December 27 1957
[345] Hare Telegram to Washington NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 December 27 and 28 1957.
[346] Hare Telegram to Washington NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 January 10 1958, 1
[347] Hare Telegram to Washington NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 December 27 1957 and Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 41.

The reaction from visiting delegates was more mixed, but Iraqi delegate Mohammed Hadid argued that the conference was successful, representing "the most genuine available reflection of mass sentiment" of both the participants and the Bandung spirit.[348]

In the aftermath of the conference, the majority of American embassy telegram traffic was devoted to detailing the tone of international coverage of the conference, however, many of the participating nations were also concerned with the pro-communist stance of the conference. For example, the Yugoslavian press "devoted considerable attention" to the conference but only before receiving news of the pro-communist influence, while the Indian press was fairly critical in its coverage for the same reason.[349] In Nairobi, the conference was front page news, though focusing primarily on the refusal from governments of Zanzibar Tanganyika and Kenya to release passports to delegates.[350] Similar coverage appeared in Beirut's newspapers, with stories on the Lebanese government preventing known communists and teachers from attending, as well as directing Radio Liban to avoid mentioning the conference. Indeed, the Lebanese delegation even withdrew from the conference, alarmed at the "Communist usurpation of the conference."[351] While this reaction was a boon for Western governments, they were also frustrated over the significant attention afforded to the conference. The American embassy in New Delhi concluded that part of the 'voluminous coverage' in the Indian press was the result of the wire services, and "if these news services had ignored or played down the conference, publicity and resultant mileage by Communists in India

[348] "Views of an Iraqi Delegate to Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference," American Embassy Baghdad Unclassified NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 January 18 1958, 1 Also apparently the views of the Indian press. In *The Cairo Conference,* Homer A. Jack described the conference as a "propaganda defeat" for the West, 8.
[349] "The Asian-African Solidarity Conference – Yugoslavia's Evaluation," Belgrade NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 January 15 1958.
[350] Withers Telegram to Embassy Cairo, Embassy Nairobi NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 January 10 1958, 1.
[351] Higgs Telegram to Embassy Cairo, Embassy Beirut NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 January 10 1958, 1.

would have been much less."[352] A similar message was sent from both the American embassies in Nairobi and Tokyo regarding the impact of Reuters Cairo dispatches.[353]

This international prominence of the conference in Cairo was in many ways a victory for the Egyptian information regime. While the Egyptian press covered the conference extensively, so too did *The Scribe*. With the headline "The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference: Cairo Meeting Outcome of Popular Demand" the winter 1957-58 issue reprinted many of the speeches and photos from the conference, as well as brief statements from the delegations. However, notably absent from the magazine was any discussion of the creation of the permanent office of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in Cairo immediately after the conference. Intended to continue the struggle for liberation, AAPSO was to be chaired by Yusuf al-Sabai and housed in a villa in Zamalek, with the Egyptian government footing most of the bill for the new organization.[354] By February 1958, the American embassy in Cairo believed that the press had been "instructed to say little of the Conference and of the Permanent Secretariat which it created" due to the controversies over the communist influence.[355] *The Scribe* also carried no coverage of another conference that occurred in Cairo that December – the Third Congress of Arab Writers.

While Yusuf al-Sabai was heading the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo and then later the AAPSO, he was also in charge of the Egyptian branch of the Congress of Arab Writers, which was meeting in Cairo from December 12-16 to discuss "literature and Arab nationalism." Yoav Di-Capua details how this government-sponsored conference brought together Arab writers and intellectuals from across the region "to solidify the internal Arab front and celebrate the

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[352] Bunker Telegram to Embassy Cairo, Embassy New Delhi NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 January 11 1958, 1, 3.
[353] MacArthur Telegram to Embassy Cairo, Embassy Tokyo NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 January 3 1958, 1.
[354] Telegram Cairo to Washington January 4 1958 and Telegram Cairo to Washington January 14 1958 NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58.
[355] Claude G Ross American Embassy Cairo Unclassified NARA RG 84 Afro Asian Conference 1956-58 February 12 1958.

redemptive qualities of Pan-Arabism."[356] While the previous meetings in Beirut and Damascus had been without official state sponsorship, the Cairo Congress of Arab Writers was funded through the Egyptian government, which set the agenda to focus on literature, poetry, Arab nationalism and pan-Arab unity – largely promoting the trend of committed literature discussed last chapter.[357] Di-Capua quotes the editor of *al-Adab*, Suhayl Idris who described the conference and Pan-Arabism as "the right kind of *iltizam*."[358] The delegates at the conference adopted similar language to the AAPSO, describing "the mission of Pan-Arabism" as "liberation in the heart of Africa and Asia," and the conference sent two final statements – one to the United Nations in support of Algeria and one to the writers of the world to join together against imperialism.[359] However, Di-Capua also details the dissent of delegates at the conference who chafed at the limits of this political theology that privileged the state and politics over intellectual freedom.[360] The American embassy in Cairo also reported an anecdote from one of the delegates, the Lebanese poet Mikha'il Na'ima, who claimed that Yusuf al-Sabai had asked him to preside over the committee to draft the final resolutions of the Congress. Na'ima was apparently reluctant, and in an effort to persuade, Sabai stated that "all decisions have already been drafted, edited, and printed."[361] This heavy-handedness from the Egyptian state at the Third Congress, as well as their attempts to control the press narrative in Cairo around the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference were both emblematic of the contradictions of the Egyptian state's support for anti-colonialism. While pan-Arabism and Afro-Asianism provided the state with legitimizing rhetoric and broad popular support, Nasser and his government were increasingly attempting to funnel this energy towards state-prescribed ends, rather than those of

[356] Di-Capua, *No Exit*, 116.
[357] "Third Annual Congress of Arab Writers (December 12-16, 1957)," American Embassy Cairo NARA RG 84 Egypt US Embassy Cairo Classified Records 1953-1961 Box 310 December 20 1957.
[358] Di-Capua, *No Exit,* 117.
[359] Di-Capua, *No Exit,* 117 and "Third Annual Congress of Arab Writers (December 12-16, 1957)", 2.
[360] Di-Capua, *No Exit,* 118-120.
[361] "Third Annual Congress of Arab Writers (December 12-16, 1957)", 1.

anti-colonial revolutionaries. This final section considers how the creation of the United Arab Republic was a culmination of these trends, realizing the dream of constructing Cairo into a capital for both pan-Arabism and international revolutionary movements. However, the international and domestic realities increasingly challenged the primacy of Nasser and the Egyptian state, leading to an eventual showdown and the end of the Bandung period.

Closing the Door: The United Arab Republic and Controlling Anti-Colonial Cairo

In the lead up to the official announcement on February 1, 1958, the headlines in the Egyptian dailies were increasingly spreading the news that a union between Egypt and Syria was imminent. *Al Ahram* proclaimed "The door is open" on January 28, describing the negotiations as inching closer to realizing the dream of Arab unity.[362] The tone of the coverage was jubilant but the news was also unexpected. Indeed, the idea for union was only proposed a few weeks earlier, on January 11 when a group of Syrian Ba'ath party officials arrived in Cairo. Their visit was so sudden that Nasser was in Aswan entertaining Indonesian President Sukarno, and so they instead first met with General Mohamed Abdel Hakim Amer.[363] Eventually Nasser returned, and historians have detailed the flurry of negotiations between the reluctant Nasser and the Syrian delegation, led by Prime Minister Salah al-Din Bitar. In *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic,* James Jankowski recounts how Nasser struggled to keep detailed notes or chronology of the negotiations, and "since he had handled these matters personally without advising Egyptian Foreign Office with result no record [was] kept".[364] Though the proposal was a surprise in Cairo, in Beirut and Damascus, communist publications increasingly championed a union between Egypt and Syria,

[362] *Al Ahram*, January 28 1958.
[363] Dina Rezk *The Arab World and Western Intelligence: Analysing the Middle East, 1956-1981* (University of Edinburgh Press, 2017), 58.
[364] Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, 108.

which would counter Israeli expansion and "become [a] cornerstone [of] Arab "liberative" unity and renaissance"[365]. After being approved by both governments and plebiscites in the end of February, the final agreement was expansive in its vision for Arab unity and Egyptian leadership, demanding the end of Syrian military involvement in politics and the dissolution of Syrian political parties in favor of the recently created Egyptian National Union party; and finally with Gamal Abdel Nasser as the head of this new Arab state.[366] By the end of March 1958, the UAR was officially recognized as a new nation state representing both Egypt and Syria, and was further cemented with creation of the United Arab States, a confederation with the imamate in Yemen - all of which seemed to herald a new pan-Arab era.

While the initial post-colonial moment was rife with alternative proposals for unions and federations, the creation of the UAR and its emphasis on an "integrated union" between Egypt and Syria was comparatively new.[367] The existing historiography has largely focused on trying to understand how such an exceptional political entity could both be created and approved within a month. One of the primary research avenues has focused on explicating the origins and initial motivations of the Syrian Ba'athists, in part because they ceded so much of their sovereignty to Egypt. Though Syria experienced five coups between 1949 and 1954, much of the existing scholarship focuses on the impact of the Baghdad Pact as a watershed moment in 1955 that convinced the Syrian leadership to pursue some form of pan-Arab unity in the face of growing Cold

[365] NARA RG 84. Egypt US Embassy Cairo General Records 1953-1961. Box 6 1956-58. Folder 320 Egypt-Syria. Telegram from American Embassy Beirut January 15 1958 and Telegram from American Embassy Damascus January 18 1958.
[366] Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, 106-9 and Gordon, *Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation*, 59.
[367] From the end of the Second World War to the late 1980s, there were approximately 18 "voluntary unification attempts between Arab States", including: Iraq-Syria (1946, 1949, 1963, 1978, 1979), Jordan-Iraq (1946, 1951 and 1958), Egypt-Syria (1958-1961), Egypt-Syria-Iraq (1963), Libya-Egypt (1972), Egypt-Libya (1973), Libya-Tunisia (1974), Libya-Morocco (1984), Libya-Sudan (1988), and North Yemen-South Yemen (1972, 1979 and 1990). Dates from "The Decline of Pan-Arabism" in *Routledge Handbook of South-South Relations* ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Patricia Daley.(New York: Routledge, 2019).

War regional divisions.[368] Nasser and Egypt were at the vanguard of pan-Arabism in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, and facing the prospect of an ascendant communist movement along with an increasingly troubled economy, the Syrian military officers saw Nasser as a potential solution to their state's continued political instability. In part to dissuade the Syrians, Nasser proposed demanding conditions to the union, and that the Ba'athists agreed speaks to both the power of the pan-Arab ideal, as well as their fears over the potential for a breakup of Syria. While these concerns might seem exaggerated in retrospect, the situation in Syria during 1957 was considered an international crisis as the country moved increasingly towards the Soviet bloc, and President Eisenhower attempted to pressure conservative Arab states to intervene and prevent another 'China'.

Historians have also speculated on Nasser's rationale for acceding to the union. Syrian proposals for a union started in 1955, but were consistently rebuffed by Egyptian government officials who felt that any form of political union would be impossible to meaningfully implement, and the Syrian crisis of 1957 added further complications.[369] By December 1957, Eisenhower and Dulles realized that isolating Nasser regionally was impossible, and gave tacit signals to Nasser that unity would not be actively opposed in Washington.[370] Ironically, Nasser shared many of Eisenhower's fears over a communist takeover in Syria, though the Americans struggled to distinguish between Nasser's commitment to non-alignment and neutralism, and his willingness to deal with the Soviets.[371] Ultimately most historians describe Nasser as trapped in a bind of his own making - namely his universalist rhetoric of pan-Arab unity. Joel Gordon describes the power of this

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368 Cyrus Schayegh, "1958 Reconsidered: State Formation and the Cold War in the Early Postcolonial Arab Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45, no. 3 (2013), 422, Podeh, *The Decline of Arab Unity* entirety of "Chapter 2 The Road to Union" and especially pages 26 and 28.

369 Podeh, *The Decline of Arab Unity*, 36-40 and Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt* "Chapter 5: The Creation of the United Arab Republic."

370 Rezk *The Arab World and Western Intelligence*, 60-66. Rezk also explores how Western intelligence was fairly sanguine about the creation of the UAR in "Chapter 2: Formation of the United Arab Republic." Podeh, *The Decline of Arab Unity*, 40-42, Robert McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the balance of power in the Middle East, 1952-1967: from the Egyptian revolution to the Six-Day War* (London, 2003), 96-99.

371 Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, 95-99.

dream as crowds mobbed Nasser on his first visit to Syria in February 1958.[372] Indeed, the creation of the UAR represented in many ways the ideal of the revolution made real.

While the creation of the UAR was a rushed affair, whose structural problems would ultimately be its doom, this new state's formation produced shockwaves across the region. Iraq and Jordan initially tried to counter the UAR by forming the Arab Union in February of 1958, but their federation and the Baghdad Pact quickly fell apart. First, instability in Lebanon and Jordan resulted in American and British troops being dispatched to each country, respectively, in early July 1958. Simultaneously, the military officer Abd al-Karim Qasim led a revolution in Iraq that violently overthrew Nuri al-Said's monarchy. Historians have explored how the revolutions of 1958, though destabilizing, also reinforced the existing nation states in the Middle East. Cyrus Schayegh argues that these shifts represented "state-formation surges" across the region, where regional competition intersected with international efforts to enact modernization and state planning. Arguing that these transformations were linked, Schayegh recounts how in the case of the UAR pressure from Iraqi and Syrian communists pushed the regime to propose an expansive five-year plan for industrialization.[373] In terms of the Egyptian information regime, similar to the Suez Crisis, the creation of the UAR did not immediately shift Egyptian policies, but rather accelerated them and provided new avenues for the state's involvement in the press and information, with Syria as a new base of operations.

By the end of 1958, the United States Information Agency's Office of Research and Intelligence would describe Egyptian 'propaganda' as "professional in technique with well-developed facilities at its disposal."[374] The budget for the Egyptian State Broadcasting had increased to over eight million pounds and new radio transmitters from Czechoslovakia were operational, including

[372] Gordon, *Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation*, 7; Podeh, *The Decline of Arab Unity*, 50; and Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, 114.
[373] Schayegh, "1958 Reconsidered," 426-27.
[374] "Egyptian Propaganda Activities – 1958," RG 306 USIA Office of Research and Intelligence Research Note RN-34-59 February 25 1959, 1.

four 150 KW medium waves and half a dozen short waves ones. Indeed, Radio remained the primary vehicle for promoting Cairo's message, and the Lebanese crisis of 1958 had purportedly set off "a revival of clandestine radio warfare in the Middle East", with Egypt targeting Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq through secret black radio stations. In a Lebanese report on Egyptian propaganda, an additional concern was the proliferation of Egyptian print propaganda. In an attempt to undercut the Lebanese press, the report claims that Cairo "flooded Lebanon's publishing houses and news-stands with newspapers and other publications, and gave the sellers an extra commission (though they are sold at cost-price) on and above what they usually get for selling Lebanese newspapers." Once banned by the Lebanese government, UAR print materials with their higher quality production remained popular. Indeed, the UAR embassy distributed free photos of Nasser and circulated the latest news from Cairo, which was often picked up in the Lebanese press.[375] These efforts were built from the existing activities of the Egyptian information regime, which would continue its mass book publishing initiative and expanding the Middle East News Agency's operations to most Arab capitals, as well as their wire exchanges with Soviet and Chinese news agencies.[376]

The target for this messaging continued in the Arab world, but "Africa, particularly the independent or soon-to-be independent areas of East and West Africa, was the second target of UAR propaganda."[377] These efforts were furthered through the liberation bureaus and their publications, as well as scholarships for more than four thousand African students to visit Cairo, and the dispatching of Egyptian experts and teachers across the continent.[378] Egypt also opened a cultural center in Accra with a library and cultural exchange program, as well as an Islamic Institute in Mogadishu. While the earlier memo from 1956 correctly predicted the continued prevalence of

[375]"Untitled report about Egyptian activities in Lebanon," 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Emir Farid Chehab Collection, GB165-0384, Box 8, File 29F/8, Middle East Centre Archive, St Antony's College, Oxford. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/175768
[376] "Egyptian Propaganda Activities – 1958", 2-3.
[377] "Egyptian Propaganda Activities – 1958", 1.
[378] "Egyptian Propaganda Activities – 1958", 4.

Africa and Muslim themes in Egyptian propaganda, the geographic scope of this dissemination was widening beyond the Middle East and Africa towards Asia and Latin America. In Afghanistan, for example, Egypt published a daily bulletin promoting anti-colonialism and Islamic solidarities, and increasingly sent teachers and offered scholarships to Muslim students in Southeast Asia. During 1958, new information offices were opened in Brazil, and Arab-focused newspapers were founded in Chile. The most influential however, was the expansion of radio broadcasts to Latin America through new infrastructure.[379] While the USIA report was pessimistic regarding the prospects for long-term success in Latin America, these endeavors represented a significant growth in the reach of Cairo's message, which is also illustrated in Table 3 that details the weekly broadcasts from the United Arab Republic to the rest of the world.

[379] "Egyptian Propaganda Activities – 1958", 5-6.

Table 3. "International Broadcasts of the United Arab Republic December 31 1958"

Data from RG 306 Office of Research Analysis 1029 Research Notes 1958-1962 RN-34-59 Egyptian Propaganda Activities 1958

Language	From	Beamed to:	Hours per week
Arabic	Egypt	Arab World	189:00
Arabic	Egypt	Sudan	21:00
Arabic	Egypt	Southest Asia	3:30
Arabic (Palestinian)	Egypt	Israel	3:30
Arabic	Egypt	Central Europe	3:30
Arabic	Egypt	The Americas	7:00
Arabic	Syria	North Africa	7:00
Arabic	Syria	Latin America	6:25
Arabic	Egypt	(News Dictation Abroad)	3:30
Arabic	Egypt	(News Dictation to the Arab World)	3:30
English	Egypt	(News Dictation Abroad)	3:30
English	Egypt	India and Pakistan	7:00
English	Egypt	Europe	3:30
English	Syria	Europe	1:45
French	Egypt	Europe	3:30
French	Syria	Europe	1:10
French	Egypt	Arab World (North African area)	1:10
Hebrew	Egypt	Israel	17:30
Hebrew	Syria	Israel	5:45
Indonesian	Egypt	Indonesia	7:00
Malay	Egypt	Malaya	3:30
Benghali	Egypt	India and Pakistan	3:30
Urdu	Egypt	India and Pakistan	3:30
Swahili	Egypt	East Africa	7:00
Swahili	Egypt	East Africa (clandestine)	4:40
Amharic	Egypt	Ethiopia and Eritrea	3:30
Kurdish	Egypt	"Kurdistan"	5:15
Turkish	Egypt	Turkey	5:15
Turkish	Syria	Turkey	3:30
Persian	Egypt	Iran and Afghanistan	5:15
Somali	Egypt	Somaliland	5:15
Italian	Egypt	Europe	3:30
German	Egypt	Europe	7:00
Portuguese	Egypt	Brazil	5:15
Spanish	Egypt	Latin America	5:15
Spanish	Syria	Latin America	7:00
Various languages: Hebrew, Serbo-Croat, German, Russian	Syria	Israel	0:35

While detailing the influence of this message in these countries is beyond the scope of this project, James Brennan's research on Radio Cairo in East Africa points to the creation of the Swahili-language programming beginning in July 1954 on Radio Cairo, which by 1958 offered a full hour of programming, as the beginning of Egypt's influence in the region, which promoted "a powerful vision of an emerging Afro-Asian world that would assist Britain's East African colonies to throw off the chains of Western colonialism."[380] This vision was less influential in Uganda and Tanganyika, but Brennan details how in Zanzibar Radio Cairo was "widely listened to", especially in the larger Muslim communities, with "an American diplomat reckoned there were more listeners [in Zanzibar] than in all the rest of East Africa combined."[381] The reach of Cairo was furthered with the creation of the 'pseudo-clandestine' Voice of Free Africa station in April 1957, which claimed to be broadcasting "in the heart of Africa", but was actually an Egyptian station.[382] Brennan details how these broadcasts would eventually inspire a riot in Dar-es-Salaam in 1958, leading Cairo to tone down commentary on Zanzibari politics.[383] Yet though Egypt was ascendant internationally by the end of the 1950s, its influence in Africa was increasingly being challenged from "rising African forces, and particularly from the Ghana-led Pan-African Liberation Movement."[384] Robert Vitalis describes 1957-59 as "soft power" war between Nasser and Nkrumah over who would lead the "Bandung spirit" in Africa. In March 1957, Nkrumah announced Ghana would host the Conference of Independent African States in April 1958, and then the All African Peoples' Conference in December 1958.[385] A USIA report details how Nkrumah was hesitant to support the Afro-Asian

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[380] James R. Brennan, "Radio Cairo and the Decolonization of East Africa, 1953–64,"*Making a World*, 174-177, Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 155
[381] Brennan, "Radio Cairo and the Decolonization," 180-182.
[382] Brennan, "Radio Cairo and the Decolonization," 177-78, Boyd, "Egyptian Radio: Tool of Political and National Development", 25.
[383] Brennan, "Radio Cairo and the Decolonization", 183.
[384] "UAR Activities in Ghana – 1958," RG 306 USIA Office of Research and Intelligence Research Note RN-39-59 March 2 1959, 1.
[385] Vitalis, "The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah", 275.

Solidarity Conference or AAPSO, and that Ghana had yet to send delegates in part because of the challenge the organization presented to "newly-established Accra Secretariat of the All-African Peoples' Conference." Nasser was reportedly pleased when the April 1958 conference was downgraded to the foreign ministers' level, and in part derailed by the unexpected appearance of Algerian and Cameroonian revolutionaries, who were not invited to the meeting, undermining Nkrumah's emphasis on continental unity.[386] Nkrumah was also well-aware of Egyptian propaganda and activities in Accra, and was beginning to counter these initiatives through the creation of his own information regime with a new Bureau of African Affairs and the International Service of the Ghana Broadcasting System.[387] Ghana's new status was particularly threatening to Nasser since Nkrumah initially had close ties to both Israel and the West.[388]

Egypt's success at promoting revolution in the Arab world had also created further competition, as Qasim became a challenger to Nasser's pan-Arab leadership after the Iraqi revolution in July of 1958. In response, the UAR also stepped up its propaganda to Iraq and the rest of the region, using similar strategies to those in Lebanon, as well as what Owen L Sirrs described as "clandestine ('black') radio stations" to counter Qasim's communist credentials.[389] The Iraqi Communist Party, Qasim's primary base, in turn increased its broadcasts leading to a "war over the airwaves." [390] While this competition with Iraq would lead to an unsuccessful Egyptian-supported coup in March 1959, the influence of this competition with both Ghana and Iraq would have a profound impact within the newly created UAR.

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[386] Jeffrey Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 70.
[387] "UAR Activities in Ghana – 1958," RG 306 USIA Office of Research and Intelligence Research Note RN-39-59 March 2 1959, 1-2, and Hachten, *Muffled Drums*, 117.
[388] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 43 and Vitalis, "The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah", 276.
[389] Sirrs, *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Services*, 46.
[390] Schayegh, "1958 Reconsidered", 422.

After the union, the relatively 'free' Syrian press was immediately placed under Egyptian control. Podeh recounts how Nasser appointed Fathi Radwan, an Egyptian, as the head of the Syrian Ministry for National Guidance, which was modeled on a recently created Egyptian version. Prior to the Suez Crisis, the RCC had planned to hold the first elections for the new parliament, the National Assembly, through the newly created National Union, the sole political party. These elections only occurred in the summer of 1957, and while Hatem was elected to the National Assembly, he was also assigned a new post, as the head of the Egyptian Ministry for National Guidance.[391] Under the auspices of these two ministries, the Egyptian and Syrian radio broadcasting organizations were merged. Similar to the Lebanese press, the Syrian local press was overwhelmed through the importing of Egyptian newspapers, and as a result, Syrian news publications were sharply reduced, with publishers reimbursed after eight of the nineteen daily newspapers in Damascus were shuttered in favor of Egyptian newspapers. Some of the more prominent Ba'ath and communist publications attempted to continue publishing, but by October 1958 they were also closed by the new government. This shuttering of these papers would signal the beginning of the end of the 'Bandung period', and a shift away from the rapprochement between the Egyptian government and the Arab left.

With the creation of the union with Syria, many Egyptian and Syrian communists believed that the UAR was on the path towards becoming a progressive and Communist country. This belief was premised on the sense that Nasser was moving leftwards, beginning with his purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia, then the Suez Crisis and hosting the AAPSO in Cairo.[392] Roel Meijer details how this belief in this 'authoritarian modernism' led many communists to fully support and participate in the 1957 elections, and engage in new intellectual debates over the definition of the

[391] Hatem, *Mudhakkirāt*, 66.
[392] Lensink, "*The Writers in the Alley*", 39 and Beinin, *Was the Red Flag Flying There*, 97-98.

'Egyptian personality' in the wake of Suez and the end of British imperialism. Many of these intellectuals viewed themselves as "the vanguard of the nation," and as responsible for formulating the ideological underpinnings of Egypt's new foreign policy.[393] However, as the Egyptian state expanded into Syria, there were increasingly demands from communists in both countries for further political reforms, and even more troubling to the Arab left was the Nasser's increasing competition with Qasim in Iraq. Facing mounting international pressure from Ghana and Iraq, Nasser's response was swift and sudden – arresting hundreds of communists in the middle of the night on December 31, 1958, including prominent intellectuals such as Louis Awad and Abdel Rahman al-Sharqawi.[394] In March 1959, after criticizing the Egyptian-supported attempted coup in Iraq, Khaled Mohieddin, Lutfi al-Khuli, and other editors of *al-Messa* were arrested and jailed, along with over two thousand leftists by the end of 1959.[395] In the aftermath of this roundup of the Egyptian and Syrian left, *Al-Messa* was officially closed, and the other leading leftwing paper *al-Shaab* was incorporated into *al-Gumhuriyya*.[396]

This tightening of political freedoms in Cairo also impacted the African liberation bureaus. In August 1959, the American embassy described receiving a note of protest from Osende Afana, the Marxist delegate of Union of the Population of the Cameroons (UPC), expressing frustration of American support for French imperialism in Cameroon. The cable was notable because one of the UPC members, Abdul Bagui, went back to the embassy to record his dissent from the note, as well as inform the embassy that the UPC statement had been passed to "Cairo press and radio facilities with the expectation that it would receive wide circulation. UAR censorship authorities, however, had forbidden its appearance in the press and refused to permit it to be read over Cairo radio."[397]

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[393] Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 252.
[394] Lensink, "*The Writers in the Alley*", 42 and Beinin, *Was the Red Flag Flying There*, 206-7.
[395] Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution*, 53.
[396] Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 150.
[397] "Transmitting Letter and Note of Protest from Cameroonian Nationalists," August 20 1959 RG 84 Egypt Embassy Gen Classified Recs Folder 1959-1961 Box 9 Folder UAR-Communism.

While the exact rationale for the UAR silence on this issue is unknown, the timing of this censorship, as well as the repression of communists, seemed to indicate that the Egyptian government was no longer willing to continue the status quo of the Bandung period, when the state collaborated with leftists and foreign revolutionaries. Instead, the state would now be the sole produced and arbiter of ideologies and information.

Thus as 1960 dawned, many of the Arab intellectuals and communists that had embraced this new Egyptian state and championed the 'Arab cause' and *iltizam* were no longer able to yield their previous influence. Roel Meijer describes this shift was the 'deepening' of the authoritarian modernism that had started to emerge after the revolution, as the state increasingly became seen as a modernizing force for society. This new norm would privilege nationalization, state planning, and the co-opting of intellectuals over democratic reforms and political freedoms.[398] This next chapter outlines how this "view of the state as in charge of the rationalization of society" would privilege Hatem and the mass information regime, while continuing to promote Cairo as a hub for international anti-colonialism, making the state the sole producer of information and anti-colonial politics.

[398] Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 251-252.

CHAPTER IV

CAIRO'S CONGO CRISIS: AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION AND CAIRO'S PROPAGANDA MACHINE

On May 24 1960, the National Assembly passed Law No. 156 "The Press Organisation Law." The next day at the Presidential Palace with editors from all the major Egyptian newspapers, President Nasser explained the rationale for the law, stating:

> "We understand that the press is a message, not a commercial commodity. [...] What is important in my opinion is to define our way, and ask ourselves, what is our goal? What community do we want to live in? This is the whole point, the society we want to live in and that we want to build. This society is not just one for those in the Cairo community or Zamalek or the high society nightclubs. [...] We need newspapers that share our efforts to highlight the best of society and show us the solutions to our problems. [...] Every one of us has the opportunity to contribute in the making of this new society, and it is here that there is an immense and important role for the press."[399]

The announcement of the law was sudden, but much of this speech was old news. Previous chapters traced how Nasser and his government, since 1952, had increasingly used the press to inculcate a socialist mentality and mobilize the masses, although as this quote hints, Nasser was personally critical of the press, spending a great deal of the speech sharply criticizing capitalist ownership and the press' penchant for covering Cairo's high society scandals.[400] In a *New York Times* article on the law and Nasser's speech, the issue of the foreign control of news was also seen as an impetus for the

[399] "Kalimat al-Rayyis Gamal Abdel Nasser fi 'aedha majalis 'idarat al-suhuf wa al-majallat min al-qasr al-gumhuriyya 28/05/1960" [President Gamal Abdel Nasser addresses members of the boards of newspapers and magazines at the Republican Palace, May 5 1960] *Nasser Archive* http://nasser.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=900&lang=ar

[400] The use of deviation in the speech, echoes Soviet language around the press. Talhami, *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 151.

law, as both Western and Eastern blocs were increasingly using advertisements in the Cairo press to further their own agendas.[401] In histories of the Egyptian press, this law is seen as both a culmination of trends from the 1950s and a watershed moment that fundamentally centralized governmental control of the press by transferring the private ownership and management of the four largest publication houses to the National Union (NU).[402] As the successor of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Liberation Rally, the NU had already been in the publishing business through many of the activities outlined in the last chapters, such as the creation of Dar al-Tahrir as well as the publication of *The Scribe* and the *Ikhtarna Laka* series. The law also formalized the existing ad-hoc policies for controlling the press, including embedding military officers to monitor coverage, appointing top officials to the main newspapers' editorial boards, and by requiring journalists to join the NU.[403] Many of these new regulations were expected, given the tight state control of the Egyptian press after the March crisis in 1954 and then again with the creation of the UAR in 1958. However, what was unexpected was the timing of the announcement, which was not only sudden, but also belated.

Nasser had been considering transferring control of the press to government since 1956, fearing that it would only take the three major private publishers "to launch a campaign all together against the government, for the whole of Egypt to be inundated from one day to the other with articles which could be very prejudicial to public order […] able to create movements of public

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401 Jay Walz, "Cairo Newspapers Seized by Nasser," *The New York Times* May 25, 1960, 1. The American Embassy would send back clippings of advertisements of interest in the Egyptian press to the State Department and kept notes on market research contractors and advertising agencies in Egypt. For examples, see NARA RG 84 Embassy Cairo General Recs 1953-1961 Box 8 Folder 510.4.

402 Talhami *Palestine in the Egyptian Press,* 150; *Dabbous*, "Nasser and the Egyptian Press,=", 66; and Awatef Abdel Rahman, *Humum al-sahafah wa al-sahafiyeen fi Misr* [The Concerns of the Press and Journalists in Egypt] (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1995), 46–53.

403 William Rugh, *The Arab Press: News Media and Political Process in the Arab World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 150-1; Adnan Almaney, "Government Control of the Press in the United Arab Republic, 1950-70," *Journalism Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (Summer 1972), 344-45; and Munir K. Nasser, *Press, Politics, and Power: Egypt's Heikal and al-Ahram* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979), 4-5.

opinion in the country."[404] The previous chapter outlined how rather than pursuing nationalization, Nasser's regime first attempted to co-opt leftists and intellectuals to their cause, but that by 1960, this rapprochement had largely failed. Instead, the state now turned to centralizing its control of the information regime. In *The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic,* Elie Podeh describes Egyptian journalists reacting positively to the law, although most political dissent had been suppressed by 1960.[405] Despite this support and the fact that the 1960 Press Reorganisation law was not the first attempt to regulate the press (notably the Press Law of 1881), the regime remained sensitive to criticisms that the law represented wholesale nationalization.[406] The June 26, 1960 issue of the *Arab Observer: The Weekly Middle East News Magazine* outlined the government's rebuttal to these accusations in the anonymously authored, "The Press Reorganisation Law." The piece painted the history of the press as the co-optation by capitalists and imperialists during the colonial era, and then summarized Mohamed Hassanein Heikal's recent editorials on the new law. To the question "Is It Nationalisation?" Heikal argued that the NU's ownership was not nationalization since the NU was controlled through the "people's will" and this ownership was of "an idealistic character" since there were no material benefits to the NU. Notably, Heikal argued that Egypt's law would become a model for Africa and Asia, as an alternative to the current status quo of newspapers that benefits World Zionism and Israel or the Soviet repressive revolutionary model.[407] While the article echoed Nasser's speech, the existence of the *Arab Observer* was new.

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[404] International Press Institute Survey, *The Press in Authoritarian Countries*, 179. Both Talhami and Dabbous discuss the regime's oscillating policy of censorship, though they refrain from considering why the regime was reluctant. In "Nasser Weighing Rigid Censorship", an article from *The New York Times* in February 1956, Osgood Caruthers describes Nasser "grappling for several weeks" over whether to nationalize the press, citing Hatem as a source regarding the regime's fear over the resurgence of communist propaganda if censorship was lifted. Osgood Caruthers, "Nasser Weighing Rigid Censorship: Egyptian Leader Seeks Way to Keep Control of Press Without Attack in West," *The New York Times*, February 26 1946, 17.

[405] Podeh recounts how in private though, apparently Heikal "admitted that he had been unaware of the move, which he thought was a 'mistake.'" The only other dissent was from the Amin brothers who owned *al-Akhbar*, who were replaced by Kamal Rifa'at. Podeh, *The Decline of Arab Unity*, 116.

[406] In "Nasser Weighing Rigid Censorship," Carruthers depicts Nasser as "extremely sensitive to how the world views his policies", and well-aware of the "stigma" in the West towards nationalization or censorship of the press.

[407] "The Press Reorganisation Law," *Arab Observer: The Weekly Middle East News Magazine* Issue 1. June 26 1960, 5-6.

Simultaneous with the drafting of the press law, a new centralized state institution, the National Publications House (*Dar al-Nasharat al-Qawmiyya* or NPH), was established as a clearinghouse for the regime's publications. The *Arab Observer* was one of the first NPH periodicals, and built upon the earlier efforts of *The Scribe*, while also inaugurating a new era of Egyptian media for international anti-colonial audiences. A year later, Anthony Derrick Parsons, one of the British Embassy officers in Cairo, sent a scathing memorandum back to the Foreign Office, decrying these publications as part of what he termed "The Cairo Propaganda Machine." For Parsons, the Egyptian press and state-funded publications were "one of the most sickening and stifling aspects of life in the U.A.R."[408] Parsons's depiction offers a tour de force of Orientalism, illustrating the mixture of skepticism and suspicion that colored foreign observations of Egypt's mass information regime. Nonetheless, it does provide some insight to this regime, detailing the expansion of Egyptian information activities both at home and abroad, as well as identifying Hatem at the helm of "Cairo's Propaganda Machine."[409]

While the previous chapters described Hatem's rise, as well as the creation of this information regime, the current chapter explores the beginning of what Roel Meijer described as the "deepening" of the Egyptian state's control of mass media.[410] Over the course of the early 1960s, Egyptian state expansion would transform the nation, but many of the economic and political reforms were only implemented after the state had fully mobilized the press and media in the aftermath of this law. This centralization of the control over the flow of information in Cairo was in part due to the widespread arrests of Egyptian communists in 1959, which sidelined the opposition to Hatem's vision for a state-funded mass-producing information regime, and largely suppressed

[408] BNA FO 371 158861 UAR Propaganda 1961 Tony Parsons "Reflections on the Cairo Propaganda Machine" July 30 1961, 1.
[409] Parsons describes Hatem's role as a "highly placed executive instrument" but not part of Nasser's inner circle.
[410] Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity,* 252.

debates over the direction of the state's monopoly of information and culture. Beginning with the 1960 Press Reorganisation Law, this chapter traces how the changing political landscape influenced the outputs and institutions of the Egyptian mass information regime.

The majority of these changes happened beyond Egypt's borders, as the so-called "winds of decolonization" were spreading across the globe. Indeed, with seventeen formerly colonized African nations gaining independence, 1960 was heralded as the year of Africa. This optimism would be challenged however, by the outbreak of the Congo Crisis in July 1960, when Belgium intervened in the newly independent Congo and then the southern province of Katanga seceded, which quickly devolved into an international crisis with the deployment of UN forces. In Cairo, the crisis was of grave concern, but also represented an opportunity to further cement Egypt's involvement in the continent. While the previous chapter detailed Nasser's increasing efforts to make Cairo a hub for anti-colonialism, this chapter details the extent of Cairo's participation in the crisis, and how Congo increasingly came to symbolize Egyptian anti-colonialism in government policy and publications. In many ways, the trajectory of Cairo's Congo crisis was determined by the policies of the 1950s – from the expansion of Radio Cairo to support for African liberation movements – but I argue that the Congo crisis also represented a turning point for Egypt. The degree of Nasser's and Egypt's involvement in the crisis was significant, and the crisis forced Egypt to confront the limits of this anti-colonial solidarity as the conflict intensified. Indeed, the eventual failure of the anti-colonial bloc to resolve the crisis was crucial in Nasser's decision to advocate for a more formal institutionalizing of anti-colonialism, eventually resulting in the Non-Aligned Movement Conference that Belgrade hosted in September 1961. Lessons from Congo would remain influential in Cairo throughout the 1960s, especially as the union with Syria, formed in 1958, collapsed suddenly in October 1961, confirming fears of a resurgence of imperialism - through the guise of neo-colonialism. Ultimately, this chapter contends that 1960 was both the year of Africa, and the year that Egypt's mass

information regime committed to not only the global promotion, but also production of anti-colonialism. I argue that uncovering how these two parallel trends collided is crucial for contextualizing the eventual leftist shift in Cairo and the later rise of radical anti-colonialism in the 1960s.

Printing the Congo in Cairo: The Founding of the National Publications House and The Outbreak of the Congo Crisis

Recently, the Congo crisis has seen a revival among historians, with many works exploring the transnational dimensions of the conflict.[411] In *Hearts, Minds, Voices: US Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*, Jason Parker describes the crisis as a "postwar moment of truth" since it challenged the United Nations' role in "North-South relations" and was a "catalyst for Afro-Asian unity."[412] Parker's book explores the impact of the crisis on the United States Information Agency and American public diplomacy in Africa, and builds from work by Robert Rakove and Philip Muehlenbeck on how the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations responded to the crisis.[413] This focus on public diplomacy is also part of Frank Gerits and Jeffrey Byrne's research into how the crisis influenced Ghana's Bureau of African Affairs and the Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale, respectively.[414] Access to new Soviet and Eastern bloc materials has provided further insight to the dynamics of the crisis, especially since it coincided with and accelerated Soviet

411 For examples, see John Kent, *The UN and Decolonisation* (New York, NY: Routledge) and Lise Namikas, *Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo 1960-1965* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2013). Earlier research from the 1960s and 70s included A. Lee Burns and N. Heathcote, *Peace-Keeping by UN Forces, from Suez to the Congo* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963); E. W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1965); S.R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1974); Madeline Kalb, *Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1982); and G. Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo*, 1960-1964 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1979). For a broad historiographical overview, see Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, *Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba*, (Harvard UP 2015).
412 Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices*, 144.
413 Philip Muehlenbeck *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012) and Robert Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
414 Frank Gerits, "'When the Bull Elephants Fight': Kwame Nkrumah, Non- Alignment, and Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957–66)," *The International History Review*, 37:5, (2015), 951-969 and Byrne *Mecca of Revolution.*

involvement in the Third World.[415] This recent focus on the Congo Crisis has also inspired new histories of the UN, including Alanna O'Malley's recent book *The Diplomacy of Decolonization: America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo Crisis 1960-1964*, which details how the crisis reshaped both the UN and Anglo-American relations through "wider ideological discussions about how decolonization should evolve and what the role of the UN would be in managing this process."[416]

However, even in this new literature, Egypt's role in the crisis remains marginal.[417] In most of the literature, Nasser and Egypt are usually listed with other radical African states and leaders, such as Ghana under Nkrumah, Algeria under Ben Bella, and Guinea under Sekou Toure, all of whom were supporters of Patrice Lumumba, and then later the Gizenga government. For example, in "Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations, 1960–1," Alanna O'Malley mentions Nasser's role in her analysis of the Ghanaian and Indian impact at the United Nations, but focuses on those two countries due to the Nkrumah's relationship with Lumumba and Nehru's relationship with the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.[418] However, Nasser was deeply involved in the decision to deploy UN forces to the Congo, and attempted to advise Lumumba during the crisis. In *Cold War in the Congo*, Frank R. Villafana describes some of this activity through his research on the relationship between Egypt and Cuba, which was informed by the Congo crisis.[419] Specifically, Villafana mentions how Cairo was a crucial

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[415] Alessandro Iandolo, "Cold War conflict in the Congo," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 16, number 2, (Spring 2014) 32-55; Philip Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945-1968* (Bakingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2016); and Sergey Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964*, (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

[416] Alanna O'Malley, *The Diplomacy of Decolonization: America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo Crisis 1960-1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 2.

[417] One of the few books on the Congo crisis that does acknowledge Nasser's role is Kwame Nkrumah's *Challenge of the Congo*.

[418] Alanna O'Malley, "Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations, 1960-1," *International History Review*, (2015), 1-21.

[419] Frank R. Villafana describes the relationship between the UAR and Cuba, detailing how even though Nasser and Castro disliked each other personally, Cuban and Egyptian troops cooperated in Algeria during a border dispute with Morocco in 1963 and the Congo Crisis brought the two together with Cuban and over the shipment of arms to the

transit hub for Cuban and Soviet aid, as well as a sanctuary for Congolese rebels following Lumumba's murder. Recent works on the United States' policy in Africa also mention Nasser's involvement in the crisis, including Philip Muehlenbeck's *Betting on the Africans,* although he only devotes three paragraphs to the impact of the Congo on Nasser and JFK relations.[420] However, given the linguistic challenges and political obstacles to accessing archives, most of these studies have limited access to the Egyptian perspective. The crisis is rarely foregrounded in histories of Egypt during this period, but is instead overshadowed by the focus on pan-Arabism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Yemeni Civil War, and the Arab Cold War. Exceptions to this trend include Tareq Y. Ismael's *The UAR in Africa: Egypt's Policy Under Nasser* from 1971 and Ankush B. Sawant *Egypt's Africa Policy* from 1981.[421] More recently Yoav Di-Capua discusses the Congo Crisis' impact on the Arab and European Left, but his treatment is fairly brief and mostly concerned with how the crisis furthered Arab socialism and leftist networks. The current chapter builds upon this existing scholarship to trace how Cairo became involved in the Congo crisis, and how the crisis in turn shaped Egypt's vision for an anti-colonial political community. First, this chapter explores the impact of the press law through the creation of the NPH.[422]

While historians have widely cited NPH's publications, the sole explicit mention of NPH that I have located is in Menachem Klein's "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture," where he describes a government-funded publication house named *Dar al-Qawmiyya* that was founded in 1959 and became the primary venue for book publishing through the Ministry of National Guidance and

Congolese rebels. *Cold War in The Congo: The Confrontation of Cuban Military Forces* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 136.

[420] Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, 125-6.

[421] Hilmi S. Yousuf's *African-Arab Relations* also examines this larger history, but neglects the Congo Crisis.

[422] NPH's full name is *Dar al-Qawmiyya lil-Taba'a wa al-Nashr* [National House of Publishing and Distribution] not to be confused with *Dar al-Kutub wa al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiyya*, which is the Egyptian National Library and Archives. I refer to *Dar al-Qawmiyya* as the National Publications House since that was how it was referred to in English language publications.

Culture.[423] Many of the NPH publications often included advertisements for other magazines and books that were available. Exploring the metadata on WorldCat for these publications identifies multiple entities that were affiliated with NPH, including the UAR Welfare Institute, the Information Department, the Middle East News Agency, the General Egyptian Publishing Organization, and the Middle East Research Centre, which produced *The Scribe* discussed in the previous chapters.[424] Under the auspices of the NPH, the Middle East Research Centre continued its "Arab Affairs" series, and published its first "Africa for Africans" volume with *The Awakening of Africa* by Shawky Ikladios in 1959. In addition to the *Arab Observer*, mentioned in the introduction, the NPH's first publications also included *The Arab Review,* edited by Amin Shaker. Since his appointment as Nasser's personal secretary in 1954, Shaker had risen in the ranks of the intelligence services.[425] The publications were both initially printed in English and modeled on *Newsweek* and *Time Magazine,* with glossy photos and articles on a wide range of subjects. The first issue of *The Arab Review* was published in March 1960, and the first issue of the *Arab Observer* was published on July 26, 1960.

[423] Klein, "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture," 151, 167, 172.

[424] Searches for National Publications House periodicals were conducted in English, French, and Arabic, and WorldCat identities produced the following results *Dar al-Qawmiyya lil-Taba' wa al-Nashr* (http://worldcat.org/identities/lccn-n85195658/) U.A.R. Welfare Institute (http://worldcat.org/identities/viaf-155319758/), *Mua'ssat al-Misriyya al-'Alma lil-Anba' wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawazi' wa al-Taba'* [General Egyptian Organization for News, Publishing, Distribution, and Printing] (http://worldcat.org/identities/lccn-n85195660/), *Anba' al-Sharq al-Awsat* [Middle East News Agency] (http://worldcat.org/identities/lccn-n83002017/), Cairo Information Department (http://worldcat.org/identities/viaf-210670819/), Middle East Research Centre (http://worldcat.org/identities/nc-middle%20east%20research%20centre%20cairo/). These publishing identities are far from exact or definitive, but in the absence of other sources they help provide a sense of the NPH's place in Egypt's mass information regime. For more infomration on how WorldCat assembles these identities, see https://www.oclc.org/research/themes/data-science/identities.html.

[425] Shaker also published *Bena' al-Watan* beginning in 1958, but so far I have been unable to locating issues or citations of the magazine prior to 1962. Talhami *Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From al-Ahram to al-Ahali*, Awatif 'Abd al-Rahman *The Concerns of the Egyptian Press and Journalists,* and Ahmed Hamroush's memoirs all mention this magazine with a publication date of 1958.

The *Review* was a monthly publication, and its first issue copied the *Ikhtarna Laka* model of prominently featuring advertisements for a range of public and private companies, including the Nile Hilton, Misr Travel, and Syrian Tobacco. The first issue was 156 pages, and opened with a letter from Amin Shaker, where he outlined the magazine's aim; "to develop relations between our country and your country, between our people and your people, between the individual Arab and other individuals all over the world. [...] *The Arab Review* is, therefore, planned to be a mirror reflecting current events and activities in the Arab world in general and the United Arab Republic in particular."[426] While exploring the reception to these publications is difficult, each magazine contained information on subscription rates, providing some sense of the intended audience. However, the ordering of the Table of Contents is even more telling, as it was not numerical but instead topical, and the top billing is "The Significance of the Democratic, Socialist, Cooperative Society, by President Gamal Abdul-Nasser".

Subscription Rates for *The Arab Review* Transcribed from March 1960 Issue

SUBSCRIPTION RATES	One Year	Two Year
U.A.R.	L.E. 1	L.E. 1.80
U.S.A. & CANADA	U.S. $ 3.00	USD $5.40
U.K. and Sterling Countries	£ 13	£ 16
INDIA, PAKISTAN & CEYLON	Rs. 13	Rs. 23
EAST & WEST AFRICA	£ 1	£ 16
GERMANY	DM. 12	DM. 21.6
DENMARK & NORWAY	Kr. 20	Kr. 36
SWEDEN	Kr. 15	Kr. 27
FRANCE	Frs. 1.500	Frs. 2.700
ITALY	Lr. 1.750	Lr. 3.150
SWITZERLAND	S.Frs. 12	S.Frs. 21.60
BELGIUM	B.Frs. 150	B.Frs. 270
HOLLAND	Fl. 11	Fl. 20

Figure 6. Distribution of Topics in The Arab Review March 1960 (NMF Model)



[426] *The Arab Review*, March 1960. 3.

Figure 6 visualizes the overview of topics in the first issue and covers the majority of the content, with the exception of Nehru's visit to Cairo, which focuses on Egyptian government initiatives, from state planning and industrialization to cultural events.[427] Drilling down further into the topic on Arts and Festivals produces a number of words on radio and broadcasting from an article entitled "This is Cairo Calling". The piece describes the ongoing expansion of the *Voice of Arabs* programming, as well as the growth of *The Overseas Programme* - Cairo's broadcast services to the rest of the world. Described as the "the most highly organized and most complex of all the services", the article describes how broadcasts were produced in twenty-four languages and provided over fifty hours of daily programming. Broadcasting was divided into six regional groups, "South and South-East Asia, the Middle East (its non-Arabic speaking countries), East Africa, West Africa, Europe, and the two Americas" and the purpose of *The Overseas Programme* was almost identical to *The Arab Review*; "to give the peoples of the world a better understanding of the United Arab Republic."[428]

In comparison to *The Arab Review, Arab Observer* was a much shorter, weekly publication. While both periodicals built off the earlier model of Hatem's *The Scribe*, unlike the *Review, Arab Observer*'s first issue did not have a listed editorial board or a table of contents. Figure 7 visualizes the distribution of topics within the issue, and while overlap in content exists between the periodicals, *Arab Observer*'s coverage ranges further both geographically and thematically.

[427] This figure and figure 2 were generated using two methods, Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency and Non-Negative Matrix Factorization. These figures show the top-level topics generated using these methods across each magazine, but this data is more illustrative than a definitive description of these articles. More information about these methods, the selected hyperparameters used to generate these figures, and my rationale for using these methods are in Appendix I. For an example use of these methods, see Jo Guldi "Parliament's Debates about Infrastructure: An Exercise in Using Dynamic Topic Models to Synthesize Historical Change" *Technology and Culture*, Volume 60, Number 1, January 2019, 1-33.

[428] *The Arab Review*, March 1960, 91.

Figure 7. Distribution of Topics in Arab Observer June 26 1960 (NMF Model)



In particular, the *Observer* pioneered the reprinting and translating of Egyptian daily press and radio coverage. Returning to the Press Reorganisation Law, this first issue reprinted excerpts from Radio Cairo broadcasts on May 25 1960 where the law is described as ending the "minority mouthpiece" of private publishers and establishing the principle of non-alignment in the press.[429] While the first issue was primarily devoted to Nasser's visit to Greece and Yugoslavia, it also included two articles on African nationalist movements, "Some Features of African Nationalist Movements" by Dr. Abdel Malek Odah, a lecturer at Cairo University, and "Africa To-Day" by Mursi Saad el-Din. The first piece outlines "why African nationalist movements prefer to use Cairo as a centre for their activity" and the second one provides an overview of decolonization across the continent, declaring it a "year of miracles for Africa."[430]

This type of coverage regarding African affairs had become the norm in the Egyptian press, according to the American Embassy in Cairo, citing how on June 24, *Al-Ahram* devoted a full page to African events in Cairo. This page-long article begins with quoting Nasser's *The Philosophy of the Revolution* about Egypt's position in Africa as a justification for Cairo's involvement in the "bloody

[429] *Arab Observer*, June 26 1960, 26.
[430] *Arab Observer*, June 26 1960, 17-19.

fight which is now in progress in the heart of Africa."[431] The article describes many of the activities detailed in the previous chapter, from the publishing of *The Renaissance of Africa* to the establishment of the African liberation bureaus in Zamalek, with a new one opening that week under the auspices of Oliver Tambo and the National African Party from South Africa. The authors also describe the efforts of African students trying to reach Cairo to study at *al-Azhar* and Cairo University, and announced that over four thousand were currently in the city. The most prominent feature was Radio Cairo, which now included a team of "18 African announcers" to deliver broadcasts in "six languages […] to well over 120 million Africans", and increasingly used commentaries "to whip up the feelings of agitation" for these nationalist movements.[432] The article ends by describing the officials from the African Bureau in the Foreign Ministry traveling to independence celebrations in the Mali Federation, Somaliland, Nigeria, and Congo.[433] Both this article and the ones from the first issue of the *Arab Observer* were largely reporting on already established trends in Egyptian policies. However, the focus on African affairs was increasingly becoming prominent in the Egyptian press. In *The UAR in Africa*, Tareq Ismael quotes the March 9 1959 issue of *Ruz al-Yusuf,* which wrote that "1959 will be the year of Africa. The center of activities will be transformed from the Middle East to the heart of the African continent."[434] Part of this shift away from the Arab world was the subsiding of the propaganda war with Iraq, and to a lesser degree Saudi Arabia, as relations normalized into what Malcolm Kerr famously termed the 'Arab Cold War'.

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[431] Francis Allen, "Newspaper Article on Africans in Cairo," American Embassy Cairo to Washington July 25 1960 NARA RG 84 Embassy Cairo General Records 1953-1961 Box 10 Folder 350 Africa (Hereafter NARA RG 84 Folder 350 Africa), 1.
[432] "Newspaper Article on Africans in Cairo," NARA RG 84 Folder 350 Africa, 4-5.
[433] The Egyptian ambassador to Cameroon, Nagib al-Sadir, claimed he was the first diplomat received by Lumumba, which was a sign of the Congolese people's respect for the UAR. Embassy Cairo to Washington "The UAR and the Congo" RG 84 Egypt US Embassy Cairo General Records, 1953-1961 Box 9 Folder 320 UAR-Congo (Hereafter NARA RG 84 Folder 320 UAR-Congo) August 12, 1960, 3.
[434] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 48.

The prediction in *Ruz al-Yusuf* was also prescient. Helmi Sharawy, one of the Egyptian officials who worked initially for the African Association and then the Bureau, described 1960 as being of "crucial importance to the National Liberation of Africa, not only because the Declaration of Independence of All Colonised Peoples was adopted by the United Nations on 14 December, but also because it was the year where much was achieved in the way of clarifying the difference between the concepts of formal independence and real national liberation."[435] While the UN declaration would be signed at the end of 1960, Sharawy's assertion about the difference between "formal independence and real national liberation" was largely a reference to the Congo Crisis, which would challenge the very premise of Cairo's involvement in African affairs.

The conflict in Congo emerged within days of the celebrations of the formal independence from Belgium, when the military mutinied against the white officers and mobs attacked foreign communities. Widely reported in the international press as a parable for decolonization gone too far, Belgium used this pretext to support the enemies of the recently elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, and to send Belgium troops to the province of Katanga – the most copper-rich part of the country.[436] On July 11, 1960 Moïse Tshombe, a former businessman and leader of the Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT), announced the secession of Katanga with support from Belgium. On July 12th, Nasser and the National Union's Foreign Affairs Committee sent cables to Lumumba, assuring him of their support, and then on July 13th they cabled Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary General, to ask for assistance in preserving Congolese independence.[437] While publicly calling for UN involvement, Nasser was privately hesitant to commit Egyptian troops and only agreed after several requests from Hammarskjöld.[438] On July 14,

[435] Helmi Sharawy, "Memories on African Liberation (1956–1975): A Personal Experience from Egypt, Part II," *Pamvazuka News*, May 25, 2011, issue 531.
[436] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, 91 and Yoav, *No Exit*, 183.
[437] "The UAR and the Congo", NARA RG 84 Folder 320 UAR-Congo, 3.
[438] Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, 175-6.

Nasser also received a cable from Nkrumah, asking for Egyptian airplanes to transport Ghanaian troops to the Congo, which Nasser quickly acquiesced to, and troops started traveling on Egyptian planes between Accra and Leopoldville on July 23rd.[439] On the 14th, the UN Security Council also passed a resolution on Congo, calling for Belgium to remove its troops and committing to the creation of Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), a mission that "would outstrip in size and ambition any UN project undertaken hitherto."[440] On July 15th, Nasser also received a cable from Tshombe requesting Egyptian recognition of Katanga. Fearing the breakup of the Congo and Tshombe's ties to Belgium, Nasser's response was to send personnel to open an Egyptian Embassy in Leopoldville, the seat of Lumumba's government.[441] Nasser was not alone in his fears, as Alanna O'Malley contends that both Nkrumah and Nehru observed events in the Congo with "growing unease", in part due to fears over Lumumba's "mercurial personality", but even more so the potential for the conflict to become 'internationalized'.[442]

This flurry of activities was reflected in the *Arab Observer*. In the July 17, 1960 issue, the cover image shows Patrice Lumumba with the headline "Cairo Prepared to Help Congo." In "Motive Behind UAR Anxiety Over the Congo's Fate", an unnamed author argues, "The U.A.R. Regarded the safety and sovereignty of any African state as its own, as any menace to an African country meant a menace to the UAR which forms part of the continent."[443] While an American embassy memorandum on the UAR and Congo described Cairo's support as "more talk than action," this talk was not only front-page news in Cairo, but also inspired mass demonstrations on August 1st and 2nd in support of Congo.[444] Known as "Congo Day", these demonstrations were

[439] Cairo to Washington NARA RG 84 Box 9 Folder 312 UN-Congo July 23 1960, 1.
[440] O'Malley, "Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations", 974.
[441] "The UAR and the Congo", NARA RG 84 Folder 320 UAR-Congo, 3-4.
[442] O'Malley, "Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations", 972.
[443] *Arab Observer*, July 17 1960, 8.
[444] "The UAR and the Congo", NARA RG 84 Folder 320 UAR-Congo, 1. The front-page of *The Egyptian Gazette* for the entire first week of August 1960 featured headlines about Congo.

organized by the NU; the African Association; and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), and included speeches from Mohamed Fuad Galal, the Deputy Speaker of the Egyptian National Union Assembly; Youssef al-Sibai, who was now the Secretary General of the Permanent Secretariat of the AAPSO; and Abdel Rashidov, the USSR delegate to the AAPSO in Cairo, as well as representatives of African liberation movements from Uganda, Algeria, Cameroon, Zanzibar, Northern Rhodesia, Somalia, and Ruanda-Urundi.[445] The speeches called for Belgium to end its imperialism in Africa, for the UN to negotiate the withdrawal of Belgium troops from the Congo, and lastly, for support of Patrice Lumumba to maintain the Congo's "freedom, unity and sovereignty."[446] According to the daily Egyptian newspaper, *al-Ahram,* the rally even sent a cable to Lumumba offering volunteers to fight Belgium imperialists, inspired in part by Cairo's struggle against imperialist aggression in the Suez Crisis of 1956.[447] The rally also sent a cable to the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, about Congo Day and the desire for UN involvement in the Congo, claiming to represent all concerned African citizens. The demonstrations eventually dispersed after waiting at the Belgium Embassy for the Ambassador to address "the African freedom fighters."[448]

Similar to many of the speeches from Congo Day, the Egyptian press couched the Congo Crisis in terms of previous imperialist plots. One article in the July 17th issue compared the Congo to "a re-enactment of the 1958 Lebanon occupation tragedy."[449] In *al-Ahram*, Nasser was quoted as comparing the Congo to the Suez aggression of 1956.[450] In response to criticisms of Egypt's lack of

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[445] Speeches mentioned include John Kale, Director of the Uganda Office in Cairo, who was the chairman of the meeting, as well as one by Tewfik Teutora, who represented the Algerian Provisional Government. Embassy Cairo to Department of State, RG 84 Box 9 Folder 310 Afro Asian People's Solidarity Organization, August 4 1960.
[446] Embassy Cairo to Department of State, Aug 4 1960, Folder 310 Afro Asian People's Solidarity Organization, Box 9, Egypt US Embassy General Records 1959-1961, RG 84
[447] *Al-Ahram* August 4 1960, 1
[448] "Congo Day," *Arab Observer*, August 7 1960, 19-20.
[449] "Political Roundup," *Arab Observer*, August 7 1960, 12.
[450] *Al-Ahram* July 17, Nasser commenting, "When I hear what is happening in the Congo, I remember what happened in Egypt in 1956." In his talks with President Abboud of Sudan, Nasser compared Congo to Port Said, Lebanon, and

direct action, an editorial in *al-Gumhuriyya* on July 17th wrote that the UAR had not offered scholarships or direct aid because bribery was not their policy, but that "No nationalist in the Congo, in Africa, or in Asia doubted that in times of stress the UAR would be at the top of the list of those rushing to help."[451] On August 7, Hatem interrupted a regular broadcast of Radio Cairo to announce that Egypt was waiting on the outcome of the UN Security Council meeting on the Congo, but that Egypt was ready to send military aid to Lumumba, after Nasser received cables from both Nkrumah and Lumumba.[452] Lumumba's message was a formal request for military assistance, while Nkrumah's messaged proposed a convening of an All African Peoples summit in Leopoldville later that month, as well as the creation of an African force to implement the 'Africanisation' of the conflict and prevent imperialist intervention.[453] Tareq Ismael describes Nasser's hesitation in replying to Nkrumah's message since this deployment of Egyptian military forces would be a first in terms of Cairo's support for national liberation movements.[454] Nonetheless, the August 14th issue of the *Arab Observer*, published an the article, "Rationale for UAR Military Support to the Congo", describing how Egypt formally committed military support for the UN mission in Congo on August 12th, as well as aerial navigation and telephone experts, and Red Crescent medical teams in early August.[455] Given Egypt's participation in ONUC,

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Jordan, claiming that all Afro-Asians should be on alert. *Arab Observer* issue from July 24 1960. Nasser also discussed Congo in his speech to the National Assembly on July 21 1960 *President Gamal Abdel Nasser on Africa* U.A.R. Information Department (Cairo, n.d.), 22.

[451] *Al-Gumhuriyya* July 17 1960, 3.

[452] *Al-Ahram* August 8 1960, 1; *The Egyptian Gazette* August 8 1960, 2; American Embassy Cairo to Washington NARA RG 84 Folder 320 UAR-Congo. August 9 1960, 1; and Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 207.

[453] O'Malley, "Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations," 974 and Ismael, *The UAR in Africa,* 207.

[454] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa,* 207.

[455] *Arab Observer*, August 14, 1960, 15 and Ismael, *The UAR in Africa,* 208.The actual flying of the military forces only occurred on August 20th on US Air Force planes, though the Egyptian press was apparently initially quiet on American involvement on announcing it after the flights left. In total, there was "17 flights carrying 555 paratroopers plus nine UAR correspondents and 234,609 pounds of cargo. The cargo included 20 jeeps, nine trucks, four trailers and one ambulance." The American Embassy largely attributed the use of American planes to "UAR inexperience in such operations." "Airlift of UAR Troops to the Congo" American Embassy Cairo to Washington NARA RG 84 Folder 320 UAR-Congo. August 26 1960, 2.

Hammarskjöld also appointed Egypt to the UN Congo Advisory Committee along with Ghana, India, and other neutralist powers who together attempted to promote a UN policy for Congo along neutralist principles.[456]

The article titled "Rationale for UAR Military Support to the Congo" outlined the Egyptian perspective on the conflict by indicating that the imperialist threat in Congo was a threat to independence across Africa. The article described the current situation in the Congo as the "Tshombe phase" - a phase of relapse in national liberation before full independence. According to the author, the "Tshombe phase" had passed with Nuri al Said in Iraq, Suhrawady in Pakistan, Menderes in Turkey, and Chamoun in Lebanon. While the article compared the Congo to Palestine, it ends optimistically, arguing that the existence of independent Afro-Asian countries will prevent history from repeating itself.[457] This coverage of the Congo was becoming more and more frequent in the *Arab Observer*, as demonstrated in Figure 8

Figure 8. Frequency of 'Congo' in Arab Observer Summer 1960



[456] O'Malley, "Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations," 974. Additional members included Canada, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Guinea, Indonesia, Ireland, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, and Tunisia.

[457] *Arab Observer*, August 14, 1960, 15. This theme was repeated in an article from *African Renaissance* "Qadiyya al mua'amarat fil kongo" ["The issue of plots in the Congo"] September 1960, 3-5.

Figure 9. Comparing Congo-Specific Pages to the rest of the Arab Observer from June - August 1960

Graph A. Shared Language Between Congo-Specific Pages and the *Arab Observer*



Graph A illustrates the top terms for two TF-IDF models. The Y-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages and the X-Axis is the model trained on the rest of the *Arab Observer*.

The two models contain 52% shared top terms, and location of the points indicates the relative weights in each model. Overall, the shared terms have a positive correlation, that is words weighted highly in one model are similarly weighted in the other model.

The Congo-specific model has higher weights for Africa-related terms, whereas the rest of the magazine model privileges words relating to the Egyptian government.

Figure metrics: Adj. R-squared 0.892; Skew 0.021; Kurtosis 2.817; Shared Terms 52%; Distinct Terms 48%

Graph B. Shared and Distinctive Language Between Congo-Specific Pages and the *Arab Observer*



Graph B illustrates shared and distinctive top terms for the two TFIDF models.

The distinctive terms in the Congo-specific list are primarily proper names associated with Congo, such as Lumumba and Tshombe. However, there is also terms such as independence, struggle, and imperialist in the Congo list, whereas the rest of the magazine's more distinctive terms included Suez Canal, Palestine, French, and Algeria.

These lists represent only the top weighted terms in each model, and thus, the distinctiveness is relative to each corpus. For example, if comparing the entirety of both models, many of the distinctive words would be shared, though with significantly different weights.

Comparing solely the top terms from each model helps elucidate the divergence in language use.

While the magazine was not exclusively focused on the conflict, Figure 9 compares the language of articles on the Congo to the rest of the magazine, using a natural language processing method called Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF), developed by Karen Spärck Jones in 1972.[458] TF-IDF weights each word in a document through dividing the number of that word's occurrence in the text by the number of times it appears in documents across the corpus. A term with a high-ranking weight in a TF-IDF model is one that is both relatively unique and occurs more than once across the corpus. TF-IDF enables the exploration of similarities and differences within and across a set of texts, and since it privileges more distinctive words across documents, is particularly useful for validating discursive trends. In Figure 9, both graphs A and B illustrate the shared discourse between articles on Congo and the rest of the magazine, especially with respect to topics concerning Africa, the United Nations, Israel, and the Egyptian government. Graph B also depicts the distinctive language between these two corpuses. Naturally, many of the words in the Congo-related articles are proper names, like Katanga, Lumumba, Hammarskjöld. However, these graphs also detail how an article that mentioned Suez or development would be less likely to include discussion of imperialism or independence struggles. Given the focus on events in the Congo, this differentiation between articles on the conflict compared to the rest of the magazine is not unexpected, but does help elucidate the particulars of Cairo's coverage and perspective of the crisis, as well as how this reporting related to the rest of the magazine.[459]

[458] Karen Sparck Jones, "A Statistical Interpretation of Term Specificity and Its Application in Retrieval," *Journal of Documentation* vol. 28, no. 1 (1972), 11-21.

[459] This Congo-specific coverage was identified through a process of investigating the frequency of the term Congo in the corpus in relation to other terms (such as Lumumba, Katanga, etc…) that I deemed relevant to the crisis. While this computational approach results in some misidentified pages, overall the ability to subset the data and compare this coverage is crucial to my argument. Furthermore, after reading the magazine, I evaluated the identified discourses and models, which comport with my interpretation of the reporting.

Figure 10. Comparing Congo-Specific Pages of the Arab Observer to The Arab Review from June - August 1960

Graph A. Shared Language Between Congo-Specific Pages of the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review*



Graph A illustrates the top terms for two TF-IDF models. The Y-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages of the *Arab Observer* and the X-Axis is the model trained on *The Arab Review.*

The two models contain 30% shared top terms, and overall, the shared terms have a relatively flat correlation, that is words weighted highly in one model are not similarly weighted in the other model.

This lack of correlation is also captured in the shaded area of the graph, which is the confidence interval. The confidence interval (ci) visualizes the amount of variance between the points, and the large size of the ci indicates that though these models share terms, their use of these words varies considerably.

Figure metrics: Adj. R-squared 0.858; Skew 0.788; Kurtosis 3.438; Shared Terms 30%; Distinct Terms 70%

Graph B. Shared and Distinctive Language Between Congo-Specific Pages of the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review*



Graph B illustrates both shared and distinctive top terms for the two TFIDF models.

Since *The Arab Review* contained no articles on the Congo, the distinctiveness of the terms is expected.

However, unlike Figure 7 Graph B, the list for *The Arab Review* contains no mention of Algeria or Palestine. Instead, the distinctive language of *The Arab Review* indicates that the magazine was primarily focused on Egyptian economic and industrial development.

While these corpuses are drawn from different magazines, the relative divergence in language highlights the differing coverage.

Figure 11. Comparing the Arab Observer to The Arab Review from June - August 1960

Graph A. Shared Language Between the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review*



Graph A illustrates the top terms for two TF-IDF models. The Y-Axis is the model trained on the *Arab Observer* and the X-Axis is the model trained on *The Arab Review.*

The two models contain 46% shared top terms, and the size of the points indicates the frequency of the term in these corpuses.

Overall, the shared terms have a relatively positive correlation with many of the terms clustering within or close to the confidence interval.

Figure metrics: Adj. R-squared 0.888; Skew 0.462; Kurtosis 2.183; Shared Terms 46%; Distinct Terms 54%

Graph B. Shared and Distinctive Language Between the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review*



Graph B illustrates both shared and distinctive top terms for the two TFIDF models.

While Figure 8 compared the Congo-specific pages of the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review,* the differences illustrated could in part be attributed to the distinct magazines.

However, Graph A and B demonstrates that while the discourses in these magazines were not identical, there exist far more similarities between the magazines than between coverage of the Congo and *The Arab Review.*

This difference in discourses is even more stark when comparing the *Arab Observer* to *The Arab Review*. Prior to the September issue, *The Arab Review* lacked any coverage of the crisis, and thus, to find similar discourses between the two magazines, I first compared articles on the Congo from the *Arab Observer* to the summer issues of *The Arab Review*. Depicted in Figure 10, the language between these two corpuses contains relatively little overlap, with the shared language only indicating that these magazines were both published in Cairo by the Egyptian government. *The Arab Review* coverage focused primarily on economic and social development, highlighting Egypt's achievements in these fields since the revolution. While some of the variation captured in Figure 8 could be attributed to comparing two different magazines with specific formats and writers, Figure 9 compares the entirety of the summer issues for the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review* to control for these factors. Figure 11 demonstrates that these two magazines contained similar language overall, but that the *Arab Observer*'s articles emphasized political events in the decolonizing world and offered their readers an anti-colonial perspective from Cairo.

These results provide crucial evidence for both the extent of and limits to Cairo's efforts to spread anti-colonialism, especially with respect to events like the Congo crisis. The divergence between the two magazines is particularly notable since both periodicals were produced by the NPH, and the few scholarly works that mention the impact of the Egyptian Press Reorganisation Law often depict this new regulatory regime as the death knell of the Egyptian press. A survey from the International Press Institute described the changes beginning in the late 1950s as resulting in press that was "increasingly government-inspired and stereotyped."[460] Adnan Almaney argues in a 1972 article that "due to the repetition of such themes as Arab socialism, Arab unity, revolutionary spirit, imperialism, reactionary elements, and the people's gains; and due to the absence of any criticism of Nasser or his regime, the press acquired the unflattering reputation of being dull and

[460] International Press Institute Survey, *The Press in Authoritarian Countries*, 180.

predictable in handling domestic affairs."[461] Such criticism continues in the historiography, with Ghada Hashem Talhami writing that post-nationalization "most papers began to sing a similar tune and resembled promotional or publicity sheets for the government's point of view."[462] Although the quasi-nationalization of the press fundamentally transformed the press and its discourses, these graphs illustrate that government-funded publications were not monolithic. In "Egypt's Revolutionary Publishing Culture," Menachem Klein makes a similar argument that even as the state's control of publishing market grew, Egyptian book publishing remained relatively diverse in its topics and formats. While the next chapter delves into the differing audiences of these magazines, this next section traces how the Congo crisis increasingly became the focus of the Egyptian press, in part due to the deterioration of the conflict. However, Nasser's personal investment in the conflict spurred Egyptian involvement, and he increasingly viewed Congo through the prism of Suez and Palestine. Ultimately, scholars have considered the influence of Egyptian involvement in the Congo crisis on later policies towards Yemen and Israel, but have yet to detail the extent of these activities, from Nasser's influence in the Afro-Asian bloc to Cairo's prominence as a hub for Congolese rebels. This next section traces how Cairo became further implicated in the Congo crisis, and especially how this transformation impacted the focus and content of these state-funded publications.

Instituting the Third World: The Afro-Asian Bloc and the Assassination of Patrice Lumumba

Lumumba became increasingly skeptical of the UNOC forces by the end of August 1960, after they failed to force Belgium troops out or to reintegrate Katanga back into Congo, and he began attacking the United Nations in speeches while appealing to the Americans and Soviets for

461 Adnan Almaney, "Government Control of the Press in the United Arab Republic, 1952-1970," 345.
462 Talhami *Palestine in the Egyptian Press*, 154. See also Donald Thomas Zajackowski "A Comparison of Censorship, Control, and Freedom of the Press in Israel and Egypt: An Update From the Journalists' Perspective" M.A. Thesis University of Maryland (1989), 46 and *Dabbous,* "Nasser and the Egyptian Press," 68.

additional aid. In response, Nasser sent cables to Lumumba asking him to continue to cooperate with the UN forces, fearing that this issue could split the Afro-Asian bloc. While American and British embassy officials in Cairo were skeptical of Nasser's position, private discussions with Egyptian officials and Egyptian press coverage articulated a similar middle-of-the-road policy – attempting to support Lumumba while avoiding criticism of Hammarskjold.[463] However, this approach quickly became untenable as both the Americans and Soviets became involved in the crisis. The U.S. government increasingly viewed Lumumba as a proto-Castro and described the situation in Congo as a potential new Cuba, a perspective that was further reinforced when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev committed Soviet aircraft and over a thousand military advisors to help Lumumba counter Belgian forces in Katanga. Lumumba's acceptance of Soviet assistance further alienated him from other members of the Congolese government in Leopoldville, including President Joseph Kasa-Vubu. In early September, the government collapsed over these tensions, as well as the outbreak of a coup, led by the chief of the army, Joseph Mobutu, who, with CIA support, was able to place Lumumba in house arrest.[464] Facing an increasingly acute situation, Nasser appointed Dr. Murad Ghaleb, a close friend, as the UAR ambassador to the Congo in early September, as well as Muhammad Abdel Aziz Ishak, Editor in Chief of the *African Renaissance* and organizer of the African Association, as cultural attaché to the Congo.[465]

However, this commitment to Congo would be furthered strained once news reached Cairo on September 6th that the UNOC Command had directed Ghanaian troops to shut down Radio Leopoldville, and sent Egyptian troops to close off the airports, which would have essentially cutoff the capital and furthered Mobutu's coup. In *The Cairo Documents*, Heikal describes how the Egyptian

[463] Reinhardt American Embassy Cairo to Washington NARA RG 84 UN-Congo August 19 1960, 1-2; From Foreign Office to Cairo Congo BNA FO UN Activities 1960 August 20 1960, 1-2; and From Cairo to Foreign Office BNA FO UN Activities 1960 August 23 1960, 1.
[464] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, 93, and Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices*, 153.
[465] Nasser had also earlier sent a delegation to Lumumba which included high ranking officials such as Muhammad Fayek, the presidential advisor on African Affairs. Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 208.

commander refused to comply with the order, but nonetheless, the leaders of the African nations participating in the UNOC forces felt "betrayed into taking part in the destruction of the man to whom they had given their word."[466] The American embassy in Cairo also reported how editorials in the Egyptian press were claiming that this was "a deliberate attempt to turn the explosive situation in the Congo into a cold war battle."[467] In response to this news, Hatem announced that Egypt was withdrawing its troops from the UNOC, stating that the "force has deviated from its mission […] to help the Congolese people."[468] Hammarskjold, learning of this decision, sent a cable to Nasser asking him to postpone the withdrawal until they had discussed the situation when they met in New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly later that month.[469]

The fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), also known as the 'Troika Session', due to Khrushchev's proposal for the replacement of the Secretary General with a triumvirate of East, West, and Afro-Asian representatives – supposedly given with dramatic shoe-banging during his speech, was a momentous occasion as world leaders descended on New York, and especially for the Afro-Asian bloc that now included thirteen new independent African states. [470] Nasser decided to attend the event after conferring with Nehru and Tito, as well as African leaders, seeing the UNGA as similar opportunity to Bandung. [471] As his first trip to a Western nation besides a visit to Greece earlier that summer, Nasser arrived in New York City on September 23rd, and was quickly swept up in a flurry of meetings. On the 24th, he met with Khrushchev, and the Congo was

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466 *The Egyptian Gazette,* September 7 1960, 1.
467 American Embassy Cairo to Washington NARA RG 84 UN-Congo 1960 September 12 1960, 1.
468 *The Egyptian Gazette* September 13 1970, 1.
469 Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, 176 and *Arab Observer* September 11 1960, 12 -13.
470 For more about Soviet involvement at the UN see Alessandro Iandolo "Beyond the Shoe: Rethinking Khrushchev at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly" *Diplomatic History* 41. 1. (2017), 128-154. Gerits 'When the Bull Elephants Fight', 158.
471 American Embassy Cairo to Washington NARA RG 84 UN-Congo 1960 September 13 1960, 1-2. Prior to leaving Nasser was apparently briefed by Hatem and the Information Department about invitations for Nasser to appear on American Television, including Meet The Press and Face The Nation, as well as interviews with leading newspapers, including the *New York Times*. Joint Embassy Cairo-USIS Message NARA RG 84 Classified Records Box 14 UNGA Sept-Dec 1960. September 20 1960, 1.

the focus of their meeting with them both agreeing that UN forces had largely been serving Western interests.[472] However, Khrushchev's extensive critiques of Hammarskjold and the UN ended up backfiring, and instead swayed the Afro-Asian bloc towards supporting the UN.[473] Part of this Afro-Asian unity was due to Nasser's efforts behind the scenes, coordinating positions with Nehru, Nkrumah, and Tito, while also meeting with Eisenhower and Macmillan, and famously traveling to Harlem to meet with Castro.[474] On September 27th he addressed the General Assembly and was adamant in his support for the liberation of Congo, along with Palestine and Algeria. Nasser drew parallels between Congo and Suez, arguing that the latter had ushered in the end of "unveiled imperialism" and united "the friends of freedom." However, Nasser described his fears that "the greater danger that confronted the people of the Congo, a danger which we ourselves share, is that imperialism is trying to take the UN as a mask to conceal its designs."[475] While Nasser's rhetoric was critical of the UN, it also embodied the growing consensus among the Afro-Asian bloc of the necessity of the UN as a venue for neutralist politics and to prevent the spread of the Cold War.[476] However, this belief in the UN would be strained as the crisis in Congo deepened over the coming months.

Back in Cairo, Nasser's UN visit was front page news, and crowds lined the streets upon his return on October 5th.[477] Even *The Arab Review* devoted the majority of its September issue to covering Nasser's trip, with Amin Shaker's editorial heralding the UN session as leading to "new assessments of the balance of power in the world" and "a new phase in the history of the modern

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[472] Iandolo, "Beyond the Shoe", 143
[473] O'Malley, "Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations," 978.
[474] Madeline Kalb, *The Congo Cables,* 119-121. See also chapters on Hammarskjold and Kennedy in Heikal's *The Cairo Documents*.
[475] "The address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from New York during his visit to the United Nations which was broadcasted on radio and television 27/09/1960 "*Nasser Archive*
http://nasser.bibalex.org/speeches/browser.aspx?SID=919&lang=en
[476] Parker, *Hearts, Minds, and Voices*, 144 and O'Malley, "Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations," 978.
[477] *The Egyptian Gazette* October 5 1960, 1.

world" with this ascendancy of 'positive neutralism' at the UN.[478] This issue also included the first coverage of the Congo crisis in the magazine with an article on the battalion of Egyptian paratroopers stationed in the Congo.[479] While at the UN, Hammarskjold persuaded Nasser to postpone withdrawing Egyptian troops, but Nasser remained concern with the crisis, even facing criticism from his cabinet who believed that he was overly focused on the Congo.[480] This focus was also present in the Egyptian press, which published increasingly stringent criticism of the United States' role in the conflict. For instance, a memo from the American embassy in Cairo complained about the Egyptian Cultural Attaché in Leopoldville, Muhammad Abdel Aziz Ishak, who claimed in an interview by *al-Ahram* and *Le Progres Egyptien* that the Egyptians did not receive "the true story of the Mobutu coup because the news agencies and Western journalists joined forces to distort Lumumba's position." Ishak went even further, accusing Western embassies of plotting the entirety of the coup and paying the salaries of Mobutu's government. While Ishak was not part of Nasser's inner circle, the embassy concluded that his interviews were emblematic of press coverage of the conflict in Cairo.[481] The Egyptian press also publicized Lumumba's request to Ishak to help get his children out of Leopoldville, and his three children would eventually arrive in Cairo in November 1960, often photographed in the Egyptian press as a symbol of Cairo's support for Lumumba.[482]

Lumumba's desire to get his children out of the country was due to his worsening political position as American support for Mobutu's forces shifted the balance of power. In late November,

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478 *The Arab Review* September 1960, 4.
479 *The Arab Review* September 1960, 12-14.
480 Telegram USUN to Secretary State Washington RG 84 NARA September 22, 1960. Discusses Nasser's fears over the balkanization of the Congo, as well as the frustrations of Ghaleb, who had been instrumental in trying to bring together Kasavubu and Lumumba. See also Madeline Kalb, *The Congo Cables,* 119 and Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, 178.
481 A similar assessment was concluded in the American Embassy memo "Press Statement of Emir Abdel Karim al-Khattaby" that described editorial in *al Masaa* by the Moroccan Emir Abdel Karim al-Khattaby as "another instance of UAR use of the Emir as a "front man", [… but] doubtful that his statement would have seen the light of day in Cairo's strictly controlled press unless it had Governmental sanction and conformed with the UAR line." American Embassy Cairo to Washington, NARA RG 84 October 7 1960.
482 American Embassy Cairo to Washington No. 310 November 3 1960 NARA RG 84 312 UN-Congo, 1; Helmi Sharawy, "Memories on African Liberation (1956–1975): A Personal Experience from Egypt, Part II," *Pamvazuka News*, May 25, 2011, issue 531; and Sawant, *Egypt's Africa Policy*, 150.

Lumumba attempted to move to Stanleyville where he had greater support, but was arrested by Mobutu's forces on December 1st. In response, Lumumba's second-in-command, Antoine Gizenga, formed his own government, while Kasa-Vubu's faction was seated at the United Nations, leading Nasser to send Hammarskjold a frustrated cable about the ineffectiveness of the UN forces in protecting Lumumba.[483] The Egyptian press condemned these actions as "barbarous," and official relations with Congo were halted, as Kasa-Vubu demanded the removal of all Egyptian officials from Congo and the shutting down of the Egyptian embassy. Nasser responded by nationalizing some Belgian firms, as a way to "make UAR's attitude toward Belgian imperialism in Congo very clear."[484] On December 19, members of the pro-Lumumba Stanleyville government, including Bernard Salumu, Gregoire Amisi, and Antoine Katesa arrived in Cairo to consult with top Egyptian officials, as well as the Soviet ambassador, which raised American hackles over Soviet influence in the Congo.[485] Salumu's press conference in Cairo furthered American ire, as he claimed that "Mobutu and his mercenaries are in the pay of Americans, Belgian and British."[486] The Egyptian press was also emphatic in their condemnation of American involvement in the crisis, with an editorial in *al-Gumhuriyya* likening UN and US efforts to "Al Capone's terrorism."[487] While Nasser increasingly feared the potential for feuds among the Congolese leaders to undermine any solution to the crisis, he remained committed to the belief in Egypt's role as the 'vanguard' for freedom on the continent.[488]

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[483] Sawant, *Egypt's Africa Policy*, 151, and Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 212.
[484] American Embassy Cairo to Washington G-308 NARA RG 84 350 Congo December 7 1960, 1 and Sawant, *Egypt's Africa Policy*, 151.
[485] American Embassy Cairo to Washington December 19 1960 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1 and Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 212.
[486] American Embassy Cairo to Washington December 19 1960 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1-2.
[487] "Libelous Attacks on US Role in Cairo," American Embassy Cairo to Washington December 20 1960 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1, 5-6.
[488] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa,* 213. Apparently, Nasser was hesitant though to commit further military aid to Salumu and Gizenga. No. 1130 American Embassy Cairo to Washington December 22 1960 NARA RG 84 320 Casablanca Conference, 1.

To that end, a new Congolese mission was formed in Cairo to support Lumumba's government.[489] The January 8, 1961 issue of the *Arab Observer* included a statement from the Congolese mission denouncing Patrice Lumumba's arrest, and declaring the legal Congolese government to be in Cairo under the leadership of Antoine Gizenga. The cover of this issue also announced the convening of an African Summit, eventually known as the Casablanca conference, in Morocco during early January. Initiated by the Moroccan King Mohammed V, the conference was intended to bring together the "really independent" African states, and address outstanding issues on the continent, especially the situation in Congo, as mistrust of the UN's mission continued to grow.[490] The conference was seen as a "turning point" in Cairo because it brought the more radical African states together for the first time to coordinate policy that, although vague on details, reflected the organizers' ambitious aims.[491] The resolutions called for the removal of the African troops serving with the UN task force in the Congo unless the UN observed and implemented its mandate in the Congo – otherwise the Casablanca group would consider direct action. Furthermore, the conference also called for support of Algerian independence, denounced Israel's occupation in Palestine, and called for the end of nuclear testing.[492] Perhaps the most notable resolution was the creation of the Casablanca Charter, which outlined the creation of numerous institutions to foster African unity, including the creation of an "African Consultative Assembly […] composed of representatives from every African state", as well as four committees: "The African Political Committee" for the heads of state; "The African Economic Committee" to coordinate both

[489] G-348 American Embassy Cairo to Washington January 4 1961 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1. The diplomatic mission in Cairo also reportedly sent a letter to President Kennedy through the American Embassy. G-369 American Embassy Cairo to Washington January 14 1961 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1.
[490] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, 96 and No. 1130 American Embassy Cairo to Washington December 22 1960 NARA RG 84 320 Casablanca Conference, 1.
[491] G-368 American Embassy Cairo to Washington January 12 1961 NARA RG 84 320 Casablanca Conference, 1; and Sawant, *Egypt's Africa Policy*, 121-22.
[492] According to the American Consul, the total agreement achieved over the Congo resolution involved both Ghana and UAR making concessions. American Consul in Casablanca to State, NARA RG 84 Box 14 320 Casablanca Conference January 7 1961.

economic and telecommunications cooperation; "The African Cultural Committee" to develop African civilization; and "a joint African High Command" to coordinate military operations.[493] Although the conference was heralded as a victory for the African radical states, there was a number of divisions, first with the more conservative African states that refused to attend (Sudan, Nigeria, Liberia, and Ethiopia), and then over the question of withdrawing UN troops from the Congo. Nkrumah believed that the African High Command would provide a solution, but Nasser, Keita, and Mohammed V were far more skeptical on the prospects for an African military force.[494]

Nonetheless, Nasser's efforts at the Casablanca conference were widely publicized in the Egyptian press, and during a speech to the National Assembly on January 23, he continued to tie the conflicts in Congo and Algeria to previous imperialist incursions in the Arab world, as well as a larger imperialist conspiracy led by the United States, Belgium, Britain, and France.[495] Nasser also stressed Nkrumah's support for the resolution condemning Israel, signaling that the competition between the two for leadership in Africa had started to shift towards cooperation.[496] Further evidence of this rapport appeared in the January 29th issue of the *Arab Observer*, which included an article on Nkrumah's Egyptian wife Fathia, who was in Cairo as the official delegate to celebrate "the inauguration of the aviation line linking Accra with Cairo."[497] African politics and the Congo crisis were also the focus of two conferences that the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) organized in Cairo that January. The first, from the 16th to the 19th, was the Afro-Asian Women's Conference that drew nearly three hundred delegates from fifty-nine states.[498] Many of the speeches and final resolutions echoed those from Casablanca, emphasizing the role of women in

493 "Casablanca Makes History," *Arab Observer* January 15 1961, 15-21.
494 Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 214.
495 "U.A.R. Permanent Constitution in the Works," *Arab Observer* January 29 1961, 7-9.
496 No. 1287 American Embassy Cairo to Washington January 24 1961 NARA RG 84 320 Casablanca Conference, 1.
497 "Ghana's First Lady," *Arab Observer* January 29 1961, 11.
498 "Afro-Asian Women Hold First Conference," *Arab Observer* January 22 1961, 16. See also Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood*, 161-63 and Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 57.

liberation struggles in Algeria, Palestine, Congo, Laos, and Vietnam. The American embassy was particularly annoyed with the final resolution that urged "all Afro-Asian women to be vigilant in order to be on their guard against American imperialism which is the most dangerous."[499] According to an interview with Amina al-Said, the editor of *Hawwa*, the Egyptian delegation had attempted to moderate the anti-colonial language of the final resolutions, but had been outmaneuvered by the Chinese Communist delegation, in many ways repeating the experiences of the first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in December 1957.[500] The second conference was an emergency session organized by the AAPSO of the Afro-Asian International Committee Formed to Support Congo and Algeria. While this committee passed similar resolutions on Algeria, Laos, and Palestine, the central focus was Congo, with a resolution passed to form a mission to visit Stanleyville and report on the situation on the ground.[501] The British Embassy had noted that after the 1957 conference, the AAPSO had faded in importance, but the outbreak of the Congo crisis had provided "new dynamism and unity" to the organization.[502]

This unity of purpose produced by the Congo crisis was true for Egyptian politics writ large. Helmi Sharawy recounts how "Egypt's role in this liberation struggle was not just some fiery speeches of the type common in the Arab world but a serious sense of national responsibility that led to mobilisation of our military forces during the Congolese crisis, and involvement of our diplomatic personnel."[503] In early February, Egyptian direct military involvement came to an end as

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499 "Afro-Asian Women's Conference," American Embassy Cairo to Washington February 14 1961 NARA RG 84 310 Afro-Asian Women's Conference, 1-2.
500 "Comment on Afro-Asian Women's Conference," American Embassy Cairo to Washington February 15 1961 NARA RG 84 310 Afro-Asian Women's Conference, 4-5.
501 "Afro-Asians Decide Action on Congo," A*rab Observer* January 29 1961, 14-16, which announced a 12-nation committee (Morocco, Guinea, Algeria, the USSR, Chinese People's Republic, the Congo, Indonesia, Algeria, Ghana, Mali, the Sudan and the UAR) based in Cairo and with some funds from the UAR Solidarity Committee to cover travel to Stanleyville. Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 214.
502 FO 1110 1370 UAR: Briefing papers, hostile radio propaganda from Cairo March 15 1961, 5.
503 Helmi Sharawy, "Memories on African Liberation (1956–1975): A Personal Experience from Egypt, Part II," *Pamwazuka News*, May 25, 2011, issue 531.

troops returned from the UN mission in Congo after increasingly acrimonious relations with Kasa-Vubu's government.[504] While the return of the Egyptian forces was in some ways a setback for Nasser's efforts to influence African affairs, the Egyptian press emphasized UN perfidy towards both Lumumba and Egyptian forces, claiming that the UN mission's leadership in Congo had spread rumors that the Egyptians killed Christ and that the Egyptians were in the Congo to colonize Africa as an effort to sow mistrust.[505] These charges were quickly overshadowed when on February 13, 1961, the world learned about the murder of Patrice Lumumba.

The newspapers in Cairo were all dedicated to the news with stark headlines - "They Slaughtered Lumumba" in *al Ahram* and "They Confessed the Slaughter of Lumumba" in *al Gumhuriya*, which also used a black banner as a sign of mourning. Hatem released the official government statement, blaming the "imperialist authorities" of the UN and stating that "this crime would trouble the conscience of the entire human race." Prior to the announcement of Lumumba's murder, reports emerged that he had escaped, and thus, the news was even more shocking. Hatem ended his statement claiming that Lumumba was one solider among many in the struggle for African freedom.[506] Hatem's statement was reprinted in Egyptian newspapers, along with summaries of global reaction including Cuba's announcement of three days of mourning.[507] Egyptian press coverage was both somber and incensed over Lumumba's murder, with editorials in all the major newspapers accusing Hammarskjöld of killing Lumumba and calling for his resignation, as well as the immediate recognition of Lumumba's successor, Antoine Gizenga.[508] Upon hearing this news, the African Association and national liberation bureaus in Cairo started a demonstration at midnight,

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[504] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 214.
[505] *Arab Observer* February 12 1961 p. 9; and No. 1281 Reinhardt American Embassy Cairo to Washington January 23 1961 NARA RG 84 312 UN-Congo, 1
[506] No. 1394 Reinhardt American Embassy Cairo to Washington February 14 1961 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1
[507] "Arabic Press Roundup" American Embassy Cairo to Washington February 14 1961 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1; and "Arabic Press Roundup" American Embassy Cairo February 15, 1961 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1-2.
[508] "Arabic Press Roundup," American Embassy Cairo, 2-3 and No. 1393 American Embassy Cairo to Washington February 14 1961 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1.

which continued in Tahrir Square for two days, with speeches from representatives of the Congo, Mali, Kenya, Ruanda Urundi, Somalia, and the Sudan. The Egyptian government organized a moment of silence for 10 minutes at 10:30am, followed by a silent procession and mass rally outside of the Engineers Syndicate building, which was attended by Lumumba's children and included speeches from Kamal al-Din Hussain, Mohammad Fuad Galal, Yusuf al Sebai, Secretary General of the AAPSO, Arsan Yombi of the Congo, Oshandi Avana of the Cameroons, Anwar Salama of the Trade Union Federation, Abdel Rashidov of the USSR, Sikasi of Uganda, and Laston Tompo of Northern Rhodesia.[509] These demonstrations quickly turned violent with the press reporting that thousands of demonstrators stormed the Belgian Embassy in Garden City, setting furniture and cars on fire, and ripping down the Belgian coat of arms and replacing it with a picture of Lumumba. The demonstrators also attacked the US Information Agency library after being turned away from the American embassy, and eventually proceeded to the UN offices, tearing the UN flag and demanding the resignation of Hammarskjöld.[510] The American embassy painted the protests as small with "hardly more than 40 or 50 protestors" and "almost all [of whom] were Africans."[511] Nonetheless, these demonstrations were front-page news in Cairo, with the *Arab Observer* claiming that, "all classes of UAR citizens took part in demonstrations to express their anger at the assassination of Lumumba." [512]

Immediately following the news, Nasser recognized Gizenga as the official Congolese government and urged other Afro-Asian states to follow suit.[513] In the following weeks, streets with Belgian names were renamed, and a square in Heliopolis was named after Lumumba. The

[509] "Arabic Press Roundup," American Embassy Cairo NARA RG 84 350 Congo February 15 1961, 2-3 and *Arab Observer* February 19, 1961, 15-17.
[510] The protesters also demonstrated in front of the nearby British embassies and the offices of the United Nations Information Center, UNESCO and FAO.
[511] "Stoning of USIS, etc." American Embassy Cairo February 16 1961 NARA RG 84 320 USA-UAR, 1.
[512] *Arab Observer* February 19, 1961, 17.
[513] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 215.

government also announced the publishing of an Africa Day post stamp with the picture of Lumumba, while the press continued to cover protests in Belgrade, New Delhi, Moscow, and Ceylon.[514] A telegram to the American Embassy in Cairo complained that even the advertisements in the Egyptian press were profiting from the fury over death of Lumumba. Many of the advertisements denounced Lumumba's death, such as one by the actors of the film H-3, which was set to open in the cinema in Cairo on February 20, and one for Nasr Fine Yarn Spinning and Weaving Company. According to the embassy, some of the advertisements even provided a space for readers' signatures and slips to be sent to responsible international organizations.[515] Yet this skepticism underappreciates the international impact of this moment. For the Afro-Asian movement, Pieter Vanhove and Taomo Zhou have traced how, for writers and journalists in the movement, Lumumba's murder and the Congo became "a common reference point for Third World left-wing forces' fury toward superpower intervention in decolonization."[516] Yoav Di-Capua also details how Lumumba's murder "scandalized" the European Left, leading Sartre to write on the dangers of neocolonialism.[517] In *Hearts, Minds, and Voices*, Jason Parker also discusses the impact of Lumumba's murder, detailing how the USIA struggled to counter the influence of Lumumba, who in death had become a "hero-martyr" symbol for "African 'radical' nationalists."[518] This symbolism would also become central in Egyptian state-funded publications, as Figure 12 illustrates.

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514 "Arabic Press Roundup" American Embassy Cairo February 15, 1961, 1-2

515 "Arabic Press Roundup" American Embassy Cairo February 15, 1961, 1. This skepticism over the protests was also conveyed in a British Pathe newsreel, entitled "Congo Riots in Cairo". The clip shows coverage of the protest with the voice over stating "It never takes much to spark an ugly looking demonstration in Cairo. […] In fact, cynics remarked that as Egypt regards herself as the foremost African state, she did not want her Congo protests to seem less fervent than others." Clip accessed from British Pathe Youtube site https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JcimAdbuNak

516 Taomo Zhou, "Global reporting from the Third World: the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association, 1963–1974", *Critical Asian Studies* 51. 2 (2019), 176 and Pieter Vanhove "A world to win": China, the Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau, and the Reinvention of World Literature, "*Critical Asian Studies* 51. 2 (2019), 144-165.

517 Di-Capua, *No Exit*, 185.

518 Parker, *Hearts, Minds, and Voices*, 156.

Since August 1960, Congo had been a frequent focus for articles in both the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review*. In Figure 12, graphs A and B compare how this increasing coverage in the *Arab Observer* related to the rest of the magazine, which followed trends similar to those visualized for the Summer of 1960 in Figure 9. However, while the rest of the magazine continued to report on events in Algeria and Israel, as well as the progress of the Aswan Dam, the Congo-related coverage shifted in tone. In Figure 12, graph C depicts the transformation of these discourses between the initial outbreak of the Congo crisis, and its denouement in February 1961. In particular, reporting in the *Arab Observer* moved away from emphasizing Congolese independence and the secession of Katanga towards a focus on Afro-Asian efforts at the UN and the Casablanca Conference to negotiate a solution. This shift in coverage was also present in *The Arab Review*, depicted in Figure 13, which had previously contained no reporting on the crisis until the September 1960 issue. However, unlike the *Arab Observer*, the Congo-specific coverage and the rest of *The Arab Review* remained relatively distinct. Nonetheless, *The Arab Review*'s coverage of the Congo increasingly adopted a similar anti-colonial tone as the one in the *Arab Observer*, visualized in Figure 14.

Figure 12. Comparing Congo-Specific Pages to the rest of the Arab Observer from January - March 1961

Graph A. Shared Language Between Congo-Specific Pages and the *Arab Observer*



Graph A illustrates the top terms for two TF-IDF models. The Y-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages and the X-Axis is the model trained on the rest of the *Arab Observer*.

The two models contain 54% shared top terms. The distribution is similar to Figure 7 (shown in the corner) that compared similar corpus for the summer of 1960. However, by February 1961, the Congo received far more coverage in the *Arab Observer* (34% to 18%).

Figure metrics: Adj. R-squared 0.846; Skew 0.998; Kurtosis 5.022; Shared Terms 54%; Distinct Terms 46%

Graph B. Shared and Distinctive Language Between Congo-Specific Pages and the *Arab Observer*



Graph B illustrates shared and distinctive top terms for the two TFIDF models.

While many of the share terms remain highly weighted, the distinctive terms in the Congo-specific list also indicate the shifting focus in coverage of the conflict, from references to the Casablanca Conference and the Afro-Asian Women's Conference in Cairo in January 1961 to the emphasis on imperialism and the United Nations.

While the rest of the magazine continue to detail economic initiatives, there was also increased focus on Israel after the outbreak of the Lavon Affair, a covert Israeli operation in Egypt in 1954 that led to the resignation of Pinhas Lavon in 1961.

Figure 12. Comparing Congo-Specific Pages to the rest of the Arab Observer from January - March 1961

Graph C. Shared and Distinctive Language Between Congo-Specific Pages and the *Arab Observer*
Comparing Changing Importance from June-August 1960 and January-March 1961



While Graph B illustrated the shared and distinctive language between articles on the Congo and the rest of the magazine, Graph C visualizes the shift in the weights for these models between June-August 1960 and January-March 1961.

The first visualization depicts the change in the *Arab Observer* without Congo-related coverage. Terms on the far side were more significant in the earlier period versus those that became more popular later on.

Words that begin in the middle of the figure were only part of one model, such as Suez or Press, which were more common in articles from Summer 1960. While terms such as Arab and Israel remain consistent throughout the magazine, events in later 1961 shifted the focus towards the Algerian revolution and the Lavon Affair.

The second visualization depicts the shift in language for the Congo-related coverage in the *Arab Observer*.

While the earlier reporting emphasized names relating to Congo and the United Nations, the later reporting highlighted anti-colonial topics, from the Casablanca and Afro-Asian Women's conference to a growing connection between Algeria and Congo.

Notably the later period also no longer included as many discussions of Congolese independence and the secession of Katanga, indicating a shift away from military solutions to an emphasis on the United Nations and Afro-Asian meetings.



Figure 13. Comparing Congo-Specific Pages to the rest of The Arab Review from September 1960 - March 1961

Graph A. Shared Language Between Congo-Specific Pages and the rest of *The Arab Review*



Graph A illustrates the top terms for two TF-IDF models. The Y-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages of *The Arab Review* and the X-Axis is the model trained on *The Arab Review.*

The two models contain 38% shared top terms, which is notable increase from earlier coverage in the magazine (the first article on the Congo appeared in the September 1960 issue).

However, though these terms are shared, there exists very little similarity in their usage in these two corpuses, as illustrated through the flat linear relationship.

Figure metrics: Adj. R-squared 0.760; Skew -0.572; Kurtosis 3.223; Shared Terms 38%; Distinct Terms 62%

Graph B. Shared and Distinctive Language Between Congo-Specific Pages and the rest of *The Arab Review*



Graph B illustrates both shared and distinctive top terms for the two TFIDF models.

Given the lack of relationship in the shared terms in Graph A, the high weighting of distinctive terms in each list is expected.

While the rest of *The Arab Review* continued to cover economic projects, including prominent features on Egyptian cotton, its Congo-related coverage appears relatively distinct.

The emphasis on neo-colonialism, freedom, independence, and imperialism, are all indicative of the growing radical tone in the magazine, and the broader Egyptian press.

Figure 14. Comparing Congo-Specific Pages of the Arab Observer to those of The Arab Review and Arab Affairs

Graph A. Shared Language Between Congo-Specific Pages of the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review*



Graph A illustrates the top terms for two TF-IDF models. The Y-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages of *Arab Observer* and the X-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages of *The Arab Review.*

The two models contain 54% shared top terms, and overall, the shared terms have a strong positive correlation, indicating similar usage in the two magazines.

While some of the terms (Congo, women) appear more frequently in one corpus versus the other, the clustering of the majority of the words near the confidence interval is evidence that this Congo discourse was shared.

Figure metrics: Adj. R-squared 0.735; Skew 0.849; Kurtosis 3.178; Shared Terms 54%; Distinct Terms 46%

Graph B. Shared Language Between Congo-Specific Pages of the *Arab Observer* and *Arab Affairs*



Graph B illustrates the top terms for two TF-IDF models. The Y-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages of *Arab Observer* and the X-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages of the *Arab Affairs*, a magazine started through the NPH and Middle East News Agency in 1960.

The two models contain only 22% shared top terms, and these magazines usage of these terms varied significantly

Unique words to the *Arab Affairs* corpus included references to East, West, World, international, uncommitted, policy, peace, and war, illustrating that the magazine was much more Cold War focused than the *Arab Observer.*

Figure metrics: Adj. R-squared 0.438; Skew 2.053; Kurtosis 6.445; Shared Terms 22%; Distinct Terms 46%

In Figure 12, graph A visualizes how, for the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review,* articles on the Congo crisis had over time come to share similar discursive patterns. This correlation underscores the impact of the conflict in shaping the language of anti-colonialism in Cairo. However, graph B in Figure 12 illustrates the same comparison, but between the *Arab Observer* and *Arab Affairs*, a weekly magazine released by the Middle East News Agency and NPH. Unlike the relationship in graph A between the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review*, the Congo coverage in the *Arab Observer* and *Arab Affairs* contained far more distinctive language and fewer similarities in the usage of even the shared terms. Though these figures provide a broad overview of these discourses, this analysis is crucial for considering both the influence of the Congo crisis on shifting political debates in Cairo, and for elucidating the various perspectives in these periodicals as window into the Egyptian officials responsible for crafting these publications.

Uncovering this coverage is also imperative for understanding how the Congo crisis strained relations between Egypt and the United States. While the Egyptian press had increasingly criticized American involvement in the crisis since September 1960, Lumumba's murder dramatically escalated the tone of the coverage. For example, the American embassy reported how Egyptian editorials were claiming that the United States was "primarily responsible" for Lumumba's assassination, writing that "American imperialism planned to get rid of Lumumba and liquidate all nationalist elements."[519] President Kennedy's announcement on February 15th that the United States would "oppose any attempt by a national at unilateral intervention and recognition of Congolese factions" was aimed at Nasser's recognition of Gizenga, and Cairo's press attention to Pierre Mulele, Gizenga's representative in Cairo.[520] Relations were further strained at the UN, where Egypt, now a member of the Security Council, sponsored a resolution calling for the UN forces to prevent civil

[519] "Cairo Press Review," American Embassy Cairo February 18 1961 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1.
[520] Sawant, *Egypt's Africa Policy*, 154.

war in Congo and for the withdrawal of all Belgian military from the country.[521] However, hoping to lessen tensions, Nasser sent a direct letter to Kennedy on February 20th expressing his frustrations over American involvement in the Congo crisis. Kennedy replied on March 2nd emphasizing the shared interests of the two countries around promoting the UN and keeping the Cold War out of the Congo.[522] This exchange would eventually become famous for normalizing relations between Egypt and the United States during the Kennedy Administration, and placing the question of Israel in the proverbial "ice-box."[523] While relations improved with the United States, they remained strained with Belgium, with the two states breaking relations in the aftermath of Lumumba's murder, and Egypt nationalizing all Belgian property and expelling Belgian nationals.[524] Overall, Nasser's gambit to leverage the Congo crisis to further Egyptian policy aims produced mixed results.

On one hand, Egypt was developing increasingly close ties to other Afro-Asian states, and the creation of the Casablanca group furthered Egyptian influence in Africa. Conversely, the inability of the Casablanca group to influence the outcome of the Congo crisis both on the ground and in the UN was an enormous setback to the optimism of the 'year of Africa', which had initially seemed to herald the end of imperialism. In the aftermath of Lumumba's murder, the prospect of resurgent imperialism, eventually termed neo-colonialism, threatened the gains of the Egyptian revolution. For the Egyptian mass information regime, the Congo crisis was also a significant moment, influencing both its coverage and the perceived audience for this reporting. This next section considers how the experiences of the Congo crisis influenced Nasser's involvement in non-alignment and how the discourses around the Congo transformed along with the meanings of Cairo's anti-colonialism.

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521 Sawant, *Egypt's Africa Policy*, 154-54.
522 Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, 193-95.
523 James, *Nasser at War*, 53-53.
524 G-457 American Embassy Cairo to Washington March 8 1961 NARA RG 84 320 A-Z, 1 and Di-Capua, *No Exit*, 185.

Secession and Success: The Rise of the Non-Aligned Movement and the End of the United Arab Republic

In *The UAR in Africa*, Tareq Ismael describes the period after February 1961 as one of "policy modification" for both the Soviets and Egypt. After the failure of the Soviets and the Afro-Asian bloc to determine the course of the conflict, Khrushchev increasingly shifted Soviet policy to support African states rather than pursue direct military involvement. According to Ismael, a similar policy would become institutionalized in Egypt, especially as relations with the Congo normalized by the end of 1961 with Gizenga and Cyrille Adoula forming a new government in Leopoldville.[525] Indeed, the American embassy reported that, in the weeks following Lumumba's murder, the Egyptian press had decreased its coverage of the Congo crisis, and moderated its tone.[526] Yet as Figure 15 demonstrates, Congo continued to be mentioned in the *Arab Observer*.

Figure 15. Frequency of Congo in the Arab Observer from June 1960 to December 1961



While Congo continued to appear in the magazine, Figure 16 considers whether the earlier era of Congo-related coverage in the *Arab Observer* differed to the reporting from April 1961 onwards.

[525] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 219.
[526] G-486 American Embassy Cairo to Washington March 25 1961 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 2.

Figure 16. Comparing Congo-Specific Pages in the Arab Observer from June 1960 - March 1961 to April 1961 - December 1961

Graph A. Shared Language Between Congo-Specific Pages of the *Arab Observer*



Graph A illustrates the top terms for two TF-IDF models from the *Arab Observer*. The Y-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages of the from June 1960 to March 1961, and the X-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages from April 1961 to December 1961.

The two models contain 64% shared top terms, and overall, the shared terms have a strong positive correlation, indicating similar usage over both time periods in the magazine, even as events in the Congo were transforming significantly.

Figure metrics: Adj. R-squared 0.974; Skew 0.314; Kurtosis 2.149; Shared Terms 64%; Distinct Terms 36%

Graph B. Changes in Shared and Distinctive Language Between Congo-Specific Pages of the *Arab Observer*



Graph B compares the shifts in the top terms for two TF-IDF models from the *Arab Observer*. The list on the left represents words that were weighted more towards the earlier period of June 1960 to March 1961 versus those on the right, which were skewed to the later period of April to December 1961.

While many of the top weighted words were common to both periods, such as those relating to the Egyptian government, Israel, Algeria, and the United Nations, there was a shift between these two eras.

The earlier period was predictably focused on the outbreak of the crisis, and especially the prospect for UN forces to restore Congolese independence.

Conversely, the later period list indicates that the coverage of the Congo was starting to move away from discussions of the immediate conflict towards broader debates over the Cold War and non-alignment.

Overall, much of the language remained consistent between these two periods, which is somewhat unexpected given the shifts in Egypt's Africa policy. However, there was also a noticeable shift in these articles from detailing the events in the conflict towards Congo's symbolism in the larger anti-colonial and Cold War struggles. Part of this transformation was already happening in March 1961, as Cairo hosted the third All African Peoples' Conference at the end of the month.

The organizing of the conference was a somewhat sudden event, spurred by the news of Lumumba's murder. Initially, the conference was envisioned as a response to the Congo crisis, and the American embassy in Cairo feared that the event would provide even more legitimacy to Gizenga's government.[527] The conference included "200 delegates, representing more than 50 political and labor organizations and 31 African territories."[528] In speeches and reporting on the conference, Congo remained a prominent theme, but so too were the failures of the African states. In "Africa Fights on Many Fronts: Learn From Errors Committed – Abdel Nasser Tells Conference," the *Arab Observer* reported on Nasser's speech to the conference, which emphasized two errors of the African states – they had "assumed that Imperialism was on the retreat" and "Africans had been divided."[529] The American embassy also noted the "tone of [Nasser's] remarks on Congo and lack of specific appeals or proposals confirmed impression here of UAR uncertainty as to future action on this problem, and failure of UAR policy to date."[530] According to Tareq Ismael, this emphasis on errors and lessons indicated a shift in Egyptian policy towards African nationalist movements, which would now be based on "principles and responsibility" – a euphemism for less direct Egyptian involvement.[531] This newly adjusted policy was in some ways expected as the divisions among the African states continued to derail the supposed unity at the

[527] No. 1491 American Embassy Cairo to Washington March 2 1961 NARA RG 84 310 All African Peoples' Conference, 1.
[528] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 61.
[529] *Arab Observer* April 2 1961, 13-15.
[530] No. 1602 American Embassy Cairo March 27 1961 NARA RG 84 310 All African Peoples' Conference, 2.
[531] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 62.

conference. For example, the more radical states, including Egypt, pushed for resolutions on the Congo that emphasized the need to "remove imperialist mercenaries" and "resorting to force in African freedom struggle" while more conservative states like Liberia and Sierra Leone advocated for more moderate language.[532] Yet even with these debates, the embassy concluded that the conference marked a new, more anti-Western African nationalism, and particularly noted the increase use of "neo-colonialism" and the denouncing of Western domination.[533]

This so-called 'radicalization' of the conference's language in many ways confirms the trend in Figure 14. While this language appeared 'radical' to the Americans, these discourses were emblematic of the growing emphasis on non-alignment in Cairo. While scholars have debated the origins of non-alignment, pointing to Nehru's use of the term in 1950, as well as the July 1956 Brioni meeting between Nasser, Nehru, and Tito, the aftermath of the Congo crisis is considered a watershed for the movement, as the crisis underscored the potential for the 'Cold War-ification' of decolonization.[534] Since meeting at the UN in September 1960, Nasser had been communicating with other Afro-Asian leaders, including Nkrumah, Tito, Toure, and Sukarno over how the 'non-aligned' states should approach the Congo crisis with a "unified and effective stand."[535] After the All African Peoples' Conference, Nasser and Tito exchanged messages agreeing on the necessity of a meeting between "heads of all 'non-aligned countries to discuss world problems."[536] The meeting was planned for September with a preparatory meeting scheduled for June 5th in Cairo. Nehru had

[532] No. 1629 American Embassy Cairo March 31 1961 p. 1 and No. 1639 American Embassy Cairo April 4 1961 NARA RG 84 310 All African Peoples' Conference, 2-3.
[533] No. 1639 American Embassy Cairo April 4 1961 NARA RG 84 310 All African Peoples' Conference, 1.
[534] Parker, *Hearts, Minds, and Voices*, 147.
[535] Anschuetz G-320 American Embassy Cairo to Washington December 19 1960 NARA RG 84 350 Congo, 1.
[536] CG-968 Washington to American Embassy Cairo May 10 1961 NARA RG 84 320 Non-Aligned Peoples Conference Preparatory Meeting, 1.

previously vetoed the organizing of a conference, apparently feeling that there were too many already, but Nasser and Tito presented him with a fait accompli.[537]

Both the *Arab Observer* and *The Arab Review* reported on the preparatory committee in Cairo, which included delegations from Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and the Algerian FLN.[538] The magazines heralded the meeting as a successful step away from a "world which is cloven into conflicting blocs and towards a world in which more harmony, constructiveness and secure peace will prevail."[539] The committee agreed on the selection of Yugoslavia as the host for the forthcoming conference, a seven point agenda, as well as a definition of 'non-alignment' for inviting countries.[540] The *Arab Observer* narrated this debate over 'non-alignment', detailing the Indonesian perspective (no foreign military or military blocs), the Nepalese version (linking African, Asian, and Latin American stats), and the Indian view (an 'elastic' definition to include as many countries as possible).[541] While the magazine emphasized the unity of purpose at the meeting, this coverage hints at the deeper tensions that were emerging over the meaning of non-alignment.

While Nasser and Tito were largely agreed that non-alignment was a mechanism for smaller countries to exert international influence, Nehru was much less supportive of what he viewed as an 'agitational' form of non-alignment.[542] Indeed, American embassy records of discussions with the Indian ambassador in Cairo detail how Nehru was very skeptical of Nasser's efforts, viewing it as

[537] No. 1893 American Embassy Cairo May 2 1961 NARA RG 84 320 Non-Aligned Peoples Conference Preparatory Meeting, 1-2.
[538] *The Arab Review* June 1961, 11.
[539] *Arab Observer* June 11 1961, 8.
[540] *The Arab Review* June 1961, 12-13.
[541] *Arab Observer* June 11 1961, 10.
[542] Jeffrey James Byrne "Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment", *The International History Review*, 37. 5 (2015), 7-8.

"little more than extension of the Casablanca group." Nehru was particularly concerned that this division between the more radical and conservative African states would provide an "entry for the Cold War," and that this tension would come to a head over the participation of Gizenga's Congolese government.[543] Indeed, the preparatory committee in many ways illustrated how the Cold War had already become inseparable from efforts to unify the decolonizing world through non-alignment. For example, the Cuban and Guinean delegates pushed for more explicit resolutions denouncing Western imperialism, and the usage of what the American embassy considered "Communist phraseology", such as "peaceful co-existence."[544] The meeting also strained Soviet-Egyptian relations, as the USSR was already critical of Egyptian arrests of communists in 1959 and increasingly viewed non-alignment as a threat to their influence among decolonizing states.[545] The June 11th issue of the *Arab Observer* included an article on the "Soviet Campaign" to discredit non-alignment and Egypt, writing that the USSR should be "content" with Egypt's neutralism and not interfere through press attacks or support for Egyptian communists.[546] In many ways, this articulation of non-alignment purported with Nkrumah's perspective that "non-alignment was a way to shield Ghanaians from adverse foreign propaganda," particularly those from the West and the East.[547]

These divisions among the delegates at the preparatory meeting resulted in few concrete preparations for the conference, so that in the weeks leading up to Belgrade there was still uncertainty over whether the conference would happen or its exact agenda.[548] Part of this ambiguity was due to overshadowing of the conference by the outbreak of the Berlin crisis, as well as the

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[543] "Cairo Preparatory Meeting for Conference Non-Aligned States" American Embassy Cairo June 15 1961 NARA RG 84 320 Non-Aligned Peoples Conference Preparatory Meeting, 1.
[544] "Cairo Preparatory Meeting for Conference Non-Aligned States" American Embassy Cairo, 2.
[545] Cairo Preparatory Meeting for Conference Non-Aligned States" American Embassy Cairo p. 5 and *Arab Observer* June 11 1961, 11-13
[546] "U.A.R. Press on Soviet Campaign" *Arab Observer* June 11 1961, 14.
[547] Gerits, 'When the Bull Elephants Fight', 963.
[548] Parker, *Hearts, Minds, and Voices,* 147.

continued struggle over nuclear testing.[549] Nonetheless, on August 30th, *The Egyptian Gazette* front-page headline "Casablanca Chiefs Discuss Major World Issues" detailed how President Modibo Keita of Mali, King Hassan II of Morocco, and Ben Khedda – the head of the Algerian Provisional Government, had stopped over in Cairo on the way to Belgrade, to coordinate their positions for the conference.[550] Together these leaders traveled to the first Non-Aligned Movement Conference on September 1, but the opening of the conference was thrown into turmoil with the Soviets announcing the resumption of nuclear testing. In *The Cairo Documents*, Heikal recounts Nasser, Tito, and Nehru discussed the news of Soviet nuclear testing, and why Khrushchev decided to "deliberately affront the non-aligned nations." In light of recent events in Berlin and Cuba, Soviet actions appeared particularly dire, with Nehru declaring that non-alignment was no longer the question, but rather "peace or war."[551] Nasser altered his opening speech, and while it mentioned the Congo crisis and Lumumba's murder, the stakes were apparently even greater as he believed that the Cold War blocs were "about to ignite the fires of the Third World War."[552] The Egyptian press reported on Nasser's proposal to have representatives from the conference speak directly to Kennedy and Khrushchev – sending Sukarno and Keita to Washington, while Nehru and Nkrumah went to Moscow – as an effort to resolve tensions and prevent the outbreak of war.[553] In the Egyptian press and state-funded publications like the *Arab Observer*, the conference was given top-billing, and described as the manifestation of humanity's "hopes" and "conscience."[554] However,

[549] Parker, *Hearts, Minds, and Voices*, 148 and Robert B. Rakove "The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961–6" *The International History Review*, 37. 5 (2015), 6-7.
[550] *The Egyptian Gazette* August 30 1961, 1.
[551] Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, 263-64.
[552] "Khitab al-rayyis Gamal Abdel Nasser fi Mutamar 'aqtab al-Duwal 'aghyr al-Munhazat min Belgrade bi-Yugoslavia 1/9/1961" [President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speech at the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade, Yugoslavia September 1, 1960] *Nasser Archive* http://nasser.org/Speeches/html.aspx?SID=995&lang=en and Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, 265.
[553] No. 455 American Embassy Cairo September 5 1961 NARA RG 84 320 Belgrade Conference, 1
[554] No. 423 American Embassy Cairo September 1 1961 NARA RG 84 320 Belgrade Conference, 1 and *The Arab Scribe* August and September 1961, 5 -13.

while not reported on in the press, the divisions from the preparatory committee again manifested, this time largely around the response to the Berlin crisis. Notably, Nasser was seen as far less radical in his speech than other leaders, like Tito and Nkrumah, due to his reluctance to propose a solution to this new Cold War conflict. Overall, Robert Rakove described the conference as "marred by discord within its meeting halls and overshadowed by superpower brinkmanship."[555]

A few weeks prior to the conference Anthony Parsons penned his memorandum on "Cairo's Propaganda Machine" for the British Embassy in Cairo. In the memo, Parsons describes his perceptions of the Egyptian mass information regime's operations. First, Hatem, who Parsons lists as "the Minister of State for Press and Information", received guidance on particular topics of interest, and then coordinate 'tactics' with the Director General of Information, Yehia Abu Bakr. Together they produced a daily Information Department newspaper for the Egyptian dailies, which Parson described as "preparing the necessary ammunition and giving the relevant orders to the editors who will eventually fire the gun."[556] While he described the Egyptian press as "the vital and most basic working part in the engine," he also detailed the existence of 'sideshows' – that is the NPH periodicals, which he viewed as "principally designed to impress English speaking foreigners (e.g. Indians and Africans)."[557] Within these publications, the absence of reporting on the tensions among the leaders of the non-aligned movement is unsurprising given this degree of government control over the messaging. Yet exploring the shift in language from the Congo crisis to the Belgrade conference is crucial for uncovering how these events transformed Cairo's anti-colonialism to include the capaciousness of non-alignment. Utilizing a similar approach for studying the Congo crisis, Figure 15 explores coverage of the Belgrade conference in relation to the earlier discourses around Congo.

[555] Robert Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World*, 68-69.
[556] Tony Parsons, "Reflections on the Cairo Propaganda Machine" July 30 1961, 2
[557] Tony Parsons, "Reflections on the Cairo Propaganda Machine" July 30 1961, 3

Figure 17. Comparing Congo-Specific Pages in the Arab Observer from June 1960 - March 1961 to Belgrade-Sepcific Pages April 1961 - December 1961

Graph A. Shared Language Between Congo-Specific and Belgrade-Specific Pages of the *Arab Observer*



Graph A illustrates the top terms for two TF-IDF models from the *Arab Observer*. The Y-Axis is the model trained on the Congo-specific pages of the from June 1960 to March 1961, and the X-Axis is the model trained on the Belgrade-specific pages from April 1961 to December 1961.

The two models contain 44% shared top terms, and overall, the shared terms have a strong positive correlation, indicating similar usage over both time periods in the magazine, even though these articles were covering differing topics.

Figure metrics: Adj. R-squared 0.918; Skew 0.197; Kurtosis 2.456; Shared Terms 44%; Distinct Terms 56%

Graph B illustrates the top terms for two supervised learning logistic regression models from the *Arab Observer*. The Y-Axis indicates the likelihood that a word in the magazine would be related to anti-colonialism (Congo), and the X-Axis is the likelihood that a word in the magazine would be related to non-alignment (Belgrade).

Graph B. Comparing Shared and Distinctive Language of Congo-Specific and Belgrade-Specific Pages of the *Arab Observer*



In Figure 17, graph A demonstrates that overall discourses around the Congo crisis and the Belgrade conference shared some linguistic features, and graph B zooms in on these aspects using an alternative method for studying discourses – a form of machine learning known as supervised logistic regression. In *Distant Horizons: Digital Evidence and Literary Change,* Ted Underwood describes this type of approach as "perspectival modeling." Unlike approaches that rely on topic modeling or unsupervised algorithmic approaches, Underwood contends that "perspectival models do not aim simply to reproduce human judgement. They are used instead to measure the parallax between different observers."[558] In essence, this 'perspectival' and 'parallax' approach does not attempt to replicate how humans would categorize documents. Instead when provided with categories or classes, these methods learn relationships between words and use these features to identify the characteristics of category. While this approach is most commonly used in spam email identification, this method has become increasingly popular in computational literary studies, including recent research exploring linguistic features of genre and the impact of publishing trends on literary language.[559] To explore changes in anti-colonial discourses in the *Arab Observer*, I trained two models, one on the earlier reporting of the Congo crisis and the later coverage of the Belgrade conference. Each model compared these pages to the rest of the magazine, and was able to identify whether a page in the magazine would be more likely to relate to Congo or Belgrade with approximately eighty percent accuracy.[560] This rate is relatively high for these models, and a hundred percent accuracy would be improbable since many of the discourses were common between these two events.

[558] Ted Underwood *Distant Horizons: Digital Evidence and Literary Change* (University of Chicago Press, 2019), xv.
[559] For examples, see Ted Underwood "Why an Age of Machine Learning Needs the Humanities" *Public Books* December 5 2018 https://www.publicbooks.org/why-an-age-of-machine-learning-needs-the-humanities/ and Dan Sinykin "How Capitalism Changed American Literature" *Public Books* July 17 2019 https://www.publicbooks.org/how-capitalism-changed-american-literature/.
[560] Using ten-fold validation the Congo model achieved 81.1% accuracy and the Belgrade model achieved 78.6% accuracy.

Figure 17. Comparing Congo-Specific Pages in the Arab Observer from June 1960 - March 1961 to Belgrade-Sepcific Pages April 1961 - December 1961

Graph C. Comparing Shared and Distinctive Language of Anti-Colonial and Non-Aligned Clusters of the *Arab Observer*

Graph C illustrates a zoomed in perspective on two of the word clusters from Graph B. The first cluster represents the words most associated with both the Congo Crisis and the Belgrade Conference, events that I argue represent Cairo's discourses of anti-colonialism and non-alignment respectively. The second cluster depicts words least likely to be related to these topics in the *Arab Observer*'s coverage.

The first visualization illustrates that words like Kennedy and Yugoslav are likely to appear in both coverage of the Belgrade Conference and the Congo crisis. Whereas words at the extremes of the graph, such as Tito and Kruschev on the X-Axis or Kasa-Vubu and UN forces on the Y-Axis were more indicative of Belgrade and Congo respectively.

The second visualization depicts the terms least likely to appear in articles on these topics, with many of the words relating to Egyptian development projects and coverage of Israel. These clusters help elucidate that, though these magazines covered a broad range of topics, the language used in these articles were not identical and represented divergent discourses.

Terms Most Related to Anti-Colonialism and Non-Alignment



Terms Least Related to Anti-Colonialism and Non-Alignment



Figure 15 Graph B



Figure 17. Comparing Congo-Specific Pages in the Arab Observer from June 1960 - March 1961 to Belgrade-Sepcific Pages April 1961 - December 1961

Graph D. Comparing Shared and Distinctive Language of Anti-Colonial and Non-Aligned Clusters of the *Arab Observer*

Graph D visualizes the other two zoomed-in word clusters from Graph B. The first cluster represents the words most associated with the Congo Crisis, and the second cluster depicts words more likely to be related to the Belgrade Conference.

Comparing these clusters highlights that variance in coverage of these events. In the first graph, words like Lumumba and Belgian are positioned close to the boundary between Congo only versus Congo and Belgrade language, indicating that these terms were still fairly likely to appear in articles about both topics. However, words like liberty, crisis, moral conscience, and settlers were all more distinctive of Congo-related reporting. Conversely, terms like interests, solidarity, agreements, and integrity were more likely to occur in the Belgrade coverage.

The spread of points in each cluster highlights that the language around these events was far from identical. While news reporting would produce some of this variation, many of these words are not proper nouns, and thus, are not simply recounting events abroad. These divergent discourses demonstrate that while there was some overlap conceptually, the move from Congo crisis to the Belgrade conference produced a transformation in the meanings of Cairo's anti-colonialism.

Terms Most Related to the Congo Crisis and Anti-Colonialism



Terms Most Related to the Belgrade Conference and Non-Alignment



Figure 15 Graph B

In Figure 17, graphs C and D zoom in on the clusters of these models and the location of each word indicates the likelihood that it would appear in coverage related to each event. The first cluster in graph C includes the names of many world leaders and states involved in the Afro-Asian and Non-Aligned blocs, as well as words relating to the United Nations and the various Third World conferences. While these terms were likely to appear in both articles on Congo and Belgrade, the positions of the words also reveal the distinctions in common usage. For example, Kasa-Vubu, troops, withdrawal, neutralism, and Tanganyika were all more likely to appear in Congo-specific pages than those on Belgrade, which was more probable to contain Tito, Khrushchev, Berlin, summit, and tension. Delving into this cluster reveals patterns that are less predictable, such as the positions of atomic and nuclear which are positioned towards opposite axes. The placement of (de) Gaulle, Algeria, leaders, and Kennedy also indicates these words are outliers, and thus are highly influential in the model for distinguishing between Congo or Belgrade. The bottom cluster represents terms least likely to appear in articles on these topics, with many of the words relating to Egyptian development, the Arab League, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition to references to the Suez Canal and the Aswan Dam, this cluster also includes Algerian, which highlights that adjectives versus the proper names of places varied in the magazine. This position of Israel in this cluster is also notable, since it represents the furthest semantic distance from Congo crisis or the Belgrade conference, which is surprising since these magazines were in part intended to promote Egypt's perspective of Israel as a neo-colonial power.

Graph D highlights the words most unique to Congo and Belgrade, respectively. Many of these terms are descriptive, from Lumumba and Belgium for Congo, to Yugoslavia and Cuba for Belgrade. But looking beyond proper names uncovers some of the uniqueness of these topics. For example, 'moral conscience', 'liberty', 'story broke', 'crisis' were all words much more likely to appear in the coverage of Congo. On the other hand, words like 'solidarity', 'integrity', 'interests', and

'agreements' were far more probably in articles on Belgrade. These visualizations help uncover the linguistic shifts in the *Arab Observer* around these events. But even more than finding change over time, this method helps consider what differences existed between the anti-colonialism of the Congo crisis and non-alignment of the Belgrade conference. The variation in Graph D in particular provides further evidence of Egypt's policy shift after the Congo crisis, with a move from abstract anti-colonial solidarity to discourses emphasizing institutional linkages. Ultimately, these graphs visualize how anti-colonialism and non-alignment were closely related concepts, but also how the growing Cold War tensions and experiences of the Congo crisis shaped the discourses in Egyptian publications, and more broadly Egyptian politics towards the decolonizing world.

Viewing the *Arab Observer* through these models also provides an alternative lens into the magazine. For example, the page identified as most emblematic of both the Congo crisis and the Belgrade conference was in the October 30, 1960 issue of the magazine. The page is number twenty-nine, and contains coverage from the "The Press Roundup", a weekly feature summarizing the Egyptian press in the magazine. The press summary included coverage of Afghanistan's withstanding "imperialist pressure" to join the Baghdad pact, and of Nasser's visit to the Northern Region, the UAR's name for Syria. Outlining Nasser's speeches, the report detailed how Nasser tied the achievements of the UAR to its foreign policy "based on non-alignment, positive neutralism, and understanding with all other nations."[561] Nasser also referenced his efforts at Bandung, the Afro-Asian conferences, and the United Nations. Finally, the summary contained a quote from *al-Ahram,*

> "If the *New York Times* calls for recognition of usurpation, plunder, imperialism, and displacement of peoples, then it will meet with no response. The neutralist leaders have

[561] *Arab Observer* October 30 1960, 29.

expressed their views. They are the advocates of peace who seek the welfare of their own countries and of the whole of mankind."[562]

This language is in the spirit of Egypt's approach to the Congo crisis and the Belgrade conference, but a standard keyword search would have failed to identify this page as important because neither 'Congo' nor 'Belgrade' occur on this page. Thus, these models help excavate discursive patterns in these publications and providing new avenues for considering the meanings of Egyptian anti-colonialism. Expanding this consideration of Cairo's Congo crisis beyond the diplomatic to the discursive is crucial for assessing the impact of the conflict on Egypt.

While these discourses would continue over the course of the 1960s, events after the Belgrade Conference also fundamentally shook the political foundations of Egypt. First, on September 18th, while flying to the Congo to negotiate a ceasefire, Dag Hammarskjold's plane crashed in Northern Rhodesia. *The Egyptian Gazette* proclaimed that he was "mourned throughout the world," and according to Heikal, Nasser believed he had died trying to "prove to the non-aligned leaders that he [Hammarskjold] was not what they thought."[563] While Nasser was deeply grieved by the news, much more profound shock would come eight days later with a military coup in Syria and the eventual dissolution of the UAR. Since forming in February 1958, the UAR had been largely dominated by Cairo, with select Syrians given key positions – in particular Abdel al-Hamid Sarraj, who was "the Minister of Interior and National Guidance, the Chair of the Regional Cabinet, and the Secretary-General of the National Union."[564] However, Egyptian concerns over Sarraj's ambitions led to a restructuring of the government in August 1961, which in turn led to a power struggle between Sarraj and Marshal Abdel Hakim 'Amr. James Jankowski contends that this fight for control, especially over the Syrian security services, provided an opening for political protests for

[562] *Arab Observer* October 30 1960, 29.
[563] *The Egyptian Gazette* September 20 1961, 1. and Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, 185.
[564] Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, 164 and Podeh, *The Decline of Arab Unity*, 148-49.

the first time since 1958, which in turn led 'Amr to deploy the military and take control of the government.[565] While initially open to reconciling with Egypt, Nasser's refusal to accede to the demands of the Syrian army "tipped the scales in favor of Syrian secession."[566]

The prospects for the UAR had in many ways been doomed from the start, but nonetheless, the breakup of the UAR was seen as "a devastating blow to Nasser" and his pan-Arab credentials.[567] In the aftermath of Syria's secession, Nasser radically overhauled the Egyptian government, passing a slew of reforms and laws in late 1961 and early 1962, which culminated in a new urtext for the revolution – The 1962 Charter. This secession also engendered a reassessment of the state's relationship with intellectuals. In March 1961, Lutfi al-Khuli, who had recently been released from prison, penned a series for *al-Ahram* on "The Crisis of Arab Intellectuals." According to Khuli, Arab intellectuals were "suffering a crisis of creativity caused by the gap between their aspirations and the moral and material depression of Egyptian society."[568] While intellectuals had initially supported the revolution and many had been given positions in the government, "they refused to give the government their hearts and as a result, their ideas."[569] In response to Khuli's articles, Heikal organized a "team of young theoreticians" at *al-Ahram* to examine Khuli's accusations. Their assessment was in many ways a condemnation of the Egyptian mass information regime, arguing that the intelligentsia had been "subjected to brutality and humiliation" through the growth of the Egyptian state, which had justified its actions through the 'pretext' of "doubling the national income in ten years."[570] Much of this criticism was also directed at the state production of information and culture, which Ahmed Hamroush ridiculed for attempting to publish a book every 6 hours, which

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[565] Jankowski *Nasser's Egypt* , 164-65.
[566] Jankowski *Nasser's Egypt* , 167-68.
[567] Podeh *The Decline of Arab Unity* p. 158 and Jankowski *Nasser's Egypt* p. 170.
[568] Rami Ginat *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution: Lutfi Al-Khuli and Nasser's Socialism in the 1960s* (London: Frank Cass, 1997) , 56-7.
[569] Abdel Malek *Egypt Society,* 190.
[570] Abdel Malek *Egypt Society*, 190.

were "full of errors" and "without genuine socialist thought."[571] While these criticisms predated the secession of Syria, in the aftermath of the breakup of the UAR, this criticism of the state's centralization of culture would be increasingly persuasive to Nasser, who once again turned to the socialists to reinvigorate his government's legitimacy.

This next chapter details how the experiences of the Congo crisis and the breakup of the UAR produced countervailing trends in Egypt's mass information regime. While Hatem would continue to expand Egyptian publishing and radio efforts, as well as the new television infrastructure he founded in early 1960, he would also be increasingly challenged by the growing power of the socialist members of the Egyptian government, who would also transform the meaning of anti-colonialism in Cairo. Furthermore, Egypt's promotion of international anti-colonialism would face growing competition from other revolutionary states, while the coalition formed at Belgrade by 1965 would largely fracture in the face of Cold War and domestic conflicts. Nonetheless, Cairo's Congo crisis was crucial to forming, even if only for a brief period, a new Third World coalition of states and revolutionaries committed to the cause of anti-colonialism.

[571] Hamroush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu*, 153 and Yoav, *No Exit*, 130.

CHAPTER V

CAIRO AT THE CROSSROADS: THE MEETINGS AND MEANINGS OF ANTI-COLONIALISM IN EGYPT

David Graham Du Bois, son of Shirley and stepson of W.E.B. Du Bois, arrived in Cairo in late August 1960. He had previously been in Peking, but in correspondence with his mother, he explained that he was "neither able or willing to accept as [his] primary role in life as a propagandist for the cause of New China."[572] Instead, David traveled to Cairo with the promise of a job teaching English at Cairo University. However, given Egyptian restrictions on foreign work visas, David ended up seeking work as a writer; first for the "Information Administration" (the Information Department), which commissioned an article on "African organizations here [Cairo]" (the African liberation bureaus), and one on "the recent radical reform decrees issued here by President Nasser."[573] At the previous chapter detailed, the timing of David's arrival to Cairo was auspicious, given the simultaneous expansion of the Egyptian mass information regime and the outbreak of the Congo crisis, which together provided David new writing opportunities, as well as a sense that "things here in Cairo and in this part of the world continue to be stimulating and, in general, progressive." Indeed, David described Cairo as a crucial place to perceive "the decay and bankruptcy of the West," even more so than Moscow or Peking, and that being in Africa had revealed how the "words, actions, and thoughts" of the continent were "reverberating around the globe with the speed of the atom," even shaping the actions of the "mighty."[574]

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[572] David Graham Du Bois (DGD) to Shirley Graham Du Bois (SGD) August 4 1960. DGD decided to end his studies at Peking University; disliking the segregation of foreigners. Box 12 Folder 23 Shirley Graham Du Bois Papers (SGD Papers). I refer to David Graham Du Bois as David to distinguish him from his mother, who I refer to as Shirley.
[573] DGD to SGD August 22 1960 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1.
[574] DGD to SGD August 22 1960 SGD Papers 12. 23, 2.

While waiting for his visa clearances and struggling to find steady work, David wrote to his mother in October 1960, and explained that though he had gotten a personal introduction to the Director of the Information Department, he believed that many doors would open if he had a "Press Card […] from a major negro paper in America" and inquired whether Shirley would suggest something to the "folks around the Baltimore Afro-American."[575] David also requested further information on "Negro **life** in the U.S.A," particularly material relating to "education, living conditions, housing, etc.…," as well as the name of an "important young Negro writer" since the only one known in Cairo was Richard Wright.[576] David's sense of potential opportunities was in part driven by demand, since after Nasser's visit to Harlem in September 1960 there was new interest in Cairo for information about black America. This demand outpaced supply; as David explained to Shirley that Egyptians had very limited knowledge of the color question in America, and that besides one other convert, he was the only black American in Cairo. Both *The Egyptian Gazette* and *al-Ahram* were interested in commissioning David to write articles about "the news coming of the South [United States]" and to provide more details than the "scanty and often in error" reports from the US Information office in Cairo.[577] As the Congo crisis worsened during 1960, David expressed his dismay, but also his exhilaration to receive daily news "but on the right side. That is, in support of Patrice Lumumba, all the way."[578] Shirley eventually visited David in January for the Afro-Asian Women's Conference, attending as the "chairwoman of the Negro Women's Workers Committee in

[575] DGD to SGD October 11 1960 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1.
[576] DGD to SGD October 30 1960 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1.
[577] In his initial meetings at another Egyptian daily, *Al Ahram*, David promoted W.E.B. Du Bois' Encyclopedia Africana project. David complained that much of the information from official sources in Cairo such as the US Information Agency and library was erroneous, and that the only book from a Negro writer translated into Arabic was Richard Wright's *Black Boy*. He mentions meeting with some of the "leading writers in Cairo" and discussing trends in Arab literature, as well as their interest in "Negro writers from America" and potentially translating more African American books into Arabic. DGD to SGD October 30 1960 SGD Papers 12. 23, 2 and DGD to SGD Nov 20 1960 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1-2.
[578] DGD to SGD December 9 1960 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1.

New York" and pushing for language in the final resolutions that condemned the United States involvement in the Congo.[579] By the end of February, David was teaching courses at Cairo University, and wrote to Shirley that his first article was in the February issue of the *Arab Review*, "which [she] could find at the U.A.R. Information Center in Rockefeller Center."[580] The article was entitled "Impressions of Cairo," and David detailed how he felt "more at home here in Cairo than I have ever felt in the United States" given that in Cairo as a black man, he found himself "suddenly in an atmosphere completely free of any distinction or privilege based on color."[581] David ends the article repeating many of the themes promoted in Egyptian government publications, describing Cairo "situated at the crossroads of the three continents" and "rapidly becoming the capital of Africa, defender of African Freedom and the freedom of the oppressed […] everywhere in the world."[582] David's experience in Cairo was in many ways emblematic of the early 1960s, when racial solidarities of the black Atlantic fused together with international anti-colonialism, leading African American and Caribbean activists and writers to participate in the struggle for national liberation in places like Algiers and Accra.[583] While Cairo is rarely included as a hub in histories of these political networks, David's attempt to contribute to the movement from Egypt underscores some of the contradictions of this moment, from his elision of existing racial tensions within Egyptian society in his article to the gap between the government's support for anti-colonialism and the state barriers to foreigners working in the country.

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[579] DGD to SGD Nov 20 1960 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1 and "Afro-Asian Women's Conference" American Embassy Cairo to Washington, 3. Shirley wrote about her experience at the conference in the March 1961 issue of *Political Affairs*, describing the setting and proceedings of the conference, though she cut the article short after receiving news of Lumumba's assassination on February 13th. Shirley Graham, "The First Conference of African and Asian Women" *Political Affairs* March 1961, 60 SGD Papers 9.14.

[580] DGD to SGD February 28 1961 SGD Papers 12. 23, 2.

[581] David Graham Du Bois "Impressions of Cairo" *The Arab Review* February 1960, 38-39.

[582] David Graham Du Bois "Impressions of Cairo", 40.

[583] For examples, see Penny M. Von Eschen's *Race Against Empire Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957*; James H. Meriwether's *Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Africans and Africa, 1935-1961*; and Kevin K. Gaines' *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era.*

Nonetheless, David's experiences provide a rare window into the operations of the Egyptian mass information regime. The previous chapters have outlined the rise of both the Egyptian mass information regime and the international coalition around anti-colonialism and non-alignment. This chapter delves into the scale of the Egyptian government's efforts, detailing how the legacies of the Congo crisis and the Syrian secession provoked a massive expansion in information activities. Though Lumumba's death and breakup of the UAR remained prominent in Egyptian press discourses, 1962 also witnessed two critical moments for Cairo – the long-awaited achievement of Algerian independence and the outbreak of civil war in Yemen. Nasser had supported Algerian nationalists since the 1952 revolution, and his support for Yemeni revolutionaries was eventually one of the defining policies of his Presidency. This chapter explores the coverage of these events, but rather than focusing solely on discourses within Cairo, it also considers the degree to which this anti-colonial language was shared beyond Egypt. Locating the distinctiveness of Cairo discourses also provides a window into the *annus mirabilis* of Egypt's promotion of anti-colonialism. In 1964, Cairo hosted three of the most important anti-colonial summits in the city, as well as a series of high-profile events, transforming the city into the crossroads of international political activity. Yet just as the Cairo's vision for anti-colonialism was not entirely universal, Nasser's ability to dictate the trajectory of anti-colonial politics was increasingly limited as this international coalition continued to grow and the bonds of anti-colonial strained under the pressures of new national interests. Nonetheless, this chapter details how twelve years after the revolution, Cairo achieved the zenith of its anti-colonial internationalism that had first been enshrined with the publishing of *The Philosophy*. Tracing this moment of international influence and prestige is crucial for uncovering both the ambitions and realities of Cairo's anti-colonialism, and how the view from the city shaped the Egyptian understanding and involvement in this global moment.

Circulating Cairo: The National Charter and Defining International Anti-Colonialism

Briefly detailed in the previous chapter, the breakup of the United Arab Republic represented a "radical turning point in the political history of Egypt."[584] The most public articulation of this transformation was the creation and implementation of the Charter of National Action (*al-Mithaq al-Watani*) in 1962. Prior to the Charter announcement, Nasser's government had already begun the work of reforming existing institutions, beginning with the Press Reorganisation Law of 1960. On June 22, 1961, the National Union met to pass similar legislation to reorganize al-Azhar, the preeminent Islamic university in Cairo.[585] Al-Azhar had become increasingly important to the revolution since 1954 and the showdown with the Muslim Brotherhood. In an effort to counter the Islamic legitimacy of the brotherhood, the RCC members often attended Friday prayers at al-Azhar, but were also critical of the power of the institution, initially nationalizing control of family waqfs (religious endowments) in 1952, and then shari'a courts in 1956, and all waqfs in 1957.[586] These new reforms were combined with efforts to leverage Islam to further "the policy of revolution," which included both the previously mentioned efforts to form an Islamic Congress in 1954 and the dispatching of Islamic missions across the Afro-Asian world.[587] The 1961 law was an attempt to reform al-Azhar, and by focusing on modernizing the curriculum and placing control of the institution directly within the Egyptian state, 'deepening' the state's control. Islamic scholars at al-Azhar (the Azharis) were decidedly unenthused about the new law, with the reforms described as humiliating and with their input having been largely ignored. In response, the government accused the Azharis of being too isolated from society and stagnated in their teaching. Facing the might of the Nasserist regime, the Azharis eventually and reluctantly acquiesced to the reforms, which

584 Ginat *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution*, 20, quoting P.J. Vatikiotis *The Modern History of Egypt*.
585 Daniel Crecelius "Al-Azhar in the Revolution," *Middle East Journal* 20. 1. (Winter 1966), 37-38.
586 Gabriel R. Warburg, "Islam and Politics in Egypt: 1952-80," *Middle Eastern Studies* 18. 2. (April 1982), 135.
587 Tareq Y. Ismael, "Religion and U.A.R. African Policy," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6. 1 (May 1968), 52.

curtailed the independence of al-Azhar.[588] The final legislation divided al-Azhar into five separate divisions and place them directly under the control of the Presidency.[589] Leveraging the mass information regime, the government promoted their view that al-Azhar had deviated "from its true path" and needed to be purified from "the effects of imperialism."[590] To this end, the new government controlled al-Azhar established state-funded publications, first *Minbar al-Islam* in English and Arabic, and then *Majallat al-Azhar*, an official journal in January 1962.[591] In many ways, the trajectory of al-Azhar repeated the experiences of the Egyptian press, with both institutions being brought to heal under the state. Controlling information was another common theme rationalizing both reforms, as Gabriel Warburg notes the impetus for the law as the perceived necessity of transforming al-Azhar into "a major channel of communication between Egypt and the Arab and Muslim world."[592]

Laurie Brand describes how these reforms of al-Azhar were part of a broader push towards implementing socialist policies beginning in July 1961, including the nationalization of hundreds of businesses in both regions of the UAR.[593] Brands also details the discursive shifts in Nasser's language; for example, his Revolutionary Day Speech that month, which emphasized socialist unity among the "peasants, workers, intellectuals, and soldiers," and represented a broadening of the definition of the revolution from a discrete time period of the coup to overthrow Farouk towards a "dynamic and continuing process."[594] Brand also argues that Nasser feared criticism that socialism

[588] Crecelius, "Al-Azhar in the Revolution", 38-39.
[589] Ismael, "Religion and U.A.R. African Policy", 54. The five sections included: "(I) the Supreme Council of Al-Azhar; (2) the Islamic Research Council; (3) the Cultural Administration and Islamic Missions; (4) Al-Azhar University; (5) Al-Azhar Institutions"
[590] Crecelius, "Al-Azhar in the Revolution", 41-42.
[591] Crecelius, "Al-Azhar in the Revolution", 42.
[592] Warburg, "Islam and Politics in Egypt: 1952-80", 136.
[593] Baha Abu-Laban "The National Character in the Egyptian Revolution" *The Journal of Developing Areas* 1. 2 (January 1967), 184 and Brand, *Official Stories*, 53.
[594] Brand, *Official Stories*, 52-53.

was "an alien, atheist ideology" given its association with the Soviet Union.[595] Though Brand does not connect the reforms of al-Azhar with these concerns, the timing of the law indicates that is was at least in part intended to also promote Arab socialism – a connection buttressed with Nasser's proposal of the Charter of National Action in November 4, 1961. This new Charter, while acknowledging Islam as the state religion, was "ambivalent" about its role, comparing it to the United Nations, while largely promoting Arab socialism in its previous pre-eminent position.[596] Nasser's announced the Charter as heralding a "new system of popular representation" and called for a committee to implement this new popularly-led political organization. Anwar al-Sadat was appointed head of the committee, and at the first meeting Nasser presented the existence of Arab socialism as "no longer a matter of controversy."[597] The final Charter was presented on May 21 1962 to the newly elected 1,750 members of the National Congress of the Popular Forces. The Charter represented the most explicit articulation of Nasser's policies since the *Philosophy of the Revolution*, and was often described as part two of the *Philosophy*.[598] The main themes of the Charter were "liberation, socialism and Arab unity", and the text of the Charter was given a privileged position in the state's curriculum and "for several generations more copies of it [the Charter] were printed than the Quran."[599] Whether the charter represented the "logical consummation of Egypt's drift toward socialism" or was a reactionary move after the fracturing of the UAR remains a matter of debate among scholars.[600] Nonetheless, Soviet observers believed that it represented a turning point in

[595] Brand, *Official Stories*, 54.
[596] Warburg, "Islam and Politics in Egypt: 1952-80", 137. Warburg recounts the "flood of articles and books" that appeared attempting to tie Islam and Arab Socialism together with titles like "The Socialism of Muhammad."
[597] Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution*, 19-20.
[598] M. Riad El-Ghonemy, "An Assessment of Egypt's Development Strategy 1952-1970," *Rethinking Nasserism*, 253 and Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution*, 20.
[599] Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution*, 21 and Laurie Brand offers a discursive reading of the charter in *Official Stories*, 57-59
[600] For example, see "Introduction", *Rethinking Nasserism*, 28.

Egyptian socialism, a perception that was further reinforced with the earlier release of Egyptian communists from jail and the promotion of individuals like Lutfi al-Khuli to posts in *al-Ahram*.[601]

The ratification of the charter ushered in a "shift toward socialism" in Cairo, with widespread agrarian, economic, and educational reforms.[602] For example, Laurie Brand details how the implementation of the Charter led the Ministry of Culture to announce a new initiative to rewrite modern Egyptian history textbooks.[603] For the broader mass information regime, the new Charter appears to have provided additional impetus to existing efforts. Mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, in 1960, Hatem had founded the first department of Egyptian television, importing equipment from Japan and establishing stations in both Egypt and Syria, while also establishing the Ministry of Tourism, which was charged with building new hotels, and that leveraged the mass information regime to promote Egypt as a tourist destination.[604] In 1962, Hatem was appointed to the head of three ministries – Information, National Guidance, and Culture, leading Yusuf al-Sibai to complain to Nasser, who apparently demurred and claimed that Hatem's selection was not on the basis of friendship, but rather his expertise in information and media.[605] With Hatem's new position of influence, Radio Cairo continued to expand its broadcasting capabilities and the National Publications House (NPH) produced new magazines and books. For example, in 1962, the Middle East News Agency (MENA) established its "first pictorial photo and TV services," as well as merging *Arab Affairs* into two new publications, *The Middle East News Weekly* and *Cairo Press Review*.[606] Mentioned earlier, MENA also established new offices in Paris, as well as other European and African bureaus, and created "its first dublex line running from Rome, Milan, Bonn, Hamburg,

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601 Rami Ginat, "Nasser and the Soviets: A Reassessment," *Rethinking Nasserism*, 242.
602 Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution*, 24.
603 Brand, *Official Stories*, 60
604 Hatem, *Mudhakkirāt*, 68. Nasser apparently was tepid on the prospects for television in Egypt.
605 Hatem, *Mudhakkirāt*, 64
606 "Monographs III" UNESCO, 105.

London, Paris, Algiers and Rabat." Additional infrastructure was established in Rome and Algiers so that news from those offices could be broadcast directly to Cairo via Round-Trip Time transmitting, guaranteeing the "maximum flow of news." The final result was that "for the first time in history the flow of Arab news coverage carried by MENA newscasts" was available to both Europe and Africa.[607] According to Douglas Boyd, the intention of this centralization was to permit monitoring of content by the Presidential Office, but broadcasting was expanding so quickly that administrative control was almost impossible.[608]

In addition to *The Middle East News Weekly* and *Cairo Press Review*, the NPH also founded *Africa for Africans*, a magazine largely building from the efforts of the *Ikhtarna Laka* series of the same name, and *al-Idhā'ah wa al-Tilifisyōn (Radio and Television)*, a publication focused on summarizing recent radio and television programming in Cairo. The only other Arabic-language magazine was *Bena' al-Watan (Building the Nation)* founded by Amin Shaker, who also established the *Arab Review*. The February 1962 issue of *Bena'* also included a five-page spread on the recent establishment of television, with the article "*Bena' al-Watan* presents: The First Largescale Report on… Arab Television." The article included an image of Hatem in the center of a meeting, with the caption

[607] "Monographs III" UNESCO, 106-105.
[608] Boyd, *Egyptian Radio,* 9. Data from 'Table 1: Number of Egyptian Medium- and Short-Wave Transmitters 1952-1970' in Boyd *Egyptian Radio*, 13.

Figure 18. Growth of Egyptian Medium- and Short-Wave Broadcast Transmitters 1952-1970



"Dr. Abdel Qader Hatem outlines his vision to perfect Arab Television."[609] Unlike the European-language NPH publications, *Bena' al-Watan* primarily covered events within Egypt and the Middle East and North Africa, but was still promoted in those publications as "The People's Magazine."[610] Beginning in June 1962, the *Arab Observer* was officially published through MENA, and the shift occasioned a revamping of the magazine. As the new Editor-in-Chief, Zein El Abdin Nagati, explained, the decision to adopt a "new garb" was intended to "widen the scope of the magazine." In particular, "the old, leisurely days of the more reflective kind of weekly periodical have definitely passed. Rapid communications and general availability of news demand a new kind of publication with less comment and more straight presentation of events."[611] Nagati distinguished this new type of reporting from newspapers, which only covered items of "twenty-four-hour interest." The impetus for this change was both the "accelerating pace of development with the United Arab Republic" and "the great social leap forward represented by the Charter."[612] The most obvious result was a change in the cover page design, but this shift also introduced new features, such as the printing of letters to the editor.[613] The first set of letters included one from Salim M. Balala in Kenya stating that the magazine was doing a "great service" against Israeli and imperialist propaganda that was trying to divide Arabs and Africans. Many of the letters echoed similarly complimentary accounts, though there was also criticism of the magazine, such as from the Salem Family in Cairo, who wrote "we are still waiting to see a new *Arab Observer*" and accused the magazine of simply changing its cover and not its content.[614] While the coverage was not radically different, one notable

[609] *Bena' al-Watan* February 1962, 44-49.
[610] Advertisement for *Bena' al-Watan* from the *Arab Observer* November 5 1962 issue.
[611] "Editorial" *Arab Observer* June 4 1962, 1.
[612] "Editorial" *Arab Observer* June 4 1962, 1.
[613] Letters to the Editor had been a feature of *The Arab Review* from its initial issues, including a letter from K. Samaratunga, who worked on the *Ceylon Observer* and claimed in his letter that given his "good work for the cause of Arabism has been rewarded by being assigned as the Ceylon correspondent of the Middle East News Agency" in the May 1960 issue.
[614] "Letters," *Arab Observer* June 11 1962, 2. Examples of the changing cover designs can be seen in the different covers of the *Arab Observer* relating to Algeria from 1962.

change was the inclusion of a more detailed list of magazine staff, including "General Editor David Dubois."

Since his initial arrival in Cairo, David Graham Du Bois had continued to be involved with the Egyptian mass information regime. His writing for the *Egyptian Gazette* had turned into a full-time position, initially as a "Leader Writer" that rewrote news stories for the paper, and then as the Assistant Editor on the Foreign News desk. David was also responsible for writing the Saturday editorial in the *Egyptian Mail* and generating stories by collating dispatches from "cable services of Reuter, AP, and UPI," essentially deciding the content of "foreign news" in the paper.[615] In addition to writing, David had developed, along with a Jamaican-Egyptian friend, a program for Radio Cairo, entitled "Africa Marches Together." The weekly broadcast was transmitted on Voice of Africa, and covered "African personalities, incidents, literature, etc., all reflecting the theme of African unity and rebirth."[616] Writing to Shirley in November 1961, David's excitement for Cairo was palpable as he detailed the socialist reforms implemented by President Nasser after "the reactionary, secessionist coup in Syria." In particular, David felt that the elimination of millionaires and the creation of a single party system similar to the one instituted by Fidel Castro heralded a new socialist era, and "the feeling of being in on most significant developments which will have tremendous repercussions not only throughout the entire Arab world, but as well throughout Africa, Asia, and the West."[617] By the time of his letter, Shirley and W.E.B. Du Bois had relocated to Accra, and David reported hearing about their move from New China News Agency people in Cairo. He also relayed the publication of his six-part series "Africa As Seen By Negro Scholars" in the October and November issues of the *Arab Observer*. David described the magazine as "Egypt's *Time Magazine"* and "the most important

[615] DGD to SGD June 29 1961 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1 and DGD to SGD November 5 1961 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1.
[616] DGD to SGD November 5 1961 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1.
[617] DGD to SGD November 5 1961 SGD Papers 12. 23, 2.

weekly news magazine published in English by the UAR Information Office."[618] David's series for the magazine was an extended review of a new volume from The American Society for African Culture and though his review was largely positive, he also accused the volume of perpetuating "the artificially created dividing line between North Africa and 'Black' Africa" – a position that David believed was largely sympathetic to American interests on the continent.[619]

David's articles and politics eventually led to a position at the Middle East News and Features Services Agency, an offshoot of the MENA, as well as a seat on the editorial board of the *Arab Observer*, and then in July 1962, becoming, in all but title, the Editor of the magazine after the previous one was removed.[620] While technically "on loan" from the Middle East Features Services, David detailed his instrumental role in the relaunching of the magazine. However, he also noted that being a foreigner in such a prominent position had aroused the 'jealousy' of the Egyptian staff.[621] However, David was not the sole foreigner on the editorial board. The printing of the editorial board also listed a Maya Make as part of the Africa section of the *Arab Observer*. Maya Make was the married name of Maya Angelou, who had come to Cairo in 1960 with her husband, the South African revolutionary Vusumzi Make. While little information exists about her time in Cairo, David mentions the Makes' offering advice on when to travel to Accra to visit the Du Boises, and the two worked together on the magazine.[622]

Along with the *Arab Observer*, the NPH also resuscitated *The Scribe*, which had continued sporadically after the Suez Crisis in 1956. This new version of the magazine was far longer, often closer to a hundred pages in length, and far more sophisticated in its features. For example, the July 1961 issue, which was published in both French and English, pioneered more complex photo

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[618] DGD to SGD November 5 1961 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1.
[619] "Africa As Seen By Negro Scholars Part 6," *Arab Observer* November 27 1961, 24.
[620] DGD to SGD July 31 1962 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1 and Keith Feldman, *Shadow Over Palestine: The Imperial Life of Race in America* (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 90.
[621] DGD to SGD August 13 1962 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1.
[622] DGD to SGD June 13 1962 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1.

layouts by introducing a 'newsreel' section that presented multipage spreads of the latest activity in Cairo, mimicking the frames of an actual reel. *The Scribe* was also published in five languages, including Italian, German, and Spanish.[623] In January 1963, *The Arab Review* also expanded to four languages, the same as *The Scribe* with the exception of Italian, and in September 1962 a new French-language magazine *La Documentation Arabe* was established. In addition to photo layouts and languages, *The Scribe* also included sections of tear out pages, so that readers could recirculate materials. In the August-September 1961 issue, the selected documents for tearing out were the "Communique of the preparatory meeting of the conference of non-aligned states *(Cairo, June 5-12 1961)*" and "New Laws Issued to Implement and Consolidate the Socialist, Democratic, Co-Operative Society in the United Arab Republic *Issued on July 19th and 20th 1961*."[624] In addition to laws and announcements, the tear out section also included "The Arab Calendar" a monthly chronology of events from the perspective of Cairo that detailed activities in the city, as well as Egypt's footprint abroad, such as the November-December 1962 version which included excerpts from the Egyptian representative to the United Nations, Mohamed Fawzy's, address to the General Assembly on October 2, 1962. The magazine also expanded on the *Arab Observer*'s "Press Roundup" section with "What They Think of US… And What We Think of Them." This feature printed snippets from foreign press and included *The Scribe*'s reply, as well as translating reporting from Egyptian newspapers. In the May-June 1962 issue, this section included articles from *La tribune des Nations*, *Le Monde*, *L'Express*, and *France Observateur*, which was paired with the Egyptian riposte that focused on the recent signing of Évian Accords and the victory of the Algerian liberation struggle.

While the Editor-in-Chief of *The Scribe* was Dr. Adel Amer, the magazine was under the auspices of Yahya Abu Bakr in the Information Department. Each magazine opened with an

[623] According to the March 2 1964 issue of the *Arab Observer*, *Bena' al-Watan* was also published in five languages (Arabic, English, French, Spanish, and German), but I have not been able to locate any of these non-Arabic language editions.
[624] "Documents," *The Scribe* August-September 1961, 45-52.

editorial entitled "Under the Probing Lens of Truth," which was part of Abu Bakr's initiative to establish an "Army of Truth." Intended for Egyptians abroad and sympathetic foreigners, the "Army of Truth" was a write-in-campaign, where enlisted members were sent these publications, as well as many of the pamphlets and books also being produced from the Information Department to help further spread anti-colonialism and the Egyptian cause. While the success of this particular endeavor is unknown, it was part of broader push from the Information Department to circulate its materials, which also included the creation of information centers in Egypt and abroad. These centers were essentially "small kiosks" in major cities, hotels, and embassies that contained both this printed media, and radio and television sets.[625]

Though not necessarily widespread, scholars have, since their publication, utilized NPH periodicals as historical sources, and *The Scribe*, in particular, was intended to provide 'factual documentation.' Indeed, *The Scribe* not only published legislation and chronologies, but also in its "Know the U.A.R." section, the magazine included a weekly "Identity Card," listing biographical details of key government officials.[626] While this section provides crucial, difficult to locate information on these bureaucrats, the explicit listing of these details was also intended to further legitimize and humanize the state's expanding powers. Treating these magazines as Sean Latham and Robert Scholes contends not "merely as containers of discrete bits of information [but rather as] autonomous objects of study" requires delving into these publications to consider them as both part of this larger information regime, but also as heterogenous attempts to communicate Cairo's vision to various international audiences.[627]

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[625] Tony Parsons "Reflections on the Cairo Propaganda Machine" July 30 1961, 7.
[626] "Identity Card Dr. Hatem" *The Scribe* April-May 1962.
[627] Sean Latham and Robert Scholes "The Rise of Periodical Studies" *PMLA*, Volume 121, Number 2, (March 2006), 517.

Such a perspective brings into focus the diversity of these publications, which is in part summarized by their individual taglines. *Arab Observer* was initially "The Weekly Middle East News Magazine" but in 1962 became the "Cairo International Magazine" and then in the April 1 1963 issue (no. 145) the adopted the line of "The Non-Aligned Weekly." Conversely, *The Scribe* was "a monthly omnibus of Information and Documentation"; *Bena' al-Watan* was "The People's Magazine"; *La Documentation Arabe* was "Documentary Review of Events in the U.A.R., Middle East and Africa"; and *The Arab Review* was "The Leading Monthly Magazine." Almost all the advertisements for these magazines contained some reference to the Middle East News Agency, including the one for *The Middle East News Weekly* which by the end of 1962 had joined with *Arab Affairs* to become *The Middle East News: Weekly Review of World & Arab Affairs* and was described as a "Middle East News Agency Publication" that provided "an authoritative survey of the week's events […] produced by news analysts and experts and giving the comprehensive stories behind the headlines."[628] Ultimately, exploring the diversity of these magazines, whether in their formats or intended audiences, highlights the ambitions of these Egyptian mass information regime, while also complicating the category of state-funded publications, especially considering the involvement of non-Egyptians in the production of these media.

Contextualizing these publications also requires situating them within broader international events and discourses of this moment. Over the course of 1962, the two most prominent events in the Egyptian press was the advent of Algerian independence from France in March and then the outbreak of Yemeni Civil War in September. Since the outset of the Free Officers' Revolution, Cairo had been a safe haven for Algerian revolutionaries, including Ahmed Ben Bella and Mohammed Khider, who initially established themselves in the city as an external delegation of an earlier

[628] These taglines were repeated multiple times across these publications as a type of collective advertising.

Algerian nationalist political group, the Parti du Peuple Algerien (Algerian People's Party).[629] Mentioned previously in chapter 2, these Algerian nationalists eventually formed one of the most prominent national liberation groups, the Front Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Cairo, announcing its creation over Radio Cairo. The Free Officers were particularly sympathetic to the revolutionary cause of the FLN, and in the early 1950s Ben Bella became especially close to Nasser.[630] The new Egyptian government provided military training for FLN fighters, as well as international support for Algerian participation at various anti-colonial conferences, pushing for their inclusion at Bandung and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, and promoting their cause at the UN.[631] This support was not without cost to Egypt, since France's participation in the Suez Crisis in 1956 was largely a response to Egyptian assistance for the FLN. In *Information and the Arab Cause*, Hatem details some of the Egyptian mass information regime's participation, writing that "of all the manifestations of the Arab struggle for independence during these years the Algerian rising claimed perhaps the most attention from the [Egyptian] media."[632] Hatem describes how *The Voice of the Arabs* maintained continuous support for the Algerians, and how Egypt urged other African states to send material support to the FLN. While Hatem acknowledged the impact of De Gaulle's election on the resolution of the conflict, he believed that shift in international public opinion that had previously "more of less taken face value the official French policy regarding Algeria as exclusively a French issue" but by 1962, viewed Algerians as distinct people was a testament to Egypt's international influence.[633]

However, even with all this support and enthusiasm, Egyptian involvement caused tensions between the Algerian revolutionaries, which Jeffrey Byrne details in his recent book, *Mecca of*

[629] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution,* 34.
[630] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution,* 177.
[631] Fayek, *'Abd Al-Nasir wa-l-Thawra Al-Ifriqiyya*, 41 and Byrne *Mecca of Revolution,* 42.
[632] Hatem, *Information and the Arab Cause,* 211.
[633] Hatem, *Information and the Arab Cause,* 211-16.

Revolution. For example, Ben Bella utilized his ties with Nasser to advocate for his vision of an "Arab socialist" coalition, attempting to sideline other factions within the Algerian nationalist movement.[634] These tensions came to a head in the wake of the Evian Accords, as Ben Bella and another Algerian nationalist, Ben Khedda competed over the leadership and direction of this newly independent state. The British embassy reported that on Ben Bella's visit to Cairo in July 1962, the Egyptian press and Nasser "restrained from taking sides" between Ben Bella and Ben Khedda, in part fearing over commitment after the experiences with Congo and Syria.[635] While Nasser's hesitancy was also driven by fears over the potential for the leadership struggle to worsen and become either a civil war or further Cold War-ified similar to Congo, the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War seem to indicate that Nasser was still willing to commit Egyptian resources to the cause of liberation.

Largely considered Nasser's Vietnam, recent work by Asher Orkaby and Jesse Ferris has endeavored to reassess the Yemeni Civil War. In *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*, Jesse Ferris attempts to re-situate the conflict within the larger Cold War, from the outbreak of the Cuban missile crisis in the Fall of 1962 to subsequent Soviet funding for Egyptian involvement in Yemen, arguing that the confluence of these broader forces pushed Egypt towards the shocking defeat during the Six Days War in June 1967. Conversely, Asher Orkaby attempts to move beyond this Cold War focus by problematizing Malcolm Kerr's famous description of the early 1960s in the Middle East as an 'Arab Cold War', when the region was bisected by the Arab nationalists led by Nasser on one hand, and the Arab monarchies led by Saudi Arabia on the other. Orkaby reframes the conflict as one that demonstrated "the limits of ideologies," arguing that neither the dynamic of Egyptian-Saudi rivalry or Cold War geopolitics was

[634] Byrne *Mecca of Revolution,* 133.
[635] FO 371 165359 UAR Political Relations Algeria 1962 July 10 1962, 1.

solely responsible for the conflict in Yemen.[636] Rather, in taking off the 'Arab' Cold War lens, Orkaby draws together narratives of competing visions of modernity and Arab nationalism, the rise of peacekeeping and the growing tensions with Israel, and places the rivalry with the Saudis in triangulation with Egypt's worsening relations with Britain. While these works have been critical for rethinking an event that had previously been neglected by scholars, these works ultimately buttress the earlier assessments that Nasser's support for the revolution in Yemen was largely the culmination of his anti-colonial and pan-Arab vision, in the same vein as his support for African liberation or his acceptance of the union with Syria.

Notably, Hatem did not include any discussion of Egyptian efforts on the behalf of Yemen, though from the outset the conflict was widely covered in the press. The October 15, 1962 issue of the *Arab Observer* contained an interview with Abdullah Sallal, who was quoted stating that the revolutionaries were not communists and instead wanted to adopt a position of non-alignment and social justice.[637] The November-December issue of *The Scribe* repeated similar rhetoric, with the cover announcing that "Medieval Yemen Adopts Arab Socialism." The ten pages of coverage in the magazine heralded the efforts of Sallal and the Yemeni revolutionaries, while also condemning the "reactionary imperialism" of the Saudis and British forces in Aden. The article was particularly harsh towards American forces in the region, arguing that they, rather than Egyptian forces, were the true "foreign intervention" and that Cairo's involvement was in response to the appeal of the Yemenis.[638] This type of rhetoric echoed the earlier rationales for Egyptian support for Algeria or the Congolese rebels, and Figure 19 visualizes the coverage of the conflict in Yemen compared to the reporting on Algeria in the *Arab Observer*.

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[636] Asher Orkaby, *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 4-5.
[637] "Yemen: The Troublemakers," *Arab Observer* October 15 1962, 19-20.
[638] "Medieval Yemen Adopts Arab Socialism," *The Scribe* November-December 1962, 10-21.

Figure 19. Comparing Algeria-Specific Pages to the Yemen-Specific Pages in the Full Arab Observer Corpus

Graph A. Shared Language Between Algeria-Specific and Yemen-Specific Pages of the *Arab Observer*



Graph A illustrates the top terms for two TF-IDF models. The Y-Axis is the model trained on the Yemen-specific pages and the X-Axis is the model trained Algeria-specific pages of the *Arab Observer*.

The two models contain 48% shared top terms, and many of the terms are clustered within the confidence interval, indicating that overall coverage of the two events shared a high degree of similarity.

Figure metrics: Adj. R-squared 0.941; Skew 0.594; Kurtosis 3.563; Shared Terms 48%; Distinct Terms 52%

Graph B. Comparing Shared and Distinctive Language of Algeria-Specific and Yemen-Specific Pages of the *Arab Observer*



Graph B illustrates both shared and distinctive top terms for the two TFIDF models.

While a number of the top terms, including revolution, UAR, and Nasser, are shared, the unique words in each list also illustrates the distinctions in the discourses around each event.

Some of these terms are expected, like the listing of Ben Bella and De Gaulle in the Algeria-specific list or Abdullah al-Sallal, the leader of the North Yemeni revolution, in the Yemen list.

However, the overall emphasis on military and governance related terms in the Yemen group versus the use of language like independence, struggle, and liberation in the Algeria group provides some indication of the differing treatment in the magazine of the Algerian struggle for independence versus the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War.

Given the prominence of both Algerian independence and the Yemeni Civil war in the press and their connection to liberation struggles, the discourses around both events were quite similar. However, the distinctive language around each event also provides some indications of how the coverage in Cairo distinguished between the two, with the language around Yemen more likely to emphasis military and government-related terms, and the words unique to Algeria echoing similar discourses to those from the Congo crisis. While the previous chapter utilized machine learning models to delve into the specificity of language between the Congo crisis and non-alignment, Figure 20 depicts an additional advantage of these methods – the ability to compare the similarity in language across corpuses or, in this case, publications. This approach is crucial for beginning to consider both the distinctiveness of the *Arab Observer*, and more broadly, whether Cairo's version of anti-colonialism was shared internationally. Though the new 'Bandung' history has begun to recover the global dimensions of anti-colonialism in the 1960s, primarily through the legacies and networks of the 'Bandung spirit,' grappling with the extent and diversity of this international moment remains difficult. From Havana to Djakarta and from the Black press to new Afro-Asian organizations, the proliferation of relatively cheap printing equipment led to the creation of a plethora of publications intended to circulate and construct these political communities. Yet while these activists and revolutionaries were advocating for Lumumba during the Congo crisis or heralding the legitimacy of the Algerian struggle for independence, how similar these discourses and reporting were, whether from New York or New Delhi, remains difficult to assess, leaving unexplored the degree to which these global events were mediated through local lenses.

Figure 20. Comparing the Discourses in the Full Arab Observer Corpus to Anti-Colonial Magazines

Figure 20 depicts the similarity in language between the *Arab Observer* and other anti-colonial magazines. To compare this language, I trained three separate supervised logistic regression models trained respectively on the most distinctive Algeria, Yemen, and Congo related articles. I then used these models to classify each publication, capturing the degree of shared language between the *Arab Observer* and these magazines.

Each visualization includes three raincloud plots, which shows both the distribution and curve of the data. These raincloud plots represent how many pages in each magazine shared similar language to the *Arab Observer*'s coverage of that particular event, which is also summarized in the percentages next to each plot. Points clustered towards the left represent more uncertainty in this measurement of shared discourse, while conversely, points close to the far right are the most linguistically, and thus conceptually similar.

Graph A. The Similarity of National Publication House Magazines to the *Arab Observer*



Graph A illustrates the likelihood of shared language between three NPH magazines, the *Arab Observer, The Scribe,* and *The Arab Review.* If the magazines contained identical coverage, these plots would contain smooth curves with most of the points slightly more clustered towards the Y-Axis. Instead, *The Scribe* contains more coverage related to these topics overall, and especially Yemen. However, the few articles in *The Arab Review* on these events were more likely to share the same anti-colonial language as the *Arab Observer.*

Graph B. The Similarity of Egyptian and Arab Magazines to the *Arab Observer*



Graph B visualizes the likelihood of shared language between the *Arab Observer* and *The Egyptian Economic and Political Review* and *The Arab World* respectively. While both publications contain fairly similar distributions, the two magazines differ in how similarly they reported on events like the Congo crisis relative to the *Arab Observer.* More to the point, using these models not only compares direct mentions of the Congo between these magazines, but also the broader language around the crisis, such as the use of words like liberation, struggle, etc. detailed in the previous chapter.



Figure 20. Comparing the Discourses in the Full Arab Observer Corpus to Anti-Colonial Magazines

Graph C. The Similarity of Afro-Asian Magazines to the *Arab Observer*



Graph C contains plots for *Afro-Asian and World Affairs,* a quarterly journal published in New Delhi, and the *Afro-Asian Bulletin,* the periodical for the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization. While both publications contained reporting evocative of the Congo crisis, the *Bulletin,* even though it was published in Cairo, contained relatively fewer Yemen-related or -adjacent coverage. *Afro-Asian and World Affairs* also diverged in its Algeria-related reporting, indicating that by 1964 when the magazine was founded Algerian independence was a less salient issue in Afro-Asian discourses.

Graph D. The Similarity of African-American Magazines to the *Arab Observer*



Graph D represents the visualizations for two publications from the Black Press in the United States, *Freedomways* and *Liberator Magazine*. Both magazines contain a relatively high degree of Congo related reporting with language that was similar to that in the *Arab Observer*, indicating that of these three events, Congo was the most situated in global discourses of anti-colonialism. Conversely, the minimal similarity with Yemen related coverage suggests that Cairo's focus on Yemen was far more local in nature, even if the conflict had international dimensions.

While these plots are not definitive accounts of the focus of each of these magazines, the variation between them in relation to the *Arab Observer* provides additional evidence of both the heterogenity among the NPH magazines, as well as what aspects of Cairo's anti-colonialism were part of and unique from international anti-colonialism.



Figure 20 presents an initial attempt to explore this question, comparing the discourses around Algerian independence, the Yemeni Civil War, and the Congo crisis in the *Arab Observer* to magazines from both Egypt and the larger anti-colonial world.[639] To generate these visualizations, I used the method of supervised logistic regression, discussed in the last chapter, to create models for the coverage around each of these events. Yet rather than comparing the language in each of these models, I used the relationships between words captured in the model as a proxy for these broader discourses, and as a way to compare the language in the *Arab Observer* to that of other magazines.[640] For example, in Figure 20, graph A illustrates the linguistic similarity between the *Arab Observer* and two NPH publications, *The Scribe* and *The Arab Review*. While the three magazines were all produced from the same institution, this graph highlights the variation between these publications, and especially the relative uniqueness of *The Arab Review*, supporting the assessment in the previous chapter that *The Arab Review* contained comparatively fewer articles devoted to the Congo crisis. Graph A highlights that this magazine was also far less likely to contain reporting on Yemen, though this variation was in part due to the merging of *The Scribe* and *The Arab Review* in 1964. Out of all the magazines in Figure 20, *The Scribe* contained the most similar distribution to the *Arab Observer*, indicating the two magazines were not only conceptually close, but also perhaps produced together.[641] Graph B includes two periodicals that were not published by the NPH. The first is *The Egyptian Economic and Political Review*, which was a monthly journal published by the royalist Adel Mahmood Sabit, who was a cousin to the ousted King Farouk. More academic in nature than the magazines of the NPH, *The Egyptian Economic and Political Review* largely contained articles analyzing

[639] Given Hatem and David Graham Dubois' roles in the *Arab Observer*, as well as its privileged position among NPH publications, I selected the magazine as the most emblematic of Cairo's anti-colonialism.
[640] For this analysis, I identified the pages of the *Arab Observer* that were most distinctive for each of these events related to Algeria, Yemen, and the Congo. This distinctiveness was measured using the methods outlined in the previous chapter, and largely involved exploring the relationships of words in TF-IDF models, and then subseting the pages of the magazine had the highest weights. I then used the saved models to classify these additional publications.
[641] Using these trained models, I also re-classified the *Arab Observer* and the percentages for each class were almost matching those from *The Scribe* (Arab Observer classifications: Algeria 13.14%; Yemen 10.66%; and Congo 13.60%).

recent events in Egypt and the region, as well as advertisements for foreign academic journals such as the *Middle East Journal*.[642] The distribution in graph B for *The Egyptian Economic and Political Review* is almost identical in shape to *The Scribe*, illustrating that though Sabit's journal was not officially affiliated with mass information regime, the journal contained similar discourses, though whether this was due to censorship from the government or collaboration between the magazines remains unknown.

In Figure 20, graph B also comprises a visualization for *The Arab World*, a periodical produced by the Arab League. According to Maurice Labelle, this publication contained "extensive English-language translations of Arabic op-eds, speeches, press conferences, and local reporting that probably escaped non-Arab public spheres and global information providers."[643] Republished from various 'Arab Information Centers', Labelle contends that *The Arab World* was instrumental for the League in countering "Western misinformation," which was in the same spirit as the purpose of the *Arab Observer*. Yet graph B underscores how the two magazines differed, particularly in regards to Congo coverage. Though *The Arab World* promoted the Arab cause in Algeria and Yemen, the publication was far less likely to tie these struggles to ones outside of the region compared to other NPH magazines. This difference between the Arab League's information campaign and the Egyptian government can also be contrasted with the main publication from the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), depicted in graph C. The *Afro-Asian Bulletin* was a monthly publication, founded in 1958 along with the creation of the AAPSO in Cairo. Yet even though it was published from Cairo, the magazine was far less likely than other publications from

[642] *The Egyptian Economic and Political Review* September-October 1960, 31. This issue also contained an advertisement from the African National Congress, the South African national liberation group in Cairo for their quarterly magazine *Africa South*.

[643] Labelle describes the journal as published in Beirut, but that's likely since he accessed the editions at the American University of Beirut. Editions also exist from Nairobi and New York City. Maurice Jr M. Labelle, "De-coca-colonizing Egypt: globalization, decolonization, and the Egyptian boycott of Coca-Cola, 1966–68," *Journal of Global History* (2014), 9, 124.

Egypt to cover the conflict in Yemen. Instead, the *Bulletin* had much more in common with another Afro-Asian publication, the *Afro-Asian and World Affairs*. Founded in New Delhi, this publication was produced by the Institute of Afro-Asian and World Affairs, an organization created by Smt. (Mrs.) Rameshwari Nehru, cousin of the Indian Prime Minister, and the person responsible for the Conference on the Relaxation of International Tension in New Delhi that Nasser had attended before Bandung in 1955. She had also led the Indian delegation to the Afro-Asian Women's Conference in Cairo during January 1961.[644] Both Nehru's journal *Afro-Asian and World Affairs* and the *Afro-Asian Bulletin* contained articles that were significantly similar to the *Arab Observer*'s writings on the Congo crisis (including the discourses around non-alignment), but the two publications diverged around Algeria. This split might have been due to the founding of *Afro-Asian and World Affairs* in 1964 compared to the *Bulletin* in 1961, but this temporal shift signals that by the mid-1960s Algeria was notably less prominent in Afro-Asian symbolism.

The final visualization in Figure 20, graph D, compares the *Arab Observer* to two of the most prominent publications from the American Black press during the 1960s, *Freedomways* and *Liberator Magazine*. While this comparison might seem a stretch, these publications were important vehicles for spreading anti-colonial politics in the United States. In *Radical Intellect: Liberator Magazine and Black Activism in the 1960s*, Christopher M. Tinson details the creation and full publication run of *Liberator* from 1960 to 1971, situating the publication within the Civil Rights and Black Power movements. Tinson argues that the magazine was a vehicle for "black radicalism," which he defines as the combining of "anti-racist, anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist [… with] various strands of black radicalism–Black Nationalist, pan-Africanist, and community feminist, as well as

[644] For more Rameshwari Nehru, see Stolte, "Other Bandungs: Afro-Asian Internationalisms in the Early Cold War", 140-153.

Old and New Left."[645] Since the magazine was founded as a newsletter for the Liberation Committee for Africa (LCA), it contained articles advocating for African independence throughout its publication history and tried to connect the struggles in Africa with those of African Americans. Tinson details how the magazine was particularly vocal in support of Lumumba, and graph D indicates that the greatest overlap between the *Liberator* and the *Arab Observer* was in the language associated with the Congo crisis. Relative to the *Liberator*, the second magazine in graph D, *Freedomways* had an even more direct connection to Cairo, through David Graham Du Bois and his mother Shirley, who was instrumental in launching the magazine.

David requested an initial copy to share in Cairo, as well as an official letter of affiliation with "*Freedomways* in Africa" to help smooth his entry into writing for Egyptian publications when he first arrived.[646] While *Freedomways* was classified similarly to the *Liberator*, zooming into the pages of the magazine elucidates how these models identified this shared discourse. For example, the page classified as most similar to the *Arab Observer*'s reporting on the Congo crisis was from July 1961 issue and was part of "Declaration of the Government of the Congo" by Antoine Gizenga. The exact page was the final one from his speech, and emphasized how the United Nations had "failed in its responsibility," first to protect Lumumba, and secondly to implement the resolutions passed after his assassination. The speech ends with Gizenga demanding UN intervene to stop Mobutu's forces and contending that "Congo [was] suffering from a war of colonial reconquest."[647] Conversely, the page least likely to be related to Congo was from "How Powerful is the Southern Power Structure?" by J.H. O'Dell in the Winter 1964 issue, which was an article on the continued power bases fueling white supremacy in the American south.[648] The minimal similarity regarding the

[645] Charles M. Tinson *Radical Intellect: Liberator Magazine and Black Activism in the 1960s*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 4.
[646] DGD to SGD April 8 1961 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1.
[647]Antoine Gizenga, "Declaration of the Government of the Congo," *Freedomways* Summer 1961 Issue 2, 184.
[648] The exact page was number 84 and that particular one detailed the rise of share-cropping in Mississippi and how that impacted "race relations."

reporting around Yemen resulted in the model identifying a page from an article on "The Development of Philippine Nationalism" as the most similar to Yemen-centric language in the *Arab Observer*, though this classification had relatively low certainty.[649] The same issue from 1963 also contained the page most associated with the Algeria reporting in the *Arab Observer*. Page 484 was towards the end of a fourteen-page article, "After Addis Ababa," which opened with the passage, "One hundred years after Abraham Lincoln proclaimed liberation from slavery of Africans in America, Africans gathered in Addis Ababa and signed a Covenant of Union pledging themselves to the liberation of every foot of Africa."[650] The tying together of the struggle for African Americans' freedom and the liberation of Africa was a common theme for the author of the article, Shirley Graham DuBois. Like her son, Shirley was committed to furthering the cause of liberation and had attended the first meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa, and this article was her report on the momentous occasion. While the article was not on Algeria per say, page 484 contained excerpts from Premier Ben Bella speech, where he spoke of "African Unity" as bridging the imperialist divided Sahara of "white Africa" and "black Africa", and that Arab unity would be "automatically submerged" with the achievement of African unity since the two were "the same thing." Shirley also detailed Ben Bella's visit to Accra and his paying tribute to W.E.B. Du Bois as the "Father of Pan Africanism," and his support for "freedom fighters" across the continent.[651] To a reader of the magazine, this article might not be seen as Algerian-centric, but this emphasis on Algeria's place in African Unity was emblematic of the capaciousness of anti-colonialism in the *Arab Observer*, and the Egyptian government writ large.

Utilizing these machine learning methods assists in connecting Shirley Graham Du Bois' article in *Freedomways* to the writings in *Arab Observer*, and in making visible how both were part of

[649] William J Pomeroy, "The Development of Philippine Nationalism," *Freedomways* Fall 1963 Issue 4, 504.
[650] Shirley Graham Du Bois, "After Addis Ababa," *Freedomways* Fall 1963 Issue 4, 471.
[651] Shirley Graham Du Bois, "After Addis Ababa," 484.

the same anti-colonial discursive space. Yet these models are more than just a complicated search engine for surfacing these connections. In *Distant Horizons*, Ted Underwood defines machine learning models, writing that they "don't rely on explicit definitions; instead they [the models] learn concepts entirely from illustrative examples."[652] However, in learning-by-example, these models are particularly susceptible to biases in the sources, which presents enormous societal and political challenges for the use of machine learning in our current moment, but this feature is useful for historians. Uncovering the 'bias', or as Underwood terms the 'perspectival modeling' of these publications, is critical for assessing both the scale and the limits of international discourses. While an individual researcher could read the full publication runs of nine separate magazines over multiple decades, their ability to systematically and comprehensively compare each page in each issue would strain the limits of human capacity.[653] However, these methods are not a panacea. Using machine learning methods does not provide some objective ground truth about the nature of these publications, and some of the variation in these visualizations was likely produced by the divergent quality in the digitization of these magazines. Nonetheless, leveraging these methods to characterize the relationships between words, pages, and across publications provides new lines of inquiry for thinking about what we mean when we discuss a historical event as 'international.'

Though historians have increasingly attempted to internationalize the history of the Yemeni civil war, this analysis highlights that, while for Cairo, the conflict was central to its anti-colonial politics, this perspective was not widely shared beyond Egypt and other revolutionary Arab states. On the other hand, the Congo crisis, and to a lesser degree the struggle of Algerian independence, were clearly part of a global discursive anti-colonialism that superseded local concerns and linked

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[652] Underwood, *Distant Horizons,* xiv.

[653] For the sake of time, I also omitted analysis of *The Middle East News: Weekly Review of World & Arab Affairs*; *La Documentation Arabe*; *Bena' al-Watan; African Renaissance; Tricontential Bulletin; Afro-Asian Woman; African Recorder; Cairo Press Review; Egypt Travel Magazine;* and additional Afro-Asian magazines from the 1970s for a total of 16 additional digitized magazines that could be analyzed in a similar fashion.

together the struggles of activists and writers across the globe. While the discursive similarities between coverage relating to Algerian and Congo independence versus the reporting on Yemen might seem obvious, these events were all intertwined in this anti-colonial moment in Cairo. Emphasizing local perspectives on international events is crucial for grounding these historical phenomena, and to excavate how anti-colonialism manifested in Cairo relative to the rest of the world. This next section continues to trace this thread, detailing Egypt's efforts to transform its capital into the "crossroads" for the decolonized world. Though the city had already hosted many prominent conferences and events, 1964 would be the year when Cairo became an international capital for anti-colonialism. Quoted in the introduction, the new editor of the *Arab Observer*, Dr. Hamid El-Batrik, proclaimed in September 1964 that the world had finally acknowledged "Cairo's vitality as a meeting place for new ideas."[654] This next section details how Cairo ascended to such a position of influence, as well as the costs of bringing the world to Egypt.

All Roads Lead to Cairo: Locating Cairo in International Anti-Colonialism 1964

Since the All African Peoples' Conference in March 1961 and the preparatory meeting for the non-aligned conference in July that year, Cairo had continued to host a number of smaller Arab, Afro-Asian, and African meetings, generally at the minister and non-state levels, such as the Afro-Asian Writers Conference in February 1962. In June 1962, Algerian Premier Ben Khedda, Guinean President Sekou Toure, Malian President Modibo Keita, Moroccan King Hasan II, and Ghanaian Foreign Minister Ako Adjel all arrived in Cairo for the Third Casablanca Summit, which was a continuation of the Casablanca group formed in January 1961. Nasser's opening speech detailed the achievements of the leaders since the Belgrade Conference, but also noted the continued dangers in the content – especially the continued threat of extractive imperialism and under development of

[654] Abdul Hamid el-Batrik "From the Editor," *The Arab Observer*, September 7, 1964.

African states. The *Arab Observer* headline read "World Turns to Cairo," and its coverage described how "the population of Cairo with a simple turn of the head could […] see the living image of African unity parade up and down the streets."[655] This emphasis on Cairo's new international prominence papered over the fact that the Casablanca group had increasingly become isolated in African politics, and especially distant from the more conservative Monrovia group of African states, and omitted any mention of Nasser's changing policy towards the African continent..[656]

In *The UAR in Africa*, Ismael argues that after the experiences with the Congo crisis and the Syrian secession, as well as the growing commitment in Yemen, which by 1963 numbered over forty thousand troops, Nasser increasingly favored a policy of supporting anti-colonial institutions rather than advocating for direct Egyptian involvement.[657] In particular, Ismael notes that the 1962 National Charter designated Arab Unity as an "internal matter", whereas Africa was discussed "in association with the problem of Israel" and as an external issue.[658] In January 1963, the British embassy in Cairo detailed that "less is now being done" than in the past, in terms of funding liberation movements, given "that results were not commensurate with the effort and expense." However, the embassy also emphasized that Cairo's greatest strength remained its publicity efforts, with "its radio immensely popular; its newspapers and magazines widely distributed and read; and its films shown throughout the area," and that Egypt had overall maintained a "natural appeal" to "less developed or still dependent countries" in Africa as both an example and the vanguard of liberation.[659] Publicity campaigns like those in the *Arab Observer* continued to promote African liberation, but were also increasingly part of an effort to make Cairo a symbol for international anti-colonialism, emphasizing the capital's position at the crossroads of world politics. This section

[655] *Arab Observer* June 18 1962, 7.
[656] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 63.
[657]Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 64-65.
[658] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 65-66.
[659] "U.A.R. Activities in Africa," FO 371 172865 UAR Policy in Africa 1963 January 17 1963, 1-2.

considers how the successes of this policy not only put Cairo on the international map, but also in the crosshairs of the Cold War superpower competition and the growing divisions between the leaders of the decolonized world.

After the Casablanca meeting in July, Sekou Toure traveled to Ethiopia to meet Emperor Haile Selassie and proposed healing the breach between the African states through a continent-wide conference. In *Mecca of Revolution,* Jeffrey Byrne also details Algerian Premier Ben Bella's efforts to bring the African states together which, given Algeria's widespread support for liberation movements, appeared contradictory. Byrne contends that Ben Bella wanted to display Algerians "reasonableness to those governments that had reason to fear their politics," while privately counseling the more radical Nkrumah and Touré that by participating in this new African unity summit "the radical countries could then ensure that this institutionalization of African unity would include a universal commitment to assist national liberation movements."[660] As Cairo shifted away from direct military involvement in African liberation struggles, the newly independent Algeria was stepping in to fill Egypt's former role, providing military training and arm shipments, as well as refuge in Algeria for nationalists from across the continent.[661] Helmi Sharawy described that growing sense of "competition between Cairo and Algiers" over this support for liberation movements. On the one hand, Egypt advocated for "national liberation policies in general, and provided diplomatic contacts and media coverage," whereas Algeria emphasized supporting armed struggle.[662] This competition between Algeria and Egypt continued with the creation of a new African institution in May 1963, the Organization of African Unity.

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[660] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, 194-195.
[661] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, 190. Byrne lists the nationalist movements from "Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Léopoldville (as opposed to the smaller, neighboring Congo whose capital was Brazzaville), Mozambique, Niger, Portuguese Guinea, South Africa, and Southwest Africa (Namibia)."
[662] Helmi Sharawy, "Memories on African Liberation (1956–1975): A Personal Experience from Egypt, Part II"

The *Arab Observer* May 20th issue's cover depicted cartoon versions of the leaders of Africa scheduled to attend the upcoming "Addis Ababa African Summit Conference" from May 22-25.[663] Intended to bridge the main political blocs in Africa, Selassie had spared no expense for the conference, spending over two million dollars to construct a new conference building, Africa Hall, and his opening commentary made clear the stakes of the conference as "Africa was in transition from the Africa of Yesterday to the Africa of Tomorrow."[664] Helmi Sharawy describes Nasser and Selassie as "the Big Brothers to all their colleagues" at the conference, in part because of the moderating force of these two leaders between the more radical and conservative African leaders.[665] In particular, Nkrumah had proposed the creation of a federal African government as a precursor to 'true' continental unity. Instead of supporting Nkrumah's plan, Nasser had aligned Egypt with the majority of African leaders who supported a more limited form of economic cooperation prior to achieving full-fledged African unity.[666] The final outcome of these negotiations was the creation of a new African Charter and the establishing of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to coordinate policies among African states. Both the *Arab Observer* and *The Scribe* published the full text of the new African Charter, heralding the summit as "A New Bandung." *The Scribe* also took aim at foreign coverage of the conference. The "What They Think of Us" section detailed an article from *France Observateur*, which argued that the "previous attachments" of the African states might prevent any union, including Ghana's membership in the Commonwealth and Egypt's identity as a "Near Eastern rather than an African state."[667] *The Scribe* riposted that the proof was in the Charter itself,

[663] The issue was primarily devoted to Tito's visit in Cairo the week prior to the summit, but the editorial managed to connect the two as "yet another milestone on the road of non-alignment […] a road which took up in Cairo, crossed to Belgrade and has wound its way through many capitals in Africa, Asia and Latin America." "From the Editor," *Arab Observer* May 20 1963, 7.
[664] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, 196.
[665] Helmi Sharawy, "Memories on African Liberation (1956–1975): A Personal Experience from Egypt, Part II"
[666] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 67.
[667] "What They Think of Us," *The Scribe* June 1963, 71.

which had been passed unanimously and "sealed African unity."[668] Yet this criticism of Egypt as "not African" had been a common refrain prior to the summit. Nasser's attempt to thread both African and Arab unity required the sidelining of what were seen as more Arab-related issues at the conference. Thus, in his speech to the summit, while Nasser repeated similar themes from his speech the previous summer to the Casablanca leaders, he stressed Egypt's willingness to table resolutions condemning Israel for the sake of African unity.[669]

The conference also approved the creation of a special OAU committee – the Coordination Committee for Liberation of the Colonies. Known as the Committee of Nine, due to its number of original members, this new committee also included Egypt, who promised to contribute a million pounds to the committee's mission of liberating the rest of the continent.[670] The creation of the committee was a victory for the more radical states, and Ben Bella in particular pushed the assembled leaders, who were apparently moved by his fiery rhetoric demanding why the conference had "spoken of a Development Bank […but not] a bank of blood to come to the aid of those who are fighting in Angola and elsewhere in Africa?"[671] Yet as Ben Bella was pushing for more support to armed struggles, Nasser was continuing to shift Egypt's policy towards institutional forms of unity. Indeed, even prior to the African summit, the American embassy in Cairo outlined the increasing normalization of relations between Egypt and the other African states, as more and more national liberation movements transitioned into independent states.[672] Reflecting back on the creation of the OAU, Helmi Sharawy contends that this institutionalizing of African liberation undermined Egypt's earlier policies and quickly came to the "benefit of the ruling bureaucracies" on the continent. Yet in the immediate aftermath of the summit, the success of Selassie's efforts to bridge of the two African

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668 "What They Think of Us," *The Scribe* June 1963, 71.
669 "From President Gamal Abdel Nasser Is Address to The African Summit Conference in Addis Ababa, May 24, 1963," *President Gamal Abdel Nasser On Africa* Information Department Cairo, 51.
670 Sawant, *Egypt's Africa Policy*, 72-73 and Fayek, *'Abd Al-Nasir wa-l-Thawra Al-Ifriqiyya*, 42-44.
671 Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*, 197-8
672 "Briefing Memorandum for Governor Williams' visit to Cairo, February 1963," NARA RG 59 UAR Africa 1962, 3-4.

blocs in part inspired Nasser to propose a similar solution to the divisions in the Arab region, especially as the situation in Yemen continued to worsen with nearly one third of the Egyptian military deployed to the conflict.[673]

By December 1963, almost all the Arab states had agreed to attend Nasser's proposed Arab Summit in Cairo, apparently with the promise that the mass information regime would "suspend all propaganda attacks against other Arab states in order to create a 'favorable atmosphere' for the conference." In preparation for the meeting, Cairo was decorated with flags and billboards greeting the guest delegations, who were housed in the Nile Hilton and were meeting in the new Arab League headquarters.[674] From January 13th to 17th, the leaders of almost every Arab state descended on the city with Nasser greeting each one at the airport, and the conference succeeded in both restoring diplomatic relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, with both committing to continuing the ceasefire in press attacks, and laying the groundwork for a second Arab conference in Alexandria that September.[675] The Egyptian press also started reporting on new efforts for a Second Non-Aligned Conference, organized by the Big Three (Nehru, Tito, and Nasser).[676] Prior to that meeting though, Cairo hosted the first Afro-Asian Islamic Conference in early March 1964 through the now government-controlled *al-Azhar*. Forty-two delegations attended the meeting, which was organized to coordinate the Islamic world against the threat of imperialism.[677] Notably the conference included no mention of the Muslim World League, which was Saudi Arabia's attempt to create an international Islamic organization, even though relations between the two countries had marginally improved with the first Arab Summit.[678]

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673 Rezk, *The Arab World and Western Intelligence*, 154-55.
674 Joint Weekly No. 53 February 5 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 2.
675 Joint Weekly No. 2 February 14 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 2 and Orkaby *Beyond the Arab Cold War*, 107.
676 Joint Weekly No. 6 March 18 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 2.
677 Ismael, "Religion and U.A.R. African Policy," 54-55.
678 *Arab Observer* March 16 1964, 8-9.

Along with the Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Cairo also hosted a meeting of the Arab Information Ministers. Since Hatem had founded the Information Department, eventually renamed the Ministry of Information, other Arab states had followed suit, and this conference was an attempt to start coordinating information activities on behalf of the Arab cause.[679] Speaking at the meeting, Hatem urged Arab states to pool resources as a means to combat both Zionist and imperialist propaganda. Hatem also apparently drafted the main proposals for the conference, which was comprised of seven steps to achieve this "Arab information plan", including establishing an "all-Arab broadcasting network" to coordinate Arab broadcasts to "foreign countries"; adopting "a practical method for designing an Arab information service"; unifying Arab tourism advertising; coordinating Arab information campaigns abroad, and especially the efforts of the Arab League offices and individual states' information services; funding Arab professors to travel internationally and spread information about the Arab cause; founding a new Arab publishing clearinghouse through the Arab league; and lastly, organizing an Arab film organization.[680] These proposed steps were almost identical to Hatem's efforts with the Egyptian mass information regime, but now envisioned at a multinational, regional scale.

The proposals at the Arab Information Ministers meeting were also building from the recent UNESCO-sponsored "Meeting of Experts on the Development of News Agencies in Africa" in Tunis last April 1963. The meeting brought together "twenty-eight news agency directors and other press experts from some twenty-five African countries" to discuss the obstacles towards the development of domestic African news agencies, and regional and continental exchanges, which at the time remain limited in scale.[681] The rationale for developing the local capacity was that the

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[679] The conference included delegates from "Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq, and the UAR." Joint Weekly No. 10 March 25 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 3.

[680] *Arab Observer* March 16 1964, 22-23.

[681] Hachten, *Muffled Drums*, 70 and "Present Status of News Agencies in Africa" UNESCO "Meeting of Experts on the Development of News Agencies in Africa" Paris 11 March 1963, 1-2.

"greater world agencies" often sidelined events in African countries, and that the development of "informational media" was crucial to promoting education in newly independent countries. The Egyptian delegate to the meeting was Zein El Abdin Nagati, who was listed as the General Manager of the Middle East News Agency (MENA), but prior that position had been the Editor in Chief of the *Arab Observer*. At the meeting, Nagati offered six fellowships comprising of six months training at the MENA to journalists and newsmen from other African countries.[682] Whether these fellowships were actually awarded remains unknown, but the meeting resulted in the creation of the Union of African News Agencies and at a second meeting in Algiers in December 1963, Ghana proposed the creation of a Pan-African News Agency.[683] Egyptian support for further continental collaboration among news agencies was in line with Nasser's new policy towards Africa that privileged institutional cooperation. Thus, the Arab Information Ministers meeting followed a similar trajectory, with the final resolutions largely adopting Hatem's proposal, with the intention of stimulating further collaboration among Arab states' information ministries and "strengthening the Arab information machinery abroad."[684]

This sense of needing to improve the capacity and collaboration of Arab information efforts was also echoed by Mustafa Amin, who believed that printing in Cairo was falling behind "international standards," and after the conference, *al-Akhbar* published an article calling for more Egyptian information offices in the United States, writing "it is physically impossible for four offices to reach 200 million people" and calling for Hatem to expand the existing services.[685] Part of these calls for improved international information infrastructure was the continued prominence of Cairo

[682] "Report of the Meeting" UNESCO "Meeting of Experts on the Development of News Agencies in Africa" Paris 27 May 1963, 16.
[683] Hachten, *Muffled Drums*, 71.
[684] *Arab Observer* March 16 1964, 23 and Joint Weekly No. 10 March 25 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 4.
[685] Joint Weekly No. 10 March 25 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 4 and Joint Weekly No. 11 April 13 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 3.

in world events. In April 1964, Premier Khrushchev visited Egypt for sixteen days, which was widely heralded in the press, and *Akhbar el-Yom* proclaimed that "the UAR is now the center of attraction of the entire world."[686] Cairo's position at the crossroads was also impacting David Graham Du Bois, who described needing to rent a nicer apartment in the center of Cairo to entertain "members of African Embassies, newsmen and their wives, and important Egyptians" as part of his new position as the manager of a special Ghana Information Office.[687] This sense of international momentum came to a head with the OAU summit from July 17-21 in Cairo. Reporting back to Washington, the American embassy in Cairo described the conference "as very constructive […] partly due to Nasser's statesmanship, [and that] Nasser and Egypt scored a ringing propaganda victory with the delegates."[688] This American assessment underscored Nasser's efforts to bridge the divisions among the African leaders, and the overall success of the conference, which passed over twenty resolutions, encouraging the boycotting by OAU states of South Africa and calling for oil-producing states to halt shipments to the apartheid regime. Resolutions also condemned the continued imperialism in Southern Rhodesia and Angola. The tensions at the conference were largely centered on the Liberation Committee, which had failed to make much progress, leading Nkrumah to call for its abolition and the forging ahead with the African Union. The Zanzibar-Tanganyika President Julius K. Nyerere, frustrated with Nkrumah's attacks, accused Ghana of being "petty and peevish" since they had failed to commit any funds to the committee. Nasser was able to negotiate a solution to the debate by referring to the continued existence of the Liberation Committee to the new, permanent OAU secretariat.[689] Tensions also arose after

[686] Joint Weekly No. 20 May 29 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 2.
[687] DGD to SGD January 12 1963 SGD Papers 12. 23, 1; 19.1 SGD to Christine June 21, 1966; 19.3 SGD to Gloria Sept 30 1966.
[688] Joint Weekly No. 29 July 25 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 2.
[689] Joint Weekly No. 29 July 25 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 1.

Tshombe requested to attend the conference and was denied, leading the Congolese delegation to withdraw completely.[690]

Even with these problems, hosting the OAU cemented Cairo's identity as an anti-colonial *and* African capital. Indeed, Helmi Sharawy described this moment as the "glorious days for African activity in Cairo."[691] Sharawy pointed in particular to the media attention in Cairo, and the *Arab Observer* devoted a full issue to the summit and African affairs. Under the title "Africa Marches Together" the magazine detailed preparations in Cairo for the arrival of Africa's leaders, as well as the OAU Secretariat and hundreds of journalists.[692] Another notable attendee, in addition to the heads of state, was Malcolm X. In "My Heart Is in Cairo: Malcolm X, the Arab Cold War, and the Making of Islamic Liberation Ethics," Edward E. Curtis IV traces how Malcolm X became enamored with Cairo as a hub for anti-colonial activism and "constructed an Islamic ethics of liberation inspired by Nasser's example."[693] Malcolm X first traveled to Cairo in 1959, after an invitation from Egyptian officials to visit the region – a strategy that was part of the mass information regime's efforts to leverage Egypt's Islamic heritage. Similar to David Graham Du Bois, Malcolm X painted a rosy picture of race relations in Cairo, apparently amazed that "many black Muslims had achieved a social status in the Arab world that was unimaginable in the United States at the time."[694] Eventually undertaking the *hajj,* Curtis details how Malcom X's travels to Saudi Arabia and Egypt embroiled him in the larger Arab Cold War. While Malcolm X refused to take sides, privately he sympathized with Nasser's revolutionary approach to Islam. Part of this admiration for Nasser was from his experiences at the OAU summit, which he attended with the hopes of convincing African leaders of the connectedness of their struggles to those of African Americans,

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690 Joint Weekly No. 28 July 25 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 2.
691 Helmi Sharawy, "Memories on African Liberation (1956–1975): A Personal Experience from Egypt, Part II"
692 *Arab Observer* July 13 1964, 7.
693 Edward E. Curtis IV, "My Heart Is in Cairo": Malcolm X, the Arab Cold War, and the Making of Islamic Liberation Ethics," *The Journal of American History* (December 2015), 776.
694 Curtis IV, "My Heart Is in Cairo", 781.

similar to Shirley Graham Du Bois' article in *Freedomways*. While his efforts to have the African nations "internationalize the U.S. civil rights struggle" largely failed, the chance to participate in the conference led to the creation of the "Organization of Afro-American Unity," which was based off the OAU.[695] Furthermore, Malcolm X's words and visit also received widespread coverage due to David Graham Du Bois' efforts. The two had been introduced through Shirley, who had met Malcolm X in Accra earlier that year. According to Keith Feldman, David reprinted Malcom X's speech for the OAU delegations and various news outlets, and even the American embassy reported on a lengthy interview Malcolm gave to *al-Gumhuriyya*.[696] Malcolm X was not the only African American receiving extensive press coverage in Cairo. Since his announcement of converting to Islam, Mohammed Ali was also an increasingly prominent feature in the news and visited Cairo on his trip back from Lagos in mid-June.[697] Both Muhammad Ali and Malcolm X spoke of the historic ties between African Americans and Egypt, a theme that had been a consistent refrain in NPH publications.

These magazines continued to cover the African summit in the following weeks, though in a less hagiographic tone than previous reporting. The August 1964 issue of *The Scribe* acknowledged that the conference "did not adopt any spectacular decisions," but the magazine did not frame this as a failure. Instead, the authors contended that the emphasis in the Western press on the lack of action from these conferences was a type of "suggestive propaganda […] to throw suspicion on the action of the continent and to cause Africans themselves to doubt the value of their Organization."[698] Thus, *The Scribe* heralded the "relative modesty" of the resolutions passed in Cairo.

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[695] Curtis IV "My Heart Is in Cairo", 787 and Keith P. Feldman "Towards an Afro-Arab Diasporic Culture: The Translational Practices of David Graham Du Bois" *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics*, No. 31 (2011), 159.
[696] Feldman "Towards an Afro-Arab Diasporic Culture", 159 and Joint Weekly No. 28 July 25 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 3.
[697] Joint Weekly No. 8 March 21 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 3; Joint Weekly No. 22 June 12 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 2 Apparently *Al-Musawwar* devoted six pages to his visit in Cairo.
[698] "The African Heads of State Conference" *The Scribe* August 1964, 65.

Though in the same issue, a special version of the "What They Think of Us" segment devoted to the summit noted that the Western Press had "registered the remarkable progress" of the OAU. Indeed, in many ways the measured tone of the Egyptian mass information regime was less a signal of failure, and more so evidence that Cairo had achieved its information victory. With Malcolm X writing that his "heart is in Cairo" due to its leadership in progressive politics, and Mustafa Amin's editorial in *al-Akhbar* describing the sensation of dreaming of "seeing in Cairo thirty-three kings and Heads of State of independent Africa," the years of constructing Cairo into an international anti-colonial capital had finally materialized the international prestige and influential information infrastructure first envisioned by Nasser and then implemented by Hatem.[699]

From September 5-11, Egypt also hosted the Second Arab Summit, though this time in Alexandria rather than Cairo. The summit was intended to be a "demonstration of Arab unity and reconciliation," and Asher Orkaby describes how Nasser particularly desired a ceasefire in Yemen after the revolutionaries had consolidated significant territorial gains with the help of the Egyptian forces.[700] However, the summit did not publicly discuss the conflict in Yemen, preferring to stick to more unifying topics such as the continued military collaboration between the Arab states with the United Arab Command; the issue of Israel's diversion of the Jordan tributaries; and support for the Palestinian Liberation Organization.[701] The American embassy viewed the success of the summit as simply not "breaking down" and argued that any claims of positive action was "more myth than reality." The embassy in particular was concerned that further collaboration between the Arab states might lead to heightened tensions with Israel.[702]

[699] Curtis IV "My Heart Is in Cairo", 793.
[700] Orkaby *Beyond the Arab Cold War,* 107.
[701] Joint Weekly No. 36 September 25 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 1-2.
[702] Joint Weekly No. 36 September 25 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 3.

El-Batrik's editorial in the *Arab Observer* that was quoted in the introduction about the vitality of Cairo was referring to events around the Second Arab Summit. His editorial described the *Arab Observer* as "taking part in this marathon race and trying to keep abreast of what goes on [with the meeting]." El-Batrik also described how, with the proliferation of these prominent international events in Egypt, the magazine had started to publish special issues, which were intended as a "sort of background handbook of these meetings," though he acknowledged that it made those issues "a little dry and their material more dense." El-Batrik was also notably complimentary of recent American and British coverage, writing that both *Time Magazine* and *The Times* had recently produced "masterpieces" on the Egyptian High Dam and anniversary of the revolution, and that the *Observer* could only "pale before these."[703] Compared to earlier denunciations of the Western press as a tool of imperialism, El-Batrik's assessment is stark, and provides further indication of a shift within Cairo regarding their relative sense of international influence vis-à-vis the West. This sense of Cairo ascendant was further reinforced with the upcoming Second Non-Aligned Conference in October.

Preparations for the conference had started in the Spring of 1964, when Egypt began exchanging messages with Yugoslavia, India, and Ceylon about the necessity of a second Belgrade.[704] The death of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in May meant that for the first time the Big Three of the Non-Aligned world would be only two – Nasser and Tito, though forty additional countries were invited to attend than at Belgrade.[705] The June issue of *The Scribe* described the impetus for the meeting as the product of international events (specific ones were not mentioned) that necessitated a "much broader basis" for the non-aligned movement around the principles of peace and social justice.[706] The September 21 issue of the *Arab Observer* provided some details on the conference

[703] "From the Editor," *Arab Observer* September 7 1964, 6
[704] Joint Weekly No. 6 March 18 1964 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 3
[705] Joint Weekly No. 21 June 12 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 3 and *Arab Observer* June 1 1964, 6-8.
[706] *The Scribe* June 5 1964, 63-65.

planning, indicating that the very definition of non-alignment was one of the main questions for the conference, since the initial definition was premised on easing Cold War tensions and that had largely succeeded with the signing of the "Moscow Test Ban Treaty" in 1963 that had outlawed all testing of nuclear weapons except underground.[707] Overall, the language in the magazine was optimistic about the upcoming event, especially as the conference would reinforce Cairo's new international position. Yet when the conference opened on October 5th, Nasser's emphasis on anti-colonial unity was overshadowed by Moise Tshombe and the Congolese delegation.

Since 1963, Tshombe had been in exile in Northern Rhodesia, but facing the prospect of renewed civil war President Kasa-Vubu reappointed Tshombe as Prime Minister in July 1964. Robert Rakove describes how given his role in Lumumba's murder, Tshombe "was the most hated man in Africa."[708] One of his first actions as Prime Minister, Tshombe attempted to attend the OAU summit in Cairo and had been summarily prohibited by the Algerian and Ghanaian delegations. Yet in the interim between the African and Non-Aligned Conferences, tensions in Congo had once again become an international issue. In early August, the Simba rebels, who has initially been supporters of Lumumba, captured Stanleyville, taking the American Embassy staff hostage. According to Rakove, the United States, now under Lyndon B. Johnson, feared the that these Americans would be murdered by the rebels and were also disinclined to support them due to their communist ties. Left with the option of supporting Tshombe, the Americans remained critical in their assessment of him as a "gifted opportunist" who was primarily utilizing white mercenaries to fight the rebels. In late August, the two rival Congolese delegations passed through Cairo in an effort to make their case, and efforts to bridge the two groups at the OAU would increasingly flounder.[709] Mali's President Keita had attempted to provide an olive branch to Tshombe and use

[707] *Arab Observer* September 21 1964, 36.
[708] Rakove "The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6", 10.
[709] Joint Weekly No. 34 September 4 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 2.

the OAU to negotiate a ceasefire, but the Americans were undermining these efforts through the funneling of arms and money to Tshombe and the government in Leopoldville. In response, the OAU Secretary General Diallo Telli condemned American involvement, and claimed that the OAU's purview had "voided the right of the United States" to intervene in Congo.[710] The Egyptian ambassador in Washington also attempted to intervene with the Americans, recommending the United States "disengage from the Congo in order to set the stage for an African solution to the crisis."[711] Rakove argues that these appeals and attacks "set Washington on edge," and further undermined the ability of the OAU to control the conflict.[712]

The September 14 issue of the *Arab Observer* stated that the OAU was "facing the toughest problem" since its founding with the situation in the Congo. The article detailed Haile Selassie's convening of an emergency OAU foreign ministers meeting in Addis Ababa to attempt to reconcile the Congolese factions. Selassie invited Tshombe to attend, and though the debates were heated, the meeting produced some reconciliation with the OAU affirming Congolese sovereignty in exchange for Tshombe's promise to expel the foreign mercenaries.[713] However, Tshombe quickly reneged on the deal, and increasingly the conflict was spilling into the preparations in Cairo for the Second Non-Aligned Conference. On September 23 the conference committee announced that "Tshombe's presence would be undesirable," but that this prohibition did not extend to the Congo state or its people. The American Embassy reported that Egypt along with Yugoslavia and Guinea were leading the charge against Tshombe, though initially Nasser had quietly acknowledged Tshombe's right to attend the conference, and in response Ben Bella had refused to attend if Tshombe did.[714] The issue appeared settled until on October 5th, the opening day of the Second Non-Aligned Conference,

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[710] Rakove "The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6", 11.
[711] "Chronology of UAR Actions and Statements on the Congo Crisis" RG 59 UAR-Congo 1963-4, 1.
[712] Rakove "The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6", 11.
[713] *Arab Observer* September 14 1964, 33-34.
[714] Joint Weekly No. 37 September 30 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2 and Joint Weekly No. 38 October 9 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.

Tshombe attempted to "bluff" his way into the meeting through flying to Cairo.[715] His sudden arrival and the conference's refusal to allow his attendance, meant that Nasser had few options but to place Tshombe under house arrest at Orouba Palace.[716] In response, Congolese troops surrounded the Egyptian and Algerian embassies in Leopoldville, leading to a standoff in Cairo that was eventually resolved on October 8th when the staff and Tshombe were exchanged.[717] As Rakove mentions, Tshombe's trip was fairly ironic, since he had flown to "Cairo intending to denounce the OAU to the Non-Aligned Movement; he left, decrying the movement to the OAU."[718]

Even with this dustup over Congo, at closing of the Second Non-Aligned Conference the meeting was heralded as another success, moving the larger movement forward through a new emphasis on anti-colonialism that replaced Belgrade's original discursive focus on peaceful co-existence. The American Embassy viewed the shift as a victory for the more radical states in NAM, though this anti-colonial rhetoric had long been at the heart of Cairo's politics.[719] The final resolution, named "The Cairo Declaration" was heralded as the "conscience of the new world," calling for continued support to countries still under colonial and neo-colonial rule, including Congo, Northern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Palestine. This new expansive definition of non-alignment as anti-colonialism also contained a resolution calling for the end of racial discrimination, explicitly in South Africa but also implicitly in the United States, in essence formalizing the connection between racial equality and national liberation described by Malcolm X, and David and Shirley Graham Du Bois. Thus, this institutionalizing of anti-colonialism in Cairo largely seemed to have achieved Cairo's political aims of increasing its international influence and bringing together

[715] Tshombe was initially rebuffed to Athens, where he then boarded a commercial flight arriving in Cairo on October 6th. Joint Weekly No. 40 October 24 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[716] Tshombe claimed to have fasted fearing poisoning, though the *Arab Observer* painted a different picture of him lounging in "his silk robe-de-chambre" surrounded by Belgian advisors. "Tshombe: A Regrettable Exhibition," *Arab Observer* October 12 1964, 27-28.
[717] Joint Weekly No. 40 October 24 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[718] Rakove "The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6", 12.
[719] Joint Weekly No. 41 November 6 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 3.

the decolonized world, and plans for a second Bandung meeting in 1965 were announced at the closing of the conference.

However, rather than representing the continuation of Cairo's position at the crossroads of a unified anti-colonial coalition, the Second Non-Aligned was actually the beginning of the end for both Cairo and the broader movement. Hints of this coming reversal in fortunes were already happening at the conference; from the increasing Egyptian denunciations of the Western press' pejorative coverage of the conference to the behind the scenes divisions over whether to prohibit Tshombe's attendance.[720] Fundamentally though, the conference made visible the inherent tension in Nasser's promotion of international anti-colonialism as a vehicle for legitimizing his regime. While Cairo had finally become the crossroads of the world in 1964, this transformation meant that Nasser's ability to control the response to events like Tshombe's gatecrashing was increasingly curtailed through the need for 'anti-colonial unity.' This dynamic was not new, and in many ways Nasser's ideological commitments had led to his greatest political difficulties, first with the earlier Congo crisis, then the Syrian secession, and finally at that very moment, the on-going conflict in Yemen. After 1963, Nasser had increasingly endeavored to tame his anti-colonial rhetoric towards a less costly and more multilateral political agenda, which was intended to bring Cairo the international prestige without the pitfalls. However, this notion was premised on the continued status quo of the international landscape. Instead, Tshombe's appearance in Cairo presaged a radically shift in the make-up and direction of both anti-colonial and Cold War politics, which would increasingly delimit Nasser's ability to maneuver international dynamics in Egypt's favor. These transformations were also happening within Cairo, as Nasser's efforts to implement Arab Socialism after 1962 had shifted the political spectrum leftwards, meaning that technocrats like Hatem were increasingly unwelcome in the regime. The conclusion pulls together these final threads, tracing how

[720] *Arab Observer* October 5 1964, 3 and *Arab Observer* October 12 1964, 5.

the collision between longer-term forces in Egypt and rapid-fire international events resulted in the metamorphosis of Cairo's anti-colonialism, and ultimately, the end of Egypt's revolutionary commitment to constructing a mass information regime capable of influencing international public opinion.

CHAPTER VI

RADICAL LIMITS:
THE END OF ANTI-COLONIAL CAIRO AND THE MASS INFORMATION REGIME

Almost two months after Tshombe's fateful trip to Cairo, Congo once again became the center of Egyptian politics. On November 26, protests broke out in the city over the news of the American-Belgian operation in Stanleyville to rescue the American hostages, which, combined with the United States' continued support for Tshombe, was seen as proof of Western complicity in the worsening Congolese civil war.[721] The protestors in Cairo were mostly African students, and they eventually targeted their frustrations at two of the most visible symbols of America in Cairo: the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library, and the neighboring Marine Guard residence. The American Embassy reported that no official was injured, but "the windows were broken in the Chancery and embassy vehicles destroyed [… with] damages approaching an estimated half a million dollars."[722] More than the costs though, the embassy expressed frustration that the Egyptian government had sent no concerned inquiries during that or the next day, leading them to believe that the demonstration was "tacitly condoned" by the government, since according to the dispatch "inflammatory press" coverage had sparked the demonstration.[723] While the embassy accused the government of doing almost nothing, *The Egyptian Gazette* reported that about forty African students had been arrested. Yet if Nasser was reluctant to do more, it was likely in part that the protests in Cairo were reportedly happening across the globe, from Belgrade to Peking.[724]

Initially, this renewal of the Congo crisis seemed to be following a trajectory similar to the initial one in 1960 and 1961, with the Afro-Asian states expressing solidarity and American-Egyptian

[721] Rakove "The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6", 13.
[722] Joint Weekly No. 48 December 26 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 1.
[723] Joint Weekly No. 48 December 26 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[724] *The Egyptian Gazette* November 27 1964 and November 29 1964.

relations becoming increasingly strained. However, while the earlier crisis had also paradoxically produced the opportunity for Nasser and Kennedy to mend fences, in 1965 the political landscape in both Cairo and Washington was far different, and thus, tensions over the Congo would continue to get worse. In particular, the American Embassy's exasperation with Cairo's press was palpable in their reports, with one describing *al-Gumhuriyya*'s publishing of a "background" on the conflict in Cairo as a means to paint "how the US and Belgium had conspired from the beginning to carry out their colonialist schemes."[725] Conversely, the *Arab Observer* editorial summarized the perspective from Cairo, writing "if it were not for outside imperialist intervention [from the U.S. and Belgium] hundreds of lives could have been saved."[726] The editorial described the continued Western efforts to "discredit the Congo revolution" as an "intense hate campaign against the Africans which far exceeds the hate campaign against the Nazis." In particular, the piece quoted to the December 4th issue of *Time Magazine*, which described the Congolese rebels as a "rabble of dazed ignorant savages" and wondered if "Black Africa could be taken seriously at all, or whether, for the foreseeable future, it is beyond the reach of reason."[727] The next week Nasser was already attempting to reign in the Egyptian press, but these criticisms had embittered the Americans.[728]

In a private conversation with American Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot of the State Department's Near East Affairs Bureau on December 7, the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington, Mustafa Kamel, attempted to reassure the U.S. government that Cairo "had no relationship with the Stanleyville regime" and only sought a solution to the conflict through the OAU.[729] However, the press coverage in both countries became a point of contention between the two, with Kamel asserting that American reporting was playing into the hands of the communists, and Talbot

[725] Joint Weekly No. 50 December 30 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2-3.
[726] "From the Editor" *Arab Observer* December 7 1964, 7.
[727] "From the Editor" *Arab Observer* December 7 1964, 7.
[728] Joint Weekly No. 50 December 30 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 3.
[729] "UAR and the Congo" December 7 1964 RG 59 UAR-Congo 1963-64, 1-2.

responding by reviewing the "role of the press in a free society." Part of Kamel's concerns was Talbot's contention that Egypt had joined Algeria and Ghana in supplying the Congolese rebels with the Egyptian aircrafts spotted in the Sudan. Indeed, Kamel wondered if this accusation was "on the basis of press accounts of established facts." The American Embassy had in fact sent a report to the State Department earlier that week about Egyptian support for the rebels and the presence of the Defense Minister of the Simbas, Gaston Soumialot in Cairo, who had been conducting shuttle diplomacy between Cairo, Khartoum, and Algeria.[730] While the meeting had seemed to signal a potential cooling of tensions and by the end of the week the Egyptian press was refraining from attacking the United States, on December 14, the Egyptian representative to the UN Security Council, Muhammed el-Kony, denounced American and Belgium activities as a "military intervention, a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, and an intervention in the internal affairs of Africa."[731] The American response was "very disappointed" and in a meeting with Kamel on December 18, Talbot asked "How could such a difference have arisen between two states, both of which sought a unified peaceful Congo? Had we failed to communicate?" Whether these questions were sincere or not, they were emblematic of the American inability to understand the concerns of the Afro-Asian countries, beginning with the airlift in Stanleyville, which the US government had seen as a humanitarian rescue but to the anti-colonial world was an "imperialist invasion."[732]

The gulf between the two countries would only become more tenuous in the coming weeks as the Cairo press renewed its criticisms, and on December 19 an American civilian aircraft owned by Mecom Oil Company traveling from Amman to Benghazi was shot down by Egyptian forces near Alexandria. The Egyptian government maintained that the plane had failed to follow instructions or identify itself, but the American Embassy noted that the government had "made no effort to assist

[730] Joint Weekly No. 49 December 26 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 1-2.
[731] "U.S.-U.A.R. Differences on the Congo" December 18 1964 RG 59 UAR-Congo 1963-64, 1.
[732] Joint Weekly No. 47 December 23 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.

or visit to the crash site by US officials, […] delayed expressing regrets, and had not yet permitted US officials to join its investigation."[733] Even more damning was that the plane belonged to "Texas oil man" John Mecom, who was a good friend of the most powerful Texan at the time, President Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ).[734] These miscommunications and heightened frustrations continued as LBJ instructed the relatively new American ambassador in Cairo, Lucius Battle, to take an oral message to Nasser. Intended as an olive branch in the spirit of JFK messages to Nasser instead, Battle's demeanor rankled Nasser, from his refusal to discuss the shooting down of the plane to Battle's warning that Nasser would find LBJ unlikely to continue aid "because first you [Nasser] burn his libraries, then you kill his friends."[735] Rather than finding common ground between the two countries on Congo as LBJ had attended, the end result was Nasser feeling dismissed by the Americans. As a result, on December 23 at the Victory Day celebration in Port Said, Nasser gave a fiery speech pledging Egyptian support for the Simba rebels and publicly acknowledging Egypt's direct military aid about which the Americans had previously speculated. Nasser was even more blunt towards the Americans, stating that "if the Americans think that by giving us some aid they can dominate our policy" then they can go "drink the sea."[736] The British Ambassador in Cairo described Nasser's speech as an "open and gratuitous challenge to the United States which will have astonished many Egyptians and dismayed those who believe the U.A.R.'s interests lie in maintaining a reasonable relationship with the West."[737]

While in previous years, Cairo's "inflammatory" language had ruffled feathers in Washington, this time it brought the proverbial stick, when on December 26 the State Department

[733] Joint Weekly No. 49 December 26 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 1-2 and Joint Weekly No. 51 January 2 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 1-2.
[734] Orkaby *Beyond the Arab Cold War,* 126.
[735] Orkaby *Beyond the Arab Cold War,* 126 and "U.S.-U.A.R. Differences on the Congo" December 18 1964 RG 59 UAR-Congo 1963-64, 1.
[736] *Arab Observer* December 28 1964, 9 -13.
[737] FO 371 178582 British Embassy Cairo No. 1188 December 24 1964.

informed Kamel that the American government would no longer be able to provide Egypt with PL-480 food aid given Nasser's support for the Congolese rebels. The American Embassy in Cairo believed that Nasser's Port Said speech represented an attempt to turn "weakness into strength" as Nasser had in 1956, blaming the increasingly dire economic situation and food shortages on the Americans.[738] Already facing increasing criticism from within Congress about the continued funding of PL-480 to Egypt prior to this standoff, LBJ postponed wheat sales to Cairo.[739] Realizing that he had gone too far, Nasser attempted to backtrack, especially as Egypt's economy heavily relied on American wheat shipments. In *Nasser's Gamble*, Jesse Ferris outlines how even beyond food shortages caused by the loss of PL-480, Nasser had forced Egypt into an increasingly bleak financial situation, including "critical shortage of foreign exchange, […] soaring trade deficits, rising defense expenditures, and converging debt payments." In particular, the massive expenditures for the war in Yemen had already depleted Cairo's reserves.[740] Initially, the regime backpedaled on their support for the Congolese rebels. For example, in January Nasser's African Advisor, Mohammed Fayek reached out to the American Embassy and suggested that the U.S. contact the Congolese rebels, as a way to heal the breach.[741] Furthermore, even though Congolese rebels were in Cairo, the Egyptian government had yet to formally recognize them as the official government of Congo.[742] However, reversing course proved to be difficult as reports circulated that there were over three thousand rebels in Cairo at the time. One solution was to push the Congolese rebels to resolve the crisis, and the American Embassy reported that Congolese rebels had arrived in Cairo at the end of March with support from the Egyptian government to plan a conference of all the rebel groups from April 5-10 to try and form a united effort.[743] Yet the conference never materialized, and by mid-1965, the

[738] Joint Weekly No. 51 January 2 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[739] Ferris *Nasser's Gamble,* 138.
[740] Ferris *Nasser's Gamble,* 138-141.
[741] Joint Weekly No. 8 March 3 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[742] Joint Weekly No. 5 February 6 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[743]Joint Weekly No. 13 April 7 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.

American Embassy reported that Egyptian sources "deliberately leaked to the American press" that Cairo was halting arms shipments to the rebels, since the "unified front apparently failed."[744] However even this announcement failed to produce a resumption in American aid, leaving Egyptian officials scrambling over the course of 1965 to find alternative sources from Moscow to Peking, and from Bonn to Berlin.[745]

While much of the trajectory of the second Congo crisis in Cairo and the subsequent decline in Egypt-U.S. relations was a unavoidable given the divergent world views in Washington and Cairo, what foreclosed any backchannel discussions similar to those between Nasser and Kennedy in 1961 was a trend that the American Embassy had first speculated about in October 1964, writing that the "reasons behind the disturbing anti-Western UAR press" was the growing influence of Communists in Egypt, and particularly in the press.[746] This renewed Leftist influence in the Egyptian press were crucial in pushing this war of words around Congo to the brink, and would eventually become powerful enough to sideline Hatem's mass information regime. This conclusion traces how after 1961, the new mantra of the regime became what Malcolm Kerr termed "the shift to socialism," which for previously marginalized members of the Egyptian Left provided new political opportunities. As the political pendulum swung leftwards within Egypt, so too were power dynamics shifting for the Afro-Asian nations, as the earlier form of non-alignment increasingly became untenable. The Congo crisis in 1964 polarized African politics, and the continued liberation struggles in Rhodesia, Angola, Vietnam, and Palestine would further radicalize the more revolutionary states. The previous sense of optimism was increasingly replaced with paranoia and frustration as a series of coups in Afro-Asian states transformed the possibilities for anti-colonial solidarity, and international institutions like the OAU and NAM became further bogged down in disagreements.

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[744] Joint Weekly No. 17 May 21 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[745] For more information about Egypt's "scouring of the globe" for currency, see Ferris *Nasser's Gamble,* 140-165.
[746] Joint Weekly No. 46 December 23 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 3.

Ultimately this conclusion attempts to excavate these converging forces from the enormous shadow that the 1967 War has cast on histories of Egypt.

Cracks in the Mass Information Regime and the Rise of the Egyptian Left

While Communists and Leftist intellectuals had been rounded up in 1959, the secession of Syria in 1961 had created a renewed sense of the value of intellectual and cultural buy-in to the regime – in essence validating Lutfi al-Khuli's "crisis of the intellectuals" argument, described in the previous chapter. Beginning in 1961, Cairo increasingly released former political prisoners, like al-Khuli and fifteen of his former associates, and Nasser reverted to the same strategy from the 1950s that he had used with Ahmed Hamroush and Khaled Mohieddin, offering these former critics positions in the press as a means of keeping them close but not too close to power – al-Khuli became an editor for *al-Ahram*. At the time, Heikal was the Chief Editor of the newspaper, and al-Khuli feared that the offer was a trap, but believed that the opportunity was too important to pass up. The initial impetus for jailing the Communists was Nasser's fear that they represented a type of internal fifth column for the Iraqi communists back in 1958. As al-Khuli worked on the newspaper, he increasingly convinced both Heikal and Nasser that he and others from his group were "unaffiliated Marxists with no foreign connections," leading Nasser to recommend that al-Khuli take over *al-Ahram*'s editorial page. This new platform would eventually led to *al-Khuli* and his group of Marxists becoming "the voice for Egypt's Left within the Nasserist establishment."[747] From his initial publishing of the "crisis of intellectuals" articles in July 1961, al-Khuli would also increasingly influence Heikal and Nasser to adopt more Leftist positions. But al-Khuli was also part of a broader intellectual milieu. For example, Kamal Rifa't, the head of Arab Socialist Union's Committee on Ideology, founded the "Arab Socialist Association" as a sort of intellectual seminar to discuss the

[747] Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution,* 55.

"form of socialism best suited [to] Egypt."[748] Ahmed Hamroush describes how this association came to include a wide range of Arab socialists, including the former Deputy Speaker of the National Union Mohamed Fuad Galal, the Lebanese journalist Clovis Maksoud, and the Moroccan revolutionary Mehdi Ben Barka, and together the group was "following a different path than Marxism" to craft the "meaning of Arab socialism."[749]

Part of this meaning making over the definition of socialism was happening beyond Cairo, in places like Paris where the European Left were also debating similar existential and political questions. While the second chapter mentioned the activities of Suhayl Idris in Paris, over the course of the 1960s one of the primary conduits between these two capitals would be Aly el-Samman, an Egyptian student who arrived in Paris in 1958. El-Samman had just completed a degree in law and political science from the University of Grenoble, and was one of dozens of Arab students in the cafes of the Latin Quarter, which he described as "divided along ideological lines" with Iraqi communists in one café, Syrian Baathists in another, 'apolitical' Egyptians in their own café, and lastly Arab nationalists.[750] Disliking this "ghettoized atmosphere" el-Samman started promoting Arab unity and organizing these disparate students into establishing the "Association des Étudiants Arabes en France (Arab Students Association of France, Ittihad al-Tulab al-ʿArab fi Faransa)."[751] El-Samman's advocacy for the "Arab cause" brought him to the attention of the Egyptian intelligence services who started spying on him and spreading rumors that whoever joined the association would have their passport revoked.[752] Given this threat the association never materialized, but el-Samman continued to be active, eventually participating in a debate with an Israeli official in Paris and

[748] Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution,* 56.
[749] Hamroush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu*, 95. Hamroush contrasts the Arab Socialist Association with Hatem's creation of an association of political scientists "largely from university professors, who failed to promote any new understandings of modern Arab thought."
[750] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another: Memoir of a Committed Citizen under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak* (London: Gilgamesh, 2012), 32 and Di-Capua *No Exit,* 31.
[751] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 32 and Di-Capua *No Exit,* 31.
[752] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 33.

denouncing the racism of Zionism. El-Samman faced harsh criticism from Arab Baathist students who believed in 'guilt-by-association', arguing that socializing with an Israeli even to refute his arguments was "an act of treason."[753] The debate also increased the interest of the Egyptian intelligence services, leading el-Samman to travel back to Cairo and visit the mothership of Egyptian bureaucracy, the Mogamma. In the course of various meetings, El-Samman eventually ended up discussing his activities with the interior minister Abbas Radwan, and explained that while he was happy to cooperate with the government and lend "political and patriotic assistance" that he did not want to work for the intelligence services. Radwan seeing the potential of el-Samman in countering Israeli and foreign propaganda approved his visa and removed any doubts regarding el-Samman's allegiances.[754]

Back in Paris, el-Samman became friends with Pierre Rossi, an influential Frenchman who had been a cultural attaché in Iraq, and introduced el-Samman to André Ulman, editor of the foreign policy weekly, *Les Tribune de Nations*. Under Ulman's tutelage, el-Samman learned "the art of political journalism" and developed a more nuanced approach to critiquing Israeli Zionism, in part from his friendship with Ulman, who was Jewish and had survived Mauthausen, a Nazi concentration camp, along with his relationship with Eric Rouleau, who was an Egyptian Jew and in charge of the Middle East desk at *Le Monde*.[755] El-Samman would become instrumental in Rouleau's eventual meeting with Nasser, who eventually became Nasser's "favourite foreign journalist."[756] Given his increasing prominence in French journalist circles, el-Samman also became friends with the famous political authors Jean and Simon Lacouture, who had previously lived in Cairo but were forced out after the Suez Crisis and had recently published a book on Egypt. Jean Lacouture helped further el-Samman's

[753] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 33-34 and Di-Capua *No Exit,* 32.
[754] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 36-37.
[755] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 37-39 and Di-Capua *No Exit,* 31- 32.
[756] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 39.

career through the opportunity to publish with *La Vie Africaine,* "a bi-monthly magazine specializing in African affairs."[757] El-Samman was also becoming a broker in French-Egyptian relations, sending dispatches during the Evian Accords from De Gaulle to Nasser to request the moderating of the Voice of Arabs. With the resumption of relations between France and Egypt in 1963, el-Samman began working for both the Egyptian embassy as a media consultant, advising on French politics and which members of the press were most sympathetic to Egypt.[758] According to Yoav Di-Capua, these activities eventually led to al-Samman becoming a "one-person public-relations firm, all in the cause of Egypt and the Arabs."[759] Thus, at the same time that David Graham Du Bois was becoming swept into the 'machinery' of Cairo's information efforts, el-Samman was becoming more and more involved in Egypt's international media campaigns. However, Hatem's mass information regime was starting to face serious competition and a waning of its influence both at home and abroad.

Already in 1963, the British Embassy was describing the declining influence of Egypt in already independent African countries, with Cairo often "overplaying their hand" in their efforts to exert influence. For example, the Ghanaian government shut down the Egyptian information office and the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires was expelled from Upper Volta "for interference in the country's domestic affairs." James Brennan relates how even as early as 1961, the "generic anticolonialism" of Radio Cairo was becoming "somewhat stale" in East Africa.[760] The most significant determinant though was the emergence of national media regimes in these newly independent states, a goal that Cairo had previously promoted, but was now limiting the influence of Egypt's broadcasting on the continent. Brennan recounts in 1964, Radio Tanganyika "admonished the radio-listening habits of Indians, Somalis, and Arabs in Dar es Salaam," and instead, encouraged

[757] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 40-41.
[758] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 42.
[759] Di-Capua *No Exit,* 33.
[760] Brennan, "Radio Cairo and the Decolonization", 186.

the audience to listen to the newly established national broadcasts.[761] Indeed, Hatem's mass information regime had essentially become duplicated in Accra, where Nkrumah created the Bureau of African Affairs and the International Service of the Ghana Broadcasting System in 1959 and 1961 respectively. While initial broadcasts were limited in range and languages, by 1965 Accra was broadcasting 161 hours of content in multiple languages, including Arabic, Hausa, Swahili, Portuguese, and French. Furthermore, the Bureau of African Affairs had started publishing periodicals, including the *Voice of Africa* and *The Spark* intended to spread Nkrumah's vision of pan-African nationalism.[762] Though Cairo inaugurated the Voice of Islam to increase the appeal of its messaging, and in March 1965 opened the "world's largest and most powerful broadcasting station," Hatem's information regime was even losing its influence among Arab states.[763] Since 1958, many of the Arab states, with Saudi Arabia leading the charge in terms of expenditures, had emulated Cairo's information infrastructure, so that by 1967 the region was experiencing increasing overcrowding of the medium- and long-wave broadcast bands as "super-powered" broadcasting stations were built in Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.[764] Furthermore, given Cairo's enormous expenditures for the war in Yemen, the Middle East News Agency ended up liquidating its dublex network described in the last chapter by the end of 1965.[765] Perhaps the most notable sign of the emerging limits on Egypt's mass information regime was the shuttering of *Ikhtarna Laka* series in early 1964, though warning signs had started to emerge after July 1963. Menachem Klein catalogs how the series became more and more sporadically published, with varying prices that skewed more expensive than earlier volumes. He also speculates on why the series was closed,

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761 Brennan, "Radio Cairo and the Decolonization", 186-87.
762 Hachten, *Muffled Drums,* 117-18 and Gerits "When the Bull Elephants Fight", 962-963.
763 Ismael lists the inauguration of the Voice of Islam in 1964, though Boyd dates it to 1960. Ismael *The UAR in Africa,* 152, 156 and Boyd, "Development of Egypt's Radio", 23.
764 "The Spread of Super-Powered Broadcasting Stations in the Arab World" CIA- RDP85T00875R001500220002-6 January 1968, 5-9 and Boyd *Egyptian Radio,* 651-52.
765 "Monographs III" UNESCO, 106.

arguing that the publication was not a victim of the ideological battle between the Left and the Right, since most of the Communists remained imprisoned.[766] While the series had been marketed to Arabic-speaking audiences, given the increasing international competition with Cairo's information campaigns, *Ikhtarna Laka* may have been the first of many information initiatives to fall victim to Cairo's tightening budgets and shifting political priorities.

While this international rivalry over the airwaves certainly turned Cairo's previous prominence into a situation of one among many, overall the mass information regime remained intact, and Hatem in particular continued to hold three ministry-level posts (National Guidance, Culture, and Information). Furthermore, the NPH appeared to be expanding as the November 30 1964 issue of the *Arab Observer* announced the creation of three new Arabic-language NPH periodicals, the weeklies *al-Resalah* and *al-Thakafa*, as well as the monthly *al-Qissah*, all of which were now affiliated with "The Egyptian General Organization for News, Publishing and Publication," a precursor to the General Egyptian Book Organization that would become the state-run publishing house in the 1970s.[767] Yet Nasser's commitment to the mass information regime was changing as events in Cairo provided new alternatives.

While the release of imprisoned communists had started in 1961, in late 1963 Nasser proposed the creation of a new secret organization within the Arab Socialist Union to further accelerate the socialist revolution in Egypt. According the Ahmed Hamroush, Nasser had been influenced by the Yugoslavian model and eventually 250 recruits were drafted into this inner organization.[768] Initially Nasser had only shared the plan "Ali Sabri, Muhammad Hassanein Heikal and Ahmad Fu'ad, [a] former member of the Communist Party DMNL" and tasked them with creating a small sub-group of this new 'vanguard' organization. Ginat recounts how Nasser wanted

[766] Klein, "*Ikhtarna Laka* (We Have Selected for You)", 689.
[767] *Arab Observer* November 30 1964, 25 and Micklethwait, "Faits Divers", 177.
[768] Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution,* 26 and Hamroush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu*, 154-55.

this secret group to be "disciplined" and united in purpose, instead of mired in intellectual debates over Marxism.[769] As these secret socialist groups flourished in places like the *al-Ahram* editorial board, Egyptian communists received a further boon with the visit of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to Cairo in May 1964. Briefly mentioned in the last chapter, Khrushchev's arrival in Cairo on May 9th initiated a 16-day whirlwind tour of Egypt, including celebrations at the Aswan High Dam and a stop at Port Said along the Suez Canal, that remained front-page news in Cairo.[770] However, behind the scenes prior to and after Khrushchev's visit, Nasser released the remaining imprisoned communists, many of whom would end up like Lutfi al-Khuli working in the Egyptian press.[771]

Two months prior to Khrushchev's visit, after the Arab Information Ministers Conference in March 1964, the Egyptian government had suddenly announced the passing of a new press law, which was intended to clarify the relationship between the state and the press, since the National Union had been replaced with the Arab Socialist Union, a new political party in 1963. However, this announcement was so sudden that even the main Egyptian dailies gave conflicting accounts of what the law entailed.[772] At the National Assembly meeting in June, Hatem attempted to clarify over whether some of Ihsan 'Abd al-Quddus, the Editor-in-Chief of *Ruz al-Yusuf*, writings should be banned. Hatem described the press as both unaffiliated with the government and not subject to its control, stressing the democratic nature of the Egyptian system. However, this definition of democratic was a tautology; as the Egyptian people were synonymous with the Arab Socialist Union, and thus the government had the power of "guidance […] to prevent possibilities of deviation."[773] This clarification was also directed at the Western press, which had irked the Egyptian government

[769] Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution,* 27.
[770] Joint Weekly No. 18 May 16 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 1.
[771] Malek, *Egypt Society,* 350.
[772] *Dabbous*, "Nasser and the Egyptian Press," 68 and Joint Weekly No. 13 April 21 1964 NARA RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66 POL 2-1, 2.
[773] *Arab Observer* June 15 1964, 16.

through references to the "nationalisation of the press" since the 1960 law. The editorial in the *Arab Observer* refuted this claim, pointing to the diversity of newspapers and the freedom for criticism in the press. Yet the editorial also detailed that the press was intended "to help with the building up of a new, healthy society," and that journalists were also "participants in a human, socialist experiment" that was the bedrock of Egyptian policy. The editorial also emphasized the problems with the Western meaning of "freedom of the press," which in their view was "overshadowed by party politics and electioneering campaigns, where the national interest is often submerged by party squabbles."[774]

This theme of 'guidance' would be repeated in responses to American inquiries over the appearance of a "pro-leftist or pro-Communist line" in the Egyptian press, which the embassy first noted in August 1964. While the officials acknowledged that such a stance was the norm for *al-Gumhuriyya*, they were "somewhat surprised" to see the same trend in *al-Ahram* and *al-Akhbar*.[775] By October 1964, the embassy was more concerned, in a private discussion with Heikal, learned that he believed that Cairo was "now suffering consequences of the hasty decision to permit Communists to re-enter the press."[776] As the Congo crisis heated up, this new Leftist perspective in the Egyptian press was influential in pushing for a more ardent tone against imperialist forces. Indeed, the State Department detailed this "sharp turn to the left" in the press, noting that the Egyptian press was increasingly calling for African states to resist American efforts at the UN and in Congo, and that even the Egyptian "mouthpiece" in Beirut *al-Anwar* had published forged documents blaming Talbot for intervening in the recent Lebanese elections.[777] While Ambassador Kamal attempted to smooth over American concerns, officials were particularly concerned over Khaled Mohieddin's

[774] *Arab Observer* June 15 1964, 7.
[775] Joint Weekly No. 33 August 26 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[776] Joint Weekly No. 46 December 23 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 3.
[777] "The Congo" November 24 1964 RG 59 UAR-Congo 1963-64, 1.

appointment to the board of *Akhbar al-Yawm*.[778] This trend culminated in December, when Lutfi al-Khuli announced the creation of *al-Talia'* (*The Vanguard*), a new magazine that was intended to "serve as a rostrum for socialist thought […and] our revolutionary political system."[779] Nasser suggested the potential for a new "official ideological socialist organ" to Khuli, and the monthly publication quickly became the premier venue for revolutionary debate in Cairo.[780]

In late February 1965, the regime was sensitive over criticisms of its pro-communist bent, and in Nasser's speech to the Arab Socialist Union he claimed that Egypt's socialism differed from communism "by believing in religion," and that the 1964 release of communists was to reform them, not allow them to preach atheism. Ahmed Baha el-Din, editor of *al-Musawwar* and chairman of Dar al-Hilal, echoed Nasser's words in an op-ed decrying the continued accusations of communism in Egypt, arguing that the threat was "greatly overrated."[781] But the ascendancy of the Left was becoming the norm in Cairo, such as on February 10, when Khaled Mohieddin received the Curie Gold Peace Medal from the World Peace Committee.[782] More profound though was the announcements in March and April 1965 that the official Egyptian Communists parties were dissolving their formal structures so that members could join the revolutionary vanguard in the Arab Socialist Union. The exact rationale for the decision to dissolve remains unknown, though Western observers attributed it to Soviet pressures. Ginat outlines how at least for some Egyptian communists the acquiescence to dissolution was premised on "the promise of key positions in the propaganda machinery and the vanguard apparatus of the ASU.[783] Regardless of the calculus, Joel

[778] "The Congo" November 24 1964 RG 59 UAR-Congo 1963-64, 2.
[779] Joint Weekly No. 49 December 26 1964 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[780] Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution,* 58 and Di-Capua, *No Exit,* 48.
[781] Joint Weekly No. 9 March 13 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2-3.
[782] Joint Weekly No. 6 February 13 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[783] Ginat, *Egypt's Incomplete Revolution,* 28.

Beinin argues that the dissolution was more a policy culmination than sharp break, as Egyptian communists had increasingly been growing closer to Nasser's regime since 1961.[784]

The last chapter detailed how 1964 was Cairo's moment at the crossroads of international events. However, behind the sheen of high-profile conferences, Egypt's international information efforts were slowly starting to lose their earlier appeal to the rest of the world. Moreover, Hatem's position and his approach to information was also beginning to be challenged, as more and more the Left in Egypt came to hold sway over the press and its messaging. By the time of the Congo crisis, these transformations were only just starting to chip away at the mass information regime. Yet as the Egyptian economy failed to recover from the loss of American aid, maintaining Cairo's international position and the mass information regime increasingly came under fire. This final section sketches the final gasp of both the anti-colonialism of the 1950s and 60s, and the Egyptian mass information regime as it had first been constituted in 1952.

Cracks in International Anti-colonialism and the Fall of the National Publications House

Given the worsening of relations between Egypt and the US and the rising prominence of the Egyptian Left, Nasser's welcoming of Che Guevara to Cairo on February 11, 1965 seemed to signal a continuation of both trends. Technically the two had met in June 1959, but their disagreements over how to best pursue land reform and Nasser's sense that the Cubans were "a bunch of Errol Flynns," meant that this first meeting had not produced any substantial relations. Nasser had also met Fidel Castro in New York City during the September 1960 UN General Assembly, with Heikal describing "a mutual and growing admiration between the two men" from the discussions about revolutionary politics in Harlem.[785] By the time Che returned to Cairo both

[784] Beinin, *Was A Red Flag Flying There?* 210.
[785] Heikal, *The Cairo Documents,* 345-347 and Di-Capua, *No Exit,* 189.

Nasser and Egypt held the Cubans in high esteem, especially after the Bay of Pigs. Che's second visit to Cairo occasioned a long interview in *al-Talia* with Lutfi al-Khuli where he discussed the foundations of revolutionary societies, and offered a fairly critical account of the Cuban experience, which he viewed as a "fragile and inconclusive" form of socialism.[786] The March 29th issue of the *Arab Observer* also printed an interview with Che, though the author Mursi Saad el-Din described the piece as the "sum total of conversations, speeches, questions" that had taken place in both Algeria and Cairo, and across "conference halls, hotel lobbies and at embassy parties." Much of the content was similar to the interview in *al-Talia*, and el-Din in particular detailed Che's "thunderbolt" of a speech at the Afro-Asian Economic Seminar in Algeria, which attacked colonialist countries for the perpetuating underdevelopment; painted Cuban liberation as a defense of all socialist countries; called for continued support to armed liberation; and argued that socialist countries need to end trade with imperialist ones.[787] In Cairo, Che's words were well received, and in meetings with Nasser he expressed his desire to "do more for the revolution in the world" and shared his plan to join the fight in Congo. Nasser tried to counsel Che against the action, stating that he would be "another Tarzan, a white man coming among black men [to lead them]." Drawing from his failures with Yemen, Nasser cautioned that revolution "could not be helped from the outside." By the end of March, Che left Cairo, proving Nasser's warning prescient, as he struggled to will the revolution into existence in Angola and then Bolivia, where he was murdered. Che's position was emblematic of a new ethos for anti-colonialism, similar to those of Algiers and Accra but also more strident in its demands and vision for a revolutionary socialist political ideology that privileged support for armed struggle and the overthrow of imperialist world systems. Che was particularly critical of the Soviets and Chinese, since they had largely become entrenched in the existing international order. Che's

[786] Di-Capua, *No Exit,* 190.
[787] Mursi Saad el-Din, "An Interview with A Revolutionary," *Arab Observer* March 29 1965, 40-42.

radical anti-colonialism was in sharp contrast to the institutional and multilateral approach of the early 1960s, and this debate over the meaning of anti-colonialism over 1965 would eventually undermine the unity of the previous year.

In May, an Egyptian delegation led by Khaled Mohieddin attended the fourth AAPSO conference in Accra.[788] A month earlier the *Arab Observer* and *The Scribe* had been consolidated into one magazine, *The Arab Observer and the Scribe*, and the May 24th issue only briefly covered the AAPSO meeting, but maintained that conference embodied "a growing sense of fraternity and unity of purpose," even as it detailed arguments at the conference over the invitation list and Nkrumah's plea for more unity than division.[789] At the same time, Cairo was hosting the second Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, bringing together over 300 Islamic scholars from across the Afro-Asian world.[790] In April, Tito had visited to discuss the prospect of the Second Bandung, which had been first reported in October 1964 after the Second Non-Aligned Conference October 1964. The proposed location for the Second Bandung was Algiers, and the *Arab Observer* once again heralded Cairo's role as a "world's venue" as the city hosted a series of high-profile meetings in preparation for conference in late June 1965.[791] In many ways, this activity seemed to be a continuation of the previous year, with Cairo still at the crossroads of the world. Yet on June 19th word reached Cairo of a coup in Algiers against Ben Bella. Nasser initially attempted to covertly intervene to see if Ben Bella would be released to Cairo with promises of keeping him out of politics, but the new Algerian leader Habib Bourguiba refused the request. The Egyptian press widely covered the coup, and given Nasser's relationship with Ben Bella, reading between the lines indicated a distinct anti-Bourguiba tone to the coverage.[792] While Nasser tried to accommodate this new Algerian regime for the sake of

[788] Joint Weekly No. 18 June 3 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[789] *Arab Observer and the Scribe* May 24 1965, 3.
[790] *Arab Observer and the Scribe* May 24 1965, 34 and Joint Weekly No. 21 June 5 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[791] *Arab Observer* June 21 1965, 4.
[792] Joint Weekly No. 26 July 31 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.

anti-colonial unity, even before the coup the prospects appeared dim in May at the African ambassadors meeting in Cairo, which was convened to organize the proposed OAU summit but struggled to agree on a venue, since Accra was unacceptable to many of the more conservative states.[793]

Non-aligned unity was also starting to strain. In September 1965, Nasser traveled to Belgrade on his trip back from Moscow, and met with Tito, largely as an attempt to revitalize the "Socialist Alliance." However, unlike the early days of non-alignment, the two leaders had increasingly differing foreign policies with Nasser much more strident in his criticism of American involvement in Vietnam, whereas Tito condemned Chinese aggression. This divergence was also apparent in their calls for anti-colonial solidarity, which for Nasser meant support for Portuguese African territories and "occupied South Arabia" and for Tito was only generalities. While the British Embassy concluded that the meeting was harmonious, they also described as having an air of "routine."[794] The embassy officials speculated on the reasons; from Tito's annoyance over Nasser's visit to Moscow to a growing realization of the limits of non-alignment for exercising international influence. This disillusionment was apparently evident in the Yugoslavian press, which struggled to spin the meeting as significant and in the spirit of non-alignment, with the latter effectively "becoming almost meaningless."[795] This disunity was even more explicit the following week when Nasser traveled to Casablanca for the Third Arab Summit. Given the continued conflict in Yemen, the likelihood of meaningful collaboration remained minimal, but both Bourguiba's blunt speech on Palestine and Syria's demands that the United Arab Command respond to Israeli raids on Syrian and Jordanian borders further accelerated the existing divisions among the Arab states. The only area of agreement

[793] Joint Weekly No. 22 June 12 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[794] FO 371 183890 British Embassy Belgrade 14 September 1965, 1-4.
[795] FO 371 183890 British Embassy Belgrade 14 September 1965, 5-7.

at the summit was the signing of an inter-Arab press and radio agreement to cease inter-Arab propaganda campaigns.[796]

At the end October, Nasser traveled to Accra for the OAU summit, and then on to Guinea and Mali. While the OAU summit was heralded as a success, in *The Arab Observer and The Scribe* coverage of the meeting was overshadowed by the announcement of the indefinite postponement of the Second Bandung conference, which had been planned for November 5 in Algiers. The decision to cancel the conference was in part due to events in Algeria, but was also a symptom of the fracturing of the Non-Aligned Movement more broadly, as renewed conflict between India and Pakistan, as well as a coup against Sukarno in Indonesia and the growing Sino-Soviet split – all combined to make a meeting of the non-aligned states increasingly untenable.[797] Overall, the British Embassy concluded that 1965 had been "a bad year for the Egyptian regime both externally and internally" in particular they pointed to the worsening economic situation, the continued conflict in Yemen, the coup in Algeria, and the inability in unifying Africa states.[798] The one bright spot on the international horizon appeared to be the inaugural Tricontinental Conference in Havana in January 1966. While Nasser did not attend, the meeting seemed to breathe new life into the revolutionary movement, manifesting a more expansive identity than even Afro-Asianism through the creation of the new Organization of Solidarity with the People of Africa, Asia, and Latin American (OSPAAL). At the close of the conference, Nasser cabled the conference to offer Cairo as the next host and the British Embassy in Cairo reported that the Cuban Embassy in Cairo was appointed the "main link" between Africa and Havana. *Al-Ahram* printed a long interview with Fidel Castro and quoted his belief that Latin America would be "the scene of the next great fight against Colonialism," as well as

[796] Joint Weekly No. 38 October 6 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2 and FO 371 190185 "United Arab Republic: Annual Review for 1965" British Foreign Office January 11 1966, 3.
[797] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution,* 450-452 and Joint Weekly No. 36 October 25 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[798] "United Arab Republic: Annual Review for 1965," British Foreign Office January 11 1966, 1-2.

his demand to be included in the OAU since Cuba had been expelled from the Organisation of American States and "half of Cuba's people had African blood."[799]

While Havana's ascendance as a hub for anti-colonial activity might have provoked competition from Cairo, similar to Accra in the late 1950s, by 1966 critics in Cairo were questioning the very value of Cairo's international prestige. The American Embassy reported how on December 31 Heikal had attempted to defend Egypt's foreign policy, arguing that Egypt's international position is what had netted the regime the most benefits, from military shipments to support for development projects. Furthermore, Egypt had capitalized on its position at the "vanguard of two continents (Africa and Asia) which are thundering with the possibilities of revolution." Yet Heikal struggled to dispute the cost of Yemen and Egyptian support for liberation movements, given that the results from these massive expenditures produced few tangible examples of spreading the revolution.[800] Indeed, the cost for Nasser personally was seeming increasingly dire, as Nkrumah joined the ranks of Sukarno and Ben Bella. On February 24, while Nkrumah was visiting China, the Ghanaian military took over the government, ousting the leader of pan-African politics, rationalizing the action as a means of stopping Nkrumah's socialist policies.[801] This sense of the anti-colonial bloc under attack led to increasing paranoia in Cairo, most visible in the coverage of the arrest of Mustafa Amin, the former giant in Egyptian publishing, on claims of spying for the CIA.[802] Facing an increasingly fractured anti-colonial world by the summer of 1966, Heikal was once again calling for a return to Cairo's position as "a symbol of revolution" and condemning Arab reactionaries and Western imperialists.[803] Yet though the government could no longer afford the same expenditure on

[799] FO 371 184866 Cuban Embassy in Cairo 1966 January 31 1966, 1.
[800] "Haikal Argues UAR Foreign Policy is Worth More Than It Costs," American Embassy Cairo January 8 1966, 1-3.
[801] Zach Levey "The Decline of the Special Relation: Israel and Ghana, 1957-1966", *African Studies Review* 46. 1 (2003) 170.
[802] Joint Weekly No. 30 August 11 1965 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.
[803] Joint Weekly No. 52 July 12 1966 NARA RG 59 POL 2-1, 2.

fomenting world revolution, Cairo's previous efforts meant that the capital maintained its anti-colonial bona fides.

In May 1966, Shirley Graham Du Bois decided to come to Cairo, and "join with other African Freedom Fighters" after the coup in Ghana.[804] In letters to friends, Shirley was generally positive about Cairo "as the center of the African Freedom Movement" and described the Egypt as "a vastly interesting and developing country."[805] In October 1966, *al-Talia* hosted the Socialist Conference of African Political Parties. In letters, Shirley described how she initially planned to attend the conference as a journalist, but after being recognized as a leading figure in African affairs, she was requested to join the conference and even read Nkrumah's prepared speech, which was then televised in Egypt.[806] The experience seemed to herald the potential for Shirley in Cairo, but she was also frank in her letters about her struggles with the heat, language, and norms in Cairo.[807] Furthermore, she believed that Nkrumah would be leading them back to Accra within the year and was adamant about not setting down roots in Cairo. Nevertheless, Shirley started writing about events in Cairo with a piece on Kosygin in the Egypt for Jessica Smith's *New World Review*.[808] Eventually Shirley would start studying the history of the Egyptian revolution, which she viewed as the most successful on the continent. In a letter to James S. Allen, the Director of International Publishers in February 1967, Shirley admitted that she was unhappy with her summer 1966 *Freedomways* article on the coup in Ghana, and that her studies on Egypt had produced new understandings - specifically, "how mistaken we are in not realizing that Egypt also **is Africa**."[809]

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[804] 19.3 SGD to Gloria Sept 30 1966.
[805] SGD to Mr. Mohammed Fayek, The Presidency, May 6 1966; 19.4 SGD to Bernard Jaffe May 11 1966; 19.5 Letter to Unnamed Friend June 2 1966. This letter is one of the few where SGD mentions Kwame Nkrumah's wife Fathia, even though she was also in Cairo.
[806] 19.1 Letter to Peggy from SGD November 16 1966; 19.1 Letter to Dr. Gerhart Eisler from SGD November 8 1966; 19.1 Letter to Bill from SGD December 5, 1966.
[807] 19.5 Letter to Ruth from SGD May 31 1966, 19.4 letter to Edina May 30 1966.
[808] 19.4 Letter to Esther from SGD May 22 1966.
[809] 19.6 SGD to James S. Allen Director of International Publishers Feb 27 1967.

This letter was the first time that Shirley wrote the line "Egypt is Africa", but it quickly became a refrain in her letters back to the States.

While Shirley was increasingly finding the spirit of revolution in Cairo, el-Samman was helping bridge the Egyptian Left with the one in France. In 1966, el-Samman would help coordinate the visit of Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer to Paris, smoothing over potential miscommunications and preventing the French press from reporting on Egyptian students' complaints over the difficulties in renewing visas.[810] An even more crucial visit though was el-Samman's role in brokering Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone De Beauvoir's visit to Cairo in 1967. El-Samman recounts how he first came to Sartre's notice after giving a lecture in 1965 arguing that "racism is an indivisible entity" and that Arabs should join anti-racist organizations, instead of just Jewish members. Eric Rouleau extensively covered the lecture in *Le Monde*, and in the aftermath, Sartre called el-Samman requesting a meeting.[811] After the arrests of communists in 1959, Sartre had been critical of Nasser, but conversations with el-Samman convinced him the sincerity of Nasser's socialist revolution and Sartre decided to visit Egypt. Informing the Egyptian intelligence services of the prospect of France's foremost intellectual visiting Cairo, el-Samman was quickly put in touch with Heikal and al-Khuli to coordinate the visit.[812] On February 25 1967, Sartre and Simone De Beauvoir arrived in Cairo along with el-Samman and the Claude Lanzmann, the Jewish manager of Sartre's journal *Les Temps Modernes*. Yoav Di-Capua describes the visit as the culmination of Arab existentialism and a victory for the Egyptian Left, who had endeavored through collaboration with the government to build a socialist revolution.

In the end, this optimism would be short-lived as the Six-Days War radically transformed the Egyptian political landscape and ended the rapprochement between the European and Arab Left, as

[810] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 44-47.
[811] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 49.
[812] Aly El-Samman *Egypt From One Revolution to Another,* 53-55.

Sartre and other French socialists sided with Israel. For Hatem, the war represented an opportunity to leverage the mass information regime, but one he would have to watch it squandered from the sidelines.[813] In September 1966, a sudden shuffling of the Egyptian cabinet in an attempt to revitalize development plans resulted in Hatem's ousting from his elevated position and the government for the first time since 1952. Two months later the National Publications House was shuttered and all its magazines, with the exception of the *Middle East News Weekly* ceased publication. While the exact rationale for the closing of NPH and Hatem's marginalization remains unknown, the decision was at least in part a casualty of Egypt's dire economic situation. However, I believe that even more influential was the changing anti-colonial political landscape. While in the 1950s and early 1960s the building of new institutions had solidified the nebulous bonds of anti-colonialism, by 1966 there was increasing sense among revolutionaries that organizations like the OAU and NAM had become platforms for the more conservative regimes to undermine this initial revolutionary ethos. This shift in the meaning of anti-colonialism was also visible in the pages of the *Arab Observer*. Using machine learning models identifies a linguistic shift in the reporting around events in Africa from the early 1960s towards the end of the publication that was distinct from changes in the magazine overall. Ultimately, as the initial solidarity of international anti-colonialism fractured, the growing cost and competition to Cairo's efforts to influence international public opinion beyond the Arab world lost its raison d'être.

The aftermath of the catastrophe that was the Six Days War for Egypt would produce a reckoning with the state's control of the press, which would continue once Sadat came to power in 1970. For the Egyptian Left the war presented a massive setback to the socialist agenda and then Sadat effectively ended their efforts, with many Communists once again imprisoned. Under Sadat, Hatem returned to government, eventually directing the information campaign during the 1973 war

[813] Hatem *Information and the Arab Cause,* 219.

with Israel, which seen as a reversal of 1967 and an information victory akin to Suez. Yet Hatem would not endeavor to build new venues to engage with what was now termed the Third World. Instead, revolutionary activity would move on to Libya and Tanzania, as the fight continued against neo-colonial regimes, including for the Palestinians who no longer would follow directives from Cairo. In the following decades, the Egyptian press would maintain its influence in the Arab world, but no longer was the world racing to keep up with events in Cairo as El-Batrik described in 1964.

CONCLUSION

While many contemporary foreign observers and Egyptian intellectuals decried the fact that Cairo's anti-colonialism was mostly 'talk,' I argue that the extent of the Egyptian government's efforts to construct infrastructure capable of circulate this talk was one of the most successful actions undertaken during the Nasser era. Focusing on Hatem in particular provides a window into the scale and diversity of these efforts, and how the expansion of the Egyptian state in the 1950s resulted in the creation of new institutions intended to control information both within and beyond the nation. While Radio Cairo and Egypt's propaganda to the Arab world is often mentioned in histories of this period, the creation of the Middle East News Agency, the Information Department, and the National Publications House has remained obscured in existing accounts. Detailing what I have termed the mass information regime reveals a concerted effort to implement new media technologies and formats, which was crucial to Egypt attaining the height of its international prestige in the 1960s. Part of this triumph was the content of Egypt's messaging, which promoted an anti-colonial vision that found a willing audience across the decolonizing world. As a result, Cairo would increasingly become a hub in this new international anti-colonial network, as national liberation movements and high-profile conferences further reinforced Egypt's revolutionary credentials. The gravitational pull of Cairo's ideas would eventually result in the co-opting of Egyptian and foreign activists and intellectuals, from Lutfi al-Khuli to David Graham Du Bois, to the regime's cause. Ultimately, I argue that the parallel trends of Egypt's expanding information infrastructure and its promotion of anti-colonialism were actually intertwined, and with two mutually reinforcing one another while legitimizing Nasser's increasingly authoritarian state.

To trace the relationship between these phenomena, I delve into output of the mass information regime most devoted to spreading this message beyond the Arab world. In accounts of Egyptian informational efforts, previous scholars have largely re-inscribed Western critiques that this

material was dull and unpersuasive. Conversely, histories of this era often reference the *Arab Observer, The Scribe,* or *Bena' al-Watan* but without any discussion of the context in which these publications were produced. Detailing the specificities of these magazines, I argue provides a window into both their diversity and the shifts in Egypt's messaging. To this end, I utilize more experimental methods for historians, that is machine learning and natural language processing, to explore and narrate these changes. Weaving together a statistical narrative with a historical one, I leverage these methods to ultimately consider both the changing nature of Cairo's anti-colonialism and how it related to the rest of the non-Arabic speaking anti-colonial world. I argue that such an approach is imperative for localizing these expansive discourses and confronting the scale of both Cairo's and the anti-colonial world's print media.

In the end, the success of both the mass information regime and international anti-colonialism also heralded its destruction. As decolonization spread, these new states emulated Hatem's information infrastructure in an effort to assert their national identity and interests. Simultaneously, the achievement of creating new anti-colonial institutions did not lead to the type of supra-national unity first envisioned by Nasser and Nkrumah. Instead, venues like NAM and OAU increasingly re-inscribed the primacy of nation states over more expansive anti-colonial solidarities. As challenges to both Egypt's mass information regime and its initial vision for anti-colonialism emerged over the course of the 1960s, the tradeoffs of these efforts also became clear. The outbreak of the Congo crisis, the breakup of the UAR, and the civil war in Yemen all reinforced the necessity of limits on Cairo's anti-colonial rhetoric and commitments. Yet Nasser's successful effort to co-opt the Left to the regime's side gave the government its desired moral authority, but meant that putting the brakes on what Western governments considered "inflammatory rhetoric" became difficult. Furthermore, the decline in anti-colonial unity in the mid-1960s further diminished Nasser's international influence, leaving Egypt with few options but to turn to the Eastern bloc for

funds. The relatively limited resources from the Soviets and East Germans, combined with the increasing competition from other states' information campaigns, meant that ultimately the scale of the mass information regime was too costly to continue for long. Thus, rather than a radical turning point, the Six Days War was the death knell to already subsiding anti-colonial information activities in Cairo.

Nonetheless recovering this history is crucial for furthering our understandings of how Egyptian decolonization was not only a domestic process, but one with international dimensions. Furthermore, Cairo's experience underscores how the history of international anti-colonialism was as much a battle over development or modernization, which has been the focus of previous scholarship, as it was over information. From the airwaves to the news pages to the TV screens, Cairo pursued a number of avenues to counter the perceived imperialist narrative from Israel and the West. Given the overwhelming technological advantages and funds of Egypt's opponents, the success of the mass information regime was always a longshot. Nonetheless, I believe that later efforts at the New World Information and Communication Order that privileged multilateral regulation of information were informed by the failures of states like Egypt to build an information infrastructure capable of challenging the existing international information order. Finally, returning to Cairo's anti-colonial information regime is crucial for understanding how Nasser's building of an authoritarian state was rationalized through the promotion progressive politics. While a wealth of scholarship has explored facets of this history, this dissertation makes the case for focusing on information as central site for the expansion of the Egyptian state and how calls to counter foreign propaganda were deployed to not only grow this infrastructure, but also undermine the freedom of the press - a legacy that remains in Egypt today.

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