"THE BEST LAID PLANS"
Strategic Incoherence in the Jacobite Rising of 1745

By
Kathryn Fuselier

Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Department of History of Vanderbilt University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For Honors in History

April 2017

On the basis of this thesis defended by the candidate on 4/26/2017
we, the undersigned, recommend that the candidate be awarded HIGHEST HONORS in History.

Director of Honors – Frank Wcislo

Faculty Adviser – Lauren Clay

Third Reader – Catherine Molineux
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# Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 2

Chapter One: “Masters of Publicity” …and Secrecy ................................................. 14
  “The Winds Were Not Jacobite”: Initial Efforts Fail ............................................. 15
  “Iniquitous Schemes”: Division within the Cause ................................................. 20

Chapter Two: ‘A Partridge Upon the Mountains’ ....................................................... 28
  “The Throne of our Ancestors”: Support in the Highlands ............................... 29
  “Le Pretendant” Pretends Support: The Movement Loses Momentum ............... 34

Chapter Three: “The Spark of Fire” ......................................................................... 43
  “An Enterprise So Just”: Final Entreaties from Henry Stuart ......................... 44
  “The Spark of Fire”: Scotland as Means to an End ......................................... 48

Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 58

Maps ......................................................................................................................... 62

Works Cited .............................................................................................................. 63
  Primary Sources .................................................................................................. 63
  Secondary Sources ............................................................................................. 64
Introduction

It was seven o’clock in the morning after a long night march when James Johnstone, Aide-de-Camp to Prince Charles Stuart, leader of the Jacobite Rising of 1745, awoke to the sound of military drums and trumpets that “struck [him] like a clap of thunder.”\(^1\) He left his tent in the valley below the Castle of Culloden to see British troops just two miles from the Jacobite encampment, moving quickly towards him and his fellow soldiers. The Jacobites under the young Charles Stuart had been surprisingly successful throughout the first months of their attempt to take first Scotland and then England, rarely meeting strong British forces and moving unchallenged through the British countryside at an impressive pace. The British Army finally caught up to Stuart’s forces in England, though, forcing a Jacobite retreat almost as far north as possible, to a town near Inverness called Culloden.

Charles Stuart, “always eager to give battle,” resolved to engage the advancing British army rather than retreat to the more fortified and easily protected Inverness.\(^2\) The Jacobites waded through knee-deep waters in Culloden Moor to meet the British, and the battle was over almost as soon as it started. In Johnstone’s words, “the same Highlanders, who had advanced to the charge like lions, with bold, determined countenances, were, in an instant, seen flying like trembling cowards, in the greatest disorder.”\(^3\) Even Charles Stuart, instigator of the Jacobite Rising of 1745, fled soon after the battle. What began as a strong attempt by the young heir to the exiled House of Stuart to overthrow the newer British Monarchy ended in disarray. Stuart’s

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2 Ibid, 140.
3 Ibid, 143.
motley army of aristocrats, Highlanders, and Irishmen was too inexperienced and overwhelmed to withstand the powerful British Army. The Jacobite Rising of 1745, just nine months after its surprising beginning, was over.

The Rising is often remembered romantically, described through “folk myths and picturesque anecdotes, golden-haired princes, loyal Highlanders, clandestine toasts and the like.” Charles Stuart himself, nicknamed Bonnie Prince Charlie by wistful loyalists after his escape from Culloden, has been remembered just as romantically, as an almost mythical character and savior to his people. Yet, when considering the traditional narrative of the Jacobite Rising, it appears ludicrous that the so-called Bonnie Prince Charlie and his supporters, fueled by myth and “clandestine toasts” but little military or diplomatic experience could have hoped to challenge the might of the British Empire. Instead, the Rising emerges as a noble but senseless attempt by an overconfident, inexperienced, or even hopelessly archaic young prince to reclaim power and glory on behalf of his family.

The story of the Jacobite Rising becomes significantly more grounded once a key piece of its history is considered: a Jacobite alliance with the French monarchy. The events of the Jacobite Rising suggest that, just as France had brought Jacobitism its renaissance, France likewise ensured its death. Indeed, throughout Stuart’s Rising, the Jacobite leadership remained in negotiations to ensure military support from one of Europe’s most powerful nations and Britain’s biggest rival. Numerous signals from the French, not least the Treaty of Fontainebleau

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signed between the Houses of Stuart and Bourbon in 1745, suggested to the Jacobites that the French Conseil was likely to provide aid to the movement. Yet, by April 1746 when Stuart’s forces waded into Culloden Moor, the French had not arrived and Stuart’s men faced defeat alone.

This twist of fate lends itself to complex questions about the Rising’s failure and its place in a larger conversation about European history. Outside the discussion of the Jacobite Rising itself, the Jacobite movement as a whole is often positioned just within the literature on British union and the British Empire after 1707. Works on the contemporaneous pan-European War of Austrian Succession, for example, lack more than a few paragraphs of treatment of the Rising. This thesis approaches the Rising through a more international lens, which reveals that French willingness to aid the Jacobite movement was the driving force behind the Jacobite Rising of 1745 and, likewise, that the inability of the French Conseil d’état to provide forces was a major determinant in the eventual failure of the Rising. This thesis therefore presents a new analysis of the Jacobite Rising of 1745, in which the French Conseil hoped to capitalize on the ambitions of the Jacobite movement and the ’45 to challenge and distract Britain from its larger multinational aims. Consideration of more international sources shows that inconsistencies from within the Jacobite movement prevented the French Conseil from manipulating the Rising to their own ends and providing adequate aid in time to save the Rising.

Central to an argument that places blame on the internal incoherence of the Jacobite movement is the structure and history of the movement itself. “Jacobite” comes from the Latin, “Jacobus,” or James; “Jacobite,” then, refers to the followers of James Stuart II, the Catholic

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6 Colley, Britons; Jeremy Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1985); Monod, Jacobitism and the English People; Szechi, 1715.  
King of Britain. In 1688, James II was forced to abdicate the British throne in favor of the Protestant William of Orange and his British wife, Mary. Commonly referred to as the Glorious Revolution and remembered as a bloodless transfer of power, this transition in British history was not, in fact, as smooth as its name implies. As monographs such as Scottish historian John Roberts’s detail, William was able to maintain firm control over England, but civil war broke out in the Highlands of Scotland in 1689, where Stuart support was strong. Ultimately, William and his supporters in England and the Scottish Lowlands were quickly able to quell dissent, and in 1707, the Westminster Parliament passed the Act of Union, which bound England and Scotland together as the larger “Great Britain”.

Scotland, however, was another matter. The Scots have long been described, as Tim Harris quotes in his Revolution, as “reluctant revolutionaries” upon whom the new, foreign, Protestant Hanoverian rule was thrust. Unlike other scholars of the period, Harris suggests that many Scots, especially those in the more prosperous lowlands, were in fact just as supportive of regime change in the early 18th century as the English. Harris does not suggest that the transition to Hanoverian rule was smooth either in England or Scotland, but he persuasively argues that Scottish acceptance of William of Orange’s rule was more similar to English enthusiasm for their new monarch than the majority of previous literature suggests. Linda Colley, for her part, affirms Scotland’s willingness to accept William of Orange as a monarch, citing religion as a key unifier in Britain that assured the success of the new regime. In her Britons: Forging the Nation,
1707-1837, she discusses William’s Protestantism, which she argues created an allure that persuaded the English to accept the direct disregard for their hereditary monarchical tradition.\textsuperscript{13} In her estimation, that “overwhelming strength of Protestantism throughout Great Britain determined the defeat of Jacobitism.”\textsuperscript{14} Notably, though, both Harris and Colley’s arguments primarily concern the Lowlands of Scotland rather than the entirety of the kingdom.

While the English and Lowland Scots began to accept the new Hanoverian regime, discontent among supporters of the old House of Stuart in the Scottish Highlands eventually fueled military attempts to win back control of Britain. In 1715, the exiled James Stuart, son of King James II, took it upon himself to launch a Rebellion against the British crown. Though the very country James hoped to retake had fundamentally evolved—from independent kingdoms to a single, multinational Great Britain—there was still considerable support for a Stuart monarchy in Britain. Key to his strategy was French military support of the Jacobite movement; the major European power provided essential naval support that the exiled Stuart could not otherwise have hoped to muster. Despite French investment, the ‘15 was an indisputable failure, called by Daniel Szechi, possibly the most prominent scholar of this era in Jacobite history, little more than “a damp squib” compared to the original battle to maintain Stuart control in 1689.\textsuperscript{15} Just as the Hanoverian success in the Highland Wars had affirmed the house’s legitimacy in Britain, the ’15 reaffirmed the Hanoverian monarchy’s control over Scotland and, notably, resulted in many Jacobite supporters fleeing Britain into exile across Continental Europe.\textsuperscript{16}

After 1715, the Jacobite movement lost its ability to negotiate for support from Britain’s traditional enemies on the continent, especially France. Daniel Szechi’s 1715: The Great

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Colley, Britons, 79.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Szechi, 1715, 249.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 380-386.
\end{itemize}
Jacobite Rebellion shows once-prominent and now exiled Jacobite leaders deprived of property and livelihood for their participation in the rebellion and thus facing a “humiliating loss of power within their families” and weakened ability to network with potential supporters in Europe. Moreover, the Jacobite court in exile was deeply indebted. France could not—or would not—provide assistance to James and his followers. As Szechi notes, “the financial crisis of 1718-1719 demonstrated with brutal clarity how little the Jacobites mattered to [Europe]…moreover…the Jacobite shadow government had proved unable to relieve its destitute followers.” Stuck in a kind of limbo without land, finances, or political capital, the Jacobite cause gradually faded away, leaving behind a generation rendered destitute in terms of both power and money. It was only after a new Stuart son, Charles Stuart, came of age at the onset of the War of Austrian Succession that the Jacobite cause began to grow again in passion and prominence. So began the attempts by these new leaders to garner renewed support from the movement’s traditional ally, France.

France’s diplomatic strategies before the Jacobite Rising are well documented by traditional works such as Arthur McCandless Wilson’s French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 1726-1743: A Study in Diplomacy and Commercial Development, which details the French First Minister’s attempts at peaceful relationships with Britain and other European powers until his death in 1743. As First Minister, Fleury functioned as chief policymaker but was surrounded by the Conseil d’état, an ever-changing cadre of advisors appointed by the King. Wilson’s work is, as the title suggests, an attempt at a

17 Ibid., 380-381.
18 Ibid., 385-386.
19 Ibid., 389.
comprehensive history of Cardinal Fleury’s influence over French foreign policy. One of the most relevant themes that emerges from Wilson’s work is Fleury’s emphasis on successful alliances with Britain and other nations. Fleury believed that partnerships created through traditional diplomatic channels had the power to elevate France to a position of supremacy in Europe by the end of the 1730s.\(^\text{21}\) As Wilson establishes, though, Fleury’s careful diplomatic maneuvers could not endure a European war.\(^\text{22}\)

When, as Wilson indicates, Fleury’s Franco-British alliance frayed and eventually broke, Franco-Jacobite cooperation became a more politically expedient option. Histories of the War of Austrian Succession advance the history of French diplomatic endeavors into the 1740s. While Fleury had seen great success in French diplomacy during the early years of his reign, he presided over considerable French military failure in the War of Austrian Succession that benefitted Britain and fueled France’s subsequent attempts to regain military and diplomatic power on the European continent. M.S. Anderson’s *The War of the Austrian Succession*, for example, emphasizes France’s military and diplomatic weakness compared to Austria and Britain by 1742 and 1743.\(^\text{23}\) Similarly, Reed Browning’s *The War of the Austrian Succession*, for example, elaborates on France’s fruitless quest for military victory in Europe in the early years of the war.\(^\text{24}\) Both Anderson and Browning’s work discusses the French Conseil’s increasing desperation to achieve victory against its enemies, particularly Britain.

Often considered a separate historical conversation but nonetheless contemporary to the renewal of Jacobite sympathies in France is the conversation about France’s empire. The literature on the French empire, to use James Pritchard’s words, “suffers from historical

\(^{21}\) Ibid.  
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 345.  
fragmentation and lack of demographic, social, economic, cultural, and geographical contexts.”

Although histories of individual colonies are plentiful, more overarching analyses of French imperial policy are absent. This trend is slowly changing as the field of Atlantic History strengthens, and while the wealth of literature on the French Empire pales in comparison to, for example, the British Empire, the last fifteen years of scholarship has introduced a number of compelling analyses of eighteenth-century French imperialism.

One conclusion that can be drawn from this work is that the French themselves only slowly evolved an understanding of their overseas holdings as an empire in the last decades of the 18th century.

Nonetheless, even without attaching the label “empire” to it, there was a palpable French effort to expand its territory in the Eighteenth Century. Atlanticist Kenneth Banks, for his part, argues in his *Chasing Empire Across the Sea* that “the challenges posed by transatlantic communication impinged on, modified, and increasingly undermined the French state’s control over its colonies during the first half of the eighteenth century.”

James Pritchard argues that “the French empire…became very elusive” because “the French navy failed to defend the colonies effectively.” Political scientist Anthony Pagden contests that the French became “the paradigm example of all that a true empire should not be” because they “had attempted to create something resembling a single society governed by a single body of law.” Clearly, historians of

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27 Banks, *Chasing Empire Across the Sea*, 7.
29 Banks, *Chasing Empire Across the Sea*, 13.
30 Pritchard, *In Search of Empire*, xxi.
the period do agree that, while the French were consistently weak imperialists, they attempted to create an increasingly international presence throughout the eighteenth century.

One of the few works that fully synthesizes the conversation on European events and imperial ambitions with the history of Jacobitism is Frank McLynn’s *France and the Jacobite Uprising of 1745*. After the death of Cardinal Fleury, Louis XV—like his grandfather Louis XIV—chose not to replace his First Minister. McLynn argues that, though the King’s remaining ministers remained important advisors who regularly contributed their opinions on policymaking, the decision-making process in the French government became much more haphazard due not least to the King’s ability to appoint or dismiss ministers instantly and his habit of pitting his ministers against each other in order to ascertain the merits or demerits of a certain policy.\(^{31}\) The ensuing competitions between various ministers, according to McLynn, often paralyzed the decision-making policy, creating confusion.\(^ {32}\) Only when the King took particularly decisive action could any major policy plan be put into action. As the *Conseil* experienced this structural change, they attempted to manipulate the Jacobite Rising to their benefit in Flanders and, more broadly, in their largest competition for dominance against the British. McLynn contends that the *Conseil’s* internal disorganization and its negative effect on quick and decisive policymaking resulted in French failure to provide support for the ’45.

While McLynn’s description of larger French managerial incompetence is compelling, his work refers mostly to the internal politics of the *Conseil*. As such, treats “the Jacobites” as one political entity. Indeed, the only Jacobite actors he routinely mentions are those living in France with particularly close ties to the *Conseil*. The nature of his limited focus means that his

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\(^{32}\) Ibid., 41.
work does not consider the internal dynamics at play within the Jacobite movement itself. This thesis attempts to consider internal disorganization not just within the *Conseil* but within the Jacobite movement and argue that Jacobite incoherence had a substantial effect on French willingness and ability to support an invasion of Britain.

The consideration of Jacobite disorganization adds complexity to the conversation among French ministers and Jacobite actors. Rather than consider correspondence exchanged just within France, this thesis involves a distinctly international methodology that analyzes a combination of French and Jacobite sources, mainly in the forms of correspondence and other diplomatic documents sent to and from Scotland, England, France, and Italy. The majority of French language sources, including letters among ministers of the *Conseil d'état* and major Jacobite personalities, come from the Archives Diplomatiques at La Courneuve in Paris. The voluminous Stuart Papers provide additional candid reflections on the Rising from the Jacobite perspective. Additional published memoirs from influential Jacobite actors like John Murray and James Johnstone complete the main set of primary source work.

This thesis’s argument is divided into three chapters. Chapter One begins as the French *Conseil*’s desire to establish European and international preeminence intensified and sparked an interest in a Jacobite Rising. War between Britain and France gave the French the opportunity to use Jacobitism to their advantage and distract Britain from the pressing campaign in Flanders.

The French engaged with the Jacobites to plan an attempted 1744 invasion, which failed dramatically, and the 1745 Rising. However, disagreements between Charles Stuart and his more experienced advisors over how to approach an invasion created miscommunication within the Jacobite movement that affected its ability to convey a unified set of goals for the Rising to the French *Conseil*. While French ministers attempted in 1744 and early 1745 to take advantage of
Jacobite ambitions to meet their own policy goals, Jacobite guile weakened their assurances that the French would find strong and coherent Jacobite support in Britain. Such inconsistent communication of the movement’s objectives resulted in French hesitation and Stuart’s secret departure from Scotland without official French aid or any support from the Jacobite establishment in Paris or the court in exile in Rome.

The story continues in Scotland by examining the first months of the Rising. Just as Stuart experienced disagreement with advisors in Paris, he encountered new advisors on the ground in Scotland who continued to critique Stuart’s strategy and discourage substantial military action without more concrete assurances of support from the French. Perhaps more importantly, though, Chapter Two offers an additional inconsistency in Jacobite perspective that jeopardized the Rising. Stuart experienced considerable success when he first arrived in Scotland because of enthusiasm for the cause from Highland clans frustrated by British rule and British colonial attitudes towards Scotland. Soon after, he met further disagreement within his Council about the scope of the Rising because his advisors in Scotland understood that they could not amass support in the Lowlands and England. Their perception of changing religious persuasions across the country convinced them that support outside the Highlands would be weak. While the French struggled to maintain control over the relatively small Jacobite movement, the Rising faced an unexpected but substantial obstacle to success.

The third chapter discusses increased lobbying on the part of the Jacobites in Paris for French military support and, ultimately, French failure to provide adequate support. In fact, the Jacobites presented an even greater diversity of perspectives in an attempt to incentivize French enthusiasm for the ’45. New diplomatic correspondence revealed that some Jacobites in Paris remained concerned with suggesting ways the French could manipulate Jacobitism to their own
ends in order to ensure support, while other Jacobites like Stuart’s brother suggested entirely different goals to Louis XV. Soon after, the British became aware that continued Jacobite success had sparked greater French interest in military intervention and redirected troops back home to challenge the Jacobites. British attention forced the Jacobite retreat north in December of 1745 and culminated in the disastrous Battle of Culloden in April 1746. The French, still unconvinced about the strength of the ’45, failed to send support in time to save the Rising. It is here that the true significance of 1745 becomes evident. While some Jacobites like their leader saw the Rising of 1745 as a way to salvage traditional Stuart government and way of life for some Jacobites like its leader, other Jacobites presented the Rising as a means to very different ends. Confused messaging about the very goal of the Rising could not convince the French of Jacobite potential and prevented them from successfully orchestrating the Rising on their own terms and, thus, from aiding the Jacobites effectively.
Chapter One: “Masters of Publicity” …and Secrecy

“We hereby nominate, constitute, and appoint our dearest son Charles, Prince of Wales, to be the sole Regent of our Kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and of all our other Dominions, during our Absence...Requiring all our faithful Subjects to give all due Submission and Obedience to our Regent aforesaid, as immediately representing our Royal Person and acting by our Authority.”

—James R., December 23, 1743

When James Stuart issued this proclamation from Rome in late 1743, he had little idea of how his decision would affect the fate of both his family and his country. In early 1744, prepared to launch and lead an invasion of Great Britain on behalf of his family and the Jacobite movement that supported it, Prince Charles Edward Stuart arrived in Paris from Rome on his father’s orders. Stuart was confident that, with French military support, he and his forces could successfully conquer both Scotland and England. After nearly six decades of exile, the House of Stuart would, they hoped, again rule the British Isles.

The Stuart family’s opportunity for invasion was indeed the product of decades of patience. After the failed 1715 invasion, the Jacobite movement faded into near-obscurity. However, French concerns about their military failures in the War of Austrian Succession in the early 1740s incentivized a Franco-Jacobite partnership. By the early months of 1745, French interest in using a Jacobite Rising to distract the British from the ongoing War of Austrian Succession was strong, but two emergent Jacobite perspectives on the planned invasion and its goals complicated French ability to mold the cause to their advantage. On one hand, traditional

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1 James R. “The King’s Commission, given December 23, 1743,” in A Full Collection of All the Proclamations and Orders published by the Authority of Charles, Prince of Wales, Regent of Scotland, England, France and Ireland, and dominions thereunto belonging. Since his Arrival in Edinburgh, the 17th Day of September till the 15th of October, 1745, (Glasgow, 1745), 3.
Jacobite advisors centered in Paris advertised one scenario in which they affirmed that their movement needed the French Conseil to promise military support before an expedition could begin. Charles Stuart and an increasingly small band of his loyal supporters, on the other hand, deemphasized the importance of a French endorsement in advance of a 1745 invasion. These conflicting messages from within the Jacobite movement created skepticism within the French Conseil about the movement that culminated in Charles Stuart’s departure for Scotland without French approval.

“The Winds Were Not Jacobite”: Initial Efforts Fail

French desperation to compete in the larger Continental sphere reignited a support for Jacobitism that had been long dormant. After the failure of the ’15, James Stuart and his family fled to the Vatican for protection, but many exiled Jacobites began new lives scattered across France. Cardinal Fleury repeatedly refused to host the exiled James Stuart in France and expressed in letters to British diplomats France’s commitment to keeping the “Pretender”—the British diminutive term for the exiled king—at bay. A letter to James in Rome from a counselor in Paris affirmed that “[James’s] most powerful friends abroad seemed to have abandoned the thoughts of supporting your cause, at least for some time.”

When the War of Austrian Succession broke out in 1740, Britain soon became one of the consistent victors in the war’s many battles. By contrast, France consistently found herself defeated across Eastern Europe in the early years of the war, a sign that French foreign policy

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3 “Waldegrave to Newcastle,” 22 March 1731, Correspondence Politique, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, La Courneuve, Paris. Also quoted in Black, British Foreign Policy, 148.
4 “Orrey to James, 30 June 1732, The Stuart Papers, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, United Kingdom. Also quoted in Black, British Foreign Policy, 147.
5 Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession; Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession.
was in great need of “a firm hand” to set its military to rights.\textsuperscript{6} It was in this sense that the pacifist Cardinal Fleury’s death in January 1743 was a blessing to the Jacobite cause. Fleury had become a less and less effective leader as he aged: increasingly stubborn, impractical, and unwilling to relinquish power to a younger advisor with greater vigor.\textsuperscript{7} Rather than choose a new First Minister, Louis XV decided not to replace Fleury, choosing instead of make final decisions about policy after considering input from his entire Conseil, a flexible group of ministers with often disparate viewpoints.\textsuperscript{8} 

After Fleury’s death, the Conseil began to discuss ways France could regain supremacy in Europe. Maurepas, Minister of Marine and longstanding member of the Conseil, argued that France’s power could and should be derived from its colonial power, in which Britain was France’s most prominent competitor.\textsuperscript{9} The Duke of Noailles, a Maréchal of France and one of Louis XV’s most trusted advisors, though, suggested that if Britain was the greatest threat to France’s security, the French should challenge the British in an area of strategic significance to Britain that France could control.\textsuperscript{10} Following Noailles’s proposed strategy, Conseil decided that the Low Countries were the perfect location for such a challenge.\textsuperscript{11} 

At the same time, Cardinal Fleury’s death and the restructure of the Conseil gave the Jacobites hope that they could once again pursue institutional support in Paris. Jacobite leaders in Paris began to lobby the Conseil for attention and support for an invasion of Britain that, they

\textsuperscript{6} Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 129.  
\textsuperscript{7} McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising, 12-14; Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 129-131.  
\textsuperscript{8} McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising, 13. McLynn discusses at length the administrative complications and resentments that arose from this new structure and ultimately prevented swift decision making within the Conseil.  
\textsuperscript{9} McLynn, 9; Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 130.  
\textsuperscript{10} Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 130-131.  
\textsuperscript{11} Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 130.
argued, would accomplish both French and Jacobite goals. Notably, the Jacobites’ proposed strategy surrounding the 1744 invasion did not necessarily involve the House of Stuart’s success in Great Britain. Some Jacobites suspected that the culture of the “three nations” in Britain had changed to such an extent that no Catholic prince would have been accepted in lieu of the current regime. In an unusually candid letter to the Conseil in 1744, the Earl Marischal, the Scottish-born Lord who served the Jacobite court in exile as a diplomat and military strategist, made it plain that, in his view, “never will a Prince raised in Rome…convert the English to the Roman religion, never will they be able to give him their confidence, he will never be able to seduce the people into dethroning the new [King].”\(^\text{12}\)

Marischal expanded on his doubt in the Stuart family’s potential. He wrote that even if the Stuarts were able to take all three kingdoms in Britain, the “three united kingdoms… would always be mastered by the sea; the attentive Dutch are reestablishing their navy to be ready for all events, their interest being the same as the English’s. They will unite their people, and France and Spain may soon see the House of Stuart obliged to be [less] their enemy.”\(^\text{13}\) Even if the House of Stuart could conquer all of Britain, they would not be free from Hanoverian attempts to challenge the Stuarts and regain the throne by allying with the Dutch, their traditional homeland, and that such an alliance would be too powerful for the Stuarts to overcome. France could once again remain the loser in her challenge to Britain. Should the newly independent Scotland be “obliged to be [less] their enemy,” an initial investment in a Stuart Britain was risky.\(^\text{14}\)

Instead, the Earl Marischal argued for an alternative strategy that would benefit both the Stuarts and France. He envisioned that the Stuarts could gain control of Scotland, “necessarily

\(^{12}\) “Letter from the Earl Marischal,” 1 March 1744, Correspondence Politique, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, La Courneuve, Paris.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
severing the eternal division between [those thrones] and the English, who have prevented them from doing business with other European powers…England would not be able to influence them anymore, and occupied with attaching or defending itself against other nations will not long be in a condition to trouble any other nations.”

In Marischal’s opinion, this more conservative goal would be more easily achieved by the House of Stuart and would benefit France. He writes that:

The King of Scotland would be forced to always be united with France…for his power against England, from whom he would have nothing to fear, for the Roman masters of England could not count the Scots and were obliged to construct a wall to stop their insurgency. Scotland today would have even less to fear from England.

Not only did Marischal believe that the Scottish people would be receptive to Stuart control of an independent Scotland, he argued that such an outcome of a Jacobite invasion would reorder the balance of power in Europe to both Scotland and France’s benefit.

The recipient of admittedly cautious but nonetheless interested lobbying from the Jacobites, the French Conseil knew they could take advantage of the movement that, dormant for many years, was eager to capitalize on the legitimacy a major European power could give them. The time seemed right; by 1744, Britain was stretched thin abroad, defending challenges throughout Western Europe. There were reportedly only 16,000 troops stationed across the whole of Britain.

As Noailles encouraged, Louis XV planned to launch a French invasion of Great Britain under the guise of supporting the House of Stuart’s political ambitions that could distract the British from their campaign in Flanders. At face value, it appears that the French had created for themselves a strong strategic plan that allowed them to challenge the British—their main goal—and create a new ally in Scotland and Ireland. France’s Brest fleet would challenge Britain’s Channel fleet on January 20, 1744, attempting to defeat it and leave the Channel in the

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
hands of the French, who would then ferry troops under Maurice de Saxe, another Maréchal of France, from Dunkirk across to Maldon, England. Upon hearing of the invasion, James Stuart, who was living at the Vatican, fatefuly sent his son Charles Stuart to Paris to serve as the exiled House’s official representative.

Charles Stuart never got the chance to prove himself in the 1744 invasion. Nature intervened, rendering the expedition a disaster. The fleet’s departure was delayed for weeks after the planned January 20; by chance, a massive storm descended on the channel during the early days of the expedition, wreaking havoc on French and British ships alike. More weather also destroyed most of de Saxe’s forces waiting for the all-clear at Dunkirk. With such destruction to the French fleet, pursuing any renewed invasion of Britain would prove difficult. The French lost the element of surprise, meaning a new invasion would require a plan the British could not anticipate. On March 11, after only a few days of deliberation, de Saxe cancelled the project on orders from the Conseil. As de Saxe noted upon his arrival home, “the winds were not Jacobite.” Thus ended France’s first foray into Jacobitism since the disaster of 1715; the brief window of opportunity for invasion had passed. Yet again, French plans to challenge Britain had failed, but Louis XV had signaled to the British and the rest of Europe that the French once again embraced Jacobitism.

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21 Ibid.
“Iniquitous Schemes”: Division within the Cause

The year following the failed 1744 invasion revealed just how the expedition influenced both the Jacobite cause and French strategy. The young Charles Stuart decided to remain in Paris after the expedition and continue to lobby for his family’s cause. His presence as a Jacobite leader would fundamentally change the nature of Jacobite lobbying efforts in Paris. Stuart remained in Paris through the generosity of a royal pension and attempted to keep his cause at the forefront of the French public’s attention. He spent the year prominently participating in French society, behavior, some suggest, that was more strategic than frivolous. Thomas Kaiser wrote that Stuart was “the greatest and most persistent master of publicity of them all, especially when it came to advertising himself.” Stuart also made political connections in Paris, ingratiating himself to Louis XV’s Queen Marie, a friend of Stuart’s mother, and the Duc de Bouillon, tutor to the Dauphin and important political actor throughout the decade. Both a public figure and a burgeoning political one, Stuart soon became a popular social figure in Paris and used his time there to strategically foster important relationships and prove his legitimacy as a Prince through the intense social culture of Paris.

Charles Stuart’s growing popularity and political influence notwithstanding, the French Conseil looked askance at another attempt at invasion for many reasons. Their very recent failure meant that they could not take the British by surprise again, and the French remained concerned about the Stuart family’s ability to effectively hold Scotland against British resistance. Determined to regain French trust in the Jacobite cause, Stuart supporters formed a constellation of Jacobite

24 Ibid., 370.
allies who worked to once again persuade the Conseil d’état and the King himself that an alliance with the Jacobites was ideal for both parties. Of course, friends of James Stuart had assimilated after 1715 into the French court where they built strong relationships with French ministers. Though Charles Stuart was relatively new to Paris, older Jacobite advisors and sympathizers leveraged their stronger connections to lobby the Conseil and sometimes the King directly.

The Conseil received numerous positive reports on the state of Jacobitism in Britain from Stuart sympathizers who understood how significantly French qualms could affect their goals. The Earl Marischal remained a popular Jacobite advisor within the French court and the Jacobite movement; he continued to advocate for another Rising in front of the Conseil through the spring of 1746. Frenchmen, too, joined the Jacobite cause. The Duc de Bouillon reportedly threw himself to his hands and knees in front of Louis XV to plead in its favor.\(^{25}\) The Conseil even received reports on Jacobitism from abroad within England itself. French envoy to Britain Chavigny reported that “the fire of Jacobitism had not gone out, but still burnt in the embers” throughout England.\(^{26}\) The English Lord Barrymore wrote continuously to the Crown, urging French intervention on behalf of the Jacobites, and Sir Watkins Williams Winn even traveled to Paris in 1744 to testify to the extent of Jacobite support across the channel.\(^{27}\)

Though Jacobite sympathizers made strong attempts to convince the French Conseil of its high chances of success in Britain, the true state of the Jacobite movement was much less cohesive by early 1745. While older Jacobite advisors with longstanding ties to the Conseil maintained communication with French ministers, Charles Stuart had spent one year in France,

\(^{26}\) Black, *British Foreign Policy*, 149.
\(^{27}\) McLynn, *France and the Jacobite Rising*, 14-17.
impatient and petulant about the speed at which his cause was moving. He was eager to begin a Rising that, in contrast to suggestions like those from Marischal, could span all of Britain. It is likely that he derived his goals about the ‘45 from his father. When the Jacobites began once again to lobby the French Conseil for support, James Stuart declared in his manifesto of goals for the family’s moment, in which he also appointed Charles as his regent, “Our former experience leaves us no room to doubt of the cheerful and hearty Concurrence of our Scots Subjects on this Occasion [of planning an invasion], towards the perfecting the great and glorious Work.”28 Few Jacobites disagreed with his expectation of Scottish support, but James went on to affirm that the Stuart goal was also to “[enable our good Subjects in England to shake off the Yoke under which they have likewise felt their Share of the common Calamities.”29

Charles, who arrived in Paris with this mandate from his father, soon became frustrated by how poorly his family’s ambitions corresponded with those of his advisors. He felt that some of the most influential Jacobites in Paris, his father’s close confidants did not value his ambition and potential and were therefore moving too slowly towards another invasion attempt. Charles grew increasingly frustrated by about his advisors’ effective boycott of his aspirations for invasion. He complained in a letter to his father as early as February 1745 that, after not hearing a promised report on the cause’s progress from Stuart representative to the French Court, Lord Francis Sempill, “I esely conceive the reson on’t, which is that after making such a noise of his being able to do a great deal, he dos nothing—or he dos not care to let me in the confidence of his manedgments…for I see here everybody thinks himself to be the wisest man in the world.”30

28 “The King’s Commission.”
29 Ibid.
He wanted and expected, as the movement’s leader, to be engaged in the decision making within his cause, but felt alienated by his more seasoned advisors.

Stuart wrote to his father again in April 1745 that “it would be endless for me to write & for you to rede…all the little Malice and douings of Lumley (Sempill) & Mallock (Balhaldy)…I believe because they have nothing to say, which makes them both avoid seeing & writing to me…their heds are filled with nothing but malice & spite.”31 Stuart was not wrong that his older advisors opposed another attempt at invasion at that time and attempted to thwart his efforts to plan one, but correspondence from those advisors indicated that they acted out of consideration for their cause rather than “malice and spite.”32 For example, Lord Sempill wrote bluntly to James Stuart in July 1745, after the Rising began, that he was “afraid there is little room to hope [the Prince] will succeed” if he departed for Scotland.33

John Murray of Broughton, a Jacobite advisor who arrived in France from Scotland in the summer of 1744 to report on the state of Jacobite sympathies in Britain, soon became Charles’s Secretary and one of his only close confidants. He agreed that many of the Jacobite advisors in Paris, particularly William MacGregor of Balhaldy, another friend of James Stuart, did not have the Prince’s best interests at heart. He wrote in his memoirs of the ’45 that Balhaldy doubted the Jacobite cause could amass even a few thousand men in Scotland and that “it was a pity that upon this discovery…the Prince did not immediately dismiss him from his service.”34 He also wrote that he attempted to open up a direct channel of communication between himself and the

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31 “Prince Charles to his father,” April 19, 1745, Paris. The Stuart Papers, 125. Stuart uses code names to describe his advisors. This was common practice at the time in order to avoid sabotage of sensitive information by British or other enemy agents.
32 Ibid.
33 “Lord Sempill to the King,” July 1745, Paris. The Stuart Papers, 125.
Lord Marischal to “put it [out] of Bohaldy’s power to carry on his iniquitous schemes” but sparked neither little interest from Marischal nor support from other Jacobites.  

Partly at Murray’s encouragement, Stuart worked to exclude the advisors he distrusted from his plans after April 1745, even as they used their longstanding relationships with French Ministers to lobby for support. Stuart spent the spring developing his plans for a Rising while attempting to achieve a delicate balance: that his “resolution of going to Scotland without Forces to be keept private from the King, Lord Marischal and the Court of France, but at the same time to acquaint those in Scotland who could be trusted.” He wrote to Murray, now in Scotland, in the spring of 1745:

“You may very well remember when I saw you last, I had no great hopes of procuring any Succours from the French and asked you what we should do, if we could obtain none. Your answer was that then we should trust to Providence and see what we could do for and by ourselves—upon which I gave you my word to do so and pay you a visit this summer. It being at the same time agreed that this resolution should be kept as secret as possible and particularly from the King and Lord Marischall, the latter being never like to approve of or the other consent to any such thing.”

Indeed, because he had chosen to alienate some of his most experienced advisors, comparatively few Jacobites knew how serious Stuart was about pursuing his burgeoning plans. His own father and brother, James III and Henry of York, respectively, were kept in the dark about the Stuart heir’s plans. Murray referenced the letter in his own memoirs, writing that, though he distrusted the fact that so many advisors had discouraged Stuart’s plans, “this letter gave me great concern… I was afraid…that as soon as it was known he came without foreign assistance, it would hurt his affairs in the eye of the world.”

35 Murray, Memorials, 98.
38 Murray, Memorials, 100.
By Stuart’s account, there were in fact only three confidants in France aware of his developing plans: John Murray and two Irish Jacobites, Sir Thomas Sheridan, and Sir John O’Sullivan. Stuart was truly committed to keeping his plans under wraps and wrote that he “[dared] not hint at before to the very people I must now employ and depend on.”\(^39\) He demonstrated that he was not above coercion of Jacobite allies to maintain secrecy and placed blind trust in Murray and other advisors left behind in France to do a great deal of work on Stuart’s behalf during his journey to Scotland. He in fact went so far as to suggest that, when he left, he could “bring the Duke of Atholl with [him]…he shall know nothing of the matter until he is on board or at least on the point of embarking” while Murray instructed the younger Johnstone to muster Atholl’s men and make them ready to meet the Duke upon his arrival.\(^40\)

Stuart laid out his logic regarding his invasion without French aid in his letter to Murray promising a swift departure. The Prince remained confident that he simply needed to prove his commitment to the cause and that his scheme would be met with positive responses once his departure became evident to the French Court. He wrote that the King had refused to fund the project simply because Stuart, in his attempt to prevent his plans from becoming “the Town Talk of Paris and Madrid,” was “not willing to let [the King] into the secret” of the planning.\(^41\) He complained to Murray that the Louis XV was unwilling to allow him more money for the expedition but almost immediately asserted his confidence that his financial situation will soon change. He wrote that though the King had “made some difficulties,” he would “subsist no more after he hear[s] of the resolution I have taken with which I shall not acquaint him till I am actually on board, and then I doubt not but he will send me…a large sum.” He continued,


alluding to his hopes for pan-European support: “I have besides strong hopes of obtaining succours of one kind or another from France and Spain, for then I can employ many people.” In Stuart’s mind, the obstacle to French support was lack of faith in his commitment to the cause, rather than in his chances of success, and he trusted that he could prove his potential to the French Conseil.

Stuart’s letters to Murray show a surprising awareness of exactly how ill-advised his plan was. He consciously went against all the advice he had been given by his more experienced advisors, convinced he could prevail. Stuart wrote to Daniel O’Brien, who maintained close communication with French actors like Cardinal Tencin, the Marquis d’Argenson, and the Maréchal de Saxe, in mid-June: “I know the reasons you would have to oppose [my decision], but I am resolved to continue…I know that it is only success that can justify [my expedition] to the public, but I hope my friends will judge it differently and that they will not cry to me for taking this risk.”

Likewise, Stuart wrote to his father on June 30, making excuses for not writing to either family member and warning him not to “be alarmed if even you do not heare from me next post…you may be shure of my impatience to let you no more fully the reason of this hiding.”

Stuart also hinted directly to the French Court that he was planning a prompt departure by writing directly to the King. In two brief letters written to Louis XV, Stuart delivered an ultimatum to the King, writing, “after having tried useless…to come to Your Majesty in the hopes of obtaining from your generosity the necessary aid…I am resolved to…undertake alone a design which even a mediocre course would render infallible. I venture to flatter myself that

43 “Prince Charles to O’Brien,” June 1745, The Stuart Papers, 129. The “friends” Stuart references are no doubt other Jacobite advisors, but also the French themselves.
Your Majesty will not refuse me.”⁴⁵ He promised to remain faithful to France after his success as he departed: “I want to try my destiny which, after the hands of God, is between your hands. If [France] helps me succeed, she will find a faithful ally.”⁴⁶ Stuart’s other letters in advance of his departure maintain that he never received a response to his letters to the King.⁴⁷

Stuart’s decision to operate and later depart in isolation pointed to a disorientation among Jacobites wherein Stuart was unwilling to wait until the movement as a whole could establish a clear set of goals. His eagerness and subsequent departure for Scotland impeded larger French goals. The French Conseil, which had expressed clear interest in supporting the Rising in some form, could not control a Rising begun by Stuart with unclear aims, making it much harder for the French Conseil to manipulate the invasion to its own ends, the crux of French willingness to support the Rising at all. As such, Jacobite disorganization and miscommunication jeopardized both the movement’s safety and the French Conseil’s ability to implement its plans to check British imperial power before Stuart even landed in Scotland to begin his Rising.

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⁴⁵ “Prince Charles to Louis XIV,” June 1745, Correspondence Politique, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, La Courneuve, Paris.
⁴⁶ Ibid.
Chapter Two: ‘A Partridge Upon the Mountains’

“Our faithful Highlanders, a People always trained up and inured to Arms, have been deprived of them: Forts and Citadels have been built and garrisoned, where no foreign Invasion could be apprehended, and a Military Government has been effectually introduced…such a Remedy can never be obtained, but by our Restoration to the Throne of our Ancestors”

—James R., December 23, 1743

Charles Stuart landed near Inverness, Scotland, in July of 1745 accompanied by seven of his remaining loyal followers, including Sullivan, Sheridan, Murray, and Atholl. After months of secrecy, he was finally ready to fulfill his dream of invading Britain and retaking his family’s homeland. Upon his arrival in the north of Scotland, Stuart immediately found refuge with members of some of the oldest and most highly regarded Highland families such as the Macdonalds of Glencoe, Camerons of Lochiel, and Stuarts of Appin. As the campaign evolved, Stuart’s advisory Council in Scotland grew to incorporate several of these Scottish lords, including the Duke of Perth, the Duke of Atholl who came with Stuart from France, and Atholl’s brother Lord George Murray, all of whom supplemented his lack of strategic experience. However, just as he became frustrated with incompatibilities in expectations for the Rising among Jacobite advisors in France, Stuart faced unexpected disagreements in objective between his and his Council’s intentions for the Rising once in Scotland.

Charles’s plans required him to place a great deal of trust in his people because, to prove his strength to France, Stuart would need to amass substantial support once he arrived in Britain. Indeed, it became clear as Stuart departed for Scotland that he expected people across the British Isles to rise in support of a Stuart King. In some ways, Stuart’s expectations for British reactions

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1 “The King’s Commission,” 5-6.
2 For a detailed image of Stuart’s route during the Rising, please see Map 1.
3 Johnstone, Memoirs of the Rebellion, 5.
to his invasion were consistent with some of the testimonies given to the French *Conseil* regarding Jacobite support across Britain, but the Jacobite forces soon found that they were unable to recruit new soldiers as they moved through Scotland towards England. Stuart’s naivété about the true nature of the culture and society he was attempting to both enlist and conquer created tension that furthered the Jacobite failure. With the French watching Stuart’s actions for signs of potential, the difficulties Stuart encountered in Scotland only further emphasized the larger inconsistencies in objective that hobbled his movement.

“The Throne of our Ancestors”: Support in the Highlands

Jacobites on the Continent were intensely worried by Stuart’s decision to leave for France in secrecy and without French aid to buttress his forces. James Stuart made it very clear in letters to his advisors in France that he worried his son’s inexperience made a Jacobite invasion dangerous and likely to fail unless another European power could come to Charles’s aid. James wrote to the Earl Marischal that had he “been acquainted with [the Rising] in time, [he] had certainly done [his] best to prevent its being executed.”

He called his son “a partridge upon the mountains,” waiting to be shot by the British army. Both James and Charles Stuart hoped that loyal Highlanders would step forward, form the backbone of the Prince’s Council, and help him take control of his homeland successfully. James, for his part, knew that longstanding resentment towards the British crown among Scottish Highlanders could significantly help his son’s cause. Vicious British treatment of the Highland clans after the ascent of William of Orange to the British throne, perhaps best espoused in the Glencoe Massacre of 1691 in which King William

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ordered all of Clan Macdonald killed, had a profound effect on Highlanders. The subsequent Act of Union in 1707, which legally bound England, Scotland, and Wales into the nation of Great Britain, only furthered tension in the Highlands by seemingly coopting not just the Scottish monarchy but Scottish nationality as well.

Historic ties to the Stuart family were complemented by more contemporary mistreatment of the Scottish people, particularly Highland clans, by their British sovereign. Indeed, British imperial sensibilities created a culture in which Englishmen viewed Scotsmen as barbarians, much like they viewed other colonized populations. For example, the British Gentleman’s Magazine, a publication largely concerned with culture, published an account of Scottish culture in 1739 that asserted, “Ignorance and Superstition greatly prevail [in Scotland]; In some Places…the Reformation from Popery has never yet obtained…The Parishes where Ministers are settled, are commonly of very great Extent…so that the Inhabitants [are] destitute of all Means of Knowledge…” Indeed, the article implied that the Highlands, where “the Reformation from Popery has never yet obtained,” were a wilderness inhabited by the uneducated masses, an unfortunate population in need of English order and establishments to civilize it.

The article continued by addressing the ancient clan system directly. The author asserted that “the Inhabitants [of the Highlands]…are subject to the Will and Command of their Popish disaffected Chieftains, who have always opposed the propagating Christian Knowledge, and the English tongue, that they might with less Difficulty keep their miserable Vassals in a slavish

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6 Roberts, Clan, King, and Covenant, 234.
7 Szeczi, 1715, 31.
Dependence.” Clearly, though British law had unified England and Scotland into one Kingdom more than three decades before the publication of this article, the dynamic between England and Scotland was not truly one of a unified nation. The British saw themselves as liberators who could free the Scottish people from the “Principles of Tyranny and Arbitrary Government” perpetuated by the barbaric clan system.\(^9\)

Poor British treatments of Scottish Highlanders did not just manifest in magazine articles; the British often took harsh action to force the obedience and assimilation of the Scottish people.\(^10\) James Stuart wrote, “our faithful Highlanders, a People always trained up and inured to Arms, have been deprived of them: Forts and Citadels have been built and garrisoned, where no foreign Invasion could be apprehended, and a Military Government has been effectually introduced.” The Stuarts therefore saw themselves as the Highlands clans’ true liberators, who would harness the traditional strengths of the country to regain prior glory for house and country alike. James Stuart believed that “such a Remedy [to offenses committed against the Highlands] can never be obtained, but by our Restoration to the Throne of our Ancestors.”\(^11\)

The image James created for his cause under this assumption was picturesque: the saving grace of the Rising would be the highland chiefs who, in keeping with the strong feudal bonds that molded highland society and still devastated from their betrayal by the British Crown, could ally themselves with Charles Stuart, the new appointed leader of the Jacobite movement.\(^12\) Indeed, in characterizing highland clan culture and the Stuart expectation that the clans would support them, the feudal nature of the clan system cannot be ignored. Even in the eighteenth

\(^9\) Ibid.

\(^10\) Ibid.


\(^12\) “The King’s Commission,” 6.

\(^13\) Ibid., Roberts, *Clan, King, and Covenant*, 5.
century, the highland chiefs, many of whom had also been made lords under past monarchs, remained powerful in their individual regions of northern Scotland and loyal to the Stuarts.\textsuperscript{14} Johnstone wrote that “the duty of the clansman was indelible; and no feudal grant which he might acquire, or another engagement whatsoever, was to be referred to his service to the chief,” and the House of Stuart had long been the preeminent clan that had unified the clans under the monarchy.\textsuperscript{15}

Like his father, Charles envisioned himself a savior for the Scottish people. For example, he published a manifesto, written in Rome but distributed once he arrived in Scotland addressed, to “His respective Kingdoms” of England, Scotland, and Ireland in which he asserted his family’s “undoubted Right to the Throne.”\textsuperscript{16} He declared his intent to invade and told his people, “we shall deem justly entitled all such of his Majesty’s Subjects, as shall testify their Willingness to accept of it, either by joining our Forces with all convenient Diligence…or, at least, by openly renouncing all pretended Allegiance to the Usurper.”\textsuperscript{17} He claimed in his manifesto that all existing allegiance to the King George was “pretended,” and assumed that all subjects would want to accept and support the Stuart return.\textsuperscript{18} He continued by encouraging the people:

before they engage in any Fight or Battle against his Majesty’s Forces…[to] quit the said unjust and unwarrantable Service [of supporting the current King] …since they cannot but be sensible, that no Engagements, entred into with a foreign Usurper, can dispence with the Allegiance they owe to their Natural Sovereign.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{14} Roberts, Clan, King, and Covenant, 234.
\textsuperscript{15} Johnstone, Memoirs of the Rebellion, xii. (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1820). It is worth noting that Johnstone is a strong Jacobite supporter, and his memoirs show substantial bias towards the Stuart cause. The fact that he is not always complimentary of Stuart and his expeditions is revealing about the true state of Jacobite affairs.
\textsuperscript{16} Charles Stuart “The Prince’s Manifesto, given May 16, 1745,” in A Full Collection of All the Proclamations and Orders published by the Authority of Charles, Prince of Wales, Regent of Scotland, England, France and Ireland, and dominions thereunto belonging. Since his Arrival in Edinburgh, the 17th Day of September till the 15th of October, 1745, (Glasgow, 1745), 10-11.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
His statement to his people assumed that the British people would seize the opportunity to declare their true allegiance to the House of Stuart.

Indeed, many Highland clans did seize the opportunity to support Stuart upon his arrival in Scotland, much to Charles’s relief. Stuart’s initial support was a mixture of tangible involvement and propaganda. Despite his confident decision to launch an invasion alone, Stuart was somewhat aware of his inability to lead the Rising without counsel. He wrote to his father before departing for Scotland, “I am very young and it is very hard for me to forsee many things, in which all I am at is at leste not to do harm.”

The next week, he continues in the same vein: “My want to experience is what I two much know & would fain get as soon as possible, for to be able to serve you & our country more effectually & to purpose, which is all that I am putt in this world for.” To compensate for his lack of experience, Stuart left Murray with “blank Commissions and letters…for different people” and instructed him to draft old supporters of note for the Jacobite Army after his departure so that they could “acquaint” themselves with him aims and meet him with arms in Scotland. “Iff they all joyn or at leste all those to whom I have sent commissions to at request,” he wrote to O’Brien in Paris, “everything will go to a wish.”

Indeed, when Charles arrived in Scotland, the reception he got from the highland chiefs was much like the one he had always imagined; Johnstone wrote about the numerous clan chiefs who rode immediately to meet the Prince and rally behind his cause in a “happy omen of his future success”.

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20 “Prince Charles to his father,” April 12, 1745. Fitzjames. The Stuart Papers, 125.
21 Ibid.
Correspondence from France at the time encouraged Stuart’s assumptions that the Jacobite movement could gain more and more support, and indeed some Scottish press outlets echoed the fervor Stuart claimed to foresee. *The Caledonian Mercury*, an Edinburgh-based newspaper, reported on September 3, just weeks after the Charles began to recruit from the general population in earnest, that the Prince had amassed an army of highlanders, “said to be 3000 strong, and some apprehend they will move southward.”\(^25\) The paper additionally reported word that a “Body of the Highlanders have not only surprized a Detachment of the Scots Fusileers who were at Work on the Road leading to Inverary,” on the west coast of the island, “but also took Possession of the little Fortress at Inversnaid.”\(^26\) The paper also received word the same week that citizens of Perth towards the east coast feared the chance that “Highlanders should think proper to come down from Athole to pay [them] a Visit.”\(^27\) By reporting so many Highlander appearances across Scotland in the same week, the paper aggrandized Stuart’s forces as vast, formidable, and in control.

“Le Pretendant” Pretends Support: The Movement Loses Momentum

What both Stuarts failed to realize was the limited scope of enthusiasm for Jacobitism. Charles encountered skepticism about his potential across both Scotland and England, and apathy for the Jacobite cause grew stronger as he moved south. Just a few weeks into the ’45, Charles found that exerting control over even the Highlands was not as simple as he had imagined. For example, tension between Stuart and his mostly Highland-born advisors developed soon after his arrival in Scotland. Some of these disagreements were merely ones of

\(^{26}\) Ibid.  
\(^{27}\) Ibid.
temperament. For example, Lord George Murray, brother to the Duke of Atholl, soon emerged as the preeminent advisor during the Rising. “Lord George was vigilant, active and diligent,” Johnstone wrote, “his plans were always judiciously formed, and he carried them promptly and vigorously into execution.”28 Lord George’s expertise “gained [him] the hearts of the Highlanders; he made them perform prodigies of valour against various English armies.”29 Yet, he “wished to have the exclusive ordering of everything,” in part because he believed, correctly, the highland soldiers and their chiefs alike were brutal and untrained compared to the British army.30 Stuart, already frustrated by his lack of agency in France, did not appreciate Murray’s gumption.31

Johnstone referred to continued disagreements between Stuart and his advisors over larger issues as well. Notable tension arose after the Jacobites succeeded in taking Edinburgh via the Battle of Prestonpans in the fall of 1745 over the expansion of the Rising into England. The Prince’s Highland advisors strongly opposed a movement into England and even insisted to the Prince that their loyalty, however strong, only extended so far. They told him “they had taken arms, and risked their fortunes and their lives, merely to seat him on the throne of Scotland; but that they wished to have nothing to do with England.”32 Just as the Earl Marischal wrote in 1744, Stuart’s advisors held firm that declaring Scottish independence would rally support, keep the Prince’s advantage over the British and, most importantly, persuade the Court of France “to maintain him on the throne, and…[exert] themselves to the utmost to prevent a union with England.”33

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 40.
33 Ibid., 34-35.
Even more, Stuart’s councilors argued that a division between Scotland and England was not only the most feasible way to maintain military success and endear France to the ‘45, but was indeed the wish of the Scottish people themselves. “Every one,” Johnstone wrote of Stuart’s Council, advised the Prince “to dissolve and annul the union between Scotland and England…[for] such a step would have given infinite pleasure to all Scotland.”\(^{34}\) Their reticence irritated Stuart, who had left France frustrated by the incongruity between his goals for the Rising and his advisors’ expectations. Stuart’s hand-picked advisors in Scotland had sponsored the Rising and worked every day to create effective military strategy, but even they advocated for the same, more measured goals Stuart passionately resisted in France.

Such discord within the Jacobite movement in Scotland also became palpable outside Stuart’s Council. Though Stuart initially found great enthusiasm for his cause in Scotland, he ran into further trouble amassing the maximum support possible from those powerful highlanders who had not immediately rushed to his aid upon his landing in Scotland. While many highland clans were willing to risk their lives to help their kin and old monarchs, some older, more powerful clan leaders and nobles seemed more reticent to risk their lives and stature for Stuart’s sake. Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat was perhaps the most prominent of these examples. Lovat was the head of Clan Fraser and had been a loyal Stuart supporter since the Glorious Revolution. Lovat had in fact written to Cardinal Fleury in France alongside other Highland chiefs after the outbreak of war between Britain and Spain to promise “to venture our lives and fortunes to restore the King and his offspring” to the Stuart throne and “begged of His Majesty to support us.”\(^{35}\) His correspondence continued until 1745, including promises to Charles Stuart that he was

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

“the most zealous and active partisan your Royal Highness has in the north of Scotland.”\textsuperscript{36} Once the Rising began, Lovat began to amass his kinsmen, purporting that he could send up to 6000 troops to Stuart’s aid.\textsuperscript{37}

Despite his promises, Lovat did not immediately send reinforcements to the Prince. Instead, he wavered indecisively between sending troops under the command of his son and biding his time to wait for European aid. Indeed, he “neither would join the rebels himself nor send his men” until he heard “assurances of powerful succours from France.”\textsuperscript{38} During Lovat’s trial for treason in 1748, the prosecuting Solicitor General characterized Lovat’s experience with the Rising: “His wavering and irresolution speak a mind divided between former engagements and present fear.”\textsuperscript{39} Lovat did not immediately send troops in order to hedge his bets and determine whether the Rising could be successful against the might of the British Empire. After Stuart’s victory in Prestonpans, Lovat conceded that his son should lead the Lovat forces, but subsequent posturing from British troops changed Lovat’s mind. It was only after continued overtures of support from the French made their way to the Highlands that Lovat was ultimately convinced to send reinforcements, betting that a challenge to the British by another great power rather than the measly Jacobite force was more likely to succeed. Ultimately, those reinforcements did not meet the Prince until the Stuart forces had been chased back to the north by British troops, and Lovat lost his bet.\textsuperscript{40}

Lovat’s situation highlights how differences in perspective that existed between Stuart and his advisors in France manifested similarly in Scotland. The cultures of both absolute

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 259.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 260.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Trial of Simon Lord Lovat of the ’45. David N. Mackay 248 1911, 260.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
monarchy and the highland clan system heavily emphasized loyalty and fealty. The Stuarts, as the traditionally-accepted monarchs, were the rightful heirs to the British throne and deserved the loyalty of the Scottish lords. However, one of the clan system’s primary characteristics was competence. “Should a chief prove unequal to a task,” John Roberts writes in his history of the Highland clans, “it was not unknown...for a clan to revert to the ancient Celtic tradition of inheritance” in which more competent men with more distant connections to the chief could take control of the clan. Even when placed in the historical context Charles Stuart cherished, it is clear why many in Scotland like Lord Lovat were reticent about supporting Stuart’s ambitions. Highland culture taught chiefs that it was not solely the most legitimate heir who deserved power, but he who would effectively lead his men and win his battles. Stuart saw substantial success at the beginning of his expedition but faltered soon after, signaling a lack of capability and momentum to potential allies. As the British Solicitor General points out, Lovat’s “wavering and irresolution” spoke to his lack of trust in Stuart, as an inexperienced leader, and his respect for the British power that had become the status quo. No longer could the House of Stuart’s fiercest allies afford to be single-mindedly committed to the Jacobite cause. Despite longstanding ideological ties to the Stuarts, the might of the newly imposed British dominance in Scotland made alliance with the Jacobite forces impractical at best and deadly at worst.

Arguments among his most influential generals and advisors notwithstanding, Stuart continued to push the Jacobite forces farther and farther south. As he moved with his army, he often caught the British by surprise in major strategic cities like Carlisle and Preston. Stuart continued to look for the massive rising of the common people against the crown. He consistently referenced in conversation with his advisors and in his letters to his family

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42 *Trial of Simon Lord Lovat of the ’45*, 260.
substantial and enthusiastic support the Jacobite Army would undoubtedly find after each of its victories. Stuart’s confidence in his public support was likely the result of his knowledge of the history of the Highlands and his experience in France, where he had rejected his father’s trusted advisors and instead surrounded himself with loyal and arguably sycophantic supporters like John Murray. Henry Stuart, The Duke of York and Charles’s younger brother, was waiting to be dispatched with French troops to Scotland and likewise continued to reassure his brother and other Jacobite advisors that troops would arrive imminently. All of the news Stuart was receiving from the Continent, then, was wholly optimistic and indicated that the Jacobite cause was only gaining popularity and credibility.

As Charles hoped, his army successfully took the city of Carlisle in the north of England with an army that had grown to 4,500 men. At Carlisle, though, no support from English lords appeared, and Stuart’s Council renewed their argument that the army should not attempt to push farther south. Various advisors dismissed the chances of the increased support from the British people that Stuart so desperately wanted. “The attachment to the House of Stuart,” Johnstone understood, “was general only in the Highlands, which did not contain one-eighth part of the population of Scotland—The Presbyterians of the Low Country were, with very few exceptions, among the most decided adherents of the Revolution (of 1688)” and likewise were very suspicious of Jacobite sentiments.

As Johnstone alluded, Stuart’s advisors focused on religion in the Lowland and England as a major reason Stuart could not amass support. In an unsigned letter addressed to James in Rome, one of Stuart’s councilors affirmed that, at best, Stuart could expect apathy from the

43 Johnstone, Memoirs of the Rebellion.
45 Johnstone, Memoirs of the Rebellion, 41.
46 Johnstone, Memoirs of the Rebellion, 2.; Szechi, 1715, 38.
greater population. “The Clergy, even of the established Church,” he wrote, “are well satisfied with the Hanover Family.”\footnote{Anonymous Letter to King James,” in \textit{Account of the Melancholy Situation of the Young Pretender in Scotland After his Defeat near Inverness}, ed. Robert Douglass of Straithbogie, (H. Carpenter. Fleet Street, 1746), 13. The letter’s annotation presumes that the correspondence came from Sheridan, Murray, or Sullivan.} Even “the Catholicks, though pretty numerous, are not at all forward to put themselves to the Experience and run the Hazard of ruining themselves by a new Trial for the re-establishment of their Religion in the British Dominions.”\footnote{Ibid., 13.} In this author’s estimation, they would instead seek to maintain their safety as a minority and ignore Stuart’s cause. At worst, “the new Nations [of Scotland and Britain] are now so absolutely, so invincibly prejudiced against the Catholick Religion, and so averse to being governed by a Catholick Prince, that if our Attempt should be renewed…hence appears the sad Consequence of so ill supporting our late Undertaking.”\footnote{Ibid., 12.} Regardless of the population’s religious persuasion, he argued, Charles Stuart would fail to recruit enthusiastic supporters.

The anonymous councilor also attributed lack of support in Britain to Stuart’s upbringing and continental connections. Stuart imagined himself a savior to the British people, who he was convinced would subsequently rise upon his arrival to challenge the Hanover “Usurper.”\footnote{“The King’s Commission,”; “The Prince’s Manifesto.”} In part, his naiveté is forgivable; he was raised in Rome by a father who, too, had largely been reared on the Continent. Three generations and nearly six decades had passed since any Stuart had governed in Britain, and most Stuart supporters had been exiled after the ‘15. The letter’s author argued that this physical and chronological distance did not just cause naiveté on Stuart’s part, but hobbled the persuasiveness of his movement. He wrote:

> By [Stuart’s] connections with the old and most inveterate Enemies of \textit{England}, and who are now at open War with her, and she perfectly satisfied of the Justice of her Cause, his
Majesty hath only extended the Distance betwixt himself and the Affections of not only the *English* but the Kingdoms of *Scotland* and *Ireland*.\(^{51}\)

With such “Distance” established between Stuart and his proposed people, this Scottish advisor concluded, “it would be impossible for such a Prince to accomplish this Great End by any other Means than downright open Force, and of the Success of this desperate Method there is little Probability.”\(^{52}\)

Charles Stuart admitted to his father and to other advisors that his upbringing in Rome hindered his practical experience as a leader and strategist, but he did not understand that his childhood also had the potential to alienate supporters. Ignorant of his reputation in Britain, “the Prince held a council of all the Highland chiefs, in which he again pretended he had received fresh letters from his friends in England, assuring him that he should find all of them in arms, on his arrival at Preston.” The Prince and the chiefs recreated their argument at Preston, where “friends” of the Prince did not appear, this time discussing their arrival in Manchester. Johnstone documented this conversation as well, writing that “the council…had never opposed the Prince in any thing, as they saw themselves too far advanced in England to be able to retreat.”\(^{53}\)

While both Stuart and contemporary news at the time encouraged the idea that the Jacobite army was a formidable threat, what Stuart imagined and what in fact existed were two very different things. Albeit well after the fact, Johnstone was very frank in his assessment of the actual size of the Stuart army. He noted that he was “greatly surprised to find so few supporters with the Prince, as public report at Edinburgh had increased them to a prodigious amount.”\(^{54}\) He instead contended that there were in fact only one thousand troops under Stuart’s command. In

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\(^{51}\) “Anonymous Letter to King James,” 12.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., 13.
\(^{54}\) Ibid, 12.
comparison to the power of the British army, a reported 16,000 with most of the British troops occupied on the Continent, Stuart’s 4,500 men constituted a worrisome display. Charles’s unwillingness to heed the advice of his older advisors combined with his lack of understanding of the population he attempted to disarm hobbled his movement’s potential for success.
Chapter Three: “The Spark of Fire”

“His Majesty undertakes to help him in all which is practicable and to work in union and concert for the re-establishment of peace on a basis which could be to the mutual advantage of both countries.”

—Treaty of Fontainebleau, October 24, 1745

Having experienced great success through the summer of 1745 and bolstered by the promise of French aid, Prince Charles continued his advance southwards through the fall. As Johnstone notes, Stuart seemed unfazed by his army’s lack of new recruits, consistently ensuring his Council that supporters would materialize. After successfully taking much of northern England, the army continued through England to Derby, the city that would become the southernmost point of Stuart’s expedition.

The French continued their nominal support for the Rising through the fall on 1745, as Jacobite supporters in France continued to highlight the movement’s potential to play a central role in French strategy. Stuart’s early success against the small pockets of British troops he encountered, combined with Jacobite lobbying in Paris, impressed French ministers like the Duc de Noailles and encouraged Louis XV enough to sign the Treaty of Fontainebleau on October 24, 1745. Lobbying from Jacobite sympathizers reignited once treaty negotiations began, but efforts by various Jacobites did not just further affirm the ideological difference in perspective that emerged between Stuart and other Jacobite leaders much earlier in the year. Arguments presented in additional correspondence from Jacobite sympathizers in fact broadened the gap in

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2 Johnstone, Memoirs of the Rebellion.
perspective, further obscured Jacobite aims, and, fatefully, rendered Stuart’s actual victory less relevant to French goals.

“An Enterprise So Just”: Final Entreaties from Henry Stuart

As Stuart moved south, the French honed their primary objective in supporting the ’45: success in Flanders. In a letter to the Maréchal de Saxe, the Duc de Noailles signaled a clear linkage between the French Conseil’s current strategy and the suggestions presented by the Earl Marischal and other Jacobite leaders more than a year before. Noailles theorized that “the arrival of the Pretender’s son in Scotland will necessarily oblige the English to take precautions; and they can only do so by recalling, if not all, at least the largest part of their forces.” He encouraged de Saxe to take advantage, should the British redirect forces to fight the Rising, and “put the Dutch and their allies in the necessity of making peace in just and honorable conditions…It is from these different circumstances that the King judges it would be usefully profitable to complete the glorious campaign which he has made.” Louis XV remained sympathetic towards the plight of the Stuart family and remained intent on sending some form of reinforcements, but Noailles’s letter showed that true French aims were not ideological, but strategic.

Confident that Stuart’s success could achieve their immediate goal, Louis XV agreed to sign the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which theoretically committed the French to military involvement in Britain. In its preamble, the treaty stated: “the prince has proposed to His Most

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3 Maréchal de Saxe, Memoires, 289.
4 Ibid., 289-290.
5 Ibid.; The Conseil, for example, decided against forming an anti-Protestant coalition to support a Stuart England, for fear of alienating Protestant allies in Germany. They focused instead on more secular strategy. McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising, 76.
Christian Majesty that he send to him auxiliary troops to be used against their common enemy and to unite their interests by a treaty of alliance.” ⁶ The terms of the agreement, however, were largely vague, with assurances that “His Majesty undertakes to help him in all which is practicable,” and “to work in union and concert for the re-establishment of peace on a basis which could be to the mutual advantage of both countries.” ⁷ Furthermore, the French promised military aid “to follow all the changes which will be judged useful or necessary.” ⁸ The form and quantity of aid deemed “useful or necessary” is left to interpretation. The language of the treaty kept the intended extent of intended French aid ambiguous and ensured they could not be drawn further into the conflict than they wanted to be while encouraging the Jacobites to continue their rebellion.

As the French King and Conseil attempted to hedge their bets, Charles’s brother Henry emerged as a major player in petitioning for French aid. Henry Stuart had been waiting in France throughout the last months of 1745, ready to take the helm of a French invasion force to join his brother. He was eager to leave for Scotland and often sent entreaties to King Louis XV begging to be allowed to join French forces departing for Scotland. Stranded though he was, he became an active lobbyist for the Jacobite cause. He wrote directly to Louis XV on November 13, 1745 and expressed his “hopes [the King] will want to order the prompt transport of corps of troops” now that he had signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau and seen the success of Charles’s troops even without substantial French aid. ⁹ Henry’s letters harkened back to his brother’s own solicitations six months earlier, marking the continued incongruity in Jacobite messaging during the last

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⁶ “Treaty of Fontainebleau.”
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid.
months of the 1745. Earlier correspondence from within France—not to mention Stuart’s Scottish advisors’ arguments—made it clear that most Jacobites did not anticipate asking the French to support an invasion of England, but Henry Stuart revealed in his letters that he expected the French to contribute to his brother’s ambitions across Great Britain now that the Rising had successfully made its way through the South.

While the Conseil had received plenty of information from actors in Scotland about the supposed strength of the Jacobite movement in Britain and Stuart’s progress throughout the second half of 1745, powerful ministers and the King himself remained doubtful of the Rising’s actual chances of success. In response, Henry offered to go to Britain “to give a new clarification on the facilities that a corps of troops [from France] would find once arriving in the country” and to give the King the right to “approve the account that [he sends]” before France officially deploys troops. He additionally reported that his brother would allow the French to appoint their own general to lead the Jacobite charge and therefore give the French a considerable amount of agency in conducting the military incursion. Henry finished the letter by once again insisting that the King “would do well to order without delay to England the corps of troops destined for that Kingdom,” for it is “impossible that [Charles] could resist [British forces] for very long.” Over the course of just one correspondence, Henry pleaded for French support while simultaneously admitting that the Jacobite movement was not strong enough to win on its own, echoing the very fears he tried to allay. Henry’s letter is a long one, undeniably colored by a hint of desperation. He seemed to know, even if Charles did not, that the need for French aid was becoming more and more pressing.

10 McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising, 122.
11 “Henry Stuart to His Royal Highness Louis XV,” 13 November 1745.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
Henry wrote to the French King again on November 25. He made his point much more quickly and directly in this letter. He wrote, “it is important for the cause that [the Crown] will generously enterprise to support, to promptly sent to England a corps of troops sufficient to put our friends on the throne there...I address your generous heart and strong experience...help our house retake the throne.”

He concluded his letter in a different tone by appealing to Louis’s ego and sense of glory:

“There is no great and glorious project without difficulties. If the generosity of your majesty appears in [our project] they will be able to overcome [difficulties] by gaining immortal glory and forever attaching unflinching recognition of a nation to which it owes its freedom, and of Princes who owe her everything.”

Henry’s beseeching tone betrayed how desperate the Jacobites were for additional aid, but his words also highlighted his misunderstanding of the Franco-Jacobite alliance. His argument to the French King, again similar to his brother’s, was not one of diplomatic strategy within the context of France’s international ambitions, but one that assumed “immortal glory” for the King could be a deciding factor in launching a foreign invasion.

Additional correspondence from Henry to the King presented a similar perspective. He wrote, “The greatest misfortune of all would be if the English party came to suspect that the object of France is merely to make a diversion in Scotland and to foment a Civil War by successive small succors in the sole idea to occupy the English army in his own country.”

Henry’s correspondence demonstrated that he believed he could persuade the Louis XV to support the Jacobite cause through appeals to the King’s sense of glory and power and, even

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15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 “Henry Stuart to His Royal Highness Louis XV,” 13 November 1745.
more, that he was offended by the idea that the French could support the Rising for alternative, pragmatic ends.

Though Henry’s argument may have sought to take advantage of Louis XV’s apparent sympathy for the Stuart cause, it was also at odds with Noailles’s strategic plans for the Rising. Henry persisted, renewing his argument multiple times in the last months of 1745 as his impatience and boredom grew. Henry’s last letter to Louis XV in 1745 was written on December 20, ironically the day Charles Stuart officially crossed the border back into Scotland on his retreat from Derby. Henry’s letter is only a page long but even more sycophantic than his previous entreaties. He writes, “In my powerlessness to fully recognize everything that our House owes to Your Majesty, and all that I owe to it in particular, I have this consolation…that an enterprise so just, so great, and so generous could not fail to fill itself with glory in the eyes of the whole world.” Like his brother, Henry believed that the ‘45 Rising was about more than political expediency. He failed to understand that the French intended to use his family’s Rising very differently, and he was unable to alter his arguments for support to appeal to those French goals. Despite his many entreaties, Henry would remain in France until May of 1746, after the ultimate fall of the Rising, to wait for a flood of troops that never came.

“The Spark of Fire”: Scotland as Means to an End

Henry Stuart’s letters were accompanied by letters to French Ministers that continued to allege that, after years of defeats at the hands of Austria and Britain, the French could achieve international success by supporting the Jacobites. As the Rising continued, Jacobite strategies

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proposed to the *Conseil* began to expand their purview to discuss France’s overseas ambitions in addition to their campaign in Flanders. Just as the Earl Marischal’s letter in 1744 detailed the strategic relevance of the Jacobite cause within the War of Austrian Succession, a subsequent letter by a concerned French merchant to his friend the Comte Maurepas, Secretary of the Navy, reaffirmed the importance of the Jacobite cause to French goals. Daniel O’Heguerty was a merchant based in France with decidedly Jacobite sympathies—he came from a Jacobite family—but who communicated directly with the Comte Maurepas throughout the ’45. In October 1745, amidst consistent communication with Maurepas, O’Heguerty sent an extensive letter that presented an unusually detailed description of French strategy towards the Jacobite Rising.\(^{19}\)

O’Heguerty counseled that placing Stuart on the throne in Scotland as soon as possible would be the most effective way for the French to distract the British in Flanders through an argument for military economy. Given that Scotland at this time was largely unsecured by British troops, he asserted that “eight thousand troops brought to England would there bring more service to the state than twenty thousand troops brought to Flanders.”\(^{20}\) While rhetoric from within the Stuart family often referenced dynastic glory and ideological consistencies between Scotland and France, even a Jacobite supporter previously disconnected from the established corps of advisors in Paris like O’Heguerty thought differently. Instead, he argued like Jacobite advisors before him, that a decision to invade Scotland, as opposed to challenging the British elsewhere, was one of strict imperial pragmatism.

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\(^{20}\) “*Projet pour renverser le Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne.*”
Letters from important Jacobite actors like the Earl Marischal written as early as Spring 1744 emphasized the need to distract the British in Flanders via a Jacobite invasion in order to ensure French dominance in the immediate War of Austrian Succession, a mutually beneficial goal. However, O’Heguerty’s letter indicated that Jacobite sympathizers were not concerned only with French predominance in the War of Austrian Succession, but with French imperial dominance as well. O’Heguerty’s letter from October tied the Rising to even broader discussions of foreign policy, not least France’s overseas ambitions towards an empire that could rival the Spanish or the British. O’Heguerty expressed his concern that the British and Spanish would soon reach an agreement regarding free passage of British ships to and from New Spain. He wrote that “everyone knows that Great Britain can sustain its strength and its splendor only by its manufactured goods and its navigation. Both have decreased substantially since the Treaty of Utrecht.” He worried, then, that the British, who had experienced recent successes in the ongoing War of Austrian Succession, would use her fortuitous position “to force Spain to grant [the British] permission to sail freely on the coast of New Spain.” Free access to New Spain’s territories and markets would have been a substantial economic advantage for the British. O’Heguerty, intimately acquainted with France’s nascent naval power through his relationship with Maurepas and the transatlantic nature of his commercial ventures, feared that “the British would smuggle their merchandise to the Spanish coast clandestinely and with impunity, without paying the considerable import duties.”

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. The Treaty of Utrecht ended the War of Spanish Succession in 1715, giving France’s Prince Philippe the right to ascend to the Spanish throne but also forcing France to give up territories in Canada and the Atlantic. Spain also gave Britain a monopoly on the slave trade in New Spain.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
could mean “the radical ruin of the manufactured goods of France would meanwhile be necessary and indubitable.”25

This emergent international factor had the potential to wreak greater havoc on France economically and diplomatically. The colonial world was gaining greater and greater significance as an economic hub for European powers moving into the second half of the eighteenth century, and economic supremacy in the New World correlated to greater power on the European stage; a more influential empire had greater leverage to hold over other rivals.26 From O’Heguerty’s perspective, French aid for the Jacobite movement in the form of naval support would help France achieve greater imperial power. He wrote, “Who does not know that the King of Great Britain will not have dared to induce…to oppose him a rival whose fleet, if he had one, would be able to arrive without fear in England with forces capable of making the people decide in his favor.”27 Britain had long relied on its naval power for its international supremacy, but France, concerned with contiguous conflicts with the Spanish and Dutch for much of Louis XIV’s reign, was still in the process of building an adequate navy. O’Heguerty predicted that Britain:

will want to watch Louisbourg in the hopes of bringing Canada under British domination…will probably insist on the conclusive privilege of fishing on the coast of Newfoundland…will doubtless demand the demolition of…the port of Dunkirk…will insist on the freedom of navigation on the Spanish coast of America.28

Such transcontinental challenges to French power would require much greater naval strength. This, in O’Heguerty’s view, would become “a means of freeing [France] from the type of

25 Ibid.
26 Banks, Chasing Empire Across the Sea; Marchand, Ghost Empire; Pagden, The Burdens of Empire; Pritchard, In Search of Empire.
27 “Projet pour renverser le Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne.”
28 Ibid.
[British] whims that represent us on the other side of the hideous coin.”\textsuperscript{29} The small numbers of British troops at home further substantiated O’Heguerty’s idea that an attack from within Britain’s own country would be somewhat unexpected; he wrote that the “arrogant pretensions of the English for America” had distracted them from their homeland.\textsuperscript{30} Sending the French navy to launch an invasion of Britain would therefore become a substantial blow to British naval supremacy by forcing them to refocus on their domestic security rather than international challenges to French power.

The lynchpin of O’Heguerty’s transatlantic strategy, then, was Scotland. He used particularly passionate and compelling language to describe how Scotland could help France accomplish all its imperial goals. He envisioned that “The scene that actually passes in Scotland” could be “a spark of fire by which France can set Great Britain alight…the time has come to cut the Gordian knot of the allied forces of the enemies of France, to light the torch of the war in the breast of Great Britain” rather than her limbs\textsuperscript{31} O’Heguerty’s use of the Gordian knot metaphor is apt. Scotland and England had been involved in an increasingly complicated relationship over the course of the two nations’ histories, and the cultures of the two nations were now sufficiently intertwined that, were Scotland to fully rebel under Charles Stuart, massive civil war would occur, as Henry Stuart’s letters to Louis XV also suggested.

O’Heguerty also referenced the idea, introduced by the Earl Marischal in his own letter pleading for French aid to the Jacobites more than a year before and echoed by Henry Stuart in Fall 1745, that it was important for the French to create a faithful ally in the British Isles. He wrote that “if Scotland were assisted by [France] in the wars it had to maintain against

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
England…one might compare, one day soon, London to Carthage.” In his view, then, support for the Jacobite Rising was not just about distracting the British from immediate concerns like Flanders or Louisbourg. Creating such strife and dissent in Great Britain’s backyard would have been the ultimate distraction from their international campaigns and could have the power to destroy the entire empire.

O’Heguerty’s counsel to Maurepas should have been beneficial to Stuart’s movement in Scotland. He used intensely passionate language to further an argument that rested not just on the importance of creating a distraction but on the benefits of Stuart’s actual success in “cutting the Gordian knot.” However, O’Heguerty continued his argument, adding new and disparate factors for Maurepas and the Conseil to consider. He suggested that the French focus on liberating Ireland, rather than Scotland, from British rule, citing religious concerns in Ireland. He expressed his disapproval that, in Ireland, “it is forbidden for a Catholic to keep firearms in his home” and that “any Protestant may seize a Catholic’s horses by paying him ten pistols per horse,” for “the British keep their foot on the throat of the [Catholic].” To date, arguments from Jacobite leaders for French aid in Scotland had been based on solidly imperial and economic factors, rather than religious or dynastic concerns, and O’Heguerty’s letter introduced yet another varied perspective. O’Heguerty’s proposal was even more problematic here, though, because he justified his proposition with religious values that the French Conseil had already abandoned in the context of the Rising.

Just as O’Heguerty’s letter added complexity to arguments in favor of French support for the Jacobite Rising, his attempts at lobbying further confused Jacobite messaging by adding new

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32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 McLynn, *France and the Jacobite Rising*, 76.
ideas and information to a flow of communication already plagued by inconsistency. He advocated for a French invasion of Britain via both Scotland and Ireland while simultaneously expressing doubts about Stuart’s ability to win all of Britain. Such scattered messaging conveyed an inherent lack of faith in Stuart’s movement. As such, the French Conseil d’état did not gain any confidence in an assured Stuart victory.\footnote{Ibid., 122.} The King, according to the Earl Marischal, continually affirmed the necessity of France’s commitment to Stuart’s cause against British control throughout Summer and Fall 1745, but never expressed any confidence in a Stuart victory.\footnote{Ibid.} The reckless speed at which Stuart moved through Great Britain only further concerned Louis XV; he believed such a fast past could prevent Franco-Jacobite cooperation should France launch an invasion.\footnote{Ibid., 122.}

As Louis XV and his Conseil attempted to find a way to corral the Jacobite movement within their plans, Stuart continued to push into England. His forces arrived on the fourth of December in Derby, England, and began to prepare for battle against British troops under the command of the Duke of Cumberland camped only one league from the Jacobite forces. Stuart still hoped that his success even without French aid would persuade the French to send additional reinforcements and help them solidify their victory against Cumberland’s troops.\footnote{Johnstone, Memoirs of the Rebellion, 61.} Louis XV remained unsure about whether the French should send reinforcements, but nonetheless gave Maurepas the order to amass some 6,000 troops at Dunkirk under de Saxe in preparation for a departure for England.\footnote{McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising, 101-102.} While this decision was met with much excitement from many Jacobites, it was also somewhat antithetical to the movement’s goals. To be sure, the exact goals
of the Jacobite movement were still unclear throughout 1745 due to such disparate communication from various Jacobite actors. Yet, by early December, France’s signing of the Treaty of Fontainebleau and subsequent amassing of troops signaled to the British that they intended to launch an invasion on behalf of the Rising, but apparent French support also communicated to the British the Jacobite Rising was indeed a legitimate threat to British sovereignty. While British were still not sure whether the French would invade, they now “were taking seriously the threat from across the Channel,” jeopardizing the Jacobite army’s chance of success.⁴⁰

Word of France’s troop movement eventually reached Stuart in a message from Lord John Drummond, brother to Stuart’s councilor the Duke of Perth, that reinforcements were making their way to Scotland and then south to the Jacobite army. He wrote that he had raised 3,000 men himself, partly comprised of volunteers from the Royal Scots and Irish Brigade—a France-based corps of exiled Irishmen—“and partly of the Highlanders who could not join the Prince before his departure for England.”⁴¹ He also assured the Prince that “the whole Irish brigade had embarked” from France, “besides several French regiments; and that there was every probability they would arrive in Scotland before his letter could reach the Prince.”⁴² The Jacobites believed the French invasion was imminent, and indeed French documents like Noailles’s letter to de Saxe confirmed that their hopes were not misplaced.

Almost simultaneously, the tides of the Rising changed from successful to disastrous. On the same day that the Prince received Drummond’s letter, a messenger arrived to tell the Prince and his Council that in addition to the army under the Duke of Cumberland just a few miles from

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⁴⁰ Ibid., 95.
⁴¹ Johnstone, Memoirs of the Rebellion, 52.
⁴² Ibid.
Derby, another 30,000 British militiamen were amassing at nearby Finchley Common with the intention of reinforcing Cumberland’s troops. The tiny Jacobite force, then, would soon be surrounded by enemy lines. Stuart was hence presented with a difficult choice, which he brought to the attention of his Council on the afternoon of the fifth. Stuart’s advisors were finally able to convince him to “return to Scotland, and avail [themselves] of the reinforcements…and wait in that country for the succours from France.” The Council reminded the Prince that Lord Drummond had promised that 3,000 of “his own regiment, the Royal Scots, the piquet of six Irish regiments, with Fitzjames’s regiment of horse” were heading south from Montrose, with larger forces from the French impending. By retreating to the north, the Jacobites could solidify their hold over Scotland and, after amassing the substantially greater number of troops they believed France would soon supply, renew their fight to take all of England as well. After some protestation, the Prince relented to the will of his Council. The Jacobites would retreat and wait to renew their push southwards with the French.

The Jacobite retreat ultimately made Louis XV’s decision for him. While he undoubtedly had sympathy for the Jacobite movement, but the British were chasing the Stuart forces north. Jacobite defeat seemed eminent, and most ministers of the Conseil doubted French deployment could reach Scotland in time to salvage the ‘45. Moreover, the French had accomplished Noailles’s goal of distracting the British from their campaign in Flanders, and that was enough for most of the Conseil. Louis XV did not officially suspend French troops movement until February 1746, but it became clear to the Jacobites in Paris that the French would not send aid by

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 52-53.
46 Ibid., 61-63.
47 McLynn, *France and the Jacobite Rising*, 166-180
48 Ibid.
late December 1745.\textsuperscript{49} Despite ardent lobbying from various Jacobites and genuine French interest in the Jacobite movement, the Rising failed.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
Conclusion

The Jacobite forces continued their retreat north throughout the first months of 1746. Their march southwards had largely been free of major battles. They were fortunate to find Scottish and English towns alike that, while unwilling to support the movement, did not try to challenge the Jacobite army. On the retreat, however, British forces had been redirected from Continental Europe with the purpose of extinguishing the Jacobite forces. The Jacobites were able to move from Derby to Kendal in the north of England between December fifth and fifteenth with little trouble from the British, “where [they] received certain information that [they] had left Marshal Wade behind [them], and that [they] were no longer in any danger of having [their] retreat to Scotland cut off.”¹

The Jacobites reentered Scotland on December 20, and “the Highlanders began all to dance, expressing the utmost joy on seeing their country again.”² The army headed to Glasgow, pursued by the combined armies of the Duke of Cumberland and Marshal Wade—easily nearing 20,000 troops—aided by six thousand Dutch. The Jacobites moved on to Stirling in the first week of January 1746. They would camp at Bannockburn, ironically the location of the decisive victory by Robert Bruce and his army during the First War of Scottish Independence. Here, they were finally joined by the troops Lord Drummond had managed to amass from the Royal Scots and Irish Brigade, plus additional Highlanders; Johnstone estimated that these new regiments brought the Jacobite army to eight thousand men.³ The French were still missing.

¹ Johnstone, Memoirs of the Rebellion, 63.
² Ibid., 75-76.
³ Ibid., 83-84.
Ultimately, in April 1745, both the British and Jacobite arrived in Inverness, the northernmost major city in Scotland and site of Stuart’s original landing from France. There, on April 15, the armies fought their final battle on Culloden Moor. Very simply, the British Army vastly outperformed the Jacobite army in numbers and strength of artillery. Hundreds of Jacobite soldiers were killed, and many fled during the battle in the hopes of escaping capture by the British forces. Charles Stuart himself fled and eventually returned to Continental Europe. The Rising had failed.

During his first sixth months in Britain, it seemed that Charles Stuart could succeed in his endeavor. All Scottish actors, from the Prince, to his father, to advisors in Scotland and France alike, agreed that substantial French aid would be essential to the success of the Rising, and, of course, the French were receptive to providing support should the Jacobites be able to accomplish French goals: to establish an independent Scotland as an ally for France, to achieve greater maritime power in Europe and the New World by intimidating the British navy and, most importantly, to distract Britain in Flanders. Why, then, after so many promises, did France fail to come to Stuart’s aid?

Frank McLynn is not wrong that French disorganization around the Jacobite Rising prevented them from efficiently sending troops to Scotland, but their disorganization did not come simply from within the Conseil. Conflicting goals within the Jacobite movement and disparate reports of Jacobite sympathies in Britain weakened the Jacobite lobbying efforts such that, though Louis XV professed enthusiasm for the Jacobite cause, King and Conseil grew concerned about a potential invasion’s chance of success and thus demurred on promising aid until it was clear that the movement could succeed in accomplishing the goals set out throughout 1744 and 1745. Once Stuart landed in Scotland to begin his Rising, though, further
disagreements and cultural shifts across Britain made it hard for Stuart to amass loyal support in both Scotland and England. Stuart’s stubborn advocacy for an invasion of England, in direct contrast to the suggested goal of an independent Scotland, proved controversial to his Scottish and Irish advisors. Even more, his goal of a united Britain was incompatible with British cultural sentiments at the time. The continuation of such disparate perspectives and objectives only complicated Jacobite attempts to inspire French confidence throughout Fall 1745, especially as the French Conseil received an even greater variety of arguments for supporting the Jacobites from Henry Stuart and O’Heguerty.

The Jacobites failed, through poor communication and inconsistency of ideas, to inspire the confidence necessary for a major European power looking to accomplish larger international goals to make a substantial investment in supporting the movement. British victory at Culloden had a substantial effect not just on Jacobitism, but on Scottish culture. Charles Stuart escaped Culloden, famously hiding in the mountains and islands of Scotland before returning to France. He became a hero to Scots and Frenchmen alike, the inspiration for an almost Arthurian folk myth that persists in Britain today. Yet, scholars like Geoffrey Plank contend that the Rising inspired new treatment of Scotland that can be characterized as even more heavy-handedly imperial. Further, he argues that his imperialism in Scotland was soon exported to other reaches of the British Empire and therefore made a lasting contribution to British imperial culture.

Conversely, the French emerged victors from the Rising. Their object in supporting the Stuart family, as both the Earl Marischal and O’Heguerty understood in their correspondence with the French court, was to sow dissent in Britain’s backyard, and this could be done with or

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5 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 3.
without a Jacobite victory. The failure of the Rising naturally did not accomplish all of France’s initial aims, namely an independent and loyal Scotland and a substantial blow to the British imperial system. However, in revealing their intentions to the British, the French realized their immediate goal of intimidating their rival and distracting the British army from the Flanders campaign without becoming actively involved in the conflict. Such French manipulation of a smaller underdog political force bears noticeable similarities to other, even more successful international conflicts, not least the American Revolution thirty years later.

As such, Jacobitism emerges not as an isolated movement or the last gasp of absolutism but as a distinctly modern method by which two major European powers communicated and competed. Its origins with Charles Stuart may have been decidedly antiquated, but its ramifications were steeped in an increasingly colonial perspective on the part of both the French and the British. Likewise, French treatment of the ‘45 exhibited a style of foreign policy strategy that diverged from the more traditional, straightforward diplomatic negotiations favored by Cardinal Fleury. Though many in the French Conseil, including the king himself, sympathized with the Stuart family’s cause, the Jacobites were ultimately pawns in the French game, and the Rising remained at the mercy of French willingness to help. Even though the ‘45 failed, the Jacobites, in many aspects, served their purpose well.
Maps

Map 1: Stuart’s route throughout Britain in the Jacobite Rising of 1745

\[1\] Plank.
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