Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice

dc.contributor.author	Ehlers, Lars
dc.contributor.author	Weymark, John A.
dc.date.accessioned	2020-09-13T19:45:42Z
dc.date.available	2020-09-13T19:45:42Z
dc.date.issued	2001
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15673
dc.description.abstract	A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a cadidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica,2001) have established a number of theorems which demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of these impossibility theorems.
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.publisher	Vanderbilt University	en
dc.subject	axiomatic social choice
dc.subject	candidate stability
dc.subject	political economy
dc.subject	voting
dc.subject	JEL Classification Number: D71
dc.subject	JEL Classification Number: D72
dc.subject.other
dc.title	Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice
dc.type	Working Paper	en
dc.description.department	Economics