dc.contributor.author | Hallett, Andrew Hughes | |
dc.contributor.author | Weymark, Diana N. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-13T20:40:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-13T20:40:36Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15730 | |
dc.description.abstract | This article investigates the impact on economic performance of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government with both distributional and stabilization objectives. It is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared to a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy is determined simultaneously. Further, it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities. The implications of these results for a country deciding whether to join a monetary union are also considered. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | Central bank independence | |
dc.subject | monetary policy delegation | |
dc.subject | policy coordination | |
dc.subject | policy game | |
dc.subject | policy leadership | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: E52 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: E61 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: F42 | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | Government Leadership and Central Bank Design | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |