Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining

dc.contributor.author	Daughety, Andrew F.
dc.contributor.author	Reinganum, Jennifer F.
dc.date.accessioned	2020-09-13T21:32:33Z
dc.date.available	2020-09-13T21:32:33Z
dc.date.issued	2005
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15796
dc.description.abstract	We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can arise due to exogenous factors such as correlated culpability or damages, or they can be generated by discretionary choices on the part of the litigants themselves or by legal doctrine and rules of procedure.
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.publisher	Vanderbilt University	en
dc.subject	Multiple litigants
dc.subject	externalities
dc.subject	asymmetric information
dc.subject	JEL Classification Number: C78
dc.subject	JEL Classification Number: D82
dc.subject	JEL Classification Number: K41
dc.subject.other
dc.title	Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining
dc.type	Working Paper	en
dc.description.department	Economics