International Seigniorage Payments

dc.contributor.author	Eden, Benjamin
dc.date.accessioned	2020-09-14T00:31:04Z
dc.date.available	2020-09-14T00:31:04Z
dc.date.issued	2006
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15812
dc.description.abstract	What are the "liquidity services" provided by âˆšÂ¨over-pricedâˆšÃ† assets? How do international seigniorage payments affect the choice of monetary policies? Does a country gain when other hold its âˆšÂ¨over-pricedâˆšÃ† assets? These questions are analyzed here in a model in which demand uncertainty (taste shocks) and sequential trade are key. It is shown that a country with a relatively stable demand may issue "over priced" debt and get seigniorage payments from countries with unstable demand. But this does not necessarily improve welfare in the stable demand country.
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.publisher	Vanderbilt University	en
dc.subject	Seigniorage
dc.subject	liquidity
dc.subject	rate of return dominance
dc.subject	optimal monetary policy
dc.subject	JEL Classification Number: E42
dc.subject	JEL Classification Number: F00
dc.subject	JEL Classification Number: G00
dc.subject	JEL Classification Number: H62
dc.subject.other
dc.title	International Seigniorage Payments
dc.type	Working Paper	en
dc.description.department	Economics