dc.contributor.author | Cartwright, Edward | |
dc.contributor.author | Wooders, Myrna | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-14T01:04:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-14T01:04:36Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15831 | |
dc.description.abstract | We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose properties that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium: within-group anonymity, group independence, predictable group behavior and stereotyped beliefs. We then demonstrate that (a) a correlated equilibrium satisfying these properties exists in games with many players (b) a player who stereotypes other players cannot do better with correct beliefs and (c) correlation allows predictability of group behavior, which ensures that a correlated equilibrium is approximately ex-post stable. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | Non-cooperative games | |
dc.subject | correlated equilibrium | |
dc.subject | large games | |
dc.subject | behavioral conformity | |
dc.subject | stereotyping | |
dc.subject | identity | |
dc.subject | expost stability | |
dc.subject | group anonymity | |
dc.subject | group independence | |
dc.subject | predictable group behavior | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: C72 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: D7 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: D71 | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium;Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |