| dc.description.abstract | The fall of Saddam Hussein created a power vacuum in Iraq, heightened by a deepening sectarian divide. The state of security in Iraq became more complicated as militias emerged spontaneously as means to support the ruling Shiites, deter their efforts, or combat ISIS. This paper will explore how the decision to integrate or distance each militia affected the likelihood of pursuing activities shunned by the government. Employing three case studies, I argue that although ties to the government represented an important established relationship, only the combination of official recognition of the militia and ties to the government reduced the likelihood of pursuing activities that were either extreme or unsanctioned by the government. The Badr Organization chose not to pursue these types of activities because of the former two points, while the Mahdi Army resorted to extreme violence and corruption because of the lack of government recognition. The Sons of Iraq were denied ties and long-term recognition, leading to their eventual dissolution. | |
