| dc.contributor.author | Broughman, Brian | |
| dc.contributor.author | Fried, Jesse M. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-05-05T18:21:16Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-05-05T18:21:16Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 10 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 49 (2020) | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2164-361x | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/17164 | |
| dc.description | article published in a business law review | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Black & Gilson (1998) argue that an IPO-welcoming stock market stimulates venture deals by enabling VCs to give founders a valuable "call option on control." We study 18,000 startups to investigate the value of this option. Among firms that reach IPO, 60% of founders are no longer CEO. With little voting power, only half of the others survive three years as CEO. At initial VC financing, the probability of getting real control of a public firm for three years is 0.4%. Our results shed light on control evolution in startups, and cast doubt on the plausibility of the call-option theory linking stock and VC markets. | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Harvard Business Law Review | en_US |
| dc.subject | control evolution in startups, call-option theory, venture capital, Stock Markets | en_US |
| dc.title | Do Founders Control Start-up Firms that Go Public? | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
