dc.contributor.author | Weymark, John A. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2004-10-05T14:27:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2004-10-05T14:27:13Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-04 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Weymark, John A. "Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property." Working Paper No. 04-W09. Dept. of Economics, Vanderbilt University. Nashville, TN, April 2004. | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/24 | |
dc.description.abstract | A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property, provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this article, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy-proof social choice function satisfies the tops-only property when everyone has the same set of admissible preferences. | en |
dc.format.extent | 205247 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University. Dept. of Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Paper | |
dc.subject | D71 | en |
dc.subject | Strategy-proofness | en |
dc.subject | Social choice | en |
dc.subject | Tops-only property | en |
dc.subject | Option sets | en |
dc.subject | D82 | en |
dc.title | Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |