Browsing College of Arts and Science by Subject "inflation bias"

Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Inflation Income Redistribution and Optimal Central Bank Independence 
      Weymark, Diana N.; Reeves, Daniel (Vanderbilt University, 2001)
      The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank ...
    • Inflation Targeting, Announcements, and Imperfect Credibility 
      Weymark, Diana N. (Vanderbilt University, 2001)
      In virtually all theoretical studies of inflation targeting, the announced inflation target is treated as being fully credible. However, inflation targeting policies have typically been implemented after protracted periods ...
    • Inflation, Government Transfers, and Optimal Central Bank Independence 
      Weymark, Diana N. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)
      The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank ...