Now showing items 1-7 of 7

    • Groenert, Valeska; Wooders, Myrna; Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2008)
      We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second mover advantage.' A key feature of standards is that, unlike public goods ...
    • Groenert, Valeska; Wooders, Myrna; Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2010)
      Abstract: We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second- mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not ...
    • Groenert, Valeska; Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a `second-mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not unanimously ...
    • Groenert, Valeska; Wooders, Myrna; Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second-mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not unanimously ...
    • Zissimos, Ben; Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2007)
      We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...
    • Zissimos, Ben; Wooders, Myrna H. (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax competition through public good differentiation, traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have ...
    • Dhillon, Amrita; Wooders, Myrna; Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2006)
      In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public good provision. ...