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Inflation Income Redistribution and Optimal Central Bank Independence
(Vanderbilt University, 2001)
The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank ...
Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics, and Central Bank Design
(Vanderbilt University, 2002)
The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and ...
Government Leadership and Central Bank Design
(Vanderbilt University, 2002)
This article investigates the impact on economic performance of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government with both distributional and stabilization objectives. It ...