Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "kernel"

Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • Cores of Many-Player Games: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment 
      Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      This paper provides sufficient conditions to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores of many-player games and symmetry of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential ...
    • The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments 
      Reny, Philip J.; Winter, Eyal; Wooders, Myrna (Vanderbilt University, 2009)
      An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved ...