| dc.contributor.author | Thomas, Randall S., 1955- | |
| dc.contributor.author | Martin, Kenneth J. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-02T12:54:06Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-11-02T12:54:06Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1999 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1021 (1998-1999) | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/5613 | |
| dc.description.abstract | During the last decade, the stratospheric increases in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay levels have made executive compensation a popular target for shareholder activism, particularly when high pay is accompanied by poor corporate performance. Outraged investors have made their views know to corporate boards of directors using shareholder proposals, binding bylaw amendments, "Just Vote No" campaigns, and other activist efforts. As institutional and other shareholders have attempted to monitor board decisions, the question remains: Have their efforts been successful in influencing executive compensation? | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 1 document (63 pages) | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | University of Cincinnati Law Review | en_US |
| dc.subject | executive compensation | en_US |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Stockholders' voting | en_US |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Executives -- Salaries, etc. | en_US |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Chief executive officers -- Rating of | en_US |
| dc.title | The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ssrn-uri | http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729832 | |
