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Legitimacy, Selectivity, and the Disunitary Executive: A Reply to Sally Katzen

dc.contributor.authorBressman, Lisa Schultz
dc.contributor.authorVandenbergh, Michael P.
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-15T15:46:38Z
dc.date.available2014-04-15T15:46:38Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citation105 Mich. L. Rev. 1511 (2006-2007)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/6297
dc.description.abstractProfessors Bressman and Vandenbergh respond to the comments of Sally Katzen on their article presenting and analyzing results from an empirical study of the top political appointees at the Enviromental Protection Agency (EPA) during the William Clinton and George H.W. Bush administrations. In their previous article, Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh examined White House involvement in EPA rulemaking during the relevant periods, concluding that it may be a more complex and less positive phenomenon than previous studies have acknowledged. In this reply, the authors reinforce why the EPA is an important agency to study for information about White House involvement in agency rulemaking, and why it matters that multiple offices and individuals within the White House are involved in agency rulemaking.en_US
dc.format.extent1 document (15 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherMichigan Law Reviewen_US
dc.subject.lcshUnited States. Environmental Protection Agencyen_US
dc.subject.lcshEnvironmental policy -- United Statesen_US
dc.titleLegitimacy, Selectivity, and the Disunitary Executive: A Reply to Sally Katzenen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn-urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=987521


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