dc.contributor.author | Sherry, Suzanna | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-05-16T21:27:21Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-05-16T21:27:21Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1993 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 175 (1993) | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/6367 | |
dc.description | article published in law review | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | The main burden of Professor Perry's paper is to demonstrate that an originalist may, but need not, be a minimalist. In the course of this project, Perry reiterates his earlier arguments in favor of originalism. He also tentatively endorses minimalism as a background presumption, suggesting that non-minimalist or aggressive judicial review must be affirmatively justified and should be limited to questions that are "vulnerable to majority sentiment."1 His primary argument in favor of minimalism is a democratic or majoritarian one: as between historically plausible interpretations of the written Constitution, the people and their elected representatives, rather than the unelected judiciary, ought to prevail on policy questions. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1 PDF (9 pages) | en_US |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Northwestern University Law Review | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Constitutional law -- United States -- Philosophy | en_US |
dc.title | An Originalist Understanding of Minimalism | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |