dc.contributor.author | Viscusi, W. Kip | |
dc.contributor.author | Moore, Michael J., 1953- | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-07-21T18:58:34Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-07-21T18:58:34Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1993 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 101 Journal of Political Economy 161 (1993) | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/6596 | |
dc.description.abstract | Product liability ideally should promote efficient levels of product
safety, but misdirected liability efforts may depress beneficial innovations.
This paper examines these competing effects of liability
costs on product R & D intensity and new product introductions by
manufacturing firms. At low to moderate levels of expected liability
costs, there is a positive effect of liability costs on product innovation.
At very high levels of liability costs, the effect is negative. At the sample mean, liability costs increase R & D intensity by 15 percent. The greater linkage of these effects to product R & D rather than process R & D is consistent with the increased prominence of the design defect doctrine. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1 PDF (25 pages) | en_US |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | The Journal of Political Economy | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Products liability -- Economic aspects | en_US |
dc.title | Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innovation | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |