dc.contributor.author | Guthrie, Chris | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-08T16:42:06Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-08T16:42:06Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 163 (2000) | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/6644 | |
dc.description | published article in a law review | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | This Article uses an often-overlooked component of prospect theory to develop a positive theory of frivolous or low-probability litigation. The proposed Frivolous Framing Theory posits that the decision frame in frivolous litigation induces risk-seeking behavior in plaintiffs and risk averse behavior in defendants. Because plaintiffs in frivolous litigation have a greater tolerance for risk than the defendants they have sued, plaintiffs in frivolous litigation have "psychological leverage" in settlement negotiations, which is likely to lead to plaintiff-friendly settlements or bargaining impasse. This in turn, suggests that reformers concerned about frivolous litigation should target reform efforts at plaintiffs' decisionmaking in frivolous suits. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1 PDF (55 pages) | en_US |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | University of Chicago Law Review | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Frivolous suits (Civil procedure) -- United States | en_US |
dc.title | Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |