Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux
dc.contributor.author | Sherry, Suzanna | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-27T21:40:17Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-10-27T21:40:17Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1992 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123 (1992) | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/6826 | |
dc.description | article published in law review | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | For more than two decades, the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence was "at war with" its Free Exercise jurisprudence. In recent years, however, two major decisions--"Employment Division v. Smith" and "Lee v. Weisman"--have effected a significant shift in our religion clause jurisprudence. In this article I will suggest that, considered together, these two decisions have merely replaced one form of incoherence with another. In particular, I will suggest that either decision could be justified alone--and indeed, that either standing alone would be an improvement on the Court's previous religion clause doctrine--but that together they make little sense. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1 PDF (33 pages) | en_US |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Supreme Court Review | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Freedom of religion -- United States. | en_US |
dc.title | Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
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