dc.contributor.author | Viscusi, W. Kip | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-04-10T18:08:10Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-04-10T18:08:10Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1994 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 25 The RAND Journal of Economics 94 (1994) | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/6949 | |
dc.description | article published in journal of economics | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Risk regulations directly reduce risks, but they may produce offsetting risk increases. Regulated risks generate a substitution effect, as individuals' risk-averting actions will diminish. Recognition of these effects alters benefit-cost criteria and the value-of-life estimates pertinent to policy analysis. Particularly expensive risk regulations may be
counterproductive. The expenditure level that will lead to the loss of one statistical life
equals the value of life divided by the marginal propensity to spend on health. Regulations
with a cost of $30 million to $70 million per life saved will, on balance, have a net adverse
effect on mortality because of these linkages. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1 PDF (18 pages) | en_US |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | The RAND of Economics | en_US |
dc.subject | Risk regulations | en_US |
dc.subject | Policy analysis | en_US |
dc.subject | Risk reduction | en_US |
dc.subject | Risk-averting actions | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Policy sciences | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Safety regulations -- Cost effectiveness -- Mathematical models | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Mortality | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Risk-taking (Psychology) | en_US |
dc.title | Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation Criteria | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |