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Behavioral Public Choice: The Behavioral Paradox of Government Policy

dc.contributor.authorViscusi, W. Kip
dc.contributor.authorGayer, Ted, 1970-
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-26T20:13:19Z
dc.date.available2016-04-26T20:13:19Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citation38 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 973 (2015)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/7550
dc.descriptionarticle published in law journalen_US
dc.description.abstractAlthough government agencies increasingly use behavioral irrationalities as a justification for government intervention, the paradox is that these same government policies are also subject to similar behavioral inadequacies across a broad range of policies. This article develops an analysis of behavioral public choice in which we recognize that government officials are human and subject to behavioral anomalies and to public choice incentives that could further lead to welfare-reducing policies. Moreover, the existence of behavioral failures by the general public will lead to public pressures on government agencies to foster policies in response to these behavioral inadequacies. This article presents a series of policy examples indicating how government policies as well are subject to behavioral and political biases.en_US
dc.format.extent1 PDF (38 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherHarvard Journal of Law & Public Policyen_US
dc.subject.lcshBehavior modification -- Law and legislation -- United Statesen_US
dc.titleBehavioral Public Choice: The Behavioral Paradox of Government Policyen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn-urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=2559408


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