dc.contributor.author | Newton, Michael A., 1962- | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-05-01T16:32:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-05-01T16:32:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 45 Tex. Int'l L. J. 323 (2009) | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/8391 | |
dc.description | article published in law journal | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | This article challenges the prevailing view that U.S. "exceptionalism" provides the
strongest narrative for the U.S. rejection of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. The United States chose not to adopt the Protocol in the face of intensive
international criticism because of its policy conclusions that the text contained overly
expansive provisions resulting from politicized pressure to accord protection to
terrorists who elected to conduct hostile military operations outside the established
legal framework. The United States concluded that the commingling of the regime
criminalizing terrorist acts with the jus in bello rules of humanitarian law would be
untenable and inappropriate. In effect, the U.S. concluded that key provisions of
Protocol I actually undermine the core values that spawned the entire corpus of
humanitarian law. Whether or not the U.S. position was completely accurate, it was
far more than rejectionist unilateralism because it provided the impetus for subsequent
reservations by other NA TO allies. More than two decades after the debates regarding
Protocol I, the U.S. position provided the normative benchmark for the subsequent
rejection of efforts by some states to shield terrorists from criminal accountability
mechanisms required by multilateral terrorism treaties. This article demonstrates that
the U.S. policy stance regarding Protocol I helped to prevent the commingling of the
laws and customs of war in the context of the multilateralf ramework for responding to
transnational terrorist acts in the aftermath of September 11. In hindsight, the
"exceptional" U.S. position was emulated by other nations as they reacted to
reservations designed to blur the distinctions between terrorists and privileged
combatants. U.S. "exceptionalism" in actuality paved the way for sustained
engagement that substantially shaped the international response to terrorist acts. This
article suggests that reservations provide an important mechanism for states to engage
in second-order dialogue over the true meaning and import of treaties, which in turn
fosters the clarity and enforceability of the text. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1 PDF (56 pages) | en_US |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Texas International Law Journal | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Geneva Conventions (1949 August 12). Protocols, etc. (1977 June 10) | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2000) | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Terrorism -- Prevention -- Law and legislation | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Humanitarian law | en_US |
dc.title | Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against Terrorism | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |