Does a Loss or a Win Affect Who Tunes
In? Political Advantage, Disadvantage,
and Media Consumption

By

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To my parents, sister, brother, and Joshua for their unwavering support and unconditional love.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Helen Thomas, a legendary White House reporter who covered every president from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, once said that, "we are the only institution in our society that can question a president on a regular basis and make him accountable. Otherwise, he could be king" (Sullivan 2013). The notion that the media's purpose is to help hold elected officials accountable is a value that is not only integral to Americans' definitions of democracy, but also one that dates back to the time of the First Amendment's enumeration of the freedom of the press.

Throughout history, reporters have indeed helped hold politicians accountable. Perhaps most famously, the reporting of *The Washington Post*'s Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein broke the story of the Watergate scandal and other abuses of power in the Nixon administration that ultimately led to his resignation. More recently, local papers and the national media—including partisan-leaning media—helped bring to light Governor Chris Christie's "bridgegate" scandal when lanes of the George Washington Bridge were closed allegedly as a means of exacting revenge against a mayor who did not endorse Christie in the 2013 gubernatorial election.

In the 2016 election, David Fahrenthold's Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative reporting into Donald Trump's charitable giving (that was even crowdsourced via Twitter) served as a conceptually simple, yet deeply valuable way to hold Trump accountable for all the times he had claimed to donate money to various organizations. And even in the early months of Trump's presidency, reporters at *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* have broken story after story about potential abuses of power within this administration, particularly surrounding the investigation into collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia in the 2016 election.

The media's reporting on such abuses of power is a large part of the reason why scholars have written that in an ideal democracy, individuals should be informed so that they can monitor and hold elected officials accountable at the ballot box and through other forms of political activity

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(e.g., Dahl 1998). More generally, the media also provide citizens with information on campaigns, key policy debates, and political elites that they need to make political decisions and form political attitudes. Indeed, journalism schools train future members of the press to think of their work as a "social obligation" to provide accurate and comprehensive information to the democratic citizens comprising their audiences (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2001, 52).

In this dissertation, I examine the conditions under which individuals choose to consume more (or less) political news, and thereby, help identify the conditions under which people choose to fulfill (or not fulfill) their roles as democratic citizens by becoming more (or less) politically informed. My primary research question is: how does the political context affect news consumption? I argue that advantage and disadvantage derived from the political environment can meaningfully affect political media consumption in a variety of different ways. Throughout the project, I focus mainly on the effects of electoral advantage and disadvantage—that is, believing that your favored candidate will win or lose, or actually experiencing your favored candidate win or lose an election outright—as my key independent variables.

For my dependent variable, I examine variation in the demand for political news, and I focus a good deal of attention on the consumption of partisan-leaning news. While the notion of objective reporting is often entwined in idealistic accounts of journalists as society's stewards of vital news information, in practice, media outlets of the past and present have not always lived up to such normative standards. Instead, there is clear evidence of ideological bias in the reporting of partisan papers throughout history (Groeling and Baum 2013) and in our current media environment (Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Ho and Quinn 2008). Because much of our nation's history has actually been filled with both the supply of *and* demand for ideologically biased news and because these news outlets still provide information to their audiences that helps them monitor political elites, I think examining partisan-leaning media is a worthy endeavor. Further, my work provides a new perspective on our understanding of partisan media that goes beyond their effects on viewers (e.g., Levendusky 2013) or the implications of

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changes in their supply over time (e.g., Gentzkow et al. 2011).

There are several possibilities for the direction of the relationship between the political environment and political news consumption. One is that the political context is simply unrelated to media demand due to relatively stable levels of interest over time (Prior 2010). Alternatively, advantage could boost news consumption. In particular, news outlets associated with politically advantaged parties could experience increased demand relative to media affiliated with disadvantaged parties. Perhaps individuals grant political news the most attention when their party is going to win or has won an election and they are full of enthusiasm (Brader 2006), but choose to disengage from the pain of politics after a loss or when a loss is eminent (Hirschman 1970 as cited in Anderson et al. 2005). Conversely, media associated with disadvantaged parties may experience increased demand compared to those affiliated with advantaged parties. Disadvantage may breed anxiety among individuals experiencing an electoral loss and consequently, intensify their interest in political information; advantage may do the opposite by signaling that all is well and close monitoring of the political world is unnecessary (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000).

To understand how the political context influences media demand among individuals, I analyze a variety of data ranging from the aggregate circulation levels of local partisan papers over time to original experimental data, observational surveys, and trends in Google searches. In doing so, this project provides evidence of how electoral advantage and disadvantage affect political information seeking in different time periods and for different types of news media. Even more, my results demonstrate that beyond stable, individual-level variables such as income (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), environmental factors can also meaningfully affect news consumption.

As a preview of my results, I use aggregate-level analyses in Chapter 2 to understand how the national political environment affects variation in the aggregate demand for partisan media. Here, I focus on the relationship between the political context—namely, political advantage and disadvantage derived from the national results of presidential elections—and media demand in the form of local partisan newspaper circulations from 1932 to 2004. The results suggest that when

parties are electorally advantaged in presidential contests, demand for their affiliated newspapers decreases relative to demand for papers affiliated with disadvantaged parties. I also present a case study of local Florida newspapers from the Tampa Bay region, and I briefly outline patterns in the prime-time audiences of cable television news channels; both analyses uncover results similar to those for the aggregate partisan paper circulations. Finally, I compare the power of presidential versus congressional election outcomes in shaping feelings of advantage and disadvantage, and the results suggest it is the former that matters the most for partisan news demand.

While informative in providing information about the first-order conditions of the relationship of interest, the analyses in Chapter 2 are both aggregate and observational. To better understand what is happening at the individual level, Chapter 3 of the dissertation presents original data from two experimental studies that randomly assigned treatment texts to induce a sense of political advantage and disadvantage on subjects. Importantly, this chapter's findings also shed light on the causal nature of the relationship between the political environment and media consumption. These data were collected in the weeks prior to the 2014 midterm elections and in the midst of the primaries for the 2016 presidential election in February 2016. The first study in this chapter tracked information-seeking patterns among a sample of individuals targeted to be nationally representative who were randomly assigned to read an article that framed their party as either advantaged or disadvantaged in the 2014 midterms. Process tracing technologies then monitored the types of stories respondents read.

In the second study in this chapter, respondents again read treatment texts that were meant to induce a sense of advantage or disadvantage about an upcoming election—this time, the 2016 presidential election. The treatments here differed from the first study in that they sought to specifically induce an emotional response: enthusiasm for advantage; anxiety and anger for disadvantage. Taken together, I find evidence in both studies that electoral advantage induces a sense of complacency by depressing respondents' willingness to learn more about the election at hand. I also find that anger associated with electoral disadvantage promotes behaviors that defend

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the in-group (i.e., one's political party), while anxiety is positively correlated with information seeking via social media—a particularly safe space to read political news because individuals can filter out oppositional viewpoints by only following those who align with their beliefs.

Chapter 4 presents the results of a case study of the 2016 U.S. presidential election that draws on observational survey analyses. Using data from the 2016 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP), I operationalize the electoral context using individuals' subjective perceptions about who they thought would win or lose the election, and I combine that with their vote choice to create measures of advantage and disadvantage. Statistical analyses then examine the relationship between those variables and outcome measures gauging interest in the campaign, beliefs about the importance of political knowledge, and political participation. I also analyze search patterns in Google trend data in Massachusetts and Alabama—states that overwhelmingly supported Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, respectively—before and after the election.

I find additional evidence supporting the notion that disadvantage can promote interest while advantage can breed complacency both before and after the election. Further, after the election, it seems the effects of disadvantage were exacerbated among Clinton voters who had been expecting her to win the presidency all along, which suggests the surprise outcome created conditions that made disadvantage a particularly motivating force for political engagement in 2016. However, the results also provide some scope conditions to the positive effects of disadvantage. Trump voters who believed the overwhelming predictions of the polls and did not think he would win ahead of the election were not energized by their disadvantage. Instead, they seem to have become hopeless and less engaged with politics than Trump voters who thought he would win. These patterns hold for political engagement among this subset of Trump supporters both before and after the election.

Throughout this project, I use a variety of measures for advantage and disadvantage. In the aggregate-level analyses of the first empirical chapter, I rely on an objective operationalization of electoral winners and losers based on the vote shares received by the candidate of each party. In the

second empirical chapter, I use experimentally induced frames meant to persuade individuals that their party was either going to win or lose the upcoming midterm or presidential election. Finally, in the third empirical chapter, I use observational data that relies on subjective perceptions of which candidate will win or lose to determine who feels advantaged and disadvantaged. Because I do not rely on one type of measure, yet still uncover results that largely complement one another across chapters, I feel more confident in the validity of my overall findings.

This dissertation also presents analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 that begin to connect the political context to political participation. Understanding the effects of advantage and disadvantage on behaviors like voting or donating money, for example, sheds light on variation in political activity due to the political environment. This, of course, also has important implications for understanding the quality of representation and accountability in our democratic society as political activity is a crucial way for citizens to voice their opinions (and grievances) to elected officials.

Chapter 5 closes the dissertation by providing a summary of the research and its normative importance, particularly the ways in which the analyses in this project speak to key issues of accountability. I also discuss directions for future work in this research agenda that further examine the determinants of perceptions of advantage and disadvantage and that move beyond advantage and disadvantage in electoral contexts to examine how these processes work once campaigns end and governing begins. A better understanding of how the political context affects engagement in between campaigns—when real governance takes place—will provide important insights into the factors that promote information seeking, participation, and ultimately, the quality of accountability and representation.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL ADVANTAGE, DISADVANTAGE, AND THE DEMAND FOR PARTISAN NEWS

Why do citizens consume political news? This chapter examines the determinants of such news consumption by focusing on the relationship between the national political context and partisan news demand. Studying the conditions under which individuals choose to learn about politics is important because the press conveys key information to the public ranging from candidates' and parties' platforms to elected officials' behavior in office. Citizens, in turn, are thought to form political opinions and make political decisions on the basis of such information (e.g., Dahl 1998).

Of course, many of the political news sources that individuals rely on today are tinged with partisan bias (see Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Ho and Quinn 2008), an attribute that also characterizes media offerings of the past. Given the presence of partisan media throughout U.S. history (e.g., Groeling and Baum 2013 but see Schudson 1978) and today, this chapter examines the conditions under which aggregate demand for news affiliated with the Republican and Democratic parties surges or declines. In doing so, I offer a new perspective on our understanding of partisan media that goes beyond their effects on viewers (e.g., Levendusky 2013) or the implications of changes in their supply (e.g., Gentzkow et al. 2011). Instead, my primary research question asks: how does the political environment affect demand for partisan news? I argue that a sense of advantage and disadvantage in the national electoral context can meaningfully influence relative partisan media consumption.

To understand how the political environment affects partisan media demand, my research—like Gerber and Huber (2009)—incorporates data rich in ecological validity that look beyond survey responses to study politically motivated behavior. Specifically, I examine two local Floridian papers' circulations between 1932 and 2014 and the aggregate circulations of local, daily partisan papers in the U.S. from 1932 to 2004. In doing so, my results speak to the effects of

political advantage and disadvantage across different time periods and geographic contexts.

Such analyses represent a new approach to the way that we typically conceptualize the relationship between the media and political outcomes. Existing literature often focuses on how nonpartisan and partisan media affect the political attitudes and behaviors of both citizens and elites (e.g., Clinton and Enamorado 2014; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Yet I take a different approach by characterizing how factors in the political context (i.e., electoral advantage or disadvantage) influence the relative demand for partisan media.

This chapter also helps adjudicate between competing hypotheses in the literature that suggest both advantage and disadvantage could boost or depress partisan news demand. While advantage could increase morale (e.g., Healy et al. 2010) and partisan news consumption, it may also promote a sense of complacency that decreases incentives to monitor politics. Conversely, the threat related to disadvantage may boost news demand (Marcus et al. 2000), but may also decrease efficacy and lead to political withdrawal (Hirschman 1970 as cited in Anderson et al. 2005).

Finally, examining the effects of advantage and disadvantage on partisan news demand has implications for the relationships between citizens and elites. Knowing whether the political context motivates some voters to consume more partisan news than others is critical, as this could lead to different responses to and interpretations of political outcomes based on the content of such news. Asymmetries in the monitoring of elites could also emerge, creating parallel asymmetries in accountability and representation. Thus, understanding *who* pays attention most and *when* can provide insight into the constraints elected officials perceive among their constituents.

Connecting the Political Environment to Partisan Media Demand

The goal of this chapter is to understand the relationship between the national political context and demand for partisan media. I argue that beyond more stable, individual-level traits like education, political advantage and disadvantage derived from parties' standings in national elections can meaningfully affect partisan news consumption. And because the relative status of political parties fluctuates over time (Anderson et al. 2005)—no one party has dominated the zero-

sum game of politics throughout U.S. history—the advantage and disadvantage felt by electoral winners and losers, respectively, should similarly fluctuate with the political context.

I focus on partisan news consumption because previous work in political communication (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2008; Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Severin and Tankard 1992 as cited in Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Stroud 2008; Stroud 2010 as cited in Lelkes et al. 2016), political psychology (e.g., Lodge and Taber 2013), and economics (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005) suggests that individuals prefer news that aligns with their preexisting beliefs, including those that are political. That is, individuals have a preference for partisan-friendly media. Even more, the presence of biased news, which the literature attributes to supply- (Baron 2006) and demand-side forces (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006 as cited in Galvis et al. 2016), has long been a feature of the American media landscape, which allows me to trace the relationship of interest across nearly a century. While independent papers emerged around the turn of the 20th century (Schudson 1978), Gentzkow et al. (2011) find evidence that partisan affiliations are rather enduring and can affect candidate endorsements into the 21st century. Patterson and Donsbach (1996 as cited in Baron 2006) also find evidence that political bias still affects decisions about story content and headlines among journalists in Western democracies[1].

Various strands of literature support two competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between the national political context and demand for partisan news, as well as the null hypothesis that electoral conditions are unrelated to partisan news consumption. Previous work finds that political interest is rather stable over individuals' lifetimes, as even short-term disruptions often

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[1] Independent papers did emerge in the U.S. with the rise of the high-speed printing press and penny press in the 1800s (Hamilton 2004; Schudson 1978), but these papers still exhibited some partisan biases—they were just less explicit about their affiliations (see also Gentzkow et al. 2014). Smaller, local papers that relied financially on parties and could not be sustained by advertising revenue alone like independent media (Petrova 2011 as cited in Galvis et al. 2016) operated with partisan leanings into the 1900s (McGerr 1986). Even in the 20th century when objectivity was the goal of professional reporters, Schudson (1978) observes there was skepticism that pure objectivity was or could ever be attained. Finally, partisan editorials have long been featured in American papers (Schudson 1978). In national data used in my main analyses, the mean percentage of Independent papers (1932-2004) is 22.39% and remains below 25% until 1984 (its maximum is 31.73% in 2000). The mean percentage of unaffiliated papers is 0.96%.

return to their long-term equilibrium within a year (Prior 2010). Perhaps the decision to purchase a politically friendly paper (by subscribing or buying one copy of the paper) is similarly stable in both the long- and short-term. Should this be the case, the null hypothesis that the demand for partisan media is orthogonal to political outcomes is a convincing possibility[2].

However, caveats to Prior's (2010) results suggest the political environment can affect interest, as he notes that Eastern and Western Germans experienced spikes in political interest surrounding the reunification of Germany. Thus, it is plausible that electoral outcomes could also influence partisan media demand in the short-term, and the literature supports competing hypotheses regarding this relationship. First, demand for media affiliated with a party advantaged by favorable electoral conditions could increase, while demand for the disadvantaged party's media could decrease. The zero-sum nature of electoral competition in particular facilitates this effect because elections produce a clear winner and loser. Electoral winners are often more supportive of their political system than losers (Anderson et al. 2005); perhaps that sentiment also compels winners to consume more partisan-friendly news as a means of expressing support for and following their party. Political advantage could also engender enthusiasm, an emotion that increases individuals' interest in campaigns (Brader 2006) and may increase willingness to read partisan news. Similarly, the euphoria that accompanies electoral triumphs (akin to the euphoria of a sports team's victory [Healy et al. 2010]) might boost morale among advantaged partisans and heighten demand for partisan news. That is, an electoral win could elicit reactions similar to those of sports fans "basking" in the glow of their team's win (Cialdini et al. 1976 as cited in Hirt et al. 1992), with partisans basking in their party's glory by reading more about their victory or the opposition's loss.

Conversely, supporters of a disadvantaged party may choose to disengage from and exit

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[2] If people are driven to seek more information in general (rather than partisan information), then the results could also be consistent with the null hypothesis. For instance, those compelled by the political context to consume more news could subscribe to both Democratic and Republican papers, or do so in a random fashion that cancels out in the aggregate. This would suggest no net change across local partisan newspaper demand over time.

politics (Hirschman 1970 as cited in Anderson et al. 2005). Individuals are less likely to vote when they expect to lose, particularly when they have repeatedly lost electoral contests (Anderson et al. 2005). Similar patterns may hold for partisan news demand; political losers may feel disconnected from politics and discouraged from consuming such news because it reminds them of their disadvantage. Alternatively, political losers may feel angry or aversive, emotions that lead to less systematic thought and an increased proclivity for action (Huddy et al. 2007; MacKuen et al. 2010). Those facing an unfavorable climate may focus on political action (Valentino et al. 2011; Huddy et al. 2015) instead of passively reading news—particularly those who are internally efficacious (Valentino et al. 2009b)—as a means of reversing their disadvantaged status.

With these forces at work among advantaged and disadvantaged partisans, one outcome that these theories support is that:

> *Demand for media affiliated with electorally advantaged parties should increase relative to demand for media affiliated with electorally disadvantaged parties.*

Directly comparing demand for the two types of media sheds light on which are being consumed more or less—and potentially, which party is being monitored more or less.

Alternatively, the literature supports a competing hypothesis: demand for media affiliated with disadvantaged parties could increase, while favorable conditions may inhibit demand for advantaged parties' media. The electorally advantaged may feel more complacent than enthusiastic, leading them to engage in politics without much critical thought (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000). Such contentment could lead advantaged partisans to let their guards down and rely on political habits instead of seeking out more partisan news. They may also defer to the officials they voted for, as winners generally have more trust in government than losers (Anderson et al. 2005). With this mindset, increased partisan news consumption is unnecessary.

In contrast, electoral disadvantage could signal a threatening event that induces anxiety and promotes partisan news consumption. Anxiety signals failure and uncertainty (Steenbergen and Ellis 2006 as cited in Albertson and Gadarian 2015), which motivates individuals to seek out new

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information to resolve those negative feelings (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2008). For instance, anxiety over immigration boosts information seeking about that topic (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), and fear cues—not enthusiasm cues—stimulate TV news consumption (Brader 2006). Importantly, individuals tend to seek out unbalanced, partisan friendly information in the face of anxiety[3] (Valentino et al. 2009a).

Electoral losers are persistently less satisfied with the political system than winners, have less trust in government, and are more likely to protest. Additionally, electoral loss often increases support for changes to the electoral system (Anderson et al. 2005). Such political discontent coupled with a desire for change could motivate losers to consume more partisan news as a means of monitoring the opposition. Consuming partisan news can also help disadvantaged partisans cope with their loss by spinning their circumstances into something positive for their party. For example, Bill O'Reilly told Republicans there was a silver lining to their loss in the 2012 presidential election: the pressure on Democrats was now such that, "[i]f the economy doesn't improve dramatically over the next four years, the Democratic Party will evaporate" (2012).

Taken together, this second set of theories suggests the opposite of my first hypothesis:

Demand for media affiliated with electorally disadvantaged parties should increase relative to demand for media affiliated with electorally advantaged parties.

In the following sections, I examine variation in aggregate-level demand for partisan news to determine if evidence consistent with these expectations exists. In doing so, my results speak to the first-order conditions of the relationship of interest; that is, the findings will shed light on which of the predicted patterns occur in the aggregate—if at all. These data will not be able to discern which of the mechanisms predicted by the individual-level studies are at play (see, e.g., Kramer 1983), as the literature in support of each hypothesis point to observationally equivalent outcomes. However, uncovering evidence rich in ecological realism at the aggregate level that is consistent

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[3] This is true unless one has to defend one's beliefs later, making a balanced search beneficial (Valentino et al. 2009a).

with individual-level studies equally rich in internal validity allows us to be more confident in our understanding of how the political context relates to partisan media demand.

To provide an initial proof of concept, I first examine the relationship of interest using two partisan-leaning papers' circulations in the Tampa Bay region of Florida. My main analyses then focus on variation in the demand for all local partisan papers in the U.S. across nearly one century. Finally, I examine which political actors set the tone for advantage and disadvantage by comparing the effects of presidential and Congressional election outcomes on demand for partisan papers.

Advantage, Disadvantage, and Local Partisan Papers' Circulations

In studying the relationship between the national political context and demand for partisan media, I focus primarily on the demand for local, daily partisan newspapers. I view local partisan papers as just one form of partisan media that the national political context can influence. Other forms of partisan news could certainly be analyzed, but this medium's longstanding presence and prevalence throughout much of American history makes it a compelling case. And while the media environments in which local partisan papers exist have changed over time, there has, at least, always been an alternative form of news (e.g., radio or TV) throughout my analyses.

Newspapers are an appropriate medium to study for several additional reasons. Throughout much of U.S. history, papers were used as a platform for coalition merchants to advocate their stances on issues such as race. In doing so, these individuals used newspapers to guide the evolution of the parties' ideologies over time (Noel 2012). Papers also enjoy greater space to cover the news than TV broadcasts. While TV is constrained to sound bites and stories that last only minutes, newspapers can delve into greater detail with their coverage. Perhaps unsurprisingly, local papers tend to set the news agendas that their broadcast counterparts follow. Local papers also help hold elected officials accountable, as their reporters' knowledge of and access to lower-level bureaucratic processes make them well-positioned to uncover corruption (Arnold 2006).

In recent years, economic distress has certainly plagued the newspaper industry and local papers have been no exception. Notable local papers like the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* ended their

print circulation and shifted to online coverage (Yardley and Pérez-Peña 2009), while others have shut down entirely (see Dumpala 2009), giving citizens fewer choices in local papers to which they can subscribe or purchase. Aggregate circulation data of local partisan papers (used in later analyses) suggest that among U.S. cities with at least one paper, the mean percentage of cities with more than one paper fell from 69% in 1869 to 28% in 1932, 15% in 1968, and 3% in 2004[4].

However, if citizens have only one newspaper in their city, the financial decision to subscribe or not subscribe at all to a local paper could still be affected by national politics. My results are likely conservative because those with only one local partisan paper may continue to subscribe to it so they can access news even when national political forces motivate them to do otherwise. In sum, studying local newspapers is critical because they expose readers to important information ranging from ideology to elected officials' behavior. And though papers have faced economic distress and new media have emerged over time, focusing on newspapers allows me to trace the relationship between advantage, disadvantage, and demand across nearly one century[5].

A Case Study of Florida Papers

To gain insight into the relationship between the political environment and demand for like-minded news, I first focus on the weekday circulations of two prominent papers in the Tampa Bay area of Florida: the *Tampa Bay Times* (formerly known as the *St. Petersburg Times*) and *The Tampa Tribune*. This case study serves as an ideal starting point for my analyses for several reasons. First, scholarly work has demonstrated that there are ideological differences in the papers' content: prior to the *Tampa Bay Times'* purchase of *The Tampa Tribune* in 2016, analyses found the former leaned Democratic with more liberal content while the latter leaned Republican with more conservative content[6] (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010). Therefore, those in this region had the

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[4] See Appendix for a depiction of this. The mean percentage of these cities with at least one Democratic and one Republican paper: 51% in 1869, 11% in 1932, 3% in 1968, and finally, less than 1% in 2004.
[5] Depending on the research question, future work on local papers will have to consider the effects of these papers' dwindling budgets for original reporting and the closing of local papers over time. For this study, I make efforts to account for trends over time and outline those in the analyses below.
[6] The media directory Mondo Times corroborates these ideological slants (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010), however, Budak et al. (2016) suggest Gentzkow and Shapiro's (2010) findings may overstate outlets' bias.

option to consume two local papers with different political leanings. Tampa Bay is also neither staunchly Republican nor staunchly Democratic; in fact, it has been considered a swing region in the swing state of Florida (Cohen 2012). Such heterogeneity in partisanship suggests there likely is variation (i.e., a mix of "winners" and "losers") in response to changes in the political context.

Papers in the Tampa Bay region also do not serve parts of the country like Washington D.C., in which citizens are more likely to be political junkies who perennially subscribe to newspapers regardless of the context. Even more, papers in Tampa Bay differ from those in cities like New York, which tend to serve not only locals, but also people throughout the country who are consistently more attentive to politics. Finally, while the politics of Tampa Bay have been characterized at times by patronage, corruption, and machines (Kerstein 1991; 1995), its political history still has not been dominated by party bosses and formal party organizations like that of Northern cities (e.g., Chicago). Though the distinction between politics in Northern and Sunbelt regions is often overstated (Kerstein 1995), the relatively weaker presence of political machines in the Sunbelt region is helpful because a more dominant political class comprised of powerful party machines may have systematically deterred residents from following and engaging with politics.

To understand how the national political context affects newspaper circulations, I regress the relative changes in the demand for both Tampa Bay papers on presidential election outcomes. My primary independent variable is the difference in the two-party national vote share as a percentage of all votes cast. Formally, I subtract the Democratic Party's national votes from those of the Republican Party in presidential election year *t* and divide that value by the total votes cast:

$$\frac{[(RepublicanVotes_t)-(DemocraticVotes_t)]}{TotalVotes_t} * 100 \qquad [1]$$

Positive values of this variable, *GOP Vote Margin*, generally indicate a Republican victory and an electorate that is presumably more disposed toward Republican ideas, while negative values indicate a Democratic victory[7]. I use presidential elections to operationalize the political context

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[7] Election data were collected in 2014 from uselectionatlas.org. See Appendix for a plot of *GOP Vote Margin*, which is not lopsided (its mean is -0.80%, standard deviation is 13.06 percentage points, min. is -

because I am interested in how advantage and disadvantage permeating the nation affect demand for local partisan news. Additionally, presidential elections rose in prominence throughout the 20th century as the relative importance of the office increased (Moe and Howell 1999) and the president's relative ability to achieve policy goals was enhanced. Thus, presidential contests are likely to serve as powerful political stimuli that influence demand for partisan news[8].

In addition to the enhanced role of the presidency during the 20th century, I focus this analysis on 1932 to 2014 for several reasons. First, illiteracy rates fell below 5% in the 1930s (National Center for Education Statistics), which decreases the proportion of individuals who chose not to purchase newspapers simply because they could not read. The years spanning 1932 to 2014 also contain the eras in which radio (1932-1952) and then television (1956-2004) enjoyed a national penetration rate of at least 50%[9] [Sterling 1984 as cited in Gentzkow et al. 2011]). Thus, it could be the case that the types of individuals still purchasing newspapers represent a more politically fervent segment of the population that is strongly affected by the changing political environment. Such factors combined could heighten the ability of presidential elections to affect demand for local partisan papers.

To construct the dependent variable of relative partisan media demand, I rely on original newspaper circulation data collected by the author from the *Editor & Publisher International Yearbook* (1932-2010) and the *Editor & Publisher International Databook*[10] (2012-2014). This outcome variable is calculated as a measure of the relative changes in weekday circulations for each paper. I focus on the change in circulations every four years in response to presidential election outcomes. I first calculate the change in circulations from the year after one presidential election to the year after the next presidential election for each paper. These values illustrate how

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24.26% and max. is 23.15%). This variation helps alleviate concerns that there are persistent losers disaffected by politics (Anderson et al. 2005).
[8] Local political forces (e.g., how one's district or state votes) could certainly motivate partisan news demand. Studying their effects is beyond the scope of this paper, but represents an interesting avenue for future work.
[9] Gentzkow et al. (2011) only classify years up to 2004, but the TV era can presumably be extended to 2014.
[10] The databook for 2011 does not seem to exist, but is not needed since I focus on the year after elections.

demand for the Democratic paper changed over time and how demand for the Republican paper

changed over time. Then, I subtract the change in the Democratic-leaning paper (i.e., the *Tampa*

Bay Times) from that of the Republican-leaning paper (i.e., *The Tampa Tribune*) and convert that

value to a percentage of total circulations. Formally, for each presidential election year I calculate:

$$\frac{[R_{t+1} - R_{t-3}] - [D_{t+1} - D_{t-3}]}{R_{t+1} + D_{t+1}} * 100, \qquad [2]$$

where $R_{(t+1)}$ is the circulation level of the Republican-leaning paper in the year after presidential

election year *t*, $R_{(t-3)}$ is the circulation level of the Republican-leaning paper in the year after the

previous election year *t-4*, $D_{(t+1)}$ is the circulation level of the Democratic-leaning paper in the year

after election year *t*, and $D_{(t-3)}$ is the circulation level of the Democratic paper in the year after the

previous election year *t-4*. I divide this value by the sum of the papers' circulations in year *t+1*.

The goal of this chapter is to examine how the national political context affects demand for

the advantaged party's media compared to the disadvantaged party's media. By subtracting the

change in the Democratic paper's circulations from that of the Republican paper's circulations, I

am essentially comparing the papers' circulations while controlling for their raw differences and

differencing out confounding factors that equally affected both (see, e.g., Card and Krueger 1994;

Clinton and Enamorado 2014). For example, wars or natural disasters could affect the papers'

circulations. This measure effectively controls for such systematic factors by differencing out their

common effect on the papers[11]. Importantly, these aggregate-level data speak to aggregate-level

patterns, so not all individuals in all years will behave the same way, and some may respond in

ways that differ from the majority[12]. And while the timing of this analysis points to a causal

relationship between presidential elections and the relative demand for the two papers, these data

are still observational and the analysis is ultimately correlational.

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[11] Though this measure is not a traditional difference-in-differences (DiD) setup, it holds similar properties. Like other DiD models, I assume that in the absence of the current election, patterns in circulations from the previous election would follow parallel trajectories over time (see, e.g., Abadie 2005). They are, in effect, the baseline against which changes are compared. See Appendix for a plot of this measure.
[12] Future work could collect data with individuals' partisanship and partisan paper circulations over time to speak to the mechanisms driving the overall patterns found in my results.

Figure 1 Relationship Between GOP Vote Margin and Relative Changes in Circulations for Tampa Bay Partisan Papers

To understand how the political context affects news demand, Figure 1 depicts the bivariate relationship between the electoral context and relative changes in the papers' circulations. The plotted values suggest a negative correlation, which column 1 of Table 1 confirms is statistically significant[13] (b=-0.24; p=0.03). Substantively, an increase of one standard deviation (12.48 percentage points) in the percentage of votes received by the Republican Party over the Democratic Party corresponds with the Democratic-leaning *Tampa Bay Times* gaining roughly 10,110.03 circulations *more* than the Republican-leaning *Tampa Tribune*[14]. Including control variables for the change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the lagged

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[13] All analyses in this chapter use robust standard errors to account for any issues with collinearity or heteroskedasticity. Note that the effect of the change in *GOP Vote Margin* from the last election to the current one is insignificant (b=-0.04; p=0.61) and suggests citizens are not sensitive to relative changes in the two-party vote margins over time.

[14] To calculate this number, I took the standard deviation of *GOP Vote Margin* (12.48 percentage points) and multiplied it by the coefficient of interest: -0.24. This value represents the difference in the two papers' circulation changes as a percentage of all circulations. To transform that into circulations, I divided it by 100 and multiplied that by the mean value of total circulations in the year after an election (337,540.9).

Republican vote margin, and the radio era of 1932 to 1952 (Sterling [1984] as cited in Gentzkow et al. [2011]) in columns two through four, respectively, suggests the negative relationship between *GOP Vote Margin* and circulation changes is quite robust.

Table 1 Political Environment and Demand for Partisan Newspapers in Tampa Bay, 1932-2014

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GOP Vote Margin [%]	-0.24** 0.10	-0.24** 0.11	-0.20* 0.10	-0.14* 0.07	-0.08 0.09	
Change in GDP		-0.0008 0.002				
GOP Vote Margin Lagged [%]			-0.10 0.10			
Radio Period				8.37* 4.16		
Time					-2.64** 1.17	
Time-Squared					0.10* 0.05	
Winner						-3595.95 4310.70
Decade Fixed Effects						Yes
Intercept	-0.94 1.38	0.02 2.43	-1.04 1.34	-2.99*** 0.98	13.58* 6.68	9041.48*** 2155.35
N	20	18	20	20	20	40
R²	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.45	0.43	0.80

Note: The dependent variables in Columns 1-5 are a relative measure of the changes in the two papers' circulations over time as a percentage of circulations in the year after a presidential election. Column 6 uses the alternative specification with the change in circulations for party *j*'s paper as the dependent variable. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with robust standard error below; Column 6 also has standard errors clustered by year. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

In column 5, I control for time and time-squared, which detrend the data and decrease the significance of *GOP Vote Margin*. Though it is still negatively signed (b=-0.08), this coefficient is not statistically significant (p=0.37). Finally, column 6 uses an alternative specification that also controls for time trends but in a different manner. Here, the dataset is reorganized so that the unit of analysis is year-party of paper; that is, each row contains the circulations of party *j*'s paper, so there are two rows per election year: one for each party's paper. The dependent variable in this model is

the change in the circulations of party *j*'s paper from the year after the previous election (*t-3*) to the year after the current election (*t+1*), and the key independent variable is *Winner*, which represents whether or not the party affiliated with a given paper won year *t*'s presidential election. Controls for time using decade fixed effects are also included[15]. The coefficient for *Winner* describes the average difference between the change in circulations for the winning party's paper and the change in circulations for the losing party's paper, and the results again point to a negative, albeit insignificant, relationship: the disadvantaged party's paper gains an average of 3,596 more circulations than the advantaged party's paper from the year after the last election to the year after the current election (*p*-value=0.42, two-tailed). (Note that *b*=-5,089, *p*=0.23, two-tailed controlling also for the paper's party and change in GDP; *b*=-472.49, *p*=0.20, two-tailed when vote share is used as the independent variable with decade fixed effects.)

Taken together, the results of this case study are consistent with Hypothesis 2's expectation of a negative relationship between political advantage and the relative demand for partisan-affiliated media. The results do not allow us to discern if the advantaged are reading less, the disadvantaged are reading more, or if both are at play. They do, however, provide insight into the overall direction of the relationship of interest. Because these findings are not robust to all specifications in Table 1 and the analysis is limited to one specific part of the country, the next section draws on a more geographically expansive dataset with which I examine circulations for all local partisan papers across states. Doing so helps us understand if and how the national political context affects relative, aggregate demand for partisan media throughout the U.S. and across time.

An Analysis of All Local, Daily Partisan Newspaper Circulations

To understand the effects of national political conditions on partisan news consumption across time and the entire U.S., I focus on the demand for all local, daily partisan newspapers from

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[15] I use time and time-squared in Model 5 and decade fixed effects here instead of year fixed effects due to the low *N* in this dataset and concerns of overfitting the model. In column 6, robust standard errors clustered by year are used.

1932 to 2004. In this analysis, the political context is again represented by electoral outcomes from presidential races, which serve as an indicator of each party's political advantage or disadvantage. For this measure, I calculate the difference between the two parties' votes received in presidential elections from 1932 to 2004 by subtracting the Democratic Party's votes from the Republican Party's votes in election year t and dividing that by all votes cast[16]. Once again, positive values generally indicate a Republican victory and an electorate that is more disposed toward Republican ideas, while negative values indicate a Democratic victory.

To measure and characterize demand for local partisan papers, I rely on a dataset collected by Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2012). Their data provide information on the circulation levels of local daily papers for each presidential election year from 1869 to 2004 and classify every newspaper as Republican, Democratic, Independent, or unaffiliated. This information was collected from the G. Rowell & Co.'s *American Newspaper Directory* (for papers from 1869 to 1876), the N.W. Ayer & Son's *American Newspaper Annual* (for papers from 1880 to 1928), and the *Editor & Publisher Yearbook* (for papers from 1932 to 2004). Like before, I begin my analysis in 1932, but end it in 2004, as this is the last year of Gentzkow et al.'s (2012) dataset[17].

While recent scholarship attempts to quantify and rank the ideology of media organizations, this work characterizes a narrow sliver of the contemporary media environment (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Ho and Quinn 2008) or an even narrower sample of historical papers (e.g., Groeling and Baum 2013 examine two papers), and is unhelpful for this analysis. Therefore, I rely on the coding scheme of Gentzkow et al. (2011) to determine the political associations of local newspapers. Specifically, the authors use whether or not the paper had ever formally declared a Republican, Democratic, or Independent affiliation to

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[16] Analyses that calculate the denominator using the sum of only the two party's votes produce similar results.
[17] Gentzkow et al.'s (2012) data include only general-circulation English-language daily U.S. papers (distributed at least four weekdays per week) and exclude foreign-language papers and national papers like *USA Today* and *The Wall Street Journal*. Their data are missing circulation numbers for less than 1% of Republican and Democratic papers from 1932-2004. I downloaded this dataset from ICPSR in February 2014; it has since been revised on that site.

assign political associations to papers throughout the duration of the dataset[18].

The assumption of time-invariant partisan reputations is strong, but Gentzkow et al. (2011) conduct content analyses to show that between 1872 and 1928—the years in which papers were the preeminent source of news—Republican papers devoted 48% of their candidate mentions to Republicans while Democratic papers mentioned Republican candidates only 29% of the time, a difference that is highly significant. In more recent years (1932 to 2004), historically Republican papers endorsed Republican candidates 90% of the time while historically Democratic papers endorsed Republican candidates only 45% of the time[19] (Gentzkow et al. 2011).

Even if these analyses prove unconvincing, the claim that there are lasting partisan differences is an empirical one. If the partisan reputations of papers eroded over time, then we would expect the differences in my hypotheses to deteriorate, particularly as emerging papers became less partisan. That is, the lack of enduring partisan effects would provide another reason to expect a null relationship between political forces and media demand. Should we find empirical evidence of one of the theoretically expected relationships, this would suggest that the original affiliation truly does have a lasting impact as Gentzkow et al. (2011) assume[20].

To understand the relative demand for partisan papers, I focus once again on the changes in circulation trends over time. Here, I use a measure of Republican and Democratic papers that calculates the change in circulations from the previous election year to the current one for both types of papers and then subtracts the change in Democratic papers from that of Republican papers.

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[18] In the few cases in which a paper switched partisan affiliation, the majority affiliation is used.

[19] This endorsement rate of out-party candidates may seem high for originally Democratic papers, and it suggests more variance around Democratic papers. Ideally, I would use more fine-grained data with the partisanship and strength of partisan bias of each paper reassessed each election year, as the political context could have a stronger effect on demand for more partisan papers versus less partisan papers. Unfortunately, such data are not readily available, so I follow Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) and use the majority partisan affiliation provided. It is reassuring that Republican vote share is positively related—albeit, not precisely estimated—to the Republican minus Democratic paper circulation difference over time (similar to analyses in Gentzkow et al. 2014).

[20] See Appendix for a plot of the circulations of local partisan papers from 1932 to 2004. While the two types of papers follow the same general pattern over time—with Republican papers enjoying more circulations than Democratic ones—there are clear divergences in the slopes of their trend lines at times.

This measure again allows me to identify relative changes in demand for the two types of papers while also eliminating confounding factors by subtracting out their common effects on both papers. The outcome variable also controls for disparities in the papers' raw circulation levels, which is helpful because relying on the raw measures would nearly always result in a Republican paper advantage even though there have been sizable surges in Democratic papers' circulations at various points in history. Formally, for each presidential election year t I calculate:

$$\frac{[R_t - R_{t-4}] - [D_t - D_{t-4}]}{TotalCirculations_t} * 100, \qquad [3]$$

where R_t is the circulation level of Republican papers in presidential election year t, $R_{(t-4)}$ is the circulation level of Republican papers in the previous election year t-4, D_t is the circulation level of Democratic papers in election year t, and $D_{(t-4)}$ is the circulation level of Democratic papers in the last election year t-4. Like before, I divide this measure by total circulations in election year t[21].

Ideally, I would focus on circulations in the year following presidential elections, as I did in the Florida case study analyses. Doing so would better model the temporal order of the relationship of interest. However, aggregate circulation data in the year after presidential elections are not readily available for all local partisan papers in the country from 1932 to 2004. Therefore, I make a key assumption in support of my model choice based on analyses of existing and newly collected data consisting of a sample of papers' yearly circulations: I assume that newspapers' circulations in year t versus year $t+1$ are linearly related to one another[22]. (This does not preclude the possibility of circulations changing meaningfully every four years, as incremental changes each year could result in larger differences in circulations between every fourth year.)

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[21] See Appendix for a plot of this dependent variable. Analyses omitting Independent and unaffiliated papers from the denominator produce substantively similar results.

[22] To validate this assumption, I collected the circulations of 13 notable newspapers—local and national, as well as Republican and Democratic—for all years from 1950 to 2013 using the *Editor & Publisher International Yearbooks*. I find a tight mapping from one year to the next (average b=0.92 for all papers regressing year t on t-1). I also analyze circulations for *all* domestic papers between 1945 and 2009 using *Editor & Publisher International Yearbook* data. The results are similar (regressing t on t-1: b=1.00, p=0.00 for daily papers; b=0.96, p=0.000 for Sunday papers), and imply there are not large year-to-year circulation changes. Analyses are available by request.

It is even more reassuring that analyses with the Tampa Bay papers produce substantively similar results using both temporal operationalizations of my dependent variable. The results remain nearly identical when I focus on circulation changes from year *t-3* to year *t+1* (*GOP Vote Margin*'s coefficient is -0.24; $p=0.03$ in the bivariate regression) and from year *t-4* to year *t* (*GOP Vote Margin*'s coefficient is -0.19; $p=0.12$ in the bivariate regression), where *t* again represents the presidential election year. If anything, the operationalization used in this section produces estimates that are somewhat conservative compared to the alternative measure.

I also assume that leading up to Election Day, the sense that the winning party will be victorious can be palpable to voters. For instance, the 1984 election was a landslide victory for the Republican incumbent, President Ronald Reagan, who beat his Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale, with 58.8% of the popular vote. Even more telling is that Reagan's approval ratings exceeded his disapproval ratings throughout 1984 (Roper Center Public Opinion Archives), so it is possible that Democrats began to sense their impending loss prior to November and adjusted their media demand in real time. Indeed, that same year also saw a large relative change in circulations favoring Democratic papers, suggesting this was the case[23].

Figure 2 plots the relationship between the vote margin of the Republican Party in a given presidential election year and the relative changes in the papers' circulations. The bivariate regression line also pictured summarizes the negative relationship between the two: as the percentage of votes received by Republicans over Democrats increases, Republican papers' circulations actually decrease compared to those of Democratic papers (*b*=-0.10; $p=0.01$).

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[23] The effects I uncover here are, of course, average effects, so this will not always be true each year.

Figure 2 Relationship Between GOP Vote Margin and Relative Changes in Circulations for All Local Partisan Papers

Statistical analyses of the dependent variable in column 1 of Table 2 confirm the significance and robustness of the negative bivariate correlation in Figure 2[24]. Substantively, the results suggest that a one standard deviation increase (13.06 percentage points) in the percentage of votes received by the Republican Party over the Democratic Party corresponds with Democratic newspapers gaining roughly 693,486 *more* circulations than Republican papers[25]. This finding provides evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2's expectation that demand for media affiliated with the disadvantaged party will increase relative to demand for media affiliated with the advantaged party. Both Hypothesis 1—which predicted a positive relationship between advantage and relative partisan media demand—and the null hypothesis are not supported by these analyses.

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[24] Bootstrapping (*J*=250) uncovers a similar result: *GOP Vote Margin*=-0.10 with a 95% c.i. of [-0.18, -0.04].
[25] I calculated this number by multiplying the standard deviation of *GOP Vote Margin* (13.06 percentage points) by the key coefficient: -0.10. I divide that by 100 and multiply it by the mean of all circulations (53,100,000).

Table 2 Political Environment and Demand for All Local Partisan Newspapers, 1932-2004

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GOP Vote Margin [%]	-0.10**	-0.07**	-0.10**	-0.08*	-0.06	
	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	
Change in GDP		-0.0009*				
		0.0005				
GOP Vote Margin Lagged [%]			-0.02			
			0.04			
Radio Period				1.39		
				0.91		
Time					-0.45	
					0.41	
Time-Squared					0.01	
					0.02	
Winner						-9292.30**
						4520.64
State-Year Fixed Effects						Yes
Intercept	0.28	0.74	0.29	-0.14	3.02	77831.65
	0.41	0.56	0.41	0.45	1.89	77904.64
N	19	18	19	19	19	1938
R^2	0.36	0.40	0.37	0.43	0.52	0.50

Note: Columns 1-5 use a dependent variable that is a relative measure of the changes in the two types of papers' circulations over time as a percentage of all circulations. Column 6 uses the alternative specification with the change in circulations for party *j*'s paper as the dependent variable. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with robust standard error below. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

To ensure the robustness of this key finding and to reduce the possibility that it is due to omitted variables, Table 2 also reports several other model specifications similar to those included in the analysis of the Floridian papers. Though the differencing used to construct the dependent variable should have eliminated the effects of confounding variables, I again control for changes in GDP from the previous election year to the current one to assess whether that is the case. Column 2 suggests the change in GDP does marginally affect the relative changes in circulations between the two papers, but the Republican vote margin remains significant and negative[26]. Column 3 includes the lagged *GOP Vote Margin* to capture the effect of previous elections. The results not only

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[26] I also ran analyses with the raw GDP for each election year and find that it has an insignificant effect.

suggest the lagged vote margin is insignificant, but the independent variable of interest is again

negatively signed and significant at the same magnitude as the original bivariate analysis[27].

I also examine whether the changing nature of the media environment across the radio

(1932-1952) and TV eras (1956-2004) as designated by Gentzkow et al. (2011) may be driving the

results. Column 4 includes an indicator variable for the radio period that uses the TV era as the

baseline, and its coefficient suggests the difference between the two is insignificant. Even more, the

size and significance of *GOP Vote Margin* remain largely intact. Analyses dividing 1932 to 2004

into thirds also alleviate concerns that the results are confined to one era, as the coefficient of

interest is consistently negative over time[28]. Further, column 5 detrends the data by including

measures for *time*, a count variable for election years, and *time-squared*, which captures nonlinear

effects of time. Neither reaches significance, while *GOP Vote Margin* remains negative, albeit

smaller in magnitude (b=-0.06) and significance (p=0.19) than before. It is reassuring, though, that

placebo tests using election results from *t-8, t-4, t+4,* and *t+8* while controlling for *time* and *time-

squared* produce effects that are smaller in absolute magnitude and much less significant[29].

The model in the last column of Table 2 accounts for time trends in a different manner

while employing an alternative specification similar to what was used in the last column of Table 1.

Here, the data are reorganized so that the unit of analysis is year-state-party of paper. Each row

contains the circulations of party *j*'s papers in each election year-state combination (i.e., two rows

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[27] Using the change in Republican vote margin (as a percentage of total votes cast) from one election to the next as the key independent variable again produces an insignificant result. This finding reinforces the notion that the current political context alone seems to drive patterns of newspaper consumption.

[28] I created dummy variables for three time periods (1932-1956, 1960-1980 and 1984-2004) and interacted each with *GOP Vote Margin*. I then regressed the dependent variable on *GOP Vote Margin*, dummies for 1960-1980 and 1984-2004 (1932-1956 was the suppressed baseline), and interactions between those two time periods and *GOP Vote Margin*. The results suggest the effects do not differ significantly over time, as none of the interactions reaches statistical significance, and the overall effect of *GOP Vote Margin* is consistently negative in each period.

[29] See Clinton and Enamorado (2014) for similar placebo analyses with a similar analysis. Cities without two distinct partisan papers might dull my effects, so I replicated the main analyses only in cities with one of each paper. Here, the coefficient for *GOP Vote Margin* (b=-0.14, p=0.29 two-tailed) is larger in magnitude. Finally, the overall negative effect is a bit stronger in more competitive elections (i.e., when *GOP Vote Margin* is less than or equal to 10 percentage points): b=-0.21, p=0.03. The main effect in less competitive elections is still negative and significant (b=-0.09, p=0.05) though. See Appendix for related figures, more robustness checks, and analyses with raw values.

per year-state combination—one for each party's papers). Similar to column 6 of Table 1, the dependent variable is the change in the circulations of party *j*'s papers within a state from the previous election year (*t-4*) to the current election year *t*. The key independent variable is again *Winner*, a dummy for whether or not the papers' affiliated party won the presidential election. Controls for time and region using state-year fixed effects are also included[30]. Therefore, the coefficient for *Winner* represents the average difference between the change in circulations for the winning party's papers and the change in circulations for the losing party's papers within each state-year combination. As reported in Column 6 of Table 2, the key coefficient is both negative and significant (*b*=-9,292.30; *p*=0.04), indicating a negative link between electoral advantage and changes in circulations from the previous to current election year. Aggregating the effect size to the national level (i.e., multiplying the coefficient by 51 to include D.C.) suggests that the disadvantaged party's papers gain roughly 473,907 more circulations throughout the nation than the advantaged party's papers.

One cause for concern could be that voters in the South experienced changes in partisanship (Stanley 1988) during the timeframe of my analysis due to shifts in the parties' ideological reputations. To alleviate concerns that this is driving my results, I drop the 11 states that were members of the Confederacy. Doing so has no effect on my overall findings. As reported in the Appendix, the coefficients for *GOP Vote Margin* using the same specifications as Models 1 and 6 of Table 2 are *b*=-0.14 (*p*=0.02) and *b*=-15,082.99 (*p*=0.006), respectively.

Taken together, the results in Table 2 provide repeated evidence that the political context is meaningfully correlated with aggregate partisan media demand. In particular, the results are consistent with—though not dispositive of—Hypothesis 2's causal expectation that when parties are electorally advantaged, demand for their affiliated local papers decreases relative to demand for

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[30] All results using this specification are similar when state- and year-fixed effects are included separately and when the percentage of total votes won by party *j* in the nation is the key independent variable instead of *Winner*.

the disadvantaged party's papers. This negative link helps alleviate concerns of endogeneity, as it is unlikely the same forces increasing one type of paper's circulations would also depress voter turnout for its affiliated party. And while the findings do not allow us to discern if the advantaged are reading less, the disadvantaged are reading more, or if it is a mixture of both, the results do undermine Hypothesis 1's prediction of a positive link between advantage and relative demand as well as the null hypothesis that the political context is unrelated to partisan news consumption.

All Eyes on the White House

Thus far, my analyses have suggested a negative link between partisan newspaper circulations and advantage in the national political context operationalized solely in terms of the presidency. However, elected officials besides the commander-in-chief could set the tone of the political environment. In this section, I expand my analysis of local partisan paper circulations from 1932 to 2004 to consider how the partisan makeup of the House of Representatives may influence feelings of political advantage and disadvantage. Below, I compare the effects of the House's partisan composition against presidential election outcomes in driving relative changes in partisan paper circulations. I find that the latter tends to be the more important factor.

Examining the House over the Senate in my analysis makes sense because all 435 members of the House face re-election at the same time unlike the staggered terms of their Senate counterparts. Thus, the attention given to all of the House seats versus a subset of Senate seats is better positioned to influence the dynamics of political advantage and disadvantage. Additionally, members of the lower chamber still enjoy media attention given their lawmaking and oversight roles on issues that affect citizens' lives ranging from national security to healthcare.

In the analyses below, I use the partisan makeup of the House elected in the same year as the president to operationalize the parties' relative advantage or disadvantage in the lower chamber. Specifically, I subtract the number of Democratic seats elected from Republican seats elected and convert that value to a percentage of total seats to form *GOP House Seat Margin*. Positive values of this measure reflect instances in which there are more House Republicans than Democrats. For my

dependent variable, I again use the two measures of circulation changes for all local partisan newspapers (1932 to 2004) used in Table 2.

I first focus on the dependent variable used in the first five models of Table 2. Model 1 of Table 3 reports a negative and marginally significant bivariate correlation between *GOP House Seat Margin* and relative changes in demand for local partisan papers (b=-0.05; p=0.12). However, Model 2 of Table 3 regresses the dependent variable on both the *GOP House Seat Margin* and *GOP [Presidential] Vote Margin*, the latter of which is identical to the measure used in the last two sections. Including both the House and presidency allows for a direct comparison between the influence of Congressional electoral outcomes and presidential ones. And though the two are correlated at 0.60, it is plausible that they each still have independent effects.

Table 3 Differential Effects of the Political Environment on Demand for Partisan Newspapers, 1932-2004

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GOP House Seat Margin [%]	-0.05	-0.005	0.05	-0.01	0.002	0.03	
	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	
GOP Vote Margin [%]		-0.10**	-0.10***	-0.08*	-0.08*	-0.08†	
		0.04	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.05	
Change in GDP			-0.001**				
			0.0005				
GOP Vote Margin Lagged [%]				-0.02			
				0.05			
Radio Period					1.40		
					0.91		
Time						-0.42	
						0.43	
Time-Squared						0.01	
						0.02	
House Seats							-25.37
							52.27
Winner							-8153.44†
							5120.93
State-Year Fixed Effects							Yes
Intercept	-0.51	0.21	1.88*	0.06	-0.11	3.58*	82716.18
	0.50	0.64	0.89	0.71	0.67	1.78	80490.82
N	19	19	18	19	19	19	1938
R^2	0.15	0.36	0.49	0.38	0.43	0.54	0.50

Note: Columns 1-6 use a dependent variable that is a relative measure of the changes in the two types of papers' circulations over time as a percentage of all circulations. Column 7 uses the alternative specification with the change in circulations for party *j*'s paper as the dependent variable. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with robust standard error below. † $p<0.12$; *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Though still negative, the coefficient for seats in the House is now insignificant (*b=-0.005; p=0.90*), while that of presidential elections is negative and significant (*b=-0.10; p=0.03*). This suggests that the marginal significance of Congressional outcomes in Column 1 of Table 3 was largely due to that independent variable tapping into House *and* presidential outcomes simultaneously. Columns 3 through 6 report robustness checks similar to those used in previous analyses, and provide evidence that even when controlling for a variety of other factors, the effect

of presidential outcomes overpowers that of House outcomes[31]. Finally, Column 7 compares House and presidential election results but employs the alternative specification used in the last column of Table 2. The results demonstrate a negative and significant effect of winning the presidential election (b=-8,153.44; p=0.11), while the effect of the number of House seats won by party j is again insignificant[32] (b=-25.37; p=0.63).

In sum, the results suggest that even though House races have meaningful political consequences, their overall influence on the relative demand for partisan newspapers is largely out-shadowed by presidential campaigns and elections. That is, citizens seem to take cues of advantage and disadvantage more from the party of the presidency than the partisan makeup of the House. Such asymmetries in attention paid to different political actors could have implications for asymmetries in citizens' abilities to monitor and hold elected representatives accountable.

Conclusion

In defense of their decision to publish a controversial article about government surveillance of terrorists' financial transactions, the former executive editor of *The New York Times* and the former editor of *The Los Angeles Times* wrote that, "[o]ur job…is to bring our readers information that will enable them to judge how well their elected leaders are fighting on their behalf, and at what price" (Baquet and Keller 2006). Normative theories of democracy also uphold the importance of free-flowing information as it enhances citizens' participation and ability to hold elites accountable (Dahl 1998).

Given the press's import, it is crucial that scholars understand the determinants of media consumption, particularly its political determinants. My work represents one approach to doing so by examining how advantage and disadvantage in the political environment affect relative partisan news demand. While many scholars have considered the effects of media consumption on political

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[31] Like before, *Change in GOP Vote Margin* is insignificant, but so is the result for *GOP House Seat Margin*.
[32] Using the vote share (%) won by party j in the presidential election in this model produces negative and significant results (b=-977.79; p=0.01), while the effect of House seats won by party j is again insignificant (b=-5.14; p=0.92).

outcomes like voter turnout or candidate choice, I examine whether political outcomes affect the consumption of partisan news. Taken together, the combined analyses provide compelling evidence of a negative correlation between political advantage and relative, aggregate partisan media consumption across nearly a century. This project is the first of my knowledge to establish the first-order conditions for such a relationship. The findings also undermine the plausibility of both the null hypothesis and the expectation that political advantage could boost partisan media demand relative to disadvantage in the aggregate. Additionally, I find that presidential election outcomes tend to overpower those related to the House in terms of influence over partisan media demand.

Focusing on local partisan newspaper circulations has provided a broad historical view of the relationship between the electoral context and partisan news demand, but cable news channels like Fox News and MSNBC have emerged more recently as prominent sources of partisan news for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. Research on partisan media has and should continue to draw on this contemporary news medium, which can also shed light on the results in this paper. Because partisan cable news is rather new—Fox News was created in 1996, while MSNBC began to lean left in 2007 (Pew 2007)—I am limited in the analyses I can perform. Therefore, I briefly examine fluctuations in these channels' median prime-time audiences below. In doing so, I find further evidence of a negative link between advantage and relative partisan media demand[31].

For instance, after the 2008 election, Democrats were advantaged with control of the White House and majorities in both houses of Congress, while Republicans were disadvantaged. That disadvantaged status seems to have propelled Republicans to watch their favored cable TV news channel at a rate that outpaced their Democratic counterparts. While both Fox News and MSNBC experienced increases in viewers from 2008 to 2009, the former's median prime-time viewership increased 19.02% compared to the latter's increase of 2.5%. Similarly, the 2012 election resulted in the re-election of President Obama and Democrats gaining back eights seats in the House and one

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[31] Transcripts of prime-time shows on Fox News and MSNBC verify their biases through devices like story selection (Levendusky 2013). See Appendix for a plot of changes in both channels' prime-time audiences.

in the Senate. Thus, Republicans were relatively disadvantaged while Democrats were advantaged. Changes in prime-time viewership again suggest that relative political advantage dampens demand for partisan-friendly news more so than disadvantage: while MSNBC saw a 24.21% decrease in audience share for these key hours from 2012 to 2013, Fox News experienced only a 5.67% decrease in their audience share. And even in the months right after the 2016 election of Republican Donald Trump, prime-time viewership for MSNBC increased 55% from one year prior—a growth rate that is larger than its rivals (Grynbaum and Koblin 2017). In sum, these patterns suggest the findings based on local partisan newspapers may generalize to other, more contemporary forms of partisan media.

Throughout this paper, it has been reassuring that the results based on aggregate-level data, which are rich in ecological realism and focus on actual behavior instead of potentially biased self-reports (Prior 2009), have been consistent with individual-level studies of information demand (e.g., Marcus et al. 2000). However, using solely aggregate data can lead to problems of ecological inference, as I cannot clearly identify the mechanism(s) at play. For instance, I cannot discern if in- or out-party affect is a stronger force, or if advantaged partisans are consuming less, disadvantaged partisans are consuming more, or a bit of both is at play. Subsequent chapters will further this research by pinpointing the plausible individual-level mechanisms driving these overall patterns.

Finally, the results of this chapter can speak to critical issues of accountability and representation. If advantaged partisans sometimes check out of politics and blindly trust elected officials, then the monitoring of those who govern may be uneven. Consequently, the feedback given to representatives may be in one party's best interest while those in the other party may not voice their opinions as intensely. Those whose party is out of power may also be more likely to act on opinions formed after consuming partisan-tinged news that misrepresent reality. Future work might examine if the disadvantaged are generally more critical, outspoken, and politically active with a focus on the next election, or perhaps more likely to participate as a result of consuming biased information. In the end, understanding how advantage and disadvantage affect the relative

demand for partisan news sheds light on both the political determinants of partisan media

consumption and also the relationship between elites and citizens in democratic societies.

CHAPTER 3

THE INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL EFFECTS OF POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE

ON POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Campaigns and elections serve as opportunities for citizens to pause and take stock of the

political world surrounding them. The constant polling and horserace coverage that bombard

television screens, news websites, and social media during campaigns provide individuals with

tangible information regarding which party is ahead or behind in the electoral context. I argue that

citizens may respond to such information in differential ways depending on whether or not they

feel a sense of advantage or disadvantage based on their own party's standing.

This chapter examines the effects of feeling politically advantaged or disadvantaged on

individuals' willingness to engage with politics in a variety of ways. I define political advantage

and disadvantage as a feeling of one's party being ahead or behind, respectively, in an electoral

setting. I also focus on three key emotions that can result from hearing about a party's electoral

advantage or disadvantage: anger and anxiety, which are associated with disadvantage, and

enthusiasm, which can accompany feelings of advantage.

In doing so, I draw on previous work that argues individuals develop deep psychological

attachments towards parties (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960) and can also experience emotions on behalf

of groups they identify with, such as the Republican and Democratic parties. Experiencing those

group-based emotions has important downstream consequences for behavior (e.g., Mackie et al.

2000; Mackie et al. 2008) that I believe can include engagement with politics. Given the "team-

like" nature of partisan competition more generally (Green et al. 2004), but especially in electoral

contexts, it makes sense that learning about the advantage or disadvantage of one's party could

incite various emotions within individuals and in turn, affect their levels of political engagement.

For instance, we know that anger—an emotion of confrontation—prepares individuals for

action (Ellsworth and Smith 1988) and can promote political action (e.g., Huddy et al. 2015), while

anxiety has been found to consistently boost information seeking (e.g., Marcus et al. 2000; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Enthusiasm can promote cognitive and behavioral engagement with politics at times (e.g., Marcus et al. 2000; Brader 2006; Huddy et al. 2015), but may also cause individuals to let their guards down and follow politics less vigilantly as Chapter 2 suggests.

To understand how the national political context can influence individual-level media demand, I present evidence from two original experimental studies. The first was collected in the weeks leading up to the 2014 midterm elections and establishes the overall effects of advantage and disadvantage on news consumption. This study tracked information-seeking patterns among a sample of individuals targeted to be nationally representative who were randomly assigned to read an article that framed their party as either advantaged or disadvantaged in both the 2014 midterms and 2016 presidential election. Process tracing technologies then monitored the types of stories respondents read.

I also analyze original data collected on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in February 2016 to understand how advantage and disadvantage work in tandem with specific emotions to affect people's willingness to engage with politics. In particular, I focus on their influence over respondents' likelihood of learning more about politics—from politically friendly and unfriendly news sources as well as social media—and also their likelihood of supporting their own party at the voting booth.

Understanding the conditions under which people choose to read about politics is particularly important because notions of representative government are often predicated on the belief that citizens are well-informed decision-makers who participate in politics and make voting decisions based on their knowledge of candidates' and parties' platforms (e.g., Dahl 1998; Downs 1957). The news media play a crucial role in conveying this information to the public in addition to reporting on elected officials' performances in office. My analyses, therefore, provide important insight into the conditions under which citizens take steps to better fulfill their democratic duties of being politically informed and engaged, but also suggest those processes do not always entail a

search for strictly objective sources of news.

The Political Context, Emotions, and Engagement

This chapter seeks to understand how the electoral context—specifically, electoral advantage and disadvantage—affects individuals' willingness to cognitively and behaviorally engage with politics. I draw on literature examining the intersections between partisanship, emotions, and political activity to understand why and how the broader electoral context should influence individuals' engagement with politics. In doing so, I argue that the political context can evoke feelings of anger, anxiety or enthusiasm, which in turn, have meaningful consequences for citizens' attitudes and behavior.

First and foremost, partisan identity serves as a necessary condition for electoral advantage and disadvantage to matter because party membership compels citizens to care about the broader political environment. Previous work has established the importance of partisanship, a deep psychological attachment toward a specific political group (Campbell et al. 1960) and a social identity akin to one's religion or ethnicity (Green et al. 2004). Similarly, scholars suggest that party attachments are often as intense as attachments to sports teams (Green et al. 2004).

The literature also finds that self-categorization into social groups—such as a political party—can cause individuals to actually experience emotions on behalf of that group. These group-level emotions have meaningful consequences for individuals' behavior (e.g., Mackie et al. 2000; Mackie et al. 2008; Huddy et al. 2015). I argue that the advantage or disadvantage related to one's political team or experienced by other "team members" may elicit similar emotional responses among partisans and affect their levels of political engagement. That is, individuals who identify with a political party and feel an attachment to that group should presumably care about their party's electoral fortunes. And the emotions felt by other members of the group—both elites and non-elites—in light of their politically advantaged or disadvantaged status should transfer to their co-partisans and affect those individuals' behavior (Mackie et al. 2000; Mackie et al. 2008). Even more, the performances of these political teams fluctuate over time—no one party dominates the

zero-sum game of politics throughout our nation's history—so the sense of advantage or disadvantage felt by partisans should similarly fluctuate with the political context.

Scholarship in psychology and political science has shed light on the conditions under which certain emotions arise and the consequences of their presence. Like others in these fields, I approach emotions through the lens of appraisal theories, which posit that discrete emotions can be invoked in response to individuals' appraisals of a given stimuli (e.g., Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Ellsworth and Smith 1988; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Valentino et al. 2011). That is, beyond trait emotions that individuals chronically experience due to dispositional differences, state-based discrete emotions can also arise under differing conditions. I focus on three of the most prominent and consistently tested emotions in relation to politics: anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm[32].

Anger and anxiety are both associated with electoral disadvantage, but the two emotions should be invoked under different conditions and therefore, will affect individuals in distinct ways. First, anger is incited when individuals feel wronged or that others are responsible for negative events. Anger also emerges when there is a feeling of individual control and certainty about what happened (Lerner and Keltner 2000; Lemerise and Dodge 2000). This emotion is related to feelings of scorn, resentfulness, disgust, and frustration, and the appraisal of other-agency is crucial in distinguishing anger from other emotions (Ellsworth and Smith 1988). Feelings of anger prepare the individual to attack the opposition and/or remove the irritant or obstacle in the way of one's well-being (Ellsworth and Smith 1988). That is, anger leads individuals to take action in defense of themselves or their threatened group.

Increases in willingness to engage with the opposition due to anger may also be accompanied by less careful processing of events, a decrease in perceived risks and likewise, an increased tolerance for risky action (Huddy et al. 2007). Political scientists have found consistent

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[32] While they may not be completely separable—as emotions of similar dimensions are often correlated to some extent (see, e.g., Ellsworth and Smith 1988)—they still have discrete causes and effects on behavior (Valentino et al. 2011). I do not consider the emotion of hopelessness in this chapter, but do briefly discuss its potential effects in relation to political disadvantage in Chapter 4.

evidence that anger about "the way things are going in the country" or a particular candidate is effective in boosting participation, particularly costly political acts that bolster the in-group like attending a rally or donating money to a campaign (Valentino et al. 2011). In sum, when threats come from a specific source and individuals feel control over the situation at hand, they are more likely to feel anger and respond with actions intended to defend the in-group (Ellsworth and Smith 1988; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Valentino et al. 2011).

Given this, I expect that anger will arise within individuals who feel frustrated by their party's disadvantaged status in comparison to a known opposition: the other party. Anger should stem from a sense of certainty about the parameters of the unpleasant electoral circumstances their party is facing; that is, there should be no questioning of whether or not they are truly behind in a given electoral competition. Even more, these individuals should feel in control of the situation and their abilities to reverse their current state. Once anger is invoked, I expect individuals will be more likely to engage in forms of political engagement that defend their in-group. Doing so should flow out of their need to confront the opposition and take action against them.

Like anger, anxiety can also emerge in response to disadvantage, yet the conditions under which individuals experience anxiety—in addition to their responses to this emotion—differ significantly from anger. When individuals appraise a situation to be highly uncertain, unpredictable and unpleasant, while at the same time feel low levels of their own control (i.e., high levels of situational control), then the emotion of fear emerges (Lerner and Keltner 2000). Similarly, anxiety is experienced if one is unable to avoid or escape a negative situation[33] (Ohman 2000). Unlike anger, fear motivates behaviors of avoidance (Izard and Ackerman 2000) and prepares us to flee a perceived danger or obstacle (Ellsworth and Smith 1988).

Anxiety also engages our minds by increasing levels of thoughtfulness (Marcus et al. 2000;

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[33] Some distinguish anxiety from fear by theorizing that anxiety is considered to occur in anticipation of a negative event or stimulus, while fear sets in post-stimulus (Ohman 2000). I follow others in political science (e.g., Valentino et al. 2011) who use the two interchangeably to describe an overall feeling of uncertainty, unpleasantness, and lack of control (Lerner and Keltner 2000).

Huddy et al. 2007). In the context of politics, anxiety increases interest in reading more about the threatening stimuli. Doing so alleviates the unpleasant uncertainty that accompanies anxiety by providing individuals with the information needed to course-correct and return to a more pleasant state (e.g., Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Marcus et al. 2000; Huddy et al. 2007; Valentino et al. 2008). Therefore, individuals should feel anxious when told that their party is not only in a disadvantaged electoral state, but also when there is a sense of uncertainty about what to do and/or how to resolve their unpleasant feelings. Even more, anxiety should emerge from a sense of situational—not individual—control and should boost information seeking about the topic at hand.

Finally, enthusiasm and similarly positive emotions (e.g., happiness) can arise when one feels advantaged due to the achievement of a goal or the successful avoidance of negative outcomes (Stein and Hernandez 2007). Examples of this could include hearing that your party is likely to win or has won an election. Enthusiasm leads individuals to rely on political habits (e.g., Marcus et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2008), which could impose a sense of complacency that decreases (or at least stagnates) cognitive and behavioral engagement with politics. That is, supporters of an advantaged party may effectively let their guard down by relying on political habits instead of actively seeking more news information about politics. These individuals may be content to sit back and defer to the judgment of the officials they supported at the voting booth, trusting them to govern responsibly on their behalf. With this mindset, careful monitoring of political news is simply unnecessary. As Lorne Michaels, the creator and executive producer of *Saturday Night Live* has even observed, "If it's an election where things are pretty much going to go the way everyone expects them, people stop paying attention" (Haberkorn 2016).

While the emotion of enthusiasm itself has been correlated with increases in information seeking (Marcus et al. 2000) and political participation (but less so than anger; see Valentino et al. 2011), these results are not always consistent and require a sufficient amount of enthusiasm to be marshaled within an individual. Chapter 2 also suggests that electoral advantage is negatively correlated with a willingness to seek out more information relative to electoral disadvantage;

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therefore, I expect feelings of enthusiasm related to advantage will promote a reliance on political habits and either decrease or not change political engagement in the form of information seeking and participation.

To understand the differential effects of political advantage and disadvantage on political engagement, I draw on two experimental studies that provide individual-level evidence that complement the aggregate-level results of Chapter 2. The first study seeks to establish the overall effects of advantage and disadvantage on my primary dependent variable of information seeking. The second study builds on the first and takes a more nuanced approached to understanding the effects of advantage and disadvantage by focusing on their associated emotions. In addition to analyzing information seeking dependent variables, this study also focuses on outcome measures such as willingness to vote for one's candidate.

Study 1: Establishing the Effects of Advantage and Disadvantage

The goal of my first study is to establish how the political context matters for media consumption at the individual level. I posit that in addition to more stable traits like education and financial status (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Verba et al. 1995; Burns et al. 2001), factors in the macro political environment can meaningfully affect citizens' demand for partisan media. In particular, I argue that a sense of political advantage or disadvantage can influence news consumption. And similar to the differential responses of sports fans to their teams' wins or losses based on general interest in the sport (e.g., Fisher and Wakefield 1998), the effects of the political context may be conditioned by ex ante interest in the domain of politics.

Against the theoretical backdrop discussed above, there are several different ways in which the relationships of interest might go. On the one hand, those who are politically advantaged might rely on political habits and not necessarily increase their information seeking (Marcus et al. 2000). There is some evidence, though, that a sufficient amount of enthusiasm can increase news consumption (e.g., Brader 2006). On the other hand, political disadvantage might motivate people to seek out more information due to their anxiety about their current political status, but it could

also inhibit news consumption due to an angry reaction to disadvantage and instead, divert people's energy and attention away from news and towards political activity (Marcus et al. 2000).

Like more recent research examining patterns of information demand (e.g, MacKuen et al. 2010), I allow subjects in this first study to select ideologically biased news to read. Providing such choice makes sense given the prevalence of ideological news today and throughout U.S. history. In the context of this study, it could be that individuals who are advantaged feel confident enough to expose themselves to politically unfriendly information, while those facing disadvantage might consume news that is favorable towards their party or unfavorable towards the other party as a means of alleviating their negative feelings.

There is some evidence to suggest that the interaction between interest and the political environment will be particularly strong among individuals who experience the threat of political disadvantage. Anxiety, in particular, is a reaction to a perception of threat to one's own well-being (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), and it may be that those generally most invested in politics strongly perceive such threats from their context. Similarly, fans of the home team at a sports game were more likely to feel the threat of the visiting team's presence on the home team's turf if these fans were strongly versus weakly identified with their team (Wann and Grieve 2005). That stronger sense of threat in the political realm could asymmetrically trigger negative emotions among those most interested in politics and result in greater changes in their information seeking.

This study took place during the lead-up to the 2014-midterm elections between October 20 and November 4, 2014. I chose this time frame to bolster the external validity of my treatment texts, which were written to influence beliefs about political advantage and disadvantage. Specifically, these texts were designed to realistically manipulate individuals' predictions about either the Republican or Democratic Party winning majority status in the Senate. Both were likely possibilities throughout the campaign, so the real world political climate boosted the plausibility of my treatments. Even more, focusing on future electoral outcomes mirrors the constant polling and speculation about winners and losers that pervades media coverage during elections.

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Survey Sampling International (SSI) was contracted to distribute the survey to a sample targeted to be nationally representative based on census benchmarks. In exchange for their participation, panelists were entered into a lottery run entirely by SSI. The sample consisted of 1,249 individuals and aimed to reflect census benchmarks for age, gender, education and census region. Because a sense of allegiance to one party must exist for partisan advantage or disadvantage to affect an individual, participants affiliated with either the Republican or Democratic Party were targeted to take the survey and pure Independents were not recruited[34].

Participants received an email from SSI with a link to the survey programmed entirely using the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE) technology (see Lau and Redlawsk 2001). The DPTE presents individuals with a scrolling feed of headlines that can be clicked on to read their associated stories. The dynamic nature of the interface is particularly useful because it produces a sense of information overload similar to what individuals typically face in our saturated media environment. Even more, the interface itself resembles Twitter or Facebook newsfeeds because it is constantly refreshing, causing individuals to prioritize their time by clicking the items most interesting and important to them.

Participants first answered a battery of questions inquiring about partisanship, ideology, political interest, general consumption patterns of political news, and whether or not they were registered or eligible to vote in the November midterms. Then, subjects proceeded to a practice round with the scrolling headlines that lasted one-and-a-half minutes. Previous studies (e.g., Utych and Kam 2013) using the DPTE software also implemented a practice round to familiarize subjects with the technology and the scrolling headlines. This interface allows for a maximum of six stories to appear on-screen at any given time with a new story appearing every four seconds and bumping the last story off the screen.

The headlines and stories for the practice round and the main round were written to reflect

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[34] Any Pure Independents (*N*=22) that still made it into my sample are dropped from analysis.

real news stories and events (see Appendix for full headline and story texts) in hopes of engaging

subjects and encouraging them to take this study seriously. Of the 25 practice headlines written, 12

consisted of serious news (some political, but never about U.S. politics as I did not want to affect

the main stories), while 13 were less serious stories about entertainment, fashion, etc. All headlines

in the practice and main rounds were randomized to prevent any order effects.

      Once subjects completed the practice round, they were randomly assigned to read one of

the three treatment texts before seeing another dynamic process tracing information board[35]. The

two main treatments were designed to induce a sense of political advantage or disadvantage for one

party over the other in terms of who would win the Senate majority in the upcoming 2014 midterms

and, to a lesser degree, who would win the presidency in 2016. The control text described an

upcoming baking competition and is used as a baseline for discussion of a future competition

against which the political treatments can be compared[36].

      The texts were first piloted in a study on MTurk that verified that the treatment wording

was effective in persuading individuals that either Democrats or Republicans would win the Senate

in 2014 and the presidency in 2016. Those who received the advantaged Democrats text were

significantly more likely to think that Democrats would win both the Senate in 2014 (b=0.55;

p=0.00[37]) and presidency in 2016 (b=0.23; p=0.004) compared to those with the Republicans-

advantaged text. This was also the case for the House, as the advantaged Democrats group thought

Democrats were more likely to win the House than the advantaged Republicans group (b=0.34;

p=0.00). Because the House was not mentioned in any of the treatments, this suggests that the texts

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[35] See Appendix for all treatment and control texts.

[36] Forty percent of the sample received the treatment that said Democrats were advantaged, 40% received the Republicans-advantaged treatment and 20% were assigned to the control group. I did this so that I would effectively have my sample evenly divided between advantaged Democrats, advantaged Republicans, disadvantaged Democrats, disadvantaged Republicans, and the control group. The two political treatments do not manipulate one specific emotion. Instead, their text could lead to different emotional reactions (e.g., anger vs. anxiety in response to political disadvantage) depending on the individual. The next study dives deeper into the effects of discrete emotions.

[37] All models regarding respondents' electoral predictions use linear probability models that control for only three variables that were slightly off balance in the pilot study's sample randomization: a dummy for whether or not the individual is a Republican, level of political interest, and voter registration.

were successful in creating a sense of advantage for one party over the other that bled into other aspects of politics as well. Participants in the pilot study who experienced disadvantage also reported higher levels of negative emotions while the advantaged reported higher levels of positive emotions. Finally, all three texts are also balanced in terms of word count, reading level, and evaluations of how interesting subjects found them to be[38].

Following their random assignment to a treatment story, subjects were given four minutes to read various headlines and click on those headlines in the main DPTE portion of the study. In those four minutes, individuals could click on as many or as few stories as they wanted under the assumption that those clicked were the most important and/or interesting to subjects given the time constraints and information overload they experienced. A maximum of 60 stories could appear in total—40 political stories and 20 apolitical stories—with a new headline appearing every four seconds. Again, headlines were randomized to prevent any order effects in terms of click patterns; texts for both the headlines and stories are listed in the Appendix[39]. The political headlines cover a range of topics and consist of 10 stories that are positive towards Republicans, 10 negative towards Republicans, 10 positive towards Democrats, and 10 negative towards Democrats.

Finally, subjects completed a battery of questions regarding their predictions for the upcoming midterms and 2016 presidential election, their emotional feelings about the midterms,

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[38] Individuals rated how interesting the texts were using a five-point scale ranging from "Not at all interesting" to "Extremely interesting"; responses were rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for the following analyses. Respondents did not find the Republican-advantaged text to be any more or less interesting than the Democrat-advantaged text ($p=0.51$), and the same can be said for ratings of the control text compared against those of the Democrat-advantaged text ($p=0.31$). There was, however, a slightly more meaningful gap in the evaluations of the Republican-advantaged and control-group texts (difference=0.09 favoring the Republican-advantaged text; $p=0.06$). In regards to emotional responses to the treatments, perhaps unsurprisingly, those who were disadvantaged were significantly angrier ($p=0.00$), more anxious ($p=0.001$) and more disgusted ($p=0.00$) about the upcoming midterm elections than those who were advantaged. Conversely, those who were advantaged were significantly happier ($p=0.001$) and more hopeful ($p=0.003$) than the disadvantaged. (The exact questions about emotions were worded as such: "To what extent do you feel ___ about the upcoming midterm elections?" using anger, anxiety, disgust, happy and hopeful. The response categories ranged from not at all [1] to extremely [5].) For results see Appendix.

[39] The stories were programmed to appear only once, and given the number of stories and their pacing, that meant that all 60 headlines could appear once in the four minutes. Subjects who spent an inordinate amount of time reading one story could, of course, have missed some stories in their feed, but again, there was a chance for exposure to all 60 headlines in the four minutes.

likely vote choice in 2014 and 2016 (by party), and their likely political participation and media consumption in 2014 and 2016. The last portion of the study asked basic demographic questions like gender, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, employment status, and income bracket. The study ended with a debrief and lasted around 12 to 15 minutes.

Results

The primary goals of this experiment are to determine the causal influence of disadvantage and advantage on media demand and to see if there are differential patterns of information seeking by citizens' ex ante interest in politics. I use the following dependent variables for this analysis (the first two represent politically friendly stories, while the latter two represent politically unfriendly stories): the percentage of positive stories about your party clicked out of total stories clicked, the percent of negative stories about the other party clicked, the percent of positive stories about the other party clicked, and the percent of negative stories about your own party clicked. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the percentage of each type of stories opened by respondents[40]. These measures of information seeking focus on the percentage of these stories opened within an individual's overall news diet and thereby, capture how the proportions of stories consumed by citizens shift given their status of advantage or disadvantage[41].

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[40] If an individual clicked a story more than once, I only count that one time.

[41] The main results are mostly similar when controlling for the total number of stories opened and when examining the raw number of stories read as the dependent variable. Key differences when controlling for total stories clicked is that here, advantage and disadvantage open people up to reading more positive stories about the opposition, though the effect is a bit larger for the advantaged. In looking at the raw DVs, key differences are that the effects for disadvantage change a bit with the disadvantaged reading fewer positive and negative stories about their own party. See Appendix for these results.

Table 4 Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Positive Stories: In-Party	16.46	16.06	0	100
Negative Stories: Out-Party	17.17	17.06	0	100
Positive Stories: Out-Party	9.78	11.19	0	100
Negative Stories: In-Party	16.67	16.64	0	100

Note: All dependent variables represent stories opened as a percentage of all stories opened. Values for maximum are from the sample and are not just theoretical maximums.

For my key independent variables, I construct two dummy indicators: one for advantaged partisans and one for disadvantaged partisans with individuals in the control group as the suppressed baseline. More specifically, *Advantaged* equals one for Democrats who received a Democrat-advantaged treatment or for Republicans who received a Republican-advantaged treatment; all others (i.e., disadvantaged and those in the control group) take the value of zero. *Disadvantaged* equals one for Democrats who received a Republican-advantaged treatment or for Republicans who received a Democrat-advantaged treatment; all others (i.e., advantaged and those in the control group) take the value of zero.

Political interest is also included as an independent variable in the first set of analyses. *Interest* is operationalized using the following question, which was asked prior to randomized treatment assignment: "In general, how interested are you in politics?" Respondents could choose between five responses ranging from "Not at all interested" to "Extremely interested." I first examine the effects of political advantage and disadvantage and then discuss the effects of interacting both *Advantaged* and *Disadvantaged* with *Interest* when notable.

The statistical models I employ regress the dependent variables on *Advantaged* and *Disadvantaged,* clustering the standard errors by state and controlling for factors off balance in randomization. Specifically, I control for race (coded as 1 for any race besides white, 0 for those

who are white) and voter registration (a dummy variable for registered or not)[42].

Table 5 presents the results of the first analyses and provides the average effects of the political environment on partisans. Again, all dependent variables represent the number of each type of story clicked as a percentage of total stories clicked by that individual[43]. The first and second columns focus on stories that are friendly to one's party: *Positive Stories about the In-Party* and *Negative Stories about the Out-Party*. The third and fourth columns pertain to stories that are unfriendly to one's party: *Positive Stories about the Out-Party* and *Negative Stories about the In-Party*. Figure 3 summarizes the key effects of advantage and disadvantage for each type of story.

Table 5 Effects of Advantage and Disadvantage

	Friendly Stories		Unfriendly Stories	
	Positive Stories: In-Party (1)	**Negative Stories: Out-Party (2)**	**Positive Stories: Out-Party (3)**	**Negative Stories: In-Party (4)**
Advantaged Condition	-2.82*	-0.04	0.71	1.80*
	1.63	1.02	0.74	1.05
Disadvantaged Condition	-1.61	-0.72	0.49	-0.34
	1.60	1.10	0.89	1.16
Non-white	1.08	-5.02***	-0.74	-0.85
	1.31	1.10	1.19	1.85
Registered To Vote	1.07	5.18*	-2.17	4.76**
	2.36	2.62	2.33	2.01
Intercept	17.19***	13.52***	11.68***	11.88***
	2.45	2.84	2.42	2.35
N	1228	1228	1228	1228

Note: The DVs represent the percentage of each type of stories clicked out of all stories clicked. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error clustered by state below. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

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[42] Inquiries about voter registration were asked before the treatments were administered. All independent variables range from 0 to 1.

[43] Note there are no significant differences between the advantaged and disadvantaged for the total number of stories clicked. This is also the case when interacting both treatment groups with political interest.

Figure 3 Effects of Advantage and Disadvantage

The results in Column 1 of Table 5 suggest that political advantage has a negative and significant effect on subjects' willingness to consume positive stories about their own party when compared to the control group, while political disadvantage does not meaningfully change news consumption patterns from those in the control. The difference between the coefficients for *Advantaged* and *Disadvantaged* is marginally significant: p-value=0.12, one-tailed. Figure 4 breaks down the effects of advantage and disadvantage on willingness to read positive stories about the in-party by ex-ante level of political interest[44]. The results suggest that the negative effect of advantage is strongly driven by those most interested in politics: $b=-4.48$, $p=0.04$ for those "extremely interested" in politics and $b=-3.46$, $p=0.03$ for those who are "very interested." Because the dependent variable is scaled to represent percentages, the coefficients can be interpreted as such. Further, the difference between the effect of advantage and disadvantage among those most interested in politics is significant: subtracting the effects for the most politically interested who are

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[44] For corresponding table, which also validates the measure for political interest given its baseline positive effect in the control condition ($b=5.65$, $p=0.13$), see Appendix.

Disadvantaged from those who are most politically interested and *Advantaged*=-3.08, *p*=0.03.

Finally, it's worth noting that disadvantage has a uniformly insignificant effect across levels of

political interest.

Figure 4 Effects of Advantage and Disadvantage for Positive Stories About Party

The coefficients for *Advantaged* and *Disadvantaged* are largely insignificant for the other

types of stories in Table 5, although there is a positive and marginally significant (*b*=1.80; *p*=0.10)

for advantage in relation to stories that are negative about one's own party. This effect is

significantly larger than the effect for disadvantage (*p*=0.05), and it is largest among those

moderately to highly interested in politics.

I also examined differences in *Advantaged* and *Disadvantaged* between Democrats and

Republicans by interacting each with a dummy variable that distinguished between the two parties.

The results suggest the effects were quite similar among the two groups. The only notable

differences emerged in relation to willingness to read negative stories about the opposition party.

Though the differences between those in the advantaged and disadvantaged conditions *within* each

party were not significant (p=0.97 for Republicans and p=0.40 for Democrats), meaningful differences did emerge *across* parties: Democrats who were advantaged and disadvantaged were generally more willing to read negative stories about the opposition party than Republicans who were advantaged and disadvantaged[45].

Returning to our main results, Study 1 provides evidence in support of the notion that the political context can affect partisan news consumption at the individual level. Specifically, feelings of political advantage seem to deter people from consuming positive coverage of their own party more so than they would in the absence of reading about an election and more so than those who are disadvantaged (although the difference between advantage and disadvantage is less pronounced). One explanation for this finding is that an advantaged status prevents individuals from needing such positive reinforcement in their news. This effect is particularly pronounced and significant among those who are ex-ante most interested in politics, a somewhat surprising finding since we might expect those most politically interested to be consistently and uniformly willing to consume partisan friendly news.

My results also suggest there is a slightly positive effect of advantage on the consumption of politically unfriendly news in the form of negative coverage about one's party. While this could also be driving the negative link between advantage and relative partisan news consumption in Chapter 1, the effect here is much smaller than the negative effect on positive, friendly stories. And in either case, the results provide evidence in support of the first-order effects of political advantage from the last chapter: those who are politically advantaged are consuming less partisan friendly news than they otherwise would and than those who are disadvantaged.

Study 2: Breaking Down Effects by Emotions

The goal of my second study is to again understand how feelings of electoral advantage

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[45] The coefficient for *Advantaged X Democrat* is 5.20, p=0.06, two-tailed; the coefficient for *Disadvantaged X Democrat* is 4.22, p=0.07, two-tailed. The difference between advantaged Democrats and disadvantaged Republicans is also significant (p=0.02, two-tailed), and so is the difference between disadvantaged Democrats and advantaged Republicans (p=0.14, two-tailed). See Appendix for full table of results.

and disadvantage affect political engagement. However, this study takes a more nuanced, deeper approach than Study 1, as I examine the relationship between the emotions evoked under conditions of advantage and disadvantage in the 2016 presidential election and political engagement. Here, I analyze original data collected on Amazon MTurk and identify the effects of anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm associated with advantage and disadvantage on information seeking and participation.

This study was fielded on Friday, February 19, 2016, after key caucuses and primaries such as Iowa and New Hampshire and before those in Nevada and South Carolina. Subjects first received a battery of questions inquiring about their political identity, ideology, political interest, media consumption patterns, and voter registration. Then, individuals were randomly assigned to read an article about either the upcoming election or an upcoming singing competition (for the control group). Unlike Study 1, those assigned to read about the 2016 election were always given information about their *own* party's status and the emotional responses (anger, anxiety, or enthusiasm) of *co*-partisans to their electoral advantage or disadvantage. Following the experimental manipulation, subjects were asked to report which party they felt was most likely to win the general election as a manipulation check and their levels of anxiety, anger and enthusiasm about the 2016 election with the targeted emotion appearing first.

Next, respondents were asked about their willingness to read more or seek out more information about the 2016 election as well as their likelihood of engaging in a variety of political acts including likelihood of voting and their predicted vote choice[46]. Finally, subjects were asked about trust in the two parties and basic demographics. Right before the debrief page, individuals were also given the option to select a link to either a partisan or non-partisan news website to read more about politics after the study ended as one final measure of willingness to seek out additional information about politics.

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[46] The information-seeking and participation batteries were counterbalanced to prevent any order effects.

The treatments for this study focus on the 2016 presidential election and are similarly worded except for certain phrases intended to induce a sense of disadvantage or advantage. Even more, these texts were crafted to invoke a specific emotion related to feelings of advantage or disadvantage[47]. The first treatment is meant to promote a feeling of both disadvantage and anger. Its text for Democrats [Republicans] starts by noting that top Democratic [Republican] candidates are losing to top Republican [Democratic] candidates in the latest polls and that a majority of co-partisans are angry about their disadvantaged status. Even more, Democratic [Republican] Party officials know that they need to reverse these polling numbers in order to prevent their party from losing in November, an action statement meant to induce a sense of certainty about what needs to happen prior to the general election. Democratic [Republican] subjects are then told that if they lose the election, the opposition party will dial back the progress Democrats [Republicans] have made on a variety of issues. Finally, subjects are informed that they should be outraged about the ideological extremism of this year's crop of Republican [Democratic] candidates.

The next set of treatments also introduces a sense of disadvantage, but differentiates itself by evoking anxiety—not anger—about the upcoming election. The vignette begins by telling Democrats [Republicans] that top Democratic [Republican] candidates are losing to top Republican [Democratic] candidates in the latest polls and a majority of co-partisans are anxious about their disadvantaged status. Here, Democratic [Republican] Party officials don't know how to reverse the polling numbers and are afraid of what will happen in November, which suggests a sense of uncertainty and unease. Democratic [Republican] subjects are again informed that if they lose the election, the opposition party will likely dial back the progress Democrats [Republicans] have made on a variety of issues, and are told that they should be worried about the ideological extremism of this year's crop of Republican [Democratic] candidates.

The third group received a treatment text that suggests their party is ahead in the polls

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[47] See Appendix for exact treatment texts.

going into this election and that promotes feelings of enthusiasm due to their advantaged status. Specifically, the text begins by noting that Democrats [Republicans] are ahead in polls that pit top Democratic [Republican] candidates against top Republican [Democratic] candidates. Subjects are then told that co-partisans and officials in their party are enthusiastic about these polling numbers and excited for the general election in November. The text notes that if Democrats [Republicans] win, they'll continue to make progress on various issues, and that Democratic [Republican] commentators are optimistic about their chances of beating the other party because the opposition's candidates are too ideologically extreme.

Finally, some subjects were given a control text that discussed an upcoming singing competition on the NBC show, *The Voice*. Like the baking competition text of Study 1, the goal of this vignette was to serve as a control for simply talking about an upcoming competition. Additionally, this competition was described as being between groups—in this case, the different singing coach's teams—to mirror the electoral competition that takes place between partisan groups in the other treatments.

Results

To begin, I assess the effectiveness of my treatments in several ways. I exclude Pure Independents from this and all other analyses unless otherwise specified because individuals must first have some level of partisan attachment in order to care about the electoral fortunes of the parties[48]. First, I was able to convince Democrats who were given the disadvantaged treatments (evoking anger and anxiety) that they were less likely to win the 2016 election at about the same rate (b=-0.11 and $p<0.05$ in a linear regression model for both when compared to the control group). However, the enthusiasm text did not convince Democrats that they were more likely to win than Democrats in the control group (b=0.04, p=0.43). The results for Republicans are

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[48] It is worth noting that like most MTurk samples, mine is not nationally representative. For instance, the 728 subjects in my study are overwhelmingly Democratic (only 24.66% identifies as a strong, weak or leaning Republican) and white (80% of subjects). Also, the sample skews young with around 75% of the subjects listing an age of 40 or younger. Despite this, my results still shed light on the phenomena of interest that can inform the direction and design of future related studies.

correctly signed yet largely insignificant, which is likely due to the small number of Republicans in my sample (*N*=179). Overall, I was marginally effective in convincing partisans that their party was more or less likely to lose the upcoming presidential election—a difficult feat given biases such as motivated reasoning that may have prevented me from observing any movement in beliefs[49].

Next, I examined the mean levels of each emotion reported by subjects in each treatment group to see if the different texts were successful in producing their intended emotions. Note that the questions regarding each emotion asked about how anxious, angry or enthusiastic individuals felt specifically about the 2016 election—not just their general feelings. These questions were also asked *after* individuals received the treatments. The results in Table 6 indicate that the treatments were effective in inducing their intended emotions. That is, levels of anxiety, anger, and enthusiasm are highest among those in the anxiety, anger, and enthusiasm conditions, respectively, when compared to other treatment texts[50]. It is worth noting that those in the control group have a high baseline level of anxiety and moderately high level of enthusiasm regarding the election, which could be due to the intense media attention this particular election received.

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[49] For the Pure Independents in this sample (*N*=100), the results suggest I was marginally able to convince them of which party would win; though not all coefficients are significant, they are mostly correctly signed.
[50] Emotions can co-occur, and as expected, anger and anxiety do seem to move together: the two are moderately correlated at 0.43. The correlation between anxiety and enthusiasm is 0.07; enthusiasm and anger are negatively correlated at -0.24.

Table 6 Mean Levels of Emotion Produced by Each Treatment

	Levels of Anxiety	Levels of Anger	Levels of Enthusiasm
Anxiety Condition	0.49	0.21	0.36
Anger Condition	0.44	0.24	0.36
Enthusiasm Condition	0.38	0.11	0.51
Control Group	0.46	0.17	0.44

Note: Pure Independents are excluded.

To examine whether the treatments produced their intended emotions with more analytical rigor, I also regressed each emotion on the treatment groups. The results reported in Table 7 use the control group as the suppressed baseline, and uncover statistical patterns that again suggest the treatments were relatively effective in terms of influencing the targeted emotion. Column 1 of Table 7 reports the results for levels of anxiety as the dependent variable. Here, the anxiety and anger treatments didn't do much compared to the control group, which makes sense given the already heightened level of anxiety among control respondents. The enthusiasm treatment did significantly decrease levels of anxiety though (b=-0.08, p=0.01, with significant differences between the effects of enthusiasm versus anger and anxiety: p=0.06 and $p<0.01$). Turning to levels of anger as the dependent variable in column 2 of Table 7, the anger treatment was the most effective in boosting levels of anger (b=0.06, p=0.03 for the anger treatment vs. b=0.04, p=0.16 for the anxiety treatment[51]), while the enthusiasm text decreased levels of anger (b=-0.06, p=0.03) at a rate significantly different than the other two treatments ($p<0.01$ for differences from both). Finally, reading the enthusiasm treatment significantly boosted levels of enthusiasm (b=0.08, p=0.02), while both the anger and anxiety treatments decreased levels of enthusiasm (b=-0.08, p=0.01 for the anxiety treatment; b=-0.07, p=0.03 for the anger treatment). The effect of the enthusiasm text

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[51] Note the difference between these two treatments is only 0.02, p=0.42.

differed significantly from the other two treatment groups ($p<0.01$). In sum, I was able to

manipulate each of the intended emotions to different extents, but largely in ways consistent with

expectations[52].

Table 7 Effect of Each Treatment on Levels of Emotions

	Anxiety (1)	Anger (2)	Enthusiasm (3)
Anxiety	0.03	0.04	-0.08**
Condition	0.03	0.03	0.03
Anger	-0.02	0.06**	-0.07**
Condition	0.03	0.03	0.03
Enthusiasm	-0.08**	-0.06**	0.08**
Condition	0.03	0.03	0.03
Intercept	0.46***	0.17***	0.44***
	0.02	0.02	0.02
N	639	639	639

Note: DVs are five-point measures of each emotion. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error below. All variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Pure Independents are excluded. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Anger, Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and Political Engagement

Given my relative success in evoking the intended emotions by treatment, I examine the

effects of assignment to each treatment condition in the following analyses. I employ dummy

variables for each treatment, which leaves the control group as the suppressed baseline category

once again. This analytical strategy allows me to understand—most broadly—how the political

environment affects information seeking and vote choice. More specifically, this approach isolates

the differences in the effects of each condition, which were intended to evoke a particular emotion

in relation to either political advantage or disadvantage. The results again suggest that advantage

can depress willingness to learn more about politics. Even more, there are key differences in the

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[52] I also interacted each treatment with strength of PID (a four-count variable), but did not find any significant interactions and do not report those here. The only interactions that come marginally close to significance are those for the anxiety and anger treatments: as PID strength increases, there are marginally significant decreases in levels of enthusiasm in these conditions ($p=0.20$ and $p=0.16$, respectively). Since I use the traditional strength of PID measure—not the expressive partisanship measure of Huddy et al. (2015)—the lack of findings here is perhaps unsurprising.

ways in which anxiety and anger, two emotions related to disadvantage, affect vote choice. Thus, learning about the political environment and the emotions experienced by partisans has meaningful consequences for individuals' engagement with politics.

Willingness to Learn More About Politics

I first analyze individuals' willingness to learn more about the 2016 presidential election, a five-point dependent variable that ranges from "Not at all interested" to "Extremely interested" in learning more[53]. Overall, a relatively small portion (6.10%) of my sample—again, excluding Pure Independents—said they were "Not at all interested" in learning more about the election, while 17.06% were "Somewhat interested," 32.24% were "Moderately interested," 25.67% were "Very interested," and 18.94% were "Extremely interested." The mean levels of willingness to learn more about the election for the control, anxiety and anger conditions were nearly identical at 0.59. However, the same cannot be said for the enthusiasm group, which had a mean value of 0.56.

Column 1 of Table 8 confirms this difference is meaningful. While the effects of the anxiety- and anger-inducing treatments are statistically indistinguishable from the control group, those in the enthusiasm condition were significantly less willing to learn more about the 2016 presidential election compared to those in the control (b=-0.04, p=0.06 one-tailed). Even more, the effect for the enthusiasm condition was significantly smaller than the anxiety condition (difference=0.03, p=0.08 one-tailed) and marginally smaller than the anger condition (difference=0.02, p=0.15 one-tailed). This result confirms my expectation that electoral advantage can engender a sense of complacency and decrease the need for individuals to closely monitor the political realm, particularly in comparison to those in the control and anxiety groups.

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[53] Unlike Study 1, this information seeking dependent variable does not specify partisan news, which provides some variety to my results across studies.

Table 8 Willingness to Learn More

	Learn More (1)	Friendly News (2)	Unfriendly News (3)	Social Media (4)
Anxiety	-0.004	0.07	-0.09	0.29**
Condition	0.02	0.16	0.21	0.16
Anger	-0.01	-0.02	0.14	0.08
Condition	0.02	0.16	0.20	0.16
Enthusiasm	-0.04*	-0.08	-0.26	0.14
Condition	0.02	0.16	0.22	0.17
Democrat	-0.05*	-0.42**	0.32	0.25
	0.03	0.21	0.26	0.22
Age	0.07	0.69**	0.50	-0.89***
	0.04	0.29	0.36	0.31
Political	0.82***	1.50***	0.85**	0.03
Interest	0.03	0.26	0.34	0.26
Female	0.03**	0.05	-0.03	-0.28**
	0.02	0.11	0.15	0.12
Asian	0.03	0.13	-0.17	-0.28
	0.03	0.24	0.37	0.24
Black	-0.04	0.34	0.13	-0.38
	0.03	0.21	0.28	0.24
Hispanic	0.04	-0.008	0.09	0.06
	0.04	0.26	0.33	0.25
Ideology	-0.12***	0.08	0.60	-0.27
	0.05	0.32	0.40	0.33
Education	-0.04	-0.15	-0.54	-0.25
	0.04	0.29	0.37	0.30
Unemployed	-0.03	0.43*	-0.13	-0.03
	0.03	0.23	0.33	0.24
Income	0.006	0.09	0.30	-0.26
Level	0.03	0.21	0.28	0.23
Intercept	0.17***	-1.37***	-2.19***	-0.19
	0.05	0.38	0.50	0.39
N	633	595	595	595

Note: The DV for model 1 is a 5-point variable gauging willingness to learn more about politics. DVs for models 2 through 4 are dummy variables for willingness to consume different types of news. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error below for column 1 and probit coefficient with standard error below for columns 2-4. All variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Pure Independents are excluded. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, one-tailed for experimental treatments and two-tailed for all other variables.

For those who indicated they would at least be "slightly interested" in learning more about the 2016 presidential election, an open-ended follow-up question appeared asking, "What news sources are you most likely to read or watch to learn more about the 2016 election?" I hand coded these responses into categories for news sources that lean Democratic, those that lean Republican,

and social media sites[54]. From those, I created dummy variables for willingness to consume news

from these different sources: partisan friendly news, partisan unfriendly news[55], and social media.

Analyses involving these dependent variables will remove me from a strictly experimental

environment since responses were predicated on first indicating a marginal willingness to learn

more about politics. However, the relationships discussed below still shed light on preliminary

expectations that we might hold for the ways in which advantage and disadvantage affect different

types of information seeking.

While there is no movement between treatment and control groups in relation to

willingness to consume partisan friendly news (see column 2 of Table 8), the same is not the case

for the consumption of news from an opposing source. Column 3 of Table 8 reports a negative and

marginally significant relationship (b=-0.26, p=0.12 one-tailed) for those in the enthusiasm

treatment. The difference between the effects of the enthusiasm condition and the anger condition is

significant (p=0.03, one-tailed), but the difference between the enthusiasm and anxiety conditions

is not (p=0.23, one-tailed). Holding the other two treatment conditions at zero and all other

variables at their medians, the predicted likelihood of seeking out news from an unfriendly source

shifts from 7% to 4% moving from the baseline group to the enthusiasm condition. Taken together,

these results suggest that subjects told of their party's electoral advantage become less willing to

learn more about politics—and presumably more complacent—than those in the other conditions.

Among those who said they were at least slightly interested in learning more about the election,

advantage appears to decrease willingness to seek out a politically unfriendly source of news when

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[54] For each news source listed by a respondent, I coded those as a 1 or a 0 depending on whether or not they fit the following categories: CNN, MSNBC, Fox News Channel, Network News (ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS), Other: Republican/Conservative Source (e.g., Rush Limbaugh), Other: Democratic/Liberal Source (e.g., MoveOn.org), Other: Unspecified Ideology (e.g., the Skimm or just saying one would watch the debates), or Social Media. If an individual listed more than one news source, each source was coded. Therefore, if someone listed both Fox News Channel and CNN, then they would receive a 1 for both the *CNN* and *Fox News* dummy variables. Examples of social media sources include Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, and YouTube. If a blog was listed that has an ideological bent, I coded this as a liberal or conservative source.
[55] News sources were determined to be friendly or unfriendly based on individuals' PID and the ideological reputation of the news outlet. Network news or those with unspecified ideology were not considered to be friendly or unfriendly.

compared to the anger and control groups. Thus, unlike Study 1, electoral advantage in this study, which specifically promotes enthusiasm, largely reduced incentives to open oneself up to potentially uncomfortable news from the opposition.

Finally, I analyze individuals' willingness to turn to social media for news about the 2016 election, a medium that is becoming an increasingly popular source of news for users (Pew 2014). Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat have taken strides to feature trending news stories prominently and have even invested in staff to curate news content. In my sample, 24.81% of subjects who said they were minimally interested in learning more about the election would go to social media to do so[56]. As a comparison, 29.95% of subjects who were willing to learn more about the election listed a friendly partisan source in their open-ended response and only 11.04% listed network news channels.

The results here suggest that while those in the anger and enthusiasm treatment did not differ significantly from their counterparts in the control group, assignment to the anxiety treatment was positively correlated with a willingness to read political news on social media (b=0.29, p=0.04 one-tailed). Moving from the control to the anxiety condition increases the predicted likelihood of seeking out news on social media by 10 percentage points (from 30% to 40%), holding all other variables at their median values. The size of this effect is marginally larger than the anger (p=0.10, one-tailed) and enthusiasm (p=0.18, one-tailed) conditions.

This finding suggests that the anxious uncertainty associated with this politically disadvantaged treatment encouraged individuals to retreat to a "safe space" like Facebook or Reddit to learn more about the election at a higher rate than those in the control group and, to a lesser extent, the other treatment conditions. Social media platforms are uniquely positioned to provide a sheltered, comforting political space because they link individuals to people with whom they have some personal connection and because they often use algorithms to tailor news feeds to reflect the

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[56] This is probably a bit elevated given my younger sample. Note that social media sites were not double-coded as leaning towards one party or the other.

(political) preferences of users. Interestingly, those in the anxiety treatment were not more willing to consume more traditional sources of politically friendly news (see Column 2 of Table 8); instead, social media seem to be the outlets best suited to reduce the anxious uncertainty that can accompany political disadvantage.

Taken together, these results suggest that the political environment can affect people's engagement with politics. First, inducing a sense of political advantage depresses engagement in the form of willingness to learn more about politics. Similar – though more muted – patterns emerged in relation to the consumption of politically unfriendly news, as those in the enthusiasm treatment were less willing to open themselves up to news from the opposition in comparison to the anger and control groups[57]. Such results are consistent with the assertion that learning of one's electoral advantage and the enthusiasm of co-partisans produces a sense of complacency by signaling that all is well on the political front. This result might have been even stronger if the study had not been fielded in the midst of the primaries; the treatments' focus on the general election at this time could have seemed less relevant to subjects. Finally, disadvantage in the form of anxiety was positively related to information seeking on social media. It seems that subjects experiencing this form of disadvantage felt social media platforms, which are populated with personal connections, tailored to individuals' preferences, and filled with news that is accompanied by social endorsements (e.g., likes or re-tweets from family or friends), could help resolve their anxious uncertainty and provide a politically safe shelter in their disadvantaged state.

Willingness to Vote for Your Party

After the information-seeking questions, individuals were asked about their willingness to vote in the upcoming election as well as the party they would likely support in November. In general, respondents reported rather high levels of willingness to vote with little differences

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[57] This differs slightly from Study 1 but the measures of unfriendly news are different. It could be that people don't like news that's positive about the opposition (like in Study 2), but they are willing to read news that is critical of their party (like in Study 1) when advantaged.

between the experimental conditions and control group. So perhaps unsurprisingly, the results for the likelihood of voting are generally unremarkable (see Table 9, column 1[58]). More interesting patterns emerge, however, in relation to willingness to support one's own party—a question all respondents were given. As column 2 of Table 9 indicates, the anger treatment boosted willingness to support one's party at the polls (b=0.28, p=0.08 one-tailed) in comparison with the control group. In terms of predicted probabilities, holding all other variables at their median values and moving from the baseline condition to the anger condition increases the likelihood of supporting one's party from 91% to 95%.

The differences in the coefficient for the anger treatment compared to the other two treatments were both significant as well: the anger condition minus the anxiety condition has a difference of 0.45, p=0.01 one-tailed; anger minus enthusiasm is 0.31, p=0.06 one-tailed. The opposing results for anger and anxiety are particularly interesting because they suggest that different dimensions of disadvantage can lead to distinct responses depending on the emotion that is most strongly provoked. In this case, anxiety does not change individuals' willingness to vote for their party, and perhaps compels individuals to reassess their party's candidate a bit (see the negatively-signed coefficient for *Anxiety Condition* in column 2 of Table 9). Conversely, anger significantly increases the likelihood of voting for one's party as expected. Subjects in the anger condition seem to be doubling down in support of their party at the voting booth, which serves as a form of bolstering or defending one's party in response to electoral disadvantage. That is, declaring your vote for your party is a form of political action and a way to "confront" or take action against the opposition[59].

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[58] The mean levels of this variable ranged from 0.84 in the anger treatment group to 0.88 in the anxiety condition. Note that only those who said they were registered or eligible to vote prior to treatment randomization were given this question, which helps explain the overall high values. It's worth noting that a one-tailed test of the coefficient for the anger treatment is actually insignificant (p=1-(.17/2)=0.915) because the effect is in the opposite direction than what was originally expected.

[59] The results are similar for the strength of one's vote choice as well.

Table 9 Willingness to Vote and Support One's Party

	Vote (1)	Support Own Party (2)
Anxiety Condition	0.002	-0.17
	0.03	0.19
Anger Condition	-0.04	0.28*
	0.03	0.21
Enthusiasm Condition	-0.02	-0.03
	0.03	0.19
Democrat	-0.04	0.26
	0.03	0.23
Age	0.10**	0.27
	0.05	0.36
Political Interest	0.32***	0.38
	0.04	0.29
Female	0.04**	-0.35**
	0.02	0.14
Asian	-0.10**	0.41
	0.04	0.37
Black	-0.08**	-0.38
	0.04	0.24
Hispanic	0.05	0.02
	0.04	0.33
Ideology	-0.06	-0.49
	0.05	0.38
Education	0.08	-0.94**
	0.05	0.38
Unemployed	-0.08**	-0.18
	0.04	0.30
Income Level	0.07**	0.03
	0.04	0.26
Intercept	0.60***	1.77***
	0.06	0.43
N	600	633

Note: The DV for model 1 is a five-point variable gauging willingness to vote; the DV for model 2 is a dummy variable indicating willingness to vote for one's party. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error below for column 1 and probit coefficient with standard error below for column 2. All variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Pure Independents are excluded. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, one-tailed for experimental treatments and two-tailed for all other variables.

Discussion

First and foremost, the results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that the political environment can affect the ways in which individuals engage with politics. Learning about your party's advantaged or disadvantaged status in an electoral competition can influence outcomes ranging from

information seeking to vote choice. Figure 5 summarizes Study 2's key results by displaying the predicted probabilities for each dependent variable with notable findings (i.e., dependent variables for which one or more of the treatment conditions had a significant effect on respondents[60]).

As previously discussed, a sense of advantage tinged with enthusiasm actually decreases willingness to learn more about politics and depresses willingness to seek out an ideologically unfriendly source of news in comparison to the control group and, to a lesser degree, the anger and anxiety conditions. Thus, advantage seems to induce a sense of complacency by decreasing the incentives for advantaged individuals to vigilantly monitor politics and by closing them off to hearing from the opposition party. While this differs slightly from the positive relationship between advantage and willingness to read negative stories about one's own party in Study 1, such discrepancies could be due to differences in the operationalizations of the dependent variables and treatments. (Reading negative stories about your own party is different from reading stories from an oppositional source, and only Study 2 sought to specifically induce the emotion of enthusiasm.) In either case, evidence of a negative effect of political advantage on partisan news consumption is present. Future work can do more to unpack the reasons for these two slightly different outcomes.

Figure 5 also highlights the positive relationship in Study 2 between anxiety stemming from disadvantage and individuals' willingness to look at social media for political news. Sites such as Facebook, Twitter and Reddit, which are often tailored to individual preferences, seem to be particularly effective in helping citizens cope with this form of electoral disadvantage.

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[60] Predicted probabilities are calculated using the median values of all demographic variables.

Figure 5 Predicted Probabilities by Treatment for Key Results

Additionally, the results in Study 2 suggest that anger related to disadvantage can actually boost individuals' willingness to vote for their own party. This anger due to the disadvantaged status of one's group seems to garner a response entailing action at the voting booth in defense of one's party. Additional analyses suggest there is also some evidence that those in the anger treatment might be more likely to trust their own party, another form of defending the in-group[61]. Thus, anger stemming from disadvantage seems to turn individuals' attention inward to the threatened in-group more so than the control, anxiety, and enthusiasm conditions.

Finally, it is worth noting that in the analyses of Study 2, the effects of disadvantage in the forms of anger and anxiety were, at times, quite distinct. Even though the two emotions are both

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[61] See Appendix for these results. Essentially, the anger treatment was somewhat powerful in boosting trust in respondents' own party to do what is right in Congress, although that effect does not differ significantly from other treatments. It actually seems that providing any information about the election boosts trust in people's own party, and that effect is just a bit larger for the anger treatment. None of the experimental conditions affected levels of trust in the other party (including the anger treatment), which suggests that changes in trust in one's party will not necessarily result in compensating changes in trust in the other party.

rooted in feelings of disadvantage, different conditions lead to the two forms of disadvantage and two distinct responses flow from them. Anger promotes actions or attitudes that bolster the in-group; conversely, anxiety seems to compel individuals to read more about politics on one particular platform (social media), but does little to affect more behavioral outcomes or attitudes that bolster their favored party.

Taken together, the two studies provide evidence that political advantage often deters people from increased news consumption, while political disadvantage can have differential effects depending on the negative emotion most strongly evoked by such a disadvantaged status. When anxiety is invoked, people tend to gravitate more towards political safe havens (e.g., social media) for news, while anger pushes citizens to defend their party through action.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the 2016 election, which witnessed the defeat of Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and the victory of Republican candidate Donald Trump, ratings for left-leaning shows and subscriptions to left-leaning publications experienced notable surges that often outpaced those of their right-leaning counterparts (Higgins et al. 2016; Grynbaum and Koblin 2017; Pallotta 2017). In fact, *The New York Times* observed that "rattled liberals are surging back, seeking catharsis, solidarity and relief" through such increases in news consumption (Grynbaum and Koblin 2017). The notion that an election outcome, which left Democrats politically disadvantaged and Republicans advantaged, could reshape patterns in partisan information seeking in such a powerful and expedient way suggests the political context can truly affect individuals' behaviors.

In this chapter, I use original data collected via Survey Sampling International and Amazon MTurk to uncover systematic evidence that the political environment can affect engagement in a variety of ways. First, advantage tends to depress willingness to learn more about politics. There are also key differences in the ways in which anxiety and anger, two emotions related to disadvantage, affect engagement. Most notably, anger tends to promote inward-looking responses that bolster one's party, while anxiety can boost information seeking on social media platforms.

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Admittedly, the electoral environment surrounding the implementation of my two studies may have undermined the effectiveness of my treatments by reducing their believability for some subjects. The fact that the parties' primaries were going on in the real world at the time of Study 2, for instance, may have weakened these treatment texts' predictions about the general election by effectively putting the cart before the horse. Further, the heightened level of anxiety in the baseline condition may provide an explanation as to why the effects for anxiety in relation to disadvantage were largely insignificant throughout the results.

Another reason why the effects in this chapter may be weakened is that in Study 1, the treatment texts are mostly focused on Congress since the midterm campaigns were occurring during the time that study was fielded. Despite the benefits of this external validity, Chapter 2's findings suggest that Congress is not as powerful as the presidency in affecting feelings of advantage and disadvantage. Future work can build on these pilot studies and may be better served if they are run in between the primaries and the general election. They may also benefit from focusing on a hypothetical *presidential* election during a less politically saturated time.

Even still, this chapter's examination of the effects of electoral advantage and disadvantage provides useful insights into the conditions under which democratic citizens engage with politics in various ways. The results suggest that introducing information about the status of one's party can evoke responses that, at times, promote normatively undesirable actions such as a decreased willingness to learn more about the election at hand. Similarly, these emotional responses may point citizens' attention inward toward their own party and close them off from hearing from the other side. Thus, examining the interplay between the political environment and emotional responses provides greater nuance to our understanding of the conditions under which individuals become more or less politically engaged, and, thereby, more or less willing to fulfill their duties as citizens of a democratic society.

CHAPTER 4

A CASE STUDY: POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE IN THE 2016

U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

To further examine the effects of advantage and disadvantage on information seeking and broader political engagement, I turn again to real political events and focus on the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The 2016 election serves as a nice case study because the near certainty that Clinton would win leading up to Election Day coupled with Trump's surprise victory essentially exposed citizens to strong stimuli inducing political advantage and disadvantage depending on their favored candidate. For months leading up to the election, it was a near foregone conclusion that Clinton would win the presidency, with data journalists at the Upshot (among many others) consistently giving her around a 90% chance of becoming the 45th president (e.g., Katz 2016). Reporting around the election also suggested that it was not just the Clinton campaign who thought her victory was all but certain, as the Trump campaign was also fairly certain of their impending loss leading up to November 8 (Jacobs and House 2016). Thus, the shock of a Trump victory made the "treatments" of electoral advantage and disadvantage—for Trump and Clinton supporters, respectively—all the more powerful.

Even more, the days preceding and succeeding Trump's inauguration on January 20, 2017, have seen discussions and enactments of controversial policies like the repeal of Obamacare or the travel ban on majority Muslim countries which highlight the consequences of—and thereby, reinforce feelings of—advantage and disadvantage among those who were winners and losers in the election, respectively. I examine the effects of those events—in addition to the election results—as a first step in understanding political advantage and disadvantage beyond an electoral context.

Unlike the forms of advantage and disadvantage in Chapter 2 that use objective, aggregate-level vote shares or the experimentally induced, individual-level treatments of Chapter 3, I rely here on another operationalization of the political context: subjective measures of advantage and

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disadvantage taken from observational data. Specifically, I use data from the 2016 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) rolling cross-section of surveys for the majority of my analyses. I also rely on trends in Google searches before and after the 2016 election that use more objective measures of advantage and disadvantage.

Throughout these analyses, I again find evidence that advantage can lead to complacency in information seeking while disadvantage can do the opposite by promoting news demand. The same is also the case when it comes to other forms of political activity. Additionally, I uncover clear differences within subsets of Trump and Clinton voters who had differing expectations about who would win the election. The results suggest the surprise of disadvantage can be particularly motivating, as Clinton voters who thought she would win were more critical of Trump and willing to support protests of him after the election as compared to Clinton voters who predicted her loss. However, when disadvantage is overwhelming like what Trump voters who believed he would lose experienced before November 8, it can lead to hopelessness and disengagement both during and after the campaign. Such results provide further nuance to our understanding of the effects of the political context.

<div align="center">

Political Advantage, Disadvantage, and Engagement

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I argue that a sense of political advantage or disadvantage in the electoral environment will affect engagement in the form of political news interest and even participation. Previous work has found evidence that elements of the broader political context can influence news consumption. We know, for instance, that the viability of a given candidate can boost information seeking about him or her (Utych and Kam 2013) and that the policy environment can affect individuals' emotions, information seeking, and even willingness to compromise (MacKuen et al. 2010). Additionally, over-time analyses demonstrate that because elections emphasize partisanship, they increase voters' awareness of the degree to which news outlets' coverage is congruent with their own political beliefs. This, in turn, increases the probability of selective exposure to like-minded news (Stroud 2008; 2011), and represents a way in which the political environment affects media consumption.

There are several possibilities for the relationship between the political context and engagement that I again examine in this chapter. Electoral advantage could promote the consumption of political news and engagement as a result of positive emotions such as enthusiasm (Brader 2006; Marcus et al. 2000), pride (Lewis 1993 as cited in Fredrickson 2001; Fredrickson 2003), and a desire to "bask in the glory" of one's advantaged status (Cialdini et al. 1976 as cited in Hirt et al. 1992). However, advantage can also promote complacency. Unless a sufficient amount of enthusiasm is marshaled, we rely on political habits when engaging in politics, often with little systematic thought (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000). Therefore, supporters of the advantaged party may effectively let their guard down by relying on political habits instead of actively seeking out news about politics or engaging in politics. Even more, these individuals may be content to sit back and defer to the judgment of their elected officials, trusting them to govern responsibly on their behalf.

Feelings of disadvantage may also prompt several different types of responses. On the one hand, disadvantage could cause individuals to distance themselves from politics (Hirschman 1970 as cited in Anderson et al. 2005). For instance, we know people are less willing to vote when they expect to lose and have experienced a political loss repeatedly (Anderson et al. 2005). However, a disadvantaged status could promote engagement depending on the emotional responses of individuals. Those who respond with anxiety may seek out new political information to help them determine the best course of action to resolve their negative feelings (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2008). While some argue this search for information will be even-handed so that individuals can identify the best course of action for alleviating their negative emotions (Marcus et al. 2000), others argue that the anxious are particularly drawn to news which is negative and threatening because it "provide[s] an efficient way to evaluate whether anxiety is warranted and what the potential remedies are for it" (Albertson and Gadarian 2015, 11). Either way, the presence of anxiety and the ensuing process it triggers facilitates political learning (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000; Albertson and

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Gadarian 2015).

The disadvantaged may also feel angry or aversive, emotions that promote political engagement and activity but at the cost of deep, systematic thought (Huddy et al. 2007; MacKuen et al. 2010). Thus, citizens who find themselves in an unfavorable political environment may focus their energy on political engagement in the form of action (Valentino et al. 2011; Huddy et al. 2015) instead of passively reading news—particularly those who are internally efficacious (Valentino et al. 2009b).

Because the two preceding chapters of the dissertation provide evidence that largely support the notion that advantage depresses engagement while disadvantage boosts engagement, I suspect that: *Political advantage will decrease political engagement in the form of information seeking and participation, and political disadvantage will increase political engagement in the form of information seeking and participation.* Therefore, we should expect those who are politically disadvantaged to be more engaged in politics than those who are advantaged.

The specifics of the 2016 campaign may lead to be some exceptions to that prediction. Often times, there is more noise and less certainty than there was in 2016 over which candidate will win or lose an election, which may make this particular year an anomaly[62]. Because the information environment indicated Clinton was heavily favored to win essentially from the time both parties settled on their candidates, some Clinton supporters may have viewed their advantaged position with a tinge of anxiety before November 8, as the election was theirs to lose. Particularly when Clinton's gender was factored in, her supporters may have been secretly distrustful of polling and people's truthfulness in stating their intention to vote for the potential first female president (Streb et al. 2008). Thus, their advantage could still be wrapped up in feelings of anxiety that could boost information seeking. Among Trump supporters, their underdog status could have certainly been

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[62] However, I believe this case study can be viewed as a demonstration of the possible outcomes when the treatments are particularly strong, especially given the element of surprise when the votes were tallied on November 8.

motivating, but perhaps the overwhelming degree to which the polling predicted he would lose produced a sense of hopelessness and despair, causing them to distance themselves from politics instead of engaging more. Thus, within groups of voters (Clinton supporters and Trump supporters), we may uncover meaningful differences.

How many Clinton and Trump voters thought—despite all predictions—that she would lose the election or he would win, and what did these voters look like? To delve into these questions, I draw on data from the 2016 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP), which was a rolling cross-section of surveys that used participants drawn from YouGov's standing online panel. Questionnaires were fielded throughout the campaign season from July 2016 until Election Day.

Figure 6 depicts the (weighted) percent of each type of voter that believed Clinton or Trump would win the election. In the survey, respondents were asked who they would vote for in the 2016 presidential election and who they thought would win the election, regardless of their own vote choice. The prediction question in weeks 3 through 6 allowed respondents to choose between the following predictions: "Clinton is more likely to win," "Trump is more likely to win," or "Clinton and Trump are equally likely to win." In weeks 7 to 11, the prediction question had the following answer choices: "Hillary Clinton," "Donald Trump," and "Not sure." Respondents could choose from a variety of candidates for their own vote choice and could also list any others that were not in the provided answer choices.

I focus here on the predictions of Clinton and Trump voters about those two candidates. That is, I do not graph the percentage of each type of voter who was either not sure or thought each candidate was equally likely to win. However, this is the only subset of Clinton and Trump voters not included in the figure, so this value can be calculated by subtracting the percent who think their candidate or the other candidate will win from 100.

For both Clinton and Trump voters, supporters of each candidate were overwhelmingly more likely to think their candidate would win in comparison to the other candidate. An average of 85.99% of Clinton voters thought she would win across waves 3 to 11, while an average of 56.74%

of Trump voters thought he would win across these waves. Given the polling predictions in

Clinton's favor throughout the campaign, it makes sense that Trump voters were less certain that

their candidate would win than Clinton voters were about her winning. However, more Trump

voters were optimistic about his chances of winning than those who were pessimistic about his

losing: a mean of 15% thought he would lose over this time period, with a maximum of 23.37% in

wave 9 (a couple of weeks after the Access Hollywood tape, but right before Jim Comey reopened

the investigation into Clinton's emails). Hardly any Clinton voters stated that they thought she

would lose throughout the fall of 2016: an average of 1.88% predicted a Trump win, with a

maximum of only 6.16% in wave 5.

Figure 6 Election Outcome Predictions

To provide some context for these predictions, Figure 7 depicts the percent of voters in

each wave that reported they would vote for Clinton, Trump or any other response choice (e.g.,

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other candidates, not sure, etc.). For the most part, the percent of Clinton and Trump voters is pretty similar across the pre-election waves. The average percent of the electorate that supported Clinton was 41.92% compared to a mean of 39.91% who supported Trump. Generally, a mean of 18.17% of the electorate planned to vote for another candidate, was not sure who they would vote for, or was probably not going to vote at all (that option is only given in waves 3 through 6). Wave 5 was a bit of an anomaly. It was fielded from September 20-25, 2016, which was directly after the arrest of a man who set off bombs across New Jersey and New York (Memoli 2016; Santora et al. 2016). Those events could explain a part of Trump's bump in supporters here.

Figure 7 Percent of HRC and DJT Voters

The first two columns of Table 10 present correlational analyses that use key demographics to predict whether or not Clinton voters believed she would win (coded as 1) or Donald Trump would win (coded as 0) in wave 3 (September 3-6, 2016) and wave 11 (November 4-8, 2016). The

second two columns run the same analyses but focus on Trump voters and predict the likelihood that they thought he would win or Clinton would win. I focus on waves 3 and 11 to better understand the predictors of thinking one's party would win right as the campaign was heating up for the fall (i.e., right around Labor Day, "the unofficial start of the final sprint to Election Day for presidential campaigns" [Rafferty 2016]) and to see how these patterns differed—if at all—right before Election Day. All covariates and dependent variables are scaled to range from zero to one[63].

The results suggest that early on, those who identified more strongly with their party were more likely to think their favored candidate would win; however, those differences disappear by the final wave. While most voters who identified as at least leaning towards one party were likely to think their party would win, the primary movement from waves 3 to 11 occurred among both weak partisans and strong partisans, with both groups increasing their belief that their favored candidate would win over time. In wave 3, it was also noticeable that female Clinton voters were more likely to think she would win than male Clinton voters. That difference also waned by the end of the campaign, which makes sense as most polls thought Clinton was sure to be the victor. There were no notable differences in male and female Trump voters' predictions in the first and last waves.

Instead, the main differences among Trump voters emerge when we examine different income and education groups. Trump voters in the two highest income brackets were less likely than those in the lowest income bracket (those making $30,000 or less) to believe he would win, a pattern that fits the narrative that Trump's most fervent supporters were poor, working class voters who felt D.C. and the establishment political class had forgotten them. Early on, Clinton voters making $50,000 to $80,000 (income group 3) were more likely to think she would win than those in

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[63] *Strength of PID* folds the 7-point PID measure so that the strongest partisans are coded as a 1 and the weakest (pure Independents) are at 0. *Female* is a dummy for gender; *Age* is rescaled from 0 to 1; and there are two dummy variables for race for respondents who identified as black or Hispanic. The income measure is divided into four dummy variables plus a dummy for those who refused to answer the question (*Income-Refused*); the suppressed baseline is the lowest income group: those making $30,000 or less. Education is also broken up into several dummy variables with those who earned a high school diploma or less as the suppressed baseline. The other measures are dummy variables for those who received some college education or graduated college (*Some or Grad College*) and for those who did post-graduate work (*Post-Grad*).

the bottom income category, but by the end of the campaign, the most significant difference to emerge was that highest earning Clinton voters were actually less optimistic than their counterparts in the bottom income group.

Regarding education levels, Trump voters who had gone to graduate school were less willing than those with a high school diploma or less to think Trump would win. At the end of the campaign, the key difference that emerged was people who had attended and/or graduated college were a bit more likely to think he would win than those with a high school diploma or less. Thus, Trump voters who were optimistic about his chances of winning were not simply the least educated of his supporters. Among Clinton voters, those who had done post-graduate work were also less willing to predict their favored candidate would win in wave 3. This could just be a trait among people with those levels of education, as they may just be more cautious in making predictions.

Table 10 Predict Candidate Win

	Clinton Voters		Trump Voters	
	Week 3 (1)	**Week 11 (2)**	**Week 3 (3)**	**Week 11 (4)**
Strength of PID	1.14*	-0.50	0.69**	0.24
	0.65	0.60	0.30	0.27
Female	1.87***	-0.32	-0.11	0.11
	0.63	0.28	0.23	0.24
Age	0.22	0.45	0.39	0.42
	1.14	0.53	0.56	0.59
Black	0.33	-0.27	0.90	--
	0.75	0.33	0.58	
Hispanic	-1.31*	--	0.58	--
	0.69		0.59	
Income 2	0.29	-0.02	-0.20	-0.22
	0.53	0.45	0.41	0.38
Income 3	1.15***	-0.54	-0.73*	-0.78**
	0.36	0.42	0.38	0.36
Income 4	--	-0.88*	-0.62*	-0.48
		0.50	0.39	0.39
Income – Refused	--	-0.66	-1.44***	-0.56
		0.56	0.39	0.58
Some or Grad College	0.72	0.22	-0.28	0.52**
	0.51	0.27	0.24	0.27
Post-Grad	-2.13***	--	-0.70*	-0.45
	0.59		0.38	0.36
Intercept	0.59	2.94***	0.97**	0.91**
	0.80	0.67	0.49	0.39
N	262	275	210	251

Note: Table entry is coefficient with standard error below. All DVs and IVs are coded to range from 0 to 1. Appropriate survey weights are applied. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Analyses

For the first set of analyses in this paper, I continue to examine data from the 2016 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) rolling cross-section of surveys. I focus on the weeks beginning September 3, 2016, through Election Day and when available, I use post-election data collected between November 18 and December 27, 2016.

Pre-Election Campaign Interest

I begin by examining information seeking in the months leading up to the election. Questions inquiring about respondents' levels of political interest were asked consistently in the

pre-election waves. Specifically, individuals were asked: "How interested have you been in the

political campaigns so far this year[64]?" Before delving into the results that divide Clinton and

Trump voters into subsets based on their predictions of who would win the election, I examine

aggregate differences between the two to trace the likelihood that such voters were interested in (or

not so much interested in) the campaign. Here, I regress political interest on *Vote HRC*, which is

simply a dummy variable coded 1 for Clinton voters and 0 for Trump voters. I also control for a

host of demographics including party affiliation, gender, age, race, income, and education[65].

Figure 8 presents the predicted probabilities that emerge from this analysis for Clinton and

Trump voters. Specifically, Figure 8a depicts the likelihood that Clinton voters would report they

were "very much interested," "somewhat interested," or "not much interested" in political

campaigns this year in waves 3 through 11, and Figure 8b does the same for Trump voters[66]. There

are certainly some disparities between the probability that the two types of voters would indicate

particular answer choices. For instance, the likelihood of Trump voters saying they were "very

much interested" in politics in wave 11 right before Election Day was much greater than that for

Clinton voters: 89% versus 71%. Perhaps Clinton voters felt comfortable with their advantaged

status in the polls and didn't need to follow what was going on as closely.

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[64] Response choices were: very much interested, somewhat interested, and not much interested. Given the nature of the dependent variable, I use ordered probit models for these analyses, and I apply appropriate survey weights throughout all CCAP analyses.

[65] Party ID is simply a dummy for Democrat or Republican (leaners included; Pure Independents excluded); gender is a dummy for male/female; age is recoded to vary from 0 to 1; race is accounted for using two dummy variables for those who are black and Hispanic; income is divided into four categories and represented by dummy variables for each of those categories (the highest bracket is the suppressed baseline here) as well as a dummy for those who refused to report their income; and finally, education is measured as a dummy variable for those who did versus did not attend at least some college.

[66] All predicted probabilities in this chapter are calculated for a 40-year-old white male in the second income bracket who did at least attend some college. See Appendix for the table of results from which these predicted values are derived. Predicted probabilities are converted to percentages for Figures 8a and 8b.

Figure 8 Predicted Probabilities for Campaign Interest

*Predicted probabilities are converted to percentages and based on tables in Appendix.

Figure 8a Campaign Interest – Clinton Voters

Figure 8b Campaign Interest – Trump Voters

Looking across all of the pre-election survey waves, the mean predicted likelihoods of Clinton and Trump voters selecting each answer choice did not differ greatly, but they do provide some initial evidence in support of the notion that advantage depresses information seeking relative to disadvantage. The mean likelihood that Clinton voters said they were "not much interested" was 2.48% compared to 2.28% for Trump voters; the mean likelihood of answering "somewhat interested" was 19.05% for Clinton voters and 17.64% for Trump voters; and the mean likelihood of answering "very much interested" was 78.47% for Clinton voters and 80.09% for Trump voters. Thus, Clinton voters advantaged by polling were a bit more likely to say they were either "not much interested" or "somewhat interested" in the campaign than disadvantaged Trump voters, while disadvantaged Trump voters were—on average—a bit more likely to say they were "very much interested" in the campaign than advantaged Clinton voters.

Of course, the novelty of Trump as a political figure or other characteristics unique to each candidate may have also contributed to these differences, so in the next analysis, I separate Clinton

from Trump voters and highlight differences within each group based on predictions about who would win. That is, I isolate the effect of predicting Clinton would win (versus lose) among Clinton voters, and I isolate the effect of predicting Trump would win (versus lose) among Trump voters. Separating the two is also helpful because Clinton and Trump voters differ in ways beyond those accounted for using basic demographic controls in the following models. Additionally, I examine the difference in those differences to understand whether or not the effect of predicting a win among Clinton voters differs from the effect of predicting a win among Trump voters[67].

For this analysis, I focus on three key independent variables: *Predict Win*, which represents the difference between Trump voters who thought Trump would win versus Trump voters who thought he would lose; *Vote HRC*, which represents the effect of Clinton voters thinking their favored candidate would lose compared to the suppressed baseline of Trump voters who thought he would lose; and *Predict Win X Vote HRC*, which represents the difference in the effect of thinking one's candidate would win between Clinton and Trump voters. The marginal effect of Clinton voters thinking she would win versus Clinton voters thinking she would lose is *Predict Win + Predict Win X Vote HRC*[68]. I also control for the same demographics as above.

First, I examine the marginal effect of thinking Clinton would win (versus lose) among Clinton voters. This effect is again calculated by adding *Predict Win + Predict Win X Vote HRC*. Throughout all nine pre-election waves, Clinton voters who thought she would win—something most Clinton voters expected would happen (a mean of 85.99% across all pre-election waves)—

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[67] This calculation helps us understand the differences in effects across the two types of voters. Additional work that looks beyond just the 2016 election could shed light on the degree to which those differences are in fact perennial or perhaps unique to this electoral context.

[68] In creating these independent variables, I drop individuals who thought Clinton and Trump were equally likely to win (an option only given in waves 3-6) or those who were not sure (an option only given in waves 7-11). The maximum weighted percentage of respondents who said they were equally likely to win or not sure who would win was 30.13% in Wave 6, while the minimum was 19.57% in Wave 8. Conceptually, I don't think being uncertain of who will win is equivalent to thinking your party will definitely win or lose, and I want to focus here on those who were certain in their feelings to more clearly understand the effects of advantage or disadvantage. However, future work can do more to examine this nontrivial subset of voters who were not sure. In this case study, the majority of those uncertain voters dropped are Trump supporters. Initial analyses suggest that, at times, they were more interested in the campaign than Trump voters who thought he would lose, but less interested than Trump voters who thought he would win.

were either just as interested or significantly less interested in the campaign than Clinton voters who thought she would lose[69]. Thus, at times, electoral advantage among Clinton voters depressed levels of campaign interest relative to Clinton voters feeling disadvantaged.

Table 11 Campaign Interest

	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6	Wave 7	Wave 8	Wave 9	Wave 10	Wave 11
Predict Win	0.53	0.69**	0.50*	0.72***	0.44*	0.22	0.18	0.54**	0.39
	0.48	0.37	0.34	0.30	0.29	0.33	0.29	0.28	0.31
Vote HRC	5.43***	0.18	0.07	-0.16	1.33***	0.14	4.11***	-0.04	-0.78*
	0.60	0.52	0.52	0.59	0.54	0.85	0.46	0.61	0.61
Predict WinX Vote HRC	-4.93***	-0.39	-0.72*	-0.09	-0.79*	-0.08	-4.44***	-0.32	-0.09
	0.53	0.49	0.53	0.62	0.51	0.81	0.35	0.65	0.50
Democrat	-0.41	-0.51*	0.15	-0.23	-0.84***	0.04	0.12	0.16	0.44
	0.35	0.31	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.44	0.35	0.41
Female	-0.45***	0.06	-0.26	-0.57***	-0.64***	-0.60***	-0.45***	0.08	0.10
	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.18	0.20	0.17	0.19	0.20
Age	1.18***	1.27***	1.11***	2.36***	0.89***	0.97***	1.01***	0.82***	2.23***
	0.46	0.44	0.42	0.52	0.38	0.48	0.38	0.36	0.43
Black	0.03	-0.41*	-0.41**	0.08	-0.47***	-0.25	0.01	-0.69***	-0.21
	0.21	0.29	0.22	0.33	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.27
Hispanic	-0.19	0.03	-0.93***	0.46*	-0.50***	-0.64**	-0.14	-0.32	0.05
	0.27	0.32	0.31	0.34	0.24	0.33	0.31	0.29	0.27
Income 1	-0.10	0.13	-0.28	-0.17	-0.14	-0.71***	0.12	-0.60***	-0.50*
	0.31	0.28	0.26	0.32	0.26	0.29	0.30	0.29	0.35
Income 2	0.24	-0.21	-0.54**	-0.31	-0.41*	-0.16	-0.18	-0.41*	-0.44*
	0.32	0.31	0.30	0.27	0.26	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.34
Income 3	0.37	0.05	-0.12	0.18	0.13	-0.54**	-0.20	-0.03	-0.54**
	0.29	0.27	0.24	0.37	0.34	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.33
Income – Refused	0.08	-0.01	-0.41*	0.42	0.47*	-1.04***	0.44*	-0.81***	-0.61**
	0.32	0.43	0.32	0.37	0.31	0.38	0.30	0.27	0.32
College	0.09	0.76***	0.41***	0.25	0.54***	-0.15	0.64***	0.17	0.90***
	0.20	0.22	0.17	0.24	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.20
Cutpoint 1	-1.08**	-0.61*	-1.81***	-0.73*	-1.76***	-2.20***	-1.26***	-1.28***	-0.99***
	0.63	0.41	0.44	0.47	0.39	0.45	0.47	0.38	0.43
Cutpoint 2	0.31	0.43	-0.48	0.51	-0.54*	-1.31***	0.04	-0.12	0.54
	0.58	0.43	0.42	0.48	0.38	0.46	0.43	0.38	0.43
N	449	436	445	462	452	487	484	541	468

Note: Table entry is coefficient with standard error below. All DVs and IVs are coded to be 0 to 1. Appropriate survey weights are applied. $*p<0.20$; $**p<0.10$; $***p<0.05$, two-tailed.

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[69] The marginal effect of thinking Clinton would win among Clinton voters (versus those who predicted her loss) is: difference=-4.40, *p*-value<0.01 in Wave 3; difference=0.30, *p*-value=0.39 in Wave 4; difference=-0.22, *p*-value=0.57 in Wave 5; difference=0.64, *p*-value=0.23 in Wave 6; difference=-0.35, *p*-value=0.4 in Wave 7; difference=0.14, *p*-value=0.85 in Wave 8; difference=-4.26, *p*-value<0.01 in Wave 9; difference=0.22, *p*-value=0.71 in Wave 10; and difference=0.29, *p*-value=0.48 in Wave 11. All *p*-values are two-tailed.

Next, I examine differences between Trump voters who thought he would win versus Trump voters who thought he would lose which are represented by the coefficients for *Predict Win*. Table 11 suggests there was a consistently positive—and often significant—effect of political advantage across these nine waves. That is, those who thought Trump would win and were planning on voting for him often reported higher levels of campaign interest than his supporters who thought he would lose. This pattern runs counter to my main hypotheses and previous chapters, but the group of Trump voters who seemed to go against the conventional wisdom of most polling and believed he would win was comprised of lower income and, at times, less educated voters. They may have felt particularly distrusting of polling given Trump's own rejection of polls and/or so enthusiastic to finally feel appreciated by a politician (Trump often boasted of representing "the silent majority" who had been forgotten by the establishment political class) that they were willing to follow the campaign more intensely. Trump voters who thought he would lose could also have felt so hopeless in their disadvantaged state that their levels of campaign interest were particularly depressed[70]. Finally, this question does not parse which sources of news these individuals were turning to as they followed the campaign, and optimistic Trump voters very well could have been consuming content from pro-Trump web sites and TV personalities that reinforced their confidence in Trump, his ability to win, and thereby, their interest in the election.

Turning to the difference in these differences represented by the interaction term, the effect of predicting a win is often significantly smaller among Clinton voters compared to the effect among Trump voters. Advantage seems to have worked in the expected direction among Clinton voters at least some of the time, but advantage had an unexpectedly positive effect among Trump voters, which seems to mostly be driving this result for the interaction term. It could also be that Clinton voters who thought she would lose may have still known in the back of their minds that

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[70] In fact, Trump voters who predicted he would lose were, at times, even less interested in the campaign than Clinton voters who thought she would lose. This effect did reverse by the final wave of the campaign (November 4-8, 2016) as Clinton voters who thought she would lose were marginally less interested in the campaign than Trump voters who thought he would lose. And of course, there could be other unobservable differences between these two types of voters that lead to this difference.

pollsters, journalists and pundits overwhelmingly predicted a Clinton victory. That would explain

why there were several waves in which their levels of campaign interest were not statistically

different from Clinton voters who thought she would win[71].

In sum, these pre-election analyses suggest that the relative effects of advantage and

disadvantage differed between Trump and Clinton voters. While advantage tended to boost Trump

supporters' interest in the campaign relative to disadvantage, Clinton voters' advantage was, at

times, an inhibiting force for interest compared to disadvantage. The results for Trump voters run

counter to the key findings of previous chapters, but the context of this particular election help

explain this oddity. First, the enthusiasm of his supporters who thought he would win—those in

lower income groups who finally felt their voice was being heard by a politician—seemed to be so

intense that it actually promoted engagement. Further, Trump supporters who thought he would

lose may have felt so pessimistic about the election (given all of the polling) that their feelings

turned to hopelessness, despair, and a desire to disengage from politics.

These results also provide nuance to the aggregate patterns in Figures 8a and 8b. Here,

Trump voters demonstrated a slightly greater propensity to be "very much interested" in the

campaign compared to Clinton voters. Initially, this supported the notion that Trump voters would

mostly feel disadvantaged by polling compared to advantaged Clinton voters; therefore, Trump

voters should have exhibited higher levels of campaign interest than Clinton voters. By breaking

down each type of voter by their expectations, however, we see that this effect is largely driven by

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[71] Note that I control for income and education in these analyses, which should help alleviate some concerns of endogeneity. For instance, it is not simply that those who think Clinton will lose are less educated and perhaps less cognizant of the polling at the time. I also run similar analyses for a DV that asked: "During the last week, how often did you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?" The answer choices were: always, most of the time, about half the time, some of the time, and never. This question differs from the first interest question because this DV does not mention campaigns and instead asks about government and politics more broadly. The results here are much more mixed. I again find that Trump voters who thought he would win were more willing to say they were paying attention than Trump voters who thought he would lose. The marginal effect of Clinton voters thinking she would win (compared to lose) was initially negative and significant in wave 3, but was either positive and significant or insignificant for the rest of the pre-election waves. Finally, the effect of predict win is smaller for Clinton voters than Trump voters in waves 3 and 11, but are mostly insignificant for the interim waves. Results are in Appendix.

optimistic Trump voters (the majority of Trump voters) being more interested in the campaign than pessimistic Trump voters.

Post-Election Values Regarding Interest

While the same question for campaign interest is not available for the post-election wave, there are some related dependent variables that shed light on similar concepts. In this section, I focus on questions inquiring about the importance of "freedom to criticize the government," having "knowledgeable and educated citizens," and "freedom of the press" to being a democratic society[72]. I also examine *Kind of Job Trump Will Do*, a question that asks respondents about their expectations regarding the kind of job Trump will do as President[73]. This last question is less directly tied to political interest, but pessimism about Trump's future performance in office could certainly motivate future information seeking as a means of monitoring the president-elect.

For this analysis, I examine voters' post-election responses to these questions taking into account both who the respondent voted for and who the respondent predicted would win before Election Day. Among those who were surveyed more than once in the pre-election time period, I use their prediction from the survey wave closest to the election in which they participated. That way, I can better capture their expectations going into election night.

I suspect that the effects will be exacerbated for Clinton voters who thought she would win before November 8 in comparison to those who correctly predicted what would happen and thought she would lose prior to the election. That is, the shock of Trump's victory likely intensified the feelings of disadvantage among Clinton voters who thought she would win relative to those who thought she would lose and further motivated them to engage with politics. Given the findings from Table 11, it is also possible that Trump voters who thought he would win all along may have been invigorated after the election and so enthusiastic that they were more politically engaged than Trump voters who suspected he would lose. Finally, I expect that on average, Trump voters will be

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[72] For all three, response choices were: not important; important, but not essential; and absolutely essential.
[73] The response choices are: a disastrous job, a bad job, a decent job, a good job, and a great job.

relatively less engaged than Clinton voters after the election given the former group's advantaged status and the latter group's disadvantaged status[74].

In the following models, I regress the dependent variables described above on: *Voted HRC* (coded as 1 if the respondent voted for Clinton and 0 if s/he voted for Trump), which represents Clinton voters who thought she would lose before the election compared to Trump voters who thought he would lose; *Predict Win* (coded as 1 if the respondent predicted their favored candidate would win and 0 if they predicted the candidate from other party would win), which represents the effect of thinking your favored candidate would win among Trump voters[75]; and the interaction between the two, *Voted HRC X Predict Win*, which—when added to *Predict Win*—represents the marginal effect of Clinton voters thinking she would win versus lose the election. The suppressed baseline is Trump voters who thought he would lose.

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[74] Again, we cannot necessarily rule out other unobserved causes for the differences between the two types of voters in this across-party comparison without, for instance, looking to different election years.
[75] Like before, Clinton and Trump voters only are included.

Table 12 Post-Election Values

	Freedom to Criticize Gov't (1)	Knowledgeable & Educated Citizens (2)	Freedom of the Press (3)	Kind of Job Trump Will Do (4)
Voted HRC	-0.03	-0.51**	0.54*	-0.48***
	0.30	0.26	0.30	0.04
Voted HRC X Predict Win	0.52*	0.69***	0.14	-0.25***
	0.31	0.28	0.32	0.04
Predict Win	0.03	-0.15	-0.17	0.12***
	0.13	0.11	0.12	0.02
Female	-0.41***	-0.10	-0.26***	-0.02
	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.01
Age	0.13	0.42**	0.54***	-0.02
	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.03
Black	-0.51***	-0.10	-0.30***	0.04**
	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.02
Hispanic	-0.33**	-0.05	-0.09	0.02
	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.02
Income 1	-0.40***	-0.05	-0.29**	0.01
	0.14	0.11	0.12	0.02
Income 2	-0.14	0.07	-0.19	0.03*
	0.14	0.11	0.12	0.02
Income 3	-0.20	0.06	-0.12	0.03*
	0.13	0.10	0.12	0.02
Income – Refused	-0.10	0.19	0.06	0.03*
	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.02
College	0.19**	0.12	0.07	0.004
	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.01
Cutpoint 1	-1.93***	-1.85***	-1.84***	
	0.20	0.18	0.17	
Cutpoint 2	-0.92***	-0.62***	-0.69***	
	0.18	0.16	0.16	
Intercept				0.74***
				0.02
N	3,855	3,855	3,855	3,860

Note: Table entry is coefficient with standard error below for these ordered probit models. All DVs and IVs are coded to be 0 to 1. Appropriate survey weights are applied. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Figure 9 Post-Election Values: Predicted Probabilities

* Predicted probabilities in these figures are converted to percentages and based on Table 12.

Figure 9a Freedom to Criticize Government

Figure 9b Knowledgeable and Educated Citizens

Figure 9c Freedom of the Press

Column 1 of Table 12 presents the results for the importance of having the freedom to criticize the government in a democratic society, and Figure 9a depicts predicted probabilities (converted to percentages) based on this model. The results in Table 12 suggest that Clinton voters who thought she would win prior to the election thought freedom to criticize the government was significantly more important than Clinton voters who predicted she would lose prior to the election (marginal effect=0.55, *p*=0.05). The predicted probabilities for saying it was "absolutely essential" to have the freedom to criticize the government in Figure 9a depict a clear distinction between these two types of voters. The likelihood that those who voted for Clinton and thought she would win responded with "absolutely essential" is 93.8% versus 85% for Clinton voters who thought she would lose. Throughout Figure 9a, the predicted probabilities for Trump voters who thought he would win versus lose are nearly identical—a pattern backed by the insignificant coefficient for *Predict Win* in Column 1 of Table 12. Finally, the positive and significant interaction term suggests the effect of predict win is significantly greater for Clinton voters compared to Trump voters. This

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seems to be largely driven by Clinton voters who thought she would win feeling particularly strongly about the importance of the freedom to criticize the government after the election.

Similar patterns emerge for the importance of having knowledgeable and educated citizens in a democratic society. The results in Column 2 of Table 12 suggest that the marginal effect of thinking Clinton would win compared to Clinton voters who thought she would lose was 0.54 (p=0.03). Thus, once again, Clinton voters whose predictions about who would win the election were wrong had an even greater likelihood of supporting values related to political interest and engagement. And like before, the effect of *Predict Win* was insignificant among Trump voters. Figure 9b depicts the relevant predicted probabilities. The data suggest Clinton voters who predicted a Trump win prior to the election are the most pessimistic out of all four subsets of voters after the election, as they are significantly less likely to say it is "absolutely essential" to have knowledgeable and educated citizens (yet more likely to say it's "important but not essential" or "not important") than their fellow Clinton voters and also Trump voters. Thus, the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term in Column 2 of Table 12 is largely driven by Clinton voters who predicted a loss prior to the election believing it was significantly less important for a democracy to have knowledgeable and educated citizens than Clinton voters who had thought she would win.

Column 3 of Table 12 presents the results for the importance of having a free press in a democratic society. Here, the difference between Clinton voters who had differing predictions is insignificant (p=0.93), and the difference between Trump voters with differing predictions was only marginally significant (p=0.16). What is striking, as depicted in Figure 9c, is the clear difference between Clinton voters as a whole versus Trump voters as a whole. Clinton voters are much more likely to say freedom of the press is "absolutely essential" while Trump voters were more likely to say it was either "important, but not essential" or "not important." This suggests that for some issues related to engagement and information seeking, the political environment cannot necessarily move people's beliefs. Instead, an issue like freedom of the press is so entrenched in the two

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parties' ideologies—with Democrats supporting the press and Republicans highly skeptical of it—

that feelings of advantage or disadvantage don't seem to affect people's beliefs much.

Finally, I examine responses to a question inquiring about the kind of job respondents

predicted Trump would do in office. Unsurprisingly, the results in Column 4 of Table 12 suggest

Clinton voters were generally more pessimistic about Trump's performance in office than Trump

voters. Diving deeper into the data, Clinton voters who thought she would win before the election

again exhibited more extreme responses than other Clinton voters. Clinton voters who thought she

would win believed Trump would do a significantly worse job than Clinton voters who thought she

would lose (marginal effect=-0.13, p=0.001). The predicted value for Clinton voters who thought

she would win was the lowest of all four types of voters at 0.16 compared to Clinton voters who

thought she would lose at 0.28[76]. The effect of predict win for Trump voters is positive and

significant (b=0.12; p<0.01) and also significantly greater than the (negative and significant) effect

for Clinton voters. The predicted values for Trump voters who thought he would win and lose were

0.89 and 0.77, respectively. Thus, once again, we find evidence that Trump voters who had thought

he would win the election were more enthusiastic after the election than Trump voters who

predicted he would lose.

Google Trends

To provide some external validity to my findings, I look beyond survey data and examine

trends in Google searches in two key states that are majority Republican and Democrat: Alabama

and Massachusetts, respectively[77] (Rogers 2014; Jones 2015). By using two states whose citizens

are overwhelmingly aligned with one party, I am able to approximate the search patterns of

partisans of different stripes during and after the 2016 election. I broadly expect that when

individuals are politically disadvantaged—electorally or policy-wise—their willingness to seek out

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[76] The dependent variable is scaled to range from 0 to 1.

[77] Clinton won 60% of the vote in Massachusetts and only 34.4% of the vote in Alabama. Trump won 32.8% of the vote in Massachusetts, yet 62.1% of the vote in Alabama.

political information will increase, whereas advantage will depress or not change their behavior.

I draw on weekly data from Google Trends that provide a ranking of search interest for various terms in a given region and time period. This ranking ranges from 0 to 100 and is relative to the highest value on the chart for a given region and time. Therefore, rankings of 100 indicate "peak popularity" for that particular term in that region and time period; a ranking of 50 means the given term is half as popular as the most popular term; and a score of 0 means the term was less than 1% as popular as the term at peak popularity[78].

In the following figures, I compare the relative popularity of a given search term in Alabama versus its relative popularity in Massachusetts to gauge whether or not there are differences in patterns of information seeking among Democratic- and Republican-leaning states given key political events that induce advantage and disadvantage. These analyses are, of course, aggregated and do not provide fine-grained details on the behavior of specific individuals. However, the overall patterns uncovered here provide insights into the average information-seeking behavior of right- and left-leaning states throughout and after the 2016 election as they responded to the national political environment. Even more, the overall findings align with the general patterns unearthed using observational and experimental individual-level data in this dissertation project.

First, I examine searches for key terms that suggest individuals were interested in gaining more information about the two candidates or politics more broadly. Notably, the patterns in Figure 10 suggest that in reliably Democratic Massachusetts, the relative search ranking for "Donald Trump" was larger than that of reliably Republican Alabama after key threatening events for those on the left. For instance, these surges emerged after the Access Hollywood tape was released, after November 8, and after the initial travel ban was enacted—all instances in which Democrats were particularly threatened and/or disadvantaged.

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[78] Utych and Kam (2013) use a similar metric from Google Trends for the relative ranking of search terms' popularity in their analyses. Note that the same set of comparisons were used across states (e.g., Hillary Clinton was always compared against Donald Trump, Fox News, MSNBC, and a neutral term [olive], while Planned Parenthood was always compared against NRA, ACLU, Heritage Foundation, and again, olive).

Figure 10 Google Searches: Candidates and Partisan News

First week of Jan 2016 (week of 1/3/16) to first week of April 2017 (week of 4/2/17)

Though Clinton was still leading in the polls after the Access Hollywood tape, the rhetoric in the tape (and sometimes the commentary surrounding the controversy) was threatening to most Democrats as it used crude language and advocated sexual assault on women. In the four weeks after the tape's release, the average search interest ranking of "Donald Trump" in Massachusetts was greater than that in Alabama (29.25 vs. 24). Of course, after the election, Democrats were disadvantaged by their loss and the threat of a Trump presidency that would enact policies and represent ideals that ran counter to their ideology. Here, the average relative search ranking for Trump in Massachusetts was 35.8 versus Alabama's score of 33 in the month after the election.

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Finally, the travel ban executive order of January 2017 not only enacted a policy that Democrats opposed, but also reinforced their disadvantaged status because Trump was able to act unilaterally as president to pursue this policy (Almasy and Simon 2017). The average search interest for Trump in Massachusetts was 18.5 in the month after the first travel ban (before the second one) and only 13.25 in Alabama.

The rankings for "Hillary Clinton" and "MSNBC" were pretty similar across both states, and searches for "Fox News" were always more dominant in Alabama than Massachusetts with no notable relative shifts in scores. However, in examining the four search terms that represent organizations affiliated with Republican and Democratic coalitions in Figure 11, the searches for Democratic-leaning groups noticeably spiked after key threatening events. For instance, in the month after Trump's election, searches for "Planned Parenthood" were way more dominant in Massachusetts than Alabama (search rankings of 23.6 vs. 7.2, respectively). Likewise, the dominance of searches for the "ACLU" in Massachusetts surged in the month after Trump's election (with an average score of 14) and the month after the travel ban (average score of 33.5, including a score of 100 directly after the announcement of the ban), while the prominence of this search term was lower and hardly varied in Alabama in those time periods (average score of 3.4 after the election and 8 after the travel ban).

Figure 11 Google Searches: Organizations

First week of Jan 2016 (week of 1/3/16) to first week of April 2017 (week of 4/2/17)

Search patterns for conservative leaning groups such as the NRA and Heritage Foundation did not change in meaningful ways among residents of Alabama or Massachusetts in the aftermath of these key events, which makes sense as Republicans enjoyed an advantaged status after the 2016 election and into Trump's presidency.

Taken together, patterns in Google searches suggest that disadvantage in particular can boost people's engagement with politics in the real world. Here, we saw a Democratic-leaning state focus its information searches on Trump (and not Clinton) when disadvantaged and also focus on organizations that align with its ideology more so than a Republican-leaning state, presumably as a

first step in taking action on behalf of such groups.

Post-Election Political Participation and Beliefs

The trends from these Google searches are suggestive of people's increased willingness to participate in politics during periods of disadvantage compared to advantage. Searching for groups like Planned Parenthood or the ACLU could indicate not only a desire to learn more about those groups, but could also serve as a precursor to taking action in the form of volunteering for or donating to those groups. Thus, in this final section I examine dependent variables that shed light on people's participation in politics.

Like the analysis in Table 12 that examined post-election beliefs related to political interest, I examine post-election participation taking into account both the candidate that respondents voted for and their pre-election predictions about whether or not their favored candidate would win. For those surveyed more than once in the pre-election period, I again use the prediction from the survey wave closest to the election in which they participated. I suspect once more that the effects will be exacerbated for Clinton voters who had expected her to win prior to the election in comparison to Clinton voters who thought she would lose all along. Among Trump voters, it seems likely that those who thought he would win and were validated by his victory were more enthusiastic and more likely to take part in political acts than Trump voters who thought he would lose.

In the results in Table 13, I focus on the following dependent variables: *Donate Money*, a dummy for whether or not respondents have donated money since the election, and *Support Protests*, which asks about the degree to which the respondent supports or opposes the right to protest against President-elect Trump (with response choices of strongly oppose, somewhat oppose, somewhat support, and strongly support).

Like before, I regress the outcome measures on: *Voted HRC*, which represents Clinton voters who thought she would lose before the election compared to Trump voters who thought he would lose; *Predict Win*, which represents the effect of thinking your favored candidate would win

among Trump voters[79]; and the interaction between the two: *Voted HRC X Predict Win*, which—when added to *Predict Win*—represents the marginal effect of thinking Clinton would win among Clinton voters. The suppressed baseline is Trump voters who thought he would lose.

I begin with the results for willingness to donate money. Unsurprisingly, Clinton voters were significantly more likely to say they had donated money since the election than Trump voters (b=0.09, p=0.07 in a bivariate regression). This supports the notion that disadvantage is a motivating force when it comes to the costly action of donating money. Column 1 of Table 13 breaks down these effects even further and differentiates between Clinton and Trump voters who thought their candidate would win versus those who predicted a loss prior to the election. The difference between the two types of Clinton voters is insignificant (p=0.95), and the predicted probability of donating after the election among Clinton voters who initially thought she would win (28%) is only one percentage point greater than Clinton voters who thought she would lose (27%). Both, however, are larger than the predicted probabilities for Trump voters who thought he would win (24%) and Trump voters who thought he would lose (13%). The difference between Trump voters is significant (p<0.01) and suggests that Trump voters who predicted he would win and were proven right responded with greater enthusiasm than other Trump voters. However, it is worth noting that the effect of predict win does not vary significantly (p=0.18, two-tailed) across Clinton and Trump voters as represented by the interaction term.

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[79] Like before, Clinton and Trump voters only are included.

Table 13 Post-Election Participation

|	Donate Money (1)	Support Protests (2)
Voted HRC	0.53*	0.68***
	0.29	0.23
Voted HRC X Predict Win	-0.41	0.95***
	0.31	0.24
Predict Win	0.43***	-0.28***
	0.12	0.09
Female	-0.16*	-0.29***
	0.08	0.06
Age	0.08	0.10
	0.23	0.16
Black	-0.52***	-0.15
	0.12	0.11
Hispanic	-0.21	-0.38***
	0.15	0.10
Income 1	-0.17	-0.26***
	0.13	0.10
Income 2	-0.01	-0.28***
	0.12	0.10
Income 3	0.05	-0.23***
	0.10	0.08
Income – Refused	-0.18	0.006
	0.12	0.11
College	0.36***	0.17**
	0.10	0.07
Intercept	-1.51***	
	0.18	
Cutpoint 1		-0.69***
		0.14
Cutpoint 2		-0.01
		0.14
Cutpoint 3		0.85***
		0.14
N	3,861	3,859

Note: Table entry is coefficient with standard error below for probit (column 1), ordered probit (column 2) and OLS models (column 3). All DVs and IVs are coded to be 0 to 1. Appropriate survey weights are applied. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Column 2 of Table 13 presents the results for willingness to support protests of then President-elect Trump. Clinton voters who thought she would win before the election were even more likely than Clinton voters who thought she would lose to say they supported protests of

Trump (marginal effect=0.67; p=0.002). Thus, initially optimistic Clinton voters' sense of disadvantage after the election was seemingly exacerbated by the shock of her loss, and as a result, they were even more willing to support protests than other Clinton voters. Figure 12 depicts the relevant predicted probabilities for this dependent variable. Here, we also see that Trump voters who thought he would win all along were the least willing to say they would support protests of Trump—even when compared to Trump voters who thought he would lose (p=0.001). Given the positive effect of *Predict Win* among Clinton voters and the negative effect of predict win among Trump voters, it is unsurprising that the difference-in-differences for predict win across Clinton and Trump voters is significant.

Figure 12 Support Protests: Predicted Probabilities

Predicted probabilities are converted to percentages and based on Table 13.

In sum, the results from these post-election questions suggest that disadvantage can be a powerful determinant of political engagement. Clinton voters as a whole were more willing to donate money in general and support protests of Trump after the election than Trump voters[80]. Further, we see that important differences emerge when pre-election predictions are taken into account. Clinton voters who thought she would win all along were even more supportive of protests against Trump than Clinton voters unsurprised by the election outcome. There was also some evidence that Trump voters who thought he would win were more engaged than despondent Trump voters who thought he would lose prior to the election.

Conclusion

In the 2016 presidential election, data journalism—with its complex statistical predictive models—rose to new levels of prominence in campaign coverage, and unlike most modern American presidential elections, all signs indicated more of a landslide than a tight horserace, as Clinton was the overwhelming favorite virtually from the start of the general campaign cycle. I leverage this context to help us further understand the degree to which expectations about the winner or loser of the election affect both pre- and post-election political engagement.

Drawing on observational survey data and Google search data, I find that in the lead up to the election, advantage had differential effects for Clinton and Trump voters. Advantage in the form of believing Trump would win increased Trump supporters' interest in the campaign relative to disadvantage among Trump voters who thought he would lose. Conversely, Clinton voters who thought she would win were at times less interested in the campaign than Clinton voters who thought she would lose (and even Trump voters who thought he would win). After the election, political losers were generally seeking out more information about their affiliated political groups like the ACLU and were more willing to support protests, donate money, or think that Trump

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[80] Of course, this could be due to unobserved differences between Democrats and Republicans or general in versus out of power party dynamics; future work could look to similar patterns in other election years for more context.

would do a poor job in office. Even more, the effects of disadvantage were exacerbated among Clinton voters who thought she would win prior to the election, which suggests the surprise outcome created conditions that made disadvantage a particularly motivating force for political engagement.

However, the unexpected findings among Trump voters suggest there may be some limits to the motivating effects of disadvantage. Throughout these analyses, Trump voters who thought he would lose were often less engaged than Trump voters who thought he would win. Given the lopsided nature of predictions regarding who would win before November 8, it seems that this particular manifestation of disadvantage morphed into despair and hopelessness among pessimistic Trump voters and led them to distance themselves from politics.

Of course, the specifics of this particular election cycle may mean there are some limits to the applicability of this case study. The lead up to most modern elections do not typically see such one-sided predictions in favor of one candidate winning over another. Thus, the conditions for disadvantage that turns to despair may be unique to this election. The novelty of Trump as a political candidate and the potentially new set of voters he invigorated could also help explain the high levels of engagement among his supporters who thought he would win. In future work, I would like to run similar analyses in different elections to better understand the degree to which these findings are an anomaly and to provide further context regarding the typical differences between Democrats and Republicans in the effects of predicting a win.

I would also like to dive deeper into the reasons why some people chose to trust the polling ahead of the election and why some people rejected it by either believing the exact opposite or remaining uncertain about what would happen. This could entail looking at different dispositional characteristics or considering the effects of Trump's repeated attacks of the polls that said he would lose (and attacks of the mainstream media more broadly). Finally, it would be interesting to examine the degree to which Trump voters who thought he was going to lose prior to the election were disengaging from politics because their favored (establishment) Republican candidate did not

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win the primary and Trump was seemingly taking the party in a new and different direction.

In conclusion, my results once again demonstrate that political advantage and disadvantage have meaningful consequences for individuals' information seeking. Even more, the findings shed light on conditions under which citizens take steps to fulfill or not fulfill their basic duties of not only gathering information about, but also participating in politics. And as we have witnessed in the first months of this new presidency with the Women's March, increased donations to the ACLU, and increases in subscriptions to and viewership of left-leaning news outlets on various platforms (see, e.g., Stelter 2017), the consequences of disadvantage in particular can be powerful in motivating political losers. As a result, such opposition can help ensure close monitoring of elected officials and can even set the stage for future exchanges of power from one party to another—both important qualities for healthy democratic societies.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

"Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press…" –U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1.

The Founding Fathers' decision to include the freedom of the press in the First Amendment

suggests its fundamental importance to democratic governance. Journalists today—including editor

of *The Washington Post*, Marty Baron—interpret the First Amendment as a charge to uncover the

truth and report it so that the press and public together can "hold their government to account.

That's the meaning of self-governance" (CBS This Morning 2017). Normative theories of

democracy also uphold the importance of free-flowing information because it arms citizens with the

information needed to hold elected officials accountable (Dahl 1998). Given the press's import in

our democratic society, I seek to understand the determinants of media consumption, particularly

their political determinants.

This project examines how advantage and disadvantage in the political environment affect

patterns of political news consumption across a variety of media and time periods. Existing

literature often focuses on how nonpartisan and partisan media affect political outcomes such as the

attitudes and behaviors of both citizens and elites (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1987; DellaVigna and

Kaplan 2007; Levendusky 2013). Yet I take a different approach by characterizing how political

advantage or disadvantage affect demand for partisan and non-partisan media. Even more, my

analyses employ several operationalizations of political advantage and disadvantage and several

operationalizations of political news media, ranging from newspaper circulations to cable TV

audience shares and Google searches.

In Chapter 2, I examine how both advantage and disadvantage derived from national

elections influence local partisan newspapers' circulations. Using data that span nearly a century

from 1932 to 2004, I find that parties that were electorally advantaged in presidential contests saw

demand for their affiliated newspapers decrease relative to demand for papers affiliated with electorally disadvantaged parties. Similar patterns emerge in a case study of circulations for the *Tampa Bay Times* and the *Tampa Tribune*, two papers in the same geographic region in Florida that had opposing ideological leanings. And in my analyses directly comparing the abilities of presidential versus House election outcomes to set the tone for electoral advantage and disadvantage, I find that the former seems to matter the most, while the latter did not make a significant impact on partisan newspaper circulations.

In Chapter 3, I look to original experimental data to provide causal evidence at the individual level in support of the aggregate, first-order conditions for the relationship of interest uncovered in Chapter 2. The first experimental study took place in the fall of 2014 and leveraged the real-world political context by randomly assigning individuals to read about the upcoming midterms. I manipulated predictions about either the Republican or Democratic Party holding the majority status in the Senate after the election—both were plausible outcomes throughout the campaign, which boosted the believability of my treatments. In the second experimental study, which was fielded in February 2016, I randomly assigned subjects to read about the upcoming presidential election that fall. These texts were not only meant to induce a sense of advantage and disadvantage, but also were crafted to invoke a specific relevant emotion. The article meant to induce advantage used language that promoted feelings of enthusiasm, while the two articles intended to induce disadvantage promoted feelings of anxiety and anger.

Across both studies, I find interesting differences between advantage and disadvantage more generally, as well as meaningful differences between those experiencing disadvantage and anger versus disadvantage and anxiety. The results suggest anger associated with electoral disadvantage promotes action that defends the in-group party, while anxiety is positively correlated with information seeking via social media. Further, advantage is negatively correlated with a willingness to learn more about the election at hand, which again suggests an electoral win—or the likely prospect of an electoral win—can engender complacency in the form of decreased

information seeking.

Finally, in Chapter 4, I focus on the effects of advantage and disadvantage in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. This particular election serves as a nice case study because the near certainty that Clinton would win leading up to Election Day coupled with Trump's surprise victory exposed citizens to powerful stimuli inducing political advantage and disadvantage. For this analysis, I use observational survey data to examine the effects of political advantage and disadvantage based on respondents' predictions of who would win on November 8 and their own vote choice. I also examine Google search patterns before and after the election as a measure of information seeking.

The results were a bit surprising for advantage, which seemed to work in two different ways for Trump and Clinton voters. In the lead up to the election, advantage among Trump supporters (i.e., Trump voters who believed he would win) actually increased their interest in the campaign relative to disadvantaged Trump voters who thought he would lose. Conversely, Clinton voters who thought she would win were at times less interested in the campaign than Clinton voters who thought she would lose, a pattern that aligns with the findings of the two other empirical chapters.

After the election, political losers (i.e., Clinton voters) tended to search for more information regarding their affiliated political groups, like the ACLU or Planned Parenthood, and they were also more willing to participate in politics. These effects of disadvantage were exacerbated among Clinton voters who thought she would win prior to the election, which suggests the surprise outcome intensified the motivating power of disadvantage accompanied with losing. However, there may be some limits to such effects for disadvantage. In the lead up to the election, Trump voters who thought he would win actually had higher levels of campaign interest relative to Trump voters who thought he would lose. And even after the election, Trump voters who initially thought he would lose were less engaged than Trump voters who thought he would win. Therefore, it seems when disadvantage is particularly overwhelming, it may lead to feelings of hopelessness and a desire to disengage with politics.

Taken together, I find convincing evidence at the individual level that supports the first order conditions for the relationship of interest uncovered in the aggregate-level analyses of Chapter 2. There, the results find a negative correlation between political advantage and relative partisan media consumption in the form of local partisan newspapers. In Chapter 3, I present evidence that advantage is powerful in depressing information seeking and a willingness to learn more about politics, while anxiety related to disadvantage can boost information seeking on social media platforms. Such individual-level patterns support the dominant, aggregate patterns in Chapter 2, while also providing additional nuance to which groups of individuals move under which conditions. These results also suggest the conclusions from Chapter 2 extend beyond just partisan news, since respondents in this study were asked about a general willingness to learn more about politics. Additional analyses in Chapter 3 uncover evidence that anger related to disadvantage can promote defensive behaviors that seek to protect the in-group.

Finally, Chapter 4 presents evidence that uses subjective perceptions of advantage and disadvantage at the individual level. The results are both supportive of and differ from the previous chapters. While Clinton voters who were advantaged in the sense that they thought she would win were sometimes less interested in the campaign prior to Election Day than disadvantaged Clinton voters who thought she would lose, Trump voters exhibited opposite patterns: those who thought he would win were more interested in the campaign ahead of the election than Trump voters who suspected he would lose. In fact, the sense of disadvantage was so overwhelming for pessimistic Trump voters (given pollsters' predictions that Clinton would win with a near certainty) that it seems to have decreased engagement with politics both before *and* after Election Day.

There is still more work to be done in pursuit of this overall research agenda. The role of emotions could be more clearly isolated in the case study of the 2016 election, and I could further analyze the emotion of hopelessness, which seems to permeate through pessimistic Trump voters before and after the election. Additional experimental work that builds upon that in Chapter 3 would also be useful, as the results were a bit weak here. Future experiments may be more

successful if they focus specifically on presidential elections and are fielded using hypothetical candidates in a time period that is less politically saturated than the weeks and months leading up to a midterm or presidential election.

Additional studies could also investigate the dispositional and situational factors that affect individuals' subjective perceptions of advantage and disadvantage. Just as there are differences in people's willingness to engage in motivated reasoning when considering objective economic indicators, it is likely that motivated reasoning plays a big role in, for instance, explaining why a majority of Trump voters still thought he would win the 2016 election despite all of the polling data leading up to November 8. At the same time, there was also a sizable group of Trump supporters who bought into the polling before the election and believed Clinton would win or who were at least uncertain about the election result. I would like to better understand why this was the case and also the degree to which these particular Trump voters were experiencing partisan ambivalence (Lavine et al. 2012), as they were witnessing a change in their party's direction and ideology. Additional work might examine questions probing their feelings about Trump as well as the consequences of any potential ambivalence they felt.

Future research could also examine levels of trust in mainstream and partisan media, as this seems to be an important factor in affecting people's beliefs about the political environment. There may also be a feedback loop in which trust in the media—particularly partisan media—is affected by advantage and disadvantage. Perhaps disadvantage not only promotes engagement and information seeking, but also affects the degree to which individuals trust their favored news sources and distrust oppositional sources.

Finally, there are important normative implications that stem from advantage and disadvantage affecting media demand and participation. Attention to politics tends to dissipate after an election is over, yet that is arguably a more important time as it is when laws are passed, bureaucratic appointments are made, and executive orders are enacted. If advantaged citizens sometimes become complacent and less willing to follow politics, then the monitoring of elected

officials after a campaign ends may be quite uneven. That is, the feedback given to representatives in office may be in one party's best interest, but those in the other party may not voice their opinions as intensely.

While asymmetries in the monitoring of politics is not ideal, it is also nearly impossible for all citizens to pay close attention to politics all the time due to the demands of everyday life. Given this, there is a bit of a silver lining to my findings: it is encouraging that those who are taking a break from politics are the ones advantaged by the political system, particularly when compared to an alternate scenario in which the disadvantaged remain unengaged while the advantaged fight to further advance their own agenda. That is, if there is going to be a subset of the population tuning out, it seems better for it to be the advantaged (assuming their ideology is truly being represented by their elected officials) than the disadvantaged.

Additional work examining patterns of advantage and disadvantage after the fanfare of a campaign dies down and the governing period begins could be done to gain a better idea of who is paying close attention to politics not just months, but years after an election. Analyses of Google searches similar to those in Chapter 4 represent an interesting avenue for better understanding what happens in between elections. Data on searches for the contact information of members of Congress, for example, could be collected in response to specific policy enactments like the passage of the Affordable Care Act back in 2010. If my theory is correct, we might expect people in staunchly Republican versus Democratic areas to have a much greater volume of searches for their representatives' phone numbers or even town hall meetings as a first step in voicing their opposition to the bill. In the end, examining how political factors affect engagement not only sheds light on the conditions under which citizens take steps to fulfill their normative duties of becoming informed and politically active, but can also deepen our understanding of the dynamics of representation and accountability in our democratic society during, after, and between elections.

APPENDIX A

ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 2

Table A1 reports the results for analyses dropping former Confederate states. Table A2

demonstrates that the results are robust to operationalizing the dependent variable in various

manners all described in the table's notes. The last two columns of Table A2 break down the two

papers by partisanship and suggest that the negative overall results may be driven more by

Republican papers than Democratic ones (though the findings are not very significant here).

Finally, Table A3 reports the results of the main analyses in columns 1-5 of Table 2 in Chapter 2

using raw values instead of percentages for the key independent and dependent variables.

Table A1 Political Environment and Demand for Partisan Newspapers in Non-Confederate States, 1932-2004

	(1)	(2)
GOP Vote Margin [Percentage]	-0.14**	
	0.05	
Winner		-15,082.99***
		5463.85
State-Year Fixed Effects		Yes
Intercept	0.82	8652.00
	0.66	9328.85
N	19	1520
R²	0.29	0.50

Note: DVs: Column 1 uses a dependent variable that is a relative measure of the changes in the two types of papers' circulations over time as a percentage of all circulations. Column 2 uses the alternative specification with the change in circulations for party *j*'s paper as the dependent variable. Its key IV is *winner*: whether or not party *j* won the election. The former Confederate states are: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with robust standard error below. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tailed.

Table A2 Political Environment and Demand for Partisan Newspapers, 1932-2004
[Robustness Checks]

	(1)	(2)	(3)	Republican Papers (4)	Democratic Papers (5)
GOP Vote Margin [%]	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.24**		
	0.04	0.04	0.08		
Percentage of GOP Votes				-0.27	
				0.20	
Percentage of Dem Votes					0.04
					0.12
Intercept	0.28	0.33	0.41	13.94	-1.41
	0.41	0.42	0.93	10.29	5.78
N	19	19	19	19	19
Adjusted R^2	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.07	0.002

Note: DVs: Model 1 uses the relative measure of the changes in the two types of papers' circulations as a percentage of all circulations in year *t*; Model 2 uses the relative measure of the changes in the two types of papers' circulations as a percentage of all circulations in year *t-4*; Model 3 uses the differences in the rates of change (as a percentage) between the two papers from year *t-4* to year *t*; Model 4 uses the rate of change for Republican papers from year *t-4* to year *t*; Model 5 uses the rate of change for Democratic papers from year *t-4* to year *t*. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with robust standard error below. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

**Table A3** Political Environment and Demand for Partisan Newspapers, 1932-2004 [Raw Values]

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
GOP Vote Margin	-0.07***	-0.06**	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.05*
	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
Change in GDP		-481.08*			
		255.90			
GOP Vote Margin Lagged			-0.02		
			0.02		
Radio Period				618,888.9	
				437,284.4	
Time					-158,259.5
					190,520.6
Time Squared					4,082.12
					8,775.82
Intercept	126,668.5	373,395.3	138,080.8	-73,826.06	1,170,023
	208,164.8	270,118.2	211,794.8	264,009	803,440.3
N	19	18	19	19	19
R²	0.36	0.44	0.39	0.42	0.50

Note: Models use the relative measure of the changes in the two types of papers' circulations as the dependent variable. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with robust standard error below. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Figure A1 Relative Changes in Circulations of Tampa Bay Papers – Change in Republican Paper vs. Change in Democratic Paper


Note: The mean circulation levels of *The Tampa Tribune* and the *Tampa Bay Times* in the year after an election were 159,145.9 and 178,395, respectively.

Figure A2 GOP Vote Margin, 1932-2004

Figure A3 Circulation Levels of All Local Daily Partisan Papers Over Time, 1932-2004

Figure A4 Relative Changes in Circulations of All Local Daily Partisan Papers – Change in Republican vs. Change in Democratic Papers


Positive numbers in this plot reflect years in which Republican papers grew more than Democratic papers. This figure provides evidence that should alleviate any skepticism regarding the duration of the partisan associations of these papers in that we see meaningful swings in the relative changes in the papers' circulations throughout this time period. If the ideological reputations of the papers had truly eroded over time, we would not expect to observe continuing differences in recent years.

Note: The typical circulations of Republican and Democratic papers were 23,100,000 and 17,500,000, respectively.

Figure A5 Proportion of Cities with at Least Two Papers*, 1869 to 2004

Out of all cities with at least one paper

Figure A6 Percentage Change in Median Prime-Time Cable News Viewers

APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 3

Study 1

Table B1 Story Count Dependent Variables' Summary Statistics [Raw]

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
All Stories	10.40	9.03	0	60
Political Stories	7.93	7.02	0	40
Apolitical Stories	2.47	3.14	0	20
Friendly Stories	4.30	3.93	0	20
Unfriendly Stories	3.51	3.54	0	20

Note: Values for maximum are from the sample and are not theoretical maximums.

Table B2 Effects of Advantage and Disadvantage [Raw]

	Friendly Stories		Unfriendly Stories	
	Positive Stories: In-Party (1)	**Negative Stories: Out-Party (2)**	**Positive Stories: Out-Party (3)**	**Negative Stories: In-Party (4)**
Advantaged Condition	-0.37*	-0.19	-0.21	-0.12
	0.20	0.19	0.13	0.17
Disadvantaged Condition	-0.33*	-0.32	-0.14	-0.30*
	0.20	0.21	0.16	0.16
Non-white	-0.07	-0.63***	-0.22	-0.33**
	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.14
Registered To Vote	0.53	0.94**	0.24	0.98***
	0.37	0.36	0.27	0.31
Intercept	1.90***	1.63***	1.37***	1.41***
	0.38	0.41	0.28	0.34
N	1228	1228	1228	1228

Note: The DVs represent the number of each type of story clicked. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error clustered by state below. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Table B3 Effects of Advantage and Disadvantage by Interest [Raw]

	Friendly Stories		Unfriendly Stories	
	Positive Stories: In-Party (1)	**Negative Stories: Out-Party (2)**	**Positive Stories: Out-Party (3)**	**Negative Stories: In-Party (4)**
Advantaged Condition	0.36	0.07	-0.04	0.27
	0.33	0.33	0.24	0.36
Disadvantaged Condition	0.28	0.56**	0.11	0.05
	0.29	0.25	0.22	0.27
Interest	2.31***	2.78***	1.49***	1.82***
	0.33	0.30	0.32	0.35
Advantage x Interest	-1.23**	-0.51	-0.32	-0.68
	0.50	0.58	0.36	0.56
Disadvantage x Interest	-0.95**	-1.37***	-0.38	-0.51
	0.39	0.43	0.32	0.41
Non-white	0.12	-0.68***	-0.24*	-0.35***
	0.34	0.16	0.14	0.12
Registered To Vote	0.12	0.42	-0.07	0.63**
	0.34	0.31	0.26	0.29
Intercept	0.88**	0.43	0.75***	0.64*
	0.36	0.34	0.26	0.34
N	1227	1227	1227	1227

Note: The DVs represent the number of each type of story clicked. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error clustered by state below. $*p<0.10$; $**p<0.05$; $***p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Table B4 Effects of Advantage and Disadvantage [Control for Total Stories]

	Friendly Stories		Unfriendly Stories	
	Positive Stories: In-Party (1)	**Negative Stories: Out-Party (2)**	**Positive Stories: Out-Party (3)**	**Negative Stories: In-Party (4)**
Advantaged Condition	-2.05	0.78	1.49**	2.56**
	1.61	1.02	0.68	1.03
Disadvantaged Condition	-0.89	0.05	1.23*	0.38
	1.64	1.09	0.75	1.16
Non-white	1.61	-4.46***	-0.20	-0.33
	1.20	1.02	1.13	1.83
Registered To Vote	-0.21	3.81*	-3.48	3.50*
	1.96	2.23	2.27	1.88
Total Stories Clicked	0.47***	0.49***	0.47***	0.46***
	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.05
Intercept	12.90***	8.97***	7.32***	7.66***
	2.24	2.45	2.18	2.22
N	1228	1228	1228	1228

Note: The DVs represent the percentage of each type of story clicked out of total stories clicked. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error clustered by state below. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Table B5 Effects of Advantage and Disadvantage by Interest [Control for Total Stories]

	Friendly Stories		Unfriendly Stories	
	Positive Stories: In-Party (1)	**Negative Stories: Out-Party (2)**	**Positive Stories: Out-Party (3)**	**Negative Stories: In-Party (4)**
Advantaged Condition	-0.71	-0.63	0.52	1.07
	3.86	2.48	1.89	2.69
Disadvantaged Condition	-2.13	1.95	-0.70	-3.04
	3.05	2.74	1.75	2.74
Interest	1.63	9.24***	0.43	-3.93**
	3.67	3.34	2.20	1.94
Advantage x Interest	-2.26	1.77	1.52	2.46
	4.90	4.26	2.47	4.01
Disadvantage x Interest	2.13	-2.99	3.25	5.64*
	3.74	4.48	2.57	3.33
Non-white	1.52	-4.71***	-0.18	-0.30
	1.17	1.08	1.15	1.82
Registered To Vote	-0.68	1.88	-3.94*	3.76**
	2.13	2.17	2.27	1.84
Total Stories Clicked	0.46***	0.45***	0.46***	0.46***
	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.05
Intercept	12.47***	5.73*	7.60***	9.73***
	3.11	2.99	2.20	2.65
N	1227	1227	1227	1227

Note: The DVs represent the percentage of each type of story clicked out of total stories clicked. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error clustered by state below. $*p<0.10$; $**p<0.05$; $***p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Table B6 Effects of Advantage and Disadvantage by Interest

	Friendly Stories		Unfriendly Stories	
	Positive Stories: In-Party (1)	**Negative Stories: Out-Party (2)**	**Positive Stories: Out-Party (3)**	**Negative Stories: In-Party (4)**
Advantaged Condition	-0.40	-0.33	0.83	1.39
	4.04	2.53	1.88	2.84
Disadvantaged Condition	-1.63	2.44	-0.19	-2.53
	2.94	2.59	1.83	2.81
Interest	5.65	13.19***	4.51*	0.17
	3.65	3.02	2.35	2.09
Advantage x Interest	-4.08	-0.01	-0.32	0.60
	5.22	4.42	2.47	4.34
Disadvantage x Interest	0.22	-4.86	1.32	3.70
	3.68	4.36	2.56	3.48
Non-white	0.95	-5.27***	-0.75	-0.88
	1.27	1.16	1.23	1.79
Registered To Vote	-0.11	2.43	-3.36	4.33**
	2.47	2.48	2.32	2.03
Intercept	14.89***	8.10**	10.06***	12.19***
	3.28	3.17	2.38	2.87
N	1227	1227	1227	1227

Note: The DVs represent the percentage of each type of story clicked out of total stories clicked. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error clustered by state below. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Table B7 Willingness to Read Negative Stories about the Opposition by Party

	(1)
Advantaged Condition	-2.96*
	1.79
Disadvantaged Condition	-3.05**
	1.36
Advantage x Democrat	5.20*
	2.74
Disadvantage x Democrat	4.22*
	2.24
Democrat	-9.85***
	2.00
Non-white	-2.65**
	1.13
Registered To Vote	4.61*
	2.45
Intercept	18.90***
	2.84
N	1,222

Note: The DV represents the percentage of negative stories about the opposition clicked out of total stories clicked. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error clustered by state below. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Treatment and Control Texts

Subjects were randomly assigned to read one of the following vignettes. Groups 1 and 2 include text that is underlined to specify which words were swapped out from one treatment to the next. Participants did not see any underlined words[81]:

Group 1 Text: Democratic Advantage
Below is an article about the upcoming elections. Please read this text carefully.

Headline: Upbeat Political Outlook for Democrats
Polls, pundits, and other experts agree that the Democrats will likely stay in control of the Senate after this year's midterm elections. Current polls say that Democrats will hold on to about 45 Senate seats and could win many of the nine most competitive Senate seats.

Democratic supporters are equally optimistic. Party members think they will do well in the midterms and that a Democrat will take the presidency in 2016.

"The Democratic Party is going to gain seats in the midterms and will stay in the White House in 2016," Taylor Morrison, a Democratic party official noted. "This is because most of the country disagrees with the way Republicans govern. Plus, Democrats have a great field of candidates, while Republicans can't find strong leaders who connect with everyday Americans."

This could mean several more years of a strong Democratic influence in the federal government. "As long as the American people are voting us into office, we will use that mandate to pursue liberal policies," Morrison said.

Group 2 Text: Republican Advantage
Below is an article about the upcoming elections. Please read this text carefully.

Headline: Upbeat Political Outlook for Republicans
Polls, pundits, and other experts agree that the Republicans will likely win back control of the Senate in this year's midterm elections. Current polls say that Republicans will hold on to about 45 Senate seats and could win many of the nine most competitive Senate seats.

Republican supporters are equally optimistic. Party members think they will do well in the midterms and that a Republican will take the presidency in 2016.

"The Republican Party is going to gain seats in the midterms and will win back the White House in 2016," Taylor Morrison, a Republican party official noted. "This is because most of the country disagrees with the way Democrats govern. Plus, Republicans have a great field of candidates, while Democrats can't find strong leaders who connect with everyday Americans."

This could mean several more years of a strong Republican influence in the federal government. "As long as the American people are voting us into office, we will use that mandate to pursue conservative policies," Morrison said.

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[81] Groups 1 and 2 use statistics from http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2014/senate-model/ (taken on 9/10/14).

Control Text[82]
Below is an article about an upcoming baking competition. Please read this text carefully.

Headline: Chicago to Host National Baking Competition
Amateur bakers from around the country will bring their most delectable dessert recipes to Chicago this November as they vie for the title of "Best Recipe" in the Home-Baking Recipe Competition. The competition is part of America's Baking and Sweets Show, one of the most prestigious baking and sweets events in North America.

Participants can submit recipes for up to 10 different categories. The winner of each category will take home a $500 prize.

"Every year, the bakers step up their game, and we expect this year to be no different," Taylor Morrison, an organizer of the competition said. "Our expert panel will judge contestants on taste, texture and creativity, so the winners will really have to excel in all three factors."

All dessert enthusiasts are welcome to partake in the sweets-filled event, which runs from November 14 to 16, 2014. "The contest will unfold over all three days of the show, so there will be treats to smell and enjoy the whole time," Morrison said.

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[82] Based on http://americasbakingandsweetsshow.com/home-baking-rules-regulations.

Experimental Headlines and Story Texts

PRACTICE STORIES

H1: Service for Dallas Ebola Victim Held in NC

> With hymns and prayers for answers, family and friends gathered at a North Carolina church last weekend to bid farewell to Thomas Eric Duncan, the first person to die of Ebola in the United States.
> http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/us/thomas-eric-duncan-ebola-victim-is-mourned-at-service.html?emc=edit_th_20141019&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=57001198

H2: Dress Like Olivia Pope

> Fans of the popular ABC show, *Scandal,* can now dress like Olivia Pope. The Limited is currently carrying a special line of clothes inspired by Pope.

H3: Twitter Sues US Govt Over Data Disclosure Rules

> Twitter filed a lawsuit against the United States government earlier this month, seeking to ease restrictions on public disclosures of how often the company receives requests for user data from government agencies.
> http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/twitter-sues-u-s-government-over-data-disclosure-rules/?ref=technology

H4: Federal Offices, Courts Closed for Columbus Day

> Federal offices and courts were closed on Monday, October 13, for Columbus Day.

H5: No Consensus at Vatican as Synod Ends

> A closely watched Vatican assembly on the family ended on October 18 without consensus among the bishops in attendance on what to say about gays, and whether to give communion to divorced and remarried Catholics.
> http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/world/europe/no-consensus-at-vatican-as-synod-ends-.html?emc=edit_th_20141019&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=57001198

H6: The High Price of Living in DC

> A new federal report says that Washington, D.C. is actually more expensive to live in than New York and San Francisco.
> http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/local/wp/2014/10/13/its-more-expensive-to-live-in-d-c-than-new-york-study-says/

H7: Woman Killed, 2 Injured in Crash

> A woman was killed and two people injured, including a deputy, earlier this month in Houston. The accident was the result of a driver going the wrong way on a freeway.
> http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Woman-killed-2-injured-in-wrong-way-collision-5815630.php

H8: "Gone Girl" Enjoys Box Office Success

> *Gone Girl* topped the box office for the first two weeks of its release. The thriller stars Ben Affleck and Rosamund Pike, and was adapted from a popular 2012 novel by Gillian Flynn.

H9: Queen Honors Angelina Jolie

> Earlier this month, Britain's Queen Elizabeth II made Hollywood star Angelina Jolie an honorary dame for her campaign to end the scourge of sexual violence in war zones.
> http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/10/showbiz/britain-angelina-jolie/index.html?hpt=en_bn1

H10: New Guinness World Record for Pull-Ups

> Caine Eckstein broke the Guinness World Records for most pull-ups in 12 hours and 24 hours. Eckstein did 4,210 pull-ups within 12 hours earlier this month.
> http://www.today.com/news/watch-live-caine-eckstein-attempts-guinness-world-record-most-pull-2D80195909

H11: 5-Year-Old Battling Leukemia Suits Up for NBA

> A five-year-old who has been battling leukemia since 2012 fulfilled his lifelong dream of playing for his favorite team, the Utah Jazz. The young boy got to scrimmage with the team

after signing a one-day contract with them.
http://www.today.com/news/5-year-old-battling-leukemia-suits-nba-team-2D80199716

H12: Reporter Spots Missing Boy While Reporting on Him

A 10-year-old Florida boy who had been reported missing for more than 14 hours was safely reunited with his family after a television reporter spotted him in a neighbor's yard. The journalist was reporting on the disappearance when he found the subject of his story.
http://www.today.com/news/reporter-spots-missing-boy-while-reporting-story-about-his-disappearance-2D80180489

H13: Pearls Spotted All Over New York Fashion Week

Editors can't stop talking about the pearl trend from New York Fashion Week. Of note, Rodarte sent a model in a glistening dress with a net skirt and a pearl embellishment walking through its fantastical set of fluorescent lights and shattered Swarovski crystals.
http://tmagazine.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/new-york-fashion-week-spring-2015-pearls-trend/

H14: Wedding Photo Found after 9/11 Returned to Owners

After 13 years, a peeling wedding photo found in the rubble of the World Trade Center debris following 9/11 was returned to its owners. The photo was posted to social media, and its owners say all those pictured are alive and well.
http://www.people.com/article/ground-zero-wedding-photo-found-social-media?utm_source=zergnet.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=zergnet_264789

H15: Couple Leaves $100 Tip at Restaurant

An Iowa couple recently left a $100 tip for their waiter despite the poor service they received. The couple noted that they had both been in their overwhelmed waiter's shoes and wanted to "pay it forward."
http://www.today.com/news/iowa-couple-leaves-100-tip-bad-service-thank-overwhelmed-waiter-2D80182024

H16: Germany and France Seek United Economic Front

Top officials of Germany and France promised to work together to revive the flagging eurozone economy, but they disappointed expectations that they might offer concrete proposals that would include higher spending on public works by Germany.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/business/international/eurozone-economy.html?ref=world

H17: HS Football Team Cancels Season Due to Bullying

A New Jersey high school has canceled the remainder of its football season in the wake of serious allegations of bullying and hazing.
http://www.today.com/news/high-school-football-team-cancels-season-wake-bullying-allegations-2D80199683

H18: Hawaiian Surfer Helps Disabled Paddleboard

Hawaiian surfer, Kawika Watt, invented the "Onit" Ability board, which allows those in wheelchairs to participate in water sports. The board features a wheelchair designed for beach environments on a specially crafted standup board.
http://www.today.com/health/hawaiian-surfer-creates-opportunity-wheelchair-bound-paddleboard-2D80210822

H19: 7 Hours of Sleep May be Better Than 8

Though conventional wisdom has said that eight hours of sleep per night is ideal, a new study is likely to recommend somewhere around seven. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is funding a panel to evaluate sleep research and make new recommendations for sleep.
http://www.today.com/health/why-7-hours-sleep-night-may-be-better-8-1D79962082

H20: New Clashes in Hong Kong, Activists Retake Streets

The police clashed with hundreds of pro-democracy protesters in the densely populated Mong Kok neighborhood early Sunday. This is the second straight day of violence after demonstrators recaptured blocks of city streets from the police.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/world/asia/hong-kong-officials-offer-fresh-talks-with-protesters-.html?ref=world

H21: Just Call Her Mrs. Clooney
Amal Alamuddin is headed back to work following her marriage to actor, George Clooney. As she returns to take on a new case, Amal has also officially taken on a new name: Amal Clooney.
http://www.people.com/article/amal-clooney-greece-parthenon-marbles

H22: After Delay, Iraq Appoints Two to Security Posts
After weeks of negotiations, Iraq's Parliament approved two nominees to lead ministries responsible for the nation's security forces, filling voids that exposed sectarian tensions in the government.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/world/middleeast/after-delay-iraq-appoints-two-to-posts-for-security.html?ref=world

H23: Tory Burch's New Book
Fans of designer Tory Burch can now purchase her new coffee table book, *Tory Burch in Color*. The book is organized by color and features inspirations from her travels, art, fashion and more.
http://www.stylelist.com/read/tory-burch-in-color/

H24: Jennifer Lawrence Speaks Out on Photo Hacking
Jennifer Lawrence has spoken out for the first time since this summer's nude photo hacking, calling it a "sexual violation" and the pictures' illegal release "disgusting."
http://www.people.com/article/jennifer-lawrence-speaks-out-vanity-fair-nude-photo-hack

H25: Calls to Use Yucca Mountain as Nuclear Waste Site
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has released a long-delayed report on the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a disposal spot for nuclear waste, finding that the design met the commission's requirements, and laying the groundwork to restart the project.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/us/calls-to-use-a-proposed-nuclear-site-now-deemed-safe.html?ref=politics

MAIN STORIES

Political Stories (Total stories: 40)

Positive Republican/Conservative (10)

POSREP1 Headline[83]: GOP's 2016 Bench is Deepening
  Text: We can add Jeb Bush's name into the list of potential 2016 GOP presidential candidates. Former president George W. Bush says of his brother Jeb, "Yeah, I think he wants to be president."

POSREP2 Headline[84]: Missouri Enacts Tougher Abortion Law
  Text: Missouri women seeking abortions will face one of the nation's most stringent waiting periods, after state lawmakers overrode the governor's veto to enact a 72-hour delay that includes no exception for cases of rape or incest.

POSREP3 Headline[85]: GOP Candidate Soars in No-Drama Campaign
  Text: Shelley Moore Capito, the Republican candidate for Senate in West Virginia, is on pace to win her seat easily. Observers credit her likely success to a no-drama campaign.

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[83] http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2014/10/02/bush-43-jeb-wants-to-be-president/
[84] https://www.accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n=279409;
http://www.ksdk.com/story/news/local/2014/10/05/no-challenge-expected-missouri-abortion-law/16772511/
[85] http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/the-gop-s-secret-best-candidate-20141013

POSREP4 Headline[86]: Immigration Reform Advocates Praise House GOPers
> *Text*: Immigration reform advocates expressed encouragement at the new set of principles on the issue put forward by House GOP leaders. The principles suggested an openness to legalizing illegal immigrants currently in the country but did not embrace a new path to citizenship for them.

POSREP5 Headline[87]: Praise for GOP Hopefuls Ahead of Midterms
> *Text*: Former Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney and House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy praised their party's nominees for governor and Congress in Arkansas earlier this month. The state GOP enlisted the help of national figures to boost their campaigns.

POSREP6 Headline[88]: GOP Gov. Hopeful Gaining Momentum in Deep-Blue MD
> *Text*: The race for governor in deep-blue Maryland is much closer than expected, with analysts saying Democrat Anthony Brown is vulnerable because he failed to make an argument for his election other than he's next in line. His opponent, Republican businessman Larry Hogan, is suddenly showing momentum.

POSREP7 Headline[89]: State Opposition to Gay Marriage Remains
> *Text*: Despite a rebuff from the Supreme Court, officials in states that oppose gay marriage have vowed to keep up the fight. Officials in North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, Kansas and Wyoming say they still plan on defending their state laws as far as they can.

POSREP8 Headline[90]: GOP Congressman Gets Boost from New Ad
> *Text*: Republican Congressman Lee Terry of Nebraska recently received a wave of attention for his latest campaign ad against his Democratic opponent, state Sen. Brad Ashford. The ad ties Ashford to a convicted felon.

POSREP9 Headline[91]: Mitt Romney for President in 2016?
> *Text*: Though former Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney insists he will not vie for the White House in 2016, friends and former aides say he could seek the nomination if no single GOP powerhouse emerges from the crowded field of Republicans running for the office.

POSREP10 Headline[92]: Optimism for GOP's Chances in Midterms
> *Text*: After extensive travels this year on behalf of Republican candidates, Kentucky Senator Rand Paul says he senses a strong anti-Barack Obama sentiment. Paul thinks this will help his party win control of the Senate next month.

Negative Republican/Conservative (10)

NEGREP1 Headline[93]: GOP's Top 2016 Hopefuls Embroiled in Scandal
> *Text*: Republican governors, once considered their party's best hopes for taking back the White House, have suffered significant setbacks in recent months.

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[86] http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/01/30/immigration-reform-advocates-praise-house-gop-principles/

[87] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/20/romney-mccarthy-campaigning-in-arkansas/?page=all

[88] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/8/larry-hogan-gaining-on-anthony-brown-in-maryland-g/

[89] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/7/despite-supreme-court-nondecision-state-opposition/

[90] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/17/lee-terry-brad-ashford_n_6003976.html

[91] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/08/mitt-romney-2016_n_5950902.html

[92] http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/03/paul-optimistic-on-gop-senate-chances/16687381/

[93] http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/falling-stars-gops-top-2016-hopefuls-embroiled-scandal-n183881

NEGREP2 Headline[94]: Republicans Hit Hard with Corruption Accusations

   Text: Republicans throughout the country are being hammered with allegations of corruption. Reports accuse Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) of lavish self-indulgence in his fundraising, and Governor Rick Scott (R-FL) is under fire for a $1.7 billion fraud fine against his former health care company.

NEGREP3 Headline[95]: GOP at Anxious Crossroads Over 2014 Campaigns

   Text: Republicans face multiple sources of tension in campaign strategies. There is an overall split in the party between strategies that have won midterm elections—satisfying the older, whiter, more religious party base—against strategies needed to win presidential contests: broadening its reach to younger, female and fewer white voters.

NEGREP4 Headline[96]: A Republican's Error Over Ebola

   Text: A Republican member of Congress who wants to ban travel from countries afflicted by the Ebola outbreak appeared to be unaware of a key fact -- that there are no direct flights between the U.S. and Liberia, Guinea or Sierra Leone.

NEGREP5 Headline[97]: While Campaigning, GOP Sen Is 'Needlessly Angry'

   Text: Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) made a surprise appearance in mid-October on "Kentucky Sports Radio." But in his efforts to paint himself as a fan of University of Kentucky basketball, host Matt Jones say McConnell got "needlessly angry."

NEGREP6 Headline[98]: GOP Candidate for FL Gov Lied About $340 Mil?

   Text: Gov. Rick Scott (R) may have failed to disclose at least $340 million in personal assets, according to a new lawsuit. Scott is currently campaigning for his re-election as governor of Florida.

NEGREP7 Headline[99]: GOP Candidate is 'Flip-Flopper' of Year

   Text: This year, America's flip-flopper-in-chief is Colorado Senate hopeful and Republican Cory Gardner. Among his many flip-flops, three stand out: his policy reversals and evasions on climate change, immigration reform, and birth control.

NEGREP8 Headline[100]: ND Patriot Guard Didn't Agree to be in GOP Ad

   Text: A campaign ad that intended to demonstrate Rep. Kevin Cramer's (R-N.D.) commitment to America's veterans is not truthful. Even though the North Dakota Patriot Guard's "Patriot Riders" are in Cramer's ad, the group says it does not support the congressman and does not make political endorsements.

NEGREP9 Headline[101]: Republicans Brace for 2016 Free-for-All

   Text: Interviews with more than a dozen Republican party strategists, elected officials and potential candidates lay bare a stark reality: Despite the national party's best efforts, the likelihood of a bloody primary process remains as strong as ever.

NEGREP10 Headline[102]: Romney Snubs Cruz on 2016 Electable GOPers List

[94] http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/10/why_does_shelby_hoard_18_milli.html ; http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2014/oct/13/republican-party-florida/republican-party-attacks-charlie-crist-digital-dom/

[95] http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-republicans-future-demographic-challenge-20140921-story.html

[96] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/17/dennis-ross-ebola-flight-ban_n_6002730.html

[97] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/08/mitch-mcconnell-kentucky-sports-radio_n_5953262.html?ir=Politics

[98] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/08/rick-scott-lawsuit_n_5954774.html?utm_hp_ref=politics

[99] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-wikler/and-2014s-flipflopper-of-b_5955252.html?utm_hp_ref=politics

[100] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/08/kevin-cramer-patriot-riders_n_5954838.html?utm_hp_ref=politics

[101] http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/republicans-2016-elections-111644.html

[102] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/03/mitt-romney-ted-cruz_n_4208490.html?utm_hp_ref=elections-2016

Text: Mitt Romney isn't including tea party favorite Ted Cruz among the Republicans' most electable potential presidential candidates in 2016. Last year, Cruz led the GOP effort to shut down the government.

Positive Democratic/Liberal (10)

POSDEM1 Headline[103]: Hillary Clinton in Iowa: 'I'm Ba-ack!'
>*Text*: "I'm ba-ack!" With those words, Hillary Clinton announced in September her return to Iowa, a state that will be critical to a second presidential run if she decides to take the plunge. Almost all of the 7,000 die-hard Democrats at the Iowa Steak Fry — 2,000 more than expected — seemed ready to welcome her.

POSDEM2 Headline[104]: Supreme Court Greenlights Gay Marriage
>*Text*: The Supreme Court surprised same-sex marriage advocates on the first day of its new session by declining to hear five states' appeals of pending gay marriage cases, essentially paving the way for an expansion of gay and lesbian unions in 11 states.

POSDEM3 Headline[105]: Victory in Texas for Abortion 'Pro-Choicers'
>*Text*: The Supreme Court recently blocked a Texas law that had drastically reduced the number of abortions in the state. The order allows more than a dozen abortion clinics to resume operation.

POSDEM4 Headline[106]: Gay Marriages Start in South Carolina
>*Text*: A South Carolina court has accepted a same-sex couple's application for a marriage license despite the state's constitutional ban against the practice and the attorney general's pledge to defend it. Earlier this month, the Supreme Court's decision to not hear the appeals of pending gay marriage cases effectively legalized gay marriage in South Carolina and other states.

POSDEM5 Headline[107]: Dems Happier with Party's Stance on Immigration
>*Text*: A recent poll suggests that Democrats are more pleased with the way their party is handling immigration than Republicans. Only 37 percent of Republicans think their party is doing a good job representing them on immigration.

POSDEM6 Headline[108]: Good News for Obama: Upbeat September Jobs Report
>*Text*: President Obama continues to oversee a steady recovery from the Great Recession. The unemployment rate has dropped from 6.1% to 5.9%, and U.S. employers added 248,000 new jobs to nonfarm payrolls in September, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported.

POSDEM7 Headline[109]: One Year Later and Obamacare is Working
>*Text*: It's been one year since the Affordable Care Act's health care exchange opened giving millions of Americans access to quality affordable health care, many for the first time. Over the past 12 months it has become abundantly clear that the Affordable Care Act is working: the number of uninsured Americans is down 26% and premium increases are down.

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[103] http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/hillary-clinton-returns-iowa-im-ba-ack
[104] http://mashable.com/2014/10/06/supreme-court-gay-marriage/;
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/06/supreme-court-gay-marriage/16546959/
[105] http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-blocks-texas-abortion-law/2014/10/14/a3c51252-53ad-11e4-892e-602188e70e9c_story.html
[106] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/08/gay-marriage-south-carolina_n_5951876.html?utm_hp_ref=mostpopular
[107] http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/nation-world/nation/article/Democrats-more-satisfied-with-party-on-5776007.php
[108] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/03/september-jobs-report-unemployment-rate_n_5922146.html
[109] http://factivists.democrats.org/one-year-later-and-obamacare-is-working/

POSDEM8 Headline[110]: Obama Praised as One of Best Presidents Ever

> *Text*: Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman recently called President Obama one of the best presidents in our nation's history. Krugman points to Obama's accomplishments on health care, financial reform and the economy as reasons for his claim.

POSDEM9 Headline[111]: Hillary Clinton Dominant Among Young Dems

> *Text*: According to a new poll, Hillary Clinton is absolutely dominant in the field of Democrats who might run in 2016, capturing support from 58% of likely voters aged 18-34. This is a dramatic turnaround from 2008, when younger Democrats heavily supported Barack Obama over Clinton.

POSDEM10 Headline[112]: Obama is Big Hit at Campaign Event

> *Text*: Earlier this month, President Obama headlined a key fundraising event in Greenwich, Connecticut. Those in attendance said Obama was "extraordinary."

Negative Democratic/Liberal (10)

NEGDEM1 Headline[113]: Hillary Clinton's Unfixable Problem

> *Text*: A columnist at the *National Review* says Hillary Clinton's 'unfixable problem' is her own husband, former President Bill Clinton, because Bill is prone to steal the spotlight in whatever he does.

NEGDEM2 Headline[114]: Corruption Probes Hitting Democrats Across Country

> *Text*: A wave of corruption arrests and investigations is roiling Democratic politicians. The latest were a pair of arrests in early October, snagging Charlotte Mayor Patrick Cannon, who later resigned, and California state Senator Leland Yee.

NEGDEM3 Headline[115]: Rand Paul Blisters Obama

> *Text*: Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) blasted President Obama in September as an insufficient commander-in-chief. Paul accused Obama of confounding the Constitution when he expanded Obamacare.

NEGDEM4 Headline[116]: Criticism over Dems' Pick for Ebola Czar

> *Text*: Republicans are pointing to Democratic operative Ron Klain's background in politics — rather than public health — as evidence that he isn't up to the job as "Ebola czar."

NEGDEM5 Headline[117]: Democrats Have a 'Youth Problem' for 2016

> *Text*: In a recent op-ed, Jeff Frazee, the executive director of Young Americans for Liberty, called Democrats out for having a problem with young people. Frazee says Democrats have let young people down when it comes to Internet regulation and the security of electronic property.

NEGDEM6 Headline[118]: White House Mum on Cost of Obama's Campaign Trips

> *Text*: President Obama's three-day Democratic fundraising trip to California earlier this month has raised questions about the cost of traveling to these events. The White House adamantly refuses to disclose the cost of presidential political travel.

NEGDEM7 Headline[119]: One Family's Obamacare Nightmare

> *Text*: Pattie Curran is a North Carolina mother of two children who were both born with a

[110] http://ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/paul-krugman-obama-one-best-presidents-history
[111] http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/why-did-young-democrats-come-around-hillary
[112] http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Obama-draws-Democratic-supporters-in-Greenwich-5807942.php
[113] http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/387978/hillarys-unfixable-problem-stanley-kurtz
[114] http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/03/28/corruption-probes-hitting-dems-across-country/
[115] http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-rand-paul-blisters-obama-and-clinton-calls-for-gop-diversity-20140920-story.html
[116] http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/221086-republicans-blast-obamas-pick-for-ebola-czar
[117] http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/220280-democrats-also-have-a-youth-problem
[118] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/9/white-house-mum-on-cost-of-obamas-campaign-trips/
[119] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/2/curran-one-familys-obamacare-nightmare/

rare bone-marrow dysfunction. Curran says that because of Obamacare, her family is now deeply in debt and drowning in paperwork as they fight to restore coverage of lifesaving treatments for her sons.

NEGDEM8 Headline[120]: 'Liberal' Supreme Ct Slammed For Gay Marriage Case
  Text: A senior researcher at the Family Research Council criticized the Supreme Court for its liberalism in deciding to expand gay marriage in major sections of the country earlier this month. The researcher called the Court's decision a "black mark" on the institution.

NEGDEM9 Headline[121]: Concerns for Hillary Clinton's 2016 Prospects
  Text: A former State Department official is claiming confidants of Hillary Clinton scrubbed files of politically damaging documents about the 2012 Benghazi attack before turning them over to an accountability review board.

NEGDEM10 Headline[122]: Chris Matthews to Obama: Stop Pandering
  Text: MSNBC host Chris Matthews criticized President Obama for gridlock in Washington on illegal immigration, saying that Obama should quit pandering to ethnic groups and "get something done."

Apolitical Stories (Total stories: 20)
Travel/Food stories: 3; Sports stories: 3; Celebrity/Entertainment stories: 6; Technology stories: 5; Fashion: 2; Business: 1

NONPOL1 Headline[123]: Morgan Stanley's Profits Top Forecasts
  Morgan Stanley reported third-quarter results that glided past Wall Street's expectations. The Wall Street firm, using generally accepted accounting principles, reported earnings of $1.7 billion, or 84 cents a share, compared with $889 million, or 44 cents a share, in the quarter a year earlier.

NONPOL2 Headline[124]: Hotels Help Travelers Expand Spatial Horizons
  Text: With a growing interest among travelers to better understand the galaxy, a number of hotels and resorts are creating ways for guests to appreciate the expanding universe. At the Four Seasons Costa Rica, a "Taste of the Stars" molecular gastronomy menu mingles courses like chocolate mango asteroids with a high-powered GPS-guided telescope stargazing session.

NONPOL3 Headline[125]: A New Culture-Focused Tour of Haiti
  Text: G Adventures, a small-group adventure travel company with a focus on sustainable travel, is introducing a tour in Haiti. The 10-day "Highlights of Haiti" trip aims to offer insight into the country's condition since a magnitude 7.0 earthquake nearly five years ago.

NONPOL4 Headline[126]: Blake Lively's Pregnancy Style

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[120] http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/13/supreme-court-gay-marriage-conservatives/17039049/

[121] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/15/clinton-had-benghazi-files-scrubbed-review-former-/

[122] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/9/chris-matthews-to-obama-stop-pandering-to-ethnic-g/

[123] http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/morgan-stanleys-profit-surges-in-quarter/?module=BlogPost-Title&version=Blog%20Main&contentCollection=Wall%20Street%20Earnings&action=Click&pgtype=Blogs&region=Body

[124] http://intransit.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/broaden-your-spatial-horizons/

[125] http://intransit.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/a-new-culture-focused-tour-of-haiti/

[126] http://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-moms/news/blake-lively-is-pregnant-expecting-first-baby-with-ryan-reynolds-2014610; http://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-style/news/blake-lively-accentuates-baby-bump-in-puppy-print-playsuit-picture-20141910

Text: Since announcing that she is expecting for the first time, actress Blake Lively has been spotted out and about in colorful prints and bold patterns. Lively is married to actor, Ryan Reynolds.

NONPOL5 Headline[127]: Phelps Suspended from USA Swimming Post DUI Arrest

Text: Less than a week after being arrested and charged with driving under the influence, Olympic gold-winner Michael Phelps was suspended from USA Swimming. The suspension will last six months.

NONPOL6 Headline[128]: 'Sex and the City' Stars Tease 3rd Movie

Text: It's been four years since *Sex and the City 2*, but Carrie and Charlotte (Sarah Jessica Parker and Kristin Davis, respectively) recently teased a possible third installment to the popular franchise on Twitter. Jennifer Hudson has also hinted that a third movie could be on the way.

NONPOL7 Headline[129]: Vogue: Boots are Back for the Fall

Text: *Vogue* magazine says that if there's one thing it has learned from the spring collections so far, it's that boots are back in a big way. Paired with jeans (worn over, of course) or feminine dresses, the boot has emerged as the footwear hero of fall.

NONPOL8 Headline[130]: ESPN Will Stream Out-of-Market Games on Web

Text: The NBA's new deal with ESPN gives the sports channel the right to stream games to fans in a new web service that does not require a pay television subscription with a cable, satellite or telephone company.

NONPOL9 Headline[131]: Phone Use for Photos and Videos Is Increasing

Text: A new report says that for the first time, more than half of mobile phone users over 25 used their phone for taking photos or video.

NONPOL10 Headline[132]: There's a New Redhead in Hollywood

Text: What do Katy Perry, Vanessa Hudgens and Jena Malone all have in common? They've all dyed their hair red in the past month. Malone is the latest to opt for a fiery new shade, saying goodbye to her blonde strands.

NONPOL11 [133]: Sofia Vergara and Ex-Fiance Meet Up

Text: After breaking off their two-year engagement four months ago, Sofia Vergara and her ex-fiancé Nick Loeb were spotted chatting and looking cheery together in New York City. Sofia is now famously dating Joe Manganiello.

NONPOL12 Headline[134]: Robert Downey Jr.: 'Iron Man 4' Will Happen

Text: While chatting on the daytime show *Ellen*, Robert Downey Jr. quietly confirmed that there will be an *Iron Man 4*.

NONPOL13 Headline[135]: Bethenny Frankel Will Return to NYC 'Housewives'

Text: Bethenny Frankel will appear on season seven of the *Real Housewives of New York City*, according to *Us Weekly*. Her new gig comes at the perfect time for her and producers as her daytime TV show was cancelled in February.

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[127] http://www.eonline.com/news/585951/michael-phelps-suspended-from-usa-swimming-following-dui-arrest-get-the-details

[128] http://www.people.com/article/sex-and-the-city-3-sarah-jessica-parker-twitter

[129] http://www.vogue.com/2495967/saint-laurent-graphic-fall-go-go-boots/

[130] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/sports/basketball/espn-will-stream-out-of-market-games-on-web-as-part-of-nba-deal-.html?ref=sports

[131] http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/phone-use-for-photos-and-videos-is-increasing-report-finds/?ref=technology

[132] http://stylenews.peoplestylewatch.com/2014/10/06/jena-malone-dyes-hair-red-photos/

[133] http://okmagazine.com/get-scoop/sofia-vergara-and-ex-nick-loeb-meet-up-four-months-after-breaking-off-their-engagement/

[134] http://popwatch.ew.com/2014/10/07/iron-man-4-robert-downey/

[135] http://okmagazine.com/get-scoop/bethenny-frankel-return-real-housewives-of-new-york-city/

NONPOL14 Headline[136]: Lionel Messi Reaches 10-Years with FC Barcelona

> *Text*: This month marks 10 full years since soccer star Lionel Messi first suited up for a competitive match with FC Barcelona. In that time, Messi has gone from a well-known forward in Spain to one of the most famous soccer players in the world.

NONPOL15 Headline[137]: Analysts Ask What's Next at Google

> *Text*: Google is still pulling in money hand over fist, but Wall Street is hungry for the company's next act. Investors are concerned that the company's golden goose — its search engine — is showing signs of age and becoming less profitable.

NONPOL16 Headline[138]: Facebook Readies App Allowing Anonymity

> *Text*: Facebook is working on a stand-alone mobile application that allows users to interact without having to use their real names. The app will allow users to have multiple pseudonyms to openly discuss topics that they may not be comfortable connecting to their real names.

NONPOL17 Headline[139]: Study: Voice Activation Systems Distract Drivers

> *Text*: New research from the University of Utah shows that Siri, Apple's voice activation system, is not a safe alternative to texting-and-driving, even when a driver doesn't use the phone. The distraction risks also happen with other voice-activated technologies.

NONPOL18 Headline[140]: EBay Opens Fine Art Live-Auction Sites

> *Text*: EBay has released a new live-auction product with some New York art galleries, the company's second-ever foray into live bidding for fine art. Users can bid on items priced anywhere from a few thousand dollars to more than $100,000 against others in real-time, simulating the feeling of a live auction.

NONPOL19 Headline[141]: An Imported Soda That Comes with a Buzz

> *Text*: Mexican Coke, or MexiCoke, is gaining popularity in the U.S., especially among stay-up-all-night coders, writers and musicians. It is imported from Mexico and is sweetened by pure cane sugar, rather than the corn syrup found in the American version.

NONPOL20 Headline[142]: A Wedding Dress Inspired by 'Frozen's' Elsa

> *Text:* Alfred Angelo, the designer behind Disney's Fairy Tale Weddings collection, has finally released his *Frozen*-influenced gown. It comes in both classic ivory (for the fair-weather fans) and the princess's signature ice blue (for the Disney diehards).

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[136] http://grantland.com/the-triangle/lionel-messi-tenth-anniversary-barcelona-debut/

[137] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/technology/google-search-ad-growth-slows.html?ref=technology

[138] http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/facebook-readies-app-allowing-anonymity/?ref=technology

[139] http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/voice-activation-systems-distract-drivers-study-says/?ref=technology

[140] http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/ebay-opens-fine-art-live-auction-sites-for-second-time/?module=BlogPost-Title&version=Blog%20Main&contentCollection=E-Commerce&action=Click&pgtype=Blogs&region=Body

[141] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/fashion/mexican-coca-cola-a-cult-classic.html?ref=fashion

[142] http://stylenews.peoplestylewatch.com/2014/10/09/frozen-wedding-dress-photos/

Pilot Study Results

Table B8 Political Expectations by Treatment Groups

	Expect Dems will Win House (2014)	**Expect Dems will Win Senate (2014)**	**Expect Dems will Win Pres (2016)**
Dem Advantaged vs. Control [*N*=134]	0.10 0.09	0.23*** 0.08	0.08 0.08
GOP Advantaged vs. Control [*N*=133]	-0.24** 0.07	-0.31*** 0.08	-0.16* 0.09
Dem vs. GOP Advantaged [*N*=133]	0.34*** 0.07	0.55*** 0.07	0.23*** 0.08

Note: DV is coded as 1 for reported expectations that Democrats will win House, Senate and Presidency, repectively; it assumes a value of 0 for all other answers. Table entry is the linear probability coefficient with standard error below. Controls for Republican dummy, political interest and dummy for registered to vote not reported. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tailed.

Table B9 Emotional Reactions by Treatment Groups

	Angry	**Anxious**	**Disgusted**	**Happy**	**Hopeful**
Disadvantaged vs. Advantaged [*N*=108]	0.24*** 0.04	0.16*** 0.05	0.26*** 0.05	-0.17*** 0.05	-0.16*** 0.05

Note: DV is the response to the question: "To what extent do you feel _____ about the upcoming midterm elections?" Responses range from 1=Not at all _____ to 5=Extremely _____, and are recoded from 0 to 1. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error below. Controls for Republican dummy, political interest and dummy for registered to vote not reported. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Treatment and Control Texts

Random assignment to one of the following vignettes:

Below is an article about the upcoming election. Please read this text carefully.

1. **[danger] Anger / Dem [disadvantaged]**

With the 2016 presidential election just months away, a majority of Democrats throughout the nation are angry because recent polls show top Democratic candidates losing to top Republican candidates when pitted against each other.

Democratic Party officials know that they need to reverse these polling numbers to counteract what will happen when votes are cast this November.

Those on the left have good reason to be frustrated about the election and the polls: if they lose the presidency, Republicans will dial back the progress they've made on a variety of issues.

Democratic commentators are also angry about the Republican candidates for president this year, who they feel take conservatism to an extreme level. Progressive pundits are irate about the types of policies that will be enacted if a Republican is elected president, and think Democratic voters should be especially outraged about this crop of extremist Republican candidates.

2. **[ranger] Anger / Rep [disadvantaged]**

With the 2016 presidential election just months away, a majority of Republicans throughout the nation are angry because recent polls show top Republican candidates losing to top Democratic candidates when pitted against each other.

Republican Party officials know that they need to reverse these polling numbers to counteract what will happen when votes are cast this November.

Those on the right have good reason to be frustrated about the election and the polls: if they lose the presidency, Democrats will dial back the progress they've made on a variety of issues.

Republican commentators are also angry about the Democratic candidates for president this year, who they feel take liberalism to an extreme level. Conservative pundits are irate about the types of policies that will be enacted if a Democrat is elected president, and think Republican voters should be especially outraged about this crop of extremist Democratic candidates.

3. **[danx] Anxiety / Dem [disadvantaged]**

With the 2016 presidential election just months away, a majority of Democrats throughout the nation are anxious because recent polls show top Democratic candidates losing to top Republican candidates when pitted against each other.

Democratic Party officials aren't sure how to reverse these polling numbers and are afraid of what will happen when votes are cast this November.

Those on the left have good reason to be worried about the election and the polls: if they lose the presidency, they could certainly lose ground on the progress they've made on a variety of issues.

Democratic commentators are also worried about the Republican candidates for president this year, who they feel take conservatism to an extreme level. Progressive pundits say they can't imagine what types of policies will be enacted if a Republican is elected president, and think Democratic voters should be especially worried about this crop of extremist Republican candidates.

4. **[ranx] Anxiety / Rep [disadvantaged]**
With the 2016 presidential election just months away, a majority of Republicans throughout the nation are anxious because recent polls show top Republican candidates losing to top Democratic candidates when pitted against each other.

Republican Party officials aren't sure how to reverse these polling numbers and are afraid of what will happen when votes are cast this November.

Those on the right have good reason to be worried about the election and the polls: if they lose the presidency, they could certainly lose ground on the progress they've made on a variety of issues.

Republican commentators are also worried about the Democratic candidates for president this year, who they feel take liberalism to an extreme level. Conservative pundits say they can't imagine what types of policies will be enacted if a Democrat is elected president, and think Republican voters should be especially worried about this crop of extremist Democratic candidates.

5. **[denth] Enthusiasm / Dem [advantaged]**
With the 2016 presidential election just months away, a majority of Democrats throughout the nation are enthusiastic because recent polls show top Democratic candidates beating top Republican candidates when pitted against each other.

Democratic Party officials are equally enthusiastic about these polling numbers and are excited to see what will happen when votes are cast this November.

Those on the left have good reason to be hopeful about the election and the polls: if they win the presidency, they'll almost certainly continue the progress they've made on a variety of issues.

Democratic commentators are also optimistic about winning the presidency this year because they feel the Republican candidates take conservatism to an extreme level. Progressive pundits are excited about the types of policies that will be enacted if a Democrat is elected president, and think Democratic voters should feel especially enthusiastic about being able to beat this crop of extremist Republican candidates.

6. **[renth] Enthusiasm / Rep [advantaged]**

With the 2016 presidential election just months away, a majority of Republicans throughout the nation are enthusiastic because recent polls show top Republican candidates beating top Democratic candidates when pitted against each other.

Republican Party officials are equally enthusiastic about these polling numbers and are excited to see what will happen when votes are cast this November.

Those on the right have good reason to be hopeful about the election and the polls: if they win the presidency, they'll almost certainly continue the progress they've made on a variety of issues.

Republican commentators are also optimistic about winning the presidency this year because they feel the Democratic candidates take liberalism to an extreme level. Conservative pundits are excited about the types of policies that will be enacted if a Republican is elected president, and think Republican voters should feel especially enthusiastic about being able to beat this crop of extremist Democratic candidates.

Below is an article about an upcoming singing contest. Please read this text carefully.

7. **[control] Control Group**

This spring, the best undiscovered singers in the country will compete to win one of the biggest televised singing competitions: *The Voice*. The show is known for its four celebrity coaches who select contestants to join and represent their team throughout the contest. Previous coaches include Christina Aguilera, Adam Levine, Blake Shelton, and Usher.

Fans tune into this Emmy-winning show to watch the competition between coaches as they recruit singers to their teams in the earliest stage of the show and then battle it out during weeks of grueling competition. The contest also includes multiple live performances by each contestant.

Mark Burnett, the executive producer, says the coaches' investment in the contestants can change these singers' lives.

"They're great singers in their communities and they're now on the big stage," Burnett said. "They're working with artists they never thought they would ever, ever meet. And these superstar coaches really, really care."

Quote from: http://www.ew.com/article/2015/09/20/emmys-2015-the-voice-reality-show-winner-mark-burnett

Table B10 Trust in the Parties

	Trust in Your Own Party (1)	Trust in the Other Party (2)
Anxiety Condition	0.03	0.005
	0.03	0.02
Anger Condition	0.04*	-0.01
	0.03	0.02
Enthusiasm Condition	0.04	-0.004
	0.03	0.02
Democrat	0.03	0.09***
	0.03	0.03
Age	-0.03	-0.04
	0.05	0.04
Political Interest	0.04	-0.21***
	0.04	0.03
Female	0.02	-0.02
	0.02	0.02
Asian	0.06	0.04
	0.04	0.03
Black	-0.01	-0.01
	0.04	0.03
Hispanic	0.08*	0.02
	0.04	0.04
Ideology	-0.11**	0.15***
	0.05	0.05
Education	-0.05	0.002
	0.05	0.04
Unemployed	0.02	-0.01
	0.04	0.03
Income Level	0.06*	0.03
	0.03	0.03
Intercept	0.53***	0.24***
	0.06	0.05
N	633	633

Note: DVs are each a five-point variable that gauges willingness to trust one's own party and the other party. Table entry is the OLS regression coefficient with standard error below. All variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Pure Independents are excluded. *$p<0.10$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$, two-tailed.

Table C1 Campaign Interest by Clinton and Trump Voters Only

Used for predicted probabilities in Figures 8a and 8b.

	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6	Wave 7	Wave 8	Wave 9	Wave 10	Wave 11
Vote HRC	0.41	0.14	-0.60*	0.05	0.34	0.11	0.01	-0.09	-0.68**
	0.31	0.28	0.34	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.37	0.29	0.30
Democrat	-0.33	-0.42	0.37	-0.46	-0.35	0.08	-0.19	0.04	0.32
	0.30	0.27	0.34	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.37	0.30	0.28
Female	-0.35**	-0.02	-0.19	-0.43**	-0.53***	-0.60***	-0.41**	-0.03	-0.09
	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.21	0.16	0.18	0.17	0.16	0.18
Age	1.22***	1.17***	0.98**	2.03***	1.14***	1.30***	1.03***	1.03***	2.48***
	0.40	0.40	0.38	0.45	0.34	0.46	0.33	0.31	0.36
Black	0.09	-0.27	-0.37*	0.14	-0.51**	-0.16	-0.03	-0.58**	-0.26
	0.22	0.28	0.21	0.28	0.21	0.23	0.21	0.22	0.27
Hispanic	-0.21	0.09	-0.71**	0.03	-0.45**	-0.48	-0.15	-0.22	0.20
	0.25	0.27	0.29	0.35	0.21	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.27
Income 1	-0.27	-0.02	-0.68***	-0.42	-0.06	-0.73***	-0.03	-0.64**	-0.47*
	0.29	0.27	0.24	0.30	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.27
Income 2	0.08	-0.22	-0.68***	-0.42*	-0.26	-0.22	-0.35	-0.50**	-0.40
	0.30	0.27	0.26	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.24	0.24	0.26
Income 3	0.28	0.17	-0.45**	0.15	0.08	-0.61**	-0.17	-0.23	-0.44*
	0.30	0.26	0.22	0.29	0.27	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.27
Income – Refused	-0.02	-0.14	-0.46*	0.22	0.29	-0.94***	0.44	-0.75***	-0.43*
	0.29	0.38	0.28	0.32	0.31	0.33	0.28	0.24	0.27
College	0.07	0.62***	0.29*	0.07	0.63***	-0.02	0.58***	0.19	0.81***
	0.19	0.20	0.17	0.24	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.17
Cutpoint 1	-1.63***	-1.01***	-2.14***	-1.52***	-1.66***	-2.11***	-1.52***	-1.65***	-1.08***
	0.34	0.36	0.32	0.38	0.31	0.36	0.38	0.29	0.34
Cutpoint 2	-0.31	0.06	-0.82***	-0.37	-0.43	-1.15***	-0.18	-0.49*	0.36
	0.33	0.37	0.30	0.41	0.32	0.37	0.34	0.29	0.34
N	544	535	566	590	532	564	569	642	579

Note: Table entry is coefficient with standard error below. All DVs and IVs are coded to be 0 to 1. Appropriate survey weights are applied. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, two-tailed.

Table C2 Interest in Government and Politics

	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6	Wave 7	Wave 8	Wave 9	Wave 10	Wave 11
Predict Win	0.63***	0.40	0.19	0.67***	0.48***	0.32	0.05	0.63***	0.75***
	0.30	0.35	0.34	0.25	0.22	0.26	0.27	0.21	0.34
Vote HRC	1.83***	-0.93**	-0.81**	-0.27	1.00*	0.66	0.05	-0.44**	-0.05
	0.74	0.51	0.41	0.81	0.67	0.85	0.65	0.25	0.44
Predict WinX Vote HRC	-1.64***	0.83**	0.42	0.20	-0.55	-0.82	-0.27	-0.09	-0.69**
	0.72	0.48	0.43	0.81	0.69	0.80	0.62	0.28	0.39
Democrat	-0.17	-0.27	0.08	-0.25	-0.62**	0.36	0.12	0.39*	0.46*
	0.27	0.29	0.32	0.28	0.32	0.38	0.33	0.25	0.33
Female	-0.43***	-0.27*	-0.28**	-0.49***	-0.51***	-0.55***	-0.47***	-0.03	-0.08
	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.17	0.18
Age	1.11***	0.99***	0.96***	1.27***	0.19	0.15	0.93***	1.62***	1.71***
	0.45	0.38	0.36	0.41	0.33	0.44	0.37	0.32	0.36
Black	-0.05	-0.25	-0.41***	0.46**	-0.31*	-0.03	-0.07	-0.32	-0.05
	0.19	0.25	0.20	0.26	0.21	0.25	0.18	0.27	0.26
Hispanic	0.09	-0.10	-0.40*	-0.20	-0.54***	-0.42*	0.30	-0.22	0.09
	0.28	0.24	0.29	0.26	0.23	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.22
Income 1	-0.25	-0.20	-0.29	-0.78***	-0.19	-0.50***	0.06	-0.70***	-0.54***
	0.27	0.23	0.24	0.28	0.24	0.24	0.26	0.24	0.21
Income 2	0.19	-0.12	-0.45*	-0.48***	-0.65***	-0.10	-0.20	-0.63***	-0.29*
	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.19	0.22
Income 3	0.12	0.08	-0.13	-0.21	0.03	-0.03	-0.20	-0.33**	-0.51***
	0.23	0.25	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.21	0.22	0.19	0.23
Income – Refused	-0.01	0.17	-0.08	-0.29	-0.25	-0.63**	0.46***	-0.55***	-0.43*
	0.35	0.37	0.30	0.31	0.26	0.35	0.23	0.24	0.26
College	0.01	0.71***	0.29**	0.10	0.20*	-0.20	0.56***	0.51***	0.53***
	0.20	0.18	0.16	0.19	0.15	0.19	0.17	0.18	0.17
Cutpoint 1	-1.67***	-1.92***	-2.42***	-2.20***	-2.89***	-2.92***	-1.74***	-1.12***	-1.43***
	0.44	0.47	0.47	0.40	0.33	0.43	0.48	0.36	0.41
Cutpoint 2	-0.67*	-0.73**	-1.58***	-1.34***	-1.74***	-1.82***	-0.73**	-0.41*	-0.21
	0.44	0.41	0.45	0.40	0.29	0.39	0.42	0.30	0.40
Cutpoint 3	-0.02	-0.05	-0.87**	-0.58*	-1.16***	-1.32***	-0.34	0.12	0.46
	0.45	0.44	0.45	0.40	0.28	0.41	0.42	0.29	0.40
Cutpoint 4	0.83**	0.86**	0.12	0.42	0.17	-0.37	0.78**	1.37***	1.39***
	0.46	0.44	0.45	0.41	0.29	0.40	0.41	0.30	0.39
N	449	436	445	462	453	487	484	541	469

Note: Table entry is coefficient with standard error below. All DVs and IVs are coded to be 0 to 1. Appropriate survey weights are applied. *$p<0.20$; **$p<0.10$; ***$p<0.05$, two-tailed.

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