

"Their Eagle Is Double-Headed"  
British and Austrian Policy toward Russia during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909


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On the basis of this thesis and of  
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


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# Europe in 1908





**The Balkans 1908**

## **Introduction Failed Policies**

June 28, 1914 began as another glorious summer day but it quickly and tragically turned bloody. In the city of Sarajevo, a Serb named Gavrilo Princip was able to leap onto the running board of the car carrying Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the thrones of Austria and Hungary, and his wife, Duchess Sophie, and kill them both with a pistol. It would be the spark that less than a month later ignited the First World War. During the course of the fighting, three of Europe's greatest ruling families--the Hohenzollerns, the Romanovs, and the Habsburgs--each almost a thousand years old, were brought down. Four years reduced Europe to ruins once again. For all the death and destruction, however, World War I began as a merely regional conflict which escalated out of control. The Bosnian Crisis, six years before the start of the First World War, exhibited some very striking similarities to the situation in 1914, beginning as a small, isolated conflict and quickly becoming out of hand. That it did not immediately lead to open hostilities is simply proof of the complexity and uncertainty inherent in relations among independent states.

The Bosnian Crisis of 1908 was actually a series of related incidents, beginning with unrest in the region of Macedonia, still under Turkish rule. Macedonia then referred to a much larger, much less clearly defined area on the Balkan Peninsula than the modern-day state. However, the uprisings there were very similar to those of today, as Bulgars clashed with Greeks. Russia, Great Britain, and Austria-Hungary struggled to come up with an agreement, but before they could, revolution broke out in the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turk movement, an organization of students and military officers, provided hope for much-needed reform in the crumbling empire, yet at the same time threatened to destabilize the region even more. The Turkish revolution also gave Bulgaria the opportunity to declare itself an independent kingdom and Austria-Hungary the opportunity to annex the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These alterations in the thirty-year-old

Treaty of Berlin, which had ended the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, set off violent protests in Serbia and Montenegro and resulted in various mobilizations on the part of other European nations. The regional conflict threatened to engulf the entire continent. The only reason war did not break out in 1908 was that the great powers were not willing to step over the edge.

That a regional rivalry could threaten to lead to a world war had been almost unthinkable in the nineteenth century. For one, there were no great powers outside of Europe in the 1800's. By 1908, however, Japan had defeated Russia handily in battle, and the United States was the largest industrial power in the world. The order of things in Europe itself had changed as well. The nature of alliances had altered. In 1812, the nations of Europe had allied themselves together in order to defeat Napoleonic France, and as long as they perceived France as a threat, that alliance stayed together; once France was no longer a danger, it was allowed to lapse. Throughout the nineteenth century, alliances were made for specific purposes, and once there was no longer a specific need, the alliance was dissolved. Beginning even before the turn of the century, however, alliances began to take on a more permanent nature. Their terms became more general and more rigid. The year 1908 opened with the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy balanced against the Dual Alliance of France and Russia with Great Britain gravitating toward the latter.

This system of alliances no doubt contributed to the danger of a continent-wide conflict, but there was danger even in the simple fact that diplomacy had changed. A hundred years previously, the Congress of Vienna had convened to reassemble Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. The system they created succeeded in keeping the peace for almost a hundred years, but even before the turn of the century, the ideas underlying that system were losing favor. The diplomacy of Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand was a highly formal, ritual artform. By 1900, science and pragmatic reasoning had made significant inroads into most areas of society. This old diplomacy thrived on uncertainty.

The negotiations at the Congress of Vienna were fraught with secrecy, intrigue, and manipulation. Metternich, as well as the other dignitaries assembled in Vienna, made a habit of fostering confusion in order to gain an advantage. Agreements were based more on possibilities than on facts. Starting in the 1890's however, diplomacy became more straightforward, more practical, less artful. Beginning in Great Britain and spreading eastward across the continent, foreign policy increasingly became the domain of professional bureaucrats rather than otherwise untrained and inexperienced aristocrats. The age of science and positivism transformed the unknown into a dangerous thing to be eliminated. It led to instability, and instability led to disorder, which in turn led to conflict. The unknown, therefore, was something to be feared, and it was fears of the unknown that transformed regional conflict in 1908 into a continental crisis, and in 1914 into a world war.

For many, the one nation which embodied the unknown in the pre-war period was the Russian Empire. Time and again, in the eyes of other European nations, Russia revealed a pattern of unpredictability and untrustworthiness, repeatedly throwing wrenches into the policymaking of other nations. In addition, Russia's geographic position on the periphery of the continent made its place in European affairs questionable. Long before Churchill's remark, Russia was an enigma to most outsiders. Yet because of its sheer size other nations considered Russia among the most powerful nations in Europe. Its population dwarfed those of the nations of Western Europe, and the Russian people had seemingly infinite natural resources at their disposal. For these and other reasons, other nations thought it vital to have a workable foreign policy toward the tsar and his cabinet in St. Petersburg. Before and during the Bosnian Crisis both Great Britain and Austria-Hungary struggled with the problem of Russian unpredictability and their own foreign policies. Ideologically, they were on opposite ends of the spectrum--Great Britain

in the liberal camp and Austria-Hungary decidedly reactionary.<sup>1</sup> They each had their own theories concerning proper foreign relations with Russia as well as different reasons for having to deal with the Russians. The Austrians were fearful of their economically and militarily more powerful neighbor, while the British, still wielding greater industrial power than the Russian Empire, had a far-flung global empire to protect. They worried over the rapidly decreasing economic and military lead they had and were wary of Russian encroachment on their territories in Asia. Yet, for all the differences, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary met with the same Russian difficulties.

The imperial seal of Russia included a stylized black eagle with two heads. Sir Cecil Spring Rice, first secretary at the British embassy in St. Petersburg from 1903 to 1906, said shortly before the Bosnian Crisis, "The Russians are wonderful people, but their eagle is double-headed; one for Europe and one for Asia; one to 'explain' and one to 'perform'"<sup>2</sup> For Spring Rice and many others the eagle represented the unpredictability and untrustworthiness of the Russian government. There were marked inconsistencies between what Russian leaders "explained" and what they "performed." The British especially perceived a large gap between what the Russian officials said and what they did. Implied in Spring Rice's remark was also a question of Russia's very place in Europe. It was impossible to tell at any given moment where Russia's allegiances lay, and for all concerned, this was a great danger. The possibility of armed conflict was never absent from anyone's mind.

Ninety years later, questions linger about the meaning of the Bosnian Crisis in the period before World War I, as well as the roles played by the nations involved. The

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<sup>1</sup>The terms "liberal" and "reactionary" throughout this paper refer primarily to the form of government in each nation. Thus, "liberal" Great Britain and France had more democratic, constitutionally-based governments than "reactionary" Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia.

<sup>2</sup> Keith Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), 42.



situation is so complex that historians have been able to draw very few conclusions relating to World War I and its build-up. Examining the Bosnian Crisis in more detail will help to clarify the chain of events leading up to June 28, 1914 as well as the relationships among the nations of Europe. The goal of this thesis is to show the significance of the Bosnian Crisis as a prelude to the First World War, showing the impact misperceptions can have on foreign policy, and paying particular attention to the problems Russia posed for the foreign policies of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, problems which escalated a regional conflict to a continental crisis. Unfortunately, ninety years later, the Balkan Peninsula is no more stable than it was in 1908. Bosnia and Herzegovina are once again the center of attention, and the city of Sarajevo has witnessed violence and atrocities unparalleled since the early part of the century. As today's great powers closely watch the events as they unfold, each power is faced with the question of whether or not to get involved and if so, to what extent. It remains to be seen if they can base their decisions on more than just fear and misunderstanding.

Chapter I of this paper provides a historical background together with an historiographical overview of the literature for the explosive period before the First World War. Chapter II introduces the important personalities who directed foreign policy in the first decade of the twentieth century and explores some of the main difficulties in Anglo-Russian and Austro-Russian relations before the Bosnian Crisis. Chapter III focuses on the crisis itself, examining the ways in which Russia caused the situation to deteriorate, leading Europe to the brink of war before drawing back. The Conclusion returns to the topics of World War I and reflects on the recent Balkan conflict in light of the events of 1908 and 1909.

## Chapter I Cause and Effect

This is a primarily political and diplomatic history focusing on the actions of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Russia before and during the Bosnian crisis. However, the complexity of the situation requires a look at the non-political context. A controversy has existed among historians and politicians ever since the signing of the armistice of November 11, 1918 as to who exactly should receive the blame for the First World War, and, in a broader sense, who was responsible for the tension and latent hostility which permeated the atmosphere in Europe around the turn of the century. Immediately after the war, Germany received the blame for almost everything. Indeed, Kaiser Wilhelm II was responsible for the destruction of Bismarck's carefully orchestrated system of alliances and agreements, which contributed to the formation of the two opposing alliance blocs-- the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Yet so many other factors contributed to the situation that this immediate judgment by diplomats and politicians appears oversimplified today. Most historians recognize that World War I had a long fuse, and that hostilities built up over a long period of time. In many ways, the Bosnian Crisis was a dress rehearsal for the beginning of the war. It was a situation as complex as World War I itself. The nations of Europe had common histories and intertwined economies. Domestic situations intruded on foreign policy, and tradition held sway, even as everything was changing.

Historians have often made diplomacy in Europe to resemble a chess game on a continental scale, with moves, countermoves, attacks, defenses, and checkmates, every move having several logical outcomes, and always influencing future developments. Usually, it was much more complicated than that. At the turn of the century, the nature of diplomacy itself was changing. The old view, that diplomacy was an art and the dominion of statesmen exclusively, was falling out of favor, especially in Great Britain. French, for

example, so long the language of diplomacy, was rapidly losing ground to English and German. Several authors have already addressed this change and analyzed it in detail. Alan Palmer, in *The Chancelleries of Europe* (1983), describes a more "open" diplomacy. With the expansion of the press, improved education, and the extension of democratic reforms, information was more accessible than ever. Statesmen could no longer conduct their affairs in absolute secrecy, and in Great Britain especially, the government became increasingly committed to an open, straightforward policy.<sup>1</sup> Paul M. Kennedy agrees in his book *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945* (1983), citing domestic politics and a comfortable economic situation as reasons why Great Britain preferred a diplomatic philosophy which was "pragmatic, conciliatory, and reasonable."<sup>2</sup> Of course, not all European nations progressed at the same rate. By 1900, Russian diplomacy had advanced the least toward this British ideal, explaining perhaps the problems British diplomats had with their Russian policy. In his book, *Russia's Rulers under the Old Regime* (1989), D. C. B. Lieven notes that the most striking aspect of the Russian government was its lack of professionalization. What bureaucracy there was, was firmly in the hands of the aristocracy and no governmental institution had power independent of the emperor.<sup>3</sup> However, these authors have amply discussed the workings of the foreign offices in Europe at the turn of the century. It is simply enough here to note the change which had occurred and was occurring in the way diplomacy was conducted.

Economic and military considerations, of course, can influence political decisions. Paul Kennedy discusses the economic and military factors in foreign relations in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987). The book itself covers five hundred years of

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<sup>1</sup> Alan Palmer, *The Chancelleries of Europe* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 149-150.

<sup>2</sup> Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 27.

<sup>3</sup> D. C. B. Lieven, *Russian Rulers under the Old Regime* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 287.

European history: Chapter 5 focuses on the period from 1885 to 1918. Kennedy's main purpose is to examine the emergence of the modern two-power system and the rise of the United States and Russia from an economic and military point of view. However, he also provides an overview of the entire period, portraying the "crisis" of the European powers caught between the emerging superpowers. According to Kennedy, dramatic changes were taking place in the realm of world finance and trade in the period shortly before World War I: telegraphs, steamships, and modern printing presses.<sup>4</sup> These new technologies and scientific advancements affected age-old relationships among nations. Beginning with raw population statistics, Kennedy analyzes the industrial output and military potential of the world's great powers. In 1900, Russia had by far the largest population with 135.6 million, followed by the United States and Germany with 75.9 and 56 million respectively.<sup>5</sup> He admits, though, that population statistics can be misleading and other statistics such as urban population and per capita levels of industrialization put Russia far down in the list of powers. By 1910, Great Britain, the United States, and Germany had commanding leads over other nations in most measures of industrial power such as iron and steel production and energy consumption. Russia did, however, succeed in surpassing Austria-Hungary and France by the end of the first decade, due mainly to her vast population and seemingly unending natural resources. Another significant trend was the rise of Germany from the lower ranks of the great powers to a nation with more industrial potential than Great Britain, part of the greater trend of the diminishing industrial gap between Great Britain and the other nations of Europe.<sup>6</sup> These tendencies had political consequences, influencing the development of foreign relations in the early twentieth century, especially in the light of the type of massive war made possible by the spread of the Industrial Revolution.

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<sup>4</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 198.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, 199.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, 200-201.

Germany played a critical part in the unfolding events of 1908, and Kennedy discusses the role of the Second Reich in another of his books, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1806-1914* (1980). Because Great Britain and Germany were the major powers on either side of the conflict, many historians have given great consideration to the Anglo-German rivalry before the war, and it has become a dominant theme in the literature of the period. Kennedy explores the reasons why a rivalry arose between Great Britain and Germany, considering politics and diplomacy as well as economics. Despite cultural and political ties (King Edward VII was Kaiser Wilhelm's uncle), the British perceived the Germans as a threat. No other state had more to lose from a change in the status quo than Great Britain, and the dramatic economic growth of Germany meant a decrease in Great Britain's own power.<sup>7</sup> What alarmed the British even more, however, was the rapid build-up of the German navy. The Royal Navy was larger than the next two largest navies combined. From the British point of view, such a powerful navy was necessary to protect her far-flung empire. The Germans, on the other hand, saw the need to challenge Great Britain's naval supremacy in order to secure an overseas policy for themselves.<sup>8</sup> The result was a break in Anglo-German relations. During the Bosnian Crisis, for example, such a fear of encirclement by the British, French, and Russians forced the Germans to back Austria-Hungary and to finally put an ultimatum before Russia to accept the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kennedy notes that had a war occurred between Austria-Hungary and Russia in 1908 or 1909, Germany would have thrown much of the military to the west, shifting the conflict to an area sensitive to British interests.<sup>9</sup> Kennedy, however, completely neglects other very important international relationship. London was not the only European capital made uneasy by Germany's rapid rise through the ranks of the European powers. Paris and St. Petersburg watched every move Berlin made . More than

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<sup>7</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1806-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 307.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid, 416-417.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid, 445.

just an Anglo-German military rivalry escalated tensions beyond control in 1908 and again in 1914.

Zara Steiner falls into the same camp as Kennedy. Her book *Great Britain and the Origins of the First World War* (1977) examines the influence of British public opinion, the press, and the workings of the British foreign office. Steiner is reluctant, however, to draw any firm conclusions. She disagrees with Palmer and Kennedy on the evolution of diplomacy, arguing that diplomacy in Great Britain was, in fact, in the hands of a few elites.<sup>10</sup> She picks up her narrative with the First Balkan War in 1912, four years after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but her very sparse comments on the Bosnian Crisis center around the Anglo-German arms race and Germany's reaction to British support for Russia.<sup>11</sup> In her chapter on Anglo-Russian relations, she addresses some of the problems the British faced in dealing with the Russians, but she downplays their significance. In the introduction of her book, she asks "Why should a state which had for over a hundred years preserved its distance from the European continent become involved in a war which many knew would be of unparalleled destructiveness because an Austrian Archduke was assassinated in a place which Englishmen could not locate on a map?"<sup>12</sup> In her conclusion, she answers her own question by saying that Great Britain entered World War I primarily because of fears of Germany.<sup>13</sup> Like Kennedy, however, she ignores some important international relationships, specifically with respect to Russia.

George Kennan's *The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War* (1984) provides more pieces of the puzzle while deftly representing the major alternative to the historiographical emphasis on the Anglo-German rivalry. Kennan looks at Russia's role in the conflict, portraying the empire as a more active player.

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<sup>10</sup> Zara Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), 248.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid, 52.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid, 4.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid, 242.

Bismarck's diplomacy after German unification effectively isolated France. According to Kennan, France put out feelers toward Russia as early as the 1880's.<sup>14</sup> In 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm refused to renew an agreement with the Russian government which Bismarck had made in an effort to isolate France. As a result, France and Russia moved closer together, ultimately culminating in the Franco-Russian Alliance. France gained a much-needed ally, and Russia gained much-needed financial support. As part of the agreement, French bankers floated a loan for Russia in excess of 1.8 billion francs.<sup>15</sup> However, the alliance was based on a series of misunderstandings between the French and Russian foreign ministers, as well as an almost irrational fear of Germany. Each side used the agreement to further its own goals. The French financial support also upset nations such as Germany and Austria-Hungary, but it was the military agreement which was the most problematic. Kennan asserts that Russia had the "power to unleash a major European war whenever this might suit Russia's purposes."<sup>16</sup> The military convention provided that any mobilization by any member of the Triple Alliance against either France or Russia would result in a general mobilization by both against all members of the Triple Alliance. Thus, Kennan provides an alternate chain of events which would transform regional bickerings over Bosnia and Herzegovina into a continental crisis. However, he also continues the trend of largely ignoring the Bosnian Crisis as a significant step toward World War I.

Keith Neilson partially corrects this oversight. He is the most vocal advocate for the theory that Russian foreign policy, not German, heightened tensions in the period before World War I. He maintains that Kennedy, Steiner, and others have overstated the role of Germany in Europe. In his book, *Britain and the Last Tsar* (1995), he states that the significance of Anglo-German antagonism in perpetuating hostilities has been overemphasized. Simply because war broke out in 1914 between Great Britain and

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<sup>14</sup> George Kennan, *The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 31-32.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid, 77.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid, 252.

Germany does not suggest a cause-and-effect relationship between the fighting and the Anglo-German rivalry.<sup>17</sup> True, Great Britain was an island nation and could hide behind the Channel, but according to Neilson, Russia was such a threat to British colonial interests in Asia that the government in London had to act. The problem was that Great Britain, because of distance and size, could not directly challenge the Russian Empire, and so the only recourse was to come to an agreement with Russia in the hopes of reining in some of Russia's power.<sup>18</sup> As a result, Great Britain was pulled into the conflict over the Balkans. The British had expected too much from their relationship with the Russians, and as a result during the Bosnian Crisis, they found themselves committed to policies they did not fully support.<sup>19</sup> Neilson comes the closest to identifying the significance of the British perception of Russian unpredictability and untrustworthiness in worsening tensions. However, he makes little mention of Austria-Hungary, which was struggling with many of the same questions concerning Russian foreign policy.

F. R. Bridge has written several books on Austrian foreign policy in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century which address the problem of Austro-Russian relations. In *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914* (1972), Bridge examines the deterioration of Anglo-Austrian relations. He argues that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary slowly drifted apart in the late nineteenth century until a series of events in the early twentieth prompted a break. For instance, after the Austrian government imposed sanctions on Serbia in 1906, the British used the opportunity to take a larger slice of Serbian trade for themselves. In the trade war that resulted, Anglo-Austrian relations soured while Anglo-Russian relations, Russia being a staunch ally of Serbia, improved.<sup>20</sup> Bridge addresses the Bosnian Crisis most directly. He gives an entire chapter to the issue,

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<sup>17</sup> Keith Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), xii.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid, 368.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid, 303.

<sup>20</sup> F. R. Bridge, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History* (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1972), 4.



but he, like Kennedy and Steiner, puts the focus back on Great Britain and Germany. He blames much of the diplomatic difficulty on Great Britain "being in such a self-righteous mood."<sup>21</sup> .

In *From Sadowa to Sarajevo, The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914* (1972), Bridge examines Austrian foreign policy in more general terms. Austria-Hungary was the weakest of the traditional great powers. Rather than military and economic might, Austria-Hungary had to maintain her position through diplomacy, hiding behind treaties and alliances such as the Three Emperors League of the late nineteenth century which included Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia.<sup>22</sup> For the Habsburg dynasty, survival meant maintaining the status quo. The rival nationalities within the empire were a constant cause for concern and, for very practical reasons, the government in Vienna opposed any suggestion of nationalism or liberalism on the part of the subject nations. A great difficulty for Austrian foreign relations was Austria-Hungary's ethnic make-up. The Austrians, ethnically German, were a decided minority. They shared the Habsburg empire with Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, and Poles. In 1867, in order to stave off a potential revolution, the Dual Monarchy had been created: Hungary received its own parliament, and Emperor Franz Josef became King of Hungary as well Emperor of Austria. The Hungarians did not cease to cause problems, however. They exerted considerable influence on Austrian foreign policy. Bridge points out that, ironically, it was not this internal strife which posed the greatest threat to the empire, but the fact that Austria-Hungary was falling behind militarily and economically. The Austrians did not have the British industrial base or the Russian population or the French national cohesiveness, and even in peace, according to Bridge, this put Austria-Hungary in a precarious position. Bridge's argument about the Bosnian Crisis remains very much the

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid, 118.

<sup>22</sup> F. R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria Hungary, 1866-1914* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 4.

same as Kennedy's and Steiner's.<sup>23</sup> However, his main point is that despite the crises endured by the Dual Monarchy in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Austrians managed to achieve a manner of peace. In 1914, however, they thought continued peace would be more costly for them than war. The Anglo-German rivalry had had the unexpected effect of putting the Austrians at a military and economic disadvantage.<sup>24</sup>

Samuel Williamson, on the other hand, argues that the Austrians were much more in command of their fate and returns to the idea of Russian unpredictability as a major cause of conflict. His book *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War* (1991) focuses on the period beginning with the First Balkan War of 1912 leading up to the July 1914 assassination of Franz Ferdinand. He calls Russia Austria-Hungary's "most dangerous, implacable foe."<sup>25</sup> The two nations were rivals for influence in the Balkans as the ailing Ottoman Empire lost control of its European possessions. Williamson outlines the struggle for control over the Balkan Peninsula and the influence Russia gained over Serbia and Montenegro especially. Rather than a victim pushed into war, Austria-Hungary had equal blame if only as the initiator of hostilities.<sup>26</sup> However, he overlooks the Bosnian Crisis as a major step toward open conflict.

D. C. B. Lieven tries to bring the Russian point of view more into focus in *Russia and the Origins of the First World War* (1983), exploring Franco-Russian and Anglo-Russian dealings. He believes that it is important to examine the events leading the World War I from a Russian perspective, portraying the struggle of the Russian Empire to maintain its place as a great power.<sup>27</sup> However, in his discussion of the Bosnian Crisis, he absolves Russia of any guilt in worsening the situation, blaming the diplomatic failures on

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<sup>23</sup>Ibid, 310.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid, 389.

<sup>25</sup> Samuel Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 115.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid, 119.

<sup>27</sup> D. C. B. Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 3.

German heavy-handedness.<sup>28</sup> David McDonald paints a better picture of the Russian situation just prior to the Bosnian Crisis in his book *United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914* (1992). After the disastrous outcome of the Russo-Japanese War and the domestic uprisings in 1905 and 1906, the Russian government had a genuine identity crisis. The ideas of autocratic rule by the emperor and the nobility and government by a professionalized bureaucracy independent of the autocracy collided head on. P. A. Stolypin, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, struggled to unite the various branches of the government, and to make it more efficient.<sup>29</sup> This trend of professionalization had begun decades earlier in Great Britain. The office of Foreign Minister was one of the last areas of the Russian government still beyond the bureaucracy and in the hands of the tsar and his appointed minister. McDonald portrays the Bosnian Crisis as a battle between these conflicting forces in the Russian government. From the outside, therefore, some of Russia's actions may have seemed inconsistent.<sup>30</sup> Such a theory goes far in explaining the difficulties the British and the Austrians had in developing their Russian policies.

Finally, George Kennan addresses the issue of the recent Balkan conflict in the introduction to a Carnegie Endowment report on the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 entitled *The Other Balkan Wars* (1993). He points out that despite certain significant differences between the conflict then and the one now, such as revolutions in communication and weapons technology, striking similarities also exist. Both conflicts involved new states inexperienced in matters of foreign affairs, and even more depressing, the style of fighting is the same, devastating the countryside.<sup>31</sup> Equally as ominous is the

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid, 36.

<sup>29</sup> David McDonald, *United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia 1900-1914* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 6-7.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid, 150-151.

<sup>31</sup> George Kennan, "The Balkan Crises: 1913 and 1993," in *The Other Balkan Wars* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1993), 10.

stance of the great powers in the present conflict. Kennan argues that Europe and the United States must deal with the problem in a clearly defined and predetermined way, not allowing fears and misunderstandings to cloud their judgment.<sup>32</sup>

However, Kennan also falls into the trend of downplaying the first Bosnian Crisis, focusing on a period when the nations were already arrayed along the battle lines of World War I and when tensions in the Balkans were playing out almost too quickly for the European powers to react. The Bosnian Crisis was important because it offered a brief glimpse at what was possible when the conventional means of diplomacy broke down, and it momentarily clarified the role each nation had come to play in Europe. Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, despite their differing political philosophies, were the two nations affected most by changes in the status quo. They perceived Russia to possess a powerful position in Europe, which made it imperative for these two nations to come to terms with the sprawling Russian Empire. Yet, with the Bosnian Crisis, they found their plans thwarted when their expectations came up against the reality of a Russia struggling to define its own role.

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid, 16.

## Chapter II

### Agreements and Misunderstandings

The Bosnian Crisis flagrantly illustrated the difficulties and shortcomings of relations among the nations of Europe in the first decade of the twentieth century. Even before the crisis, however, tensions and obstacles in Anglo- and Austro-Russian relations existed. Some of these tensions were the result of the personalities responsible for foreign policy; others were the consequence of changing economic situations. Still others resulted from certain miscalculations in the foreign policies of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary. Of course, by no means was Russia completely innocent of worsening tensions in the period before the Bosnian Crisis. Russian officials had never proved themselves entirely trustworthy, but the misperceptions of Russia by the British and the Austrians did not help matters.

For the student of politics, Russia at the turn of the century presented a study in contradiction. The government was a strange mixture of constitutional reform and autocratic rule. Left-wing radicals carried favor at court while reactionaries led uprisings. Archaic feudal obligations existed alongside major technological and industrial advances, and atrocities such as the anti-Jewish pogroms overshadowed Russia's great cultural and literary tradition. To the rest of Europe, Russia made little sense, and much of what Western Europeans found incongruous they attributed to the inherent nature of the empire. Theoretically, the Russian sovereign held absolute power, and consequently, the character of the tsar in many ways shaped the character of the nation. Attachment to such an anachronism was difficult for other European nations, especially the relatively liberal powers of Great Britain and France, to understand; but in Russia, it was the natural order of things. Tsar Nicholas II ascended to the throne upon the death of his father Alexander III in 1895 and ruled until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. During his reign, Nicholas

accordingly embodied much of the unpredictability which so confounded the rest of Europe.

According to Alexander Izvolskii, who was appointed to the post of foreign minister in 1905, Nicholas was simply not prepared for the role of emperor. Izvolskii wrote of the emperor's education, "To this day, I have been quite unable to understand how a prince, destined from his cradle to govern one of the greatest empires of the world, could have been left without any serious preparation for the overwhelming task that lay before him."<sup>1</sup> He was more interested in sport and in literature than in the workings of the state. Izvolskii personally believed that the emperor had great charm and intelligence, but upon the untimely death of his father, these were not enough. Alexander III had firmly believed in absolute monarchy. He ruthlessly reversed the policies of his liberal father Alexander II, centralizing the government even more. When Alexander III died unexpectedly, his son Nicholas was only twenty-six and completely unable to cope with his new duties. Izvolskii argued that Nicholas reacted by revering the memory of Alexander, so much so that he refused to assume any title above colonel in the Russian army, the last rank he had achieved before he succeeded his father. This reverence extended into the young tsar's politics, where he leaned toward reactionism. Most members of the Court had expected Nicholas, by his disposition, to be like his grandfather in his policies, and in the beginning of his reign, there was renewed hope among the liberals for true reform. They were dashed, however, when Nicholas labeled the calls for a constitutional government "insensate dreams."<sup>2</sup>

By all accounts Nicholas was open to dubious influences from various sources, including his cabinet, the court, and his own family. For instance, it was through Alexandra, his wife, that the infamous monk Rasputin came into the royal household.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander Izvolskii, *The Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky*, ed. Charles Louis Seeger (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1974), 248.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, 252-253.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, 263.

Often such influences were at odds with one another, and as a result, Tsar Nicholas's behavior was often very inconsistent. "His was a character essentially vague and elusive," Izvolskii concluded, "of nuances and half-tones, and is difficult to define in exact terms."<sup>4</sup> If Izvolskii found him difficult to understand, then to many other foreign leaders, the tsar was a complete enigma. In several ways, Russian foreign policy was the same to the British and the Austrians--"vague and elusive"--nearly impossible to decipher, and with the potential to create dangerous misunderstandings.

The tsar had control over every aspect of the government, though he did not govern alone. Izvolskii greatly succeeded in making his presence felt during his term as foreign minister. On many occasions he served as intermediary between the tsar and foreign representatives. Other nations had to contend with Izvolskii's own idiosyncrasies and inclinations, and he himself, besides being directly involved in the Bosnian Crisis, added yet another layer to the riddle of Russian foreign policy. Sir Cecil Spring Rice became first secretary at the British embassy in St. Petersburg in 1903. Despite his poor opinion of the Russian nation, shortly before he left Russia in 1906, he wrote in a letter to Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, that he found Izvolskii "very agreeable."<sup>5</sup> When pressed for an assessment of the foreign minister's character, he said, "He is clever and ambitious. He talks well and is fond of society in which he appears to advantage....He is vain and very sensitive to flattery of any sort, but he can hardly be said to have any fixed policy except perhaps a sort of sentimental interest in the Slavs."<sup>6</sup> Spring Rice, however, doubted Izvolskii's ability to perform his job successfully because of the Russian's lack of experience. This deficiency became an issue during the Bosnian Crisis. Many of the British leaders and diplomats applauded Izvolskii's appointment to the position of foreign minister, because he was politically left of center. Of course his political orientation often

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid, 278.

<sup>5</sup> Sir Cecil Spring Rice, *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, ed. Stephen Gwynn (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929), 73.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, 73.

put him at odds with the more reactionary elements in the Russian government. His position forced him to deal with the Russo-Japanese War, for instance, even though it was a war he opposed totally and a war his more conservative predecessor had begun.<sup>7</sup> The antagonisms which developed in the cabinet at St. Petersburg eventually played a role in the Bosnian Crisis. Spring Rice believed that Izvolskii needed to be dealt with cautiously in order to hold Russia in check.<sup>8</sup>

Grey, despite his differences of opinion with Spring Rice, tended to agree with him on the matter of Izvolskii's character. Personally, Grey seemed fond of the Russian minister. He found Izvolskii very open and amicable.<sup>9</sup> However, like Spring Rice, he doubted Izvolskii's ability to handle the demands of his office. During the Bosnian Crisis, for example, Izvolskii made appeals for sympathy from the British. He spoke at great length in almost flawless English, a feat which impressed Grey greatly. Grey appreciated Izvolskii's earnestness and his hard work, but the Englishman did not sympathize much with the Russian dilemma during the crisis. Grey's priority was British interests, and he viewed Izvolskii's predicament as much the Russian minister's own creation.<sup>10</sup> The Austrians, as well, noted Izvolskii's faults, commenting on numerous occasions on the foreign minister's vanity.<sup>11</sup> They felt in addition that Izvolskii tended to be indiscreet.<sup>12</sup> Even in St. Petersburg, Izvolskii was known as somewhat of a snob. He did lack the experience of his predecessors in foreign relation, but he held the one qualification which mattered to the tsar; he was a member of the aristocracy. Unfortunately for him, he

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<sup>7</sup>Izvolskii, 251.

<sup>8</sup>Spring Rice, 73.

<sup>9</sup> Sir Edward Grey, *Twenty Five Years 1892-1916* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1925), 165.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid, 171-172.

<sup>11</sup> Count Albert Mensdorff, "Bericht aus London, 10. Oktober 1908," in *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik*, ed. Ludwig Bittner and Hans Uebersberger, vol. 1 (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1930), 184.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid, Count Rudolph Kehvenhüller, "Telegram aus Paris, 15. Oktober 1908," 222.



landed directly in the center of the struggles to reform the government and often found himself caught between Nicholas and Stolypin.<sup>13</sup>

Those struggles to unify the government in the hands of professional bureaucrats grew out of the change and upheaval Russia experienced in the first decade of the twentieth century. Hopes for reform alternated with resurgent reactionism almost daily with the whims of the tsar. Faced with such inconsistency, other nations found it difficult to trust the intentions of Russian officials. A memorandum put out by the British Foreign Office in 1903 recounted several incidents in which the Russians had gone back on their word. They had agreed, for instance, not to make Port Arthur, a Chinese port in a Russian sphere of influence, a military base or to exclude other nations from trading there, but they did both. They also agreed to discuss any possible loan to the Persian shah with Great Britain, an agreement which they also broke.<sup>14</sup>

At issue as well were the anti-Jewish pogroms and the treatment by the Russians of other minority nationalities, namely the Poles. The British government became very concerned about the situation of the Jews in Russia in the late 1800's. In uprisings against Jews in the Ukraine and Poland, British representatives reported that the mobs who were burning and pillaging Jewish homes were actually being directed by the local authorities.<sup>15</sup> Izvolskii reported such anti-Jewish activity occurring during the general uprisings of 1905 and 1906. Even while the October Manifesto, which created the first ever Russian legislative body, was being drafted, anti-Jewish pogroms erupted in the countryside around St. Petersburg and Moscow.<sup>16</sup> The Poles fared little better. The Kingdom of Poland had been created as part of the Russian Empire at the Congress of Vienna in 1815,

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<sup>13</sup>McDonald, 92-93.

<sup>14</sup> British Foreign Office, "Memorandum Respecting the Value of Russian Assurances," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Part I, Series A, vol. 2, eds. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, (Washington, DC: University Publications of America, 1983), 396-397.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid, 58-59.

<sup>16</sup>Izvolskii, 28.

and Russians generally considered it politically and culturally inferior. The Polish language was not permitted in official business or in the schools, and the strikes by Polish workers in 1905 were put down brutally.<sup>17</sup> Such reports fueled the common British perceptions of Russia as a backwards nation, stuck in the antiquated ideas and senseless prejudices of the past.

The uprisings of 1905 and 1906 in Russia followed the disastrous outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. Japan succeeded in destroying the entire Russian Pacific fleet while the Russians were still anchored at Port Arthur. Shortly thereafter, the Japanese defeated the Baltic fleet at Tsushima. A humiliating defeat for the Russians, the war triggered massive anti-government protests. Russia was a tinderbox waiting to ignite. In 1905, workmen in St. Petersburg mounted a strike, and on a Sunday in January, the workmen staged a peaceful march near the Imperial Palace. They clashed with Russian troops, who left more than 300 of the protesters dead.<sup>18</sup> In May, the overall situation had deteriorated even more. Schools were closed. Public meetings were outlawed. Anti-Jewish riots, factory strikes, and uprisings in the countryside broke out all over Russia. The British felt that the government would only remain in control "as long as the troops continue willing to fire on the mob."<sup>19</sup> By August, even the army had become a potential source of rebellion, causing uneasiness in St. Petersburg.<sup>20</sup> The unrest culminated in the Manifesto of October 30, which created the Duma, the Russian parliament. The manifesto laid out the foundations for civil liberty and called for "frankness and sincerity" in the government.<sup>21</sup> Even though the Duma proved to be ineffective, the attitude of the Russian government changed slightly. Suddenly, the tsar no longer opposed to closer Anglo-

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<sup>17</sup> Sir Charles Hardinge, "Letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne, July 24 1905," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series A, vol. 3, 169-170.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid, "Letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne, January 23, 1905," 8.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid, Spring Rice, "Letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne, May 16, 1905," 119.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid, H. D. Napier, "Letter to Sir Charles Hardinge, August 2, 1905," 173.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid, Spring Rice, "Letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne, October 31, 1905,"

Russian relations, but the question remained of how Great Britain would deal with her old antagonist.

In the same year as the end of the Russo Japanese War and the beginning of widespread Russian unrest, the Liberal Party gained control in the British House of Commons. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman became prime minister, and perhaps more importantly, Sir Edward Grey became foreign secretary. Grey was the quintessential Englishman. He had a typical English education, having attended Oxford, and typical English interests--in truth, he often preferred his country estate to the office.<sup>22</sup> He came from an old family of the lesser peerage which had a history of public service. When he went into politics in 1885, he was following in that tradition, and, more specifically, in the footsteps of his grandfather, who had served in several Liberal governments. He was a great admirer of William Gladstone, under whom he served, and throughout his career, he remained devoted to the ideals of British Liberalism.<sup>23</sup>

Grey's tenure as head of the Foreign Office was to some the beginning of a new era. There was a shift in the mindset of the government as a whole--a new way of looking at foreign relations as symbolizing a passing of the baton between generations. On the whole, Grey's actions as foreign minister showed that his policy had a different "attitude," one of action rather than reaction with regard to European politics.<sup>24</sup> In an environment in which the British no longer felt secure in their supremacy of the seas or in their global empire, Grey chose to engage the obstacles that Great Britain encountered in foreign relations rather than steer around them. Indeed, he did not think that the nation could manage any longer by simply avoiding problems. His memoirs, *Twenty-Five Years* (1925), lack any specific statement on what he wished to accomplish as foreign secretary, but in a speech given in 1913, he stated his goals in general:

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<sup>22</sup> Sir Edward Grey, *Speeches on Foreign Affairs 1904-1914*, comp. Paul Knaplund (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), 10.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid, 15.

<sup>24</sup> Neilson, 49.

1. He should guard against political changes or combinations which from the outside might threaten the security of the British Empire or the maintenance of communications between its parts. 2. He must prevent the empire from assuming too heavy responsibilities, especially territorial responsibilities. 3. He should aid in the promotion and encouragement of British commerce. 4. He should make Britain serve humanity throughout the world.<sup>25</sup>

These principles were a far cry from the splendid isolation of earlier governments. The major British entanglements in the latter half of the nineteenth century, in particular the Boer War, had involved issues of the British Empire, places where British interests were perceived to be at stake. In 1905, Grey saw British interests jeopardized much closer to home than South Africa. His new active European foreign policy was evident in his statements about Germany and Russia. In a November 1908 letter to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the ambassador to Russia, Grey stated that he believed Germany was the major belligerent power in Europe, and that "British sympathy would naturally be against the aggressor in any war."<sup>26</sup> Conversely, he said in a speech given in December 1907, "For some time past, the relations between England and Russia had been more or less relations of discomfort.... The first thing I would ask you to notice in the Anglo-Russian Convention is that both countries have determined, instead of continuing to travel along the path of political distrust and friction, they will begin to retrace their step and travel in the opposite direction, which leads to peace and friendly relations."<sup>27</sup> Through the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, British and Russian officials attempted to end conflict between the two nations in the Far East, but it is clear that for Grey, closer relations with Russia countered fears of Germany.

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<sup>25</sup>Grey, *Speeches*, 13-14.

<sup>26</sup> Sir Edward Grey, "Private Letter to Sir A. Nicholson, November 10, 1908" in *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*, eds. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928), 494-495.

<sup>27</sup>Grey, *Speeches*, 40.

Sir Arthur Nicolson became almost equally integral in the shaping of British foreign policy. As ambassador to Russia from 1906 to 1910, Nicolson opened Grey's window into the workings of the nation. A staunch supporter of Grey's policy, Nicolson believed in an active foreign relations. He had no scruples in expressing his contempt for the traditional British policy of non-involvement, as he did on several occasions to the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Charles Hardinge.<sup>28</sup> With respect to Russia, Nicolson firmly believed in the air of cooperation surrounding the Anglo-Russian Convention, which had consumed most of his time in his first year and a half of service. Repeatedly, in letters to Grey, Nicolson spoke of his own eagerness, as well as that of the Russians, to pursue "more intimate and friendly relations between the two peoples."<sup>29</sup> Hardinge, who was under-secretary until 1910 when he was replaced by Nicolson, also had no love for Germany and saw Russia as the only alternative for the stability of Europe.<sup>30</sup> His pragmatism tended to temper Nicolson's idealism, but Hardinge was still very enthusiastic about the Anglo-Russian Convention, and was anxious to cement the new relationship between the two nations. On several occasions, Hardinge urged that King Edward VII should pay a visit to the Russian emperor, which the king did in June of 1908.<sup>31</sup> Hardinge said on that occasion, somewhat prophetically, that "in seven or eight years' time a critical situation might arise, in which Russia, if strong in Europe, might be the arbiter of peace...."<sup>32</sup>

Perhaps the most important aspect of Anglo-Russian relations prior to the Bosnian Crisis was the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Years before the Convention, it became obvious that Grey was contemplating closer relations with Russia. In a speech he

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<sup>28</sup> Steiner, 104.

<sup>29</sup> Sir Arthur Nicolson, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, October 18, 1907," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series A, vol. 5, 36.

<sup>30</sup>Nielson, 25.

<sup>31</sup>Hardinge, "Letter to Sir Arthur Nicolson, April 13, 1908," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 236.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid, "Report on Visit to the Emperor of Russia, June 1908," 239.

gave at a Liberal fiscal meeting in October 1905, he stated, after he noted the apparent change in attitude on the part of the tsar, that it was "urgently desirable that Russia's position and influence should be re-established in the councils of Europe."<sup>33</sup>

Russia had just been humiliated in the Russo-Japanese War, a conflict over which the British government expressed extreme disapproval, but Grey was already regarding Germany with uneasiness and saw Russia as a counterweight to German power on the Continent. British suspicion of German intentions is evident in a comment by Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador in Berlin:

The German Empire has now been in existence for thirty-six years, and it would seem that the Germans, who are the most sensitive people in the world, have not yet become quite accustomed to being a great nation, and they have the uncomfortable feeling that Germany does not occupy the position in Europe to which her military preponderance entitles her.<sup>34</sup>

The greatest German fear was being surrounded by France and Russia, but the Germans felt that the British stifled their plans overseas. The Germans resented efforts to restrict the mobility of the German navy. From 1908 to 1909, the German government proposed an increase in naval expenditures of £4 million to pay for three more battleships. For the British, these were "alarming increases."<sup>35</sup> Even Edward VII and Wilhelm II of Germany, blood relatives, had a very tense relationship.<sup>36</sup> The British wanted to make sure that the Russians did not come to an agreement with the Germans and leave Great Britain isolated.

The Anglo-Russian Convention, then, was a major step forward. For Hardinge and the rest it heralded more than just a treaty securing British interests in Asia. It was a bridge to closer relations with Russia.<sup>37</sup> Specifically, the Convention dealt with the exclusion of Russia from Tibet, where a Russian presence had been considered a threat to

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<sup>33</sup>Grey, *Speeches*, 30.

<sup>34</sup>Sir Frank Lascelles, "General Report on Germany for the Year 1906," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series F, vol. 20, 56.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid, Count de Salis, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, November 27, 1907," 147.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid, Lascelles, "Germany, Annual Report, 1907," 222.

<sup>37</sup>Nielson, 25.

British interests in India.<sup>38</sup> It divided Persia into spheres of influence and settled questions of control over telegraph and railway lines there, and it also excluded Russia from Afghanistan, where the British also perceived a threat.<sup>39</sup> Of the Convention, Grey wrote, "Russia was an ally of France; we could not pursue at one and the same time a policy of agreement with France and a policy of counter-alliance with Russia."<sup>40</sup> Russia's already existing alliance with France made an understanding with Russia even more attractive to Great Britain. The Anglo-French entente of 1904 seemed to be the first step in closer relations with Russia. This understanding between France and Great Britain had developed from the British defense of France during the First Moroccan Crisis which developed after Germany confronted France over the French military bid to gain control of Morocco. The Russians were wary of this new cordiality, but as long as French banks were willing to loan money to the Russian government, they remained eager allies.<sup>41</sup>

Grey said that the Anglo-Russian Convention would "dissipate jealousy and suspicion" and "relieve both nations from strain and anxiety."<sup>42</sup> In Russia, it was very well received, which for many was surprising, considering the apparent disadvantage at which it left the nation.<sup>43</sup> Then again, its reception may not be so surprising, given the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. Russia may have been simply ready to accept the friendship of Great Britain, once she realized the vulnerability of her position even three years after the end of the war. Indeed, many Russians, Stolypin included, felt the need for peace. The Convention alleviated some of the complications in Anglo-Russian relations in Asia,

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<sup>38</sup>Nicolson, "Annual Report, 1907." in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series A, vol. 5, 76.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid, 77-80.

<sup>40</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 147.

<sup>41</sup>Sir Francis Berite, "Annual Report on France, 1908," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series F, vol. 13, 33.

<sup>42</sup>Grey, *Speeches*, 41.

<sup>43</sup>Sir E. Goschen, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, October 4, 1907," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 214.

leaving the Russian government free to concentrate on domestic problems.<sup>44</sup> Hardinge remarked on this seeming change in attitude during King Edward's visit with Tsar Nicholas. Aboard the emperor's yacht, King Edward bestowed on the tsar the title British Admiral of the Fleet. Tsar Nicholas returned the compliment by making the king a Russian Admiral of the Fleet. Hardinge remarked that the tsar acted "with great modesty and apparent diffidence." Granted, the tsar was the king's nephew, but Kaiser Wilhelm was his nephew as well, with whom he was never on very good terms. For Hardinge what was impressive was that the sole surviving ship from the fleet which with "arrogance and self-confidence" had sailed to engage the Japanese was anchored next to the imperial yacht.<sup>45</sup> It served as a reminder of Russia's vulnerability. Hardinge noted at the meeting a significant change in the attitude of the Russians. It was a major step forward for Anglo-Russian relations. Perhaps it was even an essential one, because only months later the Bosnian Crisis would test the bounds of this newly cordial relationship.

Anglo-Russian relations were nevertheless not without their problems even before the Bosnian Crisis. British perceptions of Russian reactionism presented a major obstacle. Grey wrote later in his life, "Russian despotism was repugnant to British ideals, and something was constantly happening in Russia that alienated British sympathy or stirred indignation."<sup>46</sup> The establishment of the Duma in 1905, the first ever representative body in Russia, helped somewhat, but it soon became evident, especially after Tsar Nicholas dissolved it twice, that the Duma would be ineffective at best. The government could not control the various factions, either of the radical Left or the radical Right, and as a result, the Duma was reduced to arguing issues such as drunkenness in Russia.<sup>47</sup> In addition, the

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<sup>44</sup>McDonald, 110.

<sup>45</sup>Hardinge, "Report on Visit to Russia, June 1908," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 245.

<sup>46</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 149.

<sup>47</sup>C. H. Bentnick, "Summary of Events in Russia, January 1, 1908," *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series A, vol. 5, 55



treatment of the Jews and the Poles caused great consternation on the part of the British. Before the signing of the Convention, Grey admitted that, "The whole course of internal affairs in Russia rendered the atmosphere very unfavourable to friendly negotiations."<sup>48</sup> Even after the Convention, Russian internal matters caused some concern. Nicolson favored gradual liberal reform in Russia.<sup>49</sup> Many of his letters were preoccupied with the fate of the Duma. In early 1908, he said, "It is unfortunate that hitherto the Duma has not realized the expectations of those who anticipated that it would be a hardworking sensible assembly, which would diligently plod its way through the mass of legislative measures with which the Government have, perhaps imprudently, overwhelmed it."<sup>50</sup> He also expressed his dismay at the excruciating slowness and inefficiency of the Russian legal system, writing, "I do think that it is most regrettable that an individual, whatever crime he may have committed, should be executed two or three years after the perpetration of his misdeeds."<sup>51</sup> Hardinge, in his talks with Tsar Nicholas during King Edward's visit to Russia, expressed similar misgivings. Freedom of the press was new and still very tentative. Hardinge said it must be "carefully fostered to bear fruit in the future," but he doubted the emperor's ability to be careful and feared what might happen in the future, especially if attacks on Germany, which had been so prevalent, continued.<sup>52</sup>

In addition, a segment of the Foreign Office quite loudly expressed its distrust of Russia and its representatives. Hardinge even, while he advocated closer Anglo-Russian relations, still expressed misgivings at working with the Russians. In an letter to Nicolson discussing the Russian response to British proposals for solving the Macedonia question in

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<sup>48</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*. 151.

<sup>49</sup>Nielson, 27.

<sup>50</sup>Nicholson, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, January 26, 1908," *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series A, vol 5, 64.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, December 14, 1908," 85.

<sup>52</sup>Hardinge, "Report on Visit to the Emperor of Russia, June 1908" *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 244.

March 1908, he said, "The Russian Government in this showed the cloven hoof."<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, in a report by the Austrian ambassador in London about a conversation with Hardinge, the ambassador wrote that Hardinge "did not appear to have an especially high opinion of Izvolskii."<sup>54</sup>

One of the most vocal opponents of friendship with Russia, however, was Sir Cecil Spring Rice. He did not enjoy his time in St. Petersburg. Even though he left to be British minister in Teheran in 1906, he continued to speak out against any sort of entente between Great Britain and Russia.<sup>55</sup> In a letter to Grey in 1906, he wrote, "The Russians are a strange people; very persistent in a dull sort of way; willing to sacrifice everything to avenge their wrongs, loving destruction, and very amenable to the guidance of those who once get control over them."<sup>56</sup> After the signing of the Convention in 1907, he felt the need to warn Grey. "It is possible," he wrote, "that Russia will use the agreement as she used the agreement with Japan about Korea, in order to carry her old designs under a new cover."<sup>57</sup> Talks between Russia and Great Britain did continue, though, and just how far Anglo-Russian relations had come became evident with the advent of the Bosnian Crisis.

There occurred no major internal changes or upheavals in Austria-Hungary in 1905, but the Austrians soon found themselves reacting to the changes in Great Britain and Russia. Because Austria-Hungary was essentially the personal domain of one family, most of the power was inherently vested in the position of the emperor, despite the presence of two imperial legislatures--one in Vienna and one in Buda-Pest. At the time of the Bosnian Crisis, the emperor was Franz Josef. He ascended to the throne at the age of seventeen upon the abdication of his uncle Ferdinand in 1848, when revolutions were

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<sup>53</sup>Ibid, "Letter to Sir Arthur Nicolson, March 17, 1908," 236.

<sup>54</sup> Count Albert Mensdorff, "Privatschreiben aus London, 26. Juni 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 9.

<sup>55</sup>Nielson, 42.

<sup>56</sup>Spring Rice, 56.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid, 105.

convulsing much of Europe. As one of Franz Josef's first acts as emperor, he ordered the suppression of the national movements within the empire. Due to his swift action against the uprisings and the successes of his generals on the battlefield, he earned the reputation for being a reactionary for the duration of his sixty-eight-year reign. In reality, he was simply trying to hold the empire together. Everywhere he turned, he saw his power eroding away and his options dwindling. Personally, as his reign progressed, he grew more and more distant from those around him, even though he was one of the most respected monarchs in Europe. He rarely took anyone into his confidence. About him his own son wrote, "Our emperor has no friends, his character, his being, does not allow it."<sup>58</sup> Austria's political losses, which Franz Josef took as personal disappointments, seem to have embittered the emperor, but they also made him more determined to keep what was left of his power. Denied influence in Italy and Germany, Franz Josef turned to the south and east, toward the Balkans and the ailing Ottoman Empire.<sup>59</sup> Unfortunately, Russia had also turned her attention toward the Balkans, and relations between the two empires quickly became strained.

The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 had ended the Russo-Turkish War, creating the principality of Bulgaria under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. The Danubian principalities achieved independence as Romania, and the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by Austria-Hungary. Russia and Austria-Hungary became rivals in the Balkans, and they constantly maneuvered for position in the region. Bulgaria, for instance, was not on good terms with either Serbia or Greece, which played nicely into the hands of the Austrians, who used the conflict among the three to give them an excuse to interfere in the area. They hoped to gain influence ultimately as far south as the

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<sup>58</sup> Emperor Franz Josef, *Meine liebe, gute Freundin! Die Briefe Kaiser Franz Josefs an Katharina Schratt*, ed. Brigitte Hamann (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1992), 15.

<sup>59</sup>Bridge, 9.

Aegean.<sup>60</sup> Russia as well had no trouble finding a sympathetic ear in Sofia. Serbia, for its part, objected greatly to the Austrian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Austria dominated the area economically so that the Serbs had no choice but to keep good relations. In 1906, eighty-nine percent of Serbian exports went to Austria-Hungary, and sixty percent of Serbian imports came from Austria.<sup>61</sup> In addition, the Austrians and Russians became quite adept at manipulating the rivalry between the Obrenovitch and Karageorgevitch families for the Serbian throne. The Serbs, however, increasingly began to believe in pan-Slavism, an idea which emphasized the unity of the Slavic peoples, and because it permeated deep into Russian political thought as well, they increasingly began to look to Russia for protection.<sup>62</sup>

Izvol'skii's counterpart in Vienna was Baron Alois von Aehrenthal. He was ambassador to Russia until 1906, and he was minister for foreign affairs from 1906 to 1912. His autocratic beliefs mirrored those of Franz Josef, and he did not welcome challenges to his authority. He did not even wish those under him to express their own opinions. Aehrenthal was energetic, driven, and extremely ambitious.<sup>63</sup> When he took the office of foreign minister in 1906, Aehrenthal favorably impressed W. E. Goschen, the British ambassador to Austria-Hungary, who remarked upon his "invariable courtesy and good temper in the transaction of affairs."<sup>64</sup> The interests of Austria were always in the forefront of Aehrenthal's foreign policy. He believed Austria-Hungary's best chance for survival was in the Triple Alliance, and he resented Great Britain's attempts to isolate Germany, her only strong ally. Austria-Hungary needed Germany. Economically and

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<sup>60</sup>Sir Geroge Buchanan, "General Report on Bulgaria for the Year 1906," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series F, vol. 15, 33.

<sup>61</sup>J. B. Whitehead, "General Report on the Kingdom of Serbia for the Year 1906," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series F, vol. 16, 209.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid, 209.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid, 20-22.

<sup>64</sup>W. E. Goschen, "Report on Austro-Hungarian Affairs for the Year 1906," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series F, vol. 34, 135.

militarily, the empire had fallen behind. In 1907, the Austrians had acquired a massive national debt, and whereas practically every other nation in Europe posted sizable increases in both imports and exports, Austrian exports only barely increased. Aehrenthal felt that the entente with a powerful Russia was also important, at least before the Bosnian Crisis, but in 1906, he still considered Russia a potential enemy.<sup>65</sup>

With regard to Austria-Hungary's foreign policy, there were many who noted that the imperial Austrian eagle also had two heads. Goschen wrote about Austrian foreign policy, "When one endeavours to consider it as a whole, to discover its general trend, and disentangle the aims and objects of those responsible for it, everything becomes nebulous and indistinct."<sup>66</sup> Outwardly, the Triple Alliance was quite formidable. The Austrian government insisted that relations were as they should be, but there was unrest within Austria-Hungary. A bloc opposed the alliance as detrimental to Austrian power. Austria, they argued, was too dependent on Germany, and their own interests were being drowned out by their powerful neighbor. However, Austria-Hungary needed Germany and was in no position to oppose Berlin. Italy was a different matter. There was still tension between Austria and Italy over Venetia and Lombardy, and an armed clash was still a possibility in 1908.<sup>67</sup> From the British point of view, Austro-Russian relations in 1907 were "harmonious and friendly."<sup>68</sup> Izvolskii may have wanted to cooperate with Aehrenthal as far as possible, but Nicolson was firm in his belief that as long as Izvolskii was Russian foreign minister, Russia would never cast her lot with Austria or go against the wishes of the other great powers.<sup>69</sup> At the same time, the Austrians noted the "cooling" of their

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<sup>65</sup>Bridge, 290.

<sup>66</sup>Goschen, "Report on Austro-Hungarian Affairs for the Year 1906," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series F, vol. 34, 122.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid, 123.

<sup>68</sup>Nicolson, "Russia, Annual Report, 1907," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 84.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid, 84.

relationship with Russia<sup>70</sup> The Russians as well commented on the fact that their relationship had "changed."<sup>71</sup> Aehrenthal had miscalculated the threat the Russians posed. He did not see the Anglo-Russian Convention as an attempt by Russia to achieve a manner of peace, but rather as a means of tipping the balance of power away from Germany. Russia was economically and militarily more powerful than Austria-Hungary, and for the Austrians, this translated into a major menace. During the Bosnian Crisis, Aehrenthal's difficulties in dealing with Russia stemmed from his misunderstanding of the situation as well as the confusion caused by the lack of clarity within the Russian government.

The period from 1905 to 1907 laid a lot of the foundation for what would happen in 1908 and beyond. Russia underwent massive upheaval, both social and political. This instability caused problems for nations such as Great Britain and Austria-Hungary in striving to define their foreign policies toward Russia. However, British perceptions of Russia and fear of Germany as well as misunderstandings over the Anglo-Russian Convention led to heightened tensions going into 1908. Just as both parties to the Franco-Russian alliance expected different things from the agreement, both Great Britain and Russia read the Anglo-Russian Convention differently. Grey wanted a way to bind Russia, which he saw as aggressive and potentially threatening. Stolypin and Izvolskii wanted a way out of conflict with the British in Asia. The Austrians, perhaps more understandably, also saw Russia as a threat, and this perception strained Austro-Russian relations as it had complicated Anglo-Russian relations. Going into the Bosnian Crisis, Grey and Aehrenthal formulated their foreign policies very differently, but they both ran into difficulty when they discovered that their perceptions of Russia were inconsistent with reality.

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<sup>70</sup>Count Joseph Somssich, "Telegram aus Rom, 3. Oktober 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 126.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid, Karl Fürsterburg. "Telegram aus St. Petersburg, 23. Mai 1908," 7. .

### Chapter III Fateful Decisions

An ever-present problem in British foreign policy had been finding the balance between involvement and isolation. For most of the nineteenth century, Great Britain had enjoyed "splendid isolation," but Sir Edward Grey felt that the time had come when isolation was no longer possible. British power depended on action and Grey believed in an active diplomacy. He wrote in his memoirs:

It was only an island such as Britain that could safely afford to embark on diplomatic crusades. To continental countries, these British efforts were often inconvenient, as in the case of Turkish reforms, and they were often resented, because they were not understood. They often ran counter to obvious British interests, but this did not predispose foreign Governments to think them sincere. On the contrary, it stimulated them to search deeply for some concealed motive, though the true one lay on the surface before their eyes. It was no wonder then, that in some instances, these efforts of British Governments resulted in friction and futility. Their endeavours brought upon them the obstruction and dislike of foreign Governments, and their want of success exposed them to the criticisms of those at home, whose earnest and conscious recitude of purpose made them too impatient to reckon or to allow for the difficulties that had to be encountered.<sup>1</sup>

During the Bosnian Crisis, Grey remained committed to his policies, regardless of the criticism he received from some at home and from foreign nations such as Austria-Hungary and Germany. Perhaps the most telling word in his quotation is "crusade." From the British point of view, such campaigns were necessary to ensure the peace. From the Russian perspective, they were perhaps not so vital. The year 1908 opened with the usual diplomatic difficulties. Austria-Hungary and Russia struggled over the agreement respecting Macedonia, and Great Britain attempted to mediate. Grey admitted that the issue really had nothing to do with British interests, but public opinion demanded that something be done about the plight of the Christians under Ottoman rule.<sup>2</sup> It was a

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<sup>1</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 189.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, 67.

delicate situation. The unrest there had turned bloody: one hundred fourteen Bulgars and Greeks murdered in the first four months of 1908.<sup>3</sup> Grey, above all else, wanted an agreement which included all the powers. "It would be most unfortunate," he said in a speech to Parliament, "if individual Powers in the Concert were to become more concerned with their relations to each other than they were with the problems of Macedonian reform. That would change the concert from an instrument of Macedonian reform...into a diplomatic manoeuvring ground."<sup>4</sup> By the summer of 1908, Grey's fears had been realized. All of the great powers wanted a resolution, but none of them wanted to sacrifice their own interests in the area or invite the disfavor of the sultan. The Austrians, who had their own proposals as well as their own agenda for the area met with strong opposition from the Russians, who did include cloaked threats with their proposals.<sup>5</sup> Both Austria-Hungary and Russia rejected the initial British suggestions for judicial reform, but in explaining why, "neither of them preferred their real objections."<sup>6</sup> The opinion of many Britons was that the Austrians really did not want the situation in Macedonia to stabilize because it would have been more difficult to expand their influence in the Balkans. Russia likewise was in the position of either defending the Turks or supporting her fellow Slavs. An agreement either way would undermine Russian credibility in the region. Grey compared the whole situation to a bog. All the powers were "stuck there, bickering with one another."<sup>7</sup>

However, before the final resolution could be signed, The Young Turk Revolution broke out in the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks, a group of students and military

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<sup>3</sup> Sir G. Lowther, "Annual Report for Turkey for the Year 1908," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, eds. G. P. Gooch, Harold Temperley, vol. V (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928), 285.

<sup>4</sup> Sir Edward Grey, *Speeches*, 85.

<sup>5</sup> Baron Alois von Aehrenthal, "Telegram nach St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 16.

<sup>6</sup> Sir N. O'Connor, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, February 18, 1908," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 229.

<sup>7</sup> Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 168.



officers, succeeded in forcing the sultan to adopt a constitutional government. France and Great Britain, who hoped for positive reform, welcomed it favorably at first. Grey himself was very enthusiastic about the prospects. "For a moment," he said, "the subject races in European Turkey seemed to lose their hatred for the Turk and for each other."<sup>8</sup> The government of the sultan was universally considered corrupt and outdated. British policy encouraged the new reforms as much as possible, without endangering relations with Russia. Grey believed that a liberal Turkish government would go a long way toward solving the problems in the area. "What has happened already in Turkey is so marvelous" he wrote, "that I suppose it is not impossible that she will establish a Constitution...."<sup>9</sup> A constitution would have been a major step in the right direction according to the British, who would have liked to see a strong Turkey as a stabilizing force. Many in the Russian government, however, did not share Great Britain's enthusiasm. With regard to the revolution, Izvolskii doubted "whether the people would be able to carry out such a drastic change."<sup>10</sup> The prospect of a strong Ottoman Empire frightened many Russians when they thought about the Caucasus and the Crimea, formerly Ottoman possessions. The British also suspected that a powerful Turkey would have also overturned much of Russia's Balkan policy, and in addition, it made the chances of Russia getting concessions related to the Turkish Straits even more remote.

The circumstances also made the Austrians uneasy. It also complicated their Balkan policy as well, and threatened to undermine their influence. Aehrenthal wanted some amount of stability so that Austria-Hungary would have "a fair field and be able, in legitimate competition with other countries, to extract what profit she could from her favorable geographical position."<sup>11</sup> However, he was most uneasy for other reasons. The

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid, 168.

<sup>9</sup>Grey, "Letter to Sir G. Lowther, August 11, 1908," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 266.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid, Sir G. Lowther, "Annual Report for Turkey for the year 1908," 273.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid, W. E. Goschen, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, October, 4, 1908," 382.

Sanjak of Novibazar, a strip of land between Serbia and Montenegro and occupied by Austria-Hungary, was instrumental to the Austrians' plan for a railway into the Balkans and economic dominance of the area.<sup>12</sup> There were also Turkish troops garrisoned very close to the Austrian border. "What do our troops do," he asked, "if 'old' and 'young' Turks start fighting in front of them or if it comes to a massacre of Christians by the Muslims?"<sup>13</sup> Unfortunately for France and Great Britain, the new government was very much like the old, and as the revolution began to lose its direction, Austria-Hungary proceeded according to plan.

A day before Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, Bulgaria declared independence. The press in Great Britain widely reported that Austria-Hungary secretly supported Bulgaria, and that the Austrians had encouraged the Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand to declare independence. They intended, perhaps, to use the Bulgarian declaration as a distraction. Austria-Hungary was also suspected of sowing discord between Bulgaria and Serbia in order to guard against any sort of anti-Austrian alliance. "Ever since the Customs Union Treaty of 1905 suffered shipwreck at her hands," wrote Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador in Istanbul. "Austria has directed her policy to keeping Servia and Bulgaria as far as possible apart."<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile, Prince Ferdinand confided in Aehrenthal that he considered Belgrade "a home of criminals that should be destroyed."<sup>15</sup> The Russians naturally looked upon this arrangement with dismay, and made it a priority to split Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Izvol'skii spoke of forming the exact sort of bloc which Austria feared, saying that, "if it could be managed for Bulgaria and Servia to come to an understanding and to keep in

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<sup>12</sup> Johann Pallavicini, "Schreiben nach Aehrenthal, 12. August 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 35.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid, "Schreiben nach Semmering, 4. August 1908," 19.

<sup>14</sup>Sir George Buchanan, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, November 9, 1909," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 489. "Servia" is the British spelling.

<sup>15</sup>Aehrenthal, "Bericht auf eine Überredung mit Fürst Ferdinand, 14. März 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 2.

intimate relations with Turkey, a barrier could be raised against Austrian aggression."<sup>16</sup> The Turks, however, were against even mentioning Bulgaria at a planned conference, having been "embittered" by the declaration of independence and subsequent annexation.<sup>17</sup> The British, even at this point, worried about the consequences of defending Russia, but nonetheless, they supported Russia in this policy, Nicholson and Grey vowing to be on guard against possible Russian plans for the Balkan states.

On October 6, 1908, Austria-Hungary finally announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was not a monumental coup on the part of the Austrian government. Austrian troops had occupied the territories since 1877, and Austrian officials had been talking about the impending annexation openly for months.<sup>18</sup> The change was merely on paper, but the announcement had implications beyond the Balkans. To Grey, it struck at the very foundation of the European peace. He commented:

To us, the territorial changes were indifferent: it mattered not to us that Austria should annex instead of merely occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina; but besides sympathy with the new hope in Turkey, we felt that the arbitrary alteration of a European Treaty by one Power without consent of other Powers who were parties to it struck at the root of all good international order.<sup>19</sup>

The annexation was a blow to Turkish morale and threatened, in the view of the British, to destabilize the region even more. Great Britain demanded that the Ottoman Empire be compensated and that the question be discussed at an international conference called specifically for the purpose. From the Austrian point of view, the British support for the Ottoman Empire was an attempt to gain sympathy from the Muslim world, which "was

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<sup>16</sup>Nicholson, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, March 31, 1909," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 767.

<sup>17</sup>Pallavicini, "Telegram aus Konstantinopel, 14. Oktober 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 213.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid, Aehrenthal, "Schreiben nach Baron von Beck, 7. August 1908," 24.

<sup>19</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 169.

more important to the British Empire than any alliance."<sup>20</sup> Given the number of Muslims in Asia and Africa under British rule, Aehrenthal had some ground for making this remark. Austria flatly refused a conference at any rate, saying that they "could not allow annexation to be called into question or made subject of discussion." and that "Turkey has already been compensated, and that of any other territorial compensation in any other direction there can be no question whatever."<sup>21</sup> The Austrians did not see their actions as a violation of the thirty-year-old Treaty of Berlin, but rather as its fulfillment.<sup>22</sup>

To make matters worse, Grey and the rest of the European leaders soon discovered that Izvolskii had been in negotiations with Aehrenthal over the Balkans. At a secret meeting in Buchlau in September of 1908, Aehrenthal told Izvolskii that Russia was a "loyal friend and neighbor."<sup>23</sup> At this meeting, Izvolskii agreed to the annexation if Austria-Hungary would support Russia's attempt to gain access to the Turkish Straits for her Black Sea fleet. However, Izvolskii was left to explain to the Russian people why Austria-Hungary had been allowed to gain the advantage in the Balkans. According to Nicolson, it put Russia in an "undignified and unworthy position."<sup>24</sup> In reality, Izvolskii discovered that the Straits were not such a pressing issue any more in Russia, that pan-Slavic feeling was high, and that the absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a slap in the face for Russia.<sup>25</sup> The question in the Russian papers was, "Has Mr. Izvolskii betrayed the Slavs?"<sup>26</sup> Seen from the Austrian point of view, however, Aehrenthal had not double-crossed Izvolskii. Russia had formally agreed

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<sup>20</sup>Mensdorff, "Bericht aus London, 3. November 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 373.

<sup>21</sup>Goschen, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, October 28, 1908," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series F, vol. 34, 471.

<sup>22</sup>Aehrenthal, "Kabinetbericht, 19. August 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 43.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid, "Bericht auf eine Überredung mit Herr Izvolskii, 16. September 1908," 86.

<sup>24</sup>Nicolson in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series A, vol 5. 368.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, Sir Fairfax Cartwright, "Austria-Hungary, Annual Report, 1908," Series F, vol. 34, 272.

<sup>26</sup>Count Loepold von Berchtold, "Bericht aus St. Petersburg, 18. Oktober 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 252.

to support the move by Austria-Hungary to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. Just like the British, however, the Austrians had miscalculated. They decided to appease the Russians by giving up the Sanjak of Novibazar, but they maintained the right to continue with the railway project into Turkey and to keep troops there for that reason. They also refused to allow the region to be divided between Serbia and Montenegro. Giving the two nations a common border, Aehrenthal believed, would allow them to conspire more easily against Austria-Hungary.<sup>27</sup> Aehrenthal had spelled out the situation to Izvolskii in Buchlau. The Austrians were therefore bewildered when the Russians denounced the annexation.<sup>28</sup> The government in St. Petersburg wanted Austria-Hungary to cease the railway project which, according to Aehrenthal, would continue regardless. For the Russians, this was a "red flag." The Sanjak railway and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina gave Austria too much power in the Balkans.<sup>29</sup> Just what the Russians would do about the situation though was cause for much speculation. Aehrenthal, in attempting to get approval from Russia beforehand, perceived more of a Russian threat than there actually was. He only succeeded in embittering Izvolskii toward him and ruining Austro-Russian relations.<sup>30</sup>

This latest incident made it obvious to the British that Russian diplomacy had not turned over a new leaf, as they had hoped and expected. Nicolson wrote in early 1909 that Russian foreign relations were "a modified form of her previous policy."<sup>31</sup> Izvolskii had focused Russian policy back on eastern Europe, and from a British standpoint, this meant business as usual. Talk of a Balkan Union began to create great apprehension. A visit to St. Petersburg by the King of Serbia very shortly after the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina fueled much speculation. Both Serbia and Montenegro

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid, Aehrenthal, "Bericht, 9. August 1908," 28.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid, Khevenhüller, "Telegram aus Paris, 6. Oktober 1908," 142.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid, Pallavicini, "Report aus Konstantinopel, 9. Oktober 1908," 174.

<sup>30</sup>McDonald, 142.

<sup>31</sup>Nicolson, "Russia, Annual Report, 1908," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, 195.

increasingly looked to Russia for protection, and Nicolson reported that Izvolskii assured them of "the full sympathy and diplomatic support of Russia on behalf of their interests," which meant that the Russians would support the Serbs and the Montenegrins in their grievances with Austria-Hungary.<sup>32</sup> While there was no indication on the part of Izvolskii that Russia would endanger the peace, it was still a matter of some concern. The British perceptions were still that the Russian bear was only hibernating. Izvolskii's secret pact with Aehrenthal reinforced this feeling. The British considered it a serious breach of trust for the same reasons they were outraged at Austria-Hungary's actions. By agreeing *de facto* to the annexation, Izvolskii made Russia party to Austria's violation of the Treaty of Berlin. Grey believed that no nation had the right to alter the status quo without the consent of all parties involved.<sup>33</sup> In fact, Stolypin and the other Russian ministers were just as upset with Izvolskii as Grey, rejecting calls for a conference and bringing the matter to a close.<sup>34</sup> However, the damage to Russia's image had already been done. Furthermore, reports coming out of Persia suggested that the Russian government was not on the path to enlightenment. Russian officers were actively suppressing the Persian constitution in the Russian sphere of influence, and Cossacks were brought in to put down nationalist uprisings. According to Grey, it "created an unfavorable effect on public opinion."<sup>35</sup> Despite these incidents, however, Grey remained committed to the conciliatory course he had chosen, because he felt it was his only choice. He had to maintain the Anglo-Russian entente.

Through British perseverance, in January 1909, Austria-Hungary finally agreed to compensate Turkey financially by taking on part of the Turkish debt in the hopes that the Turks would agree to recognize the Bosnian annexation and Bulgarian independence.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid, 211.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid, 204.

<sup>34</sup>McDonald, 142.

<sup>35</sup>Grey, *Tewnty-Five Years*, 174.

<sup>36</sup>Aehrenthal, "Telegram nach Salonika, 28. Oktober 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 336.

The problem of the Straits, however, remained. Izvolskii was anxious to make up for what most everyone considered a sizable blunder, and so he made an appeal to Grey which was accompanied by a kind of threat. Izvolskii indicated not only to Grey but also to Hardinge that if he did not salvage something out of the situation, he and the rest of the Russian cabinet would most likely be replaced. Because Nicholas was not very fond of Stolypin, "there would be serious danger for the Anglo-Russian Convention, and for friendly relations between England and Russia."<sup>37</sup> Interestingly enough, Grey mentioned that Izvolskii may have allowed himself to be compromised by Aehrenthal in order to elicit sympathy from the other powers. After everything that had happened, he had trouble trusting Russia. The question on everyone's mind, including the Austrians, was "What will the Russians now do?" Count Mensdorff, the Austrian ambassador in London, felt that the primary concern just two days after the announcement of the annexation was the prevention of a war.<sup>38</sup> Grey was faced with a dilemma, saying of Izvolskii's entreaty, "I had foreseen from the very beginning that, if we were to maintain friendly relations with Russia, we must abandon the policy of blocking her access to the sea."<sup>39</sup>

There were complications, however. First, Turkey was still reeling from the Bosnian annexation and from Bulgarian independence. By opening the question of the Straits, Grey felt that it would have been another blow to Turkish morale, and that was something to which he was not willing to consent at the moment. Indeed, Turkey was wary of Russia's friendly overtures, suspicious that it was not good will but strategic maneuvering.<sup>40</sup> The other problem was that opening the Straits outright would enable foreign warship to enter the Black Sea at any time and threaten Russian ports. Grey

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<sup>37</sup>Hardinge, "Letter to Sir Arthur Nicolson, October 13, 1908" in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 434

<sup>38</sup>Mensdorff, "Telegram aus London, 8. Oktober 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 162.

<sup>39</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 172.

<sup>40</sup>Nicolson, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, October 8, 1908," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 410.

assessed the situation correctly when he said. "This would not suit Russia at all, and would in fact be very disagreeable to her."<sup>41</sup> The difficulty came in working out an acceptable agreement. Grey and Izvolskii were of the opinion that an international conference should be called, but not everyone could concur on what exactly should be discussed. Izvolskii, in an attempt to save face, wanted to discuss the Straits.<sup>42</sup> The Turks wanted talks limited to Bosnia and Bulgaria. The Austrians refused to discuss either.<sup>43</sup> For Aehrenthal, the matter of a conference in order to renegotiate the terms of the Treaty of Berlin was another perplexing situation. Only weeks before, he could report with every confidence that Izvolskii was "not very sympathetic to the idea of a conference."<sup>44</sup> Russia had gone from total agreement to the annexation to total opposition in a very short period of time, creating a seemingly difficult diplomatic situation for Austria-Hungary. Over the next few weeks, Russia and Great Britain discussed the matter of the Straits repeatedly. Grey was always open but guarded, agreeing "in principle that some opening of the Straits was reasonable."<sup>45</sup> In the end, the interested parties concluded that Russia would not bring the matter up in a general conference but rather negotiate directly with Turkey. The proposal which took shape entailed access to the Straits for those countries which bordered the Black Sea during times of peace and when Turkey was a neutral. Izvolskii was "partially, though not completely, satisfied," and the issue was "for a time allowed to rest."<sup>46</sup> The troubles, however, were far from over.

In the early months of 1909, relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia completely broke down. The Serbs were outraged by the annexation of Bosnia and

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<sup>41</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 172.

<sup>42</sup>Aehrenthal, "Telegram nach St. Petersburg, 14. Oktober 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 215.

<sup>43</sup>Nicolson, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, October 8, 1908," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 411.

<sup>44</sup>Aehrenthal, "Bericht auf eine Überredung mit Izvolskii, 16. September 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 90.

<sup>45</sup>Grey, in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 441.

<sup>46</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 179.



Herzegovina. The announcement resulted in immediate mobilization by Serbian regiments totaling 110,000 men.<sup>47</sup> A message was sent to Vienna calling the extension of Franz Josef's sovereignty over the provinces a "new and flagrant violation carried out unilaterally in virtue of the right of the strongest, in pursuance of the satisfaction of his own interests only and in disregard of the profound injury done thereby to the sentiments, interests, and rights of the Servian people."<sup>48</sup> The Serbs also demanded compensation in two parts: "1. The Grant of a concession for a railway to the Adriatic such as his government has already applied to the Ottoman Government and 2. A rectification of the Servian frontier on the side of Bosnia."<sup>49</sup>

The British were momentarily at a loss. Grey was very uncomfortable in backing Russia, which, in turn, supported Serbia and Montenegro. He wanted to avoid a war at all costs, but he had to maintain the entente. Grey advised the Serbian foreign minister Milovanovic that the Austrians would most likely reject their demands, which, of course, they did, and as the weeks progressed, the situation became critical. Grey wrote, "Serbia was obstinate and headstrong. Austria was haughty, hard, and stern."<sup>50</sup> Neither appeared willing to concede anything. Serbia continued mobilizations, the legislature voting for an increase of sixteen million francs in military spending and calling up the army reserves. There were also violent public demonstrations and demands for war with Austria-Hungary.<sup>51</sup> Austria-Hungary further complicated matters by ordering a partial mobilization along the Serbian and Russian frontiers simultaneously with the announcement of the annexation. They increased the number of troops on their southern

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<sup>47</sup>Otto Franz, "Telegram aus Belgrad, 7. October 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 147.

<sup>48</sup>J. B. Whitehead, "General Report on the Kingdom of Servia for the Year 1908," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series F, vol. 16, 318.

<sup>49</sup>Grey, "Letter to J. B. Whitehead, October 10, 1908," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 423-424.

<sup>50</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 180.

<sup>51</sup>J. B. Whitehead, "General Report on the Kingdom of Servia for the Year 1908," in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Series F, vol. 16, 318.

border alone by a total of 64,000 men.<sup>52</sup> Austria maintained that the measures were "purely defensive," but Serbia and Russia were inclined otherwise. Izvolskii suggested that Austria-Hungary might go so far as to occupy Belgrade, the Serbian capital.<sup>53</sup> Russia, perhaps unwisely, took the liberty of partially mobilizing along the Austrian border as well.<sup>54</sup>

In light of these developments, the British and the Austrians entered into a self-fulfilling prophecy. They saw Russia as the arbiter of Europe's fate, and as a result, Russia became just that. Grey wrote to Nicolson, "Russia cannot now any longer delay deciding whether she will support Serbia in the event of war, or whether, when the moment for decisive action arrives, she will tell Serbia that she finds it impossible to support her demands, as being contrary to the interests of peace."<sup>55</sup> Later, he wrote, "The probability is that if Russia had told Serbia from the first that she must not expect more than economic concessions, the situation never would have become as dangerous, and Russia would have emerged with the credit of having done, at any rate, something for Serbia."<sup>56</sup> Grey feared that any potential war would not remain confined to the Balkans and was thus a concern for all the European powers, but he made it evident from these statements that only Russia was in a position to decide the scope of the war. If she did not support Serbia, and Serbia went to war anyway, then the confrontation would most likely be confined to a small geographic area. If, on the other hand, she went to war with Austria, then Germany and France would most definitely be pulled in, and Great Britain as well.

Others shared Grey's opinion. Nicolson considered Russia's position "the governing factor in the whole problem." He believed that if Austria attacked Serbia,

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<sup>52</sup>Aehrenthal, "Bericht, 10. September 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 82.

<sup>53</sup>Nicolson, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, November 9, 1908," in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 476.

<sup>54</sup>Prince Bülow, "Privatschreiben, 30. Oktober 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 343.

<sup>55</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 181.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid*, 181.

Russia's indignation would result in swift action, and if Germany were to become involved. "Russia would not hesitate to take up the glove."<sup>57</sup> France feared Russian involvement because of the nature of her alliance with Russia. She would be obliged to mobilize against Austria-Hungary and Germany should Russia be attacked.<sup>58</sup> As for Germany, if Russia seriously threatened Austria-Hungary, she would not hesitate to "draw her sword and come to the assistance of her Ally."<sup>59</sup> Demonstrating such a claim, Germany gave Russia an ultimatum to accept the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or suffer the consequences. Izvolskii said to Mensdorff that he wanted to "avoid above all a division of Europe into two camps."<sup>60</sup> Izvolskii did not fail to recognize how powerful a position Russia was in, but St. Petersburg was unwilling to act. In February 1914, Peter Durnovo, a member of Russia's State Council, wrote a memorandum which in many ways reflected the attitude of the Stolypin government in 1908. He stated basically, that a war with Germany was extremely undesirable and that Russia would be "flung into hopeless anarchy, the issue of which cannot be foreseen."<sup>61</sup> In the spring of 1909, acting on such theories, Russia backed down, and Serbia, suddenly without any support, did the same. The Russians finally and unconditionally recognized the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia suffered deep humiliation and loss of prestige, especially in the Balkans. It appeared that she had bowed to the will of the German Empire, which irrevocably soured relations between the two empires and effectively created the two camps Izvolskii had feared. While Great Britain and Russia went into the crisis on cordial terms but nothing more, Great Britain came out calling Russia her "friend."<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>Nicolson, "Letter to Sir Edward Grey, February 24, 1909" in *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 622-623.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid, 737.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid, 684.

<sup>60</sup>Mensdorff, "Bericht aus London, 16. Oktober 1908," in *Aussenpolitik*, 231.

<sup>61</sup> Peter N. Durnovo, "Durnovo's Memorandum, February 1914," in *Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917*, ed. Basil Dmytryshyn (Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press, 1974), 464.

<sup>62</sup>Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 183.

Despite such amiable language, the British found themselves bound to the course they were not sure they wished to follow. The Russians never intended to go to war. There is no indication, however, that Grey ever knew or even suspected this, not even when writing his memoirs seventeen years later. In spite of the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War and Russia's new willingness to come to terms with Great Britain, the old notions of Russia as the aggressive, belligerent power never fully died. For the sake of peace, Grey felt he had to maintain the entente. Aehrenthal, of course, did not seek entente with the Russians. Indeed, he chose the opposite strategy. However, in doing so, the Austrians prepared for a threat which had very little substance. Austro-Russian relations fell apart, and animosities grew.

## **Conclusion Historical Ironies**

The Bosnian Crisis was a significant step toward World War I. British and Austrian perceptions of Russia as a threatening, aggressive power led to foreign policy decisions which exacerbated tensions during and after the crisis. Granted, Russia was not completely innocent of misapprehension. Izvolskii's insistence on acting independently of the rest of the government, the lack of coordination within the Russian government, and the tension between Stolypin and Nicholas presented a picture of disorganization and volatility to the other nations of Europe. However, the actions of Grey and Aehrenthal to deal with Russia effectively were often in vain.

Europe's troubles did not end in the year 1908. On October 18, 1912, after several years of relative calm, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece instigated the First Balkan War. Earlier, in March, Serbia and Bulgaria had signed a secret treaty, dividing most of European Turkey between them. Faced with the three nations' combined armies, the Ottoman Empire did lose almost all of her European possessions. The fighting stopped in December, but, the Treaty of London, ending the hostilities, was not signed until May, 1913. Greece received the coveted port city of Salonika, angering Bulgaria and Serbia. The treaty created an independent Albania, disregarding the claims of Serbia and Greece, and Bulgaria received most of Macedonia, which all three claimed. The division of the Sanjak of Novibazar between Montenegro and Serbia closed the gap between the two states, realizing Austrian fears and blocking further access to the Balkans. The Second Balkan War began less than a year later, in June 1913, when the Bulgars turned against their former allies. A coalition consisting of Serbia, Greece, Turkey, and Romania quickly defeated Bulgaria, and all the territorial compensations made in the aftermath of the fighting were at her expense. The infamous incident in Sarajevo in 1914, simply a

continuation of the unrest inherent in the region, occurred less than a year after the end of the second war.

After Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination, events moved quickly. Serbia refused Austria's July ultimatum, and Franz Josef declared war. As a result, Russia mobilized against both Austria-Hungary and Germany. German declarations of war on Russia and France followed, throwing the bulk of their forces westward. By 1914, Great Britain had joined the Franco-Russian Alliance, and when the Germans invaded Belgium, the British entered the conflict. The war that everyone had expended enormous amounts of energy to avoid had begun. The frightening parallels between 1908 and 1914 did not go unnoticed by Grey years later. He wrote in his memoirs, "In 1908 as in 1914, Austria acted without full consultation of her ally. In 1908 as in 1914, Germany, while deprecating the headstrong character of Austria's actions, thought it necessary to support her Ally. In 1909 as in 1914, Russia felt herself challenged to support Serbia."<sup>1</sup> In 1914, however, Russia did not back down. She could not afford another humiliation, such as the diplomatic defeat handed to her by the Austrians and Germans in 1908. The costs in loss of prestige and diplomatic power had been too high. Grey, though, did not blame Russia entirely. As far as he was concerned, Austria-Hungary and Germany were equally at fault.

The results of the First World War were disastrous for Europe. Three separate royal dynasties fell. The Treaty of Versailles redrew the map of the continent. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia suspended normal relations with other nations for several years. Because of the Russians premature exit from the war, Russia also lost a considerable amount of territory in Europe. Germany suffered a complete economic collapse and ultimately became a very weak republic much smaller than the Second Reich, and Austria-Hungary ceased to exist altogether. Through it all, instability prevailed, and resentments grew. One cannot help but be struck by the tragic irony of the situation. The

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Edward Grey, *Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1925), 186.

precise measures Austria-Hungary had taken to secure her continued survival as a power in Europe had been her very downfall. Reliance on Germany and diplomatic conjuring tricks helped to plunge Europe into war. Germany, ever since her creation, had feared encirclement by France and Russia. It seemed that all of Bismarck's attempts to isolate France had simply pushed Paris and St. Petersburg closer together once he was out of office. The Schlieffen Plan, Germany's vaulted offensive scheme to overcome fighting on two fronts, failed when put to the test.

There was a bigger irony, though, binding together the fates of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Russia's place in Europe defied definition. Foreign policies directed toward her had a habit of coming to naught. Great Britain came to an agreement with Russia, hoping to rein in some of her power and to make her part of the European balance. It was however, an agreement made in fear. Fear of Germany led the British to pursue an entente with the Russians. Fear of Russian power led them to hold the entente together at all costs. However, because the British had based their policy on misperceptions, they expected too much out of this agreement, and when Izvolskii secretly negotiated with Aehrenthal to subvert the Treaty of Berlin, it destroyed the very fragile trust between the two nations. Austria, which chose to work in opposition to Russia, fell victim to a simple misunderstanding as well. Izvolskii, for his part, agreed to the proposed annexation, not discerning Austria's true intentions in the Sanjak of Novibazar or understanding the significance of the Straits question in Russia. Aehrenthal, however, saw Russia as more of a threat than it was, and pursuing Russian compliance to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina while preparing for the threat of Russian attack embittered Izvolskii and ruined Austro-Russian relations thereafter.

Twice in six years, historical forces worked to make Russia the keeper of Europe's fate. The first time, she chose peace; the second, war. The irony of the situation is that both Austria-Hungary and Great Britain claimed to be working for European stability in their policies. Their misunderstanding of Russia's intentions, however, made any policy

they pursued unworkable. The Bosnian Crisis showed diplomats in capitals across the continent what was possible, as well as the shortcomings of their own diplomacy. Perhaps, if the nations of Europe had been able to set aside their fears, they might have worked out a better system and avoided a great deal of anguish. The situation is too complex, though, to ever know with certainty.

In light of the course European history has taken, the words of Sir Edward Grey are chillingly prophetic. He argued that powerful nations had great responsibilities, ones which reached beyond narrow self-interest, and it was when those responsibilities were ignored or disavowed that Europe fell into chaos. Russia's continuing efforts to define herself in Europe makes his argument resonate still. Foreign policy decisions often have unforeseen consequences, and even the best of intentions may turn out disastrously, especially when there is no black or white, only gray. His memoirs concluded, "These meditations of a moralist on public affairs are apt to become dreamy and far-fetched; perhaps these are so. Yet they may give rise to thoughts that are worth considering by all nations with great responsibilities, and they are not irrelevant to present realities and future contingencies."<sup>2</sup>

In the Balkans today the great powers have a chance to work out a rational solution to the ongoing conflict. The question of what Russia's role in that solution will be, however, has not been adequately answered. Russia's still very cordial relationship with Serbia, the main aggressor in the recent fighting, complicates efforts to punish those responsible for the most horrible atrocities. Russia's unstable political situation adds even more tangles to the crisis. There are many questions which remain to be answered. What will be Russia's relationship with NATO? What, if any at all, will be the function of Russian troops in the area? Can the other nations of Europe and the United States continue to count on Russia to put pressure on Serbia to comply with all the UN

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid, 188.



resolutions pertaining to the former Yugoslavia? Of course, the major difference today is the lack of colonial interests for the major powers, but those interests have been replaced by others. Time and technology have altered the world considerably. Colonial ties have evolved into financial, cultural, and political ties which can be just as binding. Interestingly enough, the same attitudes prevalent on Great Britain and Austria in 1908 persist today. Many western politicians and diplomats have based their decisions on their own perceptions of Russia rather than realities. In truth, the fall of Communism and the demise of the Soviet Union have not eased the threat seen by the leaders of other nations. Many view the expansion of NATO, for example, as an answer to this threat. True, Russia's domestic situation is very unstable and cause for concern, but what that means for the nations of Europe as well as for the United States is open to debate. Though ninety years have passed, it seems that just as in the case of the Bosnian Crisis in 1908, new developments in international relations have only served to bolster old ways of thinking.

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