Taking the Law into Our Hands: Trust, Social Capital and Vigilante Justice

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DEDICATION

¡Nunca se acaba, falta lo más hermoso todavía!

-Orinoco, Emilio Carballido

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

DEDICATION ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

LIST OF TABLES vii

LIST OF FIGURES viii

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION AND THEORY 1

Antecedents 3
Group Conflict 4
Culture 5
Social Hierarchy 6
Insecurity 7
Theory: Social Capital and Distrust in the Authorities as Determinants of the Emergence of ECLE 8
ECLE Incentives 8
Trust in the Law Enforcement of the State and ECLE 10
Social Capital and ECLE 15
Dissertation Structure 20

II. THE CASE OF CHERÁN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 24

The Origins of Vigilante Organizations 26
General Methods 28
Section 1: The Case of Cherán 31
Methods 35
Results 1: A Vigilante Movement in Three Acts 39
Results 2: A Strong Community in a Legitimacy Crisis 46
Section 2: Cherán in a Comparative Perspective 72
Method and Data Collection 77
Results 79
Conclusion 94

III. CONFRONTING CRIME BY OURSELVES: TRUST IN THE COMMUNITY, DISTRUST IN THE POLICE AND THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS THE AMERICAS 100

Confronting Crime as a Community 101
An Interactive Trust Hypothesis 103
Social Capital When the Authorities Cannot Be Trusted 106

Study 1: Collective Anti-Criminal Action in Mexico 108
Methods 109
Results 113
Study 2: Collective Anti-Crime Organization in Latin America and the Caribbean 118
Study 3: Collective Anti-Crime Organization and ECLE 124
Conclusion 128

IV. TRUST AND SUPPORT FOR COLLECTIVE VIGILANTISM: A VIGNETTE EXPERIMENT 131

Defining Vigilante Justice 133
Trust and Collective Vigilante Justice 135
Methods 138
Design and Validity 138
Sample 141
Treatments and Variable Operationalization 143
Results 145
Conclusion 148

V. TRUST AND VIGILANTE JUSTICE: A BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 152

Vigilante Justice 154
Defining Vigilantism 156
Costs and Benefits of Vigilantism 158
Study Design 161
Hypotheses 165
Methods 170
Data 173
Results 174
Conclusion 179

VI. CONCLUSION 181

Specific Theoretical Contributions 183
Policy Implications 184
General Implications 185
Why Is Vigilante Justice Like my Church's Soup-Kitchen? 185
Trust as a Social Mediator 186
Research Limitations and Avenues for Future Inquiry 187

Appendix

A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III 191

I. Question Wording 191
I.I Full Results from Table 1 194
II. Separating ENSI-2010 from ENSI-2011 195
III. Controlling for Occupation 197
IV. Does Insecurity Bounds the Interactive Trust Hypothesis? 199
V. Results for Hiring Private Security 201

VI. Lagged Variable Analysis Using Mexican Municipalities 203
VII. Moderating Effect of Social Capital over Citizens' Distrust in the Police. 214
VIII. Interactive effect of Trust in the Neighbors and Distrust in the Police as Determinants of Citizens' Willingness to Turn to their Neighbors for Justice. 215

B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV 216

I. Treatments 216
II. Unbalances with Respect to the General Population and the Interactive Trust Effect 219
III. Pre-Treatment Questionnaire 225

C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V 228

I. Analytic Results 228
II. Information Treatments 231
III. Sample Characteristics 233
IV. Pre-Game Questionnaire 235
V. Round Distribution 240
VI. Effects of Neighbors' Trustworthiness Over Police Untrustworthiness Conditions 241

REFERENCES 242

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

Table 1. Interactive Effect of Trust in the Neighbors and Distrust in the Police on the Probability of Engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action 114

Table 2. Interactive Effect of Trust in the Neighbors and Distrust in the Police on the Probability of Engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action 119

Table 3. Collective Anti-Crime Organization and Turning to the Neighbors for Justice 126

Table 4. OLS Estimates of the Treatment Effects and their Interaction 147

Table 5. Treatment Images 171

Table 6. Effect of Treatments on the Probability of Confronting the Thief 175

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

Figure 1. Trend in the Search for the Term “Vigilante” in Google....2

Figure 2. Support for Vigilantism in Mexico from 2004-2014.... 30

Figure 3. Geographical Localization of Cherán.... 32

Figure 4. Timeline of the Uprising of Cherán.... 40

Figures 5a.-5c. Municipal Elections in the Municipality of Cherán (Cherán-M).... 48

Figure 6. Nahuatzen and Cherán in Comparison.... 74

Figure 7. Community Groups in Cherán and Nahuatzen before 2011.... 81

Figures 8a.-8c.Insecurity, Crime, Ethnicity and Anti-Crime Organization 115

Figures 9a. and 9b. Marginal Effect of Trust in the Neighbors on Anti-Crime Organization as Moderated by Distrust in Law Enforcement.... 116

Figure 10. Sign Posted in the “Los Hornos” Neighborhood in the City of Santa Fe (Argentina).... 117

Figures 11a.-11c. Determinants of Anti-Crime Organization in Low Security Equilibrium Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.... 122

Figures 12a. and 12b. Effect of Trust in the Neighbors as Moderated by Distrust in the Police.... 122

Figures 13a. and 13b. Effect of Other Variables on Citizens’ Willingness to Turn to Their Neighbors.... 127

Figures 14a. and 14b. Effect of Engaging in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization as Moderated by Distrust in The Police.... 128

Figure 15. Differences Between the Experimental Sample and the Population (Based on the 2014 AmericasBarometer).... 141

Figure 16. Support for Vigilante Justice across Experimental Conditions.... 146

Figure 17. Police Officers Allegedly Looting in San Jose del Cabo in the Aftermath of Hurricane Odile.... 150

Figure 18. Diagram of the Incentives Faced by the Participant in the Extralegal-Confrontation Experiment.... 164

Figures 19a.-19c. Police Trustworthiness, Community Trustworthiness, and Severity of Crime Treatment Effects on the Likelihood of a Participant to Confront the Thief.... 177

Figures 20a. and 20b. Interaction Between the Police-Trustworthiness Treatment and the Neighbors-Trustworthiness Treatment (The Dependent Variable is the Participant's Likelihood of Choosing to Confront the Thief) 178

I. INTRODUCTION AND THEORY

In the early hours of Friday, April 15, 2011, a group of nearly one hundred citizens of the rural Mexican community of Cherán (state of Michoacán), armed only with sticks and stones, violently attacked a group of drug cartel-sponsored illegal loggers that passed through their community. During the attack nine vehicles were set on fire, and three loggers were captured, beaten, and tortured by members of the community.[1] Later that year, the inhabitants of Cherán expelled law enforcement authorities from the state to create their own *Policía Comunitaria* (community police) that, to this day, polices the community and the surrounding forests. [2,3]

This, however, is not the only case in which citizens have organized to attempt to enforce the law outside the purview of the state. In the Xochimilco neighborhood of Mexico City, for example, a sign posted by a group of vigilante neighbors reads:

> Neighbors Organized! Thief, if we catch you we will not take you to the authorities... we will lynch you![4]

Four thousand miles south, in Santa Fe, Argentina, an almost identical banner warns those crossing the *Los Hornos* neighborhood about the presence of a similar vigilante organization.[5]

Indeed, over the last decade we have seen citizens associating with their neighbors to confront common and organized criminals in countries as diverse as Guatemala (Handy, 2004), Brazil (Barbara, 2015), México (Melgar, 2013), Bolivia (Goldstein, 2003, 2004), Argentina (El País,

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[1] Ultimately, the alleged loggers were freed by the population after negotiations with the neighboring community of Capacuaro (a town from which some of the loggers originated).

[2] The situation deteriorated to such an extent, that seven months after the events of April 15, 2011, the citizens of the town voted for the abolition of the party system and the institution of an autonomous government elected and designed by *uses and customs* (i.e., in the way the indigenous population of the area, allegedly, had done it before the institutionalization of the Mexican sytem). Since then, the community has banned the installation of voting stations for both state and national elections and is completely restructuring its government.

[3] Research for this chapter was done with the approval of Vanderbilt's Institutional Review Board (#131366)

[4] Reforma (2013). Translation is mine. http://www.zocalo.com.mx/seccion/articulo/te-vamos-a-linchar-advierten-vecinos-a-ladrones-1357372715.

[5] "Neighbors Organized! Thief, if we catch you we will not take you to the police station... we will lynch you!" Translation is mine. El Día (2014). http://pasado.eldia.com/edis/20140401/Te-vamos-linchar-advierten-vecinos-ladrones-cartel-20140401184011.htm.

2014), and Peru (BBC Mundo, 2004).[6] Not surprisingly, over the last ten years there has been an increase in media and public attention to vigilantism around the world (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Trend in the Search for the Term "Vigilante" in Google

Source: Google Trends, August 2015. Google asigns the highest number of searches a value of 100 and reports relative levels with respect to this point.

Although groups seeking to fight crime directly often justify their actions, this type of behavior can carry human and economic costs for both victims and victimizers. Not only do citizens spend economic and social resources in the formation of anti-criminal organizations, they can also incur opportunity costs, as they have to invest their time and effort policing their own community (Bates, Greif, & Singh, 2002). Moreover, when confronting criminals, vigilantes risk their own physical wellbeing, and they can put the lives of innocent citizens at risk. As Hine (1998) points out, since crime deterrence is, at least in part, a function of the probability of capture[7] and the severity of sanctions, vigilantes have incentives to maximize the severity of sanctions in order to reduce the amount of policing that they conduct. Thus, this kind of action can severely compromise the rights and lives of those who, justifiably or not, are accused of committing a crime.

More relevant to politics, citizens' attempts to enforce the law collectively and independently of the state (what I call Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement [ECLE]) may pose a direct challenge

[6] Anonymous official source (the extension of this database is part of this project).
[7] Influenced by the amount of investment in policing.

to the state. Specifically, this phenomenon challenges the extent in which the government holds the monopoly over the coercive use of violence, a feature that Weber (1919), in his foundational work, *Politics as a Vocation*, considered as the founding pillar of the state.

In light of the social and political relevance of the phenomenon, the general research question that this project seeks to address is: Under what circumstances do citizens engage in Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement? In the rest of this chapter I review some of the theoretical approaches that have been brought to bear in the study of ECLE. Then, building on this literature I propose a novel explanation. I argue that in conditions in which citizens distrust law enforcement, high levels of social capital are more likely to increase the probability that citizens will engage in ECLE. In the final section of this chapter, I present the general outline of the four empirical chapters to follow.

Antecedents

Although most of the recent interest on ECLE has been triggered by the recent surge of self-defense movements in rural and urban Latin America[8], it is impossible to offer a complete view of the antecedents to my study without referring to the early literature on the topic. The first studies on vigilantism can be traced to scholarly interest on vigilante and mob-violence in the southern and western United States at the beginning of the 20th century (see for example Allen, 2004; Cutler, 1907; Raper, 2003).[9] Among early scholars, ECLE was seen as an expression of cultural values, group conflict, or as a form of social control.

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[8] Curacao and Brazil lead the world as the countries in which citizens most often search for the term **vigilante**.

[9] It is important to note that, although the concepts of lynching and vigilantism relate to ECLE, the overlap is far from perfect. Lynching, for instance, has been defined as "a collective act, punitive, anonymous, spontaneous or organized, with different levels of ritualization, which uses physical violence towards individuals who, presumably, have broken a legal or a virtual (instituted by the community) norm and that are considerably outnumbered" (Díaz-Fuentes, 2004) under this definition, lynching can be a manifestation of ECLE, however both concepts do not overlap perfectly. For instance, note that lynching requires the use of violence while ECLE can either be expressed violently or through relatively peaceful actions (building roadblocks, implementation of civic fines, etc.). Conversely, note that ECLE requires

Group Conflict

Due to the context in which extrajudicial mob-executions frequently appeared at the dawn of the 20th century (e.g., in the segregated South of United States) early literature on the topic studied extralegal collective law enforcement attempts exclusively as an expression of group conflict or hatred (Olzak, 1990). Scholars of this school contend that rapid social changes can trigger group competition, motivating citizens to form extralegal organizations seeking to castigate transgressions by competing ethnic or social groups.

For example, in their now classic study, Hovland and Sears (1940) found evidence showing that, as the cotton crisis in the South worsened, the number of lynchings against African Americans also increased (Hepworth & West, 1988; Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007). Similarly, other authors have found an association between rapid religious, political, and demographic change and the emergence of vigilante violence (Bagozzi, 1977; Inverarity, 1976; Tyson, 2013; Wasserman, 1977).

Although this framework has provided a fruitful guide to understand the emergence of mob-violence in the southern United States and in other highly segregated societies, it is only of limited utility for understanding the emergence of extra-legal collective law enforcement in societies with high levels of crime the absence of state-sanctioned segregation, as is the case of Latin America.

While on some occasions violent attempts to apprehend and punish alleged criminals in Latin America are racially motivated, this happens only in the minority of cases. Indeed, researchers studying vigilantes' self-reported intentions in Latin America have found that in the majority of the cases attackers describe their actions to be a response to high levels of crime. Further, rather than the attackers and the attacked belonging to clearly different groups, those studying vigilante violence

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the perception that a legal norm has been violated while lynching does not. While ECLE emerges, by definition, form the transgression of the law, lynching can emerge from the perceived transgression of moral or informal norms. Vigilantism is often used to refer to "the undertaking of law enforcement in a community without legal authority" (Vigilante, Oxford 2015). Although this concept is much closer to ELCE, it captures the action of individual vigilantes while ECLE only refers to collective actions. For a more thorough conceptual discussion of the concept of vigilantism and collective vigilantism, see Chapter IV.

have found that, for the most part, those attacked tend to be co-ethnic males living in the same neighborhood as the attackers (Castillo-Claudett, 2000; Guillén & Heredia, 2005; Vilas, 2009).

Culture

Seeking a more general understanding of the phenomenon, but still focusing on the context of the American South, a second strand of literature proposed violent ECLE to be an expression of a subculture of honor and violence (see for instance, Clarke, 1998; Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967). That is, these scholars propose that extralegal collective law enforcement is more likely to emerge in subcultures that regard violence as an acceptable way to resolve conflict, especially in cases in which this violence is tolerated by the state.

This perspective has found some resonance among some journalists and scholars. Indeed, some have noted that reports of violent ECLE attempts and self-defense movements frequently come from traditionally indigenous countries or indigenous sub-national regions within countries. Both lynch mobs and extralegal-rural police have been observed in Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia, and the recent movements towards indigenous autonomy in these countries have led some scholars to suggest that indigenous culture could be related to the emergence of ECLE (Vilas, 2009).

Although this theoretical correlation has been empirically supported in some contexts (Seligson 2005; Mendoza, 2006), this hypothesis has not gone without dispute. For instance, in her analysis of lynchings in rural Guatemala, Fernández (2004) concludes that the Mayan justice system "emphasizes compensation, not repression" (p.23) and Handy (2004) argues that ECLE-violence in Guatemala emerged from rural collapse and a sense of distrust towards the judicial system, rather than a legacy of civil war or customary law. From his extensive work in Bolivia, Goldstein (2004, 2012), for his part, concludes that rather than an expression of cultural identity, spectacular acts of

ECLE violence emerge as a community's attempt to broadcast cohesion and collective efficacy in a context of state marginalization.

Mendoza (2006) himself avoids appealing to culture as an explanation when interpreting the link between indigenous population and lynching in Guatemala. He argues that rather than reflecting the influence of cultural values, this link emerges out of ethnic solidarity (which trumps barriers to collective action) in areas in which the state has historically failed to provide its citizens with many basic services.

Social Hierarchy

Apart from the debate over the values of those engaging in ECLE, a third strand of literature has focused on the type of crimes most prevalent in cases of ECLE. Coming back the American context, these scholars have noted that violent ECLE tends to be preceded by crimes that challenge the preservation of the social hierarchy (Black, 1976; Senechal de la Roche, 2001; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). On this basis, they hypothesize that mob-violence can be understood as a way through which dominant sectors in society enforce the normative status quo.

Again, this perspective might be of use to explain the emergence of violent ECLE in the specific contexts studied by this literature (i.e. the segregated American South). However, it seems to be of less use for understanding the contexts in which lynching is most often directed against ordinary criminals, which is the case in many of the incidents I am studying in this dissertation. Further, it lends little traction to efforts to understand countries in which, like in Mexico, vigilantes point to a sense of frustration with widespread insecurity and the inaction of law enforcement as their primary motives for engaging in violent-ECLE (Guillén & Heredia, 2005).

In sum, although group-conflict and cultural theories provide us with valuable frameworks for explaining the emergence of violent ECLE in contexts of strong social conflict, they are less able

to help explain the most recent wave of vigilantism in the Americas. Thus, it seems necessary to investigate other factors that might help explain why citizens join with their neighbors to defend themselves against crime.

Insecurity

More recently, scholars have turned to the current conditions of violence, crime, and insecurity prevalent in Latin America as forces that could be behind the recent surge of ECLE across the continent. After all, 43 of the world's 50 most dangerous cities today are located in Latin America and the Caribbean (Ortega Sánchez, 2015).

Ever since the early works that emerged from the third wave of democratization, scholars have warned about the threat that insecurity could represent to democratic consolidation. In her foundational work on scarcity and democracy, for example, Bremeo (1997b) underlines how crime and insecurity can shape citizens' political behavior and authoritarian preferences. And in his now classic work on democratic consolidation, Diamond (1999) notes: in the "context of weak states and an inefficient, poorly disciplined police" (p. 91), citizens may react to crime by taking desperate measures. Thus, Diamond argues, "the problem that crime poses for democracy may generate a fatal 'cure'" (p. 91).

Scholars building from this theoretical perspective have noted that fear and insecurity can bolster citizens' support for extralegal mechanisms to fight crime. Malone (2010, 2012c) and Cruz (2009), for example, find that citizens victimized by crime or who perceive higher levels of insecurity in their neighborhoods, are more likely to be supportive of the police violating the law to catch criminals.

But beyond the police's extralegal law enforcement, others have found that citizens are also more likely to be supportive of citizens engaging in extralegal collective law enforcement. Bateson

(2012), for example, not only finds that victims of crime in Latin America are more likely to be more active civically and politically but are also more likely to be supportive of vigilante justice (see also R. Rojo-Mendoza, 2015). Similarly, Malone (2012c) finds that Central Americans who are more afraid of crime tend to be more supportive of citizens taking the law into their own hands. And in the specific case of Guatemala, Seligson (2003) finds that insecurity erodes citizens' democratic attitudes and this, in turn, increases their support for vigilantism.

Theory: Social Capital and Distrust in the Authorities as Determinants of the Emergence of ECLE

As Malone (2012) notes, "When victimized by a crime, citizens must decide to turn to the law, extralegal institutions, or to no one at all" (2012b, p. 127). Thus, to a great extent, ECLE actions reflect the strategic choice of facing criminals with the assistance of the community (one of the extralegal institutions available to citizens) rather than turning to the law to look for retribution, protection, or vengeance. Thus, in the following pages, I will argue that distrust of law enforcement moderates the degree to which high levels of social capital increase the probability that citizens will engage in Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement. To unpack this hypothesis, however, it is necessary to turn to the incentives (potential costs and benefits) for this behavior as well as the actors to which such outcomes are contingent.

ECLE Incentives

The first way in which citizens may stand to benefit from ECLE is by reducing the material and immaterial costs of crime. In the simplest case, if they are able to confront criminals successfully, citizens may expect to immediately recover property or lost income. Further, citizens engaging in ECLE may expect to deter criminals and, hence, reduce future material costs of crime

(Ceobanu, Wood, & Ribeiro, 2010; Cohen, 2008; McCollister, French, & Fang, 2010; Miller, Cohen, & Wiersema, 1996).[10]

Second, to varying degrees, citizens may expect to experience positive emotions (and thus a psychological benefit) after successfully engaging in vigilante actions. These may come from a multitude of mechanisms, including the satisfaction associated with altruistic retaliation (de Quervain et al., 2004; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006); successful collaborative interaction (Jung, Choi, Lim, & Leem, 2002); obtaining a fair outcome (Tyler, 1988); expressing a message to the offender (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009); or being seen as a hero by others.

The costs relating to ELCE, for their part, can come from direct and indirect sources. Direct costs relate to those coming from ECLE itself, and that cannot be avoided. They can include material costs (purchase of weapons or equipment), psychological distress (stress for being exposed to violence or risking physical harm), and opportunity costs (lost income due to stopped work or production) (Bates et al., 2002).[11]

Indirect costs refer to losses associated with external factors such as criminals, law enforcement agents, or society in general. First, in addition to the original cost of crime, if unsuccessful, citizens who attempt to confront criminals stand to incur in additional material or immaterial losses immediately or on the long run. For example, citizens unsuccessfully attempting to confront a thief risk being economically, physically, or psychologically injured or even killed during the confrontation. Similarly, citizens who join together to attempt to confront someone extorting them may put their lives and livelihoods at risk if they decide to defend themselves but are unsuccessful (Contreras, 2014).

[10] By material costs I refer to the loss of income, property, and land, among other things. By immaterial costs I refer to decreased life-satisfaction, the presence of negative emotions, stress, and so on.
[11] Material costs can vary greatly but are almost always a factor. While in some cases vigilantism may only cost the effort necessary to engage in it, in other situations citizens may need to invest resources to purchase weapons and equipment.

Second, since ECLE implies an intrusion over the state's monopoly on the coercive use of violence, it can be itself considered an illegal or socially deviant behavior. Thus, citizens engaging in ECLE risk being subjected to legal and social sanctions.[12] Not only can citizens be prosecuted and condemned to legal economic and corporeal sanctions (e.g. fines or jail), they may also be subject to social stigmatization and thus have to pay important reputational costs.

Thus, it is likely that conditions that directly affect the potential costs and benefits of ECLE (e.g. laws, social norms or criminal violence) can increase or decrease its prevalence. However, it is important to note that citizens do not stand to obtain these outcomes automatically, but they are contingent of other agents' likelihood of intervention. Thus, I argue that citizens' perceptions about these agents are likely to inform their willingness to engage in ECLE. More specifically, I argue that, when considering ECLE, citizens might evaluate the likelihood of their community and the authorities to intervene in response to crime.

Trust in the Law Enforcement of the State and ECLE

The stability of the modern state rests, in part, on the assumption that citizens will turn to state-sponsored institutionalized sources of law for support when they are victims of a crime. However, as in the case of ECLE, this is not always the case. Under what circumstances do people give up on the established state mechanisms of law enforcement?

Since Hirschman's (1978) important work on strategic political participation, scholars have noted that when there is discontent with the current state of affairs, citizens not only may participate with the established framework of the state but they can also exit and participate externally. Yashar (1999), for instance, notes that in the wake of the neoliberal reforms in Latin America, sectors that

[12] These sanctions may vary depending on the nature of the vigilante actions, the legal context and the nature of public opinion about vigilantism.

have been left out of the reach of the state have cultivated a profound animosity and distrust towards the latter, and have sought alternative strategies of organization and political participation.

Following this reasoning, it can be seen how citizens who feel left out of the reach of the state's law enforcement institutions and therefore distrust its intentions and capacity, may be more willing (and perhaps even prone), when victimized by crime, to resort to their community for retribution, rather than to let the authorities address it. But to understand the mechanisms linking trust with law enforcement reliability it is important to elaborate on the concept and components of trust in law enforcement.

In its most general sense, the concept of trust has been linked to a general estimation of certainty about a future outcome. Drawing from this line of thought, in the context of interpersonal relations trust has been defined as the implicit or explicit expectation that others will behave in a predictable way (Luhmann, 1979).

However, further work on the concept of trust has proposed the idea that this phenomenon can also refer to the perception that the trustee has the best interests of the trustor at heart (Bradford & Jackson, 2010; Tyler, 2006). In this sense, confidence in the law enforcement apparatus of the state refers not only to the degree of certainty that citizens have in the way that it will act when demanded, but also about the citizens' estimation of the degree to which the former has the best interest of the community at heart, and the perceived degree to which it shares their goals and priorities (J. Jackson & Bradford, 2010).

In an analogous way to the classic conceptualization of support for the system (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Easton, 1975), in which a specific and a diffuse component have been hypothesized, Bradford and Jackson (2010) propose that trust in the police can be best understood as a concept that incorporates both an interpersonal and an institutional dimension. Interpersonal trust in the police refers to "the implicit or explicit belief of individuals that one's own encounters with officers

will proceed predictably and according to their assumed role and function" (Bradford & Jackson, 2010, p. 3). Institutional trust in the police refers to "the implicit or explicit belief that the police (as an institution) behaves effectively, fairly, and that it represents the interests and expresses the values of the community – whether locally or nationally" (Bradford & Jackson, 2010, p. 2).

While interpersonal trust in the police has been regarded as dynamic, institutional trust in the police has been regarded as a relatively stable set of attitudes toward the police as an institution. Although the target of trust is of great importance for the understanding of ECLE, it is also crucial to understand the different dimensions underlying citizens' evaluations of trust, for this, in turn, will help us to understand the different mechanisms linking trust and citizens' willingness to give up their use of these institutions.

It has been proposed that trust emerges from three main dimensions: the perception of effectiveness of both the system and the individual officers that compose it, the perception of fairness of the procedures that compose the system, and the perception that the values of the system and its individual officers are aligned with one's own or those of one's community (Bradford, Jackson, & Stanko, 2009; Jonathan Jackson & Bradford, 2009). Perceptions of effectiveness refer to citizens' perception of technical competence of the different agents within the system of law enforcement. Perceptions of fairness refer to citizens' perceptions of agent and system compliance with basic underlying ideas about rule of law. Finally, perceptions of value alignment refer to the degree to which the citizens perceive that the agents in the system share their values or are able to understand the needs of the community and place its interests above their own.

Although a theoretical distinction between the different dimensions of trust in law enforcement is critical for advancing a comprehensive theory, it is important to point out that these dimensions are in no way orthogonal, and, empirically, many authors have found that these concepts sum up to a single underlying factor (Bradford et al., 2009; Jonathan Jackson & Bradford, 2009).

Thus, drawing from this literature and my earlier definition of trust, I consider the general concept of trust in state law enforcement as an individual's expectation that state law enforcement agents and institutions will intervene with sufficient competence for the law to be enforced effectively, fairly, and in a way consistent with both their values and those of their community. [13]

Based on this conceptualization, it is possible to review some of the ways in which trust in law enforcement can impact the extent to which citizens are willing (or unwilling) to rely on law enforcement. The first indication that citizens' distrust of law enforcement affects their likelihood of relying on police when victimized by crime comes from studies of security co-production.

In the context of the United States, researchers focusing on procedural fairness have found that citizens who perceive that the procedures by which the police implement the law are just are more likely to cooperate individually and collectively to co-produce security (Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Tyler, Casper, & Fisher, 1989; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002), even among strongly multicultural societies (Tyler, 2000). In fact, young adults and adolescents, populations that have generally represented a challenge for those who study the determinants of police cooperation, are more likely to collaborate with the police when they perceive them to engage in just procedures (Murphy & Gaylor, 2010; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009). Moreover, citizens who feel that the members of law enforcement share their moral values and principles (i.e., have high value congruence) have been observed to be more likely to display positive attitudes towards and greater cooperation and compliance with authorities (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).

In Latin America, for its part, evidence for the negative effect of police distrust on citizens' cooperation with law enforcement has come mainly from policing reform scholars. Sabet (2014), for instance, notes that distrust in the police is a critical component of a vicious circle into which many

[13] Note that this definition interprets a positive outcome as relating to the "fair and effective enforcement of the law" rather than simply as "a positive outcome for the subject," as the latter can confound the term with expectations of favoritism, corruption, and even criminal collusion.

Latin American countries have fallen. The chronic ineffectiveness of law enforcement agencies, Sabet argues, has fostered a deep-rooted distrust among citizens. This, in turn, has hindered security co-production, and the reluctance of citizens to cooperate with the authorities has translated into further inefficiency, closing the vicious circle.

Echoing Sabet's argument, Arias and Ungar (2009) have noted that despite heavy investments in police reform in Latin America, the erosion of citizens' trust in police continues, and this has made it difficult for these reform programs to rally the security co-production in which they desperately depend. As an example (which is also in line with my central argument), Ungar (2009) notes how, in some areas of Honduras, violence continued to rise even after the implementation of the *Mano Amiga* program. This was mainly due to the fact that some citizens invested the physical and social resources provided by the program in the creation of vigilante organizations that later engaged in extrajudicial violence.

A second indicator of the connection between citizens' distrust in law enforcement and their willingness to rely in the authorities can be found in citizens' likelihood to report crime. After all, as Malone (2012b) notes, "reporting crime indicates that people accept, at least begrudgingly, the legal system and its authorities as the legitimate arbiters of justice."(2012b, p. 127).

In the American context, for instance, Skogan (1994), Camerer et al. (1998), and other more recent authors (e.g. MacDonald, 2001; Schnebly, 2008) find that positive attitudes towards the police can be associated with an increased likelihood of citizens to report crime. Conaway and Lohr (1994), for example, find that repeated victimization is an important determinant of crime reporting only when victims experience positive outcomes from their interaction with law enforcement. Levitt (1998) finds that changes in the size of the police force are associated with changes in citizens' trust that a crime will be solved, and this, in turn, is associated with citizens' likelihood to report crime. Finally, in the three low-level-equilibrium Central American countries (Honduras, Guatemala and El

Salvador), Malone (2012b) finds that a perception that the judicial system is unlikely to punish criminals translates into a lower probability that citizens will report crime to the authorities.

In sum, previous scholarship suggests that distrust in the authorities is linked to how likely citizens are to rely on them to prevent crime or find justice after being victimized by crime. Evidence from both the United States and Latin America suggests that citizens are more likely to cooperate with the authorities to engage in security co-production when they deem them as fair, efficient, and generally trustworthy. Moreover, previous research suggests that, after being victims of insecurity, citizens are less likely to report crime to the authorities when they have negative attitudes towards police, have had negative experience with police reporting, regard them as unlikely to punish crime, or see the criminal justice system as generally ineffective.

All in all, distrust in law enforcement seems to set the stage for citizens to seek alternative ways of providing themselves with a sense of certainty and security. However, what conditions influence citizens' willingness to turn to their community rather than to a state law enforcement agency?

Social Capital and ECLE

In this dissertation, I argue that, in contexts in which citizens distrust law enforcement their perception of the strength and availability of their own social capital might increase the probability that they will attempt to engage in ECLE. After all, as Malone (2012c) notes, "in order for the perceived failure of the justice system to translate into collective action, citizens would need to have some sense of solidarity with other members of their community and view citizen action as a viable means for achieving their goals" (p.117).

Since de Tocqueville's (1863) analysis of the burgeoning American political system, many authors have been intrigued about the role that social capital plays in a democracy. I define **social**

capital as a latent capacity to trigger effective collective action indicated by the "connections among individuals, social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (Putnam, 2000, p. 19).

Although some scholars have proposed that social capital is inherently conducive to democratic (Putnam & Feldstein, 2004; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994) and economic development (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1996), others have noted that social capital can also have a dark side. Indeed, social capital has been linked to outsider exclusion (Waldinger, 1995), corruption (Graeff, 2007; Schweitzer, 2005; Treisman, 2000), and the emergence and growth of gangs and militias (Berman, 1997; Bourgois, 1996; Tarrow, 1998). Moreover, others have linked preexistent social capital to the emergence of radical, anti-state, and pro-authoritarian organizations both in developing and established democracies (Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2013; Armony, 2004; Satyanath, Voigtlaender, & Voth, 2013).

Thus, it seems that although social capital may foster collective action, it does not necessarily lead to state-centered political behavior. But can social capital lead to an increase in the prevalence of ECLE? I argue that when the relation between citizens and the state erodes significantly, and the former decide to engage in an "exit strategy" (see Hirschman, 1978), the community constitutes an alternative source to which citizens may turn in search for security. However, just as in the case of trust in law enforcement, to better understand the mechanisms by which social capital may influence the emergence of ECLE, it is important to unpack the different dimensions among which the indicators of social capital have been clustered.

Some authors, for example, have differentiated between the structural and cognitive social capital. While the structural dimension refers to the degree of connectedness of individuals within a community, the cognitive dimension refers to individuals' norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Uphoff, 1999). Both dimensions may play a significant role in citizens'

likelihood to join with their neighbors to confront criminals collectively when they perceive law enforcement to be untrustworthy.

The **structural** dimension of social capital, generally represented by community organizations and social networks, facilitates the exchange of information and resources among citizens. Thus, when citizens face a problem, citizens with strong social networks are more likely to find a point of contact from which to engage in co-operative action to solve it (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999). Therefore, it follows that, among citizens who are unlikely to rely on the judicial system, a wide and well-connected social network is likely to provide citizens with a point of entry from where they can begin to reach for help in confronting criminal victimization. As Woolcock (2001) once suggested, "one's family, friends and associates constitute an important asset, one that can be called upon in a crisis" (p. 32).

For its part, there are at least three theoretical reasons to think that the **cognitive** dimension of social capital (that is, the values and attitudes that encourage citizens to trust and cooperate with each other), under circumstances of low trust in the law, might increase the likelihood of engaging in ECLE. First, some authors have shown that interpersonal trust facilitates the resolution of collective action problems and allows communities to face problems through group behavior even in the absence of a clear individual benefit (Newton, 1997; Ostrom, 1998; Putnam et al., 1994). In the case of the ECLE phenomenon, it is reasonable to expect that citizens who believe that their neighbors will reciprocate and enforce the law to their advantage will tend to be supportive of ECLE, and perhaps even more likely to put themselves at risk by engaging in this behavior.

Second, cognitive social capital may also increase citizens' positive attitudes toward ECLE through its effect on collective efficacy.[14] Since unsuccessful attempts to engage in ECLE may result in significant economic, psychological, or even physical losses for the participants, in contexts in

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[14] Positive perception of "the performance capability of a social system as a whole" (Bandura 1997, p. 469).

which citizens distrust the effective intervention of the authorities, ECLE may become more likely as citizens consider themselves more likely to effectively substitute the action of the state.

This is not the first time trust and efficacy have been hypothesized to interact as determinants of citizens' political participation. Gamson (1968), for instance, argues that citizens' trust in government interacts with their sense of efficacy to determine different patterns through which citizens attempt to influence government. While citizens who report higher levels in both variables are likely to attempt to incentivize government through institutionalized participation, Gamson argues that citizens who perceive themselves as efficacious but consider the government to be untrustworthy are likely to attempt to constraint government through political mobilization.[15]

Although it is useful to understand democratic participation and anti-government mobilization, Gamson's framework assumes citizens preserve enough confidence in (or patience with) the state to expect it to be responsive to their attempts at influencing it. However, there are number of circumstances in which citizens may be unwilling or unable to wait for the government to respond to their requests and may attempt to solve their needs directly. Thus, just as collective efficacy can influence the emergence of political mobilization, I argue that, when trust in government erodes significantly, this variable may also increase the probability that citizens will attempt to substitute for the services that the state fails to provide.

Since higher levels of social trust have been linked to citizens' perception of collective efficacy (Kim, Lee, Kim, Jeong, & Park, 2011; Putnam, 1995; Welch et al., 2001) I hypothesize that this variable will be linked to the emergence of ECLE. Specifically, I argue that, among those who distrust law enforcement (i.e., those who would not resort to contacting the authorities after being

[15] Seligson 1980 refines Gamson's hypothesis slightly by predicting four types of citizens: alienated activists, alienated apathetics, allegiant activists, and alienated apathetics. Further, this author puts this theory to the test and finds some support for the idea that trust and efficacy influence institutionalized and mobilized participation among Costa Rican peasants. However, Seligson does not test whether efficacy influences non-institutionalized participation differently among trusting and distrusting respondents. Thus, a precise test of Gamson's hypothesis has yet to be conducted.

victimized by crime), those citizens who have a higher level of trust in their neighbors may perceive the latter as a viable source of criminal justice. Therefore, they will be more likely to reach out to them in any attempt to engage in ECLE.

Finally, coming back to social control theory, cognitive social capital may influence citizens' willingness to engage in ECLE through its effect on the social distance between criminals and themselves. Citizens' who have closer ties with their community may consider their neighbors to be more intimate, closer in the social hierarchy, and more culturally proximate, and they may also expect their neighbors to see them in the same way.

Thus, holding the social position of the criminal constant, if victimized by crime citizens may expect their neighbors to perceive them as more socially distant from the criminal when inserted in a trustworthy community. To the extent that the social distance between the victim and the victimizer translates into a moral outrage that triggers in-group collaboration (Black, 1976; Senechal de la Roche, 1996), citizens may be more likely to expect to trigger collaboration from the community and attempt to engage in ECLE.

Before moving forward, however, it is important to recognize that this argument assumes that the social position of the criminal is unlikely to be affected by varying levels of social capital. However, this assumption may not hold when citizens are interlinked by what Putnam (2000) calls *bridging* (social networks that bring together heterogeneous groups) rather than *bonding* (social networks bringing together heterogeneous groups) social capital. Particularly, when embedded in communities with high bridging social capital, citizens may expect others to be linked within a more diverse social network and therefore be more empathic to them but also, potentially, to those engaging in criminal activities. Consequently, as compared to that of bonding social capital, the effect of bridging social capital on social distance (and ultimately on ECLE) might be only minor.

Recapitulating, in the last ten years a number of countries in Latin America have seen a rise in scholarly and public interest in vigilantism. While early scholars argued that this phenomenon is an expression of culture, group conflict, or a form of social control, the more recent wave of vigilante actions across Latin America and the Caribbean has prompted scholars to start to consider this phenomenon as one way citizens have reacted to the high levels of insecurity in the region.

In line with this view, I argue that, in contexts in which authorities are regarded as untrustworthy, ECLE can be understood as a community-based reaction to crime. On one hand, previous evidence suggests that citizens are less likely to collaborate with and turn to the authorities. On the other, it suggests that, under certain circumstances, social capital can translate in para- and *anti*-state political participation. Building on these two lines of research, I propose that, in situations of distrust in law enforcement, citizens' perception of the strength and availability of social capital increases the probability that they will be willing to engage in Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement.

Dissertation Structure

In the following four chapters I present four different but related studies that have, at their core, the objective of putting the idea I am proposing to the test. In Chapter II, I turn to the case of Cherán, a town in western México where citizens confronted a band of illegal loggers who were cutting down the surrounding forests. This chapter is divided in two subsections. The first subsection seeks to understand the process by which Cherán's self-defense movement emerged. To do so, I analyze semi-structured interviews with some of the key actors involved in the movement. I find that a sense of distrust in local authorities, the extent of community cohesion, and pre-existent social structures all played an important role in each of the stages of the self-defense movement organized by the citizens of Cherán.

The second subsection puts this insight to the test by comparing Cherán's social capital before 2011 to that of a similar municipality in which no self-defense movement has emerged. To do this, I collected data on the community associations that existed in Cherán and the neighboring town of Nahuatzen before 2011. I found that, although both towns are demographically, culturally, and ethnically similar, Cherán had a higher number of community associations per capita than Nahuatzen before 2011.

Although this research deepens our understanding of the mechanisms and forces behind this self-defense movement, being a rural and indigenous community, Cherán is a rather exceptional case. To what extent do the insights derived from Chapter II extend to our understanding of individuals' political behavior more generally? To answer this question, it is necessary to look beyond the conditions faced by the citizens of Cherán and Nahuatzen. Specifically, it is necessary to compare citizens' likelihood of participating in collective anti-crime organizations in a larger and more representative sample of the population.

With this goal in mind, in Chapter III, I analyze individual-level data collected by México's National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). I hypothesize that, if the evidence is consistent with my thesis, we should observe the effect of social capital on citizens' likelihood to engage in collective anti-criminal action to be stronger among those who distrust in the police.

This chapter is divided into three subsections. In the first subsection, I jointly analyze data coming from INEGI's National Insecurity Survey (ENSI-2010) and the National Survey of Victimization and Perceptions of Public Safety (ENVIPE-2011). I find that, as expected, citizens' distrust in the police moderates the connection between citizens' trust in their neighbors and their likelihood of engaging in collective anti-criminal action. In the second subsection I test my hypothesis in seventeen countries with a comparable rule of law across Latin America and the

Caribbean, using data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer extending from 2008 to 2014, and find results consistent with those of the first subsection.[16]

Although these two subsections shed some light on the applicability of my framework to explain the emergence of collective anti-crime organizations, it is uncertain to what extent participation in such associations can be linked to participants' disposition to turning to their neighbors as the ultimate source of justice when victimized by crime. To address this question I analyze the effect of these organizations on citizens' willingness to seek assistance from their neighbors rather than the state as a source of justice. Once more, consistent with my hypothesis, I find that these organizations are more likely to be associated with citizens' preference for neighbors as a source of justice among those who distrust the police more strongly.

This chapter builds on Chapter II by bringing in support for the idea that my thesis can be generalized to the general political psychology of Latin Americans. However, this methodology is not without its flaws. First, although it allows us to control for a wide range of variables, it does not allow us to control for confounders that were not (or could not have been) measured by the surveys. Second, the tests of Chapter II cannot disentangle the simultaneous causation among the variables included in the study.[17] To produce a test of hypothesis robust enough to account for both of these threats, I designed the two experiments presented in Chapters IV and V.

In Chapter IV, I present the result of a laboratory-in-the-field experiment conducted among undergraduate students of the National Autonomous University of México (UNAM) during the aftermath of two hurricanes that hit the Mexican state of Guerrero. I created a fictitious article that described how an organized criminal organization had seized the aid sent to a small community severely affected by the storm. I slightly manipulated the original article to generate four versions

[16] Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, and Belize.
[17] However, see Appendix VI (Chapter III) for a test robust enough to account for simultaneous causation.

that portrayed the citizens of the community and the police in a different light. Consistent with my expectations, I found that participants' support for a collective vigilante action was more sensitive to a treatment of the community as trustworthy when they read an article that portrayed the police as unlikely to enforce the law.

Because the design of Chapter IV assigns treatments through a random process, the findings of this chapter constitute strong evidence for the causal logic of my thesis. Nevertheless, it is very important to emphasize that attitudes are cheap while behavior is expensive. That is, even if citizens responded to the exercise carefully and honestly, it is difficult to know whether or not they would act in a manner consistent with their responses when exposed to the incentives (potential costs and benefits) present in real-world circumstances.

To address this concern, in Chapter V I identify some of the most important costs and benefits associated with collective vigilante behavior as well as the agents on which such outcomes depend. Then, from this analysis, and building on previous literature, I create a behavioral experiment (referred to as the extralegal-confrontation experiment) in which citizens can display vigilante-like behavior while facing the prospect of winning or losing real money for their actions. I find that citizens are more likely to confront an agent stealing their income (thief) when: a) they have more neighbors likely to help them confront the thief (trustworthy neighbors); they see there is a lower probability that a law "enforcer" will intervene (untrustworthy police); and when the thief steals a higher proportion of their income (crime severity). Finally, in accordance with my thesis, I find that the trustworthiness of the police moderates the effect of trustworthy neighbors on the respondent.

II. THE CASE OF CHERÁN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Vigilante justice is not a new phenomenon. Early in the 20th century a number of communities in the outlaw-plagued territories of the United States independently enforced the law and attacked bands of criminals entering their territories (Allen, 2004). What is new is that in nations in Latin America, two centuries after their political independence and the establishment of the rule of law over their territories, vigilante justice has reemerged. This is not (yet) a region-wide phenomenon. However, a problem that had been limited to countries like Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador today has spread to Brazil and Argentina and, over the last five years, has put the Mexican government in check (Malkin & Villegas, 2014).[18]

Despite the reemergence of vigilante justice, its analysis has been largely left to journalists. This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework that helps to explain some aspects of the most recent reemergence of this phenomenon and test its applicability to one of the most iconic self-defense movements in Mexico. Specifically, in this dissertation I argue that under circumstances in which they do not trust the intervention of law enforcement and when they have more preexisting social capital, citizens are more likely to take recourse to what I term Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE) organizations.

After briefly reviewing my theoretical argument, in this chapter I turn to the case of the town of Cherán (referred to throughout this chapter as "Cherán-T" to distinguish it from the municipality of Cherán). Cherán-T is a small town located in the western state of Michoacán, Mexico, in which citizens confronted a group of cartel-sponsored illegal loggers.[19] This case is particularly interesting for three reasons. First, it is the case that inaugurated the most recent wave of anti-cartel vigilante organizations in Mexico. Second, it has consolidated its reputation as a case of extralegal collective

[18] Funding for the study was provided by the Social Science Research Council and Vanderbilt University´s Center for Latin American Studies.

[19] As I will develop later, citizens in the town of Cherán, Michoacán, independently faced down illegal loggers who, supported by drug cartels, had decimated nearby forest lands.

law enforcement. And third, by having evolved into a movement for political autonomy, it represents a direct challenge to the Mexican political system at large.

In my study of the case I proceed in two main steps. First, I investigate the role that distrust in the government and social cohesion had on citizens' decision to confront the illegal loggers, organizing a self-defense movement and initiating an autonomous government in Cherán-T. I do so by analyzing the narratives portrayed in 31 in-depth-interviews I conducted with citizens and elites in the town. Second, I put the social capital explanation to the test by comparing Cherán-T to the neighboring town of Nahuatzen (Nahuatzen-T). The latter is a community located only 5km away, culturally and demographically similar to Cherán-T but different in that its citizens have not engaged in ECLE. Specifically, I observed and collected information of about 500 citizen-run organizations that existed in both communities before 2011, and I use these to compare the number of organizations per 1000 inhabitants in both towns.

To foreshadow my results, I find evidence that, by the time citizens decided to confront the illegal loggers, Cherán's municipal (Cherán-M) government was going through an institutionally-induced crisis of legitimacy. Moreover, I find that in the midst of this crisis of distrust, citizens used their available social capital to: a) stop crime, b) organize the 2011 confrontation, c) organize the self-defense of the town, and d) build an autonomous government. Finally, when comparing Cherán-T's social capital to that of Nahuatzen-T I find qualitative and quantitative evidence consistent with my argument. That is, to the extent that the number of social organizations in a town can serve as an indicator of social capital, I find Cherán to have had relatively high levels of social capital and cohesion prior to the date in which citizens confronted the illegal loggers devastating the surrounding forests.

In the next section I contextualize and briefly review my general argument. Then, I introduce the case of Cherán and describe the general methodology followed in this chapter. Finally,

I show the results from my fieldwork in the area and conclude with a brief analysis of the implications and limitations of the study.

The Origins of Vigilante Organizations

Citizens' attempts to confront crime directly have challenged a number of governments across the Americas and sparked the interests of scholars across the globe (Bangstad, 2005; Bateson, 2013; Godoy, 2004; Haas, de Keijser, & Bruinsma, 2013; Owumi & Ajayi, 2013; Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007; Telle, 2009). Under what circumstances do citizens collectively confront crime?

Researchers interested in the phenomenon have proposed a number of explanations. One set of scholars has seen vigilante movements as an expression of group conflict triggered by competition over resources (Bagozzi, 1977, 1977; Hepworth & West, 1988; Hovland & Sears, 1940; Inverarity, 1976; Olzak, 1990; Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007; Tyson, 2013; Wasserman, 1977). Although this argument finds some resonance in the emergence of conflict between communities in many areas of the world (including Mexico) it is less helpful to explain why citizens attack alleged criminals living in their own communities (Castillo-Claudett, 2000; Vilas, 2009).

Another set of scholarship has proposed that vigilante violence emerges as an expression of a culture of honor and violence at odds with the central democratic state (Clarke, 1998; Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967). Although a number studies have found that lynching and vigilante groups are more prevalent in indigenous areas (Mendoza, 2006), the presumed mechanisms linking indigenous culture and violence (Vilas, 2009) has been severely challenged (Fernandez, 2004; Handy, 2004).

A third set of scholarship has proposed a direct relation between crime victimization and the emergence of extralegal anti-criminal action. Since Diamond (1999) and Bermeo (1997a) warned about the potential for a widespread sense of insecurity to trigger support for extralegal actions to attempt to cope with crime, other scholars have found that crime victimization and insecurity are

linked to support for vigilante justice and extralegal police action (Cruz, 2009 and Malone, 2012c). Although insecurity has undoubtedly served as a fuel for ECLE, this is not the whole story. Many citizens who have been victimized choose to cope with crime differently. Indeed, Malone argues that "when victimized by crime, citizens must decide to turn to the law, extralegal institutions, or to no one at all" (Malone, 2012b, p. 127). Thus, it is crucial to investigate the factors that influence the likelihood that citizens' will resort to their community (rather than migrating or turning to other actors) as a source of security.

I argue that, when citizens distrust law enforcement, their perception of the strength and availability of their social resources may increase the likelihood of ECLE to occur. The deterioration of citizens' relation with the state can have profound consequences for political behavior. As Hirschman (1978) argued, when citizens are dissatisfied with the status quo they can seek change through exercising their voice within the political system or, when distrust in the state has taken root, they can withdraw from political participation entirely.

Contexts of deep distrust in the authorities have been shown to have deleterious effects on citizens' ability to co-produce security. Distrust in law enforcement has been associated with a reduction of crime reporting (MacDonald, 2001; Schnebly, 2008), lower levels of cooperation with the authorities to prevent crime (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002) and lower levels of cooperation in Community-Oriented Policing efforts (Arias & Ungar, 2009; Sabet, 2014). Thus, I argue that it is in these contexts where citizens are more likely to invest their social capital in extralegal collective law enforcement efforts.

Social capital has been shown to make citizens more likely to participate in a group when individual benefit is unclear or far removed (Ostrom, 1998; Putnam et al., 1994), to increase citizens' perception that their group will be collectively efficacious (Kim et al., 2011; Putnam, 1995; Welch et al., 2001), and to provide citizens with a social network that facilitates the flow of information and

resources making collective problem solving easier (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). However, although this variable has been considered conducive to a better functioning democracy, there is nothing preventing social capital from translating into actions outside or against the democratic state.

When doing so, citizens may redirect their efforts outside or against the democratic state, resulting in the emergence of criminal, anti-state, and even pro-authoritarian organizations (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Armony, 2004; Satyanath et al., 2013). In line with this view, I argue that, under conditions in which citizens distrust state authorities, citizens are more likely to invest their social capital into attempts at Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE).

In line with this argument, other scholars have noted that, in low-level security equilibrium contexts, citizens are likely to consider strategic behavior in order to cope with crime (Bailey, 2014). Goldstein (2004, 2012), for instance, has argued that, rather than an expression of cultural identity, spectacular acts of ECLE violence emerge as a community's attempt to broadcast cohesion and collective efficacy in a context of state marginalization.[20] And, in line with this argument, Mendoza (2006) has found that, in Guatemala, the two factors most strongly related to the prevalence of lynching are "the solidarity among ethnic fellows within the indigenous communities, and the number of courts (per capita) in each municipality" (p.1). But how does this theoretical framework relate to citizens' experience of forming vigilante movements?

General Methods

To investigate this question, I turn to Mexico, a country whose government is undergoing intense criticism after the emergence of a number of vigilante organizations in and around the state of Michoacán, and in which citizens' support for these actions continues to increase (see Figure 2).

[20] More generally Gamson (1968) and, later, Seligson (1980) argued that in contexts of low-level government trust, efficacy translates in non-institutionalized forms of political participation. I build on this framework to hypothesize this as one of the mechanisms through government trust moderates the effect of social capital on citizens' choice to substitute the state's law enforcement.

I examine one of Mexico's most iconic cases, the vigilante movement of Cherán. This is a critical case to study not only because it inaugurated the most recent wave of anti-cartel vigilante violence in western Mexico, but also because it remains active four years after its emergence. To investigate the degree in which social capital and citizens' attitudes played a role in the emergence of this movement I proceeded in two stages.

In the first stage (during the autumn of 2013), I traveled to Cherán in order to interview some of the actors who participated in the movement. My objective during this stage was twofold: first, I aimed to go beyond existing journalistic accounts and uncover a more detailed narrative of the process by which the vigilante movement in Cherán emerged; second, I aimed to document citizens' personal experiences of the days before and after the climactic uprising. In these narratives I analyze the processes by which social capital and distrust in the authorities established a fertile ground for a community-based self-defense movement against organized crime.

Figure 2. Support for Vigilantism in Mexico from 2004-2014

Source: AmericasBarometer 2004-2014. The black line shows the linear trend in support for vigilantism. The values for the years in which the AmericasBarometer was not conducted (2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011) are OLS estimates from the available data.

In the second stage (conducted during the spring of 2015), I evaluated the relative strength of Cherán's social capital with the objective of testing the validity of my framework. With this in mind, I searched for a community that was culturally, economically, socially, and ethnically similar to Cherán and which suffered from similar insecurity problems but in which a vigilante movement had not emerged. Ultimately I traveled to the region once more with the goal of comparing the social capital of the residents of Cherán with that of their neighbors in the town of Nahuatzen.

The following section is divided in three main subsections. In the first subsection I quickly introduce the town of Cherán, paying attention to some of the characteristics related to the emergence of the movement. Then, in the second subsection, I present a timeline of the emergence of Cherán's vigilante movement based on my interviews with the citizens of the town. Contrary to previous accounts I identify at least three stages in which citizens decided to engage in Extralegal

Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE).[21] In the third and final subsection, I present evidence coming from my interviews with citizens and elites in Cherán. I find that the movement was less spontaneous than previously believed and that social capital and distrust in the government played an important role in each of the stages of Cherán vigilante movement.

Section 1: The Case of Cherán

The Municipality of Cherán (Cherán-M)[22] (221.88 square kilometers) is located in the western Mexican state of Michoacán. Specifically, the municipality sits in the heights of the Purepechan Plateau, located on the western side of the Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt.[23] The section of the Plateau in which Cherán-M is located sits between 2200 and 3000 meters (6,500-10,000 feet) above sea level. The capital of the municipality, the town of Cherán, is surrounded by nine mountains and hills[24] in which citizens can see the condition of the surrounding pine-oak forests.[25] As I explain below, these forests sit at the center of the problem from which Cherán vigilante movement evolved.[26]

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[21] By ECLE I refer to collective efforts to sanction a legally sanctioned norm without collaborating with the state authorities.

[22] Whenever referring to the municipality of Cherán as a whole I use Cherán-M.

[23] More specifically, the municipality is located in the 10th neo-volcanic axis' physiographic province and the 58th neo-volcanic Tarascan physiological sub-province (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía. "Michoacán de Ocampo. Mapa de Fisiografía").

[24] El Borrego, Kukundikata, San Marcos, San Miguel, Juanyani, El Tecolote, La Virgen and El Pilón.

[25] Rzedowski, J. 1978. *Vegetación de México*. Editorial Limusa. México, D.F., México.

[26] Some of the testimonies from the interviewees suggest that the geographical distribution of the hills around the town played an important role in the pre-movement outrage in the town. This is because it was easy to see the devastation undertaken by the organized loggers. I leave an in-depth exploration of the geographical determinants of the Cherán movement to future research.

Figure 3. Geographical Localization of Cherán

Source: INEGI

Although there are no sizable rivers, the municipality has some minor creeks and springs where ranchers water their cattle. This is important insofar as they have, for a long time, represented the town's only access to water. Cherán-M borders the municipalities of Zacapu, Nahuatzen, Paracho, and Chilchota. Of these, the majority of trade and communication takes place with Nahuatzen and Paracho. Although its relationship with the surrounding municipalities is generally friendly, conflicts over land occasionally ensue in the region. Within the municipality, there are three main urban centers, the town of Cherán, El Cerecito, and Tanaco; however, the majority of the inhabitants of the municipality live in the town of Cherán, which is the capital of the municipality and sits at the crossroads of highways coming from Uruapan (to the south), Patzcuaro (to the east), and Zamora (north-west), three of the most important cities in the state.

Demographically, Cherán is quite similar to other towns in the region. According to the 2010 census the town Cherán has about 14,328 inhabitants of whom about 51% are women. However, since the early 1980s it has been difficult to estimate the real population and gender ratio in the municipality since an important number of the inhabitants, particularly men, frequently migrate to other parts of the country and the United States (specifically North Carolina, Missouri, and California). Additionally, this is a community strongly influenced by its indigenous roots; according to the latest census, about 23.76% of the households in Cherán-M have a head of household who speaks the Purepechan language (INEGI 2010), yet most of those who speak an indigenous language are bilingual in Spanish.

Historically, timber resources have played a central role in the municipality. Although Michoacán is the most important agricultural state in Mexico, traditionally the main economic activities in Cherán have been the exploitation of timber for the construction and trade of handmade furniture, the gathering of non-timber resources for trading, and small-scale agriculture for self-consumption.

However, since the 1980s the economic landscape of the municipality has changed significantly. Reforms to the Mexican economic system have created a growing class of merchants who sell goods coming from other parts of Mexico (or the United States) to local markets. Additionally, for at least two decades a significant number of citizens (mostly male) have migrated to the United States. Thus, an important number of families in Cherán-M (about 8.9% of households[27]) receive economic remittances from their family in the United States.

For its part, the political history of the town is marked by two political figures. On the one hand the 1920s Purepechan general Casimiro Leco, on the other, the ex-president Lázaro Cárdenas del Rio. While the former became famous for his defense of the area against the incursions of bandits in the early 1900s, the latter is famous for his social and economic policies attempting to generate modernization and social justice.

More recently, Cherán's political history echoes the experiences of many communities in the region. From the end of the revolution until 1988, the town remained under control of the ubiquitous Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). However, the public of Michoacán has a positive attachment to the Cárdenas family, owing largely to the creation of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (son of Lázaro Cárdenas) in an attempt to bring down the PRI in 1988. Ever since then, politics in Cherán have been dominated by the PRD. As I will discuss in later sections, understanding this political history is critical, since it was not until an internal dispute within the PRD ensued in 2008 that the PRI could regain control over the government of Cherán.

Both the PRI and the PRD had promised to end illegal logging in the municipalities of the region; however, neither party met with much success before 2008. For many years, individuals from Cherán-M and the surrounding municipalities had illegally cut trees from the surrounding forests to

[27] See figure 4.

sell wooden boards and pillars, as well as for the production of handcrafted furniture and toys. However, according to my interviewees, it was from 2008 (the year in which the PRI returned to power) onward that armed bands of illegal loggers who sold the wood wholesale intensified the devastation of the surrounding forest.

At first, the illegal loggers started to open up small roads into the northeastern side of the San Miguel Mountain (north of the town). Then they started to move to the northwest side of this mountain and spread to the nearby twin volcanos known as Los Cuates. Finally, from the fall of 2009 to late March of 2010 the loggers moved to the La Virgen Mountain.

According to estimates by the citizens of the town, by the end of March 2010, the loggers were bringing down about 600 tons of green wood every day (about 200 trips using 3-ton trucks). Moreover, they were starting to cut down trees around the Cofradía water spring, which has symbolic importance due to its role as a stopping point at which citizens can rest and ranchers can water their cattle.[28]

Methods

During this research stage (late 2013-late 2014), I traveled to and stayed in Cherán in order to conduct interviews with citizens who participated in the town's vigilante movement. My goal in these interviews was twofold. The first goal was to go beyond existing journalistic accounts to uncover a more detailed account of the 2011 vigilante movement. Second, I aimed to document citizens' personal experiences in the days before and after the town's climactic uprising to be able to

[28] My informants in Cherán identified two main sites in which the illegal wood that was cut in the area was taken for it to be laundered and inserted into the legal market: the towns of Tanaco and Capacuaro. These two centers of laundering informed the routes taken by the loggers in and out of the mountains of the municipality of Cherán. At first, the loggers entered through the north side of the municipality and exited through the roads towards Tanaco. However, as they moved towards the west, during the second half of 2009, the loggers were forced to move through Cherán in order to reach the lumber mills of Tanaco and Capacuaro.

analyze later the role that social capital and citizens' distrust in the authorities could have had in the emergence of this movement.

In order to select those who I would interview, I followed a snowball sampling procedure. Starting with my initial contact in the town, I asked each of my interviewees to introduce me to a fellow citizen who: a) they considered had played a critical role in the organization, development, or evolution of the 2011 movement or b) they regarded as having a privileged position for understanding the origins of the uprising. I assured all informants that I would keep their identity confidential with regard to these referrals. Whenever a participant did not introduce me to the next interviewee directly I kept the recommender's identity confidential.

Each in-depth-interview consisted of four stages, an introductory stage, an open interview stage, a semi-structured stage, and a final stage. During the introductory stage I introduced myself and the research project. Then, I secured written and verbal informed consent from the interviewees. I reassured the participants that all information would be used for academic purposes only, that no identifying information would be made public, and that all names mentioned would be changed using a random name generator. Finally, I asked participants if, under the terms described, they would allow me to record the audio of the interviews.[29]

During the second stage I asked participants an open question and let them elaborate on it as much as they saw fit: "Please try to recall what where you personally doing the morning of Friday April 15, 2011 and, from there, please tell me what happened in the town that day." I took this approach in order to avoid citizens' attachment to the standard narrative of the events. Thus, I let participants develop their own thoughts and narratives during this stage without any intervention on my part. Whenever I intervened I only did it to encourage the participants to tell me more about their experiences.

[29] For their own protection, I asked participants not to state their names or provide other identifying information. In the following sections, I avoid mentioning any information by which the participants could be identified.

The third stage of the interviews was semi-structured. I asked participants to talk about their contribution to the movement as well as their perception of the causes of the uprising. Again, I let participants talk as much as they wanted in response to these two questions and only intervened to encourage them to provide me with more information. In the final part of this section I included a battery of questions designed to recover information about citizens' perception of the illegal logging problem and their evaluation of the police and government in power between 2008 and 2012. However, only rarely did I have to inquire to subjects about these topics.

In the fourth and final stage of the interview I simply asked participants whether they had any information to add. As described before, after stopping the recording I asked participants whether they could recommend other citizens I could interview who they considered a) had played a critical role in the organization, development or evolution of the 2011 movement or b) were in a privileged position for understanding the origins of the uprising. Finally, participants were thanked for their participation and reassured once more that the information they provided would only be used confidentially.

All and all I recorded 31 interviews with key citizens in the town. My interviewees occupied important positions in the organization and development of the movement and included: ten school teachers (32.26% of the sample), three members of the clergy (9.68%), four students or academics (13%), two former members of the armed forces (6.45%), four farmers (13%), six housewives (19.3%), and two merchants (6.45%). Moreover, of the citizens with whom I recorded an interview 13% were political party operatives or activists before the movement, and, at the time of the writing of this chapter, 48.39% (15) occupy an administrative role within the structure of Cherán's autonomous government. Finally, of the total sample twelve interviewees were female (38.7%) and the rest were male (61.29%).

I recorded each of the interviews using a Livescribe-Echo recording device. This hardware allowed me to insert time marks within the audio files in order to facilitate later access to the relevant information within the recordings. I then analyzed the information collected in these interviews in two different ways.

First, building from extant academic and journalistic research, I recreated a timeline of the events of April 15, 2011. I differentiate between three distinct vigilante actions (stages) occurring within the larger movement: the confrontation, self-defense actions, and self-government. Second, using this distinction, I look at citizens' accounts of the events to describe the role that citizens' social capital and distrust in the authorities could have played in each of the stages of Cherán's vigilante movement.

Before moving to these two sub-sections it is important to note that, in the following subdivisions of this chapter, I make some references to the interviews described above. To follow through with the confidentiality agreement consented at the beginning of the interviews, and due to the sensitive nature of the information, in the following sections I have censored all the demographic characteristics of the subjects interviewed.

Further, whenever I included names to make the narrative clearer, I substituted the original name with a random name obtained from the webpage www.fakenamegenerator.com. In order to avoid accidental coincidences, I used a pool of American names. Thus, any concurrence with names of actual citizens from Nahuatzen or Cherán is merely accidental.[30]

[30] While doing my best to preserve the meaning of interviewees' responses, sometimes it was necessary for me to change or insert text into the quotes. This was done only to make the quote clearer or to protect the identity of the interviewee. All additions or changes are indicated by brackets [ ].

Results 1: A Vigilante Movement in Three Acts

As described in the previous section, Cherán's citizens had faced the incursion of illegal loggers into their territory for quite some time, and things remained this way until April 15, 2011 when citizens of Cherán, armed with sticks and stones, confronted the illegal loggers. In order to recover a more detailed timeline in each of my interviews with citizens and elites of Cherán I asked them to recall, in addition to the official story, their own experiences in the days before and after the uprising. With these interviews I built a new timeline that distinguishes between the three stages: the **initial confrontation stage**, **the self-defense stage**, and the **self-government stage**. In each of these stages citizens of Cherán had to make a choice: to allow the state to intervene or to take matters into their own hands. In the next section I describe each of these stages. Then, I review how community organizations and distrust in the authorities played a role in the emergence of each of them.

Stage One: Confrontation

The first stage of the movement started on April 15, 2011, at about 5:00am when a group of 15 men and women gathered in front of the Calvary Church with the objective of confronting illegal loggers who had crossed through the town. After twenty minutes one of the young members of the group started to ring the bell of the church. By 7:00 am, approximately 75 citizens had gathered at the church, hoping to learn more information.

At 7:30 am a group of about 100 citizens intercepted a truck that attempted to cross the city filled with wood. The loggers attempted to escape, but the citizens had set up roadblocks in the surrounding streets, trapping the alleged criminals. After a brief confrontation (henceforth *the uprising*), the citizens were able to overpower five unarmed loggers. They took them out of their vehicles, tied them up, beat them, and interrogated them for about ninety minutes.

Figure 4. Timeline of the Uprising of Cherán

Year	Date	Time	Event
2011	April 15th	≈5am	Initial Meeting at the Calvary Church
		≈7am	Confrontation
		≈9:00 am	Mercenary/Police Attack
		≈10:00 am	Call to the Military Bases
		≈1:00	*Attack to the Municipal Government*
	April 16th		*Fogatas and* Barricades emerge
	April 17th		Negotiations to free hostages start
	April 29th		Large protest in The City of Morelia
	June-September		Process of Registration of Candidates
	November 2nd		Supreme Court ruling on Cherán's right to self determination
	November 13th		State Elections (Cancelled in Cherán)
	December 18th		Electoral Institute of Michoacán conducts referendum in Cherán (Political Parties vs Traditional Elections)
2012	January 21st		Official Election by Indigenous Traditions

At about 9:00 am a group of men armed with semiautomatic weapons (referred to as *sicarios* [paid mercenaries, hired-killers, assassins]) tried to rescue the loggers detained at the Calvary Church. While some of the citizens started to throw dust into the air to hinder the loggers' visibility, others threw rocks at them. One logger was injured during this confrontation forcing the remaining *sicarios* to flee.

After these events, citizens started to fear the possibility that the *sicarios* would return once more to attempt to rescue the captured loggers. They were afraid that this time the *sicarios* would realize that the people of Cherán were relatively defenseless and would commit a massacre in the town. In the face of this threat, some of the citizens who were involved in the initial rescue attempt decided to telephone the military bases in the neighboring cities of Zamora and Morelia to ask for the intervention of the army (at about 10:00 am). However, according to one of the citizens who

tried to reach the army, military personnel asked them to send a formal letter of request signed by the mayor so they could process their request. Dismayed by this response, citizens asked the town priest to persuade the mayor to send the police to the Calvary Church in order to protect those in the vicinity. According to one of my sources, after calling the municipal government, the priest told them that the mayor had been threatened by the organized crime and would not intervene in the issue.

Stage Two: Self Defense

The self-defense movement began at this point. After hearing that no government law enforcement agencies would intervene immediately, citizens began to take actions to prevent the loggers' potential retaliation.

On the one hand, some of the younger citizens gathered around the Calvary Church came down (around 3:00pm of that day) to attack the House of Culture,[31] with the objective of arming themselves. After a brief skirmish between the mob and the local police, the citizens were successful in seizing guns, bullets, and vehicles from the municipal police. After these events, the armed citizens returned to Calvary Church, where they stayed to guard the detained loggers. Hundreds of citizens remained near the church until late at night; however, because the night continued in relative calm, most of the citizens decided that it was best to return to their homes.

Although the majority of the citizens stayed in their homes in the following days, many were still scared of the possibility of armed retaliation from the illegal loggers. In anticipation of an attack, citizens set up roadblocks in every corner of the town in the event the loggers were bold enough to return to the community.

[31] The location of the municipal government at the time.

During the daytime, some of the neighbors would guard the small roadblocks, but at night, neighbors would bring out food to spend some time in community. During the first night, these improvised campfires served no other purpose than providing shelter to those waiting for potential retaliation from the loggers; however, over time, these basic self-defense units (known as *fogatas)* became the basic unit of social and political organization in Cherán.

The *fogatas* played three critical roles in and after the secondary self-defense movement. First, they served as a strategic center for the diffusion of aid and information. Citizens of Cherán would naturally come to the *fogata* to learn about the most recent developments in the conflict. It is true that, sometimes, the information transmitted in these centers was composed of rumor and speculation. However, it is also true that those in charge of negotiating with the government used these structures as a tool to inform citizens about the progress being made in those exchanges. Further, whenever other communities sent aid to Cherán, the *fogatas* provided those receiving the aid with the opportunity to spread it around the community efficiently.

Second, the *fogatas* served as a center of political participation. In addition to allowing for a relatively efficient dissemination of aid and information, the *fogatas* became important centers of political participation. There were a number of decisions that needed to be discussed and voted on by the community; however, conducting a large assembly every time that there was a relevant development in the case was impractical and too demanding. Thus, every *fogata* was encouraged to elect a representative in charge of interacting with the movement's leadership. These representatives were not only in charge of bringing the opinion of their *fogata* to the leadership of the movement (often in large assemblies); it was also their job to bring topics of discussion back to their *fogata*.

Additionally, it was in the *fogatas* where citizens were recruited to serve in the new social and political structures emerging during and after the secondary self-defense movement. In the first and second week after April 15, leaders of the movement supported the creation of a "council of honor

and justice." This council went to the *fogatas* in order to recruit volunteers to form an independent communitarian police.

Finally, the *fogatas* served to promote social bonding and participation in a number of different ways. On the one side, they created a bridge between citizens who would not have the opportunity to interact otherwise. Although most people in Cherán know their neighbors, there is no guarantee that they share interests or worldviews. Thus, by providing a framework in which to participate together, *fogatas* allowed citizens to converse with individuals with whom they would not interact otherwise. Additionally, the external threat represented by the loggers and the *fogatas* that resulted from it, provided citizens with a framework through which they could resolve conflicts. Before April 15, some neighbors did not interact due to mutual resentments, indebtedness, or general animosity toward each other. However, by being forced to interact under the threat of retaliation, many citizens had no choice but to talk through their problems and strengthen their relationships. Finally, the *fogatas* provided a structure through which the actions of pre-existing community organizations could be channeled.

Stage Three: Achieving Community-Led Long-Term Security

During the first week of the movement citizens and *fogata* representatives held assemblies in the Calvary Church to discuss the future of the detainees and the security of the town. However, these assemblies were so large that it was necessary to create a Coordination Council. This council was composed of three representatives from each of the neighborhoods in the town and had as its central objective the delineation of a plan for achieving security, justice, and the preservation of the forest.

At first, the strategy focused on pressuring the state and federal government to the point that they had to acquiesce to the citizens' demands. The first time the council attempted to pressure the

government was during the negotiations for the liberation of the six illegal loggers detained on April 15. Citizens of Cherán expected that, in exchange for releasing the detained loggers, the state would set up military checkpoints around the town to defend the citizens of the community and the surrounding forests. However, these negotiations took an unexpected turn when the council learned that the neighboring community from which some of the detainees came from (Capacuaro) had kidnaped some of Cherán's own citizens. Thus, instead of centering on Cherán's demands, the negotiations focused on the terms and conditions for the exchange of prisoners between the two communities.[32]

The second way in which the council attempted to pressure the government consisted of employing two strategies simultaneously. The first strategy was to reach out to the media and set up signs along the roadblocks located at the entrances to the town. The second strategy involved traveling to the capital (Morelia) to ask for a meeting with the state government. Although some representatives met with Cherán's Coordination Council, these actions had little effect on the situation. It was not until thousands of citizens, movement sympathizers, traveled to Morelia in order to demonstrate in front of the offices of the state government that the governor finally met with the council. As a result, the citizens of Cherán finally received reassurances that the army would take up the responsibility of patrolling the forests around the municipality.

However, only days after this meeting, an event set in motion the third self-defense movement. On July 2 the Federal Electoral Institute announced the solicitation for national and local elections. Within Cherán's Coordination Council this prompted the question of whether to trust the government's commitment to holding local elections and securing a return to relative normalcy. The prevailing sentiment within the council was that the political parties served no other purpose than dividing the community; thus, in order to secure peace within the town it was

[32] In the end, Cherán accepted terms in which they would release the illegal loggers they had captured in exchange for the liberation of the citizens of Cherán that had been kidnapped by some citizens of the community of Capacuaro.

necessary to prevent the elections from taking place. From July until the end of August, the council and its lawyers attempted to prevent elections in the community, but were unsuccessful. However, the pressure was so constant that in September of that year the state government broadened the constitution to allow citizens of Cherán to transition towards a political model in which the council would have a voice in the new municipal government.[33]

This decision prompted the council to consider the choice of settling for a position in a new municipal government or demanding a government characterized by indigenous traditions (i.e., a uses and customs government) completely changing the political institutions of Cherán. In the end the council decided to seek a government of uses and customs and held traditional elections (by public vote in an assembly) the last week of October 2011 (Caraballo, 2012). Although the new uses and customs government began working right after this election, the legal battle for this new type of government was drawn out for months. After a short battle in court, the State Electoral Institute was finally ordered to conduct a referendum to ask citizens whether they wanted to change their style of government. In November 2011, the election took place with an overwhelming victory for the uses and customs government (Magaña, 2011). Finally, after a Supreme Court ruling in favor of Cherán's citizens' right to elect their own leaders through indigenous traditional elections, in January 2012, the State Electoral Institute repeated the elections and recognized the new set of leaders (Magaña, 2012).

But how did citizens' social capital and distrust in their government influence their decision to take the law into their own hands? In the next section I answer this question by examining some of the events leading up to the movement as well as the accounts of some of its key participants.

[33] Initially, it was suggested that the council function as the *cabildo*. The *cabildo* currently is a local set of elected officials in charge of co-administering the executive branch with the mayor as a sort of municipal-level legislature. Yet, since citizens decided to pursue the full establishment of a government of uses and customs, what the precise nature of the council should be was never determined.

Results 2: A Strong Community in a Legitimacy Crisis

Distrust in The Government and Cherán's Movement

A superficial exploration of Cherán shows a general retrospective sentiment of contempt for the government that led the town before the events of 2011. However, it is unclear whether these are post-hoc evaluations or if they reflect a real state of crisis before 2011. Thus, it is important to investigate the political environment before the conflict. As I will discuss later, I find that right before the movement emerged the municipal government crossed into a deep legitimacy crisis. Further, I argue that this erosion of legitimacy can be traced back to the very structure of the Mexican electoral system and thus has the potential to spread horizontally (to other municipalities) and vertically (at the state and national level) throughout the Mexican political system.

Primary Stage

To recall, for eighteen years, the municipality of Cherán-M had been governed by the leftist PRD (1990-2008), and during that time, it had incorporated the town's customs into its primaries. The PRD would select three candidates from each neighborhood and then hold primaries between the twelve selected candidates. The winner was nominated for mayor, the runner-up was to be nominated for *síndico*, and the rest were nominated for *regidor*.[34]

Although not everyone was satisfied, this strategy was relatively effective in achieving symbolic representation in the town of Cherán. However, in other cities within the municipality (e.g., Tanaco and Casimiro Leco) the story was different. Since the PRD's primary election offered little representation to those living outside of the four traditional neighborhoods within the town of Cherán, citizens outside Cherán tended to support the PRD's closest opposition, the PRI. Yet, for

[34] The *síndico* is the equivalent of the local attorney general. This office's functions include representing the municipality legally and settling land conflict between landowners. The *regidores* within the municipality are local legislators in charge of creating municipal level regulation.

eighteen years the PRD was able to secure control of the municipality by a large margin (between 50 and 60% of the votes).

In 2008 politics took an unexpected turn. After a very close primary, the runner-up did not accept the winner's victory and decided to accept an alternative candidacy via a new party trying to break into Michoacán's political landscape, the Party of Social-Democratic Alliance (PAS). Thus, in the 2008 municipal elections the PRD's primary winner not only competed against the PRI but also against an unusually popular candidate from PAS.

As Figures 5a-5c show, this caused PRD voters to split between those supporting the primary winner (Faction 1[PRD]) and those in favor of the runner-up (Faction 2[PAS]). Although PAS was able to secure 35% of the votes inside the town of Cherán, and the PRD was able to rally as much as 31% of the voters within the community (see Figure 5a), they were not able to win the municipality as a whole (see Figure 5b) due to the fact that the PRI was able to secure 62% of votes from the citizens living *outside* the capital of the municipality (see Figure 5c).

Figures 5a.-5c. Municipal Elections in the Municipality of Cherán (Cherán-M)

Figure 5a. Inside the Town of Cherán



Figure 5b. Total Results in Cherán-M



Figure 5c. Outside of the Town of Cherán



Source: Michoacán Electoral Institute (iem.org.mx)

In sum, 66.31% of the voters *in the town* of Cherán turned out to vote for one of two leading factions within the PRD, however, the least popular party, the PRI, won the municipal government, which, according to their perspective, occurred thanks to the votes of people outside of the community. These events, I argue, triggered a crisis of legitimacy that eroded citizens' trust in the town authorities in particular and the political system more generally.

First, the closeness of the elections caused the political elites to put the winner of the election and its government into question. Not only did the PRD sympathizers not acknowledge the PRI's victory but they occupied the Town Hall and held daily rallies around it to proclaim the municipal government's illegitimacy and ask for its recall. The anti-government movement was so strong within the municipal capital that the new PRI government had to move its offices to the House of Culture (far from the center of the town).[35] One of my interviewees explained:

> [After the PRI won the election] we wanted [the local government to be impeached].[36] We occupied the town hall and kicked the mayor out of there. He rented a house and ultimately went to the House of Culture; he never really governed. The occupation lasted two years [...] but we couldn't achieve anything because the PRI is one of those parties that have always played dirty.

Second, the distribution of votes generated a sentiment of suspicion about the new government. Not only had this government not come from a customary primary, but it was also a different party than the one preferred by the vast majority of the citizens in the municipal capital. What is more, the government was elected into office due to votes coming from other communities that might have very different interests and priorities.

In sum, the electoral rules of the PRD municipal primaries (simple majority winner-takes-all with no runoff) allowed a candidate to win without majority consent. At the same time, the

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[35] The House of Culture is a governmental institution designed to promote artistic activities in the town. In Cherán, the House of Culture is located near the southwestern entrance to the town.

[36] The interviewee actually said "we wanted *desaparición de poderes*". This refers to a procedure by which, in Mexico, a higher level of government removes lower-level elected officials from power. Often this occurs due to social unrest, violence, corruption, scandals, or political instability. This happened in the state of Michoacán circa 2013, and that is probably why the interviewee chose these words.

proportional representation system at the national level (responsible for the emergence of minority parties searching for local strongholds) provided the losing sector with incentives to reject the results and seek an alternative nomination. These two factors combined caused the dominant PRD to fractionalize and enter an election with three parties with similar levels of support. The electoral rules of the municipal election, in turn, allowed the PRI (the party that otherwise would have been the least likely to win) to win without sufficient consent and, ultimately, drove the town into a legitimacy crisis.

This crisis, evident in an environment of political dissatisfaction and elite contention, eroded citizens' trust in the government and its institutions. Not only did citizens become increasingly suspicious of the PRI government, they also became more and more distrustful of police agents' actions and intentions. Since I argue that an environment of high distrust in authorities set the stage for the emergence of Cherán's vigilante movement, it is important to trace how this legitimacy crisis eroded citizens' confidence in the government's willingness to intervene to stop organized criminals' incursions into Cherán-M's territory.

First of all, citizens perceived the PRI government to be corrupt and the police to be populated by overbearing officers from communities outside of Cherán. For example, when I asked a citizen about the quality of the police during the 2008-2011 PRI government he responded:

> The policemen were always overbearing. They always thought that because they were police they could do whatever they wanted... There were five or six people who were killed or died in jail… there was also a young man who was taken by the patrol after a party and then appeared dead in a soccer field.

And another interviewee said,

> When we were evaluating what to do, we thought the municipal police cannot be police anymore. They proved that [they were involved with the criminals]. Most of them came from outside the community, and many of them were already involved in crime.

Secondly, some citizens perceived the increase in illegal logging to be directly related to the PRI's commitment to the surrounding communities' interests in logging the forests. One of the people I interviewed recalled,

> In his campaign, [the 2008 PRI candidate (who later became mayor)] ... went [to the communities where most of the loggers lived] and offered them the forests. He said, "If you support me I offer you [...] the forests for you to exploit," and starting from 2008, more open exploitation of the forests started.

Thirdly, citizens believed the authorities to be unprepared, impotent and thus incapable of standing up to the loggers. One of my interviewees said,

> Even when it became very evident that the loggers were bringing a lot of wood down, [the government] never did anything to stop them. It's like they didn't even care. That's why people said the president gave away that mountain over there (signaling to one of the surrounding mountains).

Some of the citizens in Cherán even believe that the police were responsible for a significant part of the crime occurring in the area. One of the citizens I was able to interview said, "It was...municipal policemen who were doing all the disappearances. [They were] extorting merchants, threatening citizens and [more]. That is why we were asking for security! For a trustworthy security!"

In addition to the legitimacy crisis caused by the way the PRI won the elections, between 2008 and 2011 there were a number of political assassinations that further deteriorated citizens' perception of the trustworthiness of the town's authorities. The first assassination occurred only months after the PRI's takeover. One of the most widely-recognized teacher-activists against illegal logging in the town (henceforth referred to as "Herbert") was murdered. One of my interviewees recalled,

> Herbert, in collaboration with other people, took machinery to open trenches. Further, they set up a sound system in the main square of the town to speak about the problem. I remember them saying, "Cherán, wake up! Your forests have been sold!"
>
> However, since the victory of the PRI in 2008, the mayor was against him and, as we all know, [the mayor] was involved with the "bad guys". Therefore, it was not long

> until they decided to assassinate Herbert. They kidnapped him on the morning of the 8th of May of 2008, […] outside of the Teacher Supervision Center. The next day in the afternoon they found his body in a landfill nearby. They had tortured him before killing him.

Although he was a controversial figure, Herbert was well respected within the community and his disappearance was to many of the citizens of the town a signal of the government's willingness to cooperate with organized crime to obtain its political objectives.

The last series of assassinations that shook citizens' trust in authorities occurred only two months before the primary stage of the vigilante movement. This time the victims were three citizens who had been elected in a public assembly with the explicit objective of lobbying the government to take action against illegal logging in the municipality. One of my interviewees explained,

> The group [...] was confirmed by eight community members. But organized crime ended up assassinating or disappearing now four of that group. The first disappeared four years ago [2009], the other three disappeared in February (2011)...[only two months before the movement].

These representatives not only met with the government but also organized protests and dug trenches to stop the crossing of the illegal loggers. To this day, the bodies of the kidnapped representatives have not been found. To many in Cherán, these disappearances constituted evidence of the government's incapacity or unwillingness (or possibly even collusion) with regard to stopping illegal logging in the region. For example, when asked about the actions that citizens took against the presence of illegal loggers in the town, one of my interviewees commented,

> People would make meetings. However, if someone dared to speak in public, he would last, at most, eight days before [the government-crime coalition] would organize a kidnapping. They would [abduct] him and then someone would either find their dead body or they would never appear.
>
> [...] Since the mayor had all the authorities in his pocket, he only needed to get together with the [organized crime lieutenant], they would make a plan, and they would take out any [dissidence].

Secondary Stage

The erosion of citizens' trust in government law enforcement was also critical for the start of the secondary stage of the vigilante movement. Even though before April 15 citizens had little trust that the municipal police would intervene to stop illegal loggers, after they confronted and detained the illegal loggers by themselves citizens hoped that the police would take the prisoners and defend the citizens against an eventual retaliation by the cartels. In an interview a witness of the events recalled, "When the police crossed [in front of my house] I told my neighbor –The police are going that way, perhaps they are going to defend those who are up there–But no, they were going to defend the bad guys."

The collaboration between police and organized crime to attempt to rescue the captured illegal loggers quickly eroded citizens' trust in the municipal government. As one of my interviewees said:

> It was very evident that the government [was working together] with the "bad guys" here [...]. When [the illegal loggers] came down with the wood [on April 15] the ones who opened the way for them to escape were municipal policemen. That is why the people got pissed off and said... NO WAY! [Outraged]
>
> The [movement emerged out of that] situation with the municipal police, and the municipal police as a symbol of the government.

Moreover, the role that the deterioration of trust played during the secondary stage of the movement is evident in the alternatives that citizens sought before taking the defense of the town into their own hands. Specifically, it is very telling that citizens reached out for the army and the church, the two most trustworthy institutions, to try to solve the emerging crisis. During an interview, one of the citizens involved in the initial stage of the movement explained how, initially, they still hoped for the intervention of the state:

> Interviewee: What I was asking was for the army to intervene. Because I have a telephone in my house I called the army in Zamora at about 10:00 am. They

> answered but told me that, in order for them to intervene; they would need a signed authorization from the municipal government.
>
> Researcher: And what did you think when they told you that?
>
> Interviewee: A great deal of disillusion and fear. Because people then thought [the ones who confronted the loggers] put us in a huge problem. So, then, I called the army base in Morelia. However, they told us exactly the same thing.

After not receiving help from the army, citizens turned to another traditionally trusted institution, the Catholic Church. The same interviewee continued,

> Then [after the army's refusal to intervene], […] I left the people that at the time was surrounding me and went to the Church in order to talk with the priest. I asked him, "Father, what are we going to do? Without weapons, without anything, what are we going to do now?" He said, "Only god knows!"
>
> Then, I asked him to call [the mayor and his assistant] and they told him that they could not do anything because they had also been threatened.

In sum, my research of the events surrounding the secondary self-defense movement, as well as my interviews with some of the actors involved in those events, suggest that the citizens' choice to build *fogatas*, barricade the town, and confiscate the police's weapons relates back to their perception that the government was unlikely to intervene to prevent an eventual violent retaliation by the cartels.

Tertiary Stage

The citizens' decision to form an autonomous government to achieve security, justice and the preservation of their forests in the long run (labeled the tertiary vigilante moment) also seem to relate back to citizens' distrust in Mexico's political system.

As described earlier, even after deciding to defend against probable cartel retaliation, citizens continued to pressure the government in the hope that it would take measures to ensure their safety in the long run. It was not until the government called for the registration of candidates for the next

electoral cycle that citizens of Cherán decided to take the government of the town and, thus, the long-term provision of security into their own hands (tertiary vigilante movement).[37]

Three factors informed the citizens of Cherán's estimations that they could expect to achieve long-term stability within the Mexican political system: 1) citizens' perception of the progress of their negotiation with the government; 2) their perception of the effectiveness of the measures taken by the government; and 3) their perception of the impact of political parties in Cherán's civic society. The Coordination Council believed that the negotiations were too slow and only moved forward whenever they were able to mobilize the whole community. An interviewee who was close to this process stated:

> The Coordination Council insisted that it wanted to be received [by the governor in the city of Morelia (the capital of the state)]. It was continuously coming and going to and from the city [...] but never managed to be received.
>
> Once, the sub-secretary and the secretary of the governor received us [...] but we told them –we don't want to talk to you-[...] we want to talk with whoever is going to resolve our problem.
>
> [...] What did we do? We called for a meeting of the entire community and said –let's go everyone to Morelia– Then, everyone went [to the capital], except the elderly. It wasn't until then that the governor received us.

However, even when they managed to secure some reaction by the government, citizens' skepticism of the authorities remained strong. My interviewee continued:

> When the governor received us it was all the same. He made promises, he signed the minutiae of the meeting, and he fulfilled his promises half-way. He set up some security measures but only here in the community, not around the municipality. Thus, we had to protest in Morelia once more, the entire community [...], it was only at that point when he finally put eight security filters all around the municipality. However, we never let them [the police] enter here inside the town, they always had to stay outside of the barricades.

[37] It's important to note that the citizens of Cherán's decision to govern themselves was, in the beginning, legally controversial. It was not until November that the Supreme Court finally ruled in favor of their right to self-determination.

Moreover, by the time the call for candidates appeared, citizens' disconnection with the state had become so profound that the movement in itself had come to be about defending the community against the social divisions that, they believed, were caused by the political parties. One participant elaborated:

> Interviewee: When the deadline to register candidates came, we didn't have any registered because, since the very beginning of the movement, we had said that we didn't want any more parties in the town.
>
> Researcher*:* How did that idea come to be?
>
> Interviewee: A now deceased comrade, who had always been militant with regard to the PRI, […] said: "No more political parties in Cherán! Not even one! It's thanks to them that we are in the state in which we are right now. They are the root cause of the divisionism in the community." So, at that point in time, we even set aside our demands for justice and security, and we focused on the fact that we wanted the political system completely out of the community.

Another interviewee said, "The problem was that we had said that we didn't want more parties anymore, so we had to decide how to rule ourselves."

In sum, my analysis of the testimonies of some of the most important actors in this movement shows that citizens' distrust in the government played a critical role in the emergence of the primary, secondary, and tertiary vigilante movement in Cherán. By April 15 citizens in Cherán had little hope that the municipal government would intervene to stop the illegal logging in the surrounding areas. This negative environment was fueled by the controversial election of the PRI (due to the electoral rules in Mexico) and a history of political assassinations and impunity in the municipality.

Moreover, the deterioration of citizens' trust in the government's likelihood to intervene also played an important role in the emergence of the secondary and tertiary vigilante movements in Cherán. While the police's intervention in favor of the illegal loggers influenced citizens' decision to defend themselves against the retaliation of the loggers, in later stages of the conflict the difficulty of

the negotiations and citizens' perceptions of the effect of the political parties influenced their choice to seek a community-based approach to long-term security.

Social Capital and Cherán's Self-Defense Movement

As evidenced by the statements of my interviewees, it seems that at every point in the movement citizens faced negative prospect with regard to state authorities' intervention. Moreover, given the gruesome assassination of individuals standing up to the logger-cartel alliance, individual action seemed unlikely to be conducive to a solution to the problem. Still, citizens seemed to face a choice between individual escape and collective action. Indeed, many (if not the majority of) Mexican citizens have migrated to other areas of the country or to the united states facing similar situations (Hastings, 2013). Thus, what conditions favored citizens' from Cherán's willingness to engage in collective vigilante justice? I argue that it is critical to turn to the preexisting structures, norms and networks (a.k.a. social capital) in the town in order to better understand the emergence of this movement.

Social capital is a "new old" idea. That is, it refers to a concept that, although it has been around since the times of de Tocqueville (1863), it has only recently been incorporated into theories of economic and democratic development.

As they go through life, citizens face a diversity of problems and tasks. Sometimes, citizens can derive utility by investing their individual physical or human capital into these tasks but, sometimes, citizens face challenges and opportunities that are unlikely to result in positive outcomes without investments that go well beyond any particular individual's capacity. It is in these moments that citizens find that they need to appeal to their community for collaboration in order to achieve these outcomes collectively. It is this latent capacity to trigger effective collective action which a number of authors have defined as **social capital**.

With regards to its origin, Putnam has characterized social capital as emerging from the "connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (Putnam 2000, 19), and both Coleman (Coleman, 1988, 1990) and Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 1996) have echoed this position.

Social networks refer to family links, informal community networks, social organizations, etc. that need to be maintained through the investment of time, effort, and fiscal resources. Although they might suppose some costs for citizens, they are deemed to result in social capital because they provide citizens with a scaffold through which solidarity, common interest, and information may flow. Social norms refer to commonly accepted principles and patterns of behavior as well as the informal sanctions that make them effective. These norms are deemed to be conducive to social capital since they provide citizens with some sort of reassurance that they will be able to benefit, even if immediate individual utility is unlikely or far removed (Newton 1997; Ostrom 1998; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994). Finally, social trust refers to citizens' general expectation that other members of the community will behave in a benevolent and consistent way. They reassure citizens that others will be likely to cooperate even in the absence of potential punishment. In the following section I describe whether and how each of these factors emerged in the interviews I collected with citizens involved in Cherán's 2011 self-defense movement.

Before moving on to what I found during the interviews that I conducted with key actors, it is important to acknowledge that most citizens with whom I spoke casually told me a story that disparages the importance of preexisting social capital and the community's organizational capacity. This frequent narrative (which I call the "standard story") portrays the uprising as a spontaneous act of outrage and bravery undertaken by a group of old ladies. This view has become so popular that one of the citizens I interviewed said, "There was nothing, this was spontaneous. It was the women who normally wake up early to go to mass [who were] the ones who confronted the loggers."

Many of my interviewees began our conversation with similar statements, however, whenever I asked them about their personal experiences before, during, and after the uprising a different picture started to emerge.

Primary Stage

I found that, although the majority of citizens who participated in Cherán's vigilante movement were largely unprepared, the uprising as a whole does not seem to have been entirely spontaneous. On the contrary I found evidence that the uprising involved planning and that this vigilante movement was not the first time in which community organizations attempted to directly solve the illegal logging problem.

Long before the events of April 15, citizen-led ranchers, farmers, and teachers organizations attempted to address the illegal logging problem by themselves. At first, citizens attempted to publicly pressure the authorities to solve the illegal logging crisis. For example, in the spring of 2008 community members gathered in a large assembly and elected eight unofficial members (two per neighborhood) as representatives of communal goods. Their job consisted of lobbying against the illegal loggers crossing through the municipality. Although this committee held meetings with the local government and even traveled to the state capital to meet with state government officials, little was done to limit the loggers' incursions.

As a result, the efforts of the communal goods representatives became more and more dangerous, to the point that by March 2011, they decided to go to the offices of the municipal government to resign from their posts as communal good representatives. After giving up their mandate, three of the members were kidnapped and executed by organized criminals.

Scared of suffering the same fate, other religious, professional, and economic groups attempted to influence the local government discretely or in secret. A group of teachers organized a

task force to generate collaboration between the PRI government and the PRD opposition to fight the illegal loggers. Due to the effective participation of the town priest, citizens were able to organize a meeting between the opposing factions in the town. However, none of the politicians stayed at the meeting, and the citizens were left with a sense of frustration and disappointment with the political elites of the town. A citizen close to the organization of this meeting lamented,

> We, and people of good will, met [...] with the president [...] and with the representative of communal goods [...] what we asked was unity. [We told them,] "We will leave [...] you to talk. Make a plan for us! Make a plan of activities and tell us what to do. We are not going to leave you alone, tell us what to do and we will do it." Then, we left them there, on the plaza.
>
> We had not even finished speaking when each of the participants went on their way. Thus, our attempt to bring them together and make them talk to each other was worthless!

Seeing the ineffectiveness of lobbying the state and local authorities, other groups attempted to take matters into their own hands and involved the government only tangentially. More than one group emerging from the existing ranchers, farmers, and professional associations met months before the uprising to dig large holes in the dirt roads surrounding Cherán to prevent the loggers from being able to reach the still virgin sections of forest. These groups continued to take this approach in the months leading to the uprising. Although these groups were already taking matters into their own hands, they were not expecting to have to directly confront the loggers. Whatever the case, it was not long until the loggers attacked them, and when this happened, the participants were forced to resort to the police. Unfortunately, the police response was slow or nonexistent to the point that citizens became convinced of the ineffectiveness or outright complicity of the state security forces operating in the community. I interviewed one of the citizens who participated in these extralegal groups. He stated, "The farmers invited me to go to the forest. [...] We tried to break the roads where the illegal loggers crossed. We tried [but] we were not prepared, [...] they kicked us out [...] with bullets." After barely escaping alive from the attack he and his companions went to the

municipal palace and asked to talk with the mayor. He recalled, "We asked for a hearing with the mayor [but] he left us there, hanging. That's how much he cared for solving the problems. Everyone was left with the feeling of what we had lived there. We started to say, 'They are all the same, they are part of the same.'"

But this was not the only approach to the problem. Other groups, feeling uncertain about their capacity to confront the loggers directly, took an indirect approach. A group of eight ranchers, for instance, held secret meetings one month before the uprising. They decided to look more closely into the possibility of hiring armed mercenaries to confront the illegal loggers crossing through the town. A citizen close to these events commented,

> In addition to cutting the trees, the loggers were stealing cattle. So, some days before the movement, [some people of the town] formed a secret group [...] of about eight [...] ranchers [not to confront the loggers directly] but to hire mercenaries.
>
> And the question was: Who goes? Who will make the negotiation? Where do we find mercenaries? So one of us said, "I know a group in Nurio, they are army deserters," and [another one] added, "I know another group in Copucho, but it's expensive. So, who wants to go and talk to them? I will tell you where they are."
>
> [The group] had a first talk with the mercenaries and they said, "You know, we'll go, but we want half a million pesos in advance, and the rest you will give it to us when we give you the bodies. And the problem was to collect that amount of money." One rancher in the group said, "I will donate one cow for the cause," and another one followed, "I will donate two..." However, it was insufficient to get the quantity that [the mercenaries] were asking as an advance. [...] So, the group was in the process of gathering the money and seeing who was going to do the final negotiation and all of that when the movement happened.

Not only was the mercenaries' quote too high, the ranchers also distrusted their intentions. Particularly, they feared entering into a vicious cycle of extortion in which the mercenaries would charge them regular fees in order not to terrorize them.

All in all, there is evidence that before the 2011 uprising preexisting community groups were actively pressuring the government to take effective action to solve the problem of illegal logging. Moreover, my interviews suggest that, as citizens became increasingly disillusioned with the

government's response, they started to seek more direct action. But what was the role of preexisting community organizations in the organization of the uprising itself?

Not only is the standard story silent about the role of community organizations, it perpetuates the idea that the uprising was primarily spontaneous. However, a more careful investigation of the events leading up to the uprising suggests a more nuanced story. While it is true that some of the citizens of Cherán were surprised by the events of April 15, I found indications that a number of citizens participated in preparing for the uprising by spread around flyers before the event. One of my interviewees recalled,[38]

> On the 15th I went out of my house to exercise with my neighbor at around 5:50am. I found a flyer on my door. I didn't give it much importance, but there were a lot thrown on the sidewalk and in the street.
>
> When we crossed the street there were also a lot of flyers, when we crossed the street of the hospital there were even more flyers, and when we arrived to the sports unit, there were fliers spread all around the soccer field.
>
> It was then when I asked myself, why are there so many papers thrown around? So when I came back I picked up the flyer and red it and in the flyer it said that we should do something because they were taking all of the wood. That we should organize with our neighbors, with our family, with those on our street because the guys from Tanaco had already arrived to the water spring.

Another interviewee told me,

> I was not involved in the preparation of the flyers, but I recall seeing them. The day before the confrontation I spent all afternoon in my mother's house. However, I decided to go back to my house around 10:00 pm. As I was coming back to my house my brother stopped me and told me: "See! Finally, someone is organizing for what you've been talking about all along." Then, I saw a flyer on one of the cars over there [*points towards the street*]. I didn't ask my brother any details about the flyer but I asked him to join us and not let us down.

Another interviewee recalled,

> I remember that on Thursday I was going up the hill when I caught up with a farmer and he told me, "Look, I found a flyer, it was lying on the floor by the Calvary Church." He handed it to me and I could read that it said: "If we don't rise up they

[38] What's more, citizens of Cherán recalled finding two different types of flyers — some handmade and others made by computer.

> are going to finish with our forests, and we are going to be left without water. And if we don't organize, then we will be lamenting [...] tomorrow in the Calvary Church. We will organize to detain them."

To follow up with this lead I tracked down and interviewed some of the actors most involved in the April 15th uprising. I found strong indicators that teachers, ranchers, and women from the 3rd neighborhood were organizing in advance:

> We were originally planning to stop them on Sunday. We thought about gathering in the Calvary Church. When the uprising started [we] had already warned all our relatives. We told our cousins who [have a business in the eastern side of town],[39] "Look, on Sunday we are planning to do this [*referring to the confrontation at the Calvary Church*]. As soon as you hear the bells you have to close the highway." Then, we have an aunt who lives all the way where the INI is.[40] We also told her, "We are thinking about this [referring to the uprising] are you not going to help us? And she said, "Yes, of course." "So, organize in this neighborhood! When you hear bells at the Calvary Church and some firecrackers it is because we already started." "My husband said this is the time of truth. If people help the ones who are starting this, we will be successful! If not, then we will be doomed." "Don't worry, I am organizing here already."

Another interviewee recalled:

> The day before the confrontation I spent all afternoon in my mother's house. I decided to go back to my house around 10:00pm ... When I arrived; there was a large group of women meeting with my husband. I am not sure about everything that was talked about in the meeting, but what I am sure about is that everyone attending agreed to meet next morning. At about 4:00 am, people were going to ring the bells and light up firecrackers in front of the Calvary Church for people to gather.

A citizen who directly participated in the events said,

> The butcher gave me the details. He said, tomorrow at 5am people are going to organize to meet in a place called Cruciro... I woke up about 5am and arrived there… there were about 15 people already (at the Calvary Church) …they had already set up large stones… they wouldn't let us pass; they said "We need people." There were many young people and some elderly people but only two women.

Finally, I found that although the organization of the uprising was largely secular, the local Catholic church played a role in facilitating its success. Even when I could not find

[39] Originally, the interview mentions the business's name, but I removed it to protect the interviewee's confidentiality.
[40] INI refers to the National Institute of Indigenous Studies. Note that the facilities of this institute are in the western exit of the town.

evidence of his participation in any concrete action, some interviewees perceived significant moral support from the town priest. For example, one of the women who was among the first 15 citizens who gathered outside the Calvary Church recalled how the priest came to give mass and instructed some of the citizens to stay out and fight and others to come into the church and pray. After finishing the mass, the woman recalls, the priest concluded his homily by telling the faithful, "Go on and defend yourselves. May God be with you."

All in all, the testimony from the citizens and elites of Cherán indicates that before 2011 groups of citizens emerging from a variety of community organizations were active in attempting to stop the illegal loggers. Initially, they worked within the framework of the state; however, as their confidence in the local political and law enforcement authorities deteriorated, they started to redirect their efforts towards extralegal action. Moreover, I found that, contrary to the standard story, the emergence of the uprising was not entirely spontaneous. It seems that a number of community groups prepared for the uprising together and independently. Further, it seems that the local priest played an important role as a moral support for those willing to confront the loggers. As another citizen who participated in the primary stage told me, "What is true is that they had already organized what they were going to do. Some were organized here; some were organized there. Most groups were planning to do it on Sunday but one group pushed the plans earlier. I am not sure who were the organizers, however, I have the feeling that it was the youth."

Secondary Stage

When analyzing the events following the direct confrontation of the loggers I found that Cherán's social capital also played a role in the towns' organization against an eventual retaliation from the cartels (secondary stage). On the one hand, preexisting social structures shaped the

organization of the movement; on the other, community groups helped provide leadership and support for the undertaking.

As described before, Cherán is divided into four traditional neighborhoods of about equal size: Aharikutin, Kéiku, Kalakua, and Pharikutin. These neighborhoods provide citizens with distinct identities and play an important role in community and political life. Even before the movement, it was customary for citizens to describe themselves as belonging to one of the traditional neighborhoods and participate in community life according to the role assigned to them.

For instance, during the patron saint's party, each neighborhood is in charge of financing a specific aspect of the celebration.[41] And every year citizens are elected within the neighborhood in which they live to work as volunteer organizers and fundraisers for the celebration. This neighborhood-based organization is not unique to the feast of Saint Francis (the patron saint). For virtually every local celebration, the traditional neighborhoods provide the framework through which citizens raise resources and organize collective action. Not surprisingly, this social framework seemed to set the psychological and practical stage for the emergence of the secondary stage of the vigilante movement.

On the one side, in the face of the ominous police-*sicarios*' attempt to rescue the captured illegal loggers, the efficacy associated with citizens' experience with neighborhood-level collective organization is likely to have provided the conditions under which they were able to start to consider to take the defense of the town into their own hands. As one of my interviewees recalled,

> [The self-imposed siege of the town] emerged from [the betrayal of] the municipal police and the municipal police as a symbol of the government… That's why they called for an assembly of neighbors. They asked, "What do we do?" [And we responded,] "Well, help us!" And that is when we decided to do the so called *fogatas*.

[41] For example, one neighborhood would pay for the music, another would pay for fireworks, and another would pay for the bull fight.

However, as time passed and the need to defend the town became more real, the neighborhood-oriented organizational framework also became more practically relevant. As a matter of fact, when they first structured the movement, citizens proceeded in a way very similar to the way they would for organizing a celebration. They formed neighborhood-level commissions to achieve the necessary objectives (in this case security and coordination) and selected two representatives from each neighborhood to lead these commissions.

Later in the week, when those on the coordination committee agreed to build barricades at each of the entrances to the town, the solution was once more to use the preexisting neighborhood-oriented organizational framework for their administration. Each entry point was assigned to a different neighborhood, and each of the districts was in charge of rotating those responsible to watch over the barricade. Thus, the neighborhood-based organizational framework is likely to have provided not only the psychological but also the practical bases for the organization of the second stage of the movement.

Yet, in addition to the neighborhood-oriented framework that had been used for the organization of celebrations there was another way in which social capital contributed to the emergence of the secondary stage of the vigilante movement. Specifically, as I present in the second section of this chapter, even before the 2011 uprising there were an important number of internal community organizations and these made important contributions in at least three ways. First, they provided citizens with a high level of organizational experience that take on the leadership of the movement. Second, they engaged in actions to strengthen the economy and the mood of the population, and, finally, they reached out to their external counterparts in order to raise funds and distribute aid in the town. Particularly, I found the academic, educational, and religious associations to be among the most active in this stage of the movement.

Throughout the duration of the movement, teachers and educational centers in Cherán played a central role. Schools were not only used as centers where political assemblies were held. When it came time to choose the movement's leadership, citizens overwhelmingly turned to local educators most active in the school communities and in the teacher-labor movement for guidance.[42]

The teachers' leadership experience benefited the movement in two ways. First, teachers' experience with the politics of protest created bridges with activist movements outside the town. This provided them with sufficient know-how to organize massive protests that would put significant pressure on the state and federal governments. Second, teachers with connections (or working) in the surrounding communities were in a privileged position to spread information and rally political and economic support from citizens of the surrounding communities. The latter were particularly important because, as citizens set up barricades around the town, the community plunged into what could very well have been one of the deepest economic crises in its history.

Given the uncertainty of the events developing in Cherán, many suppliers of basic goods suspended service to the town. As basic necessities, such as purified water, flour, corn, rice, and beans stopped coming into the town, citizens quickly started to suffer from a supply crisis. In addition, citizens who needed to leave the barricaded perimeter in order to go to work (farmers, professionals, etc.) suffered a substantial and sudden cut in their income flow. It was at this point that preexisting internal community organizations contributed once more. Not only did they take action to deal with the scarcity crisis in the town, they also reached out for the collaboration of external organizations and helped administer the aid coming into the community.

After the self-imposed siege started, the tortilla mill association met and agreed to subsidize the price of this basic product during the time of scarcity. Similarly, the butcher association subsidized the price of meat and agreed to donate leftovers to the *fogatas* guarding the town at night.

[42] The three main leaders during the secondary movements were all teachers in the surrounding schools.

For their part, visual artists and musicians organized workshops and public displays of their arts in order to entertain the children and boost the morale of the citizens of the town. Finally, the teachers of public schools, who received a direct deposit from the federation, conducted a teachers meeting and agreed to donate most of their income to purchase basic supplies.

But the action of community organizations did not stop there. They also reached out to their counterparts outside of the town in order to rally donations and support from their citizen-run organizations outside of Cherán. The Catholic church in the town, for instance, reached out to the churches of the surrounding municipalities and, in response, received a significant quantity of donations of basic food supplies. In addition, a group of men and women who participated in the National Jesuit Youth Network reached out to this organization and were able to rally additional support in the form of supplies from some of the largest private Jesuit universities in the country. Moreover, as part of the support this organization provided, one of the Jesuit leaders traveled to the town and blessed all of the *fogatas* and barricades in the community. A Jesuit priest involved in these actions told me:

> After we heard about the conflict we traveled to the community, we talked with the priest and we told him that we needed to do something to keep people's morale up. So we started to bless every *fogata*. People started to bring their saints outside and spend the night praying.

For their part, students who were part of non-religious student groups reached out to activist organizations in Morelia (the state capital) and Mexico City. As a response, tens of activist organizations raised supply donations within some of the largest public universities in the county. Additionally, these activist associations held rallies around the country in support of Cherán's vigilante movement and traveled to the community to deliver the donations and, in some cases, hold political discussion circles. For example, an interviewee who was very active in the post-uprising period told me,

> We a received number of student groups…at first, people were a bit suspicious of them…but little by little they became convinced that they came to help us…through them we received a lot of support in terms of food, cash, guns, bullets, all of that we received from the student groups.

The contributions from the student-activist organization at the state university (Universidad Michoacána de San Nicolas de Hidalgo) became so central that they became known within the town as the *fogata de Morelia*. As one of my interviewees suggested, "The *fogata de Morelia* helped us to create the structure of government itself. They also joined us at every visit that we did in Morelia ... There were people from here working in the university. That was their role, to be very aware of all the information."

Finally, although in different ways, other organizations also contributed to the vigilante movement during this stage. The Association of Tortilla Producers of Cherán, for instance, agreed to control inflation and even subsidized the price of this basic product. For their part, a group of visual artists from the town organized workshops in the *fogatas* encouraging citizens to demonstrate their fear, anger, and hope through painting and the construction of sky lanterns (called *globos de cantolla* in Mexico).[43] Further, many of the musical groups in the community gave impromptu presentations to cheer up the community, and in the following months they participated in the religious festivities at no cost.

Overall, social structures, community organizations, and the emergent collective efficacy among citizens of Cherán seem to have played an important role in their capacity to organize to defend their town against the potential retaliation of the loggers. First, there is evidence that soon after their confrontation against the police-supported mercenaries, citizens voiced their perception that the community could defend itself. Second, an analysis of the organization of the secondary vigilante movement shows that instead of organizing the movement from nothing, citizens implemented a preexisting neighborhood-oriented organizational framework very similar to the one

[43] Small hot air balloons made of paper with an opening at the bottom where a small fire is suspended.

used to organize religious and traditional celebrations. Finally, internal community organizations participated in the second stage of the movement in three ways. First, they organized activities to provide economic and psychological support for the rest of the inhabitants of the town and, finally, they coordinated with their external counterparts to raise and distribute aid and assistance to the town.

Tertiary Stage

It is important to recall that during the three months following the initial uprising, citizens of Cherán focused on preventing an eventual retaliation by the loggers and on pressuring the government to make a commitment to guarantee long term security in the area. However, the Federal Electoral Institute's (IFE) call for candidate registration pushed citizens to take a step back and rethink their strategy (the tertiary stage). Not surprisingly, community organizations (particularly activist and academic groups) as well as the nascent self-defense structures also seem to have played an important role in this stage of the movement.

After making public the IFE's call for candidates it was very clear to the Coordination Council the antipathy citizens felt towards the political party system. A citizen close to the Coordination Council said, "When the call for candidates came out we remembered that citizens did not want any more political parties. I remember the words of Jeffrey Henley. Even though he was a PRI partisan and he was the first to say 'No more parties in Cherán.'"

However, it was not clear how to translate this antipathy into action. It is here where the assistance secured through student-activist and academic organizations became important. Initially, one of the activist organizations linked to the movement offered citizens of Cherán free legal assistance to achieve their objectives. From that moment on, the coordination council started to work closely with lawyers to try to prevent elections in the municipality.

Initially, the strategy consisted of pressuring the government to prevent the installment of electoral booths in the municipality. However, the movement demands were unsuccessful, as the Constitution would not allow the cancellation of elections. At this point, Cherán's citizens had to reconsider whether to allow elections in the town or to take their movement even further.

In the context of a strong distrust in political parties and in view of the success of their neighborhood-oriented organizational framework, citizens decided to continue to reject the implementation of standardized elections in the town and requested full political autonomy from the Mexican electoral system. For example, one of my interviewees said,

> The appearance of the call for candidates hit us very hard. [On the one side], the Coordination Council, designed to organize the needs of the community, was already operating […] and the council of Honor and Justice, in charge of the security of our territory, was already working… [On the other], we had already said that we were not going to have political parties in our time any more… that's when we said, well, we need to see in the state congress to what extent can we name our authorities by ourselves.

It was at that point that lawyers and academics supporting Cherán's vigilante movement from the *fogata de Morelia* (originally contacted by academic organization from the town) played a central role. While lawyers helped the coordination council to lobby congress to change the law so they could start a government by indigenous traditions (a government of *usos y costumbres)*, anthropologists and historians helped citizens to re-frame the organization of the movement into a system of government reflective of the ancient Purepechan governments of the region.

In the end, the new autonomous government was designed to be composed by five councils (communal goods, honor and justice, local administration, social programs, and neighborhoods) composed of eight representatives (two per neighborhood), as well as a council of elders (*K'eris*) composed of twelve representatives (three per neighborhood), all elected through a public vote in neighborhood-level assemblies. Although it is true that this design symbolically represents the

Purepechan traditions, it appears to be more closely related to the organization implemented during the secondary stage of the vigilante movement.

In sum, my interviews with some of the key actors in Cherán's vigilante movement suggest that the town's social capital was important during the emergence of the three stages of the vigilante movement. First, I found clear signals that community organizations attempted to take the logging problems into their own hands even before the first confrontations against the loggers, and that they actively participated in the preparations for the uprising. Second, I found that these organizations, in addition to the social structures present before the movement, were critical for the organization of the self-defense movement that sought to prevent an eventual incursion of the illegal loggers and their mercenaries during the first four months after the uprising. Finally, citizens' connections with academic and activist organizations seem to have played an important role in their capacity to transform the citizens' demand for the cancellation of elections into the design for a new governmental institution to substitute for the Mexican political and electoral system.

All in all, my exploration of the social and political environment before and during the movement seems to bring initial support for asserting the importance of social capital in the emergence of vigilante organizations, particularly in the context of deteriorated government legitimacy. However, a skeptical reader might ask about the similarity in the social structures of the communities in the region. To explore this possibility further, I also conducted an inventory of the citizen-run organizations in Nahuatzen, a community very similar to Cherán in which vigilante justice has not occurred.

Section 2: Cherán in a Comparative Perspective

In order to test the applicability of my argument to the case of Cherán I searched for a community that was demographically, geographically, institutionally, culturally, and socially similar to

Cherán but in which, even when victim to similar criminal pressures, a collective vigilante organization *failed to emerge*. Although it is not possible to find an absolutely identical case, I found the neighboring town of Nahuatzen to have many of the same characteristics as Cherán.

Figure 6. Nahuatzen and Cherán in Comparison



Source: Inventario Nacional de Vivienda. National Geography and Statistics Institute of Mexico (INEGI).
* Municipal level estimates, source: www.microregiones.gob.mx
^ Municipal level estimates, source: www.mx.undp.org
' Municipal level estimates, source: www.conapo.gob.mx

In addition to being only 5 km apart, Cherán and Nahuatzen have important similarities. Figure 6 shows the available socio-demographic characteristics of both municipalities. The information available at the level of locality (bottom half of Figure 6) yields important similarities. Both communities seem to have similar age distributions and, going by the characteristics of the houses in both towns, they seem to have similar socioeconomic levels. When looking at the municipal-level information (top half of Figure 6) from Nahuatzen-M and Cherán-M, similarities continue to be apparent. Both municipalities have similar population densities (89.08 vs. 81.34), gender balance (51% vs. 52.04% female), and Human Development Index (0.62 vs. 0.68 HDI).

Although the differences are not striking, Nahuatzen-M seems to have a slightly higher number of Purepechan speaking citizens (36.75%) than Cherán-M (23.76%) and a slightly higher percentage of homes receiving remittances from the United States (8.29% vs. 5.55%). Before moving on, however, I want to point out that in my interviews with the government authorities of Nahuatzen they noted that the indigenous population in Nahuatzen-M was more heavily concentrated in the towns of Sevina and Arantepacua. Therefore, although there is no data on the number of indigenous households at the locality level it is likely that the difference in the number of indigenous households between Nahuatzen-T and Cherán-T is smaller than the difference between Nahuatzen-M and Cherán-M (Microrregiones by SEDESOL, 2013).

Before moving on, it is necessary to note that some of my interviewees attributed the uprising to the severe deforestation occurring in Cherán before 2010, and there is good reason to think that the advance of deforestation may have played an important role in the emergence of the uprising. For this reason, it was important to select a community located in an area likely to be a target of illegal logging activity by criminal organizations. Although there is no data on the advances of illegal logging at the municipal level, the director of the state forest commission went on record stating that the state as a whole has lost 20% of its forests in the last 25 years (El Universal, 2011)

and a number of journalists noted the increase of illegal logging in all the municipalities of the area even before the 2011 uprising (Lemus, 2011). By the time I visited the town in 2014, just as in the neighboring Cherán, the ongoing destruction of the surrounding forests was evident in Nahuatzen, and it was common for me to encounter groups of men driving trucks loaded with logs through the streets of Nahuatzen. An interviewee highly informed on the management of timber resources in Nahuatzen told me,

> I had a group of more than 200 people re-foresting in the past, but we had to stop 15 to 18 years ago. Since then illegal logging has been on the rise. As the matter of fact, every day, more than 100 *huallineros* (3-ton trucks) go up that mountain to log [*pointing to a patch of destroyed forest*]. And it is all robbed. They don't even pay those who own the lands.

In sum, even when there is no hard data that allows us to compare the intensity of illegal logging in Nahuatzen-M and Cherán-M, I found evidence that illegal loggers have been active, and sometimes very active, in Nahuatzen-M.

Yet, even without the action of organized crime, Nahuatzen, as well as the rest of the municipalities of the plateau, suffers from important levels of baseline deforestation. Based on historic forest data and demographic and demand characteristics Brown, DeJong, Guerrero, Hall, Masera, Marzoli, Ruiz and Shoch (2003), estimate that baseline deforestation in the Purepechan Plateau is likely to be associated with the deforestation of about 57,000 hectares of forest in the region from the year 2000 to the year 2010. Thus, even in the conservative scenario in which illegal loggers were never as active in Nahuatzen, this municipality is likely to be a relatively good point of comparison due to its high levels of baseline deforestation.

Finally, it must be acknowledged that Nahuatzen has experienced more power sharing than Cherán. While in the latter municipality, political supporters of the PRD are concentrated in the municipal capital, in Nahuatzen no political party is dominant in the municipal capital. As a result, the town experiences frequent political transition. Additionally, politicians from Nahuatzen have

been more willing to remain distant from organized crime than politicians from Cherán. For instance, in 2008 the mayor of Nahuatzen attempted to resist paying extortion to a criminal organization and, as a result, was executed by a local cartel (Garcia Tinoco, 2013).

That said, government and law enforcement authorities do not enjoy a good reputation in Nahuatzen. During the time I lived in the area (2014) I witnessed at least two occasions when citizens blocked the entrance to the municipal government's offices in order to protest against corruption and resource mismanagement. Another interviewee, with experience in the management of timber resources, told me, "The *Forestal*[44] and the local police have intervened but corruption never ends. Because those instances always come and they give them money… as you can see this forest over here (signaling a nearby hill) it's running out."

In addition to being geographically, socially, culturally, economically, and ethnically similar to Cherán, Nahuatzen has also suffered incursions from cartel-sponsored illegal loggers. Further, although it has not suffered a legitimacy crisis at the levels Cherán did in 2011, citizens of Nahuatzen are not generally satisfied with the government and do not trust that the municipal police will be effective in fighting illegal logging. However, citizens of this town have not organized an extralegal collective self-defense movement, and therefore it constitutes a good point of comparison to test the degree that my argument is consistent with the case of Cherán. If the case of Cherán is indeed consistent with my argument, I expect to find that Cherán had a stronger social capital than Nahuatzen even before 2011.

Method and Data Collection

Cherán and Nahuatzen's cultures are so similar that a casual observer may fail to find differences in both towns' civil societies. Both towns, for example, have strong Catholic populations

[44] The Policía Forestal is a special unit from the federal government in charge of monitoring the exploitation of timber resources.

and people from both communities frequently participate in patron saint's celebrations, traditional weddings, funerals, baptisms, and celebrations honoring the Indigenous-Catholic calendar.[45] In order to uncover differences in the social capital between the two communities, it is necessary to engage in a more detailed comparison.

The measurement of social capital has been contended, but specialists in the topic generally agree that measurement should circle around three main dimensions: social networks, community norms, and social trust (Coleman, 1990; Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, 2000). Ideally, one would rely on a diversity of indicators tapping into the structural (networks and associations) and cognitive dimensions of social capital (trust and norms). However, the fact that I am interested in measuring the levels of social capital in both communities retrospectively brings three main challenges to this strategy. First, the fact that the study took place almost three years after the movement makes uncertain the degree to which citizens will be able to accurately recall their capacity to generate collective action with their peers. Second, even if they were able to accurately recollect events, citizens' favorable views of and commitment to their anti-criminal movement generates incentives to portray a stark contrast between the current social cohesion of the community and social cohesion before the movement. Third and most importantly, some scholars have suggested that the movement may have actually increased the levels of social cohesion and cooperation among the citizens of Cherán. If this is so, measuring citizens' retrospective evaluations of social trust may indirectly incorporate this effect in citizens' recollection, thereby introducing systematic bias into the measurement.

To avoid these challenges, I turn to the measurement of groups and organizations that existed in Cherán and Nahuatzen before 2011. This is done under the assumption that it will be

[45] These include, among other activities, fundraising and organizing for religious festivals such as Holy Week, the Feast of Corpus Christi, Christmas, the Day of the Dead, as well as setting up and removing nativity scenes, etc.

more difficult for memory, social desirability, and post-movement changes in social cohesion to alter citizens' recollection of the community organizations that were in the town before 2011.

With the objective of recovering this information, I moved to Mexico in June of 2014, and lived in Cherán from January to May of 2015. Over the course of the time I visited and/or lived in the communities, I collected information from a number of community organizations and individuals (in both towns) through a snowball sampling technique. Adhering to the guidelines of this method, I began by contacting local governments, leagues, and churches. I spoke with members of these organizations whenever possible and collected information. Afterwards, I asked them to recommend other groups and/or individuals whom I might contact. I then contacted those groups and/or individuals and repeated the process. I continued in this fashion until every group or individual I contacted could not direct me to any additional organizations or individuals.[46] By using this method I collected information about the community groups that existed in Nahuatzen and Cherán before 2011. I collected but excluded from my analysis any groups formed in Cherán after 2011 to avoid capturing the potential impact that Cherán's movement in the strengthening of community bonds and social capital.

Results

Overall, during my investigation of both towns I was able to document 632 community organizations, of which 520 existed before 2011. Among the community organizations I was able to document, I was able to identify artistic, productive, altruistic, religious, educational, and fitness organizations. As Figure 7 shows, I found a strong difference in the number of community groups in Cherán (355) and Nahuatzen (165), and this difference extended to almost every area of

[46] For a larger discussion on snowball sampling and statistical estimation techniques for this type of sampling see Berg (2004).

community life. In the next section I look at every type of organization and conduct a brief qualitative and quantitative comparison of what I found.

Figure 7. Community Groups in Cherán and Nahuatzen before 2011



In the case of Cherán I included only the groups created before the year 2011 and surviving through 2014.

Catholic Church Organizations

First, I looked at Catholic Church groups in both towns. Although social capital can be present in friendship networks, athletic leagues, neighborhoods, and productive organizations, it is difficult to understand social capital in rural Mexico without looking at citizens' participation in religious activities. As stated earlier, both Cherán and Nahuatzen have similarly strong Catholic populations.

Yet, there are differences in citizen-church relations across towns. The first difference between Cherán and Nahuatzen emerges from the life of the local Church. The priest of Nahuatzen has been living in the community for more than twenty years, is fluent in Purepecha, and is widely beloved in and outside the community due to his social work and efforts in constructing water wells across the region. He is currently a professor at one of the universities as well. In contrast, the priest of Cherán (when I lived in the town) arrived only after the 2011 movement, has a rather conservative ideology, and vocally disagrees with the Cherán self-defense movement. [47] Therefore, I expected to find a relatively contentious church life in Cherán and perhaps a smaller number of church groups, even if the community had stronger social capital than the surrounding communities.

Indeed, I found a much more contentious church life in Cherán. Almost every citizen with whom I spoke openly manifested their discomfort with the resident priest at the time, and church officials confirmed that church and group assistance had decreased significantly since 2011. However, to my surprise, I found that Cherán's church had nearly twice (23 [1.61 per thousand citizens]) the number of church groups than Nahuatzen (13 [1.26 per thousand citizens]). Although this can be interpreted as evidence that Cherán is simply more religious, I interpret this finding as a

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[47] After the 2011 movement, the Catholic dioceses of Zamora decided to assign a new priest to Cherán. This new priest has attempted to reconcile the community with one of the towns accused of stealing wood in 2010 by scolding the citizens of Cherán during mass.

sign of a strong civil society eager for community participation despite the contentious attitude of the resident priest.

Schools and Educational Centers

Second, I looked at the number of educational centers in both communities. Although the Mexican government is constitutionally mandated to provide free education to all its citizens, it is clear that institutional, informational, and economic constraints have limited the government's capacity to provide rural communities in Mexico with the educational services they require. Against this background, it has become necessary for groups in civil society to organize in order to open new schools in the region. Opening a new school requires significant collaboration from teachers, citizens, local government, and already existing schools. First, interested teachers and families need to start an extension from an existing school. This requires them to collaborate to rent an appropriate space and recruit at least one hundred children who are unable to attend existing schools. Second, citizens need to find a donor or collect sufficient funds to buy land where the new school will be built. Finally, citizens need to complete the paperwork in order for the state to recognize the new school and assign a budget for infrastructure and personnel. Thus, it seems that the number of schools open in a community of this kind could provide an additional indicator of citizens' capacity for collective action.

As would be expected from a strong civil society, I found that the citizens of Cherán have been notably more successful in establishing educational institutions than the surrounding communities. In contrast to the 17 educational centers open within Nahuatzen's municipality (1.65 per thousand inhabitants), I found that by 2011 Cherán had already opened 43 educational

institutions (3 per thousand inhabitants)[48]. While by 2011 Nahuatzen had only one initial education center and 5 pre-schools, Cherán had been able to open 4 initial education centers and 10 pre-schools. Further, I found that while Nahuatzen has been able to open 7 elementary schools and 2 junior high schools, Cherán has 17 elementary schools and 3 junior-high schools. Additionally, while Nahuatzen has one high school institution, Cherán today has two large high schools. Finally, while the municipality of Nahuatzen has only one institution of higher education, Cherán has four.

In sum, in almost every rubric, the data I recovered from both municipalities suggests that citizens of Cherán have been more successful in recent years in opening and maintaining educational institutions. It is true that, by itself, the number of schools may also capture differences in citizens' needs and ability to navigate the system. However, my investigation of the process by which new schools are open suggests social capital, as expected from the citizens' capacity to collaborate legally and financially, plays an important role in the emergence of new educational centers in the region.

Productive Organizations: Artisans Farmers, Ranchers

In addition to these groups, some citizens in the region associate in order to coordinate their economic activities, and the prevalence of these groups can also serve as a social capital indicator. Qualitatively, I found no difference in the type of activities citizens of both communities organize. Both places are centers of production of wooden hand-crafts, ranching, and farming, and an important number of citizens earn their keep as merchants. However, I found differences in the quantitative and qualitative organization of the groups in each of these economic sectors.

The most important economic activity of Cherán and Nahuatzen is farming. Citizens grow corn, squash, beans, and other greens for personal and local consumption as well as to sell in the markets of other towns. I found that farmers do not have an overarching association; however, they

[48] Nahuatzen has one institution offering initial education, 5 pre-schools, two junior-high schools and one high-school. Additionally, Nahuatzen has one institution of higher education.

form groups in order to receive subsidies from the state. While in Cherán I found 23 farmers groups that receive subsidies (1.95 group per thousand citizens), I found 13 farmers groups in Nahuatzen (1.26 groups per thousand citizens).

In addition, both towns have an important ranching sector. Both communities have a ranching association, however, I found that Nahuatzen's ranchers association is mostly run by two office workers and does little more than certify ranchers' transactions and disputes. Cherán's ranchers association, however, in addition to serving as an authority to certify the sale of cattle, also holds regular meetings in which their members participate to address practical problems (e.g. cattle theft, plagues, diseases, etc.). In addition to these associations, ranchers also form groups to request state subsidies and, in Cherán, ranchers have formed groups to receive training on preventive animal medicine. Taken together, I found a total of 14 ranchers groups in Cherán (0.95 groups per thousand citizens) and only one (0.1 groups per thousand citizens) ranchers association in Nahuatzen (Figure 7).

A third important economic sector in both towns is trade. Citizens of both towns have a market and an important number of establishments selling anything from tortillas to medicine. I found both quantitative and qualitative difference between the trade organizations in these towns. While before 2011 Cherán had close to 17 merchant organizations (1.19 groups per thousand citizens), Nahuatzen only had one (0.1 groups per thousand citizens): the association of merchants of the central market. In Cherán I found organizations of tortilla sellers, butchers, bakers, and formal and informal-market sellers. Interestingly I found that the formal market of Nahuatzen is much better managed than that of Cherán.

Finally, although tourism is not a primary source of revenue for either town, I found organizations that focus on the promotion of traditional crafts. While in Nahuatzen I found only one wool-craftsmen organization (0.10), in Cherán I found nearly 19 citizen-run organizations (1.33

per thousand citizens) that concentrate and organize craftsmen. These organizations include groups of toy craftsmen, groups of embroiderers, and groups of hand-made fabric producers and, traditionally, have two functions, to help producers buy cheaper materials for their crafts and seek and assign places in craftsmen fairs.

Overall, I found that, with the exception of the market association (admittedly better administered in Nahuatzen), the groups in Cherán were more numerous and better organized than the ranchers, farmers, merchants, and craftsmen organizations in Nahuatzen.

Nonetheless, before concluding, it is important to acknowledge that some of the groups I found did not conduct regular meetings and seemed to have been formed as a result of top down government mobilization. Particularly, state and federal government programs require citizens to register as a group in order to receive funding. To the extent that these programs mobilize individuals to form groups, even in contexts in which collective action may be difficult or unlikely, the quantitative differences before may represent only a conservative reflection of the real difference in social capital in both communities.

Sports

In addition to organizing for economic and religious reasons, citizens of the region also organize to engage in recreational and sports-related activities. There are three reasons why these organizations may yield valuable indicators of social capital for this type of communities. First, although these activities may seem superfluous, citizens in rural areas invest a considerable amount of time, income and effort in managing athletic leagues. Second, it is traditional for local governments generally to manage a small budget for supporting this type of activity. Since this budget is insufficient to fully fund every team in the community, citizens generally collect their own funds and use government funding for prizes and trophies. This makes citizens relatively

independent and willing to work outside the government budget if necessary. Finally, although they seem innocuous, competition in this context can, at times, become rather contentious. Just as sports competitions can foster peaceful conflict resolution in communities with deep and strong social bonds, they can cause conflicts to surface in places where links between citizens are only superficial.

Except for baseball, which is only played in Nahuatzen, I found that citizens of both communities enjoy participating in soccer and basketball teams. As Figure 7 shows, both towns have outdoor and indoor soccer leagues. Leagues in both municipalities have, over time, had a similar structure and level of participation. The leagues are run by a council of team captains and are coordinated independently from the local government. After analyzing the records of the indoor soccer league I found that both communities have a similar number of teams registered in their indoor soccer leagues (Nahuatzen 17 vs Cherán 15) yet once the population diference are taken into consideration there seems to be a higher team density in Nahuatzen (1.65 per 1000 persons) than in Cherán (1.05 per 1000 people). Similarly, I found only small differences in the number of outdoors soccer teams registered in Cherán and Nahuatzen. While I found that 36 soccer teams are registered in the Nahuatzen municipal league, in Cherán I found the league had 40 participating teams. Once these numbers are weighted by the numer of citizens in each town I found Nahuatzen to have a higher density of teams per thousand inhabitants (3.5 vs 2.8).[49]

While I did not find substantive differences in these leagues, I found qualitative and quantitative differences when I looked into basketball, the most popular sport in the region. On the one hand, I found basketball in Nahuatzen to be coordinated around a municipal league. That is, for many years this sport has been organized through collaboration between citizens and the

[49] In conducting the analysis I removed two teams that came from communities outside of Nahuatzen-T (Arantepacua and Sevina) and one that came from outside Cherán-T (La Colonia). To the extent that teams from other communities in the municipality are likely to register in the leagues of the municipal capital it is likely for this differences to be biased in favor of Nahuatzen-T. This, because, although the town of Nahuatzen is smaller than the ton of Cherán, the total population of the municipality of Nahuatzen-M (about 27,000 citizens) is larger than the total population of the municipality of Cherán-M (18000).

government. While citizens are responsible for registering their teams and paying the referees, the municipal government organizes the role of games, hosts the tournament in the municipal court, and gives money for the prizes.

In contrast, before 2011 Cherán did not have a government run municipal basketball league. In its place, it had two run basketball independent from the government. The Paris Basketball League, the first of them, operates as a non-profit organization run by a number of teachers from the community and held its games in a pubic court of the Pharikutin neighborhood (neighborhood III). Not only did this league manage to maintain itself as fully independent from government, its organizers repeatedly declined invitations to coordinate a government-sponsored municipal league, as one interviewee recalls:

> The government came to us and asked us whether we wanted to manage the municipal basketball league and we said no. Mainly because we had emerged from an election from the neighbors of the third neighborhood and for us to get the municipal league would have been perceived as an act of corruption. Since then, the municipal government said they would not give us any more support. However, we told him "It doesn't matter, we will find a way!" and we started to collect our own funds.

Additionally, by 2011 a healthy for-profit league called the Shikuami league already had been operating for five years in Cherán. This league not only trained teams in every category, it also organized a tournament in the equally private Erandi Court and even has a professional team that competes with teams from the surrounding areas and charges for entrance. Quantitatively, I also found differences between the number of basketball teams in each town. I visited each of the leagues to consult their records for the number of teams registered. Unfortunately, none of the leagues kept records before 2011. Still, I was able to record the number of teams registered in ongoing tournaments (as of spring 2015) and, with the help of organizers, marked the teams that were likely to have had participated in each of the leagues before 2011. Finally, since many citizens are willing to register in more than one league and even play in both communities, I worked together

with the organizers of the leagues to identify the origin of each team and to mark teams participating in more than one league with multiple names. In the end, I found that, while in 2011 Nahuatzen had no more than 15 basketball teams (1.74 per thousand inhabitants), Cherán had about 82 teams participating in tournaments throughout the region (5.72 per thousand inhabitants).

Finally, by the time I was living in the towns (spring 2015), I found basketball organizations to be moving in opposite directions. In Cherán, Paris League organizers and the post-2011 autonomous government were finally able to collaborate and created a Municipal Basketball League run entirely by the government. In contrast, the government of Nahuatzen reduced funding for the municipal tournament. As a result, the prices were significantly reduced and, by the time I was there, the league was going through an all-time low level of participation.

In sum, I found significant qualitative and quantitative differences in the athletic organizations in Cherán and Nahuatzen. Not only did I find a higher number of sport teams in Cherán than in Nahuatzen, I also found a difference in how athletic leagues were formed and managed. While in Nahuatzen, athletic organizations continue to be strongly linked to the government, in Cherán, citizens have been rather successful in organizing athletic teams and organizations without the interference of the local government. All and all, athletic activities represent an important pastime for the citizens of the region and, to the extent that they are a reflection of social capital, in my cases of interest I found that, even before 2011, Cherán had a relatively stronger civic society capable of organizing independently of and even in opposition to the government.

Groups of Artists

In addition to collecting information about sports organizations I investigated artistic organizations. Music, dancing, and the visual arts are especially important in the rural communities

of Mexico and Latin America. Not only do they help citizens fulfill their individual expressive needs, they also serve as a bridge between citizens and their heritage. Although many communities' historical records have been lost to time, painters, writers, and musicians continue to recreate these communities' pre-Hispanic heritage.

Qualitatively, I could not find strong differences between the musical and dancing organizations in both towns. Both Nahuatzen and Cherán have musical and dancing groups dedicated to the rescue and promotion the traditional music from the region. Additionally, both communities have groups-for-hire who play popular music at weddings and public festivals in the region.

That said, I found quantitative differences between the towns. While in Nahuatzen I was able to find two traditional dancing groups (0.19 per 1000 people) and nearly twenty music organizations (1.84 per 1000 people), in Cherán I was able to find seven dancing companies (0.49 per 1000 people) and 30 bands, orchestras, and musical groups (2.09 per 1000 people).

In addition to these differences I was able to find differences between the management of both towns' cultural centers (Casa de la Cultura*)*. Before 2011, the cultural center of Cherán was formally managed by the municipal government. It provided space for artist and musical groups but a comprehensive artistic program or budget was largely absent. Thus, although funding was practically absent, artists of Cherán could use the center to hold meetings and work on their self-funded projects.

In contrast, the cultural center of Nahuatzen has been administered by the town priest for nearly twenty years. This priest has created a relatively well structured cultural program centered on the idea of turning the Casa de la Cultura into a symbolic monument of the architectural and cultural landscape of the town. Although it is true that the priest promotes exhibitions and workshops by

artists coming from the state capital, it is also the case that some of the artists express their dissatisfaction with the fact that the Casa does not offer local artists any space to meet or work.

Not surprisingly, I found strong differences in the number groups of visual artists working in the town. While in Nahuatzen I found a number of artists who work on individual paintings of saints. I only found one group of artists who collaborate for the creation of sky lanterns. In contrast, I found a very strong community of visual artists in Cherán. Not only did I find two groups of painters and visual artists who collaborate in the creation of monumental paintings, I also found nine groups of artists that have, for at least ten years, collaborated in the creation of sky lanterns (in total I found 0.63 groups of visual artists per 1000 people).

I also inquired about the existence of organizations with the goal of organizing and promoting town celebrations. I found that, like most rural communities in Mexico, both towns have an annual festival to celebrate the saint to which their church is consecrated. Thus, each community has four committees (one per neighborhood) in charge of fundraising and organizing the activities for those occasions. However, in addition to these celebrations, community groups organize two other festivals every year. On one hand, a group of artists and professionals organize an annual festival to commemorate the anniversary of the promotion of Cherán to the category of municipality. On the other, a group of artists organizes an annual festival of sky lanterns in which teams and individuals from Cherán and the surrounding communities participate.

In sum, I found both similarities and differences between the towns. I found similarities in the structures in which cultural activities are organized (an annual religious festival and a cultural center) and the type of cultural activities that take place in both towns (similar type of dances, similar outputs from visual arts, and similar musical tendencies). However, I found differences in the organization and prevalence of artistic groups between the communities. Not only did I find that there were more cultural organizations in Cherán than in Nahuatzen, I also found that while cultural

groups have been strongly centralized by the priest in Nahuatzen, in Cherán artistic groups are generally decentralized and independently funded.

Multimedia

Finally, I investigated media groups and organizations in both towns. That is, groups of citizens working on projects related to radio, television or cinema. These groups are important because they bring local news, debates of relevance for the local communities and often generate collective action and influence the community's public opinion.

Just as with the artistic organizations, media centers and organizations in both towns emerged through very different paths. While the priest has been the main proponent of radio, television, and cinema groups in Nahuatzen, in Cherán these groups emerged independently from the church or government.

In Nahuatzen, media efforts have not been very fruitful. In 2012 the priest of Nahuatzen started a radio station that would generate cultural content until 2013, when the Purepechan New Year would take place in the town.[50] During the time that the radio was active the priest invited citizens to participate in the programming, and eight groups of citizens contributed to the production of content. After the celebration of the New Year, however, the priest decided to donate the radio equipment to the community that would host the New Year festival the following year. Since then, there have not been radio groups in Nahuatzen. Additionally, from 2000 to 2010 the Priest produced a television station aimed at taking cultural content to the community; however, the station was self-administered and did not promote the emergence of any community organization. Finally, also as an initiative of the priest, Nahuatzen has a cinema administered by the church, which

[50] The Purepechan New Year (also called the Festival of the New Fire) is a celebration in which citizens from the majority Purepechan towns from around the region present their traditional songs and dances. Additionally they lit a fire to signal the start of a new year. This celebration takes place once a year in February 2 and changes to a different town of the region every year.

is often used to raise fund for the local schools. Taking all groups into account, I found nine groups in Nahuatzen that have worked for the production of media content. Once the population of the town is taken into consideration this constitutes about 0.87 groups per 1000 people.

In contrast, I found that in even before 2011, Cherán had 18 groups organizing to produce multimedia content (1.26 groups per 1000 people). Cherán has had a functioning radio station for at least 15 years. Even though the Pro-Indigenous National Institute founded the station in order to promote the Purepechan language, it also airs content in Spanish, and the majority, if not all its contributors are unpaid volunteers. Overall, after investigating the station's records I found that in addition to all individually run programs, by 2011 Cherán's radio station hosted nearly 19 shows that were coordinated by groups interested in topics relevant to the citizens of the area. Although Cherán never had a television station before the movement, after 2011 a group of activists donated the necessary components to start one; and, today, a group of six to ten young volunteers work together to produce material to air on TV-Cherán. Finally, although there is not a community cinema in Cherán, there is a group of young adults who have collaborated since 2008 in the production of documentaries about the town and the surrounding areas.

In sum, there are important differences in the community media organizations in each town. This may be due to the centralization that the Nahuatzen's priest has exerted over the funding and control of the infrastructure. However, it may also be explained by a difference in citizens' willingness or capacity to organize to create media groups in both towns. Whatever the case, I found that by 2011 Cherán had more community groups participating in the creation of multimedia content.

Conclusion

Under what conditions do citizens engage in Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement? I have argued that, in conditions in which citizens' trust in the authorities has deteriorated significantly, citizens are more likely invest their social capital into the construction of extralegal collective law enforcement organizations. To examine this hypothesis further I have taken a closer look at the case that instigated the most recent wave of vigilantism in Mexico, the case of the town of Cherán.

In doing so, I have proceeded in two steps. First I look at the narratives of citizens living in the town of Cherán. Second, in order to investigate whether social capital in Cherán was relatively or only apparently high I compared this town to a very similar municipality only 5 km away, the town of Nahuatzen.

In my interviews, I found that the 2011 vigilante movement emerged in three stages, confrontation, self-defense and self-government. Moreover, I found that contrary to current believes the movement does not seem to have evolved spontaneously but to have involved significant premeditation. Additionally, I found that, in the narratives of my interviewees, distrust in the authorities and community cohesion played an important role for the emergence and success of each of the three stages of the movement.

With respect to the relative levels of social capital I found that even before 2011 there were important differences in the prevalence and organization of community groups. Not only did I find evidence of a more decentralized community life in Cherán, I also found that in almost every rubric this town had almost twice the number of community organizations than Nahuatzen.

The results described in this chapter have implications for the case of Cherán and, more generally, for our understanding of social capital and its role in democracies going through security crises.

Since the eruption of the 2011 movement, the case of Cherán in particular has fascinated the academic community of Mexico. While most authors have focused on the implications of Cherán's legal fight for autonomy (Andrade, 2013; Cienfuegos Salgado, 2013; Mandujano Estrada, 2013; Patiño & Carmen, 2012) others have focused on a normative analysis of what the movement means for the Mexican state, capitalist structures, and liberal democracy more generally (Andrade, 2013; Calveiro, 2014). Only a precious few are empirically oriented, focusing on the way in which the movement has impacted democratic governance (Víctor Manuel, 2014), citizens' feelings of security (González Candia, 2014) and their interaction with their territory (Velázquez Guerrero, 2013). With the exception of Velazquez Guerrero (2013), virtually every study reviewed dedicates only a minor section to describing the standard journalistic account of how the vigilante movement arose, and no study has focused specifically in the factors that led to its emergence.

Thus, the findings of this chapter contribute in three ways to our understanding of this movement. First, the initial subsection of this chapter provides a timeline derived from first-hand accounts rather than second hand narratives formed during the months following the uprising. Although my results largely validate Velazquez Guerrero's (2013) description of the evolution of the movement, they extend on it by identifying three critical moments in which citizens had to decide the course of the movement. This is suggestive of the political behavior displayed by the towns' inhabitants which, I argue, is unlikely to be explained only by the threat posed by illegal logging.

Second, this chapter deepens the empirical study the role social capital and distrust in the authorities as forces related with the emergence of this movement. Most studies of this case have argued in one way or the other that the strong community ties in Cherán made its citizens better able to develop the autonomous movement that today governs the town. Cendejas Arroyo and Sanchez (2015), for example, argue for the importance of a symbolic concept of communality as a strategy to which citizens of Cherán have appealed to face criminal violence, and Dosil (2014)

defends the idea that tradition has been used as a cohesive force to facilitate resistance not only in Cherán but also in other communities in the Purepechan plateau. My evidence yields support but also some challenges to these authors' assumptions. While validating the idea that social capital currently runs high in Cherán, I find that it was high even before the 2011 events. Thus, to the extent that tradition and communality could have been already high before the uprising, my findings call us to take any claims about a significant impact of the movement on social cohesion with relative care.

More generally, my findings have implications for the meaning of the most recent rise of vigilantism in Mexico and for the potential of these groups to extend throughout the country. On the one hand my findings suggest that vigilante actions are not merely a dramatic expression of outrage over nature of the crimes in which ordinary and organized criminals sometimes engage. They suggest that vigilante actions could also emerge out from a deep sense of desolation, distrust, and frustration with the dysfunctional performance of the state's political and/or security institutions.

Moreover, my findings suggest that citizens' latent capacity to reach out to their community to engage in collective action to solve security problems (a.k.a. social capital) is likely to constrain the capacity of this type of movements to extend beyond the places where they originate. That is, due to the fact that vigilantism can result in important risks to those engaging in it, and that it is unlikely to be successful unless it can rely on widespread community participation, groups seeking to expand their fight against the cartels (like the *auto-defensa* groups of Michoacán) are unlikely to be successful in communities with low levels of social capital or with longstanding social divisions, even in the face of widespread distrust in the authorities.

Ultimately, my results suggest that collective vigilante action is unlikely to emerge without warning. On the contrary, my findings seem to indicate that communities with strong social capital

may seek to engage in security coproduction before attempting to engage in vigilantism. If the case of Cherán is any indication for the psychology of those going through significant insecurity crises, it is only after citizens' trust in the authorities erodes significantly that groups of citizens start to invest their social capital outside the purview of the state.

Even more generally, the findings have implications for our understanding of social capital and how it manifests under insecurity crises. Evidence for the correlation between social capital, the quality of democracy (Newton, 1997; Putnam et al., 1994), and economic development (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1996; Woolcock, 1998) has remained quite strong. However, it is important to highlight that these two variables do not necessarily go together. Under some circumstances, communities with high levels of social capital can be exposed to economic, political, and security crises and, under such circumstances, social capital can have distinct and quite puzzling effects. While, under some circumstances it can foster resilience (Aldrich, 2012), under others, social capital can have unexpected consequences that can put economic (Graeff, 2007), political (Armony, 2004), and democratic stability (Satyanath et al., 2013) at risk.

First, my results challenge those who, like Putnam, view social capital as the driving force for a healthy society and urge us to view social capital as a resource rather than a normatively-charged variable. Indeed, the case of Cherán illustrates how, when faced by a crisis that put their lives and livelihood at risk, citizens can reach to their reservoir of collective action to surpass such challenges. This, in itself, does not need to pose a challenge for government or society; however, when citizen action involves the use of violence to restore security, it generates a serious challenge to the state if it does not involve the coproduction of security between the community and the state.

Along this same line, my findings not only validate those contending for the existence of a "dark side of social capital". They also provide supporting evidence for those noting the importance of citizens' perceptions of the governments authorities as a moderating force for social capital

investment under crises (Della Porta, 2000; Sabet, 2014). Indeed, not only is there evidence for the preexisting strength of social networks in Cherán, but there are important indications that citizens attempted to coproduce security with the government, and, after failing to obtain collaboration from the local authorities they turned to collective action to face the loggers by themselves, to protect the town from the potential retaliation of the cartels, and, finally, to guarantee the long term security and stability of the town.

Before concluding this chapter, however, it is important to recognize the limitations of this study. Although the first section provides contextualization to the general argument I defend, there are at least three limitations that need to be underlined.

First, during my interviews I noted that citizens tend to justify the ongoing autonomy movement by asserting it as a source of good governance. Thus, interviewees may have had incentives to overstate the levels of corruption and illegitimacy of the pre-2011 administration. Although I consider it unlikely for this source of bias to completely reverse the general picture portrayed in this chapter, it is important to recognize that the negative portrayal of the PRI administration could have been exaggerated.

Second, similar to the case of governance, during my stay in Cherán I found that citizens were eager to assert the movement as a source of unity. Indeed, a number of activists and scholars have framed the movement as a generator of community cohesion, and by the time I was in the town other academics working in the town had made their conclusions public to the inhabitants of the town. In this context, it is possible that the inhabitants might have had understated their retrospective perceptions of the state of social capital in the town before the 2011 uprising.

Third, it is important to acknowledge the selection bias inherent to citizens' discussion of the pre-organizational stage of the uprising. Although I spent considerable time building rapport with the interviewees and tried to be as careful as possible not to provide information that might lead to

the identification of my sources, a number of interviewees expressed concerns and did not want to discuss the organization of the uprising or censored their statements. Thus, it is possible that my interviews portray only a subset of the total number of community actions and organizations that participated in preparing the initial confrontation with the loggers.

The second section has its own limitations. Although it allows me to test my argument to the specific case of Cherán, it does not allow me to test my argument more generally. To do this, it is necessary to analyze a larger pool of data containing variation in both dependent and independent variables while including a larger array of controls.

In the next chapter (Chapter III), I turn to two sources of data (INEGI and LAPOP) to test my hypothesis in Mexico, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Then, in Chapter IV I conduct an attitudinal experiment that allows me to test the causal logic of my argument. Finally, in Chapter V, I design and implement a behavioral experiment in which I incorporate the potential costs of engaging (or not engaging) in vigilante behavior.

III. CONFRONTING CRIME BY OURSELVES: TRUST IN THE COMMUNITY, DISTRUST IN THE POLICE AND THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS THE AMERICAS

In the previous chapter, I presented an exploration of how citizens of the town of Cherán mobilized their social resources to confront the cartel-sponsored illegal loggers that were devastating their forests when their trust in the authorities deteriorated significantly. However, how does the experience of the citizens of Cherán relates to that of others living in similar contexts?

Across Mexico and Latin America, many regions have seen an increase in crime and violence over the last decade, and more and more citizens have begun to reach out to their neighbors as a potential source of protection against crime. While these anti-criminal organizations can remain inactive, they can, sometimes, attempt to seek justice extra-legally by punishing criminals or enforcing legally sanctioned norms without the participation of government authorities (what I call Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement [ECLE]). Under what circumstances are citizens more likely to form collective anti-crime organizations? And under what conditions do these organizations increase the likelihood of citizens to seek to engage in ECLE?

In the previous two chapters I have presented a framework that sees the emergence of ECLE as the result of a choice between two potential security providers: the citizens of the community and the state's authorities. Thus, I have hypothesized that citizens' distrust in authorities may intensify the degree to which citizens invest their social capital in Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement.

This chapter is divided in three main sections. In the first section I develop my thesis and derive expectations for the emergence of collective anti-crime organizations across Latin America and the Caribbean. Then, in the second section, I test my theory by evaluating the degree to which police trust moderates the degree to which trust in neighbors increases the likelihood that citizens of selected Latin American and Caribbean countries will participate in collective anti-crime

organizations. Then, in the third section, I evaluate the degree to which police trust moderates the degree to which these organizations influence citizens' willingness to turn to their neighbors (rather than state authorities) as a source of extra-legal justice.

To conduct these tests, I analyze data from the Mexico's National Institute of Geography and Statistics (INEGI) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). I find that in Mexico and 16 other Latin American and Caribbean countries in a "low-level" security equilibrium (Bailey, 2009),[51] police distrust moderates the degree to which trust in one's neighbors increases the likelihood that citizens will join with them to defend themselves from crime. Moreover, even when I find that participating in these organizations is associated with an increased willingness to turn to the neighbors (rather than state authorities) as a source of justice after being victimized by crime, I also find that this connection is reduced (or disappears) among those who consider the police to be more trustworthy.

Confronting Crime as a Community

Since the 1980's, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have gone through significant political and economic transformations. However, few changes have marked citizens' political attitudes and behavior as strongly as the rise of crime and insecurity. In less than ten years, a region that for centuries was regarded as a refuge for those escaping from war and persecution, today stands as the most violent subcontinent in the planet.

In this context, citizens have taken a wide range of strategies to cope with crime. Some have set up physical barriers to protect their property; others have migrated to areas (or countries) with lower levels of insecurity. Still, a third set of citizens have joined with their neighbors to directly or

[51] That is, countries with comparable levels of insecurity and rule of law.

indirectly defend themselves form crime. What factors increase citizens' willingness to cope with crime in this way?

The main contribution of this chapter is to look at the influence of citizens' trust in their neighbors on the emergence of this type of behavior and to examine how trust in the authorities moderates this connection. However, before turning to these variables, it is important to address the direct effect of crime and insecurity on ECLE and other forms of political participation.

The literature on the effect of crime on citizens' attitudes towards vigilante justice suggests a positive connection between these two variables. Since their foundational work on democratization, Bremeo (1997b) and Diamond (1999) insist that insecurity can push citizens to reach for short term solutions that can put democratic governance at risk. And, in line with these scholars, a number of researchers have found Latinamericans to be more supportive of violating due process when victimized by crime.

In the context of the low-equilibrium countries in Central America, for example, Malone (2012b) finds that citizens victimized by or fearful of crime are more supportive of extralegal police action and vigilante justice, and Cruz and Bateson find consistent evidence for Latin America as a whole. Cruz (2009), for instance, finds that citizens who perceive their neighborhoods to be less safe are more likely to regard it as acceptable for the police to violate the law in order to capture criminals. Bateson (2012), for her part, finds that citizens victimized by crime in the previous year were more likely to support citizens taking the law into their hands when the authorities do nothing to punish criminals. Seligson (2003) not only finds support for the connection between insecurity and support for vigilante justice, but he also finds this effect to be mediated by a deterioration of citizens' support for democracy.

In contrast with these findings, however, the literature on the connection between insecurity and political behavior unfortunately tends to be unclear and, at times, contradictory. While some

have argued and found evidence in favor of the idea that insecurity reduces citizens' social trust as well as civic and political engagement (Trelles & Carreras, 2012; Walklate, 1998), others have argued (and also found evidence to support the contention) that "Rather than becoming withdrawn or disempowered, crime victims tend to become more engaged in civic and political life" (Bateson, 2012, p. 1). Indeed, while some citizens and communities have become withdrawn as a result of the rise of violence in the region, there is no shortage of examples of ordinary citizens[52] becoming anti-crime activists after being personally affected by crime (R. T. Rojo-Mendoza, 2014).

In sum, academic perspective on the role of insecurity is mixed. While scholars seem to agree that insecurity erodes citizens' support for the rule of law, it is hard to speculate about the impact of this variable on citizens' behavior. Indeed, the lack of consensus on whether it promotes or inhibits citizens' civic and political engagement seems to suggest that it is necessary to look at other variables to better understand the conditions that increase citizens' likelihood to start collective anti-crime organizations. In the following section I argue that in order to understand why citizens engage in collective anti-crime organization, it is important to look at their perceptions about two actors that are likely to influence the expected relative utility of engaging in anti-crime organizations (vis-a-vis engaging in security co-production).

An Interactive Trust Hypothesis

In forming collective anti-crime organizations and, ultimately, confronting crime outside of the purview of the authorities, citizens face both risks and opportunities. The expected relative utility of engaging in anti-crime organizing is not only contingent on citizens' own behavior but also on the expected behavior of the agents surrounding them. The first actor to consider is government.

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[52] Note, for example, the cases of Manuel Mireles, a doctor who became the leader of the *auto-defensa* movement in Michoacán, and Javier Sicilia, a poet who became the leader of a broad anti-criminal civic movement after his son was assassinated in Mexico City.

Since his foundational 1968 work *Power and Influence*, Gamson, for instance, has highlighted the importance of trust in government as a determinant of citizens' choice in attempts to influence the status quo through institutional or non-institutional channels. However, government is a large and multifaceted institution, and not all its agents are likely to be relevant for the emergence of ECLE. For the specific case of crime and insecurity, I argue, law enforcement agents (in particular the police) are the most relevant state representatives to consider. After all, as Malone once noted, "when victimized by a crime, citizens must decide to turn to the law, extralegal institutions, or to no one at all" (Malone, 2012b, p. 127).

On one hand, law enforcement authorities can influence citizens' likelihood of finding justice on their own or reporting crime to the police. On the other, they influence citizens' likelihood of incurring in legal fines (or jail time) when the latter attempt to take the law into their own hands. Thus, trust in law enforcement is likely to influence citizens' perception of the relative utility of engaging in institutional (security-coproduction) or non-institutionalized actions (like ECLE) to cope with crime and, ultimately, in their decision to report crime or start an independent, collective anti-crime organization.

Some researchers have noted, for instance, that citizens are more likely to collaborate with police efforts to fight crime when they have stronger trust in the authorities. Tyler and his collaborators, for instance, have found that, when citizens perceive that the police as having similar values to those of their community or that they are likely to apply fair procedures when processing those detained, they are more likely to follow the law and collaborate with the police to prevent crime (Hough et al., 2010; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 2008).

For their part, scholars interested in the evaluation of police reform in Latin America have noted that, although governments and international agencies have invested millions in the implementation of Community-Oriented Policing programs, the deep-seated distrust among the

parts involved in these efforts has caused them to advance very slowly (Arias & Ungar, 2009; Sabet, 2014).

But beyond its effects on security co-production, distrust in the authorities can also have important consequences on citizens' willingness to rely on them as a source of justice. Diamond (1999), for instance, notes that it is in the "context of weak states and inefficient, poorly disciplined police" (p. 91) where citizens may react to crime by taking desperate reactions to achieve security. Further, Bailey (2009, 2014) warns that an eroded citizen-state relationship can submerge states into a low-level security equilibrium in which crime, corruption, and impunity influence the behavior of citizens and state officials and vice-versa.

Thus, there are reasons to think that, when attempting to take action to face crime, citizens are less likely to turn to the authorities when they deem them to be untrustworthy. Malone, for example, found that among citizens living in low-level-equilibrium Central American countries (Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador), a perception that the judicial system is unlikely to punish criminals translated into a lower probability of citizens being willing to denounce crime and concluded: "reporting crime indicates that people accept, at least begrudgingly, the legal system and its authorities as the legitimate arbiters of justice" (Malone, 2012b, p. 127).

For his part, in his evaluation of the community oriented policing programs in Central America, Ungar (2009) notes how, in some areas of Honduras, violence continued to rise even after the implementation of the *Mano Amiga* program. This was due to the fact that, in the face of untrustworthy authorities, citizens re-directed the social resources strengthened by the program into vigilante actions.

In sum, distrust in the authorities is likely to inform both citizens' willingness to participate in crime-prevention programs and their likelihood to report crime to the police once they have been

victimized. However, what propels citizens to form collective anti-crime organizations rather than taking individual-level measures?

In the following section I argue that, when citizens' distrust law enforcement, their perception of the strength and availability of their social resources may increase the probability that they will turn to their community and engage in collective anti-criminal action. Consistently, I hypothesize that it will be among those who distrust in the police, where trust in the neighbors will be more strongly associated with an increased likelihood of joining together to engage in anti-criminal self-defense organizations. Further, I hypothesize that, among those more distrusting of the authorities, the availability of these organizations is more likely to increase citizens' willingness to turn to their neighbors (rather than the state) as a source of extra-legal justice.

Social Capital When the Authorities Cannot Be Trusted

Since the influential work of de Tocqueville (1863), social capital has been regarded as a predictor of state-tropic participation (participation within the state). Fukuyama, Putnam, and others have argued that social networks and the rules of trust in reciprocity that emerge from them (a.k.a. social capital) can be associated with both economic and political development (Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam et al., 1994).

Social capital has been shown to make citizens more likely to participate in a group when individual benefit is unclear or far removed (Ostrom, 1998; Putnam et al., 1994), to increase citizens' perception that their group will be collectively efficacious (Kim et al., 2011; Putnam, 1995; Welch et al., 2001), and to provide citizens with a social network that facilitates the flow of information and resources making collective problem solving easier (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Although this variable has been considered to be conducive to a better functioning democracy, there seems to be

no mechanisms preventing social capital from translating into extra-state political behavior (actions outside the state).

Indeed, as other scholars have argued, in contexts in which trust in state authorities has eroded significantly, more efficacious citizens may be more likely to attempt to influence government through non-institutionalized means (Gamson, 1968) or seek to exit the state entirely (Hirschman, 1978). When doing so, citizens may redirect their efforts outside or against the democratic state, resulting in the emergence of criminal, anti-state, and even pro-authoritarian organizations (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Armony, 2004; Satyanath et al., 2013).

In line with this view, I argue that under conditions in which citizens distrust the state authorities, citizens with more social capital may be more likely to channel it into collective anti-criminal action rather than investing their social capital in direct cooperation. Moreover, I contend that, when citizens distrust in the authorities, they are more likely to direct their social resources to Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE) rather than directing their anti-criminal efforts into security-co-production with the state.

This argument finds some support in previous scholarship. Mendoza (2006), for instance, defends that the most recent wave of vigilante justice in Guatemala can be explained by solidarity among co-ethnics (which trumps barriers for collective action), particularly in areas where the state fails to provide its citizens the most basic goods and services (e.g., indigenous municipalities). From his analysis of MINUGA's data in that country, Mendoza concludes that "the main structural factors affecting the lynching hazard are the solidarity among ethnic fellows within the indigenous communities, and the number of courts (per capita) in each municipality" (p.1).

Similarly, Malone (2012b) defends social cohesion as a critical factor whose relevance is moderated by citizens' distrust in the state. After noting that "under vigilantism, citizens band together and engage in collective action to sanction those they suspect of criminal activity" (p.117),

Malone highlights that, "in order for the perceived failure of the justice system to translate into collective action, citizens would need to have some sense of solidarity with other members of their community and view citizen action as a viable means for achieving their goals." (p.117)

In sum, Latin America seems to be going through one of the most serious crises of insecurity in its history. This crisis not only has the potential to undermine citizens' well-being but also to put democratic governance in check. While corruption, crime, and impunity can erode democratic institutions and government directly, they can also foster a low-level equilibrium that shapes the way citizens cope with crime. It is in this equilibrium where citizens' distrust in the authorities can move them to mobilize their social capital to provide themselves with the goods and services the state fails to provide.

Study 1: Collective Anti-Criminal Action in Mexico

Perhaps the most paradigmatic case of ECLE in the last five years is the case of Mexico. Whether it is in the form of neighborhood watches, communitarian polices, or paramilitary self-defense movements, an increasing number of Mexicans have turned to their neighbors to confront crime directly.

In large urban centers like Mexico City citizens have associated with the neighbors in their street or district to illegally close streets, install video cameras, purchase radio communicators and even install communal alarms (Rivera, 2011; Salgado, 2014). While these actions have often been tolerated by the authorities it is not uncommon for these organizations to post signs trying to deter crime by promising violent ECLE. A sign posted in a lamppost in the Xochimilco neighborhood of Mexico City, for example, warns:

> Neighbors Organized! Thief, if we catch you, we will not take you to the authorities we will lynch you! (Author's translation)

But collective anti-criminal action has not been limited to the urban centers of Mexico. Citizens living in rural communities across the country have also turned to their neighbors to defend themselves from crime. Towns in states as diverse as Michoacán, Guerrero, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Chihuahua (Rea, 2013; Reyes Maciel, 2013; Villalpando, 2009) have expelled the state-appointed police forces in their town and created their own citizen-operated *policías comunitarias* (community police forces). While most of these *policías comunitarias* have focused on investigating and prosecuting crime within their communities, others have been more aggressive and formed a *movimiento de auto-defensa* (self-defense movement) to pursue the drug cartels in a paramilitary fashion (Malkin & Villegas, 2014).

All and all, in the last ten years Mexico has seen an increase in collective anti-crime organizations that, although at times are willing to collaborate with the authorities, often carry out actions that challenge the rule of law and bring democratic governance into question (Melgar, 2013).[53] What role has citizens' trust in their neighbors had on the emergence of collective anti-criminal actions in this country?

Methods

In order to study why citizens participate in ECLE in Mexico, I analyze two of the largest victimization surveys that have been conducted in the country. In 2010 and 2011, the National Institute of Informatics Geography and Statistics of Mexico (INEGI) collected two very similar surveys aimed at reviewing citizens' experiences with crime. Although different in name, the National Insecurity Survey (ENSI-2010) and the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Safety (ENVIPE-2011) are similar in content, methodology, and scope. Not only did both studies implement a multistage random sampling design that allows us to derive inferences

[53] For instance, although it rarely results in violence, the hundreds of streets that inhabitants of Mexico City have closed illegally in order to attempt to control who enters their street have created a real problem for authorities trying to guarantee citizens' free transit across the city (Rivera, 2011).

representative at the state level (N=60,461 and 66,865 respectively).[54] They were also based on almost identical questionnaires.

In addition to the standard demographic questions, the two surveys asked Mexicans about their crime victimization history, about their perceptions of insecurity and about their trust in their neighbors and the police. Crucially, in addition to these questions both ENSI and ENVIPE surveys included the following question, "In the previous 12 months, they had taken joint action with their neighbors to defend themselves from crime [Yes or No]? (To be concise, I refer to this variable as "Collective Anti-Criminal Action"). [55,56]

While 14.42% of Mexicans were victims of some sort of crime in 2010, 36.04% of Mexicans were victimized by crime in 2011.[57] Additionally, in both years, about 39.35% of Mexicans reported feeling unsafe in their neighborhood. Yet a plurality of Mexicans expressed "a lot of trust" towards neighbors. In 2010 31.43% of citizens marked this category, and in 2011 40.48% did. This translated into a slight increase in the overall average, so that on a one (no trust) to four (a lot of trust) scale, Mexicans went from 2.79 in 2010 to 2.96 in 2011.

Although INEGI was careful to keep the wording of questions and questionnaire placement consistent across the ENSI and ENVIPE studies, it took a slightly different approach to the measurement of trust in the police in 2010 and 2011. While in ENSI-2010 INEGI included three

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[54] The ENSI-2010's fieldwork was conducted from August 2 to September 3 of 2010. The complex sample included 303 strata and 8,467 primary sample units (PSUs). The ENVIPE-2011, for its part, was conducted from March 14 to April 22 of 2011. The complex random sample included 324 strata and 10,025 PSUs. In both surveys a probability weight was included to obtain representativeness at the subnational level.

[55] See Appendix I for a full list of question wordings.

[56] It is important to note that, although I have found that citizens consistently recall police-community collaborative endeavors, the question does not specify that the actions have to be extralegal. To the extent that this question recover acts of collaboration between citizens and the police my conclusions may be a conservative estimate of the effects that would be found had the question asked explicitly about extralegal actions.

[57] It is important to take this difference in crime victimization with a grain of salt as there are important differences in the victimization question across surveys. First, in 2010 INEGI asked citizens whether they, a minor, or someone else had been victimized in or outside of the state in 4 different questions (in-state victim, out-of-state victim, minor victim). In 2011 INEGI used a single general question and only then asked citizens to distinguish who was victimized and where. Second, while in 2010 INEGI asked citizens whether they were victim of "a crime," in 2011 INEGI asked citizens whether they suffered one of the crimes on a list. Thus, the difference may be explained by measurement difference in addition (or instead of) actual victimization.

"trust in the police" items, in the ENVIPE-2011 study it included only one. In 2010 citizens were asked about their trust in the municipal, state, and federal police forces. INEGI found that citizens' trust in the police across the three different administrative levels is highly correlated (0.63 average inter-item correlation). Perhaps due to this fact, in 2011 INEGI decided to include only one item measuring citizens' general trust in the police.

To be able to evaluate the change in citizens' trust in the police, I created an additive index with the 2010 scale. Although at the expense of the nuance provided by the original battery, the police trust index provides us with a reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha = 0.83) that is likely to tap on a similar dimension to the 2011 item. Overall, Mexicans showed a low and decreasing trust in the police. In a one (no trust) to four (a lot of trust) scale, citizens' trust in the police went from about 1.97 in 2010 to about 1.87 in 2011. In sum, this results show that by the time both surveys were conducted citizens' trust in their neighbors and general distrust in the police were high and rising.

Finally, my descriptive analyses of both ENSI-2010 and ENVIPE-2011 show that the year previous to the 2010 survey 11.6% of Mexicans took joint action with their neighbors to defend themselves from crime and that, during the twelve months before the 2011 survey, 8.5% of Mexicans engaged in some form of Collective Anti-Criminal Action. But what can these data tell us about the factors that contribute to citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action? In order to answer this question, I specified the following logistic regression model:

$$Pr(AntiCrime) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Trust\ N_i + \beta_2 Distrust\ P_i + \beta_3 Trust\ N_i\ x\ Distrust\ P_i + \beta_4 Crime\ Victim_i + \beta_5 Insecurity_i + \beta_6 Indigenous_i + \boldsymbol{\Phi}'\ \boldsymbol{CONTROLS}' + \boldsymbol{\Theta}'\ \boldsymbol{FIXED\ EFFECTS}' + e_i \quad 1)$$

Here, the probability of a respondent to engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Action **(AntiCrime)** is modeled as a function of his trust in his neighbors **(Trust N)**, his distrust in the police **(Distrust P)**, whether he or she has been a victim of a crime **(Crime Victim)** and his/her

perception that the neighborhood in which he/she lives is unsafe **(Insecurity)**. But, in addition to these variables it is important to account for the other factors that have also been linked to the emergence of ECLE and that might also be linked with citizens' involvement in anti-crime organizations.

Particularly, journalists and scholars specializing in Latin America have suggested a connection between areas of strong indigenous traditions and the emergence of communitarian guards, and anti-criminal mob-violence (Vilas, 2009). Although the logic behind this claim has been strongly challenged (Fernandez, 2004; Handy, 2004), Mendoza (2006) found a correlation between the density of indigenous population and the prevalence of lynching in Guatemala. To the extent that an indigenous ethnic identity could be linked to an individual's social capital, trust in the authorities and, ultimately, his/her willingness to engage in anti-criminal action, it is important to account for this variable in the model.[58]

Unfortunately, neither the ENSI nor ENVIPE surveys collected information about the ethnic background of the respondent; however, the 2010 census provides information about the percentage of households in a municipality in which the head of family speaks an indigenous language. I specify this proportion as a respondent's likelihood to have an indigenous identity **(Indigenous)**. That said, it is important to underscore that I included this variable as control of substantive importance. Any results derived from this variable ought to be taken with extreme precaution since the size of the standard error is likely to be underestimated.

Finally, in order to test the interactive trust hypothesis, I include the interaction between citizens' trust in their neighbors and distrust in the police. This interaction is represented by the

[58] Recall that Mendoza (2009) goes as far to regard this variable (the density of ethnic co-ethnics) as an indicator of social capital. Moreover, note that from his study of lynchings in Bolivia, Goldstein (2004, 2012) concludes that rather than an expression of cultural identity, spectacular acts of ECLE violence are linked to an attempt to broadcast cohesion and collective efficacy in a context of state marginalization.

multiplicative term **Trust N x Distrust P**. To recap, if distrust in the police moderates the effect of trust in the neighbors, then I expect this multiplicative term to be positive and significant.

Before moving to the results of the model, it is important to explain the two terms highlighted in equation 1. The term **Φ'CONTROLS'** represents a vector of control variables. These include demographic variables such as Sex, Education, Age and Size of the Locality as well as other relevant variables such as perceptions of Insecurity in the State, perceptions of the trend of Crime in the State and perception of the trend of Crime in the City. Additionally I also included controls for respondents' reports of Alcohol Consumption, Illegal Alcohol Sales, Drug Consumption, Gunfire, Gangs, Gun Sales, Assaults, Extortions, Floor Charges, Drug Stores, Kidnappings and Piracy Sales in his/her Neighborhood.[59] All variables were recoded from 0 to 1.

Finally, it is necessary to point out that for the sake of parsimony (and because the results from each year support the same conclusions) I pooled together the data from both surveys. The term **Φ'FIXED EFFECTS'** refers to a vector of 64 dummy variables that identify each state-year included in the final merge. These variables capture all variance at this label and, therefore, even when the results come from a pooled model, the analyses only assume exchangeability within each state-year.[60]

Results

Table 1 shows the results from the model in equation 1 (full results available in Appendix I.I). As this table shows, there is a statistically significant effect of insecurity on citizens' likelihood to engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Action.

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[59] Unfortunately, the National Insecurity Survey did not include a direct measure of household income. Although the omitted variable bias introduced by the omission of this variable cannot be completely accounted for, it is likely to be attenuated by the inclusion of **Education** and **Occupation** controls. Education was included and presented in all models. For parsimony, occupation was not included in the models shown; however, the results are robust to including dummy variables for each occupation (results of this model are available upon request: see Appendix III).

[60] Additionally, I ran all of the analyses and robustness tests in the ENSI-2010 and ENVIPE-2011 separately. The results show that the findings are not an expression of a single year. The interaction is significant in each dataset independently (see Appendix II)

Overall, a maximum change in insecurity is predicted to be associated with a 9.18 percent increase (henceforward, a 9.18% increase) in the probability of a citizen to engage in joint action with their neighbors to defend themselves from crime. As Figure 8a shows, while those who report that they feel safe in their neighborhood have a 0.098 probability of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action, those who report feeling unsafe, have a probability of 0.107 of engaging in this type of behavior.[61]

Table 1. Interactive Effect of Trust in the Neighbors and Distrust in the Police on the Probability of Engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action

	ENSI/ENVIPE 2010-2011	
	Coefficient	Standard Error
Trust in Neighbors	0.784***	(0.131)
Distrust in the Police	-0.563***	(0.140)
Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police	**0.525*** **	**(0.168)**
Crime Victimization	0.377***	(0.0338)
Insecurity	0.0915**	(0.0375)
Indigenous	-0.475***	(0.159)
Age	0.124*	(0.0731)
Female	0.0435	(0.0286)
Education	1.119***	(0.0999)
Size of Locality	0.226***	(0.0263)
Constant	-2.901***	(0.175)
Fixed Effects	64 State-Year	
Observations	115,727	

Design- based robust standard errors (in parentheses) account for stratification, clustering and weighting. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See full results in Appendix I.I. For a complete list of question wording see Appendix I.

For its part, crime victimization also has a positive effect on citizens' likelihood of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action. Overall, crime victimization is predicted to be associated with a 36.97% increase in the probability of a citizen to engage in joint action with their neighbors to defend themselves from crime. As can be seen in Figure 8b, those who were not victimized by crime in the previous year have a 0.093 probability of engaging in ECLE. For their part, those who reported that they had been victimized have a probability of 0.127 of to engage in joint action with their neighbors to defend themselves from crime.[62]

[61] Probabilities are calculated using STATA's margins command. This command calculates the overall probabilities using a logit link function and setting all other covariates at their means. I also test the role of insecurity as a factor conditioning the moderating effect of distrust in the police. Although statistically insignificant, the effects seem to go in the expected direction (See Appendix IV).

[62] However it may also be the case that, ironically, by engaging in collective anti-criminal actions citizens expose themselves to a higher risk of being victimized by crime.

Figures 8a.-8c.Insecurity, Crime, Ethnicity and Anti-Crime Organization



For its part, the effect of the density of indigenous language speakers seems to run against the indigenous culture hypothesis. Once other variables are accounted for, indigenous density does not seem to have a positive but a negative effect on Collective Anti-Criminal Action. Once more, as citizens' ethnicity is not measured but only approximated by the indigenous density in his municipality, these results need to be taken with a very big grain of salt. Still, Figure 8c shows a graphical display of the relation between indigenous density and a citizens' likelihood to engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Action.

Finally, the shaded row in Table 1 shows that, as expected, distrust in the police positively and significantly moderates the effect of trust in the neighbors. That is, the coefficient suggests that, as distrust in the police increases, the effect of trust in the neighbors also increases (see Figure 9a). Figure 9b illustrates the moderating effect of distrust in the police more closely. The vertical axis in the figure displays the estimated probability of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action and the horizontal axis displays citizens' trust in their neighbors.

Additionally, the figure distinguishes the effect among those who trust (clear-solid line) and those who distrust in the police (dark, dashed line). The figure shows that as citizens' trust in their neighbors increases so does their probability of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action. But more

relevant to my argument, it shows that the degree to which citizens' likelihood of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action increases in response to changes in citizens' trust in the neighbors is greater among those more distrustful of the police (dashed-dark line) than those who trust in the authorities (clear-solid line).

Figures 9a. and 9b. Marginal Effect of Trust in the Neighbors on Anti-Crime Organization as Moderated by Distrust in Law Enforcement



Indeed, among those with the lowest level of distrust in the police, a maximum change in trust in the neighbors is associated with a 92.46% increase in the probability of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action (going from 0.076 to 0.146). However, among those with the highest level of distrust in the police, a maximum change in trust in the neighbors is predicted to be associated with a 210.36% increase in the respondents' probability of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action (going from 0.046 to 0.142).

To summarize across the broader set of results, the analyses show that older, more educated Mexicans living in larger communities with a lower proportion of indigenous-language speakers are more likely to engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Action. Moreover, I find that, consistent with Malone (2012) and Seligson's (2003) attitudinal findings, those who have been victims of crime and/or do not feel safe in their neighborhood are more likely to engage in joint actions with their neighbors to

defend themselves from crime. Finally, in line with my hypothesis, I find distrust in the police to significantly moderate the positive effect of citizens' trust in the neighbors. While among both sectors trust in the neighbors translates into an increased probability to participate to participate in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions, it is among Mexicans with the maximum level of distrust in the police where the effect is the strongest. [63,64]

However, it is important to point out that Mexico is not the only country in which collective anti-crime organizations have emerged. Other countries under security crisis and in which impunity and corruption are rampant (what Bailey (2009) would call a low level equilibrium) have also seen the emergence of this type of groups. Traditionally indigenous countries like Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia have been noted for their rural anti-criminal organizations. However, both Brazil and Argentina also have old and recent problems with citizens taking the law into their own hands (Barbara, 2015; De Souza Martins, 1991; El País, 2014). As much as four thousand miles away, a banner almost identical to the one found in Mexico (Figure 10) hangs from a lamppost in the Los Hornos neighborhood in Santa Fe, Argentina, warning bystanders of the presence of a collective anti-crime organization. To what

Figure 10. Sign Posted in the "Los Hornos" Neighborhood in the City of Santa Fe (Argentina)

"Neighbors Organized! Thief, if we catch you we will not take you to the police station, we will lynch you!" Authors' translation. Source: *El Día* (2014)

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[63] Other authors have looked at the privatization of security as an indirect indicator of indirect-ECLE (Malone, 2012a; Ungar, 2007).To further assess the validity of my results, I replicated all the analyses using citizens´ likelihood to join together with their neighbors to hire private security for a public space (their street or neighborhood) as an alternative dependent variable. I find that distrust in the authorities activates the degree in which citizens´ trust in their neighbors translates into an increased likelihood of collectively investing in private security for public spaces. See Appendix V.

[64] Note that, by itself, ENSI/ENVIPE´s individual level data cannot disentangle the simultaneous relation between citizens' trust in their neighbors and their participation in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions. To produce a test robust to this type of endogeneity, I conducted a lagged variable test by aggregating the data from both surveys at the municipal level and conducting a series of lagged variable analyses. In almost every case these analyses support the interactive trust hypothesis (See Appendix VI).

extent are the results found in Mexico reflective of the reality of the rest of the "low level equilibrium" countries of the Americas?

Study 2: Collective Anti-Crime Organization in Latin America and the Caribbean

To assess the robustness of the core finding presented above, I turn to the data that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has collected from 2004 to 2014 in Latin America and the Caribbean. Particularly, I look at the AmericasBarometer, a biennial survey designed with the objective of recovering citizens' political attitudes, experiences and behavior with a high degree of comparability across countries and waves. As part of this survey, LAPOP conducts a minimum of 1,500 face to face interviews in most of the independent democracies of the hemisphere.

In addition to the standard demographic questions, voting age adults are asked about their political and democratic attitudes, perceptions of insecurity, crime victimization profiles, perception of the trustworthiness of their neighbors and perception of the trustworthiness of the police. Importantly, in 60 country years, LAPOP asked citizens whether, "In the last 12 months out of fear of being a victim of crime, they had organized with the neighbors of their community [Yes or No]" (For short I refer to this variable as **Collective Anti-Crime Organization**).

Following the work of and Bailey (2014) and Malone (2012) I expect citizens living in countries with relatively lower levels of insecurity and a stronger rule of law to behave differently than citizens living in what Bailey would call a "low level equilibrium".

Thus, I restrict my analysis to countries with comparable levels of criminal violence, corruption and impunity. Specifically, I analyze data from Mexico (2012 and 2014), Guatemala (2008, 2012 and 2014), El Salvador (2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014), Honduras (2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014), Colombia (2012 and 2014), Ecuador (2012 and 2014), Bolivia (2012 and 2014), Peru (2012 and 2014), Paraguay (2012 and 2014), Brazil (2012 and 2014), Venezuela (2012 and 2014), Argentina (2012 and 2014), Dominican Republic (2012 and 2014), Haiti (2012 and 2014), Jamaica (2012 and

2014), Guyana (2012 and 2014), and Belize (2008, 2012 and 2014).[65] The countries excluded from the analysis were the Bahamas, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua, the United States, and Canada.

In order to replicate my previous results, I re-specified equation 1 in the AmericasBarometer data. In this model, the probability of a respondent to engage in **Collective Anti-Crime Organization** is a function of his trust in his neighbors **(Trust N)**, his distrust in the police **(Distrust P)**, his position as a victim of a crime **(Crime Victim)** and his perception about the insecurity of the neighborhood in which he lives **(Insecurity)**.[66]

Table 2. Interactive Effect of Trust in the Neighbors and Distrust in the Police on the Probability of Engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action

	Americas Barometer 2008-2014	
	Coefficient	Standard Error
Trust in Neighbors	-0.00625	(0.0953)
Distrust in the Police	-0.208**	(0.0972)
Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police	**0.320****	**(0.141)**
Crime Victimization	0.456***	(0.0310)
Insecurity	0.752***	(0.0506)
Indigenous	0.523***	(0.0699)
Age	1.270***	(0.256)
Female	-0.0887***	(0.0239)
Education	0.102*	(0.0579)
Size of Locality	0.146***	(0.0525)
Constant	-2.363***	(0.171)
Fixed Effects	40 Country-Years	
Observations	51,787	

Design-based robust standard errors (in parentheses) account for stratification, clustering and weighting. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See full results in Appendix I.I. For a complete list of question wording, see Appendix I.

In contrast to the ENSI/ENVIPE surveys, LAPOP did ask respondents whether they identified with an ethnic group. Thus, in this model, the variable **Indigenous** represents a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent self-identified as indigenous and 0 otherwise. It is worth noting that, since I also included dummy variables for those who identify themselves as Mestizo, Black, Mulato, and Other races, β_6 captures the difference between self-identified **Indigenous** and **White** respondents.

[65] The missing years among some low level equilibrium countries (e.g. Guatemala 2010, Belize 2010) are due to LAPOP not including the question in those questionnaires.
[66] Again, see Appendix I for details about question wording.

Importantly, in order to test the interactive trust hypothesis, I include the interaction between citizens' trust in their neighbors and distrust in the police. This interaction is represented by the multiplicative term **Trust N x Distrust P**. As we recall, if distrust in the police moderates the effect of trust in the neighbors, I expect this multiplicative term to be positive and significant.

Similar to the model for Mexico, the term **Φ'CONTROLS'** represents a vector of control variables including **Sex, Education, Age, Size of the Locality** and an individual level variable for **Wealth**. The latter, captures the respondent's level of wealth within the urban/rural stratum of the country in which he lives based in his possession of consumer goods. In addition to these controls I also included variables to account for respondents' **Support for Vigilante Justice**, **Support for Democracy**, **Perceptions that the Justice System Punishes Criminals**, **Perceptions that the Administration Improves Citizen Safety**, **and Support for a Military Coup in Case of High Levels of Crime**. All variables were recoded to run from 0 to 1 to show maximum effects.

Finally, the term **Φ'FIXED EFFECTS'** refers to a vector of dummy variables that uniquely identify each of the 40 country-years included in the analysis. These variables capture all of the outcome's variation at the country-year level so that exchangeability only has to be assumed within each country-year.

Table 2 shows the results from fitting equation 1 to the rest of the low-level equilibrium countries in the Americas (see Appendix I.I for the full set of results). In almost every case the results are consistent with the analysis conducted in Mexico.

First, the data show a positive and statistically significant association between insecurity and citizens' likelihood of engaging in Collective Anti-Crime Organization. The pooled model shows that a minimum to maximum change in citizens' feelings of insecurity is associated with a 77.35% increase in the probability of a citizen to organize with his neighbors out of fear of crime. As can be seen in Figure 11a, those who feel very safe in their neighborhood have a 0.14 probability of

engaging in Collective Anti-Crime Organization, while those who report feeling very unsafe have a probability of 0.25 of engaging in this type of behavior.

Second, Table 2 shows a positive and statistically significant association between victimization and citizens' likelihood of engaging in Collective Anti-Crime Organization. Overall, crime victimization is associated with a 40.61% increase in the probability of a citizen to organize with the neighbors of his community out of fear of crime. As Figure 11b shows, those who were not victimized by crime the year previous to the survey have a 0.17 chance of engaging in ECLE. For their part, those who were victimized have a probability of 0.24 of organizing with the neighbors of the community to defend themselves from crime.

Third, in stark contrast to the Mexico results, I find that citizens who self-identify as indigenous are more likely to organize with their neighbors in response to criminal threats than any other ethnic group. As Figure 11c shows, for example, other things constant, the probability that a self-described indigenous respondent (0.26) will engage in Collective Anti-Crime Organization is 46.42% larger than the probability that a self-reported white or mestizo citizen will engage in this type of behavior (0.18).

Figures 11a.-11c. Determinants of Anti-Crime Organization in Low Security Equilibrium Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean

Figure 11a	Figure 11b	Figure 11c



Figures 12a. and 12b. Effect of Trust in the Neighbors as Moderated by Distrust in the Police

Figure 12a	Figure 12b



Once more, the positive and statistically significant interaction between distrust in the police and trust in the neighbors brings supporting evidence for my hypothesis. As can be seen in Figure 12a, as distrust in the police increases, so does the effect of trust in the neighbors. Figure 12b follows the same logic of Figure 9b. This time, Figure 12b shows that, among those with the highest

level of trust in the police (clear-solid line), a mini-max change in trust in the neighbors cannot be associated with any change in the likelihood that a citizen will seek to organize with their neighbors against crime. In contrast, among those who distrust the police most intensely, a maximum change in trust in the neighbors is predicted to be associated with a statistically significant 78.74% increase in the respondents' probability of engaging in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization (going from 0.16 to 0.21).[67]

All in all, the results obtained for Mexico seem to be reflective of the reality faced by citizens living in countries with comparable levels of insecurity and rule of law. In line with my analysis of Mexico, I find that citizens living in the "low-level equilibrium" countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are more likely to engage in ECLE when they have been victimized by crime and/or feel unsafe in the neighborhood in which they live. Additionally, in contrast to the previous results, I find that respondents self-identifying as indigenous are more rather than less likely to engage in ECLE.[68]

Finally, I find additional evidence in support of the idea that citizens' distrust in the police significantly moderates the effect of citizens' trust in the neighbors. While among those who trust in the police, trust in the neighbors could not be associated to a significant increase in citizens' likelihood to engage in Collective Anti-Crime Organization, among those who distrust the police, an increase in citizens' trust in their neighbors is associated with an increase in citizens' likelihood of organizing with them in response to crime.

[67] I also considered the change in the marginal effect of distrust in the police as a function of citizens' trust in their neighbors. I found that, among citizens who trust in their neighbors, trust in the police does not significantly change citizens' likelihood of participating in a collective anti-crime organization. However, among those who distrust in their neighbors, a maximum change in citizens' distrust in the police is associated with a 14.81% decrease in a citizens' likelihood of participating in a collective anti-crime organization. This may be due to a shift of the locus of management across both situations. That is, in contexts of strong social cohesion, collective anti-crime organizations might be managed by citizens. Therefore, trust in the police might only play a small role in their emergence. However, in contexts in which social cohesion is low, collective anti-crime organizations might be more actively managed by the authorities. Thus, it is here where citizens' trust in the authorities might be more likely to play a role (see Appendix VII, Figure A2 for an illustration).

[68] This could be explained either by the inconsistency of the measure across models or by the differences in indigenous cultures across the Americas. Further research is necessary to arrive to a thorough explanation of this inconsistency.

Study 3: Collective Anti-Crime Organization and ECLE

Although the previous analysis taps into the factors that contribute to the emergence of Collective Anti-Crime Organization, a skeptical reader would point out that it is unclear the extent to which citizens' participation in a neighborhood-based attempt to address crime translates into extralegal action. Under what circumstances do citizens' collective anti-crime efforts translate into a willingness to reach out for the neighbors, rather than the state, in search for justice?

To investigate this question, I collaborated with LAPOP to include an item in Mexico's 2014 AmericasBarometer questionnaire. The item asks citizens:

> VICZIZ14. If you or someone of your family was victim of a crime in one of the streets of your neighborhood, to whom would you turn in search for justice? 1) The municipal police 2) The public prosecutor 3) Your neighbors/community 4) Other 5) No one.[69]

Of the total of respondents, 50.64% said that in case of being victimized by crime they would turn to the municipal police, and 28.36% responded that they would go to the public prosecutor. However, while 4.01% of respondents said that they would not turn to anyone to seek justice after being victims of a crime, as many as 10.64% of the interviewees manifested their preference to turn to their neighbors or community to seek justice were they victimized by crime.[70]

To evaluate the determinants of respondents who were willing to seek extralegal justice with their neighbors, I collapsed the responses to this question into three different behaviors: 1) turning to the authorities, 2) turning to the neighbors/community, and 3) other preferences (seeking other actors or seeking no one). I then specified a multinomial logistic regression model in which the respondents' probability to turn to their neighbors, rather than the authorities, is a function of their perception of insecurity, their distrust in the police (**DistrustP**), and their participation in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization.

[69] Note the question close resembles Malone's statement cited on page 6 (Malone, 2012b, p. 127).
[70] 6.35% of Mexicans say that they would turn to another actor in order to seek justice.

To test the degree to which distrust of the police moderates the effect of participating in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization, I include a multiplicative term between **Organization x Distrust P**. Remember that if distrust in the police moderates the effect of participating in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization we should expect a positive and significant coefficient associated with this term.

$$Pr(Neighbors/Authorities)_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Organization_i + \beta_2 Distrust\ P_i + \beta_3 Organization_i\ x\ Distrust\ P_i + \beta_4 Insecurity_i + \beta_5 Indigenous_i + \boldsymbol{\Phi}'\ \boldsymbol{CONTROLS}' + \boldsymbol{\Theta}' \boldsymbol{FIXED\ EFFECTS}' + e_i \quad 2)$$

In line with the previous specifications **Φ'CONTROLS'** represents a vector of control variables. **Demographic** controls include **Sex, Education, Age**, **Size of the Locality and Wealth**.[71] However, I also include controls for citizens' **Support for Vigilante Justice**,[72] and a dummy variable that distinguishes those respondents self-identifying as **Indigenous** from those with a different ethnic identity. All variables were recoded from 0 to 1 to show maximum effects.

Finally, the term **Φ'FIXED EFFECTS'** in this case is a set of **four** dummy variables that uniquely identify each of the regional strata for which the Mexican sample is representative. Table 3 shows the results from this model.[73]

Although the results do not show evidence that insecurity directly increases citizens' willingness to engage in ECLE, they show that citizens' support for vigilante justice, citizens' perception that the justice system punishes criminals, citizens' perceptions that the administration improves citizen safety, and citizens' evaluation of police response speed all are positively associated

[71] Note that in this case, wealth takes particular relevance since an important strand of literature has linked lynchings, brawls, and vigilante organizations to group competition (Olzak, 1990) often triggered by economic pressures (Hepworth & West, 1988; Hovland & Sears, 1940; Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007) but, at times, also encouraged by rapid religious, political, and demographic change (Bagozzi, 1977; Inverarity, 1976; Tyson, 2013; Wasserman, 1977).

[72] I included this control to evaluate the effect (and control for) citizens' general attitudes towards vigilantism.

[73] In addition to running this model I also evaluated the direct effect of citizens' trust in the neighbors on their willingness to turn to their community as a source of justice after being victimized by crime. I did so by an identical model to the one presented in Table 1. Although the results suggest a positive relation between both variables, the coefficient was statistically indistinguishable from zero. Further, I did not find distrust of the police to significantly moderate this effect. The results of this model are presented in Table A10 of Appendix VIII.

with an increase in citizens' willingness to engage in ECLE. Additionally, the results show that citizens describing themselves as indigenous are more likely choose to turn to their neighbors or community (rather than the state) to seek justice after being victims of a criminal act.

Table 3. Collective Anti-Crime Organization and Turning to the Neighbors for Justice

	Neighbors vs Authorities	
VARIABLES	Coefficient	Standard Errors
Distrust in The Police	1.569***	(0.372)
Anti-Crime Organization	-0.486	(0. 643)
Distrust in The Police X Anti-Crime Organization	**1.414***	**(0.789)**
Trust in the Neighbors	0.440	(0.388)
Support for Vigilante Justice	0.951***	(0.285)
Insecurity	-0.239	(0.444)
Victimized by Crime	-0.0797	(0.222)
Indigenous vs Other	0.448*	(0.264)
Women	-0.127	(0.213)
Wealth	-0.192**	(0.0829)
Education	-0.265*	(0.158)
Age	-0.00979	(0.0675)
Size Of Town	-0.0260	(0.111)
Constant	-2.996***	(0.709)
Fixed Effects	4 Regions	
Observations	1,256	

Design-based standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

As Figure 13a shows, a minimum to maximum change in a Mexican's support for vigilante justice is predicted to be associated with an 86.71% increase in the probability of being willing to turn to the neighbors/community (rather than the state) in search for justice in case of being victimized by crime. Figure 13b, for its part, shows that indigenous respondents (0.16) seem to have a likelihood 55.09% greater than non-indigenous respondents (0.10) of responding that they would be likely to turn to their neighbors (rather than the authorities) in search for justice in the case of being victimized by crime.

Figures 13a. and 13b. Effect of Other Variables on Citizens' Willingness to Turn to Their Neighbors



Finally, as expected, distrust of the police significantly moderates the effect of citizens' participation in Collective Anti-Crime Organizations. That is, as citizens' distrust in the police increases, so does the association between Collective Anti-Crime Organization and a citizen's preference for turning to his/her neighbors, rather than the authorities, as a source of justice (Figure 14a).

As seen in Figure 14b, among those who trust the police most strongly, belonging to a Collective Anti-Crime Organization does not significantly increase citizens' willingness to engage in ECLE. However, among those who distrust the police, belonging to a Collective Anti-Crime Organization positively and significantly increases citizens' willingness to engage in ECLE. Among

those in this subgroup, participating in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization is predicted to be associated with a change of about 64.29% in a citizen's willingness to engage in ECLE.[74]

Figures 14a. and 14b. Effect of Engaging in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization as Moderated by Distrust in The Police

Figure 14a	Figure 14b



Conclusion

To summarize, this chapter has focused on the emergence of Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement in Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to reviewing and testing other explanations for the emergence of ECLE, I have offered a novel, testable theoretical framework in which the likelihood of a person to engage in ECLE is influenced by an interaction between trust in two alternative law enforcement providers: the state and the community.

I conducted three empirical test of this framework. In the first section, I turned to Mexico, one of the countries that have been most concerned about ECLE. I analyzed data from ENSI-2010

[74] Finally, I also considered the opposite side of the interaction — that is, the moderating effect of participating on collective anti-crime organizations over the effect of police distrust. I found that while the effect of distrust of the police is statistically significant for both groups, it is substantively larger for those who participate in collective anti-crime organizations, while a maximum change in police distrust is associated with a 263% increase in the likelihood of turning to the neighbors to seek for justice for those who do not participate. A maximum change in police distrust is associated with an 882 percentage point change among those who do participate in collective anti-crime organizations. See Figure A3 in Appendix VII for a graphical representation.

and ENVIPE-2011 and found that citizens who have been victimized by crime and feel insecure in their neighborhoods are more likely to engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Action. Additionally, I found that the effect of trust in one's neighbors on Mexicans' likelihood of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions is stronger among those who distrust law enforcement.

In the second section, I tested whether my hypothesis is generalizable to "low-level equilibrium countries". Again, I found that, all other things being equal, crime and insecurity were positively associated with engaging in Collective Anti-Crime Organization and that distrust in the police significantly moderated the effect of citizens' trust in their neighbors.

In the final section, I evaluated the degree to which citizens' experiences with Collective Anti-Crime Organizations can be associated with an increased willingness to seek justice with the neighbors at the expense of state authorities. Consistent with my hypothesis, I found that, all other things being equal, the association between a citizen's participation in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization and his/her preference for reaching out to his/her neighbors (rather than the government) in search for justice is stronger among those who distrust the police more strongly.

Although it is true that not all citizens' attempts to defend themselves or to seek justice with their neighbors in response to crime end in dramatic acts of violence or in the emergence of paramilitary vigilante organizations, it is still crucial to understand the early (although perhaps innocuous) manifestations of ECLE before they can exert significant political, economic, or human costs. Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter shows that not only sociological but also political factors are important for understanding citizens' attempts to join with their neighbors to face crime. Trust in law enforcement allows the state to exert its most basic role, which is to serve as a moderating force in society. When citizens lose their confidence in this actor, they invest their social resources to engage criminals directly, an act that threatens the alleged criminal's individual

rights, bears significant opportunity costs, and in extreme cases can shake the very foundations of the state, particularly with regard to the monopoly over the coercive use of violence (Weber, 1919).

Even as this chapter brings important evidence (coming from more than 100 thousand interviews conducted in 17 different countries) in support from my thesis, the nature of the data does not allow us to completely rule out the potential interference of unmeasured variables and/or the simultaneous effect of ECLE on my predictors of interest. To produce a test that can account for these potential confounders, in the following two chapters I present two laboratory-in-the-field experiments conducted between 2013 and 2014.

IV. TRUST AND SUPPORT FOR COLLECTIVE VIGILANTISM: A VIGNETTE EXPERIMENT

The recent increase in the number of collective vigilante organizations around the world has captured the attention of scholars from many fields (Bangstad, 2005; Godoy, 2004; Tyson, 2013). Although collective vigilantism may help citizens to reduce the costs of crime in the short term, it can also threaten the rights, lives, and economic livelihoods of the vigilantes and their targets (Bates et al., 2002; Hine, 1998). Moreover, as they tend to be more long-lasting than individual vigilante actions, collective vigilante groups pose a particularly serious challenge to the state's capacity to maintain its monopoly over the coercive use of violence (Silke, 2001; Weber, 1919), and therefore, this phenomenon is of particular importance to political science.[75]

Citizens' support for collective vigilantism as an alternative to state intervention varies significantly across contexts (Malone, 2012c; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2015). Understanding the circumstances under which citizens manifest different attitudes towards this phenomenon may allow us to understand fluctuations in both public opinion and in the emergence and success of collective vigilante organizations. What factors contribute to an increased probability that citizens will support the idea that those concerned about crime should circumvent the state and resort to their community to confront criminals directly? I propose that the perceptions citizens have of the trustworthiness of their neighbors and the police (i.e., the apparent likelihood of effective intervention) can influence the degree to which they support this type of action. Moreover, I argue that citizens' distrust of the police moderates the effect of the apparent trustworthiness of the neighbors.

I designed a laboratory experiment in which participants were asked to react to one of four versions of a mock newspaper article. The article describes the situation of a group of concerned citizens who, having been victimized by a band of criminals, need to consider how to cope with

[75] This study was reviewed by Vanderbilt's Institutional Review Board (IRB # 131653).

crime.[76] The four versions of the article are identical in every way except that they each portray the likelihood of intervention by the concerned citizens' neighbors and the police in a different light. This strategy allows me to compare citizens' support for the idea that the concerned citizens should confront criminals directly and independently of the authorities (vicarious support for collective vigilantism) at different levels of perceived neighbors' and authorities' trustworthiness while holding every confounder constant.

The experiment was conducted among undergraduate students in one of the largest public universities in Mexico during the fall of 2013, only three months after a devastating storm (Hurricane Manuel) hit the coast of the state of Guerrero, causing the government to declare a state of national emergency. This context contributes to the validity of the study in two ways.

First, the setting used for the experiment, a natural disaster, makes it easier for participants to attribute crime to the context rather than to police incompetence. This is particularly important since an unintentional reduction of citizens' trust in the police in the "high police trust" condition could make the identification of any effect more challenging.

Second, not only is Guerrero one of the states that have been most severely victimized by crime, it is also one of the regions in which collective vigilantism has been most prevalent.[77] Thus, this context allowed me to conduct the study among a pool of participants who were likely to see organized crime as a latent but realistic threat, be sensitive to the criminal situation described in the article, and consider collective vigilantism as a believable reaction from concerned citizens. Although it is important to acknowledge that the results only capture citizens' vicarious support for collective

[76] The treatments were fictitious. After their participation, subjects were fully debriefed with respect to the nature of the treatments as well as the objective and motivation for the study. Additionally, I answered all the questions raised by those who were still curious at the end of the study.
[77] For a thorough discussion of the geography of vigilante groups, see Pérez (2013) and Reyes Maciel (2013). For a discussion of the drug cartel presence in Guerrero, see Trujillo and Michel (2014).

vigilantism, the random treatment assignment and the realism triggered by the study's context are likely to bolster the internal and external validity of the results.

To foreshadow my results, I find a direct effect of both distrust of law enforcement and trust in the community on citizens' vicarious support for collective vigilantism. Further, I find a significant interaction between these two variables (i.e., support for my hypothesis). That is, I find the effect of trust in the community manipulation to be increased by distrust in the law enforcement manipulation.

For the particular case of Mexico, these results provide some insights about the factors that, in recent years, may have contributed to citizens´ sympathy towards the idea of starting *organizaciones de auto-defensa* (self-defense organizations) in response to organized crime. More generally, this study provides a framework from which to understand how trust contributes to the emergence of vigilante justice and to explain why citizens turn to their community, rather than the state, to address their most urgent problems.

Defining Vigilante Justice

In order to theorize about the factors that increase the probability that citizens will be willing to support vigilantism as a valid response to crime, it is necessary to define what a vigilante action is. I define a **vigilante action** as the deployment of extralegal punitive force to castigate violations of the state's laws.[78,79] This definition builds on previous conceptualizations in three ways. First, it defines behavior rather than subjects. Common usage has centered on the classification of individuals and groups as vigilantes (Merriam Webster 2014); however, as Smith (2014) points out, many so-called vigilante groups use a variety of tactics to achieve their goals. Thus, I limit myself to

[78] By **extralegal punitive force** I refer to force exerted outside of the legal framework of the state.
[79] I do not restrict my definition of a vigilante action to include only non-state actors since it is entirely possible for an agent occupying an official position to engage in vigilante behavior. This may happen, for instance, when an agent perceives the institutions or procedures of the state to constrain their capacity to punish perceived violations of the state's laws.

defining specific actions. I leave the study of the appropriate methodology for classifying groups open to theoretical and empirical debate.

Second, while incorporating a wide range of actors and behaviors, as Brown (1975) and Roseembaum and Sederburg (1974) do, my definition builds on these conceptualizations by restricting the concept only to actions intended to castigate violations of the state's laws. On the one hand, this excludes punitive actions against violations of norms not codified by the state and that would otherwise not be prosecuted by law enforcement (e.g., heresy, witchcraft, inter-racial relations).[80] On the other, this highlights the challenge such actions pose to the state's monopoly over the coercive use of force as one of the defining characteristics of vigilante behavior. As Smith (2014) highlights, "vigilantism is juxtaposed to and only makes sense in relationship to the state's law" (p.22, 2014).

Finally, although this chapter focuses on collective vigilantism, I do not restrict my definition of vigilantism to collective action. It may be true that collective vigilantism can be more damaging to the stability of the state (Silke, 2001) and that this may justify its independent treatment. However, it is important to recognize that individual and collective vigilantism share important similarities so as to make the significance of the latter insufficient to justify the exclusion of individual attempts to punish criminal behavior from the definition of vigilantism.

In the next section, I analyze how community trust and distrust of law enforcement may increase the likelihood of collective vigilantism to emerge. Then, I present an experimental study designed to test whether the perceived trustworthiness of community law enforcement affects citizens' level of vicarious support for collective vigilantism.[81]

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[80] Scholars interested in gathering event-level data should look at the legal codes of the contexts in which they are collecting information for a clearer definition of the actions that would be considered as vigilante justice.
[81] That is, support for the idea that citizens concerned about crime in such a community should engage in collective vigilante justice.

Trust and Collective Vigilante Justice

In modern states, the government provides citizens with security in exchange for the monopoly of the coercive use of violence. Acting outside these institutions, as vigilantes do, entails direct opportunity costs that may result in economic and physical injury (Hine, 1998). Thus, it seems that resorting to law enforcement is not only cheaper but also less risky for citizens. Why, then, do citizens forfeit the use of these agencies? I propose that distrust of the authorities plays an important role in this phenomenon.

The conceptual study of trust has a long history and some authors have been particularly influential in the way trust is seen in today's literature (e.g. Fukuyama, 1996; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). However, there is no universally accepted definition of trust (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). In light of this fact, I define **trust** as an agent's expectation that another agent will (or will be willing to) perform an action with a sufficient level of competence to obtain a positive outcome.[82]

Based on the most recent quantitative and qualitative analysis of the way trust has been defined in the last fifty years (Walterbusch, Gräuler, & Teuteberg, 2014), this definition captures the most commonly used words to define the concept (subject, expect, action, will, confidence, competence, and outcome), acknowledges their empirical relation, and accommodates a wide array of objects of evaluation.

A number of scholars have proposed that the erosion of citizens' distrust of law enforcement reduces their reliance on these actors.[83] For instance, an increase in the quantity of the police dispatched in an area has been shown to result in an increase in citizens' trust that the police

[82] These authors note that the definition of trust covering most identified word clusters is Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner's (1998) definition, which states: "First, trust in another party reflects an expectation or belief that the other party will act benevolently. Second, one cannot control or force the other party to fulfill this expectation -that is, trust involves a willingness to be vulnerable and risk that the other party may not fulfill that expectation. Third, trust involves some level of dependency on the other party so that the outcomes of one individual are influenced by the actions of another" (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998).

[83] In line with the definition above, I define distrust of law enforcement as an individual's evaluation of the likelihood that law enforcement will intervene with sufficient competence to enforce the law effectively.

will intervene effectively after a crime has been committed. This, in turn, has been observed to lead to an increase in crime reporting (Levitt, 1998; MacDonald, 2001; Schnebly, 2008; Skogan, 1994). Further, both, citizens' distrust of the procedural justice of the authorities (Hough et al., 2010; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002) and citizens' perception that police hold values distant from those of the community have been shown to be associated with lower cooperation with law enforcement (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).

Thus, it seems clear that citizens are less likely to rely on the authorities when they distrust their ability to effectively intervene. But, as Malone highlights, "When victimized by a crime, citizens must decide to turn to the law, extralegal institutions, or to no one at all" (Malone, 2012b, p. 127). What informs citizens' likelihood of turning to their community as a source of security? I propose that, under conditions in which they distrust the authorities, citizens' social capital and their perception of the trustworthiness of their community influence their likelihood of turning to vigilante behavior to cope with crime.

Trust in other members of the community and social capital more generally have been observed to foster collective action through a number of mechanisms. On the one hand, citizens' perception that other members of their community are likely to reciprocate makes them more likely to participate in collective action even in the absence of a clear individual benefit (Ostrom, 1998; Putnam et al., 1994). On the other, community trust has been shown to increase citizens' estimation that they will be successful in solving a specific problem through group behavior (collective efficacy) (Kim et al., 2011; Putnam, 1995; Welch et al., 2001), and this has been shown to translate into a higher likelihood of collective problem solving (Fong & Chang, 2011; Stajkovic, Lee, & Nyberg, 2009).

Thus, while there is strong evidence for the idea that social capital promotes collective behavior (Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, Leonardi, Nanetti, & Pavoncello, 1983) there are few

mechanisms linking trust in one's neighbors to citizens' state-centric participation. Indeed, even since before this literature ever became popular, Gamson (1968) argued that, under circumstances in which they distrust government, efficacious citizens may engage in non-institutionalized or even anti-institutional political mobilization. Although Gamson did not refer to collective efficacy or social capital directly, others have found that, under the right circumstances, community strength can translate in counter-state political participation and even be linked to the rise of pro-totalitarian movements in democracies going through legitimacy crises (Armony, 2004; Gargiulo & Benassi, 1997; Graeff, 2007).

Building from these two strands of literature together, I propose that citizens' relationship with the state moderates their willingness to invest their material, human or social capital within it to solve their social problems. For the specific case of security, I argue that, when citizens trust law enforcement authorities, they are likely to invest their social capital to co-produce security. Conversely, I contend that, when citizens' distrust law enforcement, the availability of community resources will be more strongly linked to the probability of emergence of vigilante organizations.

In other words, I propose that citizens' expectation that the authorities will be unlikely to intervene with a sufficient level of competence to effectively enforce the law (distrust of law enforcement) positively moderates the degree to which citizens' perception that their neighbors will be likely to intervene in confronting crime (trust in their community). This translates into support for vigilante justice in response to criminal threats. The following section describes the approach that I use to assess this interactive hypothesis.

Methods

Design and Validity

Although they are valuable in their own right, observational studies like the ones presented in Chapters II and III suffer from a significant limitation. Specifically, even when they can give us a window into what happens in the real world (and are thus valuable in their own right) they can only rarely provide a test that controls for every possible confounder or accounts for reverse causality. However, it is more effective to produce to a test of this type through the use of laboratory experimentation. This is because, when participants are assigned to groups through a random process all measured or unmeasured confounders can be expected to be uncorrelated to the expected post-treatment outcomes.

With this in mind I designed a laboratory experiment in which subjects were assigned to read one of four versions of a mock newspaper article and then given the opportunity to express their support for collective vigilante justice. The article described the situation of a group of concerned citizens in a small town in Guerrero (Mexico) who, being victims of organized crime, are considering their options. The four versions of the article were identical in every way except in the way they portray how likely the citizens' neighbors and the police are to intervene. While two versions describe the concerned citizens' neighbors as cooperative and united, the other two portray them as divided and unlikely to cooperate. Similarly, while two versions describe the police as interested and willing to intervene, the other two describe the authorities as unconcerned and generally absent.

After participants finished reading the assigned version, I asked them about the degree to which they agreed that those concerned about crime should attempt to confront criminals directly and independently of the authorities. Since the assignment was determined at random, all

confounders are expected to remain at the same levels in the four treatment groups. Thus, any differences in citizens' support for collective vigilantism across groups can only be attributed to the way in which the trustworthiness of the neighbors and the police was described.

The experiment was conducted in Mexico during the fall of 2013, only two months after a devastating storm (Hurricane Manuel) hit the coasts of southwest Mexico. This storm caused more than US$4.2 billion in losses, and the damage to roads alone totaled about US$153 million in 2013. Further, amid some of the worst flooding in decades, 59,000 citizens had to be evacuated, and 123 people lost their lives as a consequence of the storm.[84]

In Guerrero, the state most heavily affected by the storm, 24 rivers flooded, at least 32 roads sustained damage, and four bridges collapsed. Approximately 30,000 dwellings were damaged, and 30% of these were completely destroyed. All in all, 20,000 citizens of the state had to be evacuated to shelters, and at least 97 people lost their lives.[85]

In the aftermath of the storm, the federal government declared a state of national emergency and the army and the national and state governments provided aid to the area. The private sector and civic society, mobilized to establish donation centers in schools, churches, workplaces, and shopping centers and the army and commercial airlines airlifted more than 12,000 items to the area.[86]

The extensive media coverage of the floods in Guerrero provided me with an opportunity to design a treatment contextualized within a situation with which participants could be familiar. Moreover, since one of the many collection centers that opened in Mexico City was located at the

[84] Hurricane Manuel passed through Mexico from September 13th to September 20th . For more on the costs of the storm see Steve Jakubowski; Adityam Krovvidi; Adam Podlaha; Steve Bowen. "September 2013 Global Catastrophe Recap". Impact Forecasting. AON Benefield. Retrieved October 25, 2013.

[85] "MÉXICO – Ingrid y Manuel – septiembre 2013 1 MEXICO – Info Note Remnants of 'Ingrid' and 'Manuel.'" National Disaster Response Advisor (ReliefWeb). September 18, 2013. Retrieved May 2, 2014.

[86] "Se entregan 12 mil despensas en Guerrero: Robles". *El Universal* (in Spanish). September 18, 2013. Retrieved September 18, 2013.

university where I was conducting the study,[87] the situation allowed me to expose participants (however vicariously) to a story about a crime to which they could be sensitive (the appropriation of the aid sent to a town by organized criminals).

By the time of the study it was well known that organized criminal groups such as Los Zetas, the Pacific Cartel, and Guerreros Unidos were active in both urban and rural communities in the state of Guerrero. The presence of the cartels was so widely known at the time that, only a couple of months later, the federal senate voted to remove all state-level elected officials from power (including the judiciary, the legislature, and the governor) to bring the state under control (*Desaparición de Poderes*). Thus, the prospect of one of these criminal organizations seizing the aid sent to the state by donors from the center of the country was likely to have been considered a realistic threat.

Finally, it is important to note that, at the time of the study, collective vigilante organizations had been extensively featured in the national and international media (Malkin & Villegas, 2014), and that, by early 2013, a number of municipalities in Guerrero had started their own self-defense movements. For example, by January of that year, citizens of the Ayutla de los Libres municipality had taken control over law enforcement in their municipality and had even organized popular tribunals in which those accused of associating with the drug cartels were tried (Reyes Maciel, 2013). In this context, organizing with neighbors to create a collective vigilante group was likely to be considered a believable coping strategy.

In sum, the random assignment of the four different versions of the article generates four groups that are identical in every way except for the manner in which the trustworthiness of the neighbors and the police was described to them. This strengthens the internal validity of the study and takes us closer to the causal effect of interest. For its part, the context in which the study took

[87] Excélsior. "Instalan Centros de Acopio En DF, Puebla Y Coahuila Para Afectados Por Ciclones." *Excélsior*, September 18, 2013. http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2013/09/18/919043

place allowed me to produce treatments likely to trigger ecologically valid responses from the subjects. Not only is it likely that participants were familiar with the disastrous situation in the state of Guerrero, it is also likely that they considered the possibility of an attack by organized criminals to be realistic and saw collective vigilantism as a believable response. All in all, although the sample was not designed to find a population treatment effect, the context in which the study took place is likely to have helped increased the psychological realism of the treatment and, in doing so, may help bolster our capacity to generalize from these results (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998).[88]

Figure 15. Differences Between the Experimental Sample and the Population (Based on the 2014 AmericasBarometer)



Sample

The study took place in December of 2013. Over the course of two weeks, 475 voting-age adult students were recruited from psychology undergraduate courses in the

[88] Although subjects were thoroughly debriefed, one participant approached me to double check whether the articles were indeed fabricated. After I explained the study more closely, the participant reported understanding the methodology and was convinced that the articles were false.

largest public university in Mexico.[89] Students were invited to report to a laboratory located within the department of psychology to participate in a study aimed at understanding public opinion on "current affairs" and were informed that they would receive extra-credit in exchange for their participation.[90]

Figure 15 shows the demographic characteristics of the experimental sample (dark gray) as compared to a nationally representative random sample of the Mexican population conducted in 2014 by LAPOP's AmericasBarometer (light gray). The sample is, on average, younger (mean: 19.43, SD: 0.10), more educated (mean: 13.1, SD: 0.095 years), and had a higher concentration of women (78%). Additionally, the sample contains a higher proportion of citizens victimized by crime (37%), with a high perception of corruption (85.7, SD: 1.12) and with a stronger feeling of insecurity (54.74, SD: 1.3). Finally, although the sample is more supportive of strong leadership (31.2%), it is also significantly more left leaning (mean: 39.42, SD: 0.835) and less authoritarian than the general population (they had lower scores in the pro-obedience, pro-respect, and pro-discipline indicators).[91,92]

On arrival at the laboratory, participants were assigned to a computer and asked to answer an online pre-experimental questionnaire.[93] After responding to these questions, participants were

[89] All the participants were Mexican citizens, and the great majority lived in Mexico City. However, since the university is affordable and does not have dorms, there is great variation with respect to the neighborhoods in which the participants live within Mexico City.
[90] An alternative activity was offered to the students in case they did not want to participate. However, no participant decided to engage in the alternative activity.
[91] All scales were transformed from their original scales (see www.lapopsurveys.org) to 0-100 scales for comparability. Although the wording of the questions was identical, note that there might be additional forces behind these differences in addition to selection bias. These additional differences include mode of application (face to face vs computer based) and setting (house hold vs laboratory). See Appendix III for the full pre-treatment questionnaire.
[92] How do these biases change the sample treatment effect with respect to the population treatment effect? Although the study was not designed to answer this question, Appendix II shows the moderating effect of the unbalanced covariates on the coefficient of interest. In every case, the analyses suggest that the effects presented here may be conservative with respect to what would be observed in a less biased sample.
[93] The study was programed using the Qualtrics survey system.

randomly assigned to read one of the four versions of the newspaper article. Then, participants were asked to indicate their degree of vicarious support for collective vigilante justice.

That is, they were asked to report the extent to which they agreed that the citizens concerned about crime should attempt to confront criminals directly and independently of the authorities. At the end of the study participants were debriefed, and professors received a list of the students who participated in the experiment so that they could give them extra credit.[94]

Treatments and Variable Operationalization

The four versions of the article described how the floods exacerbated the preexisting problems in the area. They explained that an (unnamed) organized criminal group seized control over the water and food supplies sent to the town of Huamuxitlán (in the state of Guerrero) from the center of the country. In accordance with the definition of trust presented previously, I modified small sections of the mock newspaper articles to manipulate the way they portrayed two different agents, the police and the community.[95]

Half of the articles (1 and 2) described the police as being highly **concerned** about the problem, **available** and with a **disposition** to reestablish the rule of law (henceforth **Low Police Distrust** condition). In contrast, the other two articles (3 and 4) described the police as being unconcerned about the problem, **unavailable** and with **little disposition** to reestablish the rule of law (henceforward **High Police Distrust** condition). By manipulating only these three key words I aimed to produce two articles that were identical in every way except for the way in which they

[94] In the debriefing stage participants were told: "During the study you read an article about some actions that have occurred in Guerrero. Despite the fact that some organized crime groups are present in Guerrero, and some of them may have become active after the recent floods in the state, the newspaper article you read and the information contained in it are fictitious. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, no organized crime group has stolen any kind of aid sent to the community of Huamuxitlán."

[95] To see the actual treatments, see Appendix I.

portrayed the trustworthiness of the police and community of the concerned citizens of Huamuxitlán.[96]

In addition, the mock article noted that some citizens, concerned about crime, had started calling upon the rest of the people of the town to talk about the situation. In two of the articles (1 and 3) the rest of the citizens (those being called upon) were described as **participatory**, **empathic**, and **united** (hereafter **High Community Trust** condition). In the other articles (2 and 4) these citizens were described as **not participatory**, **not empathic**, and **divided** (hereafter **Low Community Trust** condition). In other words, the two sets of articles were identical in every way except for the fact that they described in different ways the likelihood that the rest of the members of the community would intervene with sufficient competence to fight the organized criminal group that took control over the aid sent to the town. [97]

It is important to note that the treatments were not designed to manipulate citizens' general attitude towards the police nor their disposition towards their own local community. They were designed to manipulate citizens' perception of the trustworthiness of a given community and the police from the perspective of "those concerned about crime in the town" in the specific situation presented by the articles. Therefore, support for collective vigilante justice was also measured vicariously. That is, I asked citizens to locate themselves on a six-point scale in which one represents "in strong disagreement" and seven represents "in strong agreement" with the statement: "Given

[96] Overall, the modifications across articles amounted only to very small differences across treatments. The article portraying both actors (police and community) as trustworthy had 363 words and took participants an average of 1.82 (0.05) minutes to read. The article portraying both actors (police and community) as untrustworthy had 366 words and took participants an average of 1.83 (0.06) minutes to read. The article that portrayed the community as trustworthy and the police as untrustworthy had 361 words and took participants an average of 1.96(0.07) minutes to read. Finally, the article that portrayed the community as untrustworthy and the police as trustworthy had 368 words and took participants an average of 1.77(0.06) minutes to read. That is, the maximum difference in words was 5 words and the maximum difference in reading times was 11.4 seconds.

[97] Overall participants read one of the four versions of the mock article. In total, 120 participants read the article in which both law enforcement and community were portrayed as trustworthy, 118 read the article that described law enforcement to be trustworthy and the community to be untrustworthy, 118 read the article that described law enforcement to be untrustworthy and the community to be trustworthy, and the rest (121) read the article that described both the community and law enforcement as being untrustworthy.

the state of the previously described situation I believe that the people seeking to do something to solve the problem should face the criminals directly in order to reestablish security in the town. [In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)]."

Finally, before moving to the results, it is worth highlighting that the treatments were designed to explore the effect of trust on citizens' support for collective vigilantism in response to the actions taken by an organized criminal group. Note that in Mexico the euphemism "organized crime" is used to refer to heavily-armed drug cartels. Since these groups are arguably an exogenous source of crime, this allows me to talk about them while holding trust in the community to be relatively unaffected. Further, this strategy lets me link the case to some of the events that have led to the emergence of the latest self-defense movements in Mexico. However, evaluating citizens' support for vigilantism in response to organized crime also entails a difficult test, as the stakes are much higher when a community is set to confront a well-organized drug cartel than when it decides to confront petty criminals. In the next section, I describe the way the participants reacted to the treatment both in general and across treatment conditions.

Results

In general, participants tended to believe that those seeking to do something to solve the problem should not face criminals directly (mean: 2.72, SD: 0.062). Across conditions only 30.53% of the participants agreed to some extent that the concerned citizens should face the criminals directly. This is perhaps due to a serious consideration of the potential risks that the citizens may incur in confronting "organized criminals."[98]

[98] That is, 30.53% responded that they "somewhat agreed," "agreed," or "strongly agreed."

Figure 16. Support for Vigilante Justice across Experimental Conditions



There were important differences across experimental conditions. Figure 16 shows the average levels of agreement with collective vigilantism across conditions. As expected, those who read the article in which the community was depicted as trustworthy and law enforcement as untrustworthy agreed most strongly with collective vigilantism (3.13 [.124]), while those who read the article in which both the community and law enforcement were described as being untrustworthy were the least supportive of collective vigilantism (2.48 [.124]).

The pattern seems consistent with my conditional hypothesis. However, to test this hypothesis directly it is necessary to compare the difference in support for collective vigilantism caused by the **Community Trust** manipulation among those who read the article in which law enforcement was described to be **untrustworthy** (dark bars in Figure 16) with the difference in support for collective vigilantism caused by the **Community Trust** manipulation among those who read the article in which law enforcement was described to be **trustworthy** (light bars in Figure 16). To estimate this difference in differences, I specified an OLS regression model in which an

individual's agreement with the idea that citizens should confront the criminals directly is a function of the **Community Trust Manipulation**, the **Police Distrust Manipulation**, their interaction and a random error.

$$ECLE = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Police\ Distrust + \beta_2 Community\ Trust + \beta_3 Community\ Trust\ x\ Police\ Distrust + e_i \quad 3)$$

The model yields estimates for the average support for collective vigilantism among those in the High Police Distrust and Low Neighbors' Trust condition (β_0), the difference in support for collective vigilantism caused by the Community Trust treatment among those who read the article in which law enforcement was described to be trustworthy (β_1), and, critically, the **difference in the effect** of the Community Trust manipulation across the Police Distrust manipulations **(β_3)**.[99]

Table 4. OLS Estimates of the Treatment Effects and their Interaction

VARIABLES	(1) Support for vigilantism
Community Trust	0.234
	(0.172)
Police Distrust	-0.0598
	(0.173)
Police Distrust x Community Trust	**0.442***
	(0.246)
Constant	2.521***
	(0.121)
Observations	471
r-squared	0.038

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The estimates in Table 4 show that there is a positive and statistically significant interaction between the Community Trust and Police Distrust manipulations. It is possible to calculate the difference of the **Community Trust Treatment** effect across **Police Distrust Conditions** (and its

[99] Before the analyses I deleted four subjects from the sample. Four passed through the treatments in less than 15 seconds and one took more than 15 minutes to go through the treatment.

statistical significance) by differentiating the previous equation with respect to Community Trust (Kam & Franzese, 2007). As expected, the Community Trust Treatment effect is significantly larger (Δ_{high}-Δ_{low}=0.442, p=0.072) among those who were assigned to the **High Police Distrust Manipulation** (Δ_{high}=0.676, p=0.000) than among those who were assigned to the **Low Police Distrust Manipulation** (Δ_{low}=0.233, p=0.136).

All in all, the results show support for the conditional effect of trust in the community and trust in law enforcement. That is, I found that describing the community as likely to intervene to confront crime effectively caused citizens to be more supportive of collective vigilante justice, particularly in circumstances in which the police were described as unlikely to intervene to enforce the law.

Conclusion

For a long time, scholars have debated the origins of vigilante justice. While some have attributed this phenomenon to purely cultural and sociological variables, a new wave of scholarship has turned their attention to the role of the state in explaining this phenomenon. The central claim of my dissertation is that the authorities play a moderating role in society. While citizens are likely to invest their material, human, and social capital state-tropically when the authorities are trustworthy (e.g. vote, donate to campaigns, engage in community meetings, participate in security coproduction, etc.), I argue that, when trust in the authorities runs low, citizens are more likely to invest their resources extra-legally.

After testing this claim experimentally, I found that, when considering the situation of victims of crime, citizens are more likely to be supportive of engaging in vigilante behavior when they consider the local community to be trustworthy. Moreover, I found that this effect drops to insignificant levels when citizens perceive an alternative agent (in this case the police) to be likely to

intervene to enforce the law effectively (i.e., is trustworthy). In other words, consistent with what would be expected if my thesis fits the data, I found that the degree to which citizens' perceptions of the trustworthiness of a given community translates into support for vigilante justice is moderated by their perception that the police are untrustworthy.

These findings have implications for our understanding of vigilante justice and, more generally, for our assessment of the role of community trust and trust in the authorities. First, they validate those who argue that, rather than being a temporary "madness of the masses," vigilante behavior can also be understood as a community-based strategy to cope with crime. Thus, my findings suggest that, as other authors have proposed, vigilante justice could be a reflection of the deeper conflict between the state, disenfranchised communities, or even citizens disenchanted with the democratic system in general (Goldstein, 2012; Seligson, 2003).

Second, not only do my findings lend support to those arguing that social capital can have a "dark side" (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Armony, 2004; Satyanath et al., 2013), they also show that citizens' views of the trustworthiness of state authorities play a significant role as moderators of the way social cohesion translates into political behavior. Indeed, they demonstrate that, in conditions in which citizen-state relations have eroded to the point that citizens distrust the effective intervention of the authorities, citizens invest their social capital to attempt to find solutions that the state cannot provide.

Third, my findings suggest that the deterioration of citizens' trust in the authorities not only has the potential to impede the cooperation necessary for improved security (Arias & Ungar, 2009; Sabet, 2014), it can also lead citizens to invest their resources extra-legally in order to attempt to solve their problems by themselves. Thus, it follows that the effective reestablishment of citizens' trust in the authorities is likely to bolster democracy not only by improving security but, as Diamond

(1999) once put it, by preventing citizens from turning to solutions that would be fatal to democratic governance.

Figure 17. Police Officers Allegedly Looting in San Jose del Cabo in the Aftermath of Hurricane Odile

Source: Anonymous, retreived from http://noticabos.org/2014/09/27/policias-saqueadores/

To conclude, beyond their theoretical implications my results are also helpful for understanding recent developments in Mexico. As if prophesized by the treatments, one year after the study, another hurricane (Hurricane Odile) hit the western coast of Mexico. This time, however, it hit the remote city of San José del Cabo in the state of Baja California Sur, one of the most important tourist destinations in Mexico. Soon after the storm hit the city a number of thieves started to loot local stores and houses. In the face of this crisis, a number of citizens joined together around the neighborhoods of Los Cabos to patrol the streets and confront any potential thieves lurking in their neighborhoods (Excélsior, 2014). Although these actions can be seen as emerging out of the ongoing supply crisis in the town, my findings suggest that it is important to consider citizens' distrust of the ability of the authorities to effectively intervene as a key factor that prompted citizens to invest their social capital in vigilante behavior.

Indeed, when looking at this case, the significance of citizens' expectations of the ability of the authorities to intervene becomes evident. On the one hand, the action of the local authorities was anything but ideal. Local policemen not only failed to intervene against the thieves who attacked

the local stores, as Picture 1 shows many of them participated in the looting and were photographed by the local residents. The police's participation was so deep that later that year, the police commander was sent to prison for participating in acts of looting (bcsnoticias, 2014). If this was not enough, the mayor of the city was notoriously absent during the storm. Not only did the media discover that he was out of the city but that he was gambling in a casino in Las Vegas.[100]

On the other, the remoteness of San José del Cabo considerably delayed the intervention of the federal government. Located at the extreme end of the Baja California peninsula Los Cabos is accessible only by plane or boat. Therefore, while the Mexican Army is usually deployed to hurricane-affected areas within one or two days, in this case, the army could not provide aid and security services until almost one week after the events (Sandoval, 2014).

All in all, to the extent that my findings can shed some light on the psychology of the inhabitants of San José del Cabo, it is possible to understand how citizens' perceptions that the authorities were unlikely to intervene to enforce the law could have pushed citizens to look for alternative means to provide themselves with security. Had the authorities been more responsive to citizens' needs, perhaps they would have been able to prevent the emergence of vigilantism in the city and channel the existing social capital into security co-production.

[100] The scandal was so large that a group of citizens requested his impeachment (Zúñiga-Pacheco, 2014).

V. TRUST AND VIGILANTE JUSTICE: A BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT

The very foundations of the state rest on its promise of security in exchange for a monopoly over the coercive use of violence. However, at times citizens violate this principle by directly confronting suspected criminals in conjunction with their community; we commonly call such behavior "collective vigilantism."

Although scholars have studied some of the most spectacular manifestations of collective vigilantism in Latin America (e.g., Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia (Godoy, 2004), Africa (Bangstad, 2005; Owumi & Ajayi, 2013), Asia (Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007; Telle, 2009), and Europe (Haas et al., 2013), the micro-foundations of collective vigilante behavior remain underexplored. Under what conditions do individuals confront criminals with their community rather than relying on state authorities?

I propose that, to answer this question it is necessary to consider the potential costs and benefits associated with vigilante justice and the actors that determine the likelihood of those outcomes. On the one hand, vigilantes have the opportunity to reduce the costs of crime (e.g., by preventing or recovering losses). On the other, they face the risk of incurring in legal (e.g. fines, jail time) or crime-related (e.g. economic losses, physical harm, or even death) costs.[101,102]

Given these incentives, I propose first, that citizens are more likely to engage in vigilante justice when they are exposed to more severe levels of crime. Second, I contend that, since both the likelihood of recovering crime losses and engaging in legal costs for vigilantism are determined by the probability of law enforcement to intervene, citizens might be more likely to engage in vigilante justice when they estimate the likelihood of law enforcement to intervene to be lower. Thirdly, I argue that, because the probability of obtaining a positive outcome is in part determined by the

[101] The research for this chapter was reviewed by Vanderbilt's Institutional Review Board (IRB 141616).
[102] Funding for this study was provided by a grant from the *Research in Individuals, Politics, and Society (RIPS) Laboratory* at Vanderbilt University

probability that an individual's community will intervene effectively, the trustworthiness of one's neighbors is likely to inform the probability that citizens will choose to pursue vigilantism.

Finally, because the expected benefits from vigilante behavior are more likely to be upset by its costs when the authorities are likely to intervene, I propose that citizens' perceptions that law enforcement is trustworthy moderates effect that community trust has on the probability of vigilante behavior to emerge.

To test these claims, I developed the **extralegal-confrontation experiment**. Building from Bosman & Van Winden's (2002) power-to-take experiment, my experiment allows participants in a game-like scenario to have the opportunity of confronting a mock thief who attempts to take part of their income.[103] However, in addition to these two players (participant and thief), the extralegal confrontation experiment incorporates the participant's community (represented by four neighbors) and the police as additional players in the game.

While the community can help the participant to recover his tokens if he decides to confront the thief, the police have a double function. On the one hand, they can recover the tokens the participant lost to the thief at a later stage. On the other, they can fine the subject for deciding to confront the thief, also at a later stage.[104]

In order to assess the effect of crime severity on vigilante behavior I experimentally manipulated the amount of tokens stolen by the thief. To assess how trust influences citizens' choice, I experimentally manipulated the information citizens received (at the time of making their choice) about the likelihood of the neighbors and police entering the game at later stages.

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[103] The **power-to-take** experiment is a behavioral game designed to study a player's reaction to a situation in which an agent can (potentially) appropriate part of her endowment (effort) (Bosman & Van Winden, 2002, p. 149). In this paradigm, a player (responder) has part of her endowment taken by a second player (take authority), and given the chance to respond.

[104] Note that in this study the only human player was the participant. The thief, the neighbors and the police were not real; their moves were determined by dice rolls thrown by the study subject.

All in all, 150 voting-age subjects participated in 2,996 rounds of the extralegal-confrontation experiment in a laboratory I set up in Mexico City. I find that citizens were more likely to confront the thief under the following conditions: when the thief took a larger proportion of income (the crime was more severe), when the subject received information that neighbors were more likely to help (the community was more trustworthy), and when the subject received information that the police would be unlikely to enter the game (law enforcement was more untrustworthy). Further, consistent with my thesis, I find that law enforcement untrustworthiness positively moderates the effect of the community's trustworthiness.

This experiment builds on Chapter III and IV by incorporating the costs and benefits inherent to vigilante behavior and providing evidence of causal processes that can lead to collective vigilantism. Although it is important to acknowledge that they are specific to the experimental context, these findings might more generally help us understand citizens' behavior across contexts in which social capital and the trustworthiness of law enforcement vary. While early literature on vigilantism focused on the psychological and sociological forces behind this phenomenon, the results of this study suggest that citizens' trust of the state, as represented by law enforcement, not only can have direct effects on the emergence of vigilante behavior, but it can also moderate the effect of other determinants of this behavior. More generally, the findings contribute to our understanding of the heterogeneous role of social capital. While strong communities can foster state-centered (towards the state) behavior under some conditions, in contexts in which the citizen-state connection has eroded significantly, they can motivate extra-state (outside the state) actions.

Vigilante Justice

Citizen-initiated attempts to directly confront alleged criminals have captured the attention of scholars for a long time. A growing strand of literature has attempted to explain the emergence of

some of the most spectacular manifestations of vigilantism. Moral outrage (Black, 1976; Senechal de la Roche, 2001; Tolnay & Beck, 1995), group conflict (Hepworth & West, 1988; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Olzak, 1990; Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007), culture (Clarke, 1998; Hayes & Lee, 2005; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Owumi & Ajayi, 2013; Tyson, 2013; Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967), and historical structures (Bateson, 2013) have all been singled out as important factors for understanding the emergence of this phenomenon. However, this scholarship has centered their effort in the studying the emergence of vigilantism at the county or community level, the factors that influence an individuals' choice to turn to their community to confront directly confront crime remain largely unexplored

In this chapter, I propose to examine the factors that increase individuals' tendencies towards vigilante behavior in order to build solid ground to understand the emergence of its later manifestations.[105] Studying this phenomenon at the individual level avoids the selection bias inherent in trying to study the most spectacular manifestations of vigilante behavior. [106]

However, before theorizing about the factors that influence the probability of vigilante behavior to emerge, it is important to define this phenomenon (Bateson, 2014; Smith, 2014). In the next section I briefly discuss what vigilantism is and how my conceptualization builds on previous definitions of the phenomenon.

[105] A top-down approach would seek to understand the causes of lynchings and, from there, generalize to the causes of vigilante behavior. In contrast, a bottom-up approach would seek to understand the causes of early vigilante behavior and only later theorize about the factors that cause some vigilante actions evolve into lynchings.

[106] Note that not every vigilante attempt develops into a lynching or the formation of a vigilante militia, and not all of these spectacular manifestations emerge from vigilante attempts. Further, there might be incentives for media and/or government to misreport the prevalence of these events. Unless we can account for these selection processes, our inferences about the causes of vigilante behavior might be biased in an unknown direction.

Defining Vigilantism

Building from previous conceptual work on vigilantism I define a *vigilante action* as the deployment of extra-legal punitive force to castigate violations to the state's law.[107] This definition builds on previous literature in three ways.

First, it accommodates a number of behavioral manifestations but differentiates vigilantism from attempts to castigate non-legal violations. Previously, Rosenbaum and Sederburg (1976) defined vigilante behavior broadly as "threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established sociopolitical order which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from some form of subversion." (1976, p. 542). However, by generalizing vigilantism to any attempt to punish a trespass of the social order, this definition included behaviors that otherwise might not be regarded as vigilante behavior (e.g., literal witch-hunts, social and religious shunning, and honor killings). For this reason, scholars moved to develop more conceptual precision with regard to the type of actions to be considered as vigilantism.

Abrahams (2002), for his part, defined vigilantism narrowly as "an organized attempt by a group of 'ordinary citizens' to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts" (2002, 26). Although this definition is much more precise, it also incorporates distrust of law enforcement into the very conceptualization of vigilante behavior. This makes it impossible to empirically evaluate the relationship between these two variables.

My definition, on the contrary, incorporates a wide range of actions while restricting the concept to include only behavior against violators of the state's law. On the one hand, it excludes punitive action against violations of norms not codified by the state (e.g. heresy, witchcraft, inter-

[107] I do not reduce my definition of vigilante action to only non-state actors since policemen may also participate in vigilantism if they use extra-legal procedures that employ punitive force to castigate alleged violations to the state's law.

racial relations) and that would otherwise not be prosecuted by law enforcement. On the other, it highlights the challenge to the state's monopoly over the coercive use of force as one of the defining characteristics of vigilante behavior. After all, as Smith points out "vigilantism is juxtaposed to and only makes sense in relationship to the state's law" (p.22, 2014).[108]

Second, my definition accommodates a wide array of actors who can engage in vigilante actions. While Brown (1975) and Rosenbaum and Sederburg (1976) accommodate such flexibility, more recent conceptualizations do not. Smith (2014), for example, defines vigilantism as "the collective deployment of extra-legal punitive force," disallowing the use of vigilantism in reference to acts performed by individuals. Moreover, Abrams (2002) goes even further and restricts the use of the word to groups of "ordinary citizens."

Although it might be the case that individual vigilantism is less of a threat to the stability of the state when compared to collective vigilantism (Silke, 2001), I believe that restricting the scope of the concept from the start ignores the important similarities between collective and individual vigilantism. Additionally, while most actors engaging in vigilantism are indeed ordinary citizens, it is possible for state officials to disregard their social function and the rule of law to participate in vigilante actions themselves. My definition conceptualizes the phenomenon broadly in order to accommodate actions conducted by both individual and groups independently of their social role.[109]

Finally, my conceptualization of vigilantism defines behavior rather than subjects. One approach to this topic is to focus on the emergence and evolution of vigilante groups and individuals (Asfura-Heim & Espach, 2013; Tyson, 2013). However, categorizing groups and/or

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[108] The idea of restricting vigilantism to attempts to punish legal violation has been in the literature for a while. For example Brown defined vigilante behavior as "the taking of the law into one's own hand" (e.g. Brown, 1975, p. 22). In doing so, this author clarifies the concept by incorporating the term "law" into our understanding of vigilantism. Unfortunately, translating the term into metaphorical language makes the definition ambiguous.

[109] Here, I focus on collective vigilantism emerging from individual initiative. This can reflect the behavior of citizens and leaders; however, it is also possible for collective vigilantism to emerge from alternative mechanisms. I limited the scope of this study for parsimony; however, there is no reason why future studies could not extend my work to investigate these alternative mechanisms.

individuals as vigilantes is controversial and empirically complicated in particular because actors can engage in different actions simultaneously and can modify their behavior over time (Smith, 2014).

So, under what conditions do citizens engage in vigilante behavior? As any other action, vigilantism can have potential costs and benefits for those engaging in it. Thus, I argue that in order to theorize about this phenomenon it is important to look at the incentives faced by those engaging in this behavior and the agents upon whom achieving these positive or negative outcomes depends. In doing so, in the following section I note that the outcomes citizens can expect from vigilante actions are, at least in part, dependent upon the intervention of their neighbors and law enforcement. Thus, I conclude that a citizen's perception about the trustworthiness of these two agents plays a critical role in his or her likelihood of engaging in vigilantism.

Costs and Benefits of Vigilantism

Vigilante justice often captures the public's attention when gruesome or lethal punishments are applied to its victims, and its costs in terms of human rights and life are undeniable. However, to understand its causes, it is important to carefully consider the incentives (potential costs and benefits) faced by citizens who ultimately decide to engage in these actions.

First, crime generates both material and immaterial negative utility among its victims. Therefore, victims may expect an immediate or long-term benefit from engaging in vigilantism. In the simplest example, if they are able to confront criminals successfully, citizens may expect to immediately recover property or income lost to crime. Additionally, vigilantes may expect to deter future crime and hence reduce future costs of crime (Ceobanu et al., 2010; Cohen, 2008; McCollister et al., 2010; Miller et al., 1996).[110]

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[110] By material costs, I refer to the loss of income, property, and land, among other things. By immaterial costs I refer to the loss of life satisfaction, the presence of negative emotions, stress, etc.

Second, to varying degrees, citizens may expect to experience positive emotions (and thus a psychological benefit) after successfully engaging in vigilante actions. These may come from a multitude of mechanisms, including the satisfaction associated with altruistic retaliation (de Quervain et al., 2004; Maitner et al., 2006), collaborative interaction (Jung et al., 2002), obtaining a fair outcome (Tyler, 1988), or expressing a message to the offender (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009).

The costs of vigilante behavior can come from direct and indirect sources. By direct costs I refer to those that come from vigilantism itself and which usually cannot be avoided. On the one hand, they include the psychological distress that citizens may experience when engaging in vigilantism and the material costs that citizens may have to pay to confront criminals.[111] On the other hand, citizens engaging in vigilante behavior may face opportunity costs. That is, by engaging in vigilante justice participants may forfeit the opportunity to engage in productive activities and this trade off can significantly diminish their economic prospects (Bates et al., 2002).

Indirect costs refer to losses that may come from external actors like the criminals, law enforcement agents, or from society in general. First, in addition to the original cost of crime citizens who attempt to confront criminals but fail may incur additional material or immaterial losses immediately or in the long run. For example, citizens unsuccessfully attempting to engage in vigilante behavior against thieves risk being economically, physically, or psychologically injured during or after the confrontation. Similarly, citizens being extorted by organized criminals may put their lives and livelihoods at risk if they decide to defend themselves but are unsuccessful (Contreras, 2014).

Second, vigilante behavior implies an intrusion into the state's monopoly over the coercive use of violence. As such, it can be considered as illegal or socially deviant behavior and thus be

[111] Material costs can vary greatly but are almost always greater than zero. While in some cases vigilantism may only take the effort to engage in it, it other situations citizens may need to invest resources to purchase weapons and equipment.

subject to a variety of legal and social sanctions.[112] Therefore, citizens engaging in vigilante actions risk significant economic fines, imprisonment, and social stigmatization that may result in significant direct and reputational costs.

In sum, there are potential benefits and risks from engaging in vigilante action. On the one hand, citizens may derive psychological, social, and material benefits from successfully confronting crime. On the other, they also risk incurring in severe losses, either by being unsuccessful in confronting crime or by being sanctioned for violating the rule of law. What influences citizens' likelihood of deriving benefits from engaging in vigilante behavior?

I propose that, holding potential costs and benefits constant, an individual's expectation that his/her community is likely to intervene in his/her favor (community trust) and his/her expectation that the authorities will not intervene to enforce the law (law enforcement distrust) play an important role in this phenomenon by shaping the expected likelihood of benefiting from or being harmed by participating in vigilantism. In order to explain and justify these expectations in the context of this study, I first provide an overview of the experimental design developed to shed light on individuals' tendencies toward vigilantism and, then, I derive a set of hypotheses within the context of that design.

Although by design they do not attempt to incorporate the full complexity of human reality, in my laboratory study I first provide an overview of the experimental design developed to shed light on individuals' tendencies toward vigilantism, and then I derive a set of hypotheses within the context of that design.

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[112] These sanctions may vary, depending on the nature of the vigilante actions, the legal context, and the nature of public opinion about vigilantism.

Study Design

The behavioral experiments allow us to make *ceteris paribus* observations of individual agents that might otherwise be very difficult to obtain (C. Camerer, 2011; Levitt & List, 2007). In brief, the main strategy behind the approach applied here is to identify a set of potentially important influences on a particular type of behavior and then develop a laboratory task that contains features analogous to the circumstances an individual might confront in the real world. To draw out realistic behavior during the task, real money is used to entice participants to participate in an engaged manner.

Other scholars have studied topics such as altruism, negotiation, and other economic behavior using the dictator, ultimatum, and power-to-take experimental games (Bosman & Van Winden, 2002; Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). Although the first two are by far the most popular behavioral experiments (Engel, 2011; Oosterbeek, Sloof, & Kuilen, 2004), the third is particularly interesting in that it is designed to study a player's (responder's) reaction to a situation in which another agent (take authority) proposes to take part of her income (Bosman & Van Winden, 2002, p. 149).

In the classic power-to-take game (Bosman & Van Winden, 2002), two players are randomized into two roles: a "take authority" and a "responder". In the first stage, the responder receives an endowment and the "take authority" makes a proposal on the so-called "take rate". The take rate is the part of the responder's income that will be transferred to the take authority. In the second stage, the only action that the responder can take is to decide on the part of his income that will be destroyed to prevent the take authority form taking it. Finally, payoffs are assigned. To evaluate the influence of neighbors and law enforcement on the probability of vigilante behavior to emerge, I built on this protocol to create a novel behavioral game (the extralegal-confrontation

experiment) that incorporates some of the most important actors and incentives at play in vigilante justice.

Figure 18 shows the decision tree faced by the participant[113] in my extralegal-confrontation experiment. First, the participant receives some information the other actors in the game. Then, a thief[114] takes a proportion of the total income of the participant[115]. Thirdly, the participant decides whether or not to illegally confront the thief. This choice opens two branches.

If the participant decides **not to confront** the thief (branch A in Figure 18), a law enforcer (here referred as the police) has a chance to intervene. If the police intervene, the participant recovers the tokens taken by the thief, and the game ends. If the police do not intervene, the proposal stands, and the game ends.

If the participant decides **to confront** the thief (branch B) she has a chance to receive support from the members of her community in the confrontation. If the participant is successful in confronting the thief, then he recovers the tokens stolen by the thief. If the participant is not successful, she engages in additional "losing costs" (e.g. material losses, injury or even death) and the game ends. Finally, the police have a chance to enter the game. If the police enter the game, the participant incurs "legal costs" (e.g. legal defense, fines, or even jail time).

Note that, although by necessity this game is only a model of the real conditions faced by citizens when considering whether or not to engage in vigilante justice, it incorporates a number of important features. First, it gives the participant the opportunity to attempt to directly confront a thief after losing real utility. Second, it incorporates the community, in the form of four neighbors, as a potential source of support when confronting criminals. Finally, it incorporates the double role that law enforcement authorities play in society. On the one hand, the police offer a potential avenue

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[113] Equivalent to Bosman & Van Winden's (2002) respondent. Here also referred as **participant**, **subject**, **or citizen**.
[114] Equivalent to Bosman & Van Winden's (2002) **take authority**.
[115] Equivalent to Bosman & Van Winden's (2002) **take-proposal**.

for reducing the cost of crime. On the other, they establish vigilantism as an illegal action and sanction the participant if she is found engaging in this type of behavior. What hypotheses can be assessed using this experimental game?

Figure 18. Diagram of the Incentives Faced by the Participant in the Extralegal-Confrontation Experiment



□ Choice Event, ○Random event, ~ Negation

Hypotheses

One factor that may influence the probability of vigilante behavior to emerge is the severity of the crime. Results from power to take experiments show that subjects demonstrate higher levels of negative emotions (Bosman & Van Winden, 2002), anger (Ben-Shakhar, Bornstein, Hopfensitz, & van Winden, 2007), and behavioral aggression (McDermott, Tingley, Cowden, Frazzetto, & Johnson, 2009) after a higher proportion of income has been taken from them. Finally, some crimes might generate a moral outrage that may lead citizens to engage in vigilantism (Black, 1976; Senechal de la Roche, 2001; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Further, a formal analysis of the game shows that, as the theft increases, so does the marginal utility of attacking the thief.[116]

H1. As the amount of tokens stolen by the thief increases, so will the likelihood that a participant will engage in vigilante behavior

A second factor that may increase the likelihood of a citizen to engage in vigilante behavior is trust. The conceptual study of trust has a long history, and some authors have been particularly influential (e.g. Fukuyama, 1996; Morgan & Hunt, 1994); however, to date, there is no universally accepted definition of trust (Rousseau et al., 1998).

In line with a recent meta-analysis of literature on trust (Walterbusch et al., 2014), I define *trust* as an agent's expectation that another agent will (or will be willing to) perform an action with a sufficient level of competence to obtain a positive outcome. This definition captures the most commonly used words to define the concept (subject, expect, action, will, confidence, competence and outcome), acknowledges their empirical relation across definitions, and accommodates a wide array of objects of evaluation.

[116] For more details on the formal analysis of the game see Appendix I. For a figure of the expectations derived from this analysis see Figure A4.

The first object of trust that may influence the emergence of vigilante action is citizens' trust in their community.[117] Community trust has been shown to be linked to citizens' perception of collective efficacy (Kim et al., 2011; Putnam, 1995; Welch et al., 2001), and previous correlational research has shown that citizens who trust in their neighbors are more likely to join with them to attempt to defend themselves from crime (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010).

Further, when one considers the risks and opportunities present in the extralegal-confrontation game, it is clear that, all other things being equal, as the average probability of the neighbors to enter the game increases, so does the expected likelihood that the participant will defeat the thief and recover the stolen tokens. Therefore, this variable is likely to increase the utility differential between engaging and not engaging in vigilante behavior and ultimately increase the likelihood of this behavior.[118, 119] Thus, I expect that holding incentives constant:

H2. When a participant is embedded in a more trustworthy community, her likelihood of engaging in vigilante behavior will increase.

A third factor that might influence the likelihood of citizens to engage in vigilante actions is the trustworthiness of law enforcement. However, the nature of the direct effect of trust in law enforcement is disputed. On the one hand, survey research has found a positive association between this variable and support for vigilante justice (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2012). On the other, experimental evidence has found a null or negative effect on perceptions of the trustworthiness of law enforcement and support for vigilante justice (Haas et al., 2013).

This inconsistency may come from the threats to internal validity common to survey research (omitted variable bias or simultaneity bias) or our inability to extrapolate the inferences

[117] Here, I understand community simply as the collection of citizens surrounding a particular individual in his neighborhood.
[118] For more details on the formal analysis of the game, see Appendix I. For a figure of the expectations derived from this analysis see Figure A3.
[119] However, in real life, vigilantes may expect the likelihood of legal punishment if they have more support from their communities. Here, I did not incorporate the "protection of the crowd effect" for parsimony. Thus, this study is likely to present a conservative estimate of the real effect of trust in one's neighbors.

coming from experimental research to the overall population. However, it may also come from a heterogeneous understanding of trust in the police.

Since trust refers to an agent's expectation of obtaining "positive outcomes," which is a result that can be interpreted in multiple ways, it is possible for citizens to understand trust in at least two different ways. On the one hand, citizens may interpret trust as the expectation that another actor will act benevolently towards them regardless of the other actor's social role. On the other, the trustworthiness of an actor may be understood as the expectation that he/she will act with sufficient competence to produce an outcome consistent with his/her social role in society.

Since law enforcement has a double role in society, this distinction is particularly important when attempting to understand citizens' trust towards this actor. On the one hand, law enforcement has the role of protecting citizens' lives and livelihoods against crime. On the other, it has the role of admonishing citizens in cases in which they trespass on other citizens' rights or otherwise violate the rule of law.

Operationalizing trust as citizens' expectation that law enforcement will intervene to produce a result favorable to them (even if this involves violating their social role) may help us understand the emergence of vigilante justice in some contexts.[120] However, this approach risks incorporating corruption and criminal collusion into the picture before establishing the effect of citizens' trust in the effectiveness of law enforcement. Thus, in this piece I define **trust in law enforcement** simply as citizens' perception that law enforcement will intervene with sufficient competence to enforce the law even if this produces a negative outcome towards them.

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[120] For example, in studying the American South, some may argue that white supremacist lynch mobs often trusted or were in part formed by law enforcement agents. Although it is unclear to what extent these actors believed that the police were trustworthy, in this cases it seems clear that they did not expect law enforcement to admonish them for or interfere with their actions. Thus, understanding trust simply as an expectation of benevolence may lead to a more complicated relation between these two variables.

Defining trust in law enforcement in this way, and considering the incentives for vigilante behavior, there are reasons to expect a positive direct effect of citizens' trust in law enforcement on vigilante action. First, as the probability of police intervention increases, the expected cost of engaging in vigilante behavior also increases. This is because the probability that the participant will incur some cost derived from the illegal nature of vigilante justice is directly increased.

Second, as the police's probability of intervention increases so does the expected probability that the participant will recover his/her lost tokens even if he/she decides not to confront the thief.[121] Thus, since this variable is likely to have a simultaneous effect on the costs of vigilante justice and the potential effectiveness of inaction I expect that, holding the potential costs and benefits of vigilantism constant:

> **H3: As the likelihood of police intervention decreases, citizens' likelihood of engaging in vigilante behavior will increase.**

But just as the trustworthiness of law enforcement can directly affect the emergence of vigilante behavior; it can also moderate the effect of citizens' trust in their community. Distrust of law enforcement has been shown to reduce crime reporting (Levitt, 1998) and citizen-police collaboration (De Cremer & Tyler, 2007). Moreover, as I have shown in Chapter III, correlational evidence suggests that trust in the community linked to collective anti-criminal action is stronger among those who distrust the police.

Finally, a formal analysis of the effects of manipulating the likelihood that the police and the neighbors will enter the game shows that the likelihood of the police intervention moderates the degree to which the trustworthiness of the community translates into an increase in the overall expected utility of engaging in vigilantism.

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[121] For more details on the formal analysis of the game, see Appendix I. For a figure of the expectations derived from this analysis, see Figure A2.

Although the full analytical results are displayed in Appendix I, they can be summarized as follows. First, the overall utility of engaging in vigilantism depends on the utility of either engaging in vigilantism or not engaging in vigilantism.

Second, these two utilities depend on two outcomes in the game. On the one hand, they depend on the participants' ability to successfully defeat the thief. On the other, they depend on the likelihood of police intervention in the final stage of the game.

Therefore, when there is only a **low** probability that the police will intervene, as the neighbors' likelihood to intervene increases, so does the utility of engaging in vigilantism while potential costs remain low. Further, the utility of not engaging in vigilantism also remains low. Thus, changes in the neighbors' trustworthiness translate into the overall utility of engaging in vigilantism almost directly.

However, when there is a **high** probability that the police will intervene, as the neighbors become more likely to intervene, the expected benefits of engaging in vigilantism increase but costs remain high and constant. Moreover, the utility of the alternative (not engaging in vigilantism) also remains high.

Therefore, the increase in the expected benefits derived from a trustworthy community become muted by the expected costs from vigilante behavior.[122] All in all, I expect that:

> **H4: There will be a significant positive interaction between the trustworthiness of the community and the untrustworthiness of the police. That is, the effect of a trustworthy community on vigilante behavior will be *stronger* in contexts in which police intervention is perceived as unlikely.**

[122] For more details on the formal analysis of the game, see Appendix I. For a figure of the expectations derived from this analysis see Figure A5.

Methods

To evaluate the impact of the severity of the crime, citizens' trust in their community and citizens' distrust of law enforcement, I recruited a sample of voting-age citizens to play a series of repeated iterations of the extralegal-confrontation experiment. In each round, I experimentally manipulated the amount of tokens stolen by the thief and the information that participants received about a) the probability that their neighbors would enter the game and b) the probability that the police would enter the game.

Participants who came to the laboratory signed an informed consent form, completed a pre-study questionnaire, and saw a pre-recorded video that explained the instructions to the game.[123] During the instructions, participants were told the dynamics of the activity and that their final compensation would be determined by the number of tokens that they retained at the end of the activity. To avoid termination effects (see Normann & Wallace, 2012), participants were told that they would repeat the activity a number of times but were blinded to the actual number of rounds in the game.[124] After the twentieth round, the game was terminated, the participants were compensated (at a pre-disclosed rate of US$.40 per ten tokens), and they were thanked for their participation.

After the instructions and before starting the game participants were given 100 tokens as an endowment (US$4). Each iteration of the game consisted of seven actors and six stages. In this

[123] In addition to demographic questions, the pre study questionnaire included questions such as the DOSPERT risk aversion scale in Spanish and questions about participants' trust in the police, trust in the neighbors, perceptions of insecurity, crime victimization and mathematical ability. See Appendix IV.

[124] Participants were told that they would not know how many rounds were in the study. They were told that they would play for a maximum of one-and-a-half hours and that the game would end without warning. The few participants who asked whether the researcher had knowledge or control over the termination of the study (about 2) were told that the computer was programed to finish the game at random. At the end of the study, these participants were fully debriefed. They were told that the computer was programed to finish after 20 rounds and that the researcher had knowledge of this all along.

version of the study the participant was the only human player involved, and the actions of the rest of the players were determined by the role of a ten sided die.[125]

In the first stage of each round (including the very first round), the participant received a random number (between one and ten) of additional tokens. In the second stage the participant received information about the likelihood of the neighbors and police entering the game at later stages. This was done through one of nine visual images displayed in Table 5.

Table 5. Treatment Images

	Low Police Trustworthiness	Medium Trustworthiness	High Police Trustworthiness
High Neighbors' Trustworthiness			
Medium Neighbors' Trustworthiness			
Low Neighbors' Trustworthiness			



Only one image was displayed to the participant in any given round round

The images showed four neighbors of one of two types: blue (identified as trustworthy neighbors) and grey (identified as untrustworthy neighbors).[126] The participants were told that the

[125] This was done to be able to experimentally manipulate their entrance into the game. Future implementations may want to assign real players to the different roles in the game. To increase the realism of the game, the take authority was called "the thief," and the police were referred as "the police" during the game.

probability that blue neighbors would enter the game was 0.90 and the probability that grey neighbors would enter the game was only 0.10, with those odds having been selected in the design of the study for realism – no neighbor is perfectly trustworthy or perfectly untrustworthy.

All in all, one third of the images produced contained four blue (trustworthy) neighbors, one third contained four gray (untrustworthy) neighbors, and one third of the images contained one blue and three gray neighbors.

Further, the images displayed the probability of the police entering the game.[127] One third of the images showed that the police had a probability of 0.20 of entering the game, one third displayed a probability of 0.50, and the rest showed a probability of 0.80. One of the nine images displayed in Table 5 was displayed at the beginning of the round.

After seeing one of these nine figures, the thief stole at random 20%, 50%, or 80% of the total tokens in the participants' pocket (total wins plus endowment). Then, while seeing one of the nine images in Table 5, the participant was asked to choose whether she wanted to confront the thief or not. After the participant's choice was recorded, the subject continued through the stages shown in Figure 18, deciding each of the outcomes with a ten sided die. For a detailed description of the rest of the process, see Appendix II.

Before moving on to the results section, it is important to note that, within the particular context of this game, a participant's attempt to confront the thief constitutes the deployment of extra-legal punitive force to castigate violations of the state's law (i.e., vigilante behavior). Stealing income from the participant is a violation of the state's law since, if it is discovered by the police, it is prevented. Moreover, a participant´s choice to confront the thief is extra-legal since this action is independent of the police, and if it co-occurs with its intervention it leads to legal costs.

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[126] Blue neighbors were described as trustworthy neighbors during the instruction. A trustworthy neighbor was defined as one who has 90% chance of entering the game and an untrustworthy neighbor as one who has 10% chance of entering the game.
[127] See Appendix II to see the nine different images to which the participants were exposed before making their choice.

Data

I recruited my participants from 150 residents of a middle-class apartment complex located in the southern part of Mexico City.[128,129] The sample is composed of 52.05% female participants, of participants with an average age of 30.54 years old (SD. 12.3), and with an average income between $9,500 and $11,999 pesos a month (about US$830 a month). 37.31% of the sample had been victimized by crime in the previous year, and, on a 1 to 4 scale, participants trusted "little" in the police (mean: 2.05 SD: 0.77) and "somewhat" in their neighbors (mean: 3 SD: 0.68). Finally, on a 1 to 4 scale of insecurity, participants felt "somewhat" insecure in their neighborhood (mean: 3.04 SD: 0.95).

Overall I analyze a total of 2,996 rounds. With respect to the neighbors' trustworthiness manipulation, in 34.15% of the rounds participants were assigned to be among four trustworthy neighbors, in 34.11% of the rounds participants were assigned to have one trustworthy and three untrustworthy neighbors, and in 31.74% of the rounds participants were assigned to have four untrustworthy neighbors.

With respect to the police trustworthiness treatment, in 32.48% of the rounds, participants were informed that the police had a probability of 0.8 of entering the game at the end of the round, in 34.85% of the rounds they were told that the police had a probability of 0.5 of entering the game, and in 32.68% of the rounds, participants were told that the police's likelihood of entering the game was only 0.2. Finally, with respect to the severity of the crime treatment, in 34.45% of the rounds the thief took 20% of the participant's winnings, in 33.04% of the rounds the thief took 50%, and in 32.56% of the rounds the thief took 80% of the participant's income.

[128] In total, 150 people consented and started the study. However, four rounds were lost due to technical difficulties. This represents a data loss of 0.13% of the total sample.

[129] The apartment complex has 904 apartments. To recruit participants, I set up posters on each of the buildings, delivered flyers to each apartment of the complex and engaged in snowball sampling. For a more detailed description of the sample, see the results section and Appendix III.

Results

Since within the context of the game vigilante behavior is operationalized in terms of the likelihood that a participant will confront the thief, this is the outcome in which I focus in the following analyses. In total, in about 34.74% (0.87) of the rounds participants decided to confront the thief. I found that younger and older participants were slightly more likely to confront the thief and that participants were more likely to confront the thief in earlier rounds rather than later rounds.[130] However, I could not find differences in rates of confrontation across genders, income, crime victimization histories, and preexisting levels of distrust of the police. A fully specified subject and round fixed effects logistic regression model (in which every subject and every round is represented by a dichotomous variable) could not increase the adjusted pseudo r-squared to more than 0.10.

This high degree of within-subject volatility (about 90% in the response variance occurred within subject) suggests that participants engaged with the game. That is, that they responded to the shifting circumstances within the study rather than responding on the basis of their predispositions or by taking a single strategy.

But how was citizens' behavior affected by the varying intensity of crime? And more central to this chapter, how did the shifting levels of police and community trustworthiness influence citizens' likelihood of confronting the thief directly? To answer these questions, I specified a multivariate logistic regression model in which the probability that a participant will choose to confront the thief in a given round is a function of the following equation:

$$\Pr(Confronting) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Income_r + \beta_2 Gain_r + \beta_3 Take_r + \beta_4 PUT + \beta_5 NT + \beta_6 PUT\ x\ NT + \boldsymbol{\Phi ROUND} + \boldsymbol{\Psi SUBJECT} + e_r \quad 4)$$

[130] In a round-fixed-effects logistic regression model with standard errors clustered around the individual I found this to be the only significant individual predictor of confrontation. $\beta age = -.0581^{*}\ (0.031)$ $\beta age^2 = 0.0007^{*}(0.00038)$

In this model, **Income** represents the number of tokens that the participant had at the beginning of the round, **Gain** represents the amount of tokens won by the participant at the beginning of the round, and *Take* represents the proportion of the participant's income stolen by the **thief** at the beginning of the round. For their part, **PUT** (**Police Untrustworthiness**) represents the probability that the police will **not** intervene given by **1-Pr(Police Intervention)**, **NT** (**Neighbors' Trustworthiness**) represents the proportion of trustworthy to untrustworthy neighbors, and the term **PUT x NT** represents the product from multiplying both variables. Recall that if the

Table 6. Effect of Treatments on the Probability of Confronting the Thief

	(1) Confront	(2) Confront
Proportion of Trustworthy Neighbors	2.758***	1.990***
	(0.208)	(0.406)
Police Untrustworthiness[1-Pr(Police Intervention)]	7.116***	6.406***
	(0.518)	(0.601)
Proportion of Trustworthy Neighbors x Police Untrustworthiness		**1.420****
		(0.627)
Proportion of Income Taken	2.482***	2.499***
	(0.318)	(0.318)
Gain (2014 USD)	0.0139	0.0117
	(0.0501)	(0.0505)
Income (2014 USD)	-0.00046	-0.00132
	(0.0136)	(0.0137)
Constant	-5.603***	-5.164***
	(0.522)	(0.550)
Participants	150	150
Observations	2,996	2,996

Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Round and subject fixed effects included but not shown.

interactive trust theory fits the data, we should find a positive and significant coefficient associated with this term. Finally, the terms **ROUND'** and **SUBJECT'** represent a vector of dummy variables. I included these variables to account for any unbalances or correlations that might threaten the exchangeability assumptions on which my inferences rely.

Column 1 in Table 6 shows the overall direct effect of each of the treatments on the probability that a respondent will choose to confront the thief. The coefficients presented in the table show that the proportion of trustworthy neighbors, the police's untrustworthiness and the proportion of income taken have positive and statistically significant effects on the participant's probability of confronting the thief.

Figures 19a through 19c show the substantive importance of the treatment effects. Figure 18a shows that the likelihood of the intervention of the police had by far the largest substantive effect of the variables manipulated in the study. Everything else being equal, participants are much more likely to confront a thief when a third party is anticipated to be unlikely to intervene to enforce the law. As Figure 19a shows, in rounds in which the police had a high probability of intervening at the end of the round (Pr(Police Intervention=0.8)) participants are only expected to confront a thief with a probability of 0.10. However, in rounds in which the police have a low probability of intervening (Pr(Police Intervention)=0.2) participants are expected to choose to confront the thief with a probability of 0.63.

Figure 19b, for its part, shows that participants are more likely to confront a thief when they perceive themselves to be inserted into a more trustworthy community. All other things being equal, when participants are surrounded by four untrustworthy neighbors, they are expected to confront thieves with a probability of 0.20. However, when they are surrounded by four trustworthy neighbors, they can be expected to confront a thief with a probability of 0.54.

Finally, Figure 19c shows that, as participants have larger proportions of their income taken, they are more likely to attempt to confront the thief. Indeed, *ceteris paribus*, when participants lose 20% of their income they can be expected to confront thieves with a probability of 0.26. Yet, when losing 80% of their income, they are expected to attempt to confront a thief with a probability of 0.44.

Overall, the three manipulations have statistically significant and substantively important effects. In particular, citizens' expectation that the law will be enforced by a third party seems to play a role in citizens' willingness to attempt to confront criminals directly. But to what extent did this variable moderated the effect of the information provided about the neighbors' likelihood of intervention?

Figures 19a.-19c. Police Trustworthiness, Community Trustworthiness, and Severity of Crime Treatment Effects on the Likelihood of a Participant to Confront the Thief



Expected Probabilities and Confidence Intervals Derived from Model 1

Column 2 in Table 6 introduces a multiplicative term between the trust in the neighbors and Police untrustworthiness variables. As expected, the police's untrustworthiness positively moderates the degree to which the neighbors' trustworthiness translates into an increased likelihood that the participants will confront the thief.

Figures 20a and 20b show the police's untrustworthiness moderates the effect of the trustworthiness of the participants' neighbors. Figure 20a shows the relation between neighbors' trustworthiness and the probability that a participant will confront a thief in contexts in which the police is likely, moderately likely, and unlikely to intervene (light, mid, and dark respectively). Figure

20b, for its part, shows the marginal effect of trust in the neighbors over the range of the police's likelihood of intervening at the end of the turn.



Figures 20a. and 20b. Interaction Between the Police-Trustworthiness Treatment and the Neighbors-Trustworthiness Treatment (The Dependent Variable is the Participant's Likelihood of Choosing to Confront the Thief)



As the figures show, in contexts in which the police are very likely to intervene (Pr.=0.8), exchanging four untrustworthy for four trustworthy neighbors only increases a participant's likelihood of confronting a thief by 0.15. However, in contexts in which the police are only moderately likely to intervene (Pr.=0.5), exchanging four untrustworthy for four trustworthy neighbors is associated with a change of 0.41 in the likelihood of a participant confronting the thief. Finally, in a situation in which the police are unlikely to intervene (Pr.=0.2), exchanging four untrustworthy for four trustworthy neighbors is associated with an increase of 0.46 in the probability that a participant will directly confront the thief.

Conclusion

Vigilantism exerts costs on a society and its political system, and it also exposes participants to risks and losses. Yet, across countries and communities, some individuals display a willingness to participate in such behaviors. From the perspective of those suffering from intense crime victimization, there are potential costs and benefits from circumventing the state to engage in vigilante behavior. Under which circumstances do the opportunities associated with this type of behavior outweigh the potential risks associated with this sort of action?

I place a spotlight on the role of trust and the severity of the crime. With respect to the former, the focus here on the trustworthiness of law enforcement to capably execute its job places the state back into a dynamic that has frequently been studied from apolitical perspectives. In the meantime, the focus on trust among neighbors moves us beyond a framework that attributes vigilante behavior (especially collective) to particular cultures. Instead of tagging the behavior to particular peoples, the framework here identifies a generalizable condition of a community (trustworthiness) that might result from culture but is not specific to any one group.

To assess the relevance of these factors and, in the case of trust, their relationship to one another, in this chapter I developed the extralegal-confrontation experiment, a behavioral game that incorporates some of the main actors and incentives faced by someone considering engaging in vigilante behavior. Applying a cost-benefit framework, I argued that crime severity, citizens' trust in their community, and citizens' expectation that law enforcement will not intervene to enforce the law can have a positive effect on the probability that citizens will engage in vigilante behavior. Moreover, I proposed that citizens' distrust of law enforcement can positively moderate the effect of citizens' trust in their community, a dynamic that I call the Interactive Trust Hypothesis (ITH).

To test these hypotheses, I implemented the extralegal-confrontation experiment among a convenience sample of adults from Mexico City and found that participants were more likely to

confront a mock robber (thief) when a) the latter took more of the participant's income, b) the police were less likely to intervene, and c) participants had more neighbors likely to help them in a confrontation against the thief. Further, I found support for the ITH. That is, I found that the probability that the police would not intervene (Police Untrustworthiness) positively moderated the effect of the proportion of neighbors who were likely to intervene (Neighbors' Trustworthiness).

The extralegal-confrontation experiment (as portrayed in Figure 18) is a behavioral model inspired by the conditions faced by citizens considering engaging in vigilante justice, and, therefore, the degree to which we can translate these insights to the real world is uncertain. That said, this methodology contributes in a number of ways. Frist, it allows us to derive unbiased inferences resistant to simultaneous causation or endogeneity. Second, it allows us to observe behavior rather than collect self-reported retrospections or attitudes. Finally, since the participants were playing with real money, the results of this experiment can tell us something about citizens' behavior in situations in which they face real risks and opportunities from attempting to confront criminals. And, indeed they tell us something else by affirming a framework that might help identify the circumstances under which, *ceteris paribus*, vigilantism is more likely to appear: those in which individuals are confronted with the threat of crime while embedded within trustworthy communities that distrust the ability of law enforcement to carry out its role effectively.

VI. CONCLUSION

Over the last ten years, highly insecure countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have seen the emergence of groups of citizens who try to castigate or prevent legally sanctioned norms independently of the state — what I call Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE). In this dissertation, I have asked, under what circumstances are citizens more likely to engage in ECLE? While early scholars argued that this phenomenon is an expression of culture, group conflict, or a form of social control, a more recent strand of literature has seen the ECLE phenomenon as an offshoot of the recent wave of crime and insecurity in the region.

In line with this scholarship and building on insights from security-coproduction, crime reporting, and social capital literature, I have argued for and analyzed evidence in support of the idea that, in contexts in which authorities are regarded as untrustworthy, citizens are more likely to invest their social capital in ECLE. The general methodological strategy behind this dissertation has been that of triangulation. That is, I have implemented a diverse range of methodological and analytic approaches in order to put my main theoretical contribution to the test.

In the first empirical chapter, I looked more closely at the case of Cherán, a town in western Mexico in which citizens confronted a band of illegal loggers that devastated the surrounding forests. From an analysis of semi-structured interviews conducted with the citizens of the town and a comparative analysis of the number of community organizations in the town, I found that community cohesion and pre-existing social capital in the context of an illegitimate government played an important role in each of the stages of Cherán's self-defense movement. Further, as indicated by the number of community associations per capita, Cherán seemed to have stronger social capital even before the 2011 movement.

To test the extent to which insights from this chapter translated into more general political behavior, I looked at individual-level data coming from Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and

Geography (INEGI) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). I found citizens' distrust of the police to significantly moderate the link between citizens' trust in their neighbors and citizens' likelihood of engaging in collective anti-criminal actions. Moreover, I found that participation in s translates into citizens' willingness to reach out to their neighbors (rather than the state) as an ultimate source of justice. However, I found this to be the case only among those who strongly distrust the police.

In Chapters IV and V, I went beyond correlational evidence to test my main argument experimentally. In a laboratory-in-the-field study conducted among undergraduate students in Mexico City I found that, when reading about a group of citizens victimized by organized crime in a community with an untrustworthy police force, participants were more likely to think that concerned citizens should reach out to their community to confront criminals when they read that the community was trustworthy. However, in line with my argument, I found this effect was diminished or absent among citizens who read an article describing the law enforcement as trustworthy.

Finally, I presented the results of a behavioral experiment designed to incorporate the main actors and incentives associated with real vigilante behavior. I found that, in the context of the study, citizens were more likely to confront a mock thief when the latter stole more income, when the players' neighbors were more likely to enter the game, and when the police were less likely to enter the game. Consistent with the evidence presented in previous chapters, I found the effect of the neighbors to be muted by the probability of the police to enter the game.

All in all, I found support for the idea that Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement emerges in part as a result of citizens' willingness to turn to their community when the state-established law enforcement agencies are perceived to be absent or unlikely to intervene effectively.

Specific Theoretical Contributions

These results make specific contributions to our understanding of Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement and public policy across the Americas. In the context of the literature on vigilantism, my results lend support to the logic previously suggested (but not fully articulated) by Mendoza (2006), Malone (2012) and Goldstein (2012). My findings bring some validation for Mendoza's speculation about the mechanisms driving the correlation between the number of indigenous co-ethnics in Guatemalan municipalities and lynching. Indeed, as Mendoza suggests, my findings are more consistent with the idea that ECLE is a reflection of solidarity among citizens whom the state has historically not provided with basic services (including security) rather than with the idea of this phenomenon emerging out of indigenous culture.

Further, my findings support Malone's more general conjecture about the link between distrust in the justice system, social cohesion, and ECLE.[131] Indeed, the positive interaction between distrust of the police and social capital not only implies that the effect of social capital is activated by police distrust, but it also implies that, as Malone proposes, for distrust of the authorities to translate into ECLE certain amount of citizen solidarity is pre-required.

Finally, my results lend support to Goldstein's view on the emergence of vigilante justice in Bolivia. Although my research was not explicitly designed to distinguish whether citizens use ECLE to fulfill security needs or expressive needs, my results are consistent with Goldstein's general perspective that, in contexts in which the law not only is absent but also actively criminalizes citizens, vigilante justice can become a space in which citizens can display their community's strength and social cohesion.

[131] "In order for the perceived failure of the justice system to translate into collective action, citizens would need to have some sense of solidarity with other members of their community and view citizen action as a viable means for achieving their goals" (p.117).

Policy Implications

In addition to these theoretical implications, my findings also have something to say to policymakers. First, over the years, we have seen a surge of development and crime prevention programs that have, as part of their objective, set out to strengthen local communities' human and social capital. The core idea behind these programs is to generate economic development and democratic governance through their effect in communities' local capacity. Although my findings do not directly challenge the expectations or effectiveness of these measures, they provide a mechanism by which they could bring about important and perhaps unexpected challenges for democracy.

Namely, in contexts of high insecurity and virtual state failure (like the ones present in some areas of Latin America) governmental and NGO attempts at strengthening social capital, without a serious commitment from the government to reestablish its lost bond with citizenry, can translate into citizens attempting to invest their newly acquired social resources to substitute for an absent or incompetent state.

As empathic as one must be towards citizens going through a security crisis, it must be noted that, at times, this type of role substitution can develop into movements for secession, autonomy, or self-determination that, like in the case of Cherán, can institutionalize the conflict between communities and the larger democratic system.[132] In order to reduce the risk of this type of reactions, developing countries must accompany developing and crime prevention efforts with a strengthening and extension of police professionalization and security co-production programs.

In Mexico City, for example, the government currently promotes and subsidizes neighborhood alarms as an attempt to fight crime and ELCE in some of the city's most dangerous districts. While providing citizens with a mechanism through which they can alert each other about

[132] Although I leave the discussion of this specific dimension for future studies, I found that some of the women directly involved in the uprising of Cherán were participants in the Oportunidades cash transfer program and were frequently asked by the government to participate in group activities to strengthen the social capital of the community.

the presence of criminal activity in their community, the alarms are also connected to the closest emergency services.

As long as the connection between these alarms and the emergency services of the state is well maintained and the police respond to these calls professionally, they are likely to help restore the link between law enforcement authorities and local communities. However, as demonstrated in Chapter III, if these efforts are not taken seriously by the police and judicial system, far from decreasing ECLE they might very well increase the prevalence of violent attacks on alleged criminals. More generally, the argument and results presented in this dissertation have implications for our understanding of the way trust and social capital work in society.

General Implications

Why Is Vigilante Justice Like my Church's Soup-Kitchen?

My findings have implications for our understanding of social capital and how it influences democratic governance. For a long time, Putnam (1994b) and other scholars have made very strong claims about the normative effects of social capital. In reaction, Armony (2004), Satyanath et al. (2013), and other authors have noted cases and contexts in which social capital can have adverse effects. My findings not only contribute to this debate by identifying yet another case in which social capital can manifest itself negatively, they also identify trust in the state authorities as a significant factor that determines how social capital will express itself.

When the state can establish itself as a legitimate, credible, and efficient service provider, citizens are likely to invest their latent capacity for collective action (social capital) into rallying others to participate with the state to co-produce services. It is under these conditions where we are likely to observe, in line with Putnam, social capital making democracy work. However, when the

state fails to establish itself (or loses its capacity to be seen) as a trustworthy service provider, we are likely to see social capital translate into collective extra-legal service substitution.

Indeed, not all forms of collective extra-legal service substitution are regarded as deleterious for democracy. For instance, a soup-kitchen started by a group of citizens who distrust the state's capacity to provide welfare to the poor is unlikely to trigger serious concerns among the media and public. However, to the extent that other forms (like ECLE) can challenge the monopoly over the use of violence, one of the very foundations of the democratic state, my theory contributes by giving us a framework for understanding the circumstances in which the dark side of social capital is likely to emerge.

Trust as a Social Mediator

Additionally, my findings have implications for the existing scholarship focusing on government trust. In some way, they could be seen as a validation of Gamson's long held hypothesis that trust in government moderates the way in which citizens' efficacy translates into political behavior. However, they also extend this framework by showing its applicability to citizens' coping strategies. This is, they show that trust not only moderates the ways citizens attempt to influence government but also the ways in which they seek to invest their social capital to substitute for the services that the state fails to provide.

This is, however, not the first time that trust has been suggested to influence investment. Students of policy preferences (Hetherington, 2006), security co-production (Jonathan Jackson, Huq, Bradford, & Tyler, 2012), and police cooperation (Tyler & Fagan, 2008) have all, explicitly or implicitly, suggested that trust informs citizens' investment preferences. For example, when arguing that "Declining trust should not affect support for all things that government does… people need to trust the government when they pay the costs but do not receive the benefits" (p.4) Hetherington (2006) foreshadows the effect that trust can have on citizens' return on investment expectations. Yet

this is the first time, to my knowledge, that this moderating force has been explicitly theorized and empirically applied to explain the emergence of Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE).

Although I have focused here on trust in law enforcement as a critical moderator of citizens' social capital investment in ECLE, if generalized, my theory could have implications for citizen investment across a wider range of politically relevant outcomes. Indeed, I propose that trust can explain why availability of resources (or conditions that incentivize the investment of such resources) sometimes translate into actual investments and sometimes do not.

Staying on the topic of security, for example, my framework could be used to understand how trust moderates the effect of income in citizens' likelihood of hiring private security. But moving beyond this specific outcome, my theory could also be used to understand the role of trust as a moderating factor that determines the impact of income on private education investment[133] and even in the dynamics of campaign contributions.[134]

Research Limitations and Avenues for Future Inquiry

This study offers a multi-method examination of the interactive role of trust in the government and social capital on the emergence of ECLE in a sample of citizens from Latin American and Caribbean countries. As a direct consequence of this methodology, it encounters a number of limitations that need to be considered. First, in implementing a multi-method approach, I acknowledge that each of the chapters of this dissertation has important methodological limitations.

While Chapter II provides an in-depth look at a case of ECLE, it can tell us little about the causal validity or generalizability of the events occurring in the town. While Chapter III was designed to address the generalizability question it cannot, on its own, eliminate the internal validity

[133] To this respect, for example, my framework could be used to predict a larger gap in private education investment between rich and poor in countries where public education is deemed inefficient and untrustworthy.
[134] If applied to political activism in the developed world, for example, my general framework could be used to predict that, all other things being equal, political activists collecting donations stand to increase their collections more when moving from a poor neighborhood to a wealthier neighborhood when they are perceived as more trustworthy.

threats inherent to observational studies. Although the methodology implemented in Chapter IV allows us to be more confident about the causal link between the variable of the studies, the degree to which vicarious support translates into action when real costs and benefits are on the line is uncertain. Even when Chapter V was designed to address this question, in itself it cannot tell us to what extent the behavior manifested in the laboratory can be generalized to real-world actions.

This being said, my hope in engaging in this methodology is that the accumulated evidence across the chapters serves as an indicator of the validity of my thesis. Future research could test some of the methodological assumptions left unchallenged through the implementation of field experiments or the analysis of potentially-exogenous variance in police distrust introduced by police reform or police corruption scandals.

Second, by studying general and early manifestations of ECLE, the contributions of this study to the subject of the emergence of later and more spectacular manifestations of ECLE are only limited. That is, I have theoretically linked social capital to general ELCE and empirically to the emergence of collective anti-criminal actions and vicarious support for vigilante justice; however, the link between ECLE, lynching, paramilitary militias, and other types of group violence was only tangentially explored.

Linking these two related but distinct phenomena needs further theoretical development and, empirically, would require a different approach. Specifically, to test ideas linking these two outcomes, it would be necessary to take a conditional comparative approach. That is, an approach that would compare cases within a subpopulation of ECLE groups to explore the factors that might trigger or reduce the use of violence.

Finally, the current project has focused on providing a framework for understanding the role of trust in the government and social capital in the emergence of ECLE; however, as presented before, my framework, when taken more generally, has implications for a broader set of outcomes

left unexplored here. Future research avenues could involve at least two main lines of research. On the one hand, an extension of this study could focus on additional political and psychological forces that could influence or distort the incentives associated with ECLE (e.g. institutions, emotions, social norms, legal sanctions, and even personality). On the other, research building on this project could focus on the more general idea that trust in the government moderates citizens' investment. Then, it could derive and test implications for other outcomes dependent on citizen investment (e.g., campaign collections, private health insurances, or private education) to derive and test expectations regarding other politically relevant outcomes.

All in all, inspired by the recent spike of vigilante violence in Latin America, this research project asks, under what circumstances do citizens engage in extralegal collective law enforcement? Looking at this particular outcome, I proposed that citizens are more likely to invest their social capital on ECLE when they distrust state law enforcement authorities. Then, I took a multi-method approach to test this thesis and found support for it across four qualitative, correlational, and experimental studies. Overall, my findings imply that there is, as a number of scholars have suggested, a strategic logic behind the emergence of ECLE. Indeed, this logic is currently putting the foundations of emerging democracies going through security crises to the test.

APPENDIX

A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III

I. Question Wording

Table A1. Question Wording			
	ENSI 2010	ENVIPE 2011	AmericasBarometer 2004-2014
Collective Anti Criminal Action/Organization	In the previous year, to protect itself from crime. Were any of the following actions taken in this household? Engage in joint actions with the neighbors. *No, Yes*	In the previous year, to protect itself from crime. Were any of the following actions taken in this household? Engage in joint actions with the neighbors. *No, Yes*	VIC44. Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the last 12 months have you organized with the neighbors of your community? *No, Yes*
Support for Vigilante Justice			E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove? *(1) Strongly disapprove – (10) Strongly approve*
Trust in the Neighbors	Please tell me the degree of trust that you have in your neighbors? *A lot, some, little, or none?*	Please tell me the degree of trust that you have in your neighbors? *A lot, some, little, or none?*	IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are...? *(1) Untrustworthy (2) Not very trustworthy (3) Somewhat trustworthy (4) Very trustworthy*
Trust in the Police (inverted when referred as distrust)	Please tell me the degree of trust that you have in 1. The municipal police? 2. The state police? 3. The federal police? *A lot, some, little, or none?* [135]	Please tell me the degree of trust that you have in 1. The police? *A lot, some, little, or none?*	B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police? *(1) Not at all – (7) A lot*
Justice System Punishes Criminals			AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? *(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None*
Administration Improves Safety			N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety? *(1) Not at all – (7) A lot*

[135] Only 1.74% of interviewees responded to only one item, 4.62% of the interviewees responded to two items and 92.56% responded to all the items. The 1.08% of respondents who didn´t respond to any items was deleted from the analyses.

Neighborhood Criminality	Do you know, or have you heard, if around your home the following situations occur? 1. Drug is used *(yes or no)* 2. Alcohol is consumed in public *(yes or no)* 3. There have been gun shots *(yes or no)* 4. There are sites selling firearms *(yes or no)* 5. There are gangs or group who commit crimes *(yes or no)* 6. There are frequent assaults (yes or no) 7. There is youth who neither work nor go to school *(yes or no)* 8. There are frequent assaults on women, children and elderly *(yes or no)* 9. There is illegal sale of alcohol *(yes or no)* 10. There are sites selling counterfeit goods *(yes or no)* 11. There are sites selling drugs *(yes or no)* 12. There have been kidnappings *(yes or no)* 13. There have been extortions *(yes or no)* 14. There have been charges for "the use of floor" *(yes or no)*	Do you know, or have you heard, if around your home the following situations occur? 1. Alcohol is consumed on the street *(yes or no)* 2. There are gangs or bands *(yes or no)* 3. There are arguments between neighbors *(yes or no)* 4. There is illegal sale of alcohol (yes or no) 5. Pirate products are sold *(yes or no)* 6. There has been police violence against citizens *(yes or no)* 7. There is invasion of land *(yes or no)* 8. Drug is used *(yes or no)* 9. There are frequent assaults or robberies *(yes or no)* 10. Drug is sold *(yes or no)* 11. There have been frequent shootings *(yes or no)* 12. Firearms are sold *(yes or no)* 13. There is prostitution *(yes or no)* 14. There have been kidnappings *(yes or no)* 15. There have been killings *(yes or no)* 16. There have been extortions *(yes or no)* 17. There have been charges for "the use of floor" *(yes or no)*	
Trend of Crime	1. For what you have noted in (State), ¿Do you consider that during last year crime has... *decreased, remained the same or increased?* 2. For what you have noted in (City), ¿Do you consider that during last year crime has... *decreased, remained the same or increased?*	1. For what you have noted in (State), ¿Do you consider that during last year crime has... *decreased, remained the same or increased?* 2. For what you have noted in (City), ¿Do you consider that during last year crime has... *decreased, remained the same or increased?*	
Security	1. Do you consider that living in your neighborhood is *safe or unsafe?* 2. Do you consider that living in your municipality is *safe or unsafe?* 3. Do you consider that living in your state is *safe or unsafe?*	1. Do you consider that living in your neighborhood is *safe or unsafe?* 2. Do you consider that living in your municipality is *safe or unsafe?* 3. Do you consider that living in your state is *safe or unsafe?*	AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel *(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe?*
Safety in places	1. Tell me if you feel *safe or unsafe* in ... your home 2. Tell me if you feel *safe or unsafe* in ... the street 3. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... the	1. Tell me if you feel *safe or unsafe* in ... your home 2. Tell me if you feel *safe or unsafe* in ... the street 3. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... the	

	public transport ... 4. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... an ATM located in public	public transport ... 4. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... an ATM located in public	
Crime Victimization	During 2009, any person who lives or lived in your household was the victim of a crime in this state?	During 2010, in (STATE) or in another state, did any person who live or lived in your household suffered any of the situations listed? (list of crimes)	VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?
Pro-Coup in case of Crime			JC10. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified when there is a lot of crime?
Support for Democracy			ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you *agree or disagree* with this statement?
Size of Town	*Rural, Suburban, Urban*	*Rural, Suburban, Urban*	Size of place. *(1) Rural Area (2) Small City (3) Medium City (4) Large City (5) National Capital (Metropolitan area)*
Ethnic Identity	INEGI censo de población y vivienda 2010	INEGI censo de población y vivienda 2010	ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race? *(1) White (2) Mestizo (3) Indigenous (4) Black (5) Mulatto (7) Other*

I.I Full Results from Table 1

Table A2. Determinants of Anti Criminal Action (Full Results)

	(1)		(2)	
VARIABLES	INEGI		AmericasBarometer	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Trust in Neighbors	0.784***	(0.131)	-0.208**	(0.0972)
Distrust in the Police	-0.563***	(0.140)	-0.00625	(0.0953)
Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police	0.525***	(0.168)	0.320**	(0.141)
Crime Victimization	0.377***	(0.0338)	0.456***	(0.0310)
Insecurity (Neighborhood)	0.0915**	(0.0375)	0.752***	(0.0506)
Age	0.124*	(0.0731)	0.0122***	(0.00247)
Female	0.0435	(0.0286)	-0.0887***	(0.0239)
Education	1.119***	(0.0999)	0.0340*	(0.0193)
% Indigenous speakers/ Indigenous vs White	-0.475***	(0.159)	0.523***	(0.0699)
Size of Town	0.226***	(0.0263)	-0.0365***	(0.0131)
Insecurity (Municipality)	0.104**	(0.0447)		
Insecurity (State)	0.0523	(0.0429)		
Trend of Crime (State)	0.176***	(0.0633)		
Trend of Crime (City)	0.0521	(0.0606)		
Alcohol Consumption in the Neighborhood	-0.0673*	(0.0367)		
Illegal Alcohol Sales in the Neighborhood	0.0727*	(0.0399)		
Drug Consumption in the Neighborhood	0.00832	(0.0386)		
Gunfire in the Neighborhood	0.0692*	(0.0365)		
Gangs in the Neighborhood	0.116***	(0.0370)		
Gun Sale in the Neighborhood	-0.146*	(0.0828)		
Assaults in the Neighborhood	0.321***	(0.0353)		
Extortions in the Neighborhood	0.351***	(0.0400)		
Floor Charges in the Neighborhood	0.178***	(0.0579)		
Drug Stores in the Neighborhood	-0.0649	(0.0407)		
Kidnap in the Neighborhood	0.0966**	(0.0478)		
Piracy in the Neighborhood	0.0364	(0.0371)		
Wealth			0.0190*	(0.0110)
Support for Vigilante Justice			0.176***	(0.0408)
Support for Democracy			0.0276	(0.0508)
Justice System Punishes Criminals			0.119***	(0.0426)
Administration Improves Security			0.114**	(0.0528)
Pro-Coup in Case of Crime			0.182***	(0.0271)
Mestizo vs White			-0.00487	(0.0387)
Black vs White			0.0911	(0.0601)
Mulato vs White			0.222***	(0.0754)
Other vs White			0.162	(0.107)
Constant	-2.901***	(0.175)	-2.363***	(0.171)
Fixed Effects	64	State-Years	40	Country-Years
Observations		115,727		51,787

Standard errors account for the complex nature of the sample.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

II. Separating ENSI-2010 from ENSI-2011

To what extent do the results in Table 1 represent an effect concentrated in a single year? To answer this question I specified the model in equation 1 for each year independently.

Table A1. Determinants of Anti-Criminal Action

	ENSI-2010	ENVIPE-2011
	(1) Anti-Crime	(2) Anti-Crime
Trust in Neighbors	0.815***	0.642***
	(0.187)	(0.186)
Distrust in the Police	-0.593***	-0.565***
	(0.203)	(0.190)
Distrust in the Police x Trust in Neighbors	**0.612****	**0.465****
	(0.249)	**(0.226)**
Household Crime Victimization	0.247***	0.523***
	(0.0522)	(0.0452)
Crime Perception State	0.0287	0.248***
	(0.0540)	(0.0830)
Crime Perception City	0.0605	-0.0303
	(0.0554)	(0.0721)
Neighborhood Drug Consumption	-0.0478	0.0865
	(0.0521)	(0.0572)
Neighborhood Alcohol Consumption	-0.0744	-0.0717
	(0.0521)	(0.0520)
Neighborhood Gunfire	0.00560	0.139**
	(0.0472)	(0.0566)
Neighborhood Gun Sale	-0.301***	0.120
	(0.103)	(0.136)
Neighborhood Gangs	0.187***	0.0341
	(0.0530)	(0.0527)
Neighborhood Assaults	0.334***	0.314***
	(0.0492)	(0.0505)
Neighborhood Illegal Alcohol sales	-0.00907	0.0820
	(0.0534)	(0.0621)
Neighborhood Piracy	0.103**	-0.161***
	(0.0487)	(0.0593)
Neighborhood Drug Stores	-0.0199	-0.146**
	(0.0545)	(0.0613)
Neighborhood Kidnap	-0.0768	0.159**
	(0.0637)	(0.0738)
Neighborhood Extortions	0.366***	0.185***
	(0.0521)	(0.0633)
Neighborhood Floor Charges	0.109	0.225**
	(0.0734)	(0.0962)

Neighborhood Non-occupied	-0.000469	
	(0.0522)	
Neighborhood Aggressions	0.208***	
	(0.0557)	
Neighborhood Fights		0.0869
		(0.0582)
Neighborhood Police Violence		0.0935
		(0.0570)
Neighborhood Illegal Invasions		0.237***
		(0.0779)
Neighborhood Prostitution		-0.108
		(0.0801)
Neighborhood Homicide		0.0770
		(0.0621)
Security in Neighborhood	-0.0405	-0.186***
	(0.0529)	(0.0525)
Security in Municipality	-0.101	-0.130**
	(0.0621)	(0.0626)
Security in State	-0.107*	0.0907
	(0.0590)	(0.0597)
Age	0.00424***	0.567***
	(0.00135)	(0.112)
Female	0.0814**	0.0127
	(0.0384)	(0.0429)
Education	0.0680***	1.098***
	(0.00497)	(0.103)
Municipal Proportion Indigenous (Source: INEGI 2010)	-1.094***	-0.174
	(0.211)	(0.200)
Constant	-2.991***	-3.049***
	(0.211)	(0.234)
Observations	56,575	59,152

Design-based standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
State fixed effects included but not shown.

Table A1 shows that the coefficient associated with the multiplicative term **Distrust in the Police x Trust in the Neighbors** is not only significant in the pooled model but also significant within each of the years.

III. Controlling for Occupation

Since none of the surveys included citizens' socioeconomic status I included their occupation as a control in order to account for differences in respondents' income. The following model includes a dummy variable for each of the occupational categories included in both surveys. If my findings are spurious, we should expect for the interactive trust effect to drop to insignificance.

Table A2. Determinants of ECLE (controlling for occupation)

	ENSI-2010	ENSI-2010
	(1)	(4)
VARIABLES	ECLE	ECLE
Indirect-ECLE		
Trust in Neighbors	0.823***	0.605***
	(0.187)	(0.184)
Distrust in the Police	-0.606***	-0.596***
	(0.202)	(0.189)
Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police	**0.609****	**0.508****
	(0.249)	**(0.225)**
Household Crime Victimization	0.252***	0.528***
	(0.0522)	(0.0455)
Crime Perception State	0.0539	0.237***
	(0.108)	(0.0838)
Crime Perception City	0.130	-0.0309
	(0.111)	(0.0724)
Neighborhood Drug Consumption	-0.0474	0.0863
	(0.0522)	(0.0585)
Neighborhood Alcohol Consumption	-0.0785	-0.0807
	(0.0521)	(0.0526)
Neighborhood Gunfire	0.00925	0.149***
	(0.0473)	(0.0575)
Neighborhood Gun Sale	-0.304***	0.123
	(0.104)	(0.139)
Neighborhood Gangs	0.187***	0.0429
	(0.0529)	(0.0530)
Neighborhood Assaults	0.336***	0.318***
	(0.0492)	(0.0507)
Neighborhood Illegal Alcohol sales	-0.0189	0.0767
	(0.0533)	(0.0624)
Neighborhood Piracy	0.106**	-0.159***
	(0.0487)	(0.0595)
Neighborhood Drug Stores	-0.0214	-0.155**
	(0.0546)	(0.0623)
Neighborhood Kidnap	-0.0769	0.155**
	(0.0636)	(0.0753)
Neighborhood Extortions	0.375***	0.183***
	(0.0521)	(0.0643)
Neighborhood Floor Charges	0.107	0.217**
	(0.0736)	(0.0982)
Neighborhood Non-occupied	0.000872	
	(0.0523)	
Neighborhood Aggressions	0.202***	

	(0.0554)	
Neighborhood Fights		0.0926
		(0.0586)
Neighborhood Police Violence		0.0821
		(0.0581)
Neighborhood Illegal Invasions		0.233***
		(0.0788)
Neighborhood Prostitution		-0.110
		(0.0811)
Neighborhood Homicide		0.0926
		(0.0629)
Security in Neighborhood	-0.0405	-0.177***
	(0.0528)	(0.0527)
Security in Municipality	-0.105*	-0.135**
	(0.0619)	(0.0635)
Security in State	-0.108*	0.0930
	(0.0588)	(0.0610)
Age	0.295**	0.627***
	(0.116)	(0.128)
Female	0.113***	0.0759
	(0.0424)	(0.0496)
Education	6.696***	1.017***
	(0.509)	(0.106)
Employee	0.284***	0.113
	(0.1000)	(0.113)
Self	0.321***	-0.00967
	(0.106)	(0.117)
Employer	0.237	0.353*
	(0.173)	(0.189)
Worker	0.381**	-0.00958
	(0.184)	(0.190)
Student	0.0349	-0.0278
	(0.143)	(0.160)
Home	0.159	-0.114
	(0.109)	(0.120)
Retired	0.256*	-0.0679
	(0.146)	(0.165)
Disabled	0.260	-0.424
	(0.244)	(0.294)
Unemployed	0.200	-0.0819
	(0.130)	(0.164)
Constant	-3.186***	-3.060***
	(0.228)	(0.259)
Observations	56,574	59,152

Design-based standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ^p<0.11
State fixed effects included but not shown.
The omitted occupation category is Farmer.

As can be seen in the figure, I find that the interaction remains significant and with almost the same strength as the one displayed in the main body of the text.

IV. Does Insecurity Bounds the Interactive Trust Hypothesis?

To answer this question I specified a model in which I aggregated a triple interaction between the interactive trust term and citizens perception that the neighborhood is safe or not. Additionally, I included independent interaction terms between citizens' perception of the safety of their neighborhood and both Trust in the Neighbors and Distrust in the Police. If perceptions of security constrain the interactive trust hypothesis we should expect a significant effect in the triple interaction.

Table A3. Triple Interaction With Perceptions of Security in The Neighbors

	ENSI-2010	ENVIPE-2011
	(1) Anti-Crime	(2) Anti-Crime
Trust in Neighbors	0.824***	0.774***
	(0.286)	(0.290)
Distrust in the Police	-0.791***	-0.507*
	(0.281)	(0.274)
Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police	0.768**	0.368
	(0.368)	(0.348)
Security in Neighborhood	-0.253	-0.0583
	(0.311)	(0.313)
Security in Neighborhood x Trust in Neighbors	0.132	-0.198
	(0.375)	(0.375)
Security in Neighborhood x Distrust in the Police	0.536	-0.0579
	(0.399)	(0.389)
Security in Neighborhood x Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police	-0.546	0.105
	(0.493)	(0.474)
Household Crime Victimization	0.254***	0.524***
	(0.0523)	(0.0452)
Crime Perception State	0.0552	0.251***
	(0.108)	(0.0829)
Crime Perception City	0.128	-0.0315
	(0.111)	(0.0722)
Neighborhood Drug Consumption	-0.0422	0.0874
	(0.0522)	(0.0573)
Neighborhood Alcohol Consumption	-0.0779	-0.0737
	(0.0521)	(0.0520)
Neighborhood Gunfire	0.00948	0.140**
	(0.0472)	(0.0567)
Neighborhood Gun Sale	-0.298***	0.120
	(0.104)	(0.136)
Neighborhood Gangs	0.187***	0.0355
	(0.0530)	(0.0528)
Neighborhood Assaults	0.339***	0.316***
	(0.0492)	(0.0505)
Neighborhood Illegal Alcohol sales	-0.0228	0.0793
	(0.0535)	(0.0619)
Neighborhood Piracy	0.113**	-0.162***
	(0.0489)	(0.0593)
Neighborhood Drug Stores	-0.0186	-0.145**
	(0.0547)	(0.0614)
Neighborhood Kidnap	-0.0785	0.159**

	(0.0637)	(0.0738)
Neighborhood Extortions	0.375***	0.185***
	(0.0522)	(0.0633)
Neighborhood Floor Charges	0.111	0.226**
	(0.0738)	(0.0961)
Neighborhood Non-occupied	0.00162	
	(0.0522)	
Neighborhood Aggressions	0.205***	
	(0.0556)	
Neighborhood Fights		0.0871
		(0.0582)
Neighborhood Police Violence		0.0918
		(0.0569)
Neighborhood Illegal Invasions		0.237***
		(0.0779)
Neighborhood Prostitution		-0.108
		(0.0801)
Neighborhood Homicide		0.0774
		(0.0622)
Security in Municipality	-0.111*	-0.132**
	(0.0618)	(0.0627)
Security in State	-0.106*	0.0920
	(0.0587)	(0.0597)
Age	0.368***	0.574***
	(0.106)	(0.112)
Female	0.0853**	0.0124
	(0.0384)	(0.0429)
Education	6.978***	1.108***
	(0.491)	(0.102)
Constant	-2.931***	-3.142***
	(0.264)	(0.288)
Observations	56,575	59,152

Design-based standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
State fixed effects included but not shown.

For the case of Anti-Criminal Action in 2010 the effect is in the expected direction. However, for the 2011 data, the interaction effect goes in an unexpected direction. In both cases the triple interaction is not statistically distinguishable from zero; thus, little can be interpreted from this result.

V. Results for Hiring Private Security

In addition to looking at citizens´ support for vigilante justice other authors have analyzed the privatization of security as an indicator of indirect ECLE (Malone, 2012a; Ungar, 2007). The privatization of security is a particularly good indicator of ECLE when citizens pool together their economic resources to police a space that should otherwise be policed by the state's authorities (a public park, their street, or their neighborhood as a whole). Thus, to further assess the validity of my results, I specified a logistic regression model in which a citizens' likelihood to join together with their neighbors to hire private security for a public space (their street or neighborhood) is a function of equation 1 presented in the text. Once more, if the data is consistent with my hypothesis I should find a positive and significant coefficient associated with the term **Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police**.

Table A4. Determinants of Hiring Private Security for Public Places

	ENSI-2010	ENVIPE-2011
	(1) Hiring Private Security	(2) Hiring Private Security
Trust in Neighbors	-0.496	-0.462
	(0.328)	(0.429)
Distrust in the Police	-0.920***	-0.660
	(0.343)	(0.409)
Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police	1.287***	0.949*
	(0.442)	(0.521)
Household Crime Victimization	0.0820	0.816***
	(0.0923)	(0.122)
Crime Perception State	-0.134	0.206
	(0.106)	(0.232)
Crime Perception City	0.182*	-0.346**
	(0.105)	(0.161)
Neighborhood Drug Consumption	-0.334***	-0.0716
	(0.105)	(0.128)
Neighborhood Alcohol Consumption	-0.338***	-0.284**
	(0.0980)	(0.124)
Neighborhood Gunfire	0.0636	0.0214
	(0.0919)	(0.124)
Neighborhood Gun Sale	-0.0650	0.209
	(0.238)	(0.330)
Neighborhood Gangs	-0.0452	0.121
	(0.0988)	(0.132)
Neighborhood Assaults	0.373***	0.460***
	(0.0909)	(0.111)
Neighborhood Illegal Alcohol sales	0.0233	-0.330**
	(0.0999)	(0.140)
Neighborhood Piracy	0.191*	-0.446***
	(0.0995)	(0.139)
Neighborhood Drug Stores	-0.0847	-0.142
	(0.110)	(0.146)
Neighborhood Kidnap	0.279***	0.443***
	(0.106)	(0.152)
Neighborhood Extortions	0.248***	0.0831

	(0.0944)	(0.136)
Neighborhood Floor Charges	0.195	0.0656
	(0.134)	(0.210)
Neighborhood Non-occupied	-0.265***	
	(0.102)	
Neighborhood Aggressions	0.201**	
	(0.100)	
Neighborhood Fights		0.137
		(0.135)
Neighborhood Police Violence		0.0339
		(0.142)
Neighborhood Illegal Invasions		0.415**
		(0.173)
Neighborhood Prostitution		-0.412**
		(0.205)
Neighborhood Homicide		-0.0905
		(0.161)
Security in Neighborhood	0.272***	-0.105
	(0.103)	(0.116)
Security in Municipality	-0.211*	-0.0209
	(0.126)	(0.144)
Security in State	-0.164	0.0853
	(0.119)	(0.140)
Age	0.0117***	0.779***
	(0.00256)	(0.238)
Female	0.0221	0.0868
	(0.0718)	(0.0990)
Education	0.187***	2.351***
	(0.0109)	(0.311)
Municipal Proportion Indigenous (Source: INEGI 2010)	-2.512***	-2.364***
	(0.903)	(0.688)
Constant	-5.749***	-5.138***
	(0.554)	(0.574)
Observations	56,575	59,161

Design-based standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
State fixed effects included but not shown.

Once more, I find support for the interactive trust hypothesis. That is, distrust in the authorities activates degree in which trust in the neighbors translates into an increased likelihood of a citizen to join with the neighbors to invest in hiring private security for the public space.

VI. Lagged Variable Analysis Using Mexican Municipalities

Although the cross-sectional analyses are consistent with the interactive trust hypotheses, they do not allow me to isolate the effect of citizens' *Trust in the Neighbors* on *Collective Anti-Criminal Action* from the effect that the latter can have on the former. To address concerns about reverse causality it is necessary to use measures of *Trust in the Neighbors* and *Distrust in the Police* that are temporally antecedent to my measure of participating in a *Collective Anti-Criminal Action* in 2011.

It is possible to produce a test of the interactive trust hypothesis robust to reverse causality by conducting a joint analysis of the ENSI-2010 and ENVIPE-2011 surveys. Specifically, I can test whether the effect of the 2010's *Municipal-Average Trust among Neighbors* is more strongly associated with the 2011's *Percentage of Citizens That Engaged in a Collective Anti-Criminal Action* among municipalities that distrusted the police more strongly in 2010.[136] In other words, if my hypothesis is robust to accounting for reverse causality I expect that $\textit{Distrust in the Police}_{2010}$ will positively and significantly moderate the effect of $\textit{Trust in the Neigbors}_{2010}$ on both measures of *Collective Anti-Criminal Action* in 2011.[137]

To conduct this test I calculated the Average Trust among Neighbors and the Average Trust in the Police for 2010, as well as the percentage of citizens that engaged in Collective Anti-Criminal Action in 2011. Then, I replicated the analyses in Table 1 using an OLS regression model of the following form:

$$AntiCrime_{2011} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AntiCrime_{\ 2010} + \beta_2 Distrust\ \ in\ the\ Police_{2010} + \beta_3 Trust\ in\ the\ Neighbors_{\ 2010} + \beta_4 Trust\ in\ the\ Neighbors_{\ 2010}\ x\ Distrust\ in\ the\ Police_{2010} + \beta_a \boldsymbol{CRIME} + \beta_b \boldsymbol{INSECURITY} + \beta_c \boldsymbol{DEMOGRAPHICS} + \beta_d \boldsymbol{STATE} + e_m$$

Here, the percentage of citizens that engaged in Collective Anti-Criminal Action in 2011 ($\textit{AntiCrime}_{2011}$) is modeled as a function of the proportion of citizens that engaged in Collective Anti-Criminal Action in 2010 ($\textit{AntiCrime}_{2010}$), 2010's Municipal Average Trust among Neighbors, 2010´s ($\textit{Trust in the Neighbors}_{2010}$), Municipal Average Distrust in the Police ($\textit{Distrust in the Police}_{2010}$), and their interaction.[138] Controls include **Crime Victimization** variables, a number of **Insecurity** Perception variables, **Socio-Demographic** variables and **State Fixed Effects**.[139]

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[136] ENSI 2010 surveyed 851 municipalities and ENVIPE 2011 surveyed 896 municipalities. Of these, 799 municipalities were sampled in both surveys.

[137] Note that proportions and percentages are 0 to 1 and 0 to 100 bounded, thus OLS may yield nonsensical predictions or biased estimates. To test whether the results were robust to alternative models, I replicated the models using a Tobit model bounded from 0 to 100 and a Generalized Linear Model of the binomial family with a Logit link function (See Section VIa below).

[138] It is important to note that the survey is not representative in all municipalities. However, aggregation error in the municipal estimates will bias the estimate of the interaction only if it is negatively correlated with both the *2010-2011 change in average the proportion of citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions* and *trust in the police.* All the same, to validate the results I performed two robustness tests. First, I repeated the analysis using only the municipalities in which more than 200 interviews (N=56) were conducted. Second, I aggregated the information at the state level (N=32)(*See Table A7*).

[139] As control variables I included: The 2010's municipal level of insecurity, derived from an additive "perceptions of insecurity index" constructed from identical variables referring to the country, state and neighborhood. The 2011's municipal proportion of citizens who feel insecure: at home, in the street, in the public transport and in the ATMs. Additionally, I included the 2011's municipal average Trust in the Neighbors, the municipal average Distrust in the

Table A5. Municipal Level Lagged Analysis		
VARIABLES	(1) Anti-Crime (2011)	(2) Hiring Private Security (2011)
Hiring Private Security $_{2010}$	---	130.4***
		(23.16)
Anti-Crime$_{2010}$	12.09*	---
	(6.427)	
Trust in the Neighbors$_{2010}$	-81.56***	20.90
	(28.79)	(14.75)
Distrust in the Police$_{2010}$	-71.05***	25.79*
	(26.59)	(14.17)
Trust in the Neighbors$_{2010}$ x Distrust in the Police$_{2010}$	113.4***	-19.38
	(37.90)	(20.47)
Perception of Insecurity $_{2010}$	-20.59**	-1.458
	(9.940)	(7.842)
Trust in the Neighbors	0.622	17.30
	(5.778)	(15.17)
Distrust in the Police	-3.731	11.94
	(6.691)	(13.95)
Vehicle Accessory Thefts	33.72***	9.649
	(12.91)	(13.10)
House Thefts	22.55*	1.400
	(13.49)	(8.243)
Street Thefts	27.27**	7.291
	(12.59)	(8.925)
Extortion	-8.157	-4.007
	(9.476)	(3.440)
Education	12.27**	5.498
	(6.005)	(7.260)
Female	-3.210	0.00610
	(4.448)	(2.506)
Urban	-0.674	1.414
	(1.361)	(4.147)
Home Insecurity	9.990*	2.275
	(6.012)	(4.497)
Street Insecurity	8.134**	1.051
	(3.495)	(2.223)
Transport Insecurity	-7.009**	0.713
	(3.386)	(1.060)
ATM insecurity	3.213	0.549
	(2.184)	(1.210)
Fixed Effects	State	State
Constant	64.09***	-26.77**
	(20.94)	(12.31)
Observations	760	760
R-squared	0.441	0.306
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.		

Police, the municipal average education, the municipal proportion of females, and the municipal proportion of interviews conducted in an urban area. Finally, I included a variable for the municipal proportion of citizens that suffered thefts of their vehicle accessories, house, and street. (*See Appendix I for question wording*)

The results from in Table A4 bring further support for the interactive trust hypothesis. That is, Distrust in the Police seems to significantly moderate the effect of Trust in the Neighbors on the municipal proportion of citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions.

Columns 1 shows that the proportion of interviewees reporting vehicle accessory thefts, house thefts, and street thefts are positively correlated with the percentage of citizens reporting Collective Anti-Criminal Actions. Additionally, the average home and street insecurity, as well as the average level of education, seem to be significant predictors of the 2011's municipal percentage of citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions. Interestingly, once insecurity in 2011 is accounted for, perceptions of insecurity in 2010 seem to be negatively associated with the percentage of citizens who engaged in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 2011.

Furthermore, the results are consistent with the interactive trust hypothesis. That is, other thing constant, as the average trust among neighbors increased in 2010 so did the percentage of citizens that engaged in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 2011, particularly among police distrusting municipalities.

To further test my hypothesis I re-specified the mode to attempt to explain citizens' likelihood of joining together with their neighbors to hire private security for a public space (see column 2). However, the interaction between trust in the neighbors and distrust of the police as predictors of hiring private security is not significant for 2011.

Figure A1. Marginal Effect of Municipal-level Trust in the Neighbors (2010) on Municipal % Anti-Crime in (2011) over the Range of Municipal-level Distrust in the Police (2010)



Figure A1 shows the marginal effect of the average Trust in the Neighbors in 2010 on the prevalence of Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 2011 over the range of municipal Distrust in the Police 2010. A pattern similar to the one shown in the main text emerges. Among municipalities that distrust the police, as the average trust in the neighborhood increases, so does the proportion of citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 2011. However, this effect drops to insignificance or is reversed in communities that trust strongly the police. Other things constant, in municipalities in which all the citizens reported to have trusted the police in 2010, going from the minimum to the maximum average of Trust in the Neighbors in that year is associated with a 81.56% decrease in the percentage of citizens who engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 2011. In contrast, in municipalities in which all the citizens reported to Distrust the Police in 2010, going from the minimum to the maximum average of Trust in the Neighbors in 2010 is associated with a 31.84% **increase** in the percentage of citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 2011.

VI.A Robustness of Pseudo Panel Analysis Using a Diversity of Model Specifications.

Because percentages and proportions are bound from 0 to one there is no consensus about how to precisely model this type of variables. Although OLS tends to yield consistent estimates when the majority of the observations are in the middle of the distribution, these estimates may be biased in other circumstances. I re-specified the models in Table A5 using both, a Tobit model in which the dependent variable is assumed to be bounded from 0 to 100 and a Generalized Linear Model with a logit link function. As can be seen, the results are consistent with the ones found in Table A5.

Table A6. Robustness of lagged variable analysis using a diversity of model specifications

	(1) Anti-Crime % (0-100) Tobit	(2) Anti-Crime % (0-100) Tobit	(3) Anti-Crime proportion GLM	(4) Anti-Crime proportion GLM
$ECLE_{2010}$	45.79***	14.33**	2.951***	0.851**
	(6.843)	(7.298)	(0.364)	(0.427)
Trust in the $Neighbors_{2010}$	-107.1**	-104.4***	-10.42***	-9.075***
	(44.26)	(37.14)	(3.778)	(2.458)
Distrust in the $Police_{2010}$	-82.91**	-82.65**	-8.553**	-7.727***
	(40.19)	(33.48)	(3.481)	(2.312)
Trust in the Neighbors$_{t-1}$	122.8**	144.8***	12.83**	13.10***
x Distrust in the Police$_{t-1}$	(58.05)	(50.08)	(5.213)	(3.552)
Perception of Insecurity $_{t-1}$		-31.31**		-2.092**
		(13.35)		(1.053)
Trust in the Neighbors		46.22***		2.790***
		(15.30)		(0.954)
Distrust in the Police		24.74		1.678*
		(16.17)		(0.967)
Vehicle Accessory Thefts		31.46**		1.630**
		(14.66)		(0.820)
House Thefts		-5.114		-0.511
		(13.17)		(0.895)
Street Thefts		20.09**		1.529***
		(8.127)		(0.578)
Extortion		-4.586		-0.497
		(5.997)		(0.398)
Education		10.10		0.852
		(7.599)		(0.522)
Female		14.73***		1.008***
		(4.834)		(0.342)
Urban		-5.843		-0.680
		(9.038)		(0.687)
Home Insecurity		-1.805		-0.460
		(7.504)		(0.534)
Street Insecurity		-10.24**		-0.561*
		(4.741)		(0.338)
Transport Insecurity		-0.617		-0.0299
		(1.857)		(0.137)
ATM insecurity		7.130**		0.291
		(3.486)		(0.255)
Sigma	16.62***	13.03***		
	(0.830)	(0.561)		
Fixed Effects		32 States		32 States

Constant	74.40**	71.97***	4.209*	3.664**
	(31.01)	(26.56)	(2.549)	(1.839)
Observations	799	760	799	760

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

VI.b Robustness of Lagged Variable Analysis to Different Aggregation Levels and Different Functional Assumptions.

Are the results included in the chapter consistent with the results that would be obtained if only representative units were used? To address this question I conducted twelve different analyses. In the first six, I aggregated each variable at the municipal level in the municipalities that: a) Had more than 200 observations within them and b) Where surveyed in both 2010 and 2011. Using this data, I replicated model 1 in Table A5 (1-3) using OLS, a 0 to 100 bounded Tobit model and a Generalized Lineal Model assuming a binomial distribution and a logit link function. I then repeated the procedure for Model 2 in Table A4 (4-6). Finally, I replicated the previously mentioned procedure aggregating the variables at the state level. Results are presented in models (7-12). Although the coefficient of the multiplicative term **Trust in the Neighbors$_{t-1}$ x Distrust in the Police$_{t-1}$** is not significant in every specification, in every case is in the expected direction.

Table A7. Robustness of Lagged Variable Analysis Across Aggregation Levels and Model Types

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
LEVEL OF AGREGATION	+200 level Analyses						State Level Analyses					
DEPENDENT VARIABLE	% Anti-Crime	% Anti-Crime	Proportion Anti-Crime	% Anti-Crime	% Anti-Crime	Proportion Anti-Crime	% Anti-Crime	% Anti-Crime	Proportion Anti-Crime	% Anti-Crime	% Anti-Crime	Proportion Anti-Crime
SPECIFICATION	OLS	0-100 Tobit	GLM	OLS	0-100 Tobit	GLM	OLS	0-100 Tobit	GLM	OLS	0-100 Tobit	GLM
Anti Crime$_{2010}$	77.14***	77.62***	6.509***	65.49**	66.39***	8.525***	242.7***	244.2***	7.113***	197.9**	198.5***	5.620***
	(10.72)	(10.46)	(0.878)	(23.33)	(8.326)	(1.303)	(54.58)	(51.71)	(0.997)	(72.32)	(47.78)	(1.280)
Trust in the Neighbors$_{2010}$	-373.0***	-370.6***	-36.16***	-100.9	-46.51	-20.61	-1,807*	-1,841**	-57.19**	-1,048	-1,059	-35.13
	(118.5)	(114.6)	(12.25)	(279.5)	(119.3)	(14.77)	(886.9)	(864.5)	(27.11)	(1,165)	(767.9)	(38.44)
Distrust in the Police$_{2010}$	-324.8***	-323.0***	-31.22***	-129.1	-103.7	-26.45**	-1,643*	-1,673**	-51.65**	-1,074	-1,083	-34.81
	(108.0)	(104.3)	(11.12)	(223.5)	(89.37)	(11.18)	(803.3)	(781.7)	(24.06)	(1,040)	(685.1)	(34.83)
Trust in the Neighbors$_{t-1}$ x	497.1***	491.5***	47.90***	170.1	116.4	37.27*	2,483*	2,527**	78.01**	2,042	2,069*	66.79
Distrust in the Police$_{t-1}$	(79.10)	(76.38)	(17.68)	(356.9)	(146.6)	(19.37)	(1,212)	(1,177)	(37.25)	(1,690)	(1,119)	(55.63)
Perception of Insecurity $_{t-1}$				-1.909	-7.047	9.111**				-129.4	-133.1	-5.454**
				(42.07)	(16.03)	(3.924)				(149.3)	(100.7)	(2.702)
Trust in the Neighbors				36.69	52.88*	9.316**				-212.6**	-212.4***	-6.644***
				(66.99)	(26.47)	(4.535)				(87.25)	(56.73)	(2.370)
Distrust in the Police				114.0	124.9***	10.92**				424.0	414.4	16.83**
				(85.90)	(33.42)	(4.416)				(402.1)	(271.8)	(7.531)
Vehicle Accessory Thefts				120.1	130.5***	10.12***				442.2	447.1**	18.23***
				(70.61)	(25.77)	(3.284)				(258.2)	(173.2)	(5.621)
House Thefts				-11.28	3.761	0.942				99.24	94.79	4.337

				(62.06)	(30.24)	(4.465)				(212.1)	(142.4)	(4.543)
Street Thefts				-14.12	-26.71	-2.577				129.3	133.8	2.630
				(49.88)	(21.73)	(2.796)				(180.3)	(121.9)	(3.105)
Extortion				-18.77	-19.50	5.027				622.7*	630.3***	21.00***
				(50.72)	(19.05)	(4.104)				(299.5)	(203.3)	(5.099)
Education				-13.57	-26.24	-5.820*				-131.5	-131.4	-4.397
				(40.22)	(19.76)	(2.989)				(117.9)	(77.61)	(3.035)
Female				-4.544	6.632	-3.764				108.0	112.1	4.537**
				(35.23)	(16.43)	(2.610)				(100.0)	(69.54)	(2.022)
Urban				-55.23	-58.92***	-11.91***				-33.00	-36.67	-2.591
				(52.38)	(17.68)	(2.683)				(164.8)	(110.6)	(3.038)
Home Insecurity				13.85	8.236	-2.838*				-217.7	-222.8*	-5.835**
				(30.86)	(13.58)	(1.692)				(175.7)	(120.3)	(2.545)
Street Insecurity				-3.913	-1.433	2.575*				-240.7	-247.6*	-7.786***
				(43.25)	(16.48)	(1.318)				(175.5)	(121.9)	(2.581)
Transport Insecurity				4.045	0.667	-1.758				-2.262	-2.368	0.00577
				(26.64)	(10.33)	(1.279)				(69.00)	(45.59)	(1.332)
ATM insecurity				37.08	26.10	8.842***				121.4	125.1	3.525
				(33.42)	(15.46)	(3.212)				(157.4)	(106.4)	(2.897)
SIGMA		5.397***			1.278***			15.28***			10.57***	
		(0.674)			(0.115)			(3.937)			(2.408)	
Constant	244.8***	244.3***	20.27***	87.11	72.89	7.953	1,194*	1,217**	34.60**	359.9	363.9	9.305
	(163.4)	(158.3)	(7.815)	(185.3)	(73.06)	(9.075)	(586.3)	(572.5)	(17.56)	(732.7)	(481.0)	(22.78)
Observations	56	56	56	56	56	56	32	32	32	32	32	32
R-squared	0.579			0.975			0.436			0.730		

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

VI.c Lagged Variable Analysis as a Hierarchical Logistic-Regression Model (HLM): A Random Intercept Approach

To further test the robustness of the findings I specified a random intercept HLM in which the probabilities of participating in a Collective Anti-Criminal Action reported in 2011(1 and 3) and Hiring Private Security for a Public Space reported in 2011(2 and 4) were modeled as a function of individual variables, the Average Distrust in the Police in 2010, the Average Trust in the Neighbors in 2010 and their interaction. The expectation was to find a significant interaction between Average Distrust in the Police in 2010 and Average Trust in the Neighbors in 2010. [140]

Table A8. Determinants of Anti Criminal Actions and Hiring Private Security for a Public Space (HLM-Lagged Approach)

Second Level	Municipal		State	
VARIABLES	(1) Anti-Crime	(2) Neighborhood Private Security	(3) Anti-Crime	(4) Neighborhood Private Security
Trust in Neighbors	1.030***	0.441***	0.943***	0.387***
	(0.0493)	(0.111)	(0.0473)	(0.108)
Distrust in the Police	-0.160***	-0.132	-0.109**	-0.0650
	(0.0529)	(0.127)	(0.0506)	(0.123)
Household Crime Victimization	0.494***	0.685***	0.540***	0.773***
	(0.0315)	(0.0742)	(0.0303)	(0.0728)
Crime Perception City	0.0384	-0.170*	0.0506	-0.184*
	(0.0440)	(0.100)	(0.0426)	(0.0980)
Neighborhood Assaults	0.408***	0.320***	0.461***	0.379***
	(0.0315)	(0.0734)	(0.0302)	(0.0717)
Neighborhood Extortions	0.337***	0.298***	0.313***	0.265***
	(0.0374)	(0.0814)	(0.0361)	(0.0793)
Age	0.306***	0.751***	0.372***	0.880***
	(0.0792)	(0.187)	(0.0758)	(0.181)
Female	-0.00303	0.133**	-0.00660	0.135**
	(0.0291)	(0.0679)	(0.0282)	(0.0665)
Education	0.855***	2.586***	1.017***	2.909***
	(0.0671)	(0.166)	(0.0624)	(0.158)
Av. Trust in the Neighbors $_{2010}$	-7.810***	-11.85**	-53.76**	-30.32
	(2.598)	(5.900)	(26.96)	(31.90)
Av. Distrust in the Police $_{2010}$	-6.140**	-6.129	-47.59*	-23.61
	(2.407)	(5.177)	(24.85)	(29.30)
Av. Trust in the Neighbors $_{2010}$ x Av. Distrust in the Police $_{2010}$	**9.308****	**14.87***	**70.73***	**35.25**
	(3.721)	(8.271)	(37.78)	(44.64)
Variance (intercept)	1.188***	1.538***	0.345***	0.436***
	(0.105)	(0.2384)	(0.09)	(0.123)

[140] Where an average citizen is one in which individual level variables are accounted for.

Constant	0.919	-2.033	31.91*	13.16
	(1.724)	(3.761)	(17.84)	(21.07)
Observations	60,101	60,116	62,017	62,033
Number of groups	799	799	32	32

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Overall the results are again supportive of the central prediction of my interactive trust hypothesis. That is, the average Distrust in the Police (2010) positively moderates the effect of the average trust among neighbors (2010) on the averages' citizen likelihood of reporting having engaged in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions or having collaborated with neighbors to hire private security for a public place in 2011.

VI.d. Lagged Variable Analysis as a Hierarchical Logistic-Regression Model (HLM): A Random Slope Approach

Finally, I also tested the robustness of the results in Table A4 to taking a random slope approach. Overall, the general idea is to let the effect of a citizen's trust in his/her neighbors on the Dependent Variable ($\beta_{\text{Trust in the Neighbors[2011]}}$) vary randomly across second level units (municipality in 1, 2 and States 3, 4). Then, I interact $\beta_{\text{Trust in the Neighbors [2011]}}$ with the average Distrust in the Police in 2010. If the data is consistent with the interactive trust hypothesis we should expect the cross-level interaction effect **Trust in the Neighbors $_{2011}$ x Distrust in the Police $_{2010}$** to be positive and statistically significant.

Table A9. Determinants of Anti Criminal Actions and Hiring Private Security for a Public Space (HLM Random Slope Approach)

	Municipal		State	
VARIABLES	(1) Anti-Crime	(2) Neighborhood Private Security	(3) Anti-Crime	(4) Neighborhood Private Security
Trust in Neighbors	0.0208	-0.655	0.259	-0.109
	(0.498)	(1.238)	(0.840)	(1.781)
Distrust in the Police	-0.160***	-0.133	-0.108**	-0.0620
	(0.0530)	(0.127)	(0.0506)	(0.123)
Household Crime Victimization	0.494***	0.681***	0.540***	0.769***
	(0.0315)	(0.0744)	(0.0303)	(0.0729)
Crime Perception City	0.0391	-0.173*	0.0509	-0.187*
	(0.0440)	(0.101)	(0.0426)	(0.0981)
Neighborhood Assaults	0.410***	0.324***	0.459***	0.377***
	(0.0315)	(0.0735)	(0.0302)	(0.0718)
Neighborhood Extortions	0.338***	0.301***	0.314***	0.267***
	(0.0375)	(0.0815)	(0.0361)	(0.0793)
Age	0.308***	0.737***	0.375***	0.870***
	(0.0794)	(0.187)	(0.0759)	(0.181)
Female	-0.00353	0.131*	-0.00734	0.135**
	(0.0292)	(0.0680)	(0.0282)	(0.0665)
Education	0.857***	2.593***	1.016***	2.908***
	(0.0673)	(0.167)	(0.0624)	(0.158)
Distrust in the Police $_{2010}$	-0.521	2.854*	0.0828	2.115
	(0.738)	(1.527)	(2.098)	(2.765)
Trust in the Neighbors $_{2011}$ x Distrust in the Police $_{2010}$	**1.299***	**1.314**	**0.979**	**0.715**
	(0.737)	(1.741)	(1.254)	(2.629)
VAR (intercept)	1.128***	1.435**	.4033***	.476***
	(0.112)	(0.2477)	(0.109)	(0.1485)
VAR ($\beta_{\text{Trust in the Neighbors[2011]}}$)	.173	.3439**	.0611***	.199**
	(0.080)	(0.184)	(0.034)	(0.125)
Constant	-3.771***	-9.148***	-4.045***	-8.241***
	(0.500)	(1.088)	(1.393)	(1.858)
Observations	60,101	60,116	62,017	62,033
Number of groups	799	799	32	32

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Although the results are only statistically significant when the second level is the state (perhaps due to the low number of states), they are consistent with the interactive trust hypothesis in every case. That is, the average Distrust in the Police in 2010 seems to increase the positive association between an individuals' 2011 levels of Trust in his/her neighbors and the probability that he/she will engage in a Collective Anti-Criminal Action.

VII. Moderating Effect of Social Capital over Citizens' Distrust in the Police.

Figure A2. Moderating effect of Citizens' Trust in their Neighbors on the Effect of Distrust on the Police



Figure A3. Moderating effect of Citizens' Trust in their Neighbors on the Effect of Distrust on the Police



VIII. Interactive effect of Trust in the Neighbors and Distrust in the Police as Determinants of Citizens' Willingness to Turn to their Neighbors for Justice.

Table A10. Determinants of Citizens' Willingness to Turn to Their Neighbors as Sources Of Criminal Justice (VICZIZ14)

	(1)	(2)
Distrust in The Police	1.873***	2.455***
	(0.312)	(0.735)
Trust in the Neighbors	0.482	1.171
	(0.388)	(0.879)
Distrust in The Police x Trust in the Neighbors		-0.905
		(1.015)
Support for Vigilante Justice	0.944***	0.940***
	(0.282)	(0.281)
Insecurity	-0.210	-0.214
	(0.442)	(0.444)
Victimized by Crime	-0.0601	-0.0572
	(0.226)	(0.226)
Women	-0.124	-0.122
	(0.212)	(0.212)
Wealth	-0.183**	-0.183**
	(0.0814)	(0.0815)
Education	-0.232	-0.229
	(0.157)	(0.156)
Age	-0.00535	-0.00217
	(0.0692)	(0.0689)
Size Of Town	-0.0374	-0.0350
	(0.110)	(0.110)
Indigenous	0.479*	0.477*
	(0.258)	(0.259)
Constant	-3.239***	-3.716***
	(0.705)	(0.840)
Observations	1,264	1,264

Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses.
Region fixed effects included but not shown.
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV

I. Treatments

Key Manipulations

Distrust in the Police	
LOW	**HIGH**
(Nonetheless) **(For their part), the police** (rarely monitors the area) **(has intensified the monitoring of the area, and the chief of the police)** (and has done little) **(has said publically that they will show zero tolerance towards any criminal group) or** (nothing to solve the problem and, in general, they seem to have little interest in maintaining the control over) **(any) trespassers of the public order in the area....** **Given the** (lack of) **great unity existent in the community and the (increase in)** (little) **presence. What do you think the people affected by the problem should do?**	**(Nonetheless)** (For their part), **the police (rarely monitors the area)** (has intensified the monitoring of the area)**, and (the chief of the police) (and has done little)** (has said publically that they will show zero tolerance towards any criminal group) **or (nothing to solve the problem. In general, they seem to have little interest in maintaining the control over)** (any) **trespassers of the public order in the area....** **Given the** (lack of) **great unity existent in the community and the** (increase in) **(little) presence. What do you think the people affected by the problem should do?**

Trust in the Community	
LOW	**HIGH**
(In this context) (At the same time)**, some people who worry about the situation, have organized secret community meetings to face the problem. (However), things are (not) going** (fairly) **well (at all) due to the fact that these meetings have encountered** (great) **(little) resonance within the community and have exposed the great (division)** (unity) **existing in the town. (Only a handful of people)** (Hundreds of neighbors) **have come to the meetings and most of the assistants are (not) very enthusiastic about participating.** .... **Given the (lack of)** great **unity existent in the community and the (increase in)** (little) **presence. What do you think the people affected by the problem should do?**	(In this context) **(At the same time), some people who worry about the situation, have organized secret community meetings to face the problem.** (However), **Things are** (not) **going (fairly) well** (at all) **due to the fact that these meetings have encountered (great)** (little) **resonance within the community and have exposed the great** (division) **(unity) existing in the town.** (Only a handful of people) **(Hundreds of neighbors) have come to the meetings and most of the assistants are** (not) **very enthusiastic about participating.** .... **Given the** (lack of) **great unity existent in the community and the (increase in)** (little) **presence. What do you think the people affected by the problem should do?**

Actual Treatments (Spanish)

A. High Community, Low Distrust in The Police Treatment

Además de afectar directamente a la población, las recientes lluvias en el sur del país han expuesto problemas inesperados en muchas de las comunidades de la región. Uno de estos problemas se relaciona con la llegada de víveres a comunidades de Guerrero en donde el crimen organizado se encuentra activo.
Específicamente, el problema reside en que grupos criminales se han dado cuenta del gran valor económico que representan las toneladas de alimentos, agua y otras provisiones que han llegado a las comunidades, y han intentado hacerse del control de los mismos.
La población de Huamuxtitlán (Guerrero), por ejemplo, es una de las comunidades en las que grupos asociados al crimen organizado han logrado apoderarse de una buena parte de los víveres que han llegado a la comunidad desde el centro del país.
Las autoridades han manifestado que estos grupos no deben ser confrontados directamente o tomados a la ligera. No solo porque tomar la justicia por propia mano se encuentra fuera de la ley, sino porque muchos de estos grupos se encuentran bien armados y podrían llegar a tomar represalias contra la población civil.
Por su parte, la policía ha intensificado su vigilancia en esa población, y el jefe de zona ha señalado que mostrarán cero tolerancia con cualquier grupo criminal o violación al orden público en el área.
Al mismo tiempo, algunas personas preocupadas por el problema han convocado a reuniones comunitarias en secreto para enfrentar el problema. Las cosas van bastante bien, ya que estas reuniones han encontrado gran resonancia dentro de la comunidad, y han puesto de manifiesto la gran unidad que existe en la población. Cientos de vecinos ya han asistido a las juntas y participan en ellas activamente.
La gente preocupada por el problema en la comunidad se encuentra en un dilema. Por un lado, la salud de sus hijos y de su familia empeora día a día. Por el otro, están conscientes del peligro que representa el crimen organizado y la posibilidad de ser castigados por la ley.
Dada la gran unidad que existe en la comunidad y el aumento en la presencia de las autoridades, ¿qué cree que debería hacer la gente afectada por el problema?
Words. 363
Average reading time in minutes: 1.82 (0.05)

B. High Community, High Distrust in The Police Treatment (Spanish)

Además de afectar directamente a la población, las recientes lluvias en el sur del país han expuesto problemas inesperados en muchas de las comunidades de la región. Uno de estos problemas se relaciona con la llegada de víveres a comunidades de Guerrero en donde el crimen organizado se encuentra activo.
Específicamente, el problema reside en que grupos criminales se han dado cuenta del gran valor económico que representan las toneladas de alimentos, agua y otras provisiones que han llegado a las comunidades, y han intentado hacerse del control de los mismos.
La población de Huamuxtitlán (Guerrero), por ejemplo, es una de las comunidades en las que grupos asociados al crimen organizado han logrado apoderarse de una buena parte de los víveres que han llegado a la comunidad desde el centro del país.
Las autoridades han manifestado que estos grupos no deben ser confrontados directamente o tomados a la ligera. No solo porque tomar la justicia por propia mano se encuentra fuera de la ley,

sino porque muchos de estos grupos se encuentran bien armados y podrían llegar a tomar represalias contra la población civil.

Sin embargo, la policía vigila muy poco la zona, y ha hecho poco o nada para solucionar el problema, y en general parece tener muy poco interés en mantener el control sobre el orden público. Al mismo tiempo, algunas personas preocupadas por el problema han convocado a reuniones comunitarias en secreto para enfrentar el problema. Las cosas van bastante bien, ya que estas reuniones han encontrado gran resonancia dentro de la comunidad, y han puesto de manifiesto la gran unidad que existe en la población. Cientos de vecinos ya han asistido a las juntas y participan en ellas activamente.
La gente preocupada por el problema en la comunidad se encuentra en un dilema. Por un lado, la salud de sus hijos y de su familia empeora día a día. Por el otro, están conscientes del peligro que representa el crimen organizado y la posibilidad de ser castigados por la ley.
Dada la gran unidad que existe en la comunidad y la poca presencia de las autoridades, ¿qué cree que debería hacer la gente afectada por el problema?
(361 words)
Average reading time in minutes: 1.96 (0.07)

C. Low Community, Low Distrust in The Police Treatment (Spanish)

Además de afectar directamente a la población, las recientes lluvias en el sur del país han expuesto problemas inesperados en muchas de las comunidades de la región. Uno de estos problemas se relaciona con la llegada de víveres a comunidades de Guerrero en donde el crimen organizado se encuentra activo.
Específicamente, el problema reside en que grupos criminales se han dado cuenta del gran valor económico que representan las toneladas de alimentos, agua y otras provisiones que han llegado a las comunidades, y han intentado hacerse del control de los mismos.
La población de Huamuxtitlán (Guerrero), por ejemplo, es una de las comunidades en las que grupos asociados al crimen organizado han logrado apoderarse de una buena parte de los víveres que han llegado a la comunidad desde el centro del país.
Las autoridades han manifestado que estos grupos no deben ser confrontados directamente o tomados a la ligera. No solo porque tomar la justicia por propia mano se encuentra fuera de la ley, sino porque muchos de estos grupos se encuentran bien armados y podrían llegar a tomar represalias contra la población civil.
Por su parte, la policía ha intensificado su vigilancia en esa población, y el jefe de zona ha señalado que mostrarán cero tolerancia con cualquier grupo criminal o violación al orden público en el área.
En este contexto, algunas personas preocupadas por el problema han convocado a reuniones comunitarias en secreto para enfrentar el problema. Sin embargo, las cosas no van nada bien, ya que estas reuniones han encontrado poca resonancia dentro de la comunidad, y han puesto de manifiesto la gran división que existe en la población. Solo un puñado de personas ha asistido a las juntas vecinales y no participan muy activamente.
La gente preocupada por el problema en la comunidad se encuentra en un dilema. Por un lado, la salud de sus hijos y de su familia empeora día a día. Por el otro, están conscientes del peligro que representa el crimen organizado y la posibilidad de ser castigados por la ley.
Dada la poca unidad que existe en la comunidad y el aumento en la presencia de las autoridades, ¿qué cree que debería hacer la gente afectada por el problema?
Words: 368

Average reading time in minutes: 1.77(0.06)

D. Low Community, High Distrust in The Police Treatment (Spanish)

Además de afectar directamente a la población, las recientes lluvias en el sur del país han expuesto problemas inesperados en muchas de las comunidades de la región. Uno de estos problemas se relaciona con la llegada de víveres a comunidades de Guerrero en donde el crimen organizado se encuentra activo.
Específicamente, el problema reside en que grupos criminales se han dado cuenta del gran valor económico que representan las toneladas de alimentos, agua y otras provisiones que han llegado a las comunidades, y han intentado hacerse del control de los mismos.
La población de Huamuxtitlán (Guerrero), por ejemplo, es una de las comunidades en las que grupos asociados al crimen organizado han logrado apoderarse de una buena parte de los víveres que han llegado a la comunidad desde el centro del país.
Las autoridades han manifestado que estos grupos no deben ser confrontados directamente o tomados a la ligera. No solo porque tomar la justicia por propia mano se encuentra fuera de la ley, sino porque muchos de estos grupos se encuentran bien armados y podrían llegar a tomar represalias contra la población civil.
Sin embargo, la policía vigila muy poco la zona, y ha hecho poco o nada para solucionar el problema, y en general parece tener muy poco interés en mantener el control sobre el orden público.
En este contexto, algunas personas preocupadas por el problema han convocado a reuniones comunitarias en secreto para enfrentar el problema. Sin embargo, las cosas no van nada bien, ya que estas reuniones han encontrado poca resonancia dentro de la comunidad, y han puesto de manifiesto la gran división que existe en la población. Solo un puñado de personas ha asistido a las juntas vecinales y no participan muy activamente.
La gente preocupada por el problema en la comunidad se encuentra en un dilema. Por un lado, la salud de sus hijos y de su familia empeora día a día. Por el otro, están conscientes del peligro que representa el crimen organizado y la posibilidad de ser castigados por la ley.
Dada la poca unidad que existe en la comunidad y la poca presencia de las autoridades, ¿qué cree que debería hacer la gente afectada por el problema?
Words: 366
Average reading time in minutes: 1.83 (0.06)

II. Unbalances with Respect to the General Population and the Interactive Trust Effect

The experimental sample was not designed to be nationally representative and therefore, the treatment effects cannot be fully extrapolated to the general Mexican population. That said, the pre-treatment questionnaire allowed me to identify some key aspects in which the sample differs from the overall Mexican population. Particularly, the sample seems to have bias in gender composition, authoritarian personality, preference for strong leaders, perceptions of corruption, crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity. Although it is impossible to find the population treatment effect with this information, it is possible to use the within-sample variation in these variables to get a rough sense of how conservative or liberal the treatments I found are.

To do this, I first created a triple interaction between the two treatments and the biasing variables

$$Vigilante = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Police\ Trust + \beta_2 Community\ Trust + \beta_3 Community\ Trust\ x\ \boldsymbol{Biasing\ Variable} + \beta_4\ Police\ Distrust\ x\ \boldsymbol{Biasing\ Variable} + \beta_5 Community\ Trust\ x\ Police\ Distrust\ x\ \boldsymbol{Biasing\ Variable} + e$$

where the direction of the rough direction and significance of the bias of the biasing variable on the interactive coefficient of interest is indicated by β_5. I ran this triple interaction model for each of the variables for which there seemed to be an imbalance between AmericasBaromenter's sample and the sample I collected (see Figure 1). Only sex, perceptions of corruption and preference for child discipline showed a moderating effect significant to a level of significance lower than 0.2.

Treatment Effects as Moderated by Unbalanced Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Trust in the Community	0.0774 (0.369)	-1.547** (0.695)	0.323 (0.425)	0.214 (0.223)	0.393* (0.215)	0.193 (0.235)	0.404* (0.214)	0.338* (0.192)
Distrust in the Police	-0.618* (0.362)	-1.031 (0.702)	0.240 (0.417)	-0.113 (0.225)	-0.1000 (0.214)	0.0537 (0.227)	-0.000305 (0.209)	0.129 (0.194)
Trust in the Community x Distrust in the Police	1.176** (0.524)	1.578 (0.981)	-0.0697 (0.580)	0.489 (0.325)	0.506* (0.306)	0.409 (0.329)	0.173 (0.301)	0.121 (0.273)
Female	-0.577** (0.286)							
Trust in the Community x female	0.233 (0.417)							
Distrust in the Police x female	0.748* (0.411)							
Trust in the Community x Distrust in the Police x female	**-0.993*** **(0.592)**							
Corruption		-0.0165*** (0.00590)						
Trust in the Community x Corruption		0.0212*** (0.00777)						
Distrust in the Police x Corruption		0.0121 (0.00785)						
Trust in the Community x Distrust in the Police x Corruption		**-0.0147** **(0.0110)**						
Insecurity			-0.00215 (0.00536)					
Trust in the Community x Insecurity			-0.000510 (0.00721)					
Distrust in the Police			-0.00341 (0.00688)					
Trust in the Community x Distrust in the Police x Insecurity			0.00642 (0.00954)					
Crime Victimization				-0.135 (0.273)				
Trust in the Community x Crime Victimization				0.248 (0.378)				

Distrust in the Police x Crime Victimization				0.449 (0.381)				
Trust in the Community x Distrust in the Police x Crime Victimization				-0.569 (0.531)				
Iron Fist					0.436 (0.289)			
Trust in the Community x Iron Fist					-0.435 (0.390)			
Distrust in the Police x Iron Fist					0.371 (0.396)			
Trust in the Community x Distrust in the Police x Iron Fist					-0.551 (0.549)			
Pro-Respect						-0.291 (0.269)		
Trust in the Community x Pro-Respect						0.311 (0.370)		
Distrust in the Police x Pro-Respect						0.0331 (0.376)		
Trust in the Community x Distrust in the Police x Pro-Respect						-0.401 (0.527)		
Pro-Obedience							-0.0949 (0.292)	
Trust in the Community x Pro-Obedience							-0.297 (0.398)	
Distrust in the Police x Pro-Obedience							0.200 (0.416)	
Trust in the Community x Distrust in the Police x Pro-Obedience							0.300 (0.575)	
Pro-Discipline								0.0849 (0.393)
Trust in the Community x Pro-Discipline								-0.305 (0.547)
Distrust in the Police x Pro-Discipline								-0.542 (0.534)
Trust in the Community x Distrust in the Police x Pro-Discipline								**1.266** **(0.781)**
Constant	2.964*** (0.251)	3.923*** (0.535)	2.580*** (0.317)	2.507*** (0.154)	2.350*** (0.147)	2.562*** (0.156)	2.488*** (0.147)	2.454*** (0.135)
Observations	475	434	434	434	431	434	434	434
R-squared	0.056	0.055	0.039	0.038	0.060	0.043	0.040	0.042

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure A1. Gender and The Interactive Trust Effect.

○ = Male, ● =Female

The figure on the left shows the marginal treatment effect across trust in the police conditions. Overall, figure A1 (on the right) shows that my conditional hypothesis seemed to be validated more strongly among male than among female. To the extent that my experimental sample is heavily female-biased, it seems that the interactive treatment effect presented in Table 4 is a conservative estimate of the effect that could be found in a more balanced sample.

Figure A2. Perceptions of Corruption and the Interactive Trust Effect.



○ = Corruption at AmericasBarometer levels (76.5)
● = Perceptions of Corruption at sample levels (85.8)

Once more, the figure on the left shows the marginal treatment effect across trust in the police conditions. For its part Figure A2 (on the right) shows that my conditional hypothesis seems to be validated more strongly among those who have lower perceptions of corruption. This second piece of evidence also supports the idea that the interactive effect shown in Table 4 is a conservative estimate. As the gray line shows the model estimates that the moderating effect would be larger if the sample had similar levels of perception of corruption as the ones displayed in the 2010 AmericasBarometer.

Figure A3 Anti-Authoritarian Personality and The Interactive Trust Effect.



Finally, the participants in my sample were more in favor of Creativity than Discipline in child upbringing than the general population found by the AmericasBarometer sample. Since Figure A3 (on the right) shows that the interaction between treatments was stronger among those who answered that discipline was preferable to creativity in child upbringing, there are reasons to think that my estimates are conservative. Once more, the figure on the left shows the marginal treatment effect across trust in the police conditions.

All in all, most of the pre-treatment variables do not seem to moderate the interactive coefficient in Table 4. However, each and every one of the three variables:

a) Indicate that my sample is biased with respect to the AmericasBarometer's sample and

b) Moderate the interaction among treatments (however slightly)

This suggests that the estimate of the interaction between trust in the community and trust in the neighbors is but an underestimation of what could be found on an unbiased random sample of the population.

III. Pre-Treatment Questionnaire

SEX. Sex
- ❍ Male - Female

AGE. Age in Years
- ❍ 18-99

INCOME. Family income in my home, including remittances and income from all adults and children who work:
- ❍ Less than $2,000 (1)
- ❍ Between $2,001 and $3,499 (2)
- ❍ Between $3,500 and $4,999 (3)
- ❍ Between $5,000 and $6,499 (4)
- ❍ Between $6,500 and $7,999 (5)
- ❍ Between $8,000 and $9,499 (6)
- ❍ Between $9,500 and $11,999 (7)
- ❍ Between $12,000 and $14,999 (8)
- ❍ Between $15,000 and $19,999 (9)
- ❍ Between $20,000 and $44,999 (10)
- ❍ $45,000 or more (11)

HIGH In which system did you study high school?
- ❍ CCH (1)
- ❍ UNAM High school (2)
- ❍ Public High school (other) (3)
- ❍ Private High school (4)
- ❍ Other (5) ____________________

ED ¿In which semester of college are you?
- ❍ 0 (1) -11 (27)

AREA In which area of psychology are you most interested in?
- ❍ Social Psychology (1)
- ❍ Educational Psychology (2)
- ❍ Clinical Psychology (3)
- ❍ Neuropsychology (4)
- ❍ Organizational Psychology (5)
- ❍ Other (6) ____________________

STATE. In what state of the country do you live?

MUNI. In which delegation or municipality do you live?

AOJ11. Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you lives and thinking about the possibility of being victim of a robbery or assault, do you feel:

- Very insecure (1)
- Somewhat insecure (2)
- Somewhat secure (3)
- Very secure (4)

VICTOT. Have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

AGE. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months?

- 0-99

EXC7 The corruption of the public officials of the country is

- No generalized (1)-Very generalized (4)

AUT. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think?

- We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (1)
- Electoral democracy is the best (2)

Aut1. For a child, what is most important?

- Independence (1)
- Respect of his/her elders (2)

Aut2. For a child, what is most important?

- Obedience (1)
- Self-sufficiency (to be able to fend for him/herself) (2)

Aut3. For a child, what is most important?

- Creativity (1)
- Discipline (2)

Leftright. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

❍ left 0 (1)-- right 10 (11)

PER1. I am a sociable and active person.
❍ In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)

PER2. I am a cynic and contentious person
❍ In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)

PER3. I am a trustworthy and disciplined person.
❍ In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)

PER4. I am an anxious and easily annoyed person.
❍ In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)

PER5. I am a person open to new experiences and intellectual.
❍ In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)

PER6. I am a quiet and timid person.
❍ In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)

PER7. I am a generous and caring person.
❍ In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)

PER8. I am a disorganized and careless person.
❍ In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)

PER9. I am a calm and emotionally stable person.
❍ In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)

PER10. I am an uncreative person and with little imagination.
❍ In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)

C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V

I. Analytic Results

After receiving a proposal of the amount of income to be taken by the thief in my game, participants must make a choice. It is possible to derive expectations about the behavior of the participants across the different experimental conditions by assuming that they are rational maximizers of the income that they expect to preserve at the end of the turn.

To begin, let Δ represent expected proportion of income preserved if a participant decides to confront a thief $(\varphi \mid A)$ and the proportion of income he would expect to preserve if he decided not to confront a thief $(\varphi|A^c)$, and ranges from -1 to +1.

$$E(\Delta) = E(\varphi|A) - E(\varphi|A^c)$$

Where the expected proportion of income preserved φ conditional to confronting or not confronting is given by:

$$E(\varphi|A, A^c) = \sum_{k=1}^{6} \Pr(R_k) * (\varphi \mid R_k)$$

Where $(\varphi \mid R_k)$ represents the proportion of income preserved associated with each of the six potential results,[141] and $\Pr(R_k)$ represents the probability of the kth potential result to occur. From *Bayes Theorem*, note that the probability of occurrence of the kth potential result is given by:

$$\Pr(R_k) = \{\| \{[\Pr(R_k|A|W|E) * \Pr(E)] + [\Pr(R_k|A|W|E^c) * \Pr(E^c)]\} * \Pr(W) \| + \| \{[\Pr(R_k|A|W^c|E) * \Pr(E)] + [\Pr(R_k|A|W^c|E^c) * \Pr(E^c)]\} * \Pr(W^c) \| * \Pr(A)\} + \{[\Pr(R_k|A^c|E) * \Pr(E)] + [\Pr(R_k|A^c|E^c) * \Pr(E^c)]\} * \Pr(A^c)\}.$$

Where R_k is the kth potential result, A is the probability of confronting a thief (or "Attack"), E is the probability of the enforcer to enter the game, and *W* is the probability of wining. W, then, is given by:

$$\Pr(W) = 1 - \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{10} k^{\sum_{j=1}^{4} \Pr(N_j)}}{10^{\llbracket \sum_{j=1}^{4} \Pr(N_j) \rrbracket + 1}}$$

Where $Pr(N_j)$ represents the probability of the jth neighbor to enter the game.
From these formulas, I calculated the change in the expected differential of preserved income (Δ) at different levels of the variables experimentally manipulated. If one assumes that the probability of choosing to confront a thief θ is a logistic function of Δ, then it is possible to generate expectations about the probability of confronting a thief at different levels of the variables of interest.

---

[141] 1) losing a confrontation with the take –authority (1%); 2) having 80% of income taken by the take authority (20%); 3) having 50% of income taken by the take authority (50%); 4) having 20% of income taken by the take authority (80%); 5) wining a confrontation but being fined (30%); 6) wining a confrontation and not being fined 100%.

$$E(\theta) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-k[E(\Delta) - \Delta_0]}}$$

Here, I assume that participants are indifferent to attacking when $E(\varphi|A) = E(\varphi|A^c)$ and thus, that the probability of confronting is 0.5. Therefore I fixed the point of indifference Δ_0 to 0. Additionally, I assume that when Δ reaches 1 and -1, θ reaches 0.99 and 0.01 respectively. Therefore, I fixed the constant k at 5. The resulting function can be seen in Figure A1.

Figure A1. Probability of Observing a Confrontation (θ) at different levels of Utility Differentials Δ



A2 and A3 show the results from manipulating the enforcer's probability to enter the game and the proportion of trustworthy neighbors surrounding the participant. Figure A4, shows the results from manipulating the proportion of income taken by the thief. A5 Show the results from manipulating the expected probability that the surrounding neighbors will enter the game at different levels of probability that the enforcer will intervene.

Figures A2-A5. Changes in the Expected Probability of Observing a Confrontation (θ) at Different Levels of The Experimental Variables



II. Information Treatments

After making a choice two different possibilities open to the respondent. If **the participant** decided **not to confront**, in the **fourth stage (a.4)**, the participant threw a ten sided die to determine if **the police** would enter the game.[142] If **the police** entered the game the participant recovered the tokens stolen by the thief and that iteration of the game ended.

If the **participant** decided **to confront** after the third stage then, in the **fourth stage (b.4),** she threw a ten sided die for each of the **neighbors** in order to decide whether they would enter the game.[143] Then, in the **fifth stage (b.5)** the participant threw a ten sided die for each player in the game to decide the outcome of the confrontation. If the number in the **thief die** was surpassed by **the participant's die or the die of one of the neighbors**, **the participant** recovered the tokens stolen by the thief and continued to the next stage. If this was not the case, she lost 99% of her tokens and that iteration of the game ended.[144]

In the **sixth stage (b.6)** the **participant** threw a ten sided die to determine if **the police** would enter the game. If **the police** entered the game, the **participant** lost 70% of her tokens. If **the police** did not enter, the participant remained unpunished. [145] After this stage the iteration ended and losses were applied.

See diagram on the next page...

[142] When the image at the beginning said that the police had a probability to enter the game of 0.2, they entered the game if the die landed on 9 or 10. When the probability was 0.5 the police entered the game if the die landed on 6 or more. When the probability was 0.8 the police entered the game if the die landed on 3 or more.

[143] Blue (**trustworthy**) neighbors entered the game if the die landed in any number except 1. Grey (**untrustworthy**) neighbors entered the game only if the die landed on a 10.

[144] I made the cost of losing against the take authority 99% because I wanted to punish the participants as harshly as I could without having any participant leave the laboratory without compensation. I did suspend the game if the participant lost a confrontation since this would severely hurt the external validity of the experiment. Specifically, it would increase the proportion of observations coming from surviving participants making the treatment effect generalizable only to "surviving players".

[145] I included this fine in order to model the potential legal risks associated with engaging in vigilantism. I fixed the sanction to 70% for three reasons. First, this was done to acknowledge that the legal sanctions for vigilantism (e.g. fines or jail) are likely to be less expensive than the potential consequences of losing a confrontation against crime (e.g. physical injury of death). Second, I did not fixed this sanction any lower because participants did not seem to be strongly deterred by sanctions in pilots. Finally, I kept it below 80% so that I could have conditions in which the severity of the crime was higher than the expected sanction.

Figure A6. Incentives Faced by the Participant in the Extralegal-Confrontation Game



☐ Choice Event, ○Random event decided by one 10 sided die, ~ Negation

III. Sample Characteristics

III.I. Demographics

Table A1. Sample Descriptive Characteristics

	N	Mean/Proportion	SD
Female	150	52.67%	
Income	149	6.637584	2.684326
Age	150	30.54667	12.3019
Crime Victim	150	37.31%	
Trust in the Police	149	2.053691	0.77795
Trust in the Neighbors	147	3.013605	0.682325
Confronted	2,996	34.73%	
Insecurity	150	3.04	0.954537

Figure A7. Sample Demographic Characteristics



III.II. Winnings

Figure A8. Distribution of Winnings in the Experiment



Table A2. Winnings in the Experiment

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Winnings (Mexican Pesos)	150	73.173	68.74618	0.5	323.5

IV. Pre-Game Questionnaire

1. Sex
- ❍ Male - Female

2. Age in Years
- ❍ 18-99

3. Family income in my home, including remittances and income from all adults and children who work:
- ❍ Menos de $2,000 (1)
- ❍ Entre $2,001 y $3,499 (2)
- ❍ Entre $3,500 y $4,999 (3)
- ❍ Entre $5,000 y $6,499 (4)
- ❍ Entre $6,500 y $7,999 (5)
- ❍ Entre $8,000 y $9,499 (6)
- ❍ Entre $9,500 y $11,999 (7)
- ❍ Entre $12,000 y $14,999 (8)
- ❍ Entre $15,000 y $19,999 (9)
- ❍ Entre $20,000 y $44,999 (10)
- ❍ $45,000 o más (11)

4. In what state of the country do you live?

5. In which delegation or municipality do you live?

6. Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live and thinking about the possibility of being victim of a robbery or assault, do you feel:
- ❍ Very insecure (1)
- ❍ Somewhat insecure (2)
- ❍ Somewhat secure (3)
- ❍ Very secure (4)

Now, we would like to ask you about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life....

7. Have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

8. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months?

- 0-99

9. Tell me the degree of confidence that you have in the Police.

- A lot (1)
- Some (2)
- Little (3)
- None (4)

10. Tell me the degree of confidence that you have in your neighbors.

- A lot (1)…None (4)

11. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?

- Strongly disapprove (0) - Strongly Approve (10)

12. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?

- Strongly disapprove (0) - Strongly Approve (10)

13. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?

- Strongly disapprove (0) - Strongly Approve (10)

14. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?

- Strongly disapprove (0) - Strongly Approve (10)

15. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?

- It's not justified (0) - Its justified (10)

For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation. Provide a rating from *Extremely Unlikely* to *Extremely Likely*

16. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend.

- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)
- ❍ Moderately Likely (2)
- ❍ Somewhat Likely (3)
- ❍ Not Sure (4)
- ❍ Somewhat Unlikely (5)
- ❍ Moderately Unlikely (6)
- ❍ Extremely Unlikely (7)

17. Going camping in the wilderness
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

18. Betting a day's income at the horse races.
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

19. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F/I)
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

20. Drinking heavily at a social function.
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

21. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return.
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

22. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue.
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

23. Betting a day's income at a high-stake poker game.
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

24. Having an affair with a married man/woman.
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

25. Passing off somebody else's work as your own.
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

26. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability.
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

27. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.
- ❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

28. Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

29. Betting a day's income on the outcome of a sporting event.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

30. Engaging in unprotected sex.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

31. Revealing a friend's secret to someone else.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

32. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

33. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

34. Taking a skydiving class.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

35. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

36. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

37. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

38. Sunbathing without sunscreen.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

39. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

40. Piloting a small plane.
❍ Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

41. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town

- Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

42. Moving to a city far away from your extended family.
- Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

43. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties
- Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

44. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand.
- Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

45. Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200
- Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)

46. ¿How much is 9/27 + 1/3?
- 2/3
- 10/30
- 21/27
- 27/9
- 7/8

47. ¿How much is 80% x 50%?
- 400%
- 40%
- 130%
- 60%
- 20%

48. ¿How much is 30% out of 200?
- 30
- 60
- 50
- 40
- 70

V. Round Distribution

Figure A9. Round Distribution



Table A3. Distribution of Rounds Across Treatment Conditions

		Distrust in the Police			Total
		Low (0.2)	Med (0.5)	High (0.8)	
Trust in the Neighbors	High (1)	332 (11.08%)	366 (12.22%)	325 (10.85%)	1,023 (34.15%)
	Med (0.25)	348 (11.62%)	337 (11.25%)	337 (11.25%)	1,022 (34.11%)
	Low (0)	299 (9.98%)	341 (11.38%)	311 (10.38%)	951 (31.74%)
Total		979 (32.68%)	1,044 (34.85%)	973 (32.48%)	2,996 (100%)

Table A4. Distribution of Rounds Across Crime Severity Treatment conditions	
	N
High (80%)	983 (32.81%)
Medium (50%)	981 (32.74%)
Low (20%)	1,032 (34.45%)
Total	2,996 (100%)

VI. Effects of Neighbors' Trustworthiness Over Police Untrustworthiness Conditions

Table A5. Effects of Neighbors' Trustworthiness Over Police Untrustworthiness Conditions

	Proportion of Trustworthy Neighbors	Pr. Confront	Standard Error	Change
High Police Untrustworthiness (0.8)	High (1)	0.88	0.01	$\Delta(\beta_{NT})$: 0.455 (0.023)*** $\Delta(Pr_{CONFRONT})$: 0.459
	Mid (0.25)	0.56	0.01	
	Low (0)	0.42	0.02	
Medium Enforcer Untrustworthiness (0.5)	High (1)	0.56	0.02	$\Delta(\beta_{NT})$: 0.368 (0.0144)*** $\Delta(Pr_{CONFRONT})$: 0.413
	Mid (0.25)	0.23	0.01	
	Low (0)	0.15	0.01	
Low Enforcer Untrustworthiness (0.2)	High (1)	0.19	0.02	$\Delta(\beta_{NT})$: 0.146 (0.017)*** $\Delta(Pr_{CONFRONT})$: 0.154
	Mid (0.25)	0.05	0.01	
	Low (0)	0.03	0.01	

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