

ESSAYS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

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Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the  
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
in  
Management

December, 2005

Nashville, Tennessee

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To my parents and my wife for their unconditional love and support

## AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I extend my gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee, who contributed a great deal to the improvement of my dissertation. I especially thank Prof. Ronald Masulis, my advisor, and Prof. Hans Stoll for spending countless hours reading many drafts of my dissertation over the past three years.

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