WE ARE HERE TO HELP! HOW THIRD PARTY MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IMPACT CIVIL

CONFLICT AT THE SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL, EVIDENCE FROM AFGHANISTAN

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DEDICATION

For those who served and the familes who served with them.

"All gave some...some gave all"

Howard William Osterkamp

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Theory

Introduction

The shura room was quaint but functional. Chairs were neatly arranged in a circle with chi and cakes provided for all to enjoy. This was the tenth such meeting between the tribal leaders of Gayan District, Afghanistan and the local American commander. The Afghans, old and weathered, came for the refreshments and to solicit money for infrastructure projects or repayment for recent damages caused by military operations. The Americans wanted information. Information that would lead to the detention of any number of local enemy fighters. They wanted anything that would be, in the words of the military "actionable." By the time the meeting ended, the Afghans left full of food and the Americans devoid of human intelligence. Before the final goodbye, the commander pulled the senior elder aside and asked why they would not share information. The elder replied that he could not. He said he would be visited by the Taliban that evening and asked about everything discussed at the shura. They would attach "night letters" to his door threatening his life. If they found out that he shared information, he would certainly be killed as others had already been. The Americans, members of a country powerful enough to send human beings to the moon and back, could not convince this frail Afghan septuagenarian to tell them where the bad guys were. They had military might and an internationally recognized legal status for operating there in support of the Afghan government. However, they did not control the territory.

Third party interventions in civil conflicts often have unintended consequences. When intervening in support of their own strategic objectives and in support of one side of the conflict, achieving the desired tactical outcomes proves difficult. Often, such interventions result in less stable governments or the repression of disadvantaged groups. Other times, they result in political and military dependency of the biased side of a conflict. Nearly always, they produce outcomes unexpected by the intervener or by the combatants themselves. The source of these unexpected outcomes can often be attributed at the micro-level of the intervention and the tactical decisions by third party troops themselves. For much of the last seven decades, much of the civil conflict literature examines such interventions from the country level of analysis. It is only

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recently that the data-rich conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan have given us a glimpse into civil conflict at a sub-national level. Largely absent from the literature, however, is an exploration of the mechanisms by which third parties affect territorial control and violence at such a level.

Control of territory is essential to the successful prosecution of military operations. In civil wars, this control is not possible without the cooperation of the population, (Galula (1964)). While military force is a necessary component for the control of territory, as agents of some other entity (such as a political movement or government), military activity indicates to a population what its principal's intentions are and the subsquent degree to which the population will consent to being ruled. The military occupation of terrain combined with a subsequent imposition of martial law demonstrates to residents that a new power is in charge while raids that terrorize the same village in search of spoils but quickly depart suggest little interest in long term control over a particular area. Cooperation is, thus, much more likely in the former than the latter situation with a corresponding increase in a combatant's ability to target its adversary.

Combatants in civil conflicts compete for territorial control at a micro-level; province by province, district by district, village by village. How combatants maneuver their forces and where they exercise their rule demonstrates what what they seek to control. However, third parties enter such conflicts with their own interests and agendas. If they intervene biased to one side, outside observers typically conclude that the supported side simply has more resources with which to fight. Indeed, such is the assumption in much of the civil conflict literature (Regan (2002), Peksen (2012), Wood, Kathman and Gent (2012)). Of course, this is not entirely untrue and the literature is filled with examples of how the supported side benefits from such third party aid. Yet, third parties see the conflict through their own eyes and do not take orders from the side they support; but, rather, prosecute the war in the way that serves their own interests. As such, where they deploy their forces, the type of forces they deploy, and the rules by which they fight are independent of the decisions the supported side makes on their own. It is this disunity, however small, between the supported and the supporter that can have unintended consequences at the sub-national level and affect war outcomes. This is especially true in the post-colonial period where third parties do not seek direct conquest of territory, but rather indirect influence.

Others may argue that third party involvement in civil conflicts allows the supported actor to shirk their responsibilities for fighting the war leaving the third party to do the heavy lifting (Lawson (2022)). Such

a conclusion is understandable, but misplaced. While military force may be necessary for the control of territory in civil conflicts, it is insufficient by itself. What is required is a connection between the population and an administrative apparatus that claims sovereignty over the territory. Such an apparatus exercises non-military control, extracts taxes, resolves internal disputes, establishes the rules, and performs other governing functions. While it needs the security that military force provides, this governing function is essential. In many civil wars, these two functions–security and governance–are performed by militant groups themselves with the military force exercising martial law. Third party intervention, while helpful in providing security, does not typically seek to govern territory. Instead of connecting the population to the supported side, they often make such a gap wider. Administrative control must be exercised through one of the primary belligerents in the conflict that is making a claim of absolute sovereignty. Doing so requires that side to be present and assume the associated risks of conflict.

While a third party may have superior military capability, if its use magnifies weakness in the supported side or indicates a temporary commitment, civilians will react accordingly. A third party that identifies a particular district as important physical terrain to control, for instance, and deploys its forces accordingly, may be the same district that the supported side has no interest in exercising direct sovereignty over. Using Kalyvas' collaboration-control model as a foundation, we would predict that such misaligned efforts between the supported side and the third party leads to undesirable results manifested as: increased selective violence against the third party or the supported side and greater isolation of the civilian population. This theory will argue that biased military interventions can have asymmetric impacts on the control of territory and a corresponding impact on violence; helping in some instances and hindering in others. By understanding the conditions by which these impacts are beneficial and detrimental, our understanding of the nature of civil conflict is increased. It is important to understand that the effect third parties have impact the civilian perception of the side that the third parties support. While there are undoubtedly tactical consequences for the opposite-side, this does not necessarily mean that it weakens the opposite-side's ability to exert territorial control. Such an understanding may help explain why some scholars have found that third party interventions increase the length of conflict or make a negotiated settlement more difficult, while others find that it hastens a military victory. In essence, the strategies that third party interveners employ are optimal for serving their own interests, while a successful war outcome is measured by the primary combatants themselves.

From this foundation, I pose the following research question:

Why does third party military intervention on behalf of an incumbent government reduce indiscriminate violence and produce selective violence, as Kalyvas expects, in some areas and not others?

Answering this question begins with an analysis of the literature addressing the collaboration-control model, third party interventions, and state formation.

Literature Review

The Collaboration-Control Model

In his theory of civil wars, Kalyvas identifies the existence of five separate territorial "zones." As explained above, these zones range from total incumbent control to total rebel control. In the middle zone, physical terrain is contested between two actors where neither side has control. In this zone (zone 3), civilians will be dissuaded from sharing information with one side for fear of being "counter-denounced" by someone choosing to share information with the other side. In such areas, either combatant would be devoid of actionable information and "selective" violence would be low (Kalyvas (2006), 13). While either side may choose to apply violence indiscriminately, they do so at the risk of such action being counterproductive.

In areas of either full incumbent control (zone 1) or full rebel control (zone 5), Kalyvas observes low levels of selective violence, because it is not necessary as consolidation is complete. The remaining zones (zones 2 and 4) represent near total control by either the incumbents or rebels respectively. In these zones, control is not fully consolidated, but there is clear dominance by one side. Since consolidation is worth fighting for, the combatants seek information from the civilian population who are now more willing to share it because the fear of counter-denunciation is low (Kalyvas (2006), 195). Civilians make a calculated decision to denounce in order to preserve their own survival as subjects of their new sovereigns. The side not in control has no access to this information. As such, the only violent option available to them is to attack indiscriminately.

While many scholars have extended Kalyvas' work, they typically give greater emphasis to the information-sharing dynamic that he addresses and not the insight he brings to the importance of territorial control. From

scholarship addressing the "collaboration" aspect of the "control-collaboration" model we find that civilian populations respond favorably to public good provisions (Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011)), punish for civilian causalities inflicted (Condra and Shapiro (2012), Shaver and Shapiro (2021)), or share with fellow co-ethnics (Lyall, Shiraito and Imai (2015)). While this helps our understanding of the various motivations civilians have in sharing information, each of these studies leaves out the importance of control over territory. We do not know, for example if providing goods amounts to simply paying insurgents not to fight, or how long civilians punish combatants for civilian casualties. Such an omission eliminates from the analysis the credibly coercive means armed actors have to compel the civilian populations to share information.

Scholarship that address the "control-collaboration" model more holistically, finds mixed results for the baseline model. For example, in an analysis of violence in 1996 Barrancabermeja, Colombia, Vargas finds solid support for the model with respect to incumbent acts of violence, but that, contrary to expectations, insurgents were found to employ selective violence in zones that they did not control (Vargas (2009)). Likewise, Bhavnani et al. find that the different levels of military power between the Israeli and the Palestinian military played a role in the Israeli Army's ability to selectively target in areas of Palestinian control (Bhavnani, Miodownik and Choi (2011)). Metelits demonstrates how the model fails to account for multiple armed actors in a given territory (Metelits (2010)), while Ziemke shows how victimization increases when control is lost (Ziemke (2008)). These studies led Kalyvas to revise the baseline model to relax some assumptions including that valuable information may only be obtained through civilian denunciations and that local conflict is only dyadic (Kalyvas (2012)). I expect these revisions to be particularly important in this project. Still, most significantly, this literature largely fails to address the role third parties play in civil wars.

Third Party Interventions

Given the destructive and geopolitical implications that arise from civil wars, it is unsurprising that other actors in the international community often intervene. Whether for humanitarian reasons (Lounsbery and Pearson (2019)) or for national interests (Aydin (2012)), third parties significantly increase the complexity of the conflict. Recent scholarship has identified that such interventions may prolong wars (Regan (2002)), result in higher amounts of human rights violations (Peksen (2012)), or even have beneficial effects (Roberts (1993)). Sullivan and Karreth show how biased intervention increases the likelihood for victory for the

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supported side if they lack conventional war-fighting capability (Sullivan and Karreth (2015)). Evidence also exists that interventions decrease the time necessary for the supported side to achieve a decisive victory while increase the time needed for a negotiated settlement (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008)). However, the existing literature presumes third party interventions do not change the binary nature of the conflict. Third party help is often seen as simply adding military capability to one side or the other, or in the case of humanitarian interventions, perhaps remains neutral. Lee breaks from this paradigm and illustrates how third parties strategically intervene in a targeted state's internal conflict in an effort to advance interests unaligned with either belligerent (Lee (2018)).

Another perspective is offered by Berman and Lake who examine third party interventions from a principal-agent perspective (Berman and Lake (2019)). In so doing they describe the difficulties principals have in getting agents to do their bidding and attribute this to a mis-alignment of interests. Using a case-study approach, they show how principals can tailor rewards and punishments to encourage their agents to respond favorably and the conditions by which they are more or less successful. As with Kalyvas' work on the collaboration-control model, Berman and Lake's insight on third party interventions is an important foundational component of my research in that I, also, do not assume the third party and the supported side share precisely the same interests. However, and importantly, my work differs in examining the consequences of misaligned preferences at the sub-national level, where Berman and Lake stay at the country-level.

Given my interest concerns civilian victimization within civil wars, I must also examine scholarship addressing the effect third party interventions have on violence against civilians. Wood et al. find that by shifting the military capability of armed actors, third parties increase the incidents of civilian victimization (Wood, Kathman and Gent (2012)). Grant and Kaussler find support for this in their detailed analysis of the Battle of Aleppo (Grant and Kaussler (2020)). Given how suicide attacks often involve significant civilian casualties, Choi and Piazza show that large, pro-government interventions are associated with increased suicide attacks (Choi and Piazza (2017)), while Hass and Ansorg find evidence that the presence of UN Peacekeepers from high-quality militaries had pacifying effects (Haass and Ansorg (2018)). While this literature gives us insight into how third party interventions impact civil conflict, the impact they have on local control of territory remains largely unexplored in the field.

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More broadly, we might also consider the circumstances where combatants resort to intentional violence against civilians. The utility in attacking civilians is seen as a strategic decision by conflict actors. Wood and Kathman show how rebels resort to violence against civilians to improve their bargaining position (Wood and Kathman (2014)) while Balcells stresses the importance of political positioning where combatants attack civilians in areas that are controlled by their opponents (Balcells (2011)). Wood, Kathman, and Gent show how the changes in territorial control incentivizes the targeting of civilians (Wood, Kathman and Gent (2012)). These studies are consistent with Kalyvas in that their observations occur when neither side has established control.

Thus, we can see robust discussion in the literature of both the extension of Kalyvas' "control-collaboration" model to other conflicts and differing environments. Likewise, we understand more how third parties can impact civil conflict at the macro level. Since territorial control is an essential component of Kalyvas' model, a review of the state formation literature is also helpful.

State Formation and Civil Conflict

Before examining the impact third party interventions have on civil conflict, one must consider the barriers to state consolidation. Consolidation increases territorial control towards Kalyvas' zones 1 or 5 and a corresponding reduction in violence. Thus, understanding how states consolidate is of critical importance. We learn from Tilly that European states consolidated their state security apparatus in response to territorial conflict with neighboring states (Tilly (1992)). Herbst notes the challenges of state control in Africa due to the difficult geography (Herbst (2014)). Melissa Lee identifies how hostile neighbors use their influence to prevent a targeted state's consolidation (Lee (2018)). However, perhaps most useful for this project is the view articulated by North, Wallis, and Weingast.

In their book, *Violence and Social Orders*, North, Wallis, and Weingast articulate how "natural orders" evolve and govern themselves (North, Wallis and Weingast (2012)). Given a competition for resources and rents from subjects, they assume that violence is a natural aspect of society. From this reality, a "specialist in violence" emerges who extracts rents in exchange for protection. The coalitions that form from this are illustrative of the internal dynamics of much of the developing world, particularly Afghanistan (Barfield (2010)). Given the fragile nature of these coalitions and their personal nature, they are very prone to shocks

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and a reemergence of violence. So, while a particular territory may be under the complete control of a rebel force (Zone 5), an exogenous shock in the form of another military force contesting the space disrupts the existing social order and naturally leads to violent acts as the old alliances and patronage networks are upended.

However, when that outside military force makes no claim of sovereignty over the terrain, such in the case of a third party intervention, it cannot credibly establish a new governing coalition. This necessitates an *effective* incumbent administrator to step in to fill that role. In recent interventions by the United States, not claiming sovereignty was a self-imposed restriction. After territory was cleared by US Forces, they made no attempt at (and were, in fact, prohibited from) establishing any state-like authority. Efforts to bring in a so-called "government-in-a-box" from incumbent government leaders mostly failed due to either incompetence or the lack of the coercive enforcement mechanism required by the supported side (Jackson (2014)). It is likely these actions signaled to the civilian population that the US Forces or government authorities had no intention of staying for the time necessary for the incumbent side to consolidate control and, thus, never really controlled the recently cleared territory.

Now that this reserch question is set in the context of the wider literature, we can begin to examine more closely how third parties are employed in civil wars. This requires us to understand the doctrines by which third parties intervene in these conflicts and what that means for the tactical employment of their forces. No better is this articulated than in the US Army's counterinsurgency doctrine published in 2006 which was directly influenced by the civil wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A Third Party View of Counterinsurgency

The great Prussian war theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, considers war to be "an act of force (or threat of force) to compel an enemy to do our will" (Clausewitz (1989)). While often distilled into the bumper-sticker phrase of war being "politics by other means," understanding war as an activity, rooted in violence that *compels* an adversary to act in a way the aggressor wants is powerful in application. Formed in the Napoleonic period, Clausewitz was speaking principally of inter-state war. The "enemy" he discussed was the rival army and the "acts of force" were to be inflicted on that enemy formation, his equipment, his supply lines, or key terrain. In intra-state war, all these targets still apply, with one significant addition–the civilian population.

Galula instructs that "the battle for the population is a major characteristic" of civil wars. In civil war, each side is attempting to compel the civil population to perceive them as the sovereign (Galula (1964), 6). This is accomplished through control of territory, and the battle Galula speaks of is much more complicated than the popular campaign for "hearts and minds."

Modern examples of third party military interventions in civil conflicts are prevelant. While most are small in scale and limited in scope, others are large with open-ended committments. The best examples of this latter type are the recent civil wars in Iraq and Afghainstan where large international coalitions, led by the United States, intervened on behalf of nacent governments they themselves created. The stated goal of the coalitions in both cases was to support the "legitimate" government and increase it's self sufficiency in governing its territory. Third party troops were viewed as necessary pieces of this puzzle where security and order would be maintained until the time when indiginous security forces and elected leaders could take over. However, with the growth of ISIS after the coalition withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and the collapse of the Afghainstan government prior to the full withdrawal of international troops in 2021, neither government proved to be self-sufficient. So what went wrong? The answer requires a deeper examination of how the third parties approached their counterinsurgency effort.

The United States Army was the lead international military force in both Iraq and Afghanistan. For the entirety of the missions in both countries, the international military coalition was led by a US general officer from either the US Army or Marine Corps. As such, an examination of US Army counterinsurgency doctrine is useful to understand how these forces were deployed and what they were designed to accomplish. First published in 2006, *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency* was widely acclaimed and read with many in political, academic, and military circles praising its content. It was also the first Army doctrinal publictation ever reviewed by the *New York Times* (Journal (2007)). The manual stressed the importance of warfare in and among the people and its influence on US Military thought in the early 21st century cannot be overstated.

Field Manual 3-24's principal authors were General David Petraus, who would go on to command US Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as lead the US Central Command and the CIA, and General James Mattis of the US Marine Corps who would lead Marines in Iraq, succeed Petraus as commander of Central Command, and later become Secretary of Defense. From 2007 through the next decade, officers at all levels were taught how to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan based on the principles outlined in FM 3-24. Declaring

allegiance to it was required for advancement and command selection. It influenced the development and procurement of weapon systems and military equipment ranging from the reintroduction of longer-range small arms weapons like the M-14 to lightly armed close air support aircraft such as the A-29. Additionally, drones, satellite communications, and mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs), were also born or expanded during this time. Even new uniform camoflauge patterns were adopted in an effort to be more useful in urban operations where the people lived.

Declaring counterinsurgency (COIN) as the "graduate level of war" (Army (2009), 1-1) FM 3-24 identified counterinsurgency warfare as something beyond offensive and defensive operations. To be sure, lethal operations would be required, but the manual instructs that "political power is the central issue" in counterinsurgencies where "each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate" and "taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule"(Army (2009), 1-1). Accordingly, FM 3-24 advised some significant changes in tactics from other contempory field manuals that were more focused on the destruction of enemy military forces. Now, the primary objectives of counterinsurgent forces would be to protect the population, increase the legitimacy of the government, and connect the government to the people. These objectives would be pursued not only through the traditional tools of war, but by the "balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means" (Army (2009), 1-21). To integrate these military and non-military means, the manual recommends commanders adopt logical lines of operation.

Logical lines of operation (LLOs) help commanders "visualize, describe, and direct operations when positional reference to enemy forces has little relevance" (Army (2009), 5-3). As the below figure depicts, these lines of operation consider several initiatives, both military and non-miliary, that counterinsurgent troops execute with the stated goal of increasing popular support for the government. Thus, one might expect third party troops to be tasked to oversee the construction of a well (part of the "essential services" LLO) on one day, provide security for the construction or repair of a road (part of the "economic development" LLO) the next day, and kill or capture an insurgent cell leader the following night as part of the "combat operations" LLO. The manual also provides instruction as to how and where this is to be accomplished using the paradigm of clear-hold-build.

Figure I.1: Example Logical Lines of Operations for Counterinsurgency, (Army (2009), 5-3)

A clear-hold-build operation has the following objectives: "1. Create a secure physical and psychological environment 2. Establish firm government control of the populace and area 3. Gain the populace's support." The idea is for counterinsurgency efforts to begin by controlling "key areas." From there, "security and influence then spread out" with the pattern being "to clear, hold, and build one village, area, or city–and then reinforce success by expanding to other areas" (Army (2009), 5-18). It is under this paradigm that third party forces were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout both countries, commanders were assigned "areas of operation" within which they were expected to execute counterinsurgency operations by clearing, holding, and building. However, applying this methodology as an intervener in a civil conflict as opposed to a primary belligerent, can fail to achieve the desired outcomes. At the root of this failure is the disunity, described above, between the intervening party and the side they are supporting.

It is here where the application of this doctrine, which is logical in theory, becomes problematic in practice. Third parties and the side they support are independent actors. The incentives the third party has regarding the deployment of its forces center on limited aims and eventual redeployment. Conversely, the supported side must consider not only its immediate security needs, but also what it is able to sustain in the absence of third party support. This leads to some fundamental questions regarding the employment of

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a counterinsurgency strategy: Is it the third party or the supported government that determines what areas are "key"? Can the government "hold" areas if they are not present? Are the third party forces adequate substitutes for the lack of government control? How does this effect the populace's support? And, finally, what does this mean for the state of the war itself? As we will see, for these answers, we must consider how territorial control is perceived by population.

Territorial Control in Civil Wars

As recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and elsewhere demonstrate, either principal side in a civil war can compel civilians to submit to their rule. Through coercion or incentive, such control leads to the imposition of sovereignty over the population when accompanied by a credible administrative apparatus. Once control is established, the population becomes critical to either side's ability to successfully prosecute the war, principally because both sides are uncertain about the other's capability, location, movements, or intentions, and civilians often possess information that can provide answers. Since control of terrain depends on the civilan population's cooperation, either side of a civil war has an incentive to punish those who either do not submit to their will or aided the opposition so long as they have the necessary information and capability. At times, this may be accomplished through non-lethal means such as arrest, prolonged detention, economic exclusion, taxation, or intimidation. However, often, this turns to violence.

Kalyvas observes that the level of violence in a geographic area varies based on the level of control one side has over the other within that geographic area. The mechanism that drives this is self-interest. Individuals within a civilian population are likely to denounce their neighbors to the side that has control over them so long as their neighbor is unable to counter-denounce them to the opposite side. To this end, Kalyvas identifies five "zones" of control ranging from complete incumbent control to complete rebel control, and tests his model using data from the Greek Civil War. His findings are consistent with his theory that individuals will share information with the side that has control over their geographic area irrespective of pre-war preferences (Kalyvas (2006)). Thus, the greater control one side has the greater the amount of selective violence against the other side up to the point of total control where violence subsides.

However, what are the impacts to violence when the conflict is joined by a third party military force? Kalyvas' model assumes a binary conflict. If a third party intervened in a civil war on behalf of the incum-

bent, would we expect that areas patrolled by third party forces would have the same observable outcomes as indigenous-sourced Government security? Indeed, the United States' experience in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates that it is exceedingly challenging to selectively target insurgents even in areas that have substantial US troop presence. Despite the US's obvious military capability, obtaining valuable intelligence from the population is difficult. Additionally, third parties are more of an independent actor in such an environment. While they recognize the importance of the human intelligence the local population can provide, they have their own agendas and their own understanding of the threat. In the language of FM 3-24, third parties may end up clearing areas the supported side cannot or will not hold. Similarly, while any information third parties obtain may be shared with the side that they are supporting, it may not be used the same way, or the supported side may lack the capability to do anything about it.

Additionally, to what extent and under what conditions would we expect locals to share information with an external military force? Does the presence of a third party military force actually undermine the government because they are a visible reminder of its inability to provide security and governance themselves? To answer such questions, the collaboration-control model would expect that third party military presence is beneficial and additive to the military capability of the supported side in areas that the supported side is perceived as the sovereign at the time of the intervention, but not in areas where sovereignty is disputed. Opposite-side initiated selective violence decreases in the former and increases in the latter. To examine this, one must separate the relationship of the third party from the supported side so as not to assume them to have aligned preferences (Berman and Lake (2019)). As such, third parties are not to be viewed as simply proxies for the side they are supporting. Rather, they are their own entity, allied with, but distinct from, the side they are supporting. To my knowledge, no such application of Kalyvas' collaboration-control model has yet been applied to third party interventions in this way.

Proposition Third parties who intervene on behalf of the government, but do not have governing agency from the state or where state control in a given territory is weak, will not establish the control over territory required to facilitate information-sharing as expected by the collaboration-control model.

That third parties intervene in civil wars in pursuit of their own interests is unsurprising. The French came

to America's aid during the Revolution primarily to weaken arch-rival Britain, and Lee shows how neighboring third parties seek to manipulate intra-state discord in pursuit of their own objectives (Lee (2018)). However, little is understood on how such forces are actually employed. I contend that third party military forces, through their deployment and tactics, signal the likelihood that they will stay for the duration of the conflict or magnify the strength or weakness of the supported side. But how do locals come to such a conclusion as to the duration of third party involvement?

First is the issue of third party resolve. If locals determine that the third party lacks resolve to see the conflict to the conclusion, the opportunity for counter-denunciation remains high upon the third party's withdrawal. As such, they will not provide the third party or the supported side the information required to selectively target the opposite side. Instead, civilians will share information with the opposing side who stands to regain power in the future. In such instances we should observe an increase in the opposite side's selective attacks or a greater use of indiscriminate violence by the third party or the supported side. The increase in selective attacks against third party forces is explained by the fact that third party forces are present in areas where they have not been before by pursuing the "clear-hold-build" strategy as outlined in FM 3-24. As such, they create targets that did not previously exist.

One way this resolve is signaled to the population, is by the extent to which the third party is willing to assume risks to themselves. While all armies attempt to minimize their own casualties, this is always done in proportion to which they believe the mission's objectives are worth fighting (and dying) for. The greater the personal risk assumed, the greater the signal to the population that the third party is committed to victory as long as it may take. This signal to stay increases dennunciation to the third party or supported side which, in turn, leads to an increase in selective targeting by the third party and supported side and decrease of selective attacks by the opposite side.

In his analysis of Long An province during the Vietnam War, Rice attributes some of the US failures due to the way in which US Forces were deployed. He quotes an American adviser, "In general, the employment of forces over here...has been to put them in such places as to provide the forces some protection, but not to provide protection to the people in the hamlets" (Rice (1972), 231). Rice's emphasis on the tendency to protect oneself is significant. It sent the message that US Forces (and their Vietnamese allies) in Long An were not willing to assume personal risk in the conflict and were, thus, not really committed to defeating

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the insurgency. Protecting the population has long been considered an important part of a counterinsurgency campaign and while the existing literature has identified a relationship between civilian casualties and wartime informing (Condra and Shapiro (2012)), there has been little appreciation for how the tactical employment of military forces signals its resolve to the same population. Protecting the people is important not only because combatants want to win their support, but because to protect them, troops must be physically present and in harm's way. Presence outside of a fixed base creates vulnerability especially if such presence is maintained over time. Yet, despite its risks, such presence signals a commitment to stay, builds trust, and facilitates information sharing. The failure to do so in Long An and despite a large increase of US Forces between 1965 and 1968, contributed to the South Vietnamese government "still occupy[ing] a decisively minority position" (Rice (1972), 215) after years of effort.

However, the US Army in Iraq learned this lesson with the adoption of the "surge" strategy in 2007. In November 2006, a US Military assessment concluded that Iraqi citizens who believed that the coalition was leaving were "less likely to engage and pass on information" (Rayburn and Sobchak (2019), 637). The surge was not simply the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops, but a reversal of how all troops were to be employed. It was a change in tactics that employed the principles outlined in the recently published Field Manual 3-24. The significance of this cannot be overstated. No longer sheltered on large "Forward Operating Bases" (FOBs), the troops were instead deployed into small neighborhood-level "Joint Security Stations" (JSS) that were focused on protecting the population directly (Knowlton (2010)). Although such a change in the tactical employment of these additional forces assumed much higher risk, the US-led coalition were no longer viewed as distant occupiers, but as essential providers of security in local communities, something that was clearly on the mind of senior American military leaders. As US General David Petraus said in reflection, "winning the support of the people required creating a *lasting presence* and demonstrating to the Iraqi people that coalition and Iraqi security forces would not abandon them" (Knowlton (2010), 9) [emphasis added]. As a consequence, insurgent-initiated selective violence plummeted.

Second, third parties also magnify the relative strength (or weakness) of the supported side. Additional military capacity in the form of a third party multiplies the relative effect of the supported side's capability in controlling territory. By reinforcing security, sharing intelligence, and providing financial resources, third parties strengthen the effectiveness of the supported side when a baseline capability exists and the

population perceives them as sovereign. Principly, this is accomplished during the "hold" and "build" steps of the "clear-hold-build" strategy. However, if the supported side has no ability to hold a given territory, then third party capability reinforces the supported side's inadequacy. Because third parties make no claim of sovereignty themselves, a supported side's inability to provide basic necessities is amplified in the third party's interaction with the population. Such a situation leads to an increase in opposite-side initiated violence compared to areas where third party troops are deployed and support for the supported side is strong. Complaints to third parties about intermittent power or lack of water access, for example, cannot be directed to a competent authority that can actually do something about it.

This problem is confounded when the third parties are not empowered with policing duties. Lower level crimes such as petty theft and vandalism go unpunished demonstrating to locals that the government is corrupt or inept. In such situations, locals share information with the opposite side who they conclude will prevail in the end, and we observe selective violence increase against the third party or their ally. As such, third parties, are only beneficial if the supported side has some credible claim to sovereignty and an existing capability to exercise that sovereignty. Otherwise, in areas where the supported side lacks sovereignty, third parties risk being viewed as unwelcome "occupiers" and ripe targets for locals to inform the opposite side against them.

Hypothesis 1

Areas that contain third party military presence will be associated with a reduction of rebel-initiated selective violence if government control is stronger compared to where government control is weaker.

Hypothesis 2

Areas where third party occupiers are the primary counter-insurgent force, and government control is weaker, will be associated with greater rebel-initiated selective violence than areas that contain third party troops and where government control is strong.

The importance of governance to control of territory became clear early in the Iraq War. Lamenting that in 2005 "the people had no way of penetrating the bureaucracy" Multinational Forces-Iraq Commander,

General George Casey, recalled the limits of what his coalition of over 120,000 troops could do (Rayburn and Sobchak (2019), 465). While killing or capturing insurgent leaders and training the Iraqi security forces clearly had important roles in the prosecution of the war, such efforts were for naught if the government was not connected to its constituents. As a result, selective violence against US Forces was extremely high and US Forces often resorted to less selective means of attacking insurgents as evidenced in the Battle for Fallujah that resulted in "60 of the town's 200 mosques and 20 percent of its residences" destroyed (Rayburn and Sobchak (2019), 355).

Casey, of course, was viewing this problem at the country level. Iraqis as a whole had been isolated from their government due to its incompetence and corruption. However, Tal Afar in far northwestern Iraq, was one bright spot at this time that demonstrated how third parties aided competent local leadership that led to a dramatic reduction in violence. Upon his deployment with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) in 2005, COL H.R. McMaster quickly realized that the situation in Tal Afar was dire. Insurgents controlled the city which served as a way point for foreign fighters pouring into Iraq from Syria. Sectarian violence combined with lack of essential services were seen as key drivers of instability. McMaster, a contributer to FM 3-24, quickly realized that fixing these problems would require solutions beyond the capability of his 3,000 soldier force. He found a partner in Najim Abed Jabouri who had recently been appointed as Tal Afar Police Chief. Jabouri proved an "able local diplomat" who "brokered cease-fires" between competing groups (Rayburn and Sobchak (2019), 450) and was widely viewed as a competent local leader who would later become Tal Afar's mayor.

Following a massive clearing operation that resulted in the killing or capturing of over 700 insurgents, "within a week...Tal Afar's electricity was restored, its schools reopened, and new construction had started" (Rayburn and Sobchak (2019), 452). Such a successful effort demonstrates how a competent government presence is bolstered by the resources that a third party can provide. Third parties must maintain such efforts, however, until the supported side is able to stand on its own. Indeed, the gains made in Tal Afar in 2005 were quickly lost after the 3rd ACR redeployed and its replacement unit failed to maintain the balance between clearing, holding, and building.

Hypothesis 3

Areas where third party military forces are absent, and government control is strong, will be associated with less rebel-initiated selective violence in comparison to areas where third party military forces are absent and government control is weak.

Hypothesis 4

Areas where third party military forces are absent, and government control is absent, will be associated with less rebel-initiated violence compared to areas that contain third party military forces and government control is absent.

Third parties also deploy to civil conflicts ignorant of the micro-level cultural and political dynamics in the areas they are sent to. This lack of knowledge can also affect the information-sharing dynamic between the population and the third party. While tactics that inflict civilian casualties are already associated with lower levels of information sharing (Condra and Shapiro (2012)) other, seemingly benign, decisions by third parties can also have unintended consequences. Third parties often wish to earn the trust of the population through the least amount of violence possible. Often this is done through the application of aid. However, the political dynamics of the communities in which the aid is applied matter as to how that aid is perceived. If the third party decides to dig a well, for example, on the land of a certain family group, other families may feel excluded and rise in opposition to the third party by turning to the opposite side. Likewise, aid distributed to local subcontractors can enrich some at the expense of others. Recent scholarship supports the idea that the distribution of aid can be exclusionary and lead to an increase in violence (Karell and Schutte (2018)). Here, again, we see how the absence of a local authority with claims of soverigenty leads third parties to make decisions that can lead to less control.

Hypothesis 5

Areas that are controlled by the government and contain third party military presence will be associated with rebel violence that is more directed towards civilians in comparison to areas that are controlled by rebels and contain third party military presence.

Hypothesis 6

Areas under weak government control that contain third party military presence will be associated with rebel violence directed towards security forces in comparison to areas controlled by the government that contain military presence.

From this brief discussion, we can see how perceptions of the civilian population change with the introduction of a third party. Rather than simply additive capability to the supportive side, as much of the literature suggests, third parties change the perceptions of civilians in unexpected ways and these perceptions have a direct impact on how the information-sharing dynamic of Kalyvas' collaboration-control model occurs. By signaling their own resolve, civilians perceive the supportive side as likely to win out eventually, and by aiding a competent local authority the strength of that side is perceived as higher than it would be alone. In both situations, information-sharing with the supported side increases with the observable outcomes being increased selective violence by the supported side and decreased selective violence by the opposite side. This effect is symmetrical. When third parties signal a lack of resolve or when they are deployed where no competent authority exists, selective violence by the supported side decreases and increases by the non-supported side.

Fragmented Control

Fragmented control of state territory is a defining characteristic of intra-state war. To illustrate, open source maps of the Iraq-Islamic State war often show demarcated areas that are under the control of one side or the other (Figure 2). Indeed, in a specific example, Mosul was under control of the Islamic state in 2016 and the Iraqi Government had neither the military capacity nor the resources available to exert control over the country's second largest city. In such areas, rebel forces establish "shadow governments" and exert state-like authority over the conquered land.

Figure I.2: ISIS Control in Iraq and Syria, December 2016

Civilian populations in these areas are in unique and challenging positions. While the Iraqi government might have been the legal sovereign of Mosul as identified by the international community, they had no actual authority locally. Here it is important not to confuse sovereignty with preferences. While Mosul residents may perceive the Islamic State as illegitimate, their military presence and administrative governance made them de-facto sovereigns; something the population had no choice but to acknowledge and accept. While residents may wish to share information with their preferred government authorities, their absence made doing so impossible and were, thus, compelled to share with the rebels as a matter of survival. As Kalyvas notes, "...control–regardless of the 'true' preferences of the population–precludes options other than collaboration by creating credible benefits for collaborators and, more importantly, sanctions for defectors" (Kalyvas (2006), 145).

Often, this collaboration has little to do with fear of the military force directly, but, rather, a fear that others would use the new occupying power as a means for revenge. So, they rat out their neighbors not to aid the new power, per se, but as a means to settle past grievances. Consequently, having replaced the

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government, rebels begin to extract from the population to pay for protection they themselves threaten and, in so doing, begin to form their own state-like institutions (Tilly (1985)).

Defending in Depth

In practice, a third party will deploy its military forces to areas that it believes will serve its interests. Ideally, in line with counterinsurgency doctrine, this would aid in connecting the population with its government. Yet, in areas that are under the total or near total control of rebels (zones 4 or 5), such a shock to the existing order cannot be pacified until security *and governance* are established by the incumbent side. When a third party fails to govern and when an incumbent government is incapable in doing so, the territory either remains under defacto rebel control or is, at best, contested (zone 3). Either way, collaboration with the incumbent side fails to occur.

This raises the question as to why third parties would deploy their forces in ways that would result in these negative micro-level outcomes. After all, such occasions seem contrary to FM 3-24's stressing the importance of the incumbent government controlling or "holding" the territory that had been cleared. The answer lies with an understanding on how military forces defend territory and the importance of defending the supported side's ability to govern combined with a third-party centric view of the conflict. US Army doctrine establishes the need for counter-insurgents to defend the government's ability to "conduct its basic functions" and considers that a failure to do so can cause an "insurgency [to] delegitimize the government" (Army (2009) 6-31). Commanders at all levels seek to do this within their areas of operations usually using a technique called a "defense in depth" (Army (2015), 7-6). Such a defense offers the greatest flexibility to commanders by providing "more reaction time for the defending force to appropriately respond to the attack" (Army (2019), 7-7).

In a defense in depth, military forces are placed in mutually supporting positions covering key terrain and likely enemy avenues of approach. Outside of the main battle area lies a security area where commanders conduct reconnaissance and attempt to identify enemy locations. However, forces may not exist in sufficient numbers to effectively defend every critical location at all times. As such, decisions are made on where to prioritize and where to assume risks.

Given the importance of governance to counterinsurgency operations, commanders prioritize the seats

of government when developing their defensive plans. It is in these critical areas where combat power is deployed first, in line with FM 3-24. Subordinate forces are then deployed to surrounding districts, therefore, not principally to connect the population in those districts to the government, but rather as the outer security area of the more important capital city. Since lower level commanders in these areas are restricted to operating within a defined area of operation, they are not always able to see the effect they have on the defense of a capital city and pursue counterinsurgency tactics with a district or village-centered view. Any lack of local governance from the supported side makes the critically important task of connecting the population to the government all the more difficult and increases the likelihood that the third-party counter-insurgents will be denounced to the other side.

Thus, if control of territory requires the physical presence of a governing authority *and* the presence of security forces, in the outer bands of the defensive belts only the security forces exist. So, third parties deployed to these areas do not really control them. Rather, they are simply the first line of defense of a larger defensive plan. With the absence of government control, they are not able to connect the civilian population with their government because their government simply does not exist or is too weak to function. Their purpose then becomes to keep the fighting as much as possible away from the critical centers of governance which are primarily contained in the capital cities at the province level or above.

Returning to Iraq, we can see how US forces were deployed in just this way. Faced with a deteriorating security situation in Baghdad in 2006, Major General John Thurman, who was responsible for Baghdad, placed four of the seven combat brigades under his command in Baghdad proper. The remaining three brigades "occupied territory in the northern and southern 'belts' just outside the city" (Rayburn and Sobchak (2019), 628). When one of the brigades in the city was slated to redeploy without replacement, a brigade was sent from the northern city of Mosul to fill the gap. When the surge forces arrived in 2007, they were quickly deployed to help secure Baghdad.

A major operation called Phantom Thunder soon commenced that attacked rebels in the outer defensive belts surrounding capitol in order to "stop the accelerants that flowed into Baghdad" (Godfroy et al. (2019), 196). Thus, while counter-insurgent tactics of connecting the people to their government still applied in these "belts," the forces deployed there were primarily used as a supporting effort to better protect the national government in Baghdad and connect it to the country as a whole. In essence, commanders find it

preferable to fight an adversary on the periphery rather than close to its center of gravity. Figures 3 depicts the disposition of US forces in and around Baghdad demonstrating commitment to fighting away from the city.

Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

(a) Early 2007 (Pre-Surge) (Godfroy et al. (2019), 63)

Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

(b) June 2007 (Post-Surge) (Godfroy et al. (2019), 205)

Figure I.3: Disposition of US Forces in Vicinity of Baghdad

Theoretical Foundations

Kalyvas articulates circumstances whereby civilians share information with combatants. In his model, Kalyvas argues that selective violence will increase as either side of a conflict consolidates control over territory. His measure of control includes not only military proximity to a civilian population, but their activity level and the behavior of non-combatant administrators (Kalyvas (2006), 421). The latter component is of greatest interest as Kalyvas' articulation of the collaboration-control model assumes that the military and civilian administrators are under the same state authority.

When military force is deployed, it is done so at the direction a government that is seeking control of the territory to which it is deployed. Third party interventions, where an outside party provides direct military

capability but political authority is retained by the host nation, may lead to a lesser perception of sovereignty in the eyes of a civilian population. In such circumstances, the third party is deployed at the direction of its government and not the government that it is supporting. Third party forces may operate along side or "in partnership with" incumbent military and government leaders, but they are not operating at their direction. As such, military force, especially when provided by a third party, is unlikely to be sufficient in facilitating the collaboration Kalyvas would otherwise expect. Instead, third parties may act as an unwelcome exogenous shock to an otherwise stable system increasing violence because they never establish the control that Kalyvas says is necessary.

Contributing Factors

Third parties fail to contribute to the consolidation of control through the following factors:

1. Strategies for prosecuting the war between the government and the third party are not aligned

Here, the third party assumes that the incumbent government desires the same tactical outcome as the third party. However, as Barfield notes, Afghans have been extremely tolerant of a fractured society where the government does not control all territory (Barfield (2010)). Noting this "swiss cheese" image, US Forces never fully understood what the Afghan government thought was worth controlling, and, thus, fighting for. In deploying military forces in ways that prioritized the defense of capital cities, they inadvertently increased violence in areas that, while important from a military perspective, lacked the administrative apparatus from the incumbent government necessary for effective control to facilitate the collaboration that Kalyvas would otherwise expect.

2. The presence of third party soldiers reinforces the inadequacy of the government's ability to provide security

In areas that are important to the government but that the government cannot fully control, locals may be reminded of their government's own inadequacy by the presence of third party troops. This is especially true if the third party is present to provide security but government officials are not around to provide the necessary services. Since the third party is unlikely to stay and the government entity cannot survive with-

out third party presence, the threat of counter-denunciation is high and information-sharing will benefit the rebels increasing rebel-initiated violence.

3. Third party's lack of responsibility for civil control (basic needs, mediate disputes, keep lights on, etc) reduces public support for their security presence and increases support for rebels who are performing some of these functions

If government officials are not present and the third party is not empowered to provide governance, the civilian population will turn to the rebels. Again in Afghanistan, we observe this with the Taliban departing villages by day only to return at night to gather information and provide necessary services.

4. Lack of knowledge on internal politics/tribal dynamics/boundaries/etc. often results in interventions performed by third parties to have the opposite effect (well dug in wrong spot, school built with no teachers, district center on tribal land)

A lack of understanding of the local political dynamics can contribute to counterproductive interventions. Building a well, for example, may provide water to one family but make them a target by another. Such exclusive decisions, however unintended, can lead civilians to share with the opposite side.

Research Design

What is missing is a synthesis of the literature where third party interventions are examined at the micro level. It is from this perspective that I seek to contribute to the field with this project. To clarify the boundaries of the analysis, I adopt Collier and Hoefflers definition of civil war as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year which has been widely used in the literature (Collier and Hoeffler (2004)). Further, I require that the national government in the war must be an active combatant. This eliminates regional types of conflict that do not vie for control of the state.

The next important aspect of this project involves third-party intervention. While many combatants in civil conflicts are supported by external powers, I apply a more restrictive criteria here. I am interested in how the presence of third party military forces change the collaboration-control dynamic at a micro level. As such, support from third-parties must involve a physical deployment of military force in either an overt

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advisory role or direct combat. This is in an effort to determine how third party military interventions influence perceptions of sovereignty among civilian populations. The idea of sovereignty is often taken for granted in civil conflicts as they are often characterized as a two-player game with a government on one side and a rebel force on the other. Throughout the conflict both sides contest the other for control over territory and the populations that reside within those territories. In fact, by their presence, third parties change this power dynamic and influence the perception of sovereignty among the population.

In order to test the above hypotheses, I intend to use district level data across Afghanistan.

Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is violence. Consistent with Kalyvas, I seek to identify how violence is affected by my variables of interest. Using Afghanistan as my test case, the NATO headquarters in Afghanistan has declassified data on insurgent attacks from 2005 to 2015. Important to the analysis is the distinction between selective and indiscriminate violence. Kalyvas predicts that selective violence is increased where the warring side has near control. The SIGACT database contains entries for five different types of attacks: direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE), IED exploded, and explosive hazards. I argue in chapters two and three that direct fire, SAFIRE, and IEDs are evidence of selective violence while indirect fires indicate evidence of indiscriminate violence. This data has been previously used in the literature most recently in Condra and Wright (2019).

Independent Variables

My primary independent variable is the presence of third party forces. In the context of Afghanistan, this would include all international forces assigned to either the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) or the Resolute Support (RS) mission. The distribution of military forces has been dynamic over the 20 year conflict varying both spatially and temporally. The ideal data would include the number and location of US forces at least to the district level. However, efforts to obtain this data in the open source have so far proven limited. Fortunately, recent papers by Sexton (2016) and Iyengar et al. (2017) used government data to determine the location of ISAF Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and Combat Outposts (COPs) by analyzing the Order of Battle (ORBAT) for each deploying formation. Such ORBATs data is used in this

analysis until data with greater fidelity can be obtained.

Another variable of interest is the level of government control in a district. Here I benefit from the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey. ANQAR was a quarterly survey commissioned by NATO and is nationally representative down to the district level. The survey was connected regularly from 2008-2014 with a five quarter gap from 2011-2012 and included all 34 provinces. Since the surveys were conducted using settlements as the primary sampling unit and districts were recorded, it is possible to make inferences at the district-level.

Using ANQAR survey data, Winkelstein (2017) develops a measure of local institutional strength to determine their effects on insurgent violence, while Hanania (2019) uses the surveys to develop a measure of legitimacy. Condra and Wright use the data to determine civilians' willingness to inform government forces on IEDs (Condra and Wright (2019)). Of significant interest to this project, the surveys ask respondents the following question "Between the two, the Anti-Government Elements and the Government, who has more influence in your mantaqa (local area) now?" When aggregated at the district level, I argue this question reveals which side has control for a particular district-month.

Because I am interested in how third party military forces affects violence as dependent on government control, I interact these two variables in my analysis and estimate the following equation:

$$Violence_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ThirdParty_{it} + \beta_2 Control_{it} + \beta_3 ThirdParty * Control_{it} + \mu_{it}$$

Where i represents the district and t represents the month. Although with the ANQAR survey data the level of analysis is the district-quarter, SIGACT and ORBATs data is at the month level of analysis. As such, I distribute the quarterly ANQAR data over the three months for the given quarter. $ThirdParty$ indicates the presence of a third party military force. While still in search of better data that will refine the third party military presence in Afghanistan, I intend to follow scholars such as Sexton (2016) and Iyengar et al. (2017) in using the ORBATs dataset. ORBATs uses a dummy variable showing which districts had an international military base. $Control$ is the index of control derived from the ANQAR survey data as outlined above and is an adaptation from Kalyvas' baseline model. The third term is the interaction term and μ is the error term.

Conclusion

This dissertation project is intended to fill a hole in the literature where third-party interventions in civil conflict are examined at a local level. By implementing their strategy of "clear-hold-build," third parties deploy their forces in ways that are sometimes at odds with the force they are supporting and do not facilitate control of territory at a local level. Using the theoretical framework Kalyvas established I seek to explain how third parties can impact the information sharing dynamic with the civilian population and the corresponding impact on violent outcomes. Using Afghanistan as a test, I hope to answer how the NATO mission impacted security in a variety of different districts and time periods. Such a study will contribute to the literature as well as have clear policy implications.

CHAPTER II

Empirical Analysis

Introduction

In his analysis of the United States' foreign policy, Walter McDougall traces the history of America's approach to international relations and asserts that despite the varying policies and doctrines that governed America's interactions with the world over the past 244 years, one constant remained; military intervention in foreign lands (McDougall (1997)). From Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates to the meliorism of the 1990s, America rarely hesitated to use military force in pursuit of its own interests. Interventions during America's younger years were typically short in duration and narrow in scope. Examples include the gunboat diplomacy of Perry's expeditions to Japan and the Ivory Coast and even minor skirmishs during the Second Opium War. However, following World War II, as the United States' power grew, interventions became broader and longer often involving civil conflicts. Efforts to contain communism found US soldiers in large regional wars such as Korea and Vietnam as well as small or covert actions like El Salvador and Grenada. In the 21st century, terrorism replaced communism as the catalyst for intervention and led the US to interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines.

Yet, such interventions are not unique to the United States. A survey of most modern states yields similar examples of foreign adventurism. For instance, Russia has supported Syria against the Islamic State, France has aided its former colony Mali, and Australia came to the aid of independence forces in East Timor. Despite their frequent occurrence, third party military interventions have mixed results in practice. From recent scholarship, we learn that third parties can have diverse impacts on civil conflict ranging from prolonging wars (Regan (2002)), increasing human rights violations (Peksen (2012)), or reducing violence (Roberts (1993)). Other scholars find that under certain conditions, third party interventions increase the likelihood of victory for the supported side (Sullivan and Karreth (2015)) while still others find that third party interventions decrease the time required for a military victory while increasing the time required for a negotiated settlement (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008)). While useful in increasing our understanding the impact third party forces have on civil conflict, they address the macro-effects of war and do not consider

how third party troops affect war at the sub-national level. In so doing, we fail to understand the mechanisms by which third party forces change the environment and effect micro-level outcomes.

Further, most studies also consider third party interventions to be simply added military capability to the side that they support (Choi and Piazza (2017), Grant and Kaussler (2020), Peksen (2012), Regan (2002)). But is this true in practice? McDoogall asserts that it was American interests that drove US interventions. Does this mean we assume, as much of the literature does, that third party interests are aligned with interests of the side that they are supporting? How does this effect the tactical employment of troops by both the indigenous forces and the third party? How do these tactics change the environment? Examining these micro-level impacts is the focus of this paper using an extension of Kalyvas' collaboration-control model (Kalyvas (2006)) and sub-national level data from the US intervention in Afghanistan.

Theoretical Overview

As noted in the previous chapter, the theoretical foundations regarding third party interventions in civil conflict are grounded in the idea that biased third party interventions have differing results at the micro-level of conflict. Central to impacting violent outcomes is territorial control. Kalyvas theorizes that in civil conflict, either side's ability to selectively target the other side is a result of information-sharing between the civilian population and the combatants. The civilians know the area and are willing to "rat out" their neighbors so long as the risk of counter-denunciation is low. Critical to understanding with which side civilians will share information is the level of control either combatant has over the local territory.

The locality of the control is important. For the information-sharing dynamic to work, control has to be established at a sufficiently local level and combatants must be sufficiently present to receive the necessary information. Control facilitates cooperation from the civilian population because the greater the control by one side, the lower the risk of counter-denunciation to the other side. In analyzing the Greek Civil War, Kalyvas shows that areas that have greater control by one side are associated with greater amounts of selective violence against the other side (Kalyvas (2006)). Thus, this idea of control is critical to understanding violence at the micro-level. The question I seek to answer in this paper is how do third party forces effect control of territory and what does this mean for violent outcomes?

Since third party forces do not typically make claims of sovereignty when they intervene in civil conflicts,

to what extent, if any, do they actually "control" territory? Since control is essential to Kalyvas' model, we might assume that third party forces proxy for control of the supported side. Indeed many studies do so explicitly (Sexton (2016)), while others do so implicitly (Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011)), Condra et al. (2018), Shaver and Shapiro (2021). But is such an assumption valid? Do locals view third parties in the same way that they view the side they support? Do third parties exercise control in the same way as the side they support? This paper argues that they do not.

In extending Kalyvas' collaboration-control model to include third parties, such interveners are likely to be effective at contributing to improved security outcomes for the supported side only if that side has first established control over the territory where the third parties are deployed. Only then should we observe locals willing to share information with the third party and a corresponding increase in selective violence against the other side as Kalyvas would expect. Symmetrically, third party forces deployed to areas controlled by the opposite side should expect the civilian population to share with their adversary resulting in greater selective violence against themselves.

Said explicitly, the extension of Kalyvas' theory proposed here is that third party military force increases the military capability of the supported side only in areas that the supported side has established control and is perceived as sovereign by the local population. In such areas, I expect locals to share information with the third party or their ally which would correspond to an increase in selective violence by the supported side or third party against the opposite side. Conversely, areas where third party forces are deployed but are not controlled by the supported side should result in locals sharing information with the opposite side and a corresponding increase in selective attacks by the opposite side.

There are two possible mechanisms that are behind these expectations. Both relate to the idea of sovereignty from the perspective of the civilian population. The first mechanism relates to the problem of counter-denunciation as articulated by Kalyvas. In areas that are controlled by the side that the third party is supporting, the third party reduces the risk of counter-denunciation by the opposite side since they bolster the capability of the supported side in that particular area. In such areas, we should also observe a decrease in the adversary's ability to selectively target. Conversely, third party troops deployed in areas that are not controlled by the side that they support are deprived of this critical information and are unable to selectively target. The resulting use of more indiscriminate means of violence ensues further reducing the cooperation

of the civilian population (Shaver and Shapiro (2021)).

The second potential mechanism relates to how third parties conduct themselves in these local areas. Where the supported side has control, third parties benefit from the knowledge local leaders have of their territory. They inform the third parties not only of critical intelligence of enemy fighters, but also of where aid money should be spent and how sensitive political issues regarding internal disputes should be resolved. As such, third parties can be much more effective in employing not only their lethal means, but also non-lethal aid and structure their operations so as not to upset any internal problems (Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011)). However, when third parties are deployed to areas that are not under the control of the supported side, they are deprived of this information. As such, they little more than guess as to where to apply aid such as digging wells and building roads and are less sensitive to the conduct of their operations. Such a mis-application of aid can lead to unknowingly excluding one group to the benefit of another, thus increasing the likelihood of violence (Karell and Schutte (2018)).

Proposition: Third parties who intervene on behalf of the government, but do not have governing agency from the state or where state control in a given territory is weak, will result in an increase in rebel initiated violence because they cannot compel the information-sharing Kalyvas says is required to facilitate their own selective targeting.

H1: Areas that contain third party military presence will be associated with a reduction of rebel-initiated selective violence if government control is stronger compared to where government control is weaker.

H2: Areas where third party occupiers are the primary counter-insurgent force, and government control is weaker, will be associated with greater rebel-initiated selective violence than areas that contain third party troops and where government control is strong.

Empirical Test - The War in Afghanistan (2001 - 2021)

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, US President George W. Bush ordered US military forces to War in Afghanistan. With his stated objective to "disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base

of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime" Bush initiated an international military presence that would endure for nearly 20 years (Bush (2001)). Perhaps prophetically, the military operation in Afghanistan was named "Operation Enduring Freedom" and enjoyed immense domestic and international support with over "80 percent" of Americans supporting the invasion (Gallup (2001)) and earning unanimous approval among member states at the United Nations for the war resolution. (UN (2001)). Quick execution and innovative thinking by US Special Operations Forces and the CIA led to a quick end to the incumbent Taliban regime. But the work was clearly not finished as Al-Queda leader, Osama bin Laden, remained at large and Afghanistan's fractured tribal and political history made security a challenge that required continued international assistance.

ISAF Creation to NATO Leadership (2001 - 2003)

To address this challenge, international and Afghan leaders gathered in Bonn, Germany in December 2001. Here they created the "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions" which established the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), and outlined a training package that would take "some time" to complete (BonnConference (2001)). ISAF was formally established on December 20, 2001 with UN Resolution 1386 and given the initial responsibility for securing Kabul (UN (2001)). Partner nations rotated ISAF leadership every six months.

Concurrently, the US-led coalition operating under "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF) remained pursuing Taliban remnants and terrorist cells elsewhere in the country. During this time ISAF troop strength hovered around 5,000 in Kabul while OEF troop strength was between 2,500 and 10,000 troops throughout the rest of the country. As the security situation worsened, the UN designated NATO to take over responsibility for ISAF in order to provide leadership stability with the ultimate end of taking over security responsibility for the entire country.

Given the limited resources in Afghanistan at this time, sub-national level data is virtually non-existent. Further, international policy was not focused on "nation-building" but very much about destroying Taliban and Al-Queda remnants and then redeploying as soon as possible. As such, there was no real counterinsurgency effort at this time. When selected to lead Operational Enduring Freedom in 2002, Lieutenant General Dan McNeill visited the Pentagon to receive his initial instructions. He was advised by Chief of Staff of the

Army General Erik Shinseki to "do nothing that looks like permanency." While Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Jack Keane reminded McNeill that the US was "in and out of there in a hurry"; a setiment that was echoed by Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Air Force General Richard Myers (Degen and Reardon (2021), 178). Therefore, I am unable to consider this time period in testing the theory.

ISAF Expands 2003 - 2006

With NATO assuming command of ISAF in 2003, NATO began gradually expanding its security responsibility in the country. First to come under ISAF command were forces deployed in the the North (2004) followed by the West (May, 2006), South (July, 2006), before the violent East (October, 2006). Throughout this time, troop levels remained relatively stable from the United States and NATO, increasing only slightly (Figure 1) given the resources required in Iraq. Afghanistan had become an "economy of force" mission for the US military which led many commentators to consider it the "forgotten war" (C-SPAN (2007)).


Figure II.1: US and NATO Troop Presence in Afghanistan 2001 - 2016

It was during this period that the US Army established "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" (PRTs) that were designed to "connect governance to people" (Degen and Reardon (2021), 225). PRTs were led by Civil

Affairs Soldiers and included experts from the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, engineers, and an Afghan Ministry of the Interior colonel. Despite their emphysis and resources, the Americans quickly realized that connecting the people to the Afghan Government depended greatly on the "willingness of the Afghan people to accept a centralized political order that few in the country had ever experienced." PRTs recognized that security would only improve by sponsoring a "local militia force" that would be acceptable to the people (Degen and Reardon (2021), 227). Combat forces remained focused on eliminating the threat posed by the Taliban and Al-Queda, and counterinsurgency had yet to become an operational paradigm. Add to the fact that data is extremely limited, this time period does not provide a suitable test for the theory.

ISAF Leads 2006-2014

When ISAF assumed security responsibility for the entirety of Afghanistan in 2006, US General Daniel McNeill took command. From this point until the end of the war in 2021, the international commander responsible for all troops in Afghanistan was a US military officer from either the US Army or the US Marine Corps. As a result of the increased responsibility, military operations and data collection dramatically increased. Following the successful US "Surge" of forces in Iraq in 2007, new US President Barak Obama ordered a similar surge of forces to Afghanistan in 2009. Despite beginning a draw-down in forces 18 months later, troop levels remained relatively high and a corresponding increase in civilian and contractor positions greatly increased the data available. It is from this time period that I collect data in order to test the theory.

Resolute Support

The ISAF mission ended in December of 2014 and marked the end of combat operations by international troops. While always retaining the right to defend themselves, international troops moved to a much more advisory role and were generally not permitted to conduct offensive operations. Accordingly, this phase saw the draw-down of significant numbers of international troops. Data collection remained strong, but is omitted from this analysis as my primary interest is in how third party troops in a combat role influenced violence at the sub-national level.

Operation Enduring Freedom

It should also be noted that while ISAF assumed responsibility for all of Afghanistan in 2006, this did not mark the end of Operation Enduring Freedom. While most conventional US forces deploying to Afghanistan deployed under the authority of ISAF and NATO, special operations forces continued to deploy throughout Afghanistan under the authority of Operation Enduring Freedom. Broadly speaking, counterinsurgency operations were primarily conducted under ISAF with conventional forces while counter-terrorism operations were conducted by special operations forces under the authority of OEF. These efforts were only synchronized at the highest level with the American ISAF commander being "dual-hatted" as the commander of US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A).

Data

For this analysis, I created a panel data set built around three primary variables of interest. The unit of analysis in the panel is the district-month.

The dependent variable is *Violence* as measured by the Afghanistan SIGACTS database consolidated by Andrew Shaver. This data was recorded by NATO forces in Afghanistan and contains individual geo-located observations of attacks. The attacks are separated by type and include indirect fire, direct fire, explosive hazard, IED found, IED exploded, and surface to air fire and was collected from January 2005 through December 2014. Most of the observations are also indicated as enemy or friendly initiated. I have aggregated these separate types of attacks into another category called *totalattacks*. A plot of the values of total attacks per year is depicted in figure 2.

Figure II.2: Dependent Variable by Year, (total attacks)

Additionally, the SIGACTs database categorizes most attacks by initiator. These types include "Enemy Action," "Friendly Action," and "Explosive Hazard." Since the initiator of violence is important in understanding the theory, I also created a separate dependent variable *enemyattacks*. This variable limits *totalattacks* to actions that are labeled "Enemy Action" by the SIGACTs database. The plot of this variable per year is depicted below in figure 3.

Total Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Year

Figure II.3: Dependent Variable, (total enemy-initiated attacks)

Here we get an appreciation for the increase in violence during this time period. Still, it is unlikely that this captures all attacks. Attacks were entered into the database by NATO military forces and, thus, only concern events that either directly involved NATO forces or were reported to them by Afghan government or security forces. While this introduces some omitted observations, the SIGACTs data is the best available in the literature (Shaver and Shapiro (2021), Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011)). Nevertheless, since I seek to examine how Kalyvas' collaboration-control model is influenced by third party military interventions, two independent variables are required. One measuring *territorial control* and one measuring *third party presence*.

For the territorial control variable, I secured access to NATO's "Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research" database that was conducted quarterly over the period of 2008 - 2016 with a one year gap from March 2011 - March 2012. The survey is nationally representative (including all provinces) where villages visited by interviewers were randomly assigned within specific districts. The survey contains the question "Between the two, the Anti-Government Elements and the Government, who has more influence in your mantaqa (local area) now?" When aggregated at the district level, I argue this question reveals which side has control for that particular district-month. Anecdotal evidence from Khost Province supports this

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interpretation in the years following President Barak Obama's "surge" in 2009. One of his stated goals in deploying an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan was to "strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government" (Obama (2009)). In the below figure, we can see how in most districts accross Khost province, the number of Afghans stating that the government was in control of their district by this measure increased from 2010-2012.

Figure II.4: Average Local Perception of Government Control in Khost Province

This data has been used recently in the literature by Austin Wright, Luke Condra, and Jake Shapiro with the source data set coming from Austin Wright (Condra et al. (2018)). While the survey is nationally representative in general, there are several districts that were unable to be surveyed throughout the various waves because the district was "under the control of the Taliban." As such, this control variable contains

many more observations that indicate pro-government districts.

To obtain the control variable, I aggregate the responses by type per district month and averaged them. I then took the difference between the average of those who responded that the Afghan Government was in control and the average of those who responded that the "Anti-Government Elements" were in control. I name the resulting number *NetInfluence* which is bounded by -1 and 1. A district-month with a *NetInfluence* value of 1 indicates that all respondents to the the ANQAR survey question said that the government "had more influence" while a value of −1 indicates that all respondents indicated that the "Anti-Government Elements" were in control for that district-month. A histogram of the *NetInfluence* variable is presented in figure 5.

Figure II.5: Histogram of Independent Variable, (NetInfluence)

For the third party presence variable, I borrow from Renard's Sexton's ORBATS data set that he used in his 2016 APSR paper. The data is derived from reports from the Institute for the Study of War and indicates which district-months contained a NATO battalion level or higher headquarters. The data is a dummy variable indicating 1 for district-months where a NATO battalion level or higher headquarters is

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present and 0 otherwise. This data is limited from May 2008-December 2010 which limits the entire panel. While the ORBATS data indicates where battalion-level or higher unit headquarters were located, it does not account for units below the battalion level.

Battalions consist of about 1,000 soldiers and are typically commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. Each battalion usually consists of four tactical companies of about 150 soldiers each in addition to administrative and support personnel. While battalions are the smallest self-sufficient tactical organization, it was quite common during the Afghanistan War for companies to be in different districts than their battalion head-quarters. This was even more common when overall force levels were low and troops were much more spread out. For example, during the time covered in the ORBATS data, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry of the US Army's 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was headquartered in Orgun District of Paktika Province while the battalion's subordinate companies were located in Zerok District, Bermel District, and Gayan District. However, the database will only show a 1 for Orgun District even though the other districts contained permanently garrisoned US combat troops. While this makes the data sub-optimal, it is the best available to scholars until further data is declassified by NATO and/or the US Government.

To answer my research question concerning the extent to which third party troops effect violence in areas controlled by the side they support, I seek to estimate the following equation where I expect the sign on the interaction term to be negative, indicating areas under the control of the Afghan government that contain third party troops are associated with less violence than areas that are not under the control of the Afghan government that contained third party troops:

$$Violence_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ThirdParty_{it} + \beta_2 Control_{it} + \beta_3 ThirdParty * Control_{it} + \mu_{it}$$

In all models except for the baseline models, I use district level fixed effects to account for time-invariant district level factors that may be correlated with violence and the deployment of third party troops. Another factor I must contend with is the seasonality of the fighting. As depicted below much-though not all-of the violence is concentrated in a summer "fighting season."

Figure II.6: Plot of Total Attacks by Month

While such an observation may lead one to conclude that applying month fixed effects is appropriate, a deeper understanding of the Afghan war suggests using a lagged dependent variable may also be appropriate. Month fixed effects assume that each month in any year is the same as previous or subsequent years. We have already seen why this may not be so. First, international troop levels were not constant throughout the years in this analysis. Thus, May of 2008 when the ORBATS data begin, for example, is not consistent from a resource standpoint as May of 2009 or 2010.

Second, month fixed effects does not account for the geographic differences. The most violent regions in Afghanistan are the East and South. With its more temperate climate, the southern region was less impacted by seasonal changes than the more mountainous east. Adding month fixed effects would obscure this difference. Fortunately, there is another identification strategy that can address the seasonality of the fighting, but also ensure that controlling for it is more localized. To do so I create a separate model that excludes month fixed effects and adds a one month lagged dependent variable instead. Here I follow Wilkins (2018) who recommends adding a lagged dependent variable for these exact reasons. The results of both

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models are reported below.

Results

Looking at the data visually yields the below figure. The x-axis indicates the relative control of the district based on the ANQAR survey responses. This was obtained by taking the mean per district-month for each possible response to the survey question of interest and then taking the difference of the mean value of those who said the government had the most influence from those who said the "Anti-Government Elements" (AGE) had the most influence. As such, positive values indicate those districts where the government was in control where negative values indicate AGE was in control. The y-axis considers all attacks in the panel regardless of type of attack or the initiator of the attack. The plot is separated by areas with or without NATO troop presence.

Figure II.7: Plot of Total Attacks on District Control by Troop Presence

However, this plot includes actions that are labeled as "friendly." While significantly smaller in number compared with "Enemy Actions" these actions still total over 5,000 observations. Yet, most friendly actions

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are a result of deliberate and planned operations and are not typically recorded in the SIGACT database. So, what is depicted in this database is likely lower than the true value. Further, the side that initiates the action is critically important in order to test the theory. I want to infer the efficacy of third party presence on the opposite side's ability to target third party or supported side's forces or infrastructure depending on which side controlled the territory. Thus, limiting the panel to actions that are enemy-initiated allows me to better make inferences of the impact of third party presence on opposite-side initiated violence even though it eliminates some observations. Re-plotting *Netinfluence* with the panel limited to enemy initiated total attacks yields a similar shape.

Figure II.8: Plot of Total Enemy Attacks on District Control by Troop Presence

In both plots, however, we see something somewhat unexpected. Kalyvas' collaboration-control model would predict an increase in selective violence by the side where control is almost completely consolidated. As such, we should expect *friendly-initiated* attacks to peak somewhat near 1 on these plots. Instead, we see *enemy-initiated* attacks peaking there. There are some possible explanations for this. First, since the violence data is derived from third party forces, it is dominated by attacks where they were involved. Third

parties in a civil conflict are likely very conspicuous due to their physical features, uniforms, and equipment they use. They are not hid among the population and usually reside on easily targetable fixed bases. As such, AGE's ability to attack such locations selectively does not require the extent of the information sharing that Kalyvas might expect in a more conventional civil war. So, we can likely expect to see more attacks on the right side of these plots simply because third party forces easily present themselves as targets and these troops tend to be in areas where the government is stronger. Such an observation is not novel in the literature either (Vargas (2009)).

This is not to say that these enemy attacks are necessarily selective, per se. Of course, I do not have data on specifically what is an indiscriminate versus a selective attack, but we do have data indicating the type of attack. The above two figures consider total attacks on the y-axis. This is attacks of all types. If we limit the data to indirect attacks, which are by their nature more indiscriminate, the shape of the figure changes.

Figure II.9: Plot of Indirect Fire Attacks on District Control

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Here we see something more consistent with expectations from the collaboration-control model with indirect fire attacks peaking near zero indicating districts where neither side has clear control. So, the extent to which indirect fire attacks proxy for indiscriminate violence, we do seem to have evidence for the collaboration-control model.

However, the primary question this dissertation seeks to answer is one regarding biased third party interventions and how their presence influences violence given varying degrees of control of the side they are supporting. Based on the collaboration-control model I would expect enemy initiated selective violence to increase in areas where third parties are present but are controlled by the enemy side and decrease in areas where third parties are present but are controlled by the supported side. As such, I would expect the sign on the interaction term in the above regression equation to be negative. To aid the analysis, I transform the dependent variable and the lagged dependent variable by taking the log+1.

First I will run the regression without fixed effects yielding:

Dependent Variable:	logtotattacks
Model:	(1)
Variables	
Constant	1.618***
	(0.0248)
NetInfluence	-0.4031***
	(0.0411)
troops	1.006***
	(0.0518)
NetInfluence $\times$ troops	-0.2651***
	(0.0926)
Fit statistics	
Observations	4,262
R^2	0.16171
Adjusted R^2	0.16112

IID standard-errors in parentheses

Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Here, we see that the sign on the interaction term is negative, as expected, and significant. However, the presence of troops alone is so great, that the effect of troop presence in areas under the control of the Afghan government is still associated with an overall increase in attacks compared to no troop presence. Further, areas controled by the Afghan Government are also associated with a reduction of attacks by 40%.

Limiting the panel to enemy actions yields similar results with negative and significant findings on the interaction term while areas under the control of the Afghan Government mitigating violence by some 25%. Troop presence alone, however, is associated with an increase in vioilence by nearly 90%. Also included is the previous regression for ease of comparison.

Dependent Variable:	logtotattacks	logenemyattacks
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
Constant	1.618***	1.386***
	(0.0248)	(0.0255)
NetInfluence	-0.4031***	-0.2569***
	(0.0411)	(0.0432)
troops	1.006***	0.8955***
	(0.0518)	(0.0527)
NetInfluence $\times$ troops	-0.2651***	-0.2159**
	(0.0926)	(0.0965)
Fit statistics		
Observations	4,262	3,130
R^2	0.16171	0.15036
Adjusted R^2	0.16112	0.14954

IID standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Given that violence is often attributed to multiple factors, I will now apply a fixed effects model. When applied at the district and month levels, I am assuming that time invariant qualities in each district and for each month may be corrolated with violence and the variables of interest. Adding fixed effects to both models yields the following:

Dependent Variable:	logtotattacks	logenemyattacks
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	0.0201	0.0317
	(0.0525)	(0.0376)
troops	0.2923**	0.1723
	(0.1071)	(0.1257)
NetInfluence $\times$ troops	-0.1878**	-0.1509*
	(0.0802)	(0.0826)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
month	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	4,262	3,130
R^2	0.46295	0.52731
Within R^2	0.00300	0.00179

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

With district and month fixed effects, both models yield significant results on the interaction term. In the first model, we see that third party troop presence in areas under the complete control of the Afghan government (NetInfluence = 1) are associated with a reduction in attacks by 19%. However, given that troop presence alone yields a statistically significant increase in attacks by 30%, we are still left with an increase of attacks by some 11% as compared to no troop presence. Given that this model includes friendly initiated attacks, this is not totally surprising as some of the attacks are likely third party troops attacking

anti-government forces.

The second model, which limits attacks to enemy-initiated only, we see results that are more in line with expectations. Here, areas with third party troop presence that are controlled by the Afghan government are associated with a reduction in enemy-initiated attacks by over 15%.

These results hold when month fixed effects is replaced with the lagged dependent variable control.

Dependent Variable:	logtotattacks	logenemyattacks
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	-0.0193	0.0201
	(0.0659)	(0.0630)
troops	0.3573**	0.2125
	(0.1307)	(0.1761)
DV_lagged	-0.0614	0.0512
	(0.0384)	(0.0351)
NetInfluence × troops	-0.2723**	-0.2684**
	(0.1003)	(0.1053)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	2,967	1,898
R^2	0.42550	0.50076
Within R^2	0.00865	0.00730

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

While the magnitude of the effect is slightly different in this model specification, the overall results are

consistent. In both models, the sign on the interaction term is negative and significant. In the first model, the interaction term is not great enough to overcome the effect of troop presence alone with overall violence in areas controlled by the Afghan government and containing NATO troops still increasing over 9% as compared to areas that do not contain third party troops.

In the second model, we observe that troop presence in areas controlled by the Afghan government is associated with a reduction in enemy-initiated attacks by nearly 27%. This finding shows support for the theory that third party troop presence reduces attacks when deployed to areas under the control of the side they support. We now turn our attention to selective attacks.

Selective Attacks

While the above results are encouraging, Kalyvas differentiates between *selective* and *indiscriminate* violence. The above analysis considers all types of enemy attacks which the SIGACTS database breaks down into *Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED Exploded, IED Found, and Surface to Air Fire*. Direct fire attacks require line of sight acquisition between a shooter and a target. These kinds of attacks typically include small arms fire from assault weapons such as the AK-47 or M16, light machine guns such as the M249, medium machine guns such as the PKM or the M240, or heavy machine guns such as the DShK or the M2. While it is possible that such weapons can be used indiscriminately, their effectiveness is greatly diminished. Likewise, another type of selective attack the SIGACT database includes is *Surface to Air* or *SAFIRE*. These attacks are much like direct fire attacks in that they require visual acquisition between the operator and the target. The only difference between the two is that *SAFIRE* attacks are ground to air attacks while direct fire attacks are ground to ground attacks.

Separately, IED attacks are also designed to be selective in nature. Unlike mines which seek to deny an adversary access to a particular area, IEDs are used to actively target an opponent. Over the course of the War in Afghanistan, Anti-Government Elements have employed IEDs in a variety of ways, but all IEDs have three basic components. The first is the explosive material itself which, upon detonation, does the damage to the target. The second is the initiation device. This device is usually an electric blasting cap which supplies the necessary heat and pressure to the explosive material to ensure detonation. The third component is the means by which the blasting cap acquires the electric signal. At times, IEDs are initiated by the target itself.

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Such "victim-operated" IEDs typically use a pressure plate initiation device where the weight of the target compresses two metal plates and completes a circuit that initiates the blasting cap. Such a method does not require visual acquisition of the target and can be considered to be indiscriminate unless the individuals who employ the IED make an effort to inform non-targets of an impending attack. Indeed, such an effort to avoid collateral damage was precisely observed in Afghanistan.

The other two most common forms of IED initiation do require visual acquisition of the target and are much easier to identify as selective in nature. The first is "command detonation." Here, the IED emplacer simply runs a wire from his observation post to the blasting cap and manually activates the explosive when the target is at the desired location. In such a situation, the observer's location is limited only by the length of the wire and is generally within 300 meters of the IED itself.

The final means of initiation is "remote controlled" activation. This method is much like command detonation, except the command wire is replaced by a radio-controlled switch that can be activated remotely. As with command detonation, visual acquisition is still required for activation of the device, but the observer can be further away from the target location and is limited only by the power and range of his remote-controlled device.

Sadly, the SIGACTS database does not differentiate between the means of IED detonation. However, given that Anti-Government elements employed IEDs principally to target NATO forces or their Afghan Allies, and given that the employment of these systems required information as to where and when they would be employed, it is reasonable to assume that, as with direct fire systems, IEDs can also be considered selective attacks. In so doing, we can repeat the above analysis and see the extent to which NATO forces deployed to areas controlled by the Afghan government decrease enemy-initiated selective attacks. To test this, I created a new dependent variable *Selective* which combines direct fire, IED, and SAFIRE attacks and ran the same model specification as above with district fixed effects.

Dependent Variable:	logselective	logenemyselective
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
Constant	1.233***	1.180***
	(0.0248)	(0.0261)
NetInfluence	-0.3186***	-0.1581***
	(0.0410)	(0.0441)
troops	0.9983***	0.9860***
	(0.0518)	(0.0538)
NetInfluence × troops	-0.3998***	-0.3726***
	(0.0925)	(0.0985)
Fit statistics		
Observations	4,262	3,130
R^2	0.14225	0.15106
Adjusted R^2	0.14164	0.15025

IID standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Here we see similar results across both models. Both models indicate that troop presence alone is associated with an increase in selective attacks by 99%. Both interaction terms are also negative and significant, but less in substance than the impact of troops presence alone. As such, areas controlled by the Afghan government where third party troops are present reduce the impact of third party presence on selective attacks by 40% and 37% respectively. However, this still yields an increase in such attacks when compared to no troop presence. This would not be consistent with expectations from the collaboration-control model. Thus, to the extent that the subset of attacks I used to create the *selective* variable actually represents selective attacks, we can say that we do not find support for the model under this specification. Adding district and

month fixed effects yields the following:

Dependent Variable:	logselective	logenemyselective
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	0.0354	0.0411
	(0.0468)	(0.0445)
troops	0.2506**	0.3514**
	(0.0929)	(0.1217)
NetInfluence $\times$ troops	-0.2747**	-0.1872
	(0.0924)	(0.1063)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
month	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	4,262	3,130
R^2	0.44735	0.51394
Within R^2	0.00314	0.00566

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Here, the first model (considering all attacks regardless of which side initiated them), indicates that troop presence in areas under the control of the Afghan government are associated with a reduction in attacks by 27%. This is greater than the effect of troop presence alone on violence of 25%. Thus we can conclude that troop presence in areas controlled by the Afghan government are assocaited with a reduction of *totalattacks* by some 2%. We do not, however, find support that this result holds for enemy initiated attacks only.

Substituting the lagged dependent variable control for month fixed effects produces:

Dependent Variable:	logselective	logenemyselective
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	-0.0188	0.0365
	(0.0690)	(0.0803)
troops	0.2847**	0.3159*
	(0.1217)	(0.1668)
DV_lagged	-0.0560	0.0788*
	(0.0407)	(0.0401)
NetInfluence × troops	-0.3040**	-0.2585*
	(0.1256)	(0.1203)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	2,967	1,898
R^2	0.42674	0.50388
Within R^2	0.00756	0.01315

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

In this specification, the results are consistent with the month fixed effects model above for the panel including all attacks regardless of initiator. The panel limiting the dependent variable to those attacks cateorgized by the SIGACTS database as *enemy initiated* indicates a significant interaction term, but substantitively smaller than the effect of troop presence alone.

Indiscriminate Attacks

Now I must consider the effects of indiscriminate attacks. The SIGACT database really only provides insight to one type of attack that can plausibly be indiscriminate in nature-indirect fire attacks or *IDF*. As the name implies, unlike direct fire attacks, indirect fire attacks do not require the shooter to visually observe the target. Such attacks can be initiated from areas out of visual contact from the target such as the relative safety of the reverse slope of a hill. Because there is less precision with indirect fire attacks, they are less discriminate in nature. Indirect fire attacks can also be used when a combatant is less sure of the location of an adversary. Kalyvas states that indiscriminate targeting is more likely when the side employing the tactic does not have control over the physical territory. Therefore we would predict that areas where NATO troops are deployed that are controlled by the Afghan Government should be associated with an increase in enemy-initiated indirect fire attacks. To test this, I made indirect fires my dependent variable and ran the same model specifications as above. Due to the significantly smaller number of IDF attacks, logging this dependent variable does not markedly increase the normalization of the data. As such, I left IDF attacks untransformed in this analysis.

Dependent Variable:	IDF enemyIDF	
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	0.3210	0.2884
	(0.2473)	(0.2671)
troops	0.8845	-0.5139
	(0.5915)	(0.3762)
NetInfluence $\times$ troops	-1.945***	-1.098
	(0.5862)	(0.7033)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
month	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	4,262	3,130
R^2	0.46282	0.31823
Within R^2	0.00888	0.00701

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Here my findings are unexpected. Instead of positive and significant results on the interaction term, it is negative yet significant in the model including all IDF attacks. Thus, we can conclude that NATO troops deployed to areas controlled by the Afghan Government are associated with a reduction of 2 attacks per month in the full panel but have no significant impact on enemy-initiated IDF attacks. The collaboration-control model would expect an effect. Since anti-government elements do not have ready access to local information in areas that are controlled by the Afghan government, the only viable means available is to use

indiscriminate violence. However, I do not find evidence of this.

Repeating this analysis with a lagged dependent variable is depicted below.

Dependent Variable:	IDF enemyIDF	
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	0.1563	0.1324
	(0.2538)	(0.2809)
troops	0.8859	-0.5963
	(0.6301)	(0.4585)
DV_lagged	0.0342	0.1742***
	(0.0226)	(0.0488)
NetInfluence × troops	-2.290***	-1.248
	(0.7325)	(0.8784)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	2,967	1,898
R^2	0.44181	0.32831
Within R^2	0.01469	0.04680

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

The above results are consisted with the fixed effects model. Troops deployed to areas controlled by the Afghan Government are associated with a reduction of over 2 total IDF attacks per month. But we can not draw a conclusion about what this means for attacks labeled enemy-initiated.

Discussion

The most expected finding in this research comes from the models considering all enemy-initiated attacks. Here we can see that NATO forces deployed to districts controlled by the Government of Afghanistan are associated with fewer overall attacks than if the area was either contested (*Netinfluence* = 0) or areas that are controlled by Anti-Government Elements (*NetInfluence* < 0). This finding is consistent with the theory that third party troops are only beneficial in areas that are controlled by the side that they support. It also underscores the importance of territorial control as a determinant of violence as Anti-Government elements were not able to freely target NATO forces or Afghan troops in areas where the Afghan government enjoyed a public perception of sovereignty, as Kalyvas would expect. This finding is consistent across all model specifications where the panel considers enemy-initiated total attacks.

Subsetting the panel and creating the *selective* dependent variable did not yield expected results when limited to attacks labeled enemy-initiated. While there was an associated decrease in violent actions in areas where NATO troops were present and controlled by the Afghan Government, this appeares to be true only when attacks labeled *friendly-action* are included. This may say more about how Anti-Government Elements use direct fire attacks. They may not, as assumed here, be selective in nature. Since the increase in NATO troops provided more ample targets and since NATO troops were very conspicuous in the operational environment, Anti-Government Elements may simply have had ample targets to shoot at. So while these attacks were less prevalent in areas controlled by the Afghan government, they were still greater than if there were no NATO troops at all.

This may also explain the findings with respect to indirect fire attacks. Here, again, this may be due to several reasons that are unique to Afghanistan. First, indirect fire attacks were frequently used against NATO bases. These bases were largely fixed and their locations were very well known to Anti-Government fighters. They were also often far enough away from population centers that Anti-Government fighters could target them with indirect fires without much concern for collateral damage. Relatedly, while indirect fire attacks are considered "area" weapons, Anti-Government fighters have been known to use them with a high degree of precision. Numerous anecdotal evidence exists where crude, but effective, aiming devices and firing platforms have been found by NATO forces. In such cases, they functioned more like selective attacks than indiscriminate attacks.

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There is also something to be said for how the data was cateorgized in the first place. As discussed above, the SIGACTs data is derived from NATO reporting. While we can be reasonably confident that NATO reported enemy-initiated attacks and cateorgized them as such, we can be less confident on the attacks labeled *friendly-action*. For example, it was common for anti-government elements to attack a base with rocket or mortar fire. In response, NATO troops would promptly return fire if the point of origin could be determined. Different units may code the same attack differently. One labeling the attack *enemy-action* because it originated from an anti-government element group, but others may label it *friendly-action* because NATO troops themselves fired weapons in response. Other units may record the attack as two separate events. As there were not clear reporting standards for how such attacks were to be cateorgized, this was often left to the discretion of a junior staff officer far removed from the action.

Thus, I can be most confident in the results that are sub-setted as enemy-initiated total attacks. As such, I find support for the general theory that third party troop presence in areas controlled by the side they support reduces overall opposite-side initiated violence. However, I am not able to conclude that this effects the type of violence the opposite-side is willing to employ.

Conclusion

These findings overall are novel in the literature on third-party military interventions in civil conflicts. The extant literature has not considered the degree to which the supported-side's territorial control impacted the efficacy of the third party troops. Such a finding not only helps us understand the circumstances by which third parties may increase or decrease violence, but can also inform policymakers and military leaders on where and when to intervene. Such knowledge will better inform military planning, better complement efforts by the supported side, as well as better communicate expectations to domestic and international audiences.

While the data used in this paper is the best available in the literature, it is not optimal. This is particularly true for the *troops* variable which only considers third party deployments down to the battalion level. Further, the data for troops used here did not cover the entire range of the other two variables which further limits the statistical power of the analysis. That said, efforts are underway to obtain new data that will fix this *troops* variable's shortcomings. Still, this analysis, illuminates important lessons for the kind of data military forces

should collect in future conflicts.

Paktia and Khost Provinces

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I conducted a test of the theory using the best available data from the war in Afghanistan. For this analysis, the dependent variable was violence and was derived from NATO SIGACTs data that had been declassified for the purpose of scholarly research. This data had been used many times in the literature including (Wright et al. (2017), Condra et al. (2018)).

Next, I secured access to the NATO-contracted ANQAR national survey. From this survey, I derived a measure of local territorial control at the district level. While ANQAR data has been used in the literature previously (Condra et al. (2018), Hanania (2019)) its direct use to derive a measure for territorial control is novel.

Finally, I used the Institute for the Study of War's ORBATS data to identify where and when NATO military forces were garrisoned in Afghanistan. This too has been used in the literature recently (Sexton (2016)). In the prior chapter's analysis, this data led us to discover that third party troops deployed to districts under the control of the Afghan government were associated with 27% fewer enemy-initiated attacks. However, precise causality remains a challenge. This chapter seeks to remedy one aspect of the limitations to the existing data, and one of central importance to the theory–more precise NATO troop locations.

The Problems with the Existing Data

Violence Data

Violence data derived from the NATO SIGACTs database omits many potential incidents of violence. For events to be added to the database, NATO formations had to report an event had occurred. The database is thus biased for attacks on NATO forces. Taliban attacks against civilians, for example, are likely under-reported as there was no direct mechanism for civilians to report them to NATO. This is especially true in areas where no NATO troops were present. Likewise, attacks on contractors working directly for the Afghan Government, foreign civil servants, or NGOs were also not captured in the military-sourced SIGACTs data

(Connable (2012), 164). Similarly, it is also difficult to determine the degree to which attacks were among anti-government elements themselves or if attacks were the result of criminal activity.

Additionally, it is likely that many US or Coalition-initiated attacks are also omitted from the database. This is largely due to the fact that many coalition-initiated attacks were conducted under the auspices of the US-led *Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)* counter-terrorism mission and not the NATO-led *International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)* counterinsurgency mission. In fact, it was common for OEF forces to conduct operations in areas under the responsibility of NATO forces without a "unity of effort" between the two (Lamb and Cinnamond (2009)).

Given these associated problems, there is still some utility for using this data which has already proven "instructive in tracing surprising dynamics" in these kinds of conflicts (Trebbi (2019)). This is because the declassified SIGACTs database covers more than 600,000 reports of violent activities from January 2008 through December 2014. This time period is critical to this study because it covers a large "surge" of international forces and a subsequent large reduction in forces. As noted in the previous chapter, international troop levels rose dramatically in conjunction with President Obama's 2009 announcement of the deployment for over 100,000 US troops and was followed by a gradual decline in international forces coinciding with the end of the ISAF mission in December 2014. As such, while not optimal, the SIGACTs data is the best currently available and has already increased our understanding of civil conflict.

Local Control

Data on local control is derived from the NATO-sourced ANQAR survey data. This survey was commissioned by NATO and conducted quarterly from 2008-2014, the time period of interest for this paper. One of the survey questions asked respondents whether or not the local government or "anti-government elements (AGE)" were in control of their "local area". After aggregating responses by type, I took the difference of those who said that the government was control from those who said that AGE was in control. This gave be a range of values from 1, indicating all respondents for that district-wave stated the government was in control, to -1 indicating all respondents stated that AGE were in control.

While this gives me high confidence in the precision of which side was in control for a particular district-wave, there were many districts inaccessible to enumerators for either geographical or security-related rea-

sons. Thus, the bias in this analysis is towards the Afghan Government. Wright et. al, are currently developing a more robust measure of Afghan district-level control that considers surveys commissioned from other organizations that cover a much larger percentage of the country (*Wright et. al, forthcoming*). Here they derive control based on enumerator access to the district. Once available this novel data will improve the precision of my results.

Third Party Presence

Lastly, and of greatest interest, is the data relating to the geographic location of third party troops. All previous scholarship considering third party troop presence in Afghanistan did so through the Institute for the Study of War's Order of Battle (ORBATS) data set. While this data is comprehensive and accurate, its two major flaws are that it only considers third party presence down to the battalion-level and only considers the time period from May 2008 to December 2010 (Sexton (2016)).

Throughout much of the War in Afghanistan, troops were deployed at the lower company and platoon levels often in districts separate from their parent battalion. Further, the limited 32-month period from 2008-2010 omits the critical increase in forces as a result of Obama's surge and the subsequent removal of forces. Thus, these prior analyses, including the previous chapter of this dissertation, ignore substantial combat troop presence in many areas throughout Afghanistan. Fortunately, this current chapter seeks to remedy this deficiency for a small portion of the country.

Using open source news reports, public statements, unit histories, and personal testimony, I developed a comprehensive district-level data set that identifies troop presence down to the platoon level for two Afghan provinces in eastern Afghanistan. While the portion of Afghanistan covered is comparatively small, the data covers the 2008-2014 years of interest and allows for over 1,200 district-month observations. The two provinces of Paktia and Khost are important and worthy of study in their own right and provide a good test for the theory.

Paktia and Khost as Test Case

The significance of Paktia and Khost as a more nuanced test of the the theory rest in the comparative consistency in the combatants themselves. As noted above, it is difficult for NATO troops to identify the combatant

behind the attacks recorded in the SIGATs database. This concern is ameliorated significantly in areas such as Paktia and Khost where anti-government forces are not warring with themselves in addition to their fight against the government and their third party allies. This is because one anti-government group was able to consolidate its control over a this particular area. This group is called the Haqqani Network which has a long and complicated relationship with the United States.

The Haqqani Network

Paktia and Khost, along with Patika province and portions of Pakistan constitute "Loya Paktia" and the "Zadran Arc." Named for the Pasthun Tribe of the same name, the Zadran Arc is home to one of the fiercest Anti-Government forces in the Afghan War, the Haqqani Network. Formed by Jalaluddin Haqqani in the 1980s, Haqqanis rise to prominence was with direct support of the United States and Pakistans ISI during the Soviet-Afghan War. This initially created opportunities for dialogue in post September 11, 2001 Afghanistan that were never fully realized. Such dialogue could have brought Haqqani into the peace process and effectively eliminated one of the most significant insurgent groups fighting US and coalition Soldiers in eastern Afghanistan. Abubakar Siddique citing Tanai, a tribal elder in Haqqanis home province of Khost, agrees in stating, "one of Haqqani's brothers stayed behind in Kabul after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, opening the prospect of using the family's influence to bring about peace." The international communitys failure to do so resulted in a "lost opportunity" (Siddique (2009)). In this sense, Haqqani's significance cannot be underestimated.

Figure III.1: Loya Paktia in Afghanistan, source:Wikimedia

Haqqanis relationship with the United States was born during one of the hottest moments of the Cold War. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 presented the United States with what it believed was an opportunity to end the three decade old struggle. Despite the might of the Soviet Red Army, the fledgling mujaheddin were incredibly determined, if outgunned, and did not back down. Quietly supporting them was the US Central Intelligence Agency with its allies in Pakistan and the Arab world. The process of getting US weapons and money to the mujaheddin was as difficult as war itself. Since the US operated covertly, no assistance provided could be directly traced to the United States. Per an agreement with the Pakistani government, American CIA agents would deliver weapons and ammunition only to Islamabad where ISI agents would take over transport to the Afghan border (Crile (2003), 105). In this sense, Haqqani

proved to be very useful. As a resident of the Zadran Arc that straddled both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, Haqqani was a key link between the ISI-delivered US weapons and the Afghan mujaheddin. As such, Haqqanis importance to both the United States and Pakistan did not go unnoticed and he was an essential part of the Soviets defeat.

The Zadran Arc along the Afghan-Pakistan border created the perfect opportunity for Pakistani ISI agents to form a special relationship with Haqqani who received an extraordinary share of US weapons and equipment (Frontline (2006)). Haqqani also developed a very close military relationship with the ISI on the battlefield. Impressed by his tenacity and inspirational leadership, they offered him safe haven within Pakistan (Qazi (2008)). Through this relationship, he became a client of the CIA as well as the ISI. As Steve Coll writes, "He was willing to fight. He did not go to a lot of meetings; he might be rough around the edges, but Americans would go up to Miram Shah and sit cross-legged at meetings with him as the cash and the weapons were being directed his way. They came away with an impression similar to the pilgrims at the hajj: This was an Afghan war fighter. This was an independent-minded, dangerous man, but someone we could do business with. Haqqani received a great deal of support" (Frontline (2006)).

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, there was widespread expectation that the Soviet-supported government of Mohammad Najibullah would collapse within 12 months (Khalilzad (1991), v). As such, a Pakistan-sponsored shura was convened on 10 February 1989 to form an interim government and Haqqani was one of the participants. The Afghan Interim Government (AIG) was designed to be a military as well as political alliance with the intent of overthrowing the communist Najib regime in Kabul. However, despite the success in forming a new government, infighting and tensions both within and outside the shura emerged which made its fate uncertain. It was quickly determined that while the AIG had international legitimacy, it did not adequately represent all Afghan groups. Complicating matters was the surprising resilience of the communist government that remained in power until April 1992 when the Taliban began consolidating its control. Nevertheless, at least initially, Haqqani continued to support the AIG no doubt out of obligation given his important role in forming it (Khalilzad (1991), 19). However as time went on, the ineffectiveness of the AIG caused many Afghan commanders and regional parties to abandon it.

Despite the inter-tribe tensions, or perhaps because of them, Haqqani continued to fight communist forces or anyone who challenged his authority in Loya Paktia. In April 1991, with the aid of US Weapons

and Pakistani advisers, Haqqanis forces liberated the communist held city of Khost, in Khost province. In so doing, Khost had been the first major Afghan city retaken by the freedom fighters (Crile (2003), 515). Haqqanis status rose from respected military commander to legend. By this time, he was the undisputed major commander and leader in east-central Afghanistan and the de-facto governor of Pakita, Khost, and Paktika provinces. Although this was good news for the United States, by this time it had largely disengaged from Afghanistan. However, Haqqanis rise to prominence did not go unnoticed by the Taliban who were looking for key allies themselves.

The ineptness of the AIG inspired widespread disgust in many Afghans. The continued infighting and under-representation within the government led many to look elsewhere for better representation. The Taliban quickly became an attractive alternative. The Taliban would fight where they needed to, but were always looking for defections. After taking the pro-Najibullah stronghold of western Herat in September 1995, the Taliban turned their attention eastward. By this time Haqqani had consolidated his control in the Zadran Arc and appeared content with his position within the AIG. However, the success of the Taliban throughout southern and western Afghanistan extended beyond just military victories. After years of war and insecurity, they were able to bring order to Kandahar which earned them tremendous popularity and "an almost supernatural aura" (Marsden (1998), 46). Haqqani took notice, and defected to the Taliban sometime in 1996.

As Michael Griffen notes, Haqqani was a practical ally for the Taliban. In addition to his political connections, Haqqani "controlled access to Osama Bin-Ladens training camps at Badr-1 and Badr-2, which housed some 2,000 terrorist operatives" (Griffin (2000), 139). Likewise, Haqqani understood the political realities in regards to the Taliban. His defection is likely attributed, in part, to his desire to ally with a winner where his voice would be heard in the government as opposed to fighting for influence from outside the Taliban movement.

The Taliban also used Haqqanis political skills, his ability as a fundraiser through his connections in the Arab world, and his contacts with the ISI and promoted him to the Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs (Frontline (2006)). However, Haqqani was still an independent minded commander who had his doubts about some of the Taliban agenda. As Ahmed Rashid writes, "although Haqqani was made a minister in Kabul, he and other non-Kandaharis remained extremely bitter that they were kept out of the decision-

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making process that took place in Kandahar under Omar, rather than in Kabul" (Rashid (2010), 60). This bitterness and independence would later give the United States hope that their relationship could be repaired after international tragedy brought Afghanistan back to front page news.

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington DC, Afghanistan was immediately at the forefront of American attention. The country was not well suited to a US military operation, however. As a landlocked country, there were no ports or an established road network to bring in troops, supplies, equipment, or humanitarian assistance. As such, much of this work had to be done from the air. The US was looking for allies on the ground and had found a natural one in the organization of Ahmad Shah Massouds Northern Alliance. Massoud had been assassinated by Al-Qaida on September 9, 2001 apparently in an attempt to disrupt anticipated American efforts to ally with the only serious resistance to the Talibans rule (Farzana (N.d.)). However, the US very much desired to find other allies and their old friend, Haqqani, quickly appeared as an attractive target.

It is encouraging that, at least initially, the United States reached out to Haqqani to solicit his involvement in their fight against Al-Quaida. In a 2008 interview, former C.I.A. case officer, Directorate of Operations leader, and State Department Counterterrorism Ambassador Hank Crumpton, stated that in 2001, "we sent emissaries to meet with him and his people, and there were some limited communications, but for whatever reason he decided he did not want to engage with us...at this time" (Frontline (2006)).

Always wary of foreign intervention in Afghanistan, Haqqani likely decided to wait and see how the future government would be structured, as he did in his days with the AIG. In the short term, Haqqani chose to support his current ally in the war against his former one. Unfortunately, when Haqqani rebuffed efforts to talk in 2001, negotiations were called off and Haqqani immediately became the target of a concerted bombing campaign only three weeks following the US invasion (Herold (2002)). Since then, the Haqqani Network has sought to hold on to its control in the Zadran Arc and expand its territory further.

As Haqqani aged, his involvement in direct military operations became more and more limited and he ultimately died in 2018. By 2010, the Haqqani Network was under the operational control of Haqqanis son, Sirajuddin. At that time, Siraj was approximately 30 years old and yielded tremendous influence throughout the Zadran Arc. While he lacks the sophistication and political skills of his father, he was able to command tremendous influence among his followers. Under Sirajs command, the Haqqani Network has worked to

increase its size and reach. No longer confined to the provinces of Paktika, Paktia, and Khost, the Haqqani network is "believed to have extended their activities to Ghazni; [and] they could be responsible for attacks in Kabul" (Khattak (2010)). It is widely believed that the Haqqani Network was responsible for an assassination attempt on President Hamid Karzai in 2008 as well as the kidnappings of New York Times reporter David Rohde and US soldier Bowe Bergdahl (Oppel (2010)).

The US response in targeting Siraj has been proportionally intense. In addition to the lethal targeting, in 2008, the US Treasury department designated Siraj a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" (Justice (2008)). In March 2009, the US State Department, through the Rewards for Justice Program, put out a 10 million bounty for information leading to his killing or capture (Justice (2008)). Predator drone attacks within North Waziristan, Pakistan, where the Haqqanis enjoy sanctuary, increased dramatically in 2009 and Haqqani has been one of the biggest targets. A strike in February 2010 is said to have killed Sirajs brother (Roggio (2010)). Despite this aggressive targeting, the Haqqani Network controlled more territory midway through the Afghan War than it did prior to the war with a firm hold on the Paktia and Khost provinces during the 2008-2014 years of interest.

US Military in Paktia and Khost

Haqqani's established control over Paktia and Khost provinces made US Military Operations there a priority with the first major ground battle taking place in the Shahi-Kot Valley of Paktia in March 2002. Named "Operation Anaconda," the attack into the Shai-Kot was designed to eliminate Osama bin Laden and Jalaluddin Haqqani who were believed to be in the area (Degen and Reardon (2021), 136). The resulting battle was far more intesnse than anticipated and US military leaders quickly realized that a lasting conventional military presence in the area was required beyond the special forces safehouses that had been there from the war's beginning.

To this end, Foward Operating Base Salerno, in Khost province, was established in late 2002 and remained continuously occupied until the end of ISAF's mission in 2014 (Degen and Reardon (2021), 250). At about the same time, Forward Operating Base Gardez was established in the capital city of Paktia province and likewise remained in operation for the duration of ISAF (Degen and Reardon (2021), 145). As the US troop presence grew, many more bases were added to each province so that by 2008, Paktia was home to 5

total bases: Gardez, Zormat, Wilderness, Chamkani, and Herrera. Likewise, Khost also hosted 5 bases by 2008: Salerno, Sperah, Clark, Chergotah, Sabari. Importantly, most of these new bases housed units below the battalion level and were, thus, not considered in the ISW's ORBATs data set and the corresponding scholarship that used them.

Smaller Bases, Better Data

The Empirical Studies of Conflict identifies eleven districts for Paktia province and 13 districts for Khost province. The ORBATS dataset, which only considers May 2008-December 2010, coded only one district in Paktia province as containing third party troops (Gardez) and two in Khost province (Khost and Nadir Shah Kot). Combined, the ORBATS data accounted for a total of 88 district-month observations in Paktia and Khost that contained third party troops. By expanding the time period from January 2008-December 2014 and including platoon and company-level outposts, the new data yields 1159 district-month observations for Paktia and Khost, an increase of 1071 district-month observations for these two provinces. Notably this includes observations in six Paktia districts and seven Khost districts that were not included in the ORBATS dataset. (See figures below)

Figure III.2: Paktia Troop Presence by District

Figure III.3: Khost Troop Presence by District

This new data will allow us to test the theory on a more localized, though limited geographic, sample. To obtain the new data, I created a spreadsheet that included every district-month in Paktia and Khost from 2008-2014. I then sought evidence for troop presence in each district month. To remain consistent with chapter 2, I only coded a district-month as containing troops if I found evidence that they had been permanently garrisoned in that district. This is because I am interested in the relationship between third party troop presence interacted with government control and violence. It was common for third party troops to occasionally conduct shorter-duration missions in districts that were adjacent to the ones where they were based. However, their temporary nature was known to all parties and did not facilitate the collaboration expected from a more permenant presence. As such, these districts were coded a zero.

In determining where troops were permanently garrisoned, I looked for named bases. As there is no Army doctrinal term for a deployed base, troops often referred to them as "Forward Operating Bases" (FOBs), "Combat Outposts" (COPs), "Firebase" (FB), 'or "Camps" while smaller facilities were referred to as "Observation Posts." To find these locations, I sought data from several sources. First, I contacted the US Central Command Engineer cell and the Army Central Engineer cell. The engineer cells were responsible for tracking facilities management throughout Afghanistan and tracked the closure of all bases in 2021. A designated official at each closing base had to submit a report that detailed it's geo-location, the approximate date the base was first occupied, the size of the base, the date it was first occupied, and the date it was closed. While this information is invaluable to this project, the documents I was able to secure from the Engineer Cells were too limited to be of value. They did not include any facilities in Paktia or Khost and were not inclusive of all bases in any other province. Further, most were for bases in the greater Kabul area which was consistently under the control of the Afghan Government. The absence of any variation on a key variable of interest made such base data un-useable.

Next, I turned my attention to publically available sources through the Defense Department's public affairs section. The Department of Defense maintains a website called the "Defense Visual Information Distribution Service." This website contains a completely serachable database of Defense Department-produced visual, audio, and print media. As public interest in the Afghanistan War was extremely high, military public affairs professionals produced thousands of stories, videos, and audio clips that distributed command information for public consumption. In searching this database for district names, unit designations, or known

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base names, I was able to obtain a signifient amount of information as to when bases were occupied. The database is also serachable by date. Since I am interested in the time period from 2008-2014, I can reasonably establish that the base was occupied if I found media about the base before that 2008. For bases established after 2008, identifying the initial district-month required more scrutiny of the database. For example, the below screenshot is from an article published in 2011 about security improvements in Bak district. In it, the author makes mention that COP Bak was established by 1st Battlaion, 187th Infantry of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) "in the 11th month of their year-long deployment." Identifying the unit's re-deployment month as January 2011 means that the COP was established in December 2010 which was coded a "1" from that point.

Afghan forces, ISAF help improve security in Bak

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KHOWST Province, Afghanistan – Joint efforts to loosen the insurgents' hold on Bak began when 10 elders from Bak visited the Saberi District combat outpost to ask coalition forces about the return of their sons, who had been detained for crimes in the area.

"They said the capture of [insurgent] leadership had upset the balance of power in the area and that they wanted to reclaim their land," said U.S. Army Capt. Steve Baunach, Khowst Provincial Reconstruction Team civil affairs team leader from West Lafayette, Ind. "Our presence here is predicated on an invitation from the people of Bak and their hope for a bright future."

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, along with help from International Security Assistance Forces, is making a concerted effort to clear and stabilize key districts like Bak.

"Bak has always been an (insurgent) stronghold," said Baunach, "It is key enemy terrain and one of the main infill routes for them."

Now this territory is finally tipping toward Afghan government control, said Baunach. The recently fortified district center and combat outpost are now routine spots where locals can discuss future projects, current problems or hold shuras with local government officials.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion 187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division from Fort Campbell, Ky., established the COP in the 11th month of their year-long deployment.

Figure III.4: Screenshot From DIVIDs Story

Where gaps remained, I next turned my attention to publically-accessible unit histories. For most Soldiers, deployment to a combat zone will be the most formidable experience of their life. This fact was not lost on unit leaders who often would capture their unit's experiences in short histories of what they accomplished. Such histories would detail operations conducted, signifient events, and commerate fallen commrades. The bases to which soldiers were assigned were inextricably linked to the Soldiers themselves.

They took pride in improving them and decorated them with unit symbols and icons. As such, the opening or closure of a base marked a major milestone in a unit's deployment and were almost always detailed in the unit history. This was particularly the case as combat operations were drawing to a close in 2013-2014. One such unit history was published by 4th Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Deployed from 2013-2014, the brigade was responsible for closing or transferring several bases. From their history, I can pinpoint the closing month of bases in five districts (Sabari, Chamkani, Zadran, Khost, and Zormat) (Army (2014), 4-6).

For units that did not publish histories, my final resource was to examine social media websites. The time period of interst coincided with the rapid rise of social media. As soldiers sought to connect with loved ones at home, social media became an easy way for them to do so. Even after deployment, soldiers will often post about their time on specific bases or commerate significant events such as the death of a fellow soldier. Even professional networking sites, such as Linkedin, can be useful in detailing when speficic bases were opened or closed. As the below screenshot depicts, one individual details his role in closing COP Bak in December 2012.

Company Executive Officer
Dec 2011 – Dec 2012 · 1 yr 1 mo
Ft. Campbell, KY; Khost Province, Afghanistan

As the Executive Officer (XO), I was the second in command of an infantry company in 3rd BCT, 101st Airborne Division. At Ft. Campbell, I managed the company's budget, and forecasted resources such as ammunition and training materials for training events. I created and enforced a regular preventative maintenance system for the company's weapons, vehicles and equipment. I managed sensitive equipment, and was overall in charge of the company's property and command supply discipline programs. I deployed the company for two training events to Tullahoma, TN, and Ft. Polk, LA for a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center. In August, 2012, I split the company's property book and deployed mission essential equipment from Ft. Campbell, KY to Khost Province, Afghanistan. When in Afghanistan, I commanded a Combat Outpost (COP) in Bak District with 60 soldiers, and was responsible for over $50 million worth of equipment. I planned and executed counterinsurgency operations in Bak and Sabari Districts, Afghanistan, targeting Haqqani Network cells in the district, and growing the district government's influence. I partnered with the Bak District Police Chief, the district intelligence professionals from the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), as well as a company from 3rd Kandak, 1/203rd Corps Afghan National Army. I advised and assisted our Afghan partners into coordinating effectively with each other, developing a District Operations Coordinations Center in Bak District. I assisted the ANA in developing sustainable medical and maintenance practices, and set the conditions to transition the district to Afghan control. I was in charge of the US retrograde from COP Bak, and its formal transition to ANA control in December 2012.

Figure III.5: Screenshot of former Company Executive Officer in Afghanistan

Results

In looking at the data visually, we first see the comparatively fewer attacks per month in Paktia and Khost compared to the full panel as identified in chapter 2. While some of the most violent district-months in some

of the southern provinces totaled nearly 500 enemy-initiated attacks, Paktia and Khost rarely combined for forty over the time period examined in this chapter. Certainly, this indicates that the southern districts were more violent, but the increase may also be due to the fact that the south was the responsibility for the US Marine Corps who may have slightly different reporting standards than the US Army which was responsible for Paktia and Khost. Nevertheless, the new data for Paktia and Khost till provide us with over 12,000 total attacks for this analysis.

Figure III.6: Plot of Total Attacks on District Control by Troop Presence

As with Chapter 2, we now look deeper at the type of attacks. Beginning with selective attacks, we do not observe an increase in selective attacks where Anti-Government Elements are in control (*NetInfluence* < 1) as we would expect with the collaboration-control model. While there does appear to be slightly more attacks in the negative range for *NetInfluence* in Paktia, both provinces see most of their selective attacks in areas where the Government is in control (*NetInfluence* > 0).

Figure III.7: Plot of Selective Attacks on District Control by Troop Presence

With respect to indiscriminate indirect fire attacks, we do observe one difference between the two provinces. In Khost, there does not seem to be a pattern with respect to enemy-initiated IDF attacks where troops are present and only slightly fewer attacks where troops are not present regardless of local control. The collaboration-control model would expect both sides to use indiscriminate attacks in areas that are contested, but this only seems to be the case in Paktia where troops are present. Interestingly, in Chapter 2, we observed the highest IDF attacks in areas that were contested, but did not contain third party troops.

Figure III.8: Plot of IDF Attacks on District Control by Troop Presence

Total Attacks

Using this new data to test the impact third party troops have on violence as conditioned by local control is the principal focus of this chapter. Since the theory is grounded in the collaboration-control model, I expect enemy-initiated selective violence to increase in districts where US troops are present (*Troops2*= 1), but are controlled by Anti-Government Elements (*NetInfluence*< 0). Conversely, I expect enemy-initiated selective violence to decrease in districts where US troops are present but are controlled by the Afghan Government. As such, I expect the sign on the interaction term to be negative.

As in the previous chapter, to control for violent activity, I specify two models. One with district and month fixed effects and the other with district fixed effects with a lagged dependent variable (Wilkins (2018)).

First I will run the regression without fixed effects or the lagged DV and including all attacks:

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Dependent Variable:	logtotattacks	logenemyattacks
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
Constant	1.506***	1.421***
	(0.0634)	(0.0687)
NetInfluence	-0.1790**	-0.2839***
	(0.0825)	(0.0880)
Troops2	0.4579***	0.2840***
	(0.0847)	(0.0865)
NetInfluence $\times$ Troops2	0.0086	0.0335
	(0.1149)	(0.1162)
Fit statistics		
Observations	1,260	943
R^2	0.09703	0.08106
Adjusted R^2	0.09487	0.07812

IID standard-errors in parentheses

Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Here, we observe that the variable of interest-the interaction term-is not significant across both models. However, we do see that US troop presence when $NetInfluence = 0$ is associated with a substantively and statistically significant 46% increase in total attacks and an increase of 28% in enemy-initiated attacks.

Next, as with Chapter 2, I add district and month fixed effects to the model.

Dependent Variable:	logtotattacks	totenemyattacks
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	0.0326	-0.0056
	(0.0765)	(0.0222)
Troops2	0.2913**	0.2186
	(0.1160)	(0.1312)
NetInfluence × Troops2	-0.1627	-0.1432**
	(0.1166)	(0.0517)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
month	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	1,260	943
R^2	0.37173	0.35587
Within R^2	0.01424	0.01274

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

With district and month fixed effects, we see no significance on the interaction term in the model that include all attacks regardless of which side initiated them. However, when limited to enemy initiated attacks, some interesting results emerge. In the enemy-initiated model, the interaction term is significant and negative, being associated with a reduction of attacks by 14%. This finding is consistent with chapter 2 which found enemy-initiated attacks decreased by 15% in areas where NATO troops were deployed and under the control of the Afghan Government.

Substituting month FE with a lagged dependent variable yields:

Dependent Variable:	logtotattacks	logenemyattacks
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	0.0230	-0.0245
	(0.0817)	(0.0609)
Troops2	0.3116**	0.2584*
	(0.1033)	(0.1361)
logtotattacks_lagged	0.0906	0.1734***
	(0.0672)	(0.0550)
NetInfluence × Troops2	-0.1269	-0.1441**
	(0.0815)	(0.0537)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	1,069	684
R^2	0.35049	0.35009
Within R^2	0.02520	0.04498

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

He we see significance on the interaction term of similar magnatude as the fixed effects model, however, the troops presence variable is also now significant at the 0.1 level. Thus, while troop presence in areas under the control of the Afghan government may reduce total enemy initiated attacks by 14%, troop presence alone is associated with an increase in attacks by 26% indicating an increase of attacks by 12% compared to know troop presence. This finding contrasts with chapter 2 where violence decreased overall.

Selective Attacks

Turning our attention to selective violence, we repeat the above models but replace total attacks as the dependent variable with selective attacks. The method for determining selective attacks for this chapter is the same as in chapter 2 and includes all direct fire, IED, and surface to air fire attacks. As above, the first models are without fixed effects or the lagged dependent variable:

Dependent Variable:	logselective	logenemyselective
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
Constant	1.013***	1.093***
	(0.0673)	(0.0714)
NetInfluence	-0.0197	-0.1602*
	(0.0876)	(0.0915)
Troops2	0.2887***	0.0731
	(0.0898)	(0.0899)
NetInfluence $\times$ Troops2	-0.0574	0.0664
	(0.1219)	(0.1209)
Fit statistics		
Observations	1,260	943
R^2	0.02568	0.01363
Adjusted R^2	0.02335	0.01048

IID standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

As with the total attacks models, both of the interaction terms are insignificant. Interestingly, we see no relationship between troop presence and enemy-initiated selective attacks, while districts controled by the Afghan government are associated with a reduction of such attacks by 16%.

Adding fixed effects yields null results:

Dependent Variable:	logselective	logenemyselective
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	0.0959	0.0389
	(0.1159)	(0.0839)
Troops2	0.1547	0.0721
	(0.1266)	(0.1390)
NetInfluence × Troops2	-0.1248	-0.0323
	(0.1499)	(0.0242)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
month	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	1,260	943
R^2	0.24331	0.27377
Within R^2	0.00260	0.00113

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Interestingly, we find very little significance in these models. In no model is the interaction term significant. Thus, to the extent that the subset of attacks used in these models actually approximates selective violence, we do not find support for the collaboration control model.

This result is consistent when we replace district and month fixed effects with a lagged dependent variable:

Dependent Variable:	logselective	logenemyselective
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	0.0465	-0.0149
	(0.1217)	(0.0974)
Troops2	0.1429	0.1237
	(0.1152)	(0.1442)
logselective_lagged	-0.0072	0.1688***
	(0.0553)	(0.0505)
NetInfluence × Troops2	-0.0503	-0.0227
	(0.1282)	(0.0747)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	1,069	684
R^2	0.23154	0.29207
Within R^2	0.00307	0.03073

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Thus, we do not observe support for the collaboration-control model with respect to selective violence. This null result is also different from Chapter 2 where we observed significance on the interaction term, although it was quantitatively less in substance than troop presence alone.

Indiscriminate Attacks

As with Chapter 2, we will now examine indiscriminate attacks with the new troop data for Paktia and Khost. Here I use indirect fire attacks as a proxy for indiscriminate attacks, but due to the comparatively few number of attacks, I do not log this dependent variable. I repeat the above analysis beginning with the models without fixed effects or the lagged DV:

Dependent Variable:	IDF enemyIDF	
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
Constant	0.9828***	1.301***
	(0.2069)	(0.2728)
NetInfluence	-0.3863	-0.5569
	(0.2691)	(0.3496)
Troops2	2.003***	1.871***
	(0.2761)	(0.3435)
NetInfluence $\times$ Troops2	-1.040***	-1.043**
	(0.3748)	(0.4617)
Fit statistics		
Observations	1,260	943
R^2	0.09730	0.08908
Adjusted R^2	0.09515	0.08617

IID standard-errors in parentheses

Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

In the above models, we do observe significance on the interaction terms for both models. However, all interaction terms are quantitatively smaller than the value of troop presence alone. As such, districts that contain US troops and are controlled by the Afghan Government are associated with fewer attacks than

districts with US troops that are controlled by Anti Government elements, they still increase compared to areas with no US troops.

Adding fixed effects to the models yields:

Dependent Variable:	IDF enemyIDF	
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	0.0956	0.1911
	(0.2611)	(0.3943)
Troops2	1.647***	1.470**
	(0.3912)	(0.5830)
NetInfluence $\times$ Troops2	-1.145**	-1.522**
	(0.3985)	(0.6215)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
month	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	1,260	943
R^2	0.27537	0.27521
Within R^2	0.03590	0.02865

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

As we can see, the addition of district and month fixed effects changes things. In the enemy-initiated IDF model, we see that the effect on the interaction term is slightly greater than the effect of troops alone. Thus, we can conclude that US troops deployed to Paktia and Khost where the government is in control are associated with fewer IDF attacks per month than if the area was under the control of AGE. Substituting the

month fixed effects for the lagged dependent variable yields similar results.

Dependent Variable:	IDF enemyIDF	
Model:	(1)	(2)
Variables		
NetInfluence	0.0342	0.2277
	(0.3357)	(0.6145)
Troops2	1.632***	1.562*
	(0.4050)	(0.7300)
IDF_lagged	0.0281	0.0686**
	(0.0349)	(0.0282)
NetInfluence $\times$ Troops2	-1.110**	-1.811**
	(0.3742)	(0.6622)
Fixed-effects		
DISTID	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics		
Observations	1,069	684
R^2	0.24566	0.27194
Within R^2	0.03430	0.03458

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Discussion

From this analysis we can see little support for the collaboration control model holistically. We simply do not observe the selective/indiscriminate dynamic playing out as Kalyvas would expect. However, we do see a relationship between troop presence conditioned by local control and violence. When all enemy-initiated

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attacks are considered we observe less violence in areas that are controlled by the Afghan government and contain US troops than in areas that are controlled by anti government elements and contain US troops. This is consistent with the findings in Chapter 2 where there was also a definitive reduction in enemy-initiated violent attacks in areas controlled by the Afghan Government and containing third party troops.

However, this finding is only true of the fixed effects model. The model with the lagged dependent variable showed an increase in violence in areas that contained US troops across all levels of Afghan Government control and only somewhat mitiaged by 14% in government controlled areas. I believe this is a more accurate depiction of the environment and is a marked contrast with Chapter 2 where troop prsence was associated with reduced enemy-initiated violence compared to no troop presence.

Further, in compairing these results to those from Chapter 2, we also observe they are somewhat less significant. With the finer data introduced here, one might expect greater stitistical significance than with the data used in the previous chapter. However, before making such a judgement, one must ensure we are making the proper compairson.

The data used in chapter 2 is identical to that used in chapter 3 with one exception: the third party troop presence data. In chapter 2, this data was taken from the ORBATs data set published by the Institute for the Study of War as used in Sexton (2016). As discussed above, this data covered the time period from May 2008-December 2010 and only included units down to the battalion level. While the data covered all provinces in Afghanistan, these two limitations ignore the vast majorty of locations where troops were deployed. The new data corrections this deficiency, but only for Paktia and Khost provinces. If we limit the ORBATS data to Paktia and Khost provinces, we will be able to draw a more "apples-to-apples" compairson. To this end, the above models are republished below using the ORBATs data limited to Paktia and Khost Provinces.

Simple Regressions

Dependent Variables:	logtotattacks	logenemyattacks	logselective	logenemyselective	IDF	enemyIDF
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Constant	1.469***	1.086***	0.8535***	0.6557***	1.848***	1.248***
	(0.1034)	(0.0987)	(0.1001)	(0.1006)	(0.3398)	(0.3600)
NetInfluence	-0.1478	0.0322	0.0824	0.2707**	-0.8679*	-0.6343
	(0.1397)	(0.1336)	(0.1353)	(0.1362)	(0.4591)	(0.4874)
troops	1.344***	0.4848	1.863***	0.9299***	0.3580	-0.7332
	(0.3619)	(0.2963)	(0.3505)	(0.3019)	(1.190)	(1.081)
NetInfluence $\times$ troops	-0.8916*	-0.2517	-1.832***	-1.016**	0.7021	1.992
	(0.4980)	(0.4131)	(0.4823)	(0.4209)	(1.637)	(1.507)
Fit statistics						
Observations	346	243	346	243	346	243
R^2	0.17741	0.07018	0.15187	0.06454	0.03453	0.03381
Adjusted R^2	0.17020	0.05851	0.14443	0.05280	0.02606	0.02168

IID standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Regressions with Month and District FE

Dependent Variables:	logtotattacks	logenemyattacks	logselective	logenemyselective	IDF	enemyIDF
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
NetInfluence	0.0202	0.2384	0.3800	0.5531***	-0.8396**	-0.7110
	(0.2377)	(0.1878)	(0.2256)	(0.1538)	(0.3295)	(0.7464)
troops	1.215***	0.8007***	1.702***	1.389***	0.2125	-1.338*
	(0.1470)	(0.2168)	(0.0260)	(0.1000)	(0.3159)	(0.7093)
NetInfluence × troops	-1.422***	-0.7804**	-2.330***	-1.608***	0.1124	2.018
	(0.3788)	(0.3174)	(0.2812)	(0.1231)	(0.7613)	(1.402)
Fixed-effects						
DISTID	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	346	243	346	243	346	243
R^2	0.48988	0.34504	0.35903	0.23527	0.36402	0.27765
Within R^2	0.03737	0.02921	0.06966	0.07774	0.00841	0.00906

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Regressions with Lagged DV

Dependent Variables:	logtotattacks	logenemyattacks	logselective	logenemyselective	IDF	enemyIDF
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

Variables

NetInfluence	0.0222	0.2359	0.4058*	0.5511*	-0.8155***	-0.8155***
	(0.2238)	(0.3003)	(0.1852)	(0.2806)	(0.2250)	(0.2250)
troops	1.137***	0.5516**	1.698***	0.9953***	0.2761	0.2761
	(0.0104)	(0.1894)	(0.0444)	(0.1007)	(0.2931)	(0.2931)
logtotattacks_lagged	0.1089	0.0940				
	(0.0889)	(0.1352)				
NetInfluence × troops	-1.389***	-0.3819**	-2.375***	-1.031***	-0.1530	-0.1530
	(0.2032)	(0.1586)	(0.2758)	(0.3287)	(0.7143)	(0.7143)
logselective_lagged			0.0265	0.0602		
			(0.0676)	(0.1415)		
IDF_lagged					0.0084	0.0084
					(0.0203)	(0.0203)

Fixed-effects

DISTID	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Fit statistics

Observations	257	143	257	143	257	257
R^2	0.50181	0.31375	0.38155	0.15371	0.34388	0.34388
Within R^2	0.05244	0.03605	0.08176	0.05609	0.00702	0.00702

Clustered (month & DISTID) standard-errors in parentheses

*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Of note, one should notice the significant increase in the number of observations that the new data provides compared to the ORBATs data, yet in most of these models, it appears that the data from chapter 2 provides slightly stronger substantive significance. For example, in the models above with that include the lagged dependent variable as a control, we find that areas that contain US troops and are controlled by the Afghan government are associated with a 38% decrese in enemy-initiated attacks compared to areas that contain US troop presence not under Afghan government control. However, this fails to offset the 55% increase in enemy-initiated attacks troop presence alone is associated with. Similarly, when compared to the same model using the new data, we find that troop presence in areas under Afghan government control are associated wiht a much smaller 14% reduction in enemy-initiated attacks which is also not enough to offset he increase of 26% troop presence alone contributes to enemy-initiated violence. The result is a net *increase* in overall enemy-initiated attacks for a particular district month in both models of 17% and 12% respectively. While both sets of data yield consistent results in Paktia and Khost, this is a departure from the findings in Chapter 2 which found an overall *decrease* in enemy-initiated violence by 26%. This contrast is worth exploring further and amounts to the most significant finding of this research.

As mentioned above, the only difference in the models used in the two chapters is the *troops* variable. In chapter 2 this variable was derived from the ORBATS database which only considered troop presence down to the battalion level. While the data in chapter 3 is limited to only two of Afghanistan's 34 provinces the troop data is to the lower company and platoon levels. This paper quantitatively illustrates a significant *qualitative* difference in the nature of the fighting at these echelons of command.

As discussed in Chapter 1, commanders array military forces in accordance with established doctrines. The principle doctrinal paradigm that existed during the War in Afghanistan was encapsulated in Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. This manual directed principal military effort be directed toward the support of the Afghan Government and its centers of control. Thus, defending capital cities and economic zones became of highest importance. In order for governance and commerce to function, these areas had to be relatively free of violence. Additionally, the synchronization of governance, economic, and security lines of efforts usually involved some complexity that required higher levels of military oversight and management. The higher rank and staff provided by battalion-level and higher headquarters meant that they were usually deployed to these capital cities. Indeed, when restricted to Paktia and Khost, the ORBATs data only identi-

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fies US troop presence in three districts (Gardez, Khost, and Nadir Shah Kot). Gardez is the capital of Paktia province, while Khost, in addition to being the capital of Khost province, is a significant regional commercial hub and that housed an Afghan Army Corps and corresponding US brigade headquarters. Companies, led by a junior officer and with no staff, by contrast, were pushed out to districts away from the capital cities in a "defense in depth" that kept much of the fighting on the periphery. This was by design.

Similarly, aspiring Afghan bureaucrats, government leaders, and entrepreneurs were also attracted to the capital cities and the resources that flowed from them. This left a talent drain in the outlying districts where the companies were fighting. So while these districts may have been under the nominal control of the Afghan Government as observed by the ANQAR survey enumerators, they did not have the same governmental capacity as the capital cities did. Thus, any actionable information a local civilian may have wanted to share with the Afghan Government may not have been met with the same competency as one would find in the capital cities. As such, US Troops in Paktia and Khost may have had the right intentions and capabilities, but a lack of government *effectiveness* as compared to the capital cities was not enough to reduce violence overall. Combined with the external intelligence-gathering resources that battalions and higher headquarters had at their disposal likely also contributed to more effective targeting in areas where they were deployed.

This explaination makes Paktia and Khost a bit of a peculiar case. If areas containing battalion level troops and above are associated with a reduction in enemy-initiated violence country-wide as evidenced in Chapter 2, we should expect to see the same result for Paktia and Khost, yet we observe the opposite. There are two possible explainations for this. Firstly, as discussed previously, Paktia and Khost were provinces claimed by the Haqqani Network. The Haqqani's ties to the community were deep and lasting. This allowed them to infiltrate Afghan Government and direct more attacks to higher US headquarters than was possible in other areas with a more fractured enemy force. Indeed the main US base in Khost province that housed the brigade headquarters responsible for the entire Zadran Arc was attacked with regularity in ways not common to other higher-level headquarters in the rest of the country (Dupee (2008), Wahdat (2010), Partlow and Whitlock (2012)).

Secondly, as border provinces, Paktia and especially Khost were the focus of counterrorism operations led by US Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is unclear the extent to which these

counterrorrism operations imapcted the conventional US Military's *counterinsurgency* operations that were conducted concurrently but not in a coordinated fasion. Such a lack of synchronization may have complicated counterinsurgency efforts and led to an increase in violence. It is also likely that the emphysis on the counterterrorism mission made US forces in general targets of greater value to enemy forces. Nevertheless, what is known is that the base that housed the counterrorism mission was also regularly attacked by enemy forces and was the site of the worst attack on the CIA of the entire War on Terrorism (Riedel (2019)). Such violence was unique to Paktia and Khost which explains in part the differing findings from the country-wide analysis of chapter 2.

While this is an interesting finding, it does not say much for the collaboration-control model and its emphasis on the difference between *selective* and *indiscriminate* violence. With the new data, I find no support for the model in Paktia and Khost with respect to *selective* violence, and, in fact, counter findings for *indiscriminate* violence. This may have more to do with factors unique to third party interventions.

Kalyvas does not consider the interventions of a major world power in the development of his theory. Focused on smaller-scale civil conflict, Kalyvas' research places a premium on the importance of personal relationships and connections. Third party interventions in civil wars, by nature, are not able to form such close personal connections from which information-sharing would naturally flow. As such, the enemy-initiated attacks against US or Afghan targets may not be as neatly categorized as *selective* or *indiscriminate*. Further, the fact the majority of attacks captured in the SIGACTs database were attacks on US forces, and that US forces lived apart from the population and were highly visible targets, indirect fire attacks, the proxy for *indiscriminate* violence may, in fact, have been intended as more selective targeting by Anti Government elements.

Separately, most US-initiated targeting was not based on information-sharing directly. US Conventional forces are not permitted to conduct their own human intelligence below the brigade level. While company commanders may receive "tips" from the local population, developing those tips into sources of information was reserved to higher levels. Such a centralization of intelligence assets, a necessity resulting from limited resources, meant that only the highest-priority targets would be developed for kinetic engagement. This often meant that companies fighting on the periphery were fighting a primarily defensive fight tying up enemy resources rather than selectively targeting enemy-forces themselves.

Conclusion

This research seeks to expand the frontier of third party interventions in civil conflict and local control. Until the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, data has not been readily available to distill how third party forces and local control interact to effect violent outcomes. Clearly much more research is needed and can be obtained by first obtaining better data.

The troop data for Paktia and Khost is novel and is a small first step in the right direction. Effort should be made to expand its availability to the rest of Afghanistan before any clear conclusions can be made for external validity. Such an effort should begin with neighboring Paktika province, the geographically largest province in the Zadran Arc.

Additionally, the question of local control is of great interest as well. Efforts to refine a measure of Afghan district control to account for enumerator accessibility to district would greatly increase the accuracy of the ANQAR survey-derived measure used in this paper. More broadly, local control is an underrepresented determinant of violence in the literature that is worthy of further exploration in its own right.

Finally, this research seeks to contribute to a greater understanding as to how third parties influence micro-level conflict. The interaction with local control adds one more small piece to the puzzle. As evidenced by the ongoing war in Ukraine and the growing power of Russia, China, and India, it is unlikely that third party military interventions will end soon.

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