

POLAND

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THE NATION OF REFUGEES.

A MEMORIAL,

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL,

Addressed to the British and French Nations,

BY

GENERAL L. MIEROSLAWSKI.

'Every handful of your earth is a relic of martyrs.'

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE:

PUBLISHED FOR THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

1855.

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1843

THE HISTORY OF THE

REIGN OF

GEORGE THE THIRD

BY

CHARLES OSGOOD

IN TWO VOLUMES

THE SECOND VOLUME

CONTAINING THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF

1760

GEORGE THE THIRD

POLAND, RUSSIA,
AND THE WESTERN POWERS.

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Paris, March 23rd, 1855.

My dear Sir and Ally,

The patriotic and enlightened perseverance with which the Newcastle 'Foreign Affairs Committee' continues to vindicate the cause of Poland's restoration as the only true guarantee against the humiliation and ruin of the Western Powers in the war which they have declared against Russia, has inspired me to state the facts of 'the Polish question,' the facts as they exist, which statement I have herewith the honour to forward.

In your capacity of Secretary to the Newcastle Committee, and as a strenuous advocate of our common cause, I hope and trust you will, to the utmost of your power, circulate the information contained in the succeeding pages among your representatives, and the various committees and societies of free England, to whom neither the cause nor the result of the great struggle carried on between the Christian world of the East and West can be a matter of indifference.

The heart of my country, dear sir and friend, is well known to me. Be assured of the gratitude of a nation, which, although prostrated into the grave, has never grown cold in its feelings nor its alliances, a nation which by its resurrection will become greater and mightier than ever, and the time will come when that nation's gratitude will amply recompense the British people for the sympathizing cooperation which your persevering zeal has so largely contributed to produce.

Accept, dear friend and ally, the cordial expression of an affectionate heart,

General LOUIS MIEROSLAWSKI.

To JOSEPH COWEN, Jun.,
Secretary to the Committee of Foreign Affairs,
Newcastle-on-Tyne.

A MEMORIAL, &c.

ALL the misfortunes of the present war against Russia originated in one fundamental error, and your military disappointments will continue until yourselves and allies are ruined, if you do not at once change the entire political and moral basis of your operations.

In undertaking a war against a great power, the first thing needful is to become thoroughly acquainted with the nature of that power, the second to make choice of such arms as are best calculated to produce an effect upon the hostile nation. Then, according as you feel ready to employ all these arms or not, you will, or will not undertake the war; for primitive errors of judgment cannot be corrected in the midst of military operations except at an exorbitant price. And this is the case with the war against Russia.

Before taking up arms the Western Powers seem to have purposely closed their eyes and refused to be enlightened as to the real character of the Russian empire. They set up a conventional Russia, in order to have to attack her in her invulnerable points and with weapons which, various and formidable though they seem, have, to the great astonishment of the cleverest statesmen and generals of Europe, been found quite powerless. Thus, without pretending to justify all the strategical faults which were committed in the last campaign, we cannot but think that the greater part of them were unavoidable, and that the greatest military genius could only have compromised his reputation on the ground to which the war has been confined by diplomacy. Strategy by land and sea could be employed only within the limits settled beforehand by the policy of the governments, and when those limits constitute a *champs-clos*, benefiting exclusively one of the belligerent parties, no ability on the part of the commander, no bravery on that of the soldiers, no superiority of organization or discipline can compensate for the disadvantage of position. There is, therefore, in our opinion, a manifest injustice in making the gallant chiefs of the English army responsible for the sacrifice of that army. Like unto Bellerophon, they were sent to fight Chimera; but without any winged horse, and restricted to merely cutting off one of the monster's claws. Nelson in the place of Sir Charles Napier and Wellington in that of Lord Raglan, would, perhaps, have slain a few hundreds more Russians and lost some scores less English, supposing that the one had been more reckless in bringing ships which cost millions against stones

which cost only the sweat of the slave, and that the other had laid siege to the north of Sebastopol instead of the south; but would not the hero of Trafalgar, his only trophy a handful of stones, have had to retire before the Baltic ice, and would not the conqueror of Waterloo have had to leave the trenches of Sebastopol to seek the real Russia elsewhere? No more than Napier and Raglan could Nelson and Wellington have made the Tzar capitulate by attacking his dead extremities, while leaving his vital parts intact under the safeguard of diplomacy. The commissioners of inquiry are not in your docks, your invincible war-ships, or in your heroic battalions, but at the inaccessible hearth of the old political clique, who have determined that their enquiries shall be confined to two cemeteries without egress. It is the treaties of 1815 which should be called to the bar of Parliament, and not the brave officers who are consigned to destruction in order that these treaties may not be infringed.

Whatever be the result of your enquiry, you are now none the less reduced to the alternative of a truce which, after having ruined and humiliated the West, will have settled absolutely nothing, and will leave Russia more powerful, insolent, and dangerous than ever, or of a new campaign, the whole aim and character of which must be altered without delay, under pain of irreparable disasters. There is, consequently, every reason why you should now become acquainted with that which you would not previously take the trouble to learn regarding Russia. Notwithstanding two years of immense and useless efforts, notwithstanding that England has already sacrificed a milliard of money and her only European army, you must begin by asking yourselves: "What is Russia, and in what does her invincibility consist?" This question the Poles alone can answer; for the Poles alone have, without losing their nationality, lived in the midst of that earthly hell for the instruction and redemption of mankind.

Russia is not a nation like Poland, nor a conventional state like Prussia, nor an old dynastic aggregation like Austria, nor a colonial power like England, nor a voluntary association like America, nor a compact and finished centralization like France. Russia is a vast absorbing machine, destined to assimilate all the Slavonic nationalities, and thus acquire the means, on the decline of the Western nations, for overwhelming Europe and the whole world. She is, therefore, above all, a continental power; and if she already seeks to obtain a footing on the Black Sea and Baltic, it is prematurely, through school-boy impatience, and only with the excess of her organic resources. Her gigantic but delusive naval constructions have acquired no real maritime character. They can aspire to that character only when, masters by means of their land forces, or political superiority, of the whole shores of the Black Sea and Baltic, the Tzars can dispose of the Greek and Scandinavian marine. But these objects are to be attained by land and not by sea if they are to be attained at all: by land alone could the Tzar ever bring the Bosphorus within his grasp. Until then he may have pontoons, amphibious batteries and a floating bridge from Cape Chersonesis to the Golden Horn, to second the operations of an army which shall have already passed the Balkans; he may have another floating bridge to aid the movements of an army marching to set right the succession of Denmark for Holstein Gottorp; but there is not

even a shadow of naval squadrons worthy your being uneasy about. If, then, you desire to prevent his ever having a navy, it is not his pontoons and the batteries behind which he hides them which must be destroyed, but the vast laboratory of these continental crimes itself, which will to-morrow supply him with four times the amount you may burn to-day, and also with the keys of the two snares into which the charms of Sebastopol and Cronstadt are drawing you. Where, then, is this laboratory of the present and future Russia? In what soil is nourished the spreading but invisible roots of this gigantic tree, of which you see and cut off only the superfluous thorns?

In Poland, and no where else.

It is by the possession of this country and not by her possession of two large lakes—better closed against her than you—that Russia sustains herself as an invading power, and laughs at the whole world. Poland, by far the most populous and productive portion of the empire, furnishes Russia with her three essential elements of growth and domination:

1. GEOGRAPHICALLY.—It is by the possession of this isthmus, extending from the Black Sea to the Baltic, and uniting the almost island of Europe to the Asiatic continent, that Russia has become, not only a European power, but the only aggressive power in Europe. It is by that possession only that the Baltic and Black Sea, both fed by Polish streams, have become Russian lakes. Moreover, it is by the aid of this immense tract of land that, penetrating into the bosom of the west, isolating, watching, sequestering, and disarming all her neighbours, Russia has rendered every coalition against her illusory and vain, if not wholly impossible, whilst she finds herself at the head of a permanent and indissoluble coalition against civilization. Thanks to this excellent arming place, whilst the rest of Europe cannot take the slightest precaution against Russia without overthrowing treaties, setting armies in motion and risking treasures, and all to end, perhaps, in a confession of impotence, Russia, alone and silent, without declaring war against a great power, finds herself in peace and comfort with everything to her satisfaction, and with bayonets and cannon at the gates of Vienna and Berlin. By the presence of the Russians on the Prosna, on the upper and lower Vistula, the parade grounds of the Tzar cut Prussia into three sections and Austria into two. Russia is thus ever ready to finish in five days in the very heart of Germany a war which for two years the allies have been seeking at Archangel, at Anapa, and in Kamschatka. In fine it is by the possession of these four-fifths of Poland, that, seated on horseback between Europe and Asia, Russia holds these two powers bowed down, weary and uneasy by her continual falsehoods, in her position inaccessible, conquering without needing to stir, crushing when she acts, but crushing still more when she does not move.

2. ECONOMICALLY.—The five dismemberments of Poland, from 1772 to 1832, have added to the empire of the Tzars fifteen governments, consisting of a total superficies of 11,292 geographical square miles, and a population of 16,000,000, this making an average of 1,500 inhabitants to the geographical square mile. Now, with the exception of some dozen large towns and their immediate radius,

all the other European parts of the empire have but an average of 300 inhabitants to the same space. It is evident that these five Western governments represent in Russian economy a power of action and of production five times greater than the other portions of the empire, and as an implacable policy forces the Tzar to exhaust as much as possible those fifteen governments, viz. : Courland, Witepsk, Mohylew, Minsk, Wilna, Grodno, Wolhynia, Podolia, Kiew, Bialystok, Augustow, Lublin, Mazovia, Kalisz, and Kielce, while he promotes the slow and gradual growth of the empire, of which the heaviest burdens are most assuredly borne by Poland. This has been especially the case since what the diplomatists with satisfaction call *the assimilation of the Kingdom of Poland*, that is to say since the time when, by the suppression of all internal limits, the vessels of separation and circulation were broken by the tyranny of the Tzar throughout his empire, these fifteen Polish provinces suffer, toil, produce, and think for the forty others, which are only deserts perpetually being colonized, or rapacious excrescences.

Save in cases of barbarian conquest, these sorts of absorption have frequently taken place between neighbouring peoples without ultimate harm to mankind; but in these cases it was generally men more civilized, more intelligent and more valiant who thus ennobled, so to speak, those who were morally and economically their inferiors, by admitting them to their city. The degrading and sterile domination of the Tzars over Poland can lay claim to no such title. Accomplished not even by the superiority of arms—which would be at least a reason for resignation for the Poles—but by the diplomatic complicity of the two great German powers. That pretended conquest is a cause not yet judged in history, and that cause yet remains intact as well in the opinion of the oppressors as in that of the oppressed. The vanquished in appearance are superior in everything, numbers excepted, to their shameful conquerors. Assimilation transforms, and puts new blood into the veins of, the latter, without enfeebling the former. It results, only, that instead of the benevolent and pacific power which during four centuries protected and guaranteed the laboratory of all the European nationalities against the submersions of the North and the East, Europe, hesitating and stupified, sees installed a frightful military laboratory, a permanent camp of barbarians, barbarians at once disciplined and hardy, Russians, brave and intelligent even as Poles, warlike, alike in defeat and in victory, provided with all the instruments and secrets of civilization to destroy civilization. It is not the dreary marshes of Bothnia, Finland, Archangel, the Caspian, or European Tartary, or the useless fortifications of Petersburg, Cronstadt, or Sebastopol which furnish the Tzars with these formidable means of domination and perpetual menace. These means are supplied by the populous and fertile governments of the West, all torn from Poland. Does not the grain of those provinces pay for the luxuries of the whole empire in time of peace and fill the magazines in time of war? Is it not with their horses that the Tzar improvises and mounts his cavalry? Is it not with their cattle and leather that he feeds and equips his soldiers? Where does he find wood, hemp, and tar for his fleets? In the North-East of Poland. Whence does he take his regular squadrons? From

the South of Poland. With what wool does he clothe and with what iron does he arm his battalions? With the wool of the Lower, and the iron of the Upper Vistula. But it is, above all, from the serried, intrepid and cheerful population of the Polish plains that he at pleasure fills up his quickly-thinned ranks; for, whilst he could not raise a regular and sufficient contingent from the thin population of Great Russia without entirely depopulating it, ruining the domains of the crown, and exasperating the nobles, whose able-bodied serfs are their only riches, he has only to extend his arm towards the West to find five times more quickly five times more than what he requires, while he knows, moreover, that he will only be ruining rebels while he charms the rest of his empire, and obtains the high approbation of neighbouring states. It will now be easily understood by what easy prodigy those Russian armies, which, even after the conquest of the Polish provinces, and up to the time of the *assimilation* were never anything but great empty skeletons, have within the last fifteen years risen to an effective and perfectly solid force of 700,000 men, of which 500,000 are in permanent activity and 200,000 in reserve. Besides this force, always ready to take the field, Russia possesses another army for service in the interior, and numbering 315,000 men. Then, again, she has an irregular army of 126,000 Cossacks, to guard her vast frontiers and for skirmishing. The Polish element is strictly confined to the grand active army. Excluded from the corps of the Guards and the Grenadiers, that element necessarily forms the numerical majority of the six corps of infantry, of the six divisions of light cavalry, and of the three corps of reserve cavalry, which constitute the remainder of the 700,000 men. In fact, four or five-sevenths of these troops, serving fifteen years in activity and ten years in reserve are natives of the fifteen Polish governments of the empire. Particularly in the fifteen divisions of the Cavalry of Reserve, where, with the exception of the superior guards, uniform, flag, all is Polish. It is, in a manner, Southern Poland in its entirety enslaved and militarily colonised for the *regular* service of the Tzar, in the same way that the Cossack population beyond the Dnieper are for his *irregular* service. In those departments giving scope to genius, such as the artillery, the intelligence and education, if not the number of the Poles prevails. In short two-thirds of the cavalry attached to the six corps of infantry of the line, and four of these six corps themselves, are almost entirely recruited in the Polish provinces. In proof of the correctness of the above, here is a more general calculation, one which cannot be contested.

It is known that the existing army has been raised by taking three soldiers from every hundred inhabitants, and as the Polish provinces contain 16,000,000 inhabitants, the number of men raised would amount to 480,000. Allowing 30,000 for the stationary artillery and marine, and 150,000 killed, dead from disease, or invalided, there would still be about 300,000 Poles in the grand active army; for we know that the Polish element does not enter into the *interior* service or the *irregular* service. If we add to this calculation the superiority of civilization, of activity, which distinguishes the Western population of the empire; above all, if we take into account the promptitude with which every Polish peasant becomes an excellent soldier, whilst it takes ten years' drill to make one

of the peasant of the Wolga (this difference was established beyond doubt by the Russian and Polish armies of 1830), it will easily be seen that there is no exaggeration in affirming that it is Poland which constitutes the sinew of the Tzar's forces, and that it is Poland alone which at this moment gives him the means and the audacity to brave united Europe.

Seeing how the Russian empire derives its power from this continental laboratory—this generating reservoir, the reader will be convinced of what we have said relative to the false and eccentric maritime ambition which characterises the Russian government. If the floating armaments of Sebastopol and Cronstadt have any importance, it is but this secondary importance that they consist of the moving *material* of the grand active army. The navy is supplied from the same forests, from the same mines, from the same regions, from the same population, and from the same arsenals. It is but the artillery put on board ship instead of being drawn by horses, it is but magazines propelled by oar, steam, or sail, it is but artillery-men working as galley-slaves, and all this at vast expense, and yet there is no navy: these efforts have been made twenty years too soon. Thus, you see that, like disguised engineers as they are, the Russian admirals, at the moment when their fleets were expected to act, destroyed those fleets with as little compunction as if they had been bridges thrown across the Danube by Gortschakoff, or the environs of a town which hindered the defence of the place. On nearing their three-deckers of 120 guns, you found that they were only harbour-booms; but you were obliged to touch them before you could believe it.

In fact the Russian admirals are not so presumptuous as they seem to be. They know very well that the Tzars cannot make any serious attempt upon the Turkish shores of the Black Sea and the Scandinavian shores of the Baltic—until they have firmly established their autocracy in the centre of continental Europe, by the help of that important tract of land which, under the name of the Kingdom of Poland, cuts Germany into five pieces, and calls upon the Slavons of Prussia, Austria, and Turkey to form one single empire, stretching from the Adriatic to the Pomeranian isles. But this continental domination once guaranteed to her by the complicity of Austria and Prussia in the partition of Poland, the Tzar can, without risk, perpetually threaten Constantinople and the Sound, even though the fortune of war be against him, though Sebastopol and Cronstadt become adjuncts to Cherbourg and Gibraltar, and the Baltic and Black Seas Anglo-French lakes. So long as the Tzars remain masters of the important isthmus which joins those two seas, no maritime disadvantage, no check experienced by them at the extremities of their empire, can retard for a single year the growth of their fundamental power. This is a state maxim which every native of the West should make his children learn by heart, and which you should engrave in uneffaceable letters on the fronts of all your ambassadors' palaces, on the prows of even your smallest ships, and over the gates of all your arsenals. Unless this elementary truth be patent to every full grown Englishman, you will pass the last century of your history between commissions of inquiry directed against your naval and military chiefs, and truces, all the expenses of which you will

have to pay. During these truces, the Tzar will rebuild his batteries and pontoons, and seize upon your first misundersanding with other states to accomplish by land that which you thought you had prevented him from accomplishing by sea. Thus his maritime phantasmagoria has accomplished his object by misdirecting your attacks from his only vulnerable part. And when, by force of obstinacy, and the sacrifice of men and money, and after having drowned popular enthusiasm in waves of blood, you shall have overthrown these defences, you will find the Russian empire stronger than on the day of Mentschikoff's arrival at Constantinople, and on the throne of that empire you will find a young and vigorous Tzar instead of the old and dying one. Then, conquerors, you will conclude a peace which will give you possession of the Black Sea for a couple of years, but which will give the vanquished possession of Europe for a couple of centuries.

If, on the other hand, whilst keeping possession of the Black Sea because you are there and of the Baltic whilst you may, you should none the less continue to seek the heart of your enemy, and to seek it with the points of your bayonets in Poland, your dead heroes of Inkermann and Balacava would rise from their graves to embrace us, their brothers in arms, every hole made in your ships by the bullets of Sebastopol would be filled up with a portion of the imperial purple, and all that you have been vainly asking for two years you will readily obtain without asking for it. In short, attack Poland, disorganize the Tzar's armies, his arsenals, his hierarchy, his plans of resistance, his hopes of a resumption of offensive operations, by provoking the defection of 300,000 Poles, by whom alone he is able to bear up against you, and then see whether he will continue to amuse himself by disputing with you the possession of the Crimea and Finland! Let these 300,000 Poles learn that their old flag (which they believe to have been consumed in the fire of the battle of Warsaw) is once more found and is borne by your van-guard on the the Baltic shore, and you will soon see how many remain under the banner of the Tzar of the 100,000 men who hold the Crimea, of the 70,000 who hold Caucassia, of the 60,000 who defend Bessarabia, of the 100,000 who watch the shores of the Baltic, and of the 250,000 who threaten Germany. Can you now conceive the importance of Poland to Russia both in a military sense and economically? But this is not all; for,

3. POLITICALLY.—Poland gives the empire of the Tzars all her titles and all her means of international and monographical suzerainty. It is well known that it was by the partition of Poland between herself and the two great powers of Germany, that Russia has succeeded in binding central Europe to her own fortunes, in tying the hands of the whole of Germany, and in acquiring in every continental congress such a preponderance that no sincere and durable coalition against the Tzar is possible whilst Poland remains dismembered. According to the stupid prejudices which, in the diplomatic free-masonry of Europe, have survived the continual violation of the treaty of Vienna by the makers of that treaty themselves, the Polish booty of the Tzars must not be touched—that is to say, a serious war against Russia must not be begun, without the consent of the two

other partitioners of Poland. Why not say at once, without the consent of Russia herself? So long, moreover as the German powers make the conservation of the their shreds of Poland the pivot of what they call the European equilibrium, that equilibrium will never be anything more than the progressive, constant and guaranteed advance of the principal spoliator of Poland; for they will feel every attack directed against their accomplice to be directed against themselves, and will consider any proposition of an alliance with states guiltyless of this great crime as an insolent proposition of repentance and suicide. And if, from madness, hypocrisy, or miscalculation, one or both of them should yield for a moment to the temptation of lifting their hands against their suzerain accomplice, their new allies could not count on their aid longer than until they sustained some reverse, for, in that case, composed as they are of shreds and patches, fully exposed to the lion wrath of Russia, and threatened with destruction or, at least, with irreparable calamities before France and England could come to their assistance, in what quarter would they seek their salvation? Evidently in a sudden return to their hard but accustomed Eastern vassalage, and in a redoubling of their servile fury against the West. This return to the old yoke, so completely foreshadowed by the events of 1813, will be the more inevitable, in consequence of Russia being, thanks to that infernal partition of Poland, always in such a position with respect to them as to make pardon as easy and profitable as punishment. How, then, can any statesman having either common sense or memory seriously offer the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin the Anglo-French alliance in exchange for the Tzar's protection whilst Poland remains dismembered? How, too, can any one imagine that the Scandinavian states, placed within grasp of the claws of the polar bear, should dare to express their real fears and their real sympathies before the complete and final disarmament of the vindictive beast, by the separation of Poland, has guaranteed their permanent freedom of choice? How can it be expected that all those uncles, nephews, cousins, fathers-in-law, descendants and collateral relations of the Tzars, who for a century have been labouring so earnestly to place the tumbling German dynasties under the protection of Romanoff and Holstein-Gottorp in competition with Hapsburg-Lorraine and Hohenzollern-Brandenbourg, should abandon the throne which supports them and insures their safety before that throne be finally levelled with the dust? How can it be expected that Poland herself should think of moving, whilst even those powers which have so pompously declared war against Russia, carry on that war as Louis XII. carried on his war against Pope Julius II., by distinguishing the sacred from the profane—that they should be overjoyed at the roar of cannon, already fired perhaps to celebrate the signature of a peace, which would be for them the eternal peace of the tomb?

Nor is this all the impious security which the possession of the holy sepulchre of modern Christendom gives to its principal possessor. Beside and under the mask of the worn-out politics of congresses, there is the serious and ever-young politics of races and nationalities;—beside and under the official and mechanical political system which is manufactured and which requires to be yearly adjusted

with lever and pulley, there is the organic and natural political system, the *perpetuum mobile* of humanity; beside and opposed to the motionless equilibrium of diplomacy, there is the ever-rising sap of races and the quickly-circulating blood of nations. Is it supposed that the cabinet of St. Petersburg, because principally profiting by that political system and that equilibrium established by the Congress of Vienna, will not endeavour to take advantage of the second? To suppose so is a gross absurdity; for what advantage would the Tzar have in his mastery over the only nationality which has yet completely disengaged itself from the Slavonic chaos—the only one of the Slavonic nationalities which is conscious of its identity, if he were not to employ it for the purpose of welding together the less homogeneous portions of the Slavonic race? Poland is, therefore, as indispensable to him ethnologically as diplomatically.

The 15 to 16,000,000 of Poles which Russia is now endeavouring to assimilate constitutes the very kernel of the Slavonic race. The three purest and most ancient tribes of that family, the Lecho-Chrobates, the Lettes, and the Russians, were established as a central nation and formed a historical community for four centuries and a half on the capital isthmus of Europe, where they were free from all foreign alluvion, and where they dominated over all the other tribes of the same race in spite of all and every written convention.

And, firstly, the political, religious, and social homogeneousness of Poland causes that one of the three partitioners who possesses two-thirds to be irresistably impelled to the acquisition of the remainder, and he, accordingly, thinks, commands, and acts as the presumptive heir of all Slavonia. And the remainder of the race, enslaved from the middle age till now by the Nazegues, the Mongols, the Turks, and the Germans have preserved, beneath the ice of their slavery, all their physical vigour, to commence their tardy national existence only in our own day. The whole of this race, consisting of 85,000,000 of men, occupying something like three-fourths of the surface of Europe, and united by a similarity of language, customs, and prophecies, are profoundly agitated in the expectation of their Mahomet or Messiah. Russia promises them the material conquest of the world on condition of their being firmly united in obedience, and offers to be their Mahomet; whilst Poland, the antithesis of Russia, promises them liberty in a federation of distinct, peaceful and equally-balanced nationalities. She, too, therefore, announces herself as their Messiah; but both undertake to free them from the supremacy of other races, and to give them their turn of taking the initiative in the annals of mankind. It will be readily understood how great an interest Russia has in destroying, if possible, that Polish competition—that Polish antithesis, by first absorbing her in her empire and then making use of her against the other constitutional Slavonic nationalities. It will be equally understood why Russia helps Prussia and Austria to destroy the rival religion in their portions of the spoil of Poland, until the hour strikes (and it has not yet struck) for Russia to raise without competition the banner of that which is called Pan Slavism against Germany and against the world.

Whilst Russia and Poland represent the two opposing historical poles of the Slavonic race, giving the latter a choice of two diametrically opposite destinies, that race as yet consists only of rudimentary, passive and malleable nationalities

taking part in the struggle between the two champions with all the irresponsible unconsciousness of their age, and are ready to follow the strongest and most fortunate. If the Western powers, for whom the present question will soon become as it now is for us, one of life or death, will give timely aid to Poland, all the other Slavonic nationalities will find themselves at once liberated, without their even having the trouble to enquire whence their safety came. The crushing and devouring mechanism of Russia once decomposed by the separation of Poland, all idea of Pan Slavism is over for ever, as is likewise the conquering autocracy, and the peril perpetually hanging over the pacific maturity of Europe. The face of affairs in the East would be completely changed at once, and, instead of troubling the West, it would quietly set about the development of its diverse nationalities. From that monstrous assemblage called the Russian empire there would be disengaged amongst others a real and fundamental nationality, called Muscovy, and whose mission would thenceforth be to form of the East of Europe and the North of Asia a confederation similar to the United States of North America.

But should Russia prevail in this duel, all the Slavonic nations, carried away by the conquering torrent like submerged flocks—all confounded in one terrible army under the most impetuous despotism that ever existed, will fall at once upon Germany and Turkey, quickly overcoming the tardy and hesitating resistance of the West by their servile and disciplined masses and by their ethnological unanimity. Poland once assimilated to the Russian empire, all the antidotes, all the warnings, all the promises of liberty addressed by the West to the other Slavonic nations will be unheard in the tumultuous vertigo of their aggressive outbreak; for, with the exception of Poland, none of those tribes have the remembrance of having been independent, or are conscious of political liberty. They have had only the experience of the social yoke of the Turks and Germans, so that even the most absolute Tzar, providing he deliver them from this social yoke which they understand and abhor will be looked upon by them as more than a liberator: he will be to them an avenger.

In presence of that ethnological tempest which would raise Bulgarians, Serbs, Bosnians, and Montenegrins against Turkish domination—would raise 17,000,000 of Galicians, Slovaks, Serbs, Moravians, Bohemians, Croats, Dalmatians, and Illyrians against Austria—would raise 4,000,000 of Pomeranians, Poles, Silesians, and others against Prussia—in presence of that blind and furious attack directed against the south and centre of Europe by the disciplined fanaticism of the Russians, combined with the enslaved valour of the Poles, what could be effected by, and what would become of, the most sapient combinations of diplomacy? What then would be the use of all their balances of power founded on the conventions of cabinets, and on the oppression of other nationalities? Where, in that hour of danger, would the West seek auxiliaries to stem the invading torrent of a whole race, the only aggressive race in Europe, because the only race that possesses nothing, and that has all to win back from its spoliators? Would it be the Greeks, who in Turkey form a counterpoise to the Slavons of the Danube? Would the Roumanians, the Hungarians and the Italians arrest

the ruin of Austria? Would the natives of the Rhine provinces fight the Posnanian vanguard of Panslavia?

There remains, you will tell us, to stem this torrent the permanent alliance of England and France. Admitting this union to be eternal, in spite of our experience of human fickleness, of what avail would be all their naval and military strategy against such a continental revolution? Will they continue to remain in the Black Sea, when the Bulgarians and Greeks themselves form the advanced guard of the Panslavian empire on the Bosphorus? Will they have more influence on the Scandinavian states by four months' cruises, than Russia, the terror and Suzerain of Germany will have by continual continental vigilance? Does not the neutrality of Denmark during all the wars of the empire suffice to show that amphibious states are always obliged to make their maritime interests bow to their fears and the continental influences brought to bear upon them? Do not outlying states always yield to the influence of the ruler who reigns in the centre of their system? Suppose that Napoleon had succeeded in establishing his continental system, in ruling all the shores of Europe without keeping a single ship of war, what would have become of the naval and colonial power of England, hard pressed by that continental blockade on the one side and American competition on the other? Well, Panslavism, with the assimilation of Poland to begin with, is the 'continental system' of Russia; but it is more extensive and dangerous than Napoleon's great bonfire, for it depends, not on the lottery of battles and the passage of a meteor, but on undying races who win campaigns whilst they lose battles, and who have enough of Napoleon in themselves to do without Napoleons. They are, it is true, at the service of the most far-seeing, and might as well be made to overwhelm the Tzar as the West; but from this it becomes the more evident that if the West does not hasten to appropriate the Polish crater, the Tzars will soon make of it a Vesuvius, utterly indifferent to the mock sea-fights of the Pompeians. It is then only, when, mistress not only of two muddy and closed lakes, but of an immense extent of coast, of really maritime populations, of illimitable resources and communications, and of the keys of the almost island of Europe, that Russia will be able to accomplish in five years that which Peter, Anne, Elizabeth, Catherine, Alexander, and Nicholas have scarcely begun in a hundred and fifty. Panslavian Russia, suzerain of the Greeks, Scandinavians, and Germans, will no longer shrink from a sea fight, but will rather seek it in your own waters, by keeping on good terms with the Americans, with whom nothing on earth can prevent her dividing the Globe. To convert into a reality this dream of our imagination—an imagination diseased as was that of the good man Noah talking to the statesmen of his day, but one of two things are required: either the immediate conclusion of a peace exceedingly advantageous for you, or, the continuation of the war in the way you have conducted up to the present time. The 'continental system' of the Tzar would be best served by the first; but, failing that *Pletwitz armistice* the other will prove useful to him. Go on, then, if it so please you.

For what has Russia been called to account since her plans are said to have been unveiled, the alliance of England and France made certain, and the German

Powers each day more and more compromised in the coalition? She counts on three great probabilities ;—1. That in the weariness of an interminable war the *entente cordiale* will be destroyed by the very cause which gave rise to it. 2. That that honey-moon will last longer than usual, as France and England, having finished and forgotten their era of ethnological transformation, have lost the consciousness of the peril with which they are threatened by this species of revolution in the east, and are, consequently, incapable of attacking their enemy in that part in which he is really vulnerable. 3. That if France and England be disarmed in consequence of their ignorance of this peril, the German Powers will be equally disarmed by their too great consciousness and too great fear of the same.

This third token of security for the Tzar is worthy of our most earnest attention ; for, combined with the diplomatic prejudice which insists in making Germany take part in every war against Russia, renders the latter eternally, and, so to speak, mathematically unattackable. At once the accomplices and liberator of Russia for their respective shares of Poland, insolvent debtors of Russia for their portions of Slavonia, subalterns of Russia in the unalterable hierarchy of the vanities of Vienna, Munchengrätz, and Cracow, supported by Poland against the revolutionary winds of the West, but taken in the rear by Russia if the West attacks them, immediately crushed in front if the West sustain them, and crushed on both sides if they remain isolated, these unfortunate German Powers having only the manner of their death to choose have chosen the slow death of a steady vassalage to Russia, and which they seek to disguise under the palms of the Holy Alliance. Russia has no real fear of their revolting, for the Tzar knows that at the decisive moment they will prefer, as the least of two evils, the alliance and protection of Russia. Their task is hard, but, at least, it is familiar to them, and they will not readily abandon it to run the risk of novelties of which no official science could reckon in advance the effects. By dazzling the eyes of Austria with some portion of Turkey, those of Prussia with the supremacy of Germany, and frightening both by speaking of the conquering ambition of France and the terrible phantom of her revolutions, the Tzar, vigilantly watching their hours of weakness, cares little for their ephemeral mutinous fits ; for these two artificial states existing by expediency and empiricism, the embarrassment of the moment will always suffice to bring them to a full stop should they attempt to stray from their allegiance to the Tzar.

Western diplomacy, unable to understand the ethnological terrors which agitate these two states, thinks to set them permanently against their tyrannical creditor by offering them the support of France and England against him ! Small consolation truly for the house of Hapsburg-Lorraine when the furious waves of the ocean of Panslavism shall be beating against the walls of Trieste, Vienna, and Egra ! Small consolation for the house of Hohenzollern-Brandenburg when Custrin, Stettin, and Breslau shall have their real names restored by their real defenders ! Notwithstanding their ability, therefore, Western diplomatists have no idea of the manner in which they are annoying and compromising these poor but proud houses by proposing to them such a misalliance. What, then, should

they propose to them in order not to offend them, in order not to make of them implacable enemies in the event of any Russian success? At most an armed neutrality which will last until some catastrophe puts an end to the useless and ruinous expeditions to the Black Sea and Baltic. But is not that armed neutrality itself, suspending until then its sword of Damocles over these expeditions, more profitable to Russia than to the allies of Turkey? Is it not manifest, for example, that the invincible resistance of the Russians in the Crimea is solely owing to the liberation of Gortschakoff on the Pruth by the Austrians taking the place of the Turks in the Danubian Principalities? Is it not equally clear that ever since the blockade of the Baltic coasts was established, the commerce of Russia has continued to exist only by the King of Prussia allowing Russian merchandise free transit through his dominions? Can it be denied, above all, that the safety of the Tzar's Polish provinces, whether guaranteed by this armed neutrality, or, still better, by a defensive alliance of the German states with the West, will have the effect of rendering Russia completely invulnerable, and the greatest successes of her enemies elsewhere illusory? Moreover, if two years of costly and bloody apprenticeship which the Western powers have benevolently inflicted upon themselves, has been of any use whatever to them, it has been by showing that in Russia they have an adversary whom they have neither conquered nor even for a single moment checked in the working out of her dark designs, so long as they shall not have overwhelmed her, and torn her asunder piece by piece, nationality by nationality, until they have penetrated to, and laid bare, his Muscovite core.

But, it will be asked, how is Russia to be conquered, that is to say, dismembered, without passing over the body of Germany, and thus, before Russia has been crippled, to provoke a continental coalition against France, a coalition from which the naval assistance of England would be unable to save her? To this question there is and ever will be but one reply: *Raise Russian Poland without the concurrence of the German Powers, and by this means save those powers as surgeons save their patients—without them and in spite of them.* You will never get these sick men—sick in body and in mind, with whom anger takes the place of courage and suspicion of reason, to free themselves by any self-performed operation from even the most painful and dangerous of their ailments; but if you have the address to ease them without asking them, they will recover courage and reason along with health. Prussia and Austria continue to hold their respective slices of Poland only from emulation towards Russia, and this emulation, as odious as it is ridiculous, prevents their seeing that what they deem an essential condition of health is only a sad infirmity. Save them, then, from Russia, and you will restore them to health and wisdom.

Never did Providence more clearly point out the way for a Western crusade in favour of Poland than by the two seas upon which that isthmus rests. And if the German Powers continued to oppose Poland's restoration they would have no better claim to continued existence than Russia herself, and they would thus show that they only sought a pretext for war against the West. But whilst Russian Poland was being raised by means of the naval forces of England and

France, Prussia and Austria would be squabbling about German supremacy, and before they had settled this question a Poland would have sprung up to calm them. In the event of that course being taken neither Austria nor Prussia could raise the slightest national feeling—the least approach to the enthusiasm of 1813, against the West, and, as soon as they saw that you could, and that you were quite determined to reestablish Poland through Riga and Odessa, their choice would soon be made. It is not unlikely, even, that in proportion as they felt themselves cured and protected from the North wind by the Polish bulwark, they would forget their prejudices against the raising of that bulwark, and benevolently open their Zollverein to the productions of the West, even if they did not supply a York and Schwartzberg contingent to the crusade. Only, a Poland already established, aiding this contingent, would prevent a repetition of the disreputable pleasantries of 1812 and 1813. From whatever point of view the question is regarded it is equally clear that a Poland, as embryonic as you will, but militant and independant, is absolutely requisite before you can be indifferent to the favourable or unfavourable disposition of the German powers. So long as you shall not have taken Riga and Odessa for your base, and the plains of the Dwina and the Dnieper for your concentric line, of operations—so long as you shall not have a Polish force for your van-guard, and either Brzesc, Litewski, or Smolensk for your last objective point, the disposition of these powers will always be unfavourable to you. They will treat with you only at the last to refuse you permission even to pronounce the name of Poland. If they dare not interdict the way of the Danube to a French army finding it easier to attack Russia on the Vistula than in the Crimea, they will consider their not doing so such a mighty favour, will make the Frenchmen's debt of gratitude so onerous, and will so din them on their route with their grievances, that when the said army reaches Poland it will have entirely forgotten what it came there for, and will be able to return again only by Anapa or Petro-Pawlosk. A Western army which should take this route without having first excited Poland to insurrection by the help of the fleets, would find itself in the position of the crusaders, depending upon the hospitality of the Greek emperor to enable them to reach the Holy Land, only the faith of these Western soldiers not being quite so great as was that of Peter the Hermit and Conrad, they would be satisfied with one attempt, and, before they reached the source of the Vistula they would understand with M. Thiers that 'that damned Poland is untouchable.'

It is in fact untouchable, as everything else is impossible when you do not set to work in the proper way. But touch it a little from the sea shore on the North and on the South, without asking permission of any intermediary, and you will soon find yourselves perfectly successful with the aid of those very intermediaries whose help you did not solicit. Only be careful to ask nothing from the German Powers, and you will be astonished at the amount of service they will offer to do you. Only find means to carry on the war absolutely without them for three months in Lithuania or Podolia, and you will find them complaining of your being tardy and lukewarm in establishing for them Poland against Russia. But this means you have no need to discover, inasmuch as you have

possessed it ever since you commenced hostilities with the Tzar. You hold this means in your hands for the first and perhaps for the last time in the annals of European conflicts since, by an alliance which never existed before, you can, on the Continent, hold Germany in respect without interfering with her, whilst by sea you can effect a landing in Poland, without any one presuming to gainsay the act.

It is true that, possessing this means, if you do not use it in a frank and proper manner, it will be just as if you possessed it not. And you will *not* use it in a frank and proper manner, if, when you have taken possession of Riga, instead of attacking Cronstadt, seized Odessa in place of besieging Sebastopol, you have no ulterior intention than that of vexing the Tzar and showing the Vienna conference the range of your cannon. The range of your guns is known, and it is not doubt of their power which inspires the friends of Russia with hope. It is rather the belief which they entertain that were you masters not only of Riga and Odessa but of Warsaw itself, you would not employ your advantages in restoring Poland. It is this hope, founded on all you have done during the last two years, which you must hasten to destroy, unless you mean to conclude a peace which will give Russia all that the war might prevent her obtaining, for ever break up the Western alliance, and throw Poland finally into the arms of Pan Slavism.

It is not, consequently, worth your while to take Riga and Odessa unless you mean to raise the whole of the isthmus between them in insurrection. But this raising of the people in insurrection in itself implies conditions, neither the gravity nor extent of which we wish to disguise; for we abstain from all diplomacy and leave the exercise of that art to those who better understand it than we do. The first of these conditions is that in sending your artillery to Riga and Odessa, you should, as a nation, feel that it is not merely to establish warehouses, as on the coasts of Asia and Africa, that you send them, but that it is to resuscitate an allied, sovereign and free power, a power transmitting its freedom to all the vassals of Russia. If you like not this prospect, think no more of what we have said, leave your artillery where it is, and subscribe at Vienna the three articles of peace above cited. If, on the contrary, by one of those outbursts of patriotism, better than any amount of reflection, and which, more surely than all diplomacy and trading, acquires the empire of the world, you clear this first fosse and accept the costs of a *real Poland*, do not think your trials are then ended. You will also need to learn how to build up that at once delicate and formidable power called a nation, from which Napoleon with all his military and governmental genius, could never obtain anything more than squadrons and battalions, similar to so many others and useless like so many others. But all the mistakes of that great captain, after he came forth from his old Charlemagne world, arose from the fact of his having been born with only the sense of that world, and, consequently, altogether incapable of understanding the Slavonic nationality in general and Polish patriotism in particular. The warnings which he received on this subject, whether from Poles or from Providence, irritated him without enlightening his understanding. It might be said that he perished because of

his not understanding Poland. These warnings and the obstinacy which persisted in disregarding them may, at least, serve to guide the generation which God has called to redeem his faults. But there is at the present day two opinions diametrically opposed to each other as to the means of restoring Poland. The first of these opinions is an exaggeration of the faults of Napoleon, and the second a peurile fanfaronade. The holders of the first say to you: Raise up a Poland, but without the assistance of the Poles; confide the work to the discreet sagacity of the diplomatists, but do not allow the dead to interfere in the work of their resurrection, for they will spoil all. The second say: Poland needs no foreign help; leave her to make her revolution by herself, only holding yourselves ready to sustain her better than you did in 1830.

We will not say how much of hypocrisy or blindness there is in the first of these two pieces of advice; but the second deserves a reply, because it may be given in all sincerity by those who are ignorant of the state in which Poland is at this moment.

Well, then, no; Poland will not rise in insurrection unless an armed, but Polish hand be extended to her from without. She will not rise in insurrection spontaneously, because her social and national organism is at this moment decomposed, at least materially, just as we hope to decompose the monstrous machine of the Tzar, in order to render it harmless. Her provinces are, so to speak, disarticulated, and guarded carefully by her three partitioners. Her population is likewise dismembered—divided into passive instruments of tyranny, in patriots, banished, enchained, or disarmed, and in economical slaves, whose lives and labour only fatten conquest. The whole of the male military population is embodied in the three armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia: 300,000 in the first, 100,000 in the second, and 60,000 in the third. It is from these depôts of stolen goods that you must obtain the 460,000 soldiers of the future Polish army. The 150,000 additional pairs of arms which could be taken from the plough in Poland without causing the army to perish of hunger in six months, will also rise; but they will not rise of their own accord, kept in mental darkness, scattered and crushed as they now are beneath a double oppression, social and political. In place of that half million of Poles carried off or paralyzed during the last two years, so foolishly expended by you, there has been crowded on that great battle field of humanity half a million of grave watchers, who, until the cemeteries of Poland open beneath their feet, will form one single army. These are, be assured, the picked troops of this moral empire. Whilst you seek them at the extremities of Russia and in the several camps, they remain silent and motionless at the centre of Europe relieving each other on guard at that overthrown altar whereon they have sworn their oath of eternal alliance. This is why this altar cannot at this moment rise up again of its own accord. But for this dismemberment, for this oppression, for this purely mechanical hindrance, however heavily it may seem to weigh, there is a remedy as simply sovereign: it is to chemically dissolve the heaviest of the three burdens which press upon Poland and render her motionless—to dissolve it by abstracting from it that Polish element by which it is held together—it is to decompose the Russian

army by means of some Polish armed force, in the same way as the hardest and most voluminous bodies are reduced to powder by means of oxygen gas. To gather this dissolving force, in a free and active condition, it is necessary to seek it not within the territorial limits of Poland, whence it is banished, but without those limits—in the Polish emigration. It is by means of the Polish emigration and only by means of the Polish emigration that you can break the first link of the chain by which the living nation is kept bound down in its triple sepulchre.

Remark that the Polish emigration is a special representation of all the phenomena of Poland's sufferings. That emigration is not, like so many others, either a party vanquished in civil war, or some noble remnant of a noble army, or a surplus population proceeding to colonize foreign lands, or yet a particular and limited caste: it is, on the contrary, the inexhaustible, illimitable and perpetual *elite* of the entire Polish society; it is the free and faithful manifestation abroad of all the internal thoughts and forces of the fatherland paralyzed by tyranny. Consequently, that emigration has neither fixed age nor fixed numbers; for it represents in succession every generation that has endeavoured to cast off the yoke of the foreigner since 1830, and it will represent all those that are to follow until their continual martyrdom tires the continual rigours of Providence. Keeping for its home use only its representations of grief, patience and servitude, the Polish nation communicates to the other nations her militant and resurrectional hopes by this perpetual embassy. Thus, when you would know what entire Poland hopes, desires and promises, it is useless to turn to the nation still gagged and bound; her emigration replies and acts for her until such time as the nation may freely dispose of itself.

But the Polish emigration is not only the verb of Poland, it is also her sword. Only the point of this sword is in the body of Russia; the hilt is out of Russia, out of Poland, and whoever shall seize it will be able to pierce Russia through and deliver Poland with the same blow. The portion of that militant expansion of Poland which you have seen amongst you during the last three and twenty years, is only the mobilized vanguard of the nation—a vanguard inseparable from the endless reserves which only await the beat of a drum to fall in behind it. The number of the emigrants wandering in France, Switzerland, Belgium, Algeria, the East, England, America, and even in Australia, would give no correct idea of the military force to be derived from them; for besides them there are:—1. The emigrants now in Prussia and Austrian Poland, who are flying from the Muscovite conscription, and who are more or less numerous exactly in proportion as they have more or less hope of forming a Polish army out of Poland. 2. All those who, in Russian Poland, are waiting to take in their turn the place of those obliged to fly. 3. All those who, in the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian Armies, are waiting for the apparition of a Polish flag on the horizon of Europe. The numerical fighting force of the Polish emigration has, therefore, no other limits than those which the national conscience recognises as necessary in sending abroad such soldiers of the national cause as cannot, in the present state of affairs, find employment at home. It depends entirely upon the amount of sincere solicitude shown to consult that conscience by the other na-

tions interested in the salvation of Poland, whether the Polish emigration will be made use of or disarmed in the present war against Russia. If, like Napoleon the first, and like some recruiting officers of the present day, who are repudiated by the Polish national conscience, you seek in the Polish emigration only material aid—only blind and stupid machines of war to replace those of which bullets and cholera have deprived you, you will find the emigration thoroughly worthless for that purpose. There are amongst us, as in every other emigration, a few immoral and needy individuals, who will ask of you money and military appointments,—the least depraved for money only, in order to have to furnish you with, in exchange, a neither greater nor less quantity of blood than you could obtain from the quarter of a dragoon's horse purchased at half price from your own breeders. Believe in our experience and buy two horses. The true soldiers, those who give their swords only with their hearts, will refuse you both, and your enemies will take advantage of the fact to persuade you that there is no Polish emigration any more than a Polish nation.

But if you understand by the Polish emigration those continual crowds of delegates which, for three and twenty years, Poland has been sending to every free people and every free government, to bid those peoples and governments aid her meditated insurrection; if you mean that invulnerable and immortal soul of the nation which has escaped all temptations as well as all the discouragements of slavery;—if you mean those Knight-errants of Liberty who have never broken their vows of self-sacrifice, and whom no trial their laws render necessary has yet daunted; if, respecting those vows and laws, if you, in accepting the Polish emigration for what it really is, seek only a lever of insurrection and military organization for Poland, and in Poland exclusively, your good faith will be rewarded by the only decisive victory which it is possible to obtain over Russia, and, afterwards, by the only peace which will not be for you a defeat.

To an appeal of such a character the Polish emigrants would respond to a man. Plant where you will the white eagle on a crimson ground, and it will be seen at the same moment by all the Polish refugees in whatever part of the world they may be: it will be seen better than the sun itself which is visible only in one hemisphere at a time. At the same moment, and without showing more hesitation than migrating birds when their time for departure has come, they would spring forth from their obscure retreats, from the shackles that are imposed upon them, from regions near and far where no police would have suspected their existence, faithful to the rendezvous agreed upon by all of them when they buried their arms under the threshold of the fatherland.

To this gathering of crusaders what have you to add to free the Holy Sepulchre of Poland? Less certainly than is needed to organize mercenaries without a country, and who, because they have no country, will change their flag at the first check you experience. All that a real Polish legion asks from your brotherly hands is a stirrup to enable it to mount: only a tithe of these mountains of muskets, cannon, powder and balls, which, employed as you have hitherto employed them, have not brought down one of Cronstadt's towers, and which, em-

ployed as you might have employed them, would already have opened in the Russian empire a breach the breadth of the whole of Poland.

Give us, then, a foot of earth to unfurl our banner, arms for ourselves and for the country we go to free, freedom to choose our way, and the support and escort of your fleets; do to raise up a Poland only a quarter of what you did to free Spain and Greece; risk for the salvation of an entire nation that which Pitt was so prodigal of for the purpose of restoring a miserable party; do for your perpetual security in Europe and Asia that which your sea-captains do daily for the security of Chinese commerce; in allying ourselves with you we ask no more. Accomodating allies, paying at once for what we have with our blood and reimbursing ourselves at the expense of the enemy, we will cost you, to deliver you for ever from war by victory, only a third of what diplomacy asks to make war permanent, and hardly a hundredth part of what you paid Austria to lose for you the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Wagram.

CONCLUSIONS.

1. Russia being an essentially continental power, and unable seriously to pretend to any maritime expansion until she has extended and consolidated her domination on the Greek and Scandinavian coasts, to attack her naval extremities is absolutely profitless.

2. That continental power of Russia depending solely on the dismemberment of Poland, Russia is vulnerable only in her portion of Poland.

3. But this one vulnerable point of Russia being constantly protected by the German Powers having been sharers in the partition of Poland, the Tzar possesses by his conquest of that country a firm hold upon Germany, the protectorate of Pan Slavism, and the certainty of being able to retake by land, not only all that may be taken from him on his present seaboard, but also the two naval Keys of Europe.

4. Thus, to reach this one vulnerable and accessible side of the Russian empire, it is requisite to cease asking permission of the German Powers, and to take a road which they cannot interdict. Only when this road has been found and the restoration of Poland taken in hand, will the said powers deny their vassalage to Russia and be forced to act in concert with the West.

5. This lateral way to Poland was opened up on the day when the fleets entered the Black Sea and the Baltic; for Poland is the isthmus which joins those two seas, and both ends of that isthmus are comprised in the Russian part of Poland.

6. When France and England shall have understood that the extremities of that isthmus are Odessa and Riga and not Sebastopol and Cronstadt, they will have to learn how they are then to act in order, from these new bases of operations, to raise up a veritable and useful Poland, a Poland which shall prevent Russian successes in all time to come.

7. That they may not be deceived on this point, we warn the Western Governments that, on one hand, disgusted by cruel experience of five attempts at resurrection by diplomatic means, leading, as could be seen, to nothing but a sixth and mortal dismemberment, and on the other decapitated, depopulated, and paralyzed internally by her three united oppressors, Poland will respond in arms only to the call of her emigration already armed, and landed in the country. This would be the triumphant return of that delegation of the Polish nation to the other peoples of the earth, which has continually been renewed during the last three and twenty years.

8. Then, any war undertaken against Russia can only end in an armistice, a sure preliminary of Russia's crowning triumph, unless the Polish emigration be armed, with the exclusive aim of opening by means of that vanguard the two gates of Poland, on the Black Sea and on the Baltic.

WHERE, O POLAND, ARE THY LANCES ?

Where, O Poland, are thy lances ?
Europe needs them once again,
Westward horde on horde are pouring,
Poles, for you we look in vain ;
Comes the savage Cossack, onward
Spurs the Tartar with loose rein,
Where, O Poland, are thy lances ?
Europe needs them once again.

O, for Kosciusko's legions,
Those Poniatowski led,
They who charged at gory Grochow,
Those who with Dombrowski bled,
Hearts that, Frenchmen, for your glory
Poured their streaming blood like rain ;
Where, O Poland, are thy lances,
Europe needs them once again.

Yes, we need them in the struggle
Looked for long, where Europe fights
Armed for all that makes her glory,
Arts and freedom, thoughts and rights :
Shall the Tartar's trampling horse-hoofs
Make the boasts of ages vain ?
Where, O Poland, are thy lances ?
Europe needs them once again.

Shall no more thy snow white eagle
Sweep the battle as of yore ?
Shall we see thy countless pennons
Streaming down the charge no more ?
Must we for thy old war-cry
Henceforth listen all in vain ?
Where, O Poland, are thy lances ?
Europe needs them once again.

W. C. BENNETT.

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INSTITUTED NOVEMBER 16TH, 1854.

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Counteract the evils of Secret Diplomacy, especially, at the present moment, in reference to any diplomatic conspiracy to hatch a shameful peace founded on such absurd and iniquitous propositions as the notorious 'four points'; and to endeavour, in opposition thereto, to promote the establishment of such a peace as shall be honourable, and durable, because based upon the recognition of the just rights of nations, and the annihilation of the despotism of Russia. Furthermore, to agitate against the secret system, and to insist that no treaties with foreign powers be concluded prior to having been discussed and sanctioned by Parliament;

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