Browsing by Subject "Central bank independence"

Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Government Leadership and Central Bank Design 
      Hallett, Andrew Hughes; Weymark, Diana N. (Vanderbilt University, 2002)
      This article investigates the impact on economic performance of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government with both distributional and stabilization objectives. It ...
    • Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics, and Central Bank Design 
      Hallett, Andrew Hughes; Weymark, Diana N. (Vanderbilt University, 2002)
      The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and ...
    • Inflation Income Redistribution and Optimal Central Bank Independence 
      Weymark, Diana N.; Reeves, Daniel (Vanderbilt University, 2001)
      The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank ...