Browsing by Subject "central bank conservatism"

Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics, and Central Bank Design 
      Hallett, Andrew Hughes; Weymark, Diana N. (Vanderbilt University, 2002)
      The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and ...
    • Independent Monetary Policies and Social Equality 
      Hallett, Andrew Hughes; Weymark, Diana N. (Vanderbilt University, 2003)
      The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and ...