Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • Thomas, Randall S.; Cox, James D. (North Carolina Law Review, 2016)
      Because representative shareholder litigation has been constrained by numerous legal developments, the corporate governance system has developed new mechanisms as alternative means to address managerial agency costs. We ...
    • Thomas, Randall S.; Schwab, Stewart J. (Washington & Lee Law Review, 2006)
      In this paper, we examine the key legal characteristics of 375 employment contracts between some of the largest 1500 public corporations and their Chief Executive Officers. We look at the actual language of these contracts, ...
    • Ricks, Morgan; Rossi, Jim (Yale Journal on Regulation, 2018)
      This foreword introduces "Revisiting the Public Utility," a series of essays published in a special issue of Yale Journal on Regulation. We cluster the contributions to this issue around public utility regulation’s core ...
    • Thomas, Randall S.; Wells, Harwell (Duke Law Journal, 2016)
      This Article explores the historical development of the academic analysis of corporate law over the past forty years through the scholarship of one of its most influential commentators, Professor James D. Cox of the Duke ...
    • Thomas, Randall S.; Thompson, Robert B. (Vanderbilt Law Review, 2004)
      Derivative suits, long the principal vehicle for discussions about representative litigation in corporate and securities law, now share the stage with younger cousins - securities fraud class actions and state law fiduciary ...
    • Thomas, Randall S.; Tricker, Patrick C. (Oklahoma Law Review, 2017)
      This paper surveys the empirical literature on shareholder voting, specifically on votes related to contested and uncontested director elections and on management proposals. While much of current theory depicts shareholder ...