| dc.description.abstract | In this dissertation, I propose a framework for evaluating a minimally adequate egalitarian theory of justice. I argue that the minimum adequacy requirements for such a theory are that the theory must be (1) clearly an account of the political concept of justice rather than some other normative concept (the Justice Requirement), (2) justified by the assumption and inference that defines egalitarianism (the Egalitarian Requirement), (3) not problematically perfectionist (the Avoiding Problematically Perfectionism Requirement), (4) able to address real world egalitarian movements (the Real World Requirement), (5) dialectically robust (the Dialectic Requirement), and (6) irreducibly relational (the Relational Requirement).
I then test five candidate accounts of what “relations of equality” entail against that framework, drawing from Samuel Scheffler, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Christian Schemmel, and Elizabeth Anderson. I find that each of these candidates falls short of at least one requirement, and so I propose an alternative account. I argue that relations of equality are present when society is structured such that no one’s participation in the socially necessary systems of cooperative production and reproduction is dependent on them giving up the capabilities that are of value to them. A society cannot function without cooperation, and so people within a society have a responsibility to contribute to that society in various ways through participation in the cooperative systems that sustain it. However, the structuring of the systems of cooperative production and reproduction must not make the development of some peoples’ capabilities parasitic on the languishing of those of others. | |
