Now showing items 1-4 of 4
Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer
(Texas Law Review, 1997)
Law and economics models of litigation settlement, based on the behavioral assumptions of rational choice theory, ignore the many psychological reasons that settlement negotiations can fail, yet they accurately predict ...
Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach
(Michigan Law Review, 1994)
The traditional economic model of settlement breakdown -- as developed by Priest and Klein -- provides an important first step in understanding why some lawsuits settle and others go to trial. Rational miscalculation ...
Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way
(The Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 1994)
When two litigants resolve a dispute through out-of-court settlement rather than trial, they realize joint gains of trade equal to the sum of the costs both parties would have incurred had they obtained a trial judgment ...
Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table
(Marquette Law Review, 2004)
In this essay, written for a symposium on The Emerging Interdisciplinary Cannon of Negotiation, we examine the role of heuristics in negotiation from two vantage points. First, we identify the way in which some common ...