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Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property
| Title: | Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property |
| Author: | Weymark, John A. |
| Abstract: | A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property, provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this article, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy-proof social choice function satisfies the tops-only property when everyone has the same set of admissible preferences. |
| Subject: |
D71
Strategy-proofness Social choice Tops-only property Option sets D82 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/24 |
| Date: | 2004-04 |
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